



**Afghanistan – Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 19 June 2015**

**Information on police in Laghman province in general regarding corruption and bribery, likelihood of a fair trial, treatment of Taliban suspects by Afghan police in general and any incidents of police in Laghman province, any incidences where Taliban suspects are just imprisoned indefinitely without trial, or “disappear”.**

**Are Taliban prevalent in this area, history/incidences of local tradesmen/workers/farmers being coerced or tricked or pressured into providing goods or money or services for Taliban and any incidents where those individuals are at risk later if considered informants by the Taliban, and what the Taliban do to those they suspect of informing.**

The most recent eligibility guidelines document published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in a section headed “The Ability of the State to Protect Civilians from Human Rights Abuses” refers to corruption in Afghanistan as follows:

“Corruption is reported to affect many parts of the state apparatus, on the national, provincial and local levels. In 2012, half of all Afghan citizens who had contact with public officials reportedly had to pay bribes to access public services. Within the police, corruption is reported to be endemic, as is the abuse of power and extortion. The justice system is similarly reported to suffer from systemic corruption.” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (6 August 2013) *UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan*, p.24)

The Executive Summary of a 2011 report published by the United Nations Development Programme states:

“There are some signs of progress in the area of corruption. The number of Afghans who perceive some or a lot of corruption within the ANP has declined by 7 points from last year, to 53 percent; these perceptions are down extremely sharply in the South West (from 63 percent to 38 percent) and in the South Central region (from 72 to 45 percent). While 53 percent is still a large number to see the police as corrupt, it’s substantially lower than views of corruption among government employees in general (79 percent) or in the court system (73 percent). In terms of personal experience, 18 percent of Afghans say they or a household member have been asked by a police officer for money or other payment in order to avoid arrest or a fine, essentially unchanged in the past year. Other police misdeeds also are reported: Seventeen percent say they or a household member were subjected to excessive physical force by an ANP member in the past year, and about as many report a false accusation of criminality. These have risen slightly, driven

by sharp increases in the West. Two in 10 also say they've been addressed by an ANP officer with insulting language. Although comparatively rare, bad experiences are memorable and negatively related to positive perceptions of the ANP." (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (December 2011) *Police Perception Survey 2011: The Afghan Perspective*, p.5)

The Introduction to the Executive Summary of a report from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) refers to the treatment of conflict-related detainees as follows:

"Since 2010, under annual mandates from the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has observed the treatment of conflict-related detainees in Afghan custody. From October 2010 to December 2012, with cooperation from Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security (NDS) and the Ministry of Interior (Mol), UNAMA interviewed 1,014 detainees held in 89 detention facilities of the NDS and the Afghan National Police (ANP), and published two reports on its findings in October 2011 and January 2013. The 2011 and 2013 reports found sufficiently credible and reliable evidence that approximately half of the conflict-related detainees interviewed had experienced torture or ill-treatment during interrogation – mainly to obtain confessions or information – in detention facilities run by the NDS and ANP. UNAMA found that torture was used systematically within several NDS and ANP facilities and noted the Government of Afghanistan's position that torture and ill-treatment of detainees was not an institutional or Government policy. The reports noted measures taken by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to address torture in Afghan custody including suspension of detainee transfers to ANP and NDS locations identified as practicing systematic torture and roll-out of a detention facility certification review process. UNAMA's two reports made 82 recommendations to relevant Government ministries and international partners. The January 2013 report highlighted that despite significant efforts by the Government and international partners throughout 2012 to address torture, it continued to be used in numerous detention facilities." (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (February 2015) *Update on the Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129*, p.16)

Referring to the prison system in Laghman province a report from the Institute for War & Peace Reporting states:

"Authorities in Laghman and Paktika provinces urged to do more to ensure basic standards are met in prison system. Prisoners in Laghman province in eastern Afghanistan face lengthy delays to their cases and suffer routine mistreatment, according to local residents." (Institute for War & Peace Reporting (8 January 2015) *Long Delays, Harsh Conditions for Afghans Awaiting Trial*)

This report also states:

"Laghman police chief Mohammad Daud Amin responded by saying suspects were initially held for 72 hours to give investigators time to collect evidence. Suspects were not beaten or forced into confessing during interrogation and were treated humanely at all times, he said. As far for conditions in

Laghman's prison, built more than 60 years ago, Amin accepted that there were some problems including a lack of space. He said work on a new jail would start next year, and added that even now, prisoners were provided with opportunities like courses in tailoring and handicrafts. Debate participant Wal Mohammad Jawed Masrur rejected Amin's claim that detainees were well-treated, saying that a friend who was currently held at the prison had told him of cases of beating and torture." (ibid)

Referring to the presence of Taliban in Laghman Province an Afghan Analysts Network article states:

"In Laghman, some people described commanders/insurgents as 'Taleban-e Pakistan' and 'Taleban-e PRT.' By the first, they mean those Taleban who routinely come in from Pakistan (and who may, in some cases, be Pakistani nationals) with money and weapons to reinforce, organise and toughen the stance of local insurgent fronts. By the second, they mean local armed groups who used to be affiliated with the insurgency or even the old Taleban regime, but have accepted the offers of the PRT in order to make economic gains and preserve their assets. Parts of Laghman province in fact feature an absence of other strong local networks occupying the security sector, as happens in other areas where there are former 'Northern Alliance' militiamen, and a paucity of ideologically-committed Taleban capable of enforcing a tough anti-government stance (the presence and efficiency of these groups tends to decrease with distance from the Pakistani border. Laghman, though an eastern province, is not on the border and seems to have a number of 'pragmatist' Taleban). There, as in other areas of the east, belonging to one of these groups can be a matter simply of choice and opportunity. Sometimes, an armed group can exist with dual loyalties at the same time. In this case, the militants are labeled *dobazgir* – 'milking-two-udders', for their ability to reap benefits from the ISAF bases and Afghan government programs as well as the Taleban leadership." (Afghan Analysts Network (18 August 2014) *Footsloggers, Turncoats and Enforcers: The fight along the eastern border*)

An article from the US military newspaper Stars and Stripes states:

"Nestled next to more famous provinces such as Kunar and Nangarhar, restive Laghman has largely been spared the major fighting that shook some areas in Afghanistan this summer. But the slow-burning insurgency that has settled in the mountain valleys here just a few hours from Kabul may provide a glimpse into Afghanistan's future, one where neither the government security forces nor the insurgent groups are able, or in some cases willing, to win decisive victories or persuade the other side to negotiate. When asked the next day whether it would be possible to visit the area the police and army had just cleared, police commander Rahm Khoda Mokhlis dismissed it as impossible. 'The Taliban have already placed [improvised bombs] all over the place again,' said Mokhlis, who leads the elite crisis response unit in Laghman province. 'When we come, they run away. As soon as we leave, the Taliban come back.'" (Stars and Stripes (15 November 2015) *Insurgents in Afghanistan's Laghman province may win by not losing*)

An International Crisis Group report, in a section titled "Taking Territory" (subsection headed "North of Kabul: Parwan, Kapisa, Laghman"), states:

“In Laghman, for instance, although Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami predominates, there are an estimated 23 small Taliban groups operating across the province. Each group commands anywhere from ten to 30 fighters, with their overall strength estimated by former commanders to be around 400 men.” (International Crisis Group (27 June 2011) *The Insurgency In Afghanistan’s Heartland*, p.18)

This section of the report also states:

“In Laghman’s Pashtun-dominated districts of Badpakh, Alishang, Dawlat Shah and in the Garouch area, the Taliban exploit tensions, focusing their recruiting efforts on tribal and political factionalism, alienation as a result of international operations, and local government rivalries. Fissures dividing prominent government officials and politicians, such as that between Hazrat Ali, re-elected to the Wolesi Jirga in 2010, and Dr. Abdullah Laghmani, NDS deputy director who was assassinated in 2009, have empowered the insurgency in Laghman. There is now widespread insecurity in mountainous areas such as Badpakh and Garouch where the Taliban are most active. Mullah Omar’s leadership council has created a well organised command structure and shadow government in Laghman, which, as of March 2011, was headed by Mullah Hazrat, head of the Taliban’s provincial military commission.” (ibid, p.19)

A report published by the Landinfo Country of Origin Information Centre, in a section titled “Government Controlled Areas” (sub-section 5.2 “Rural Areas – Pashtun Belt”), refers to risks to Afghan civilians as follows:

“To the Pashtun villager there are therefore multiple sources of risk in this conflict. The threat of IEDs is a constant one, to which we should add the threat of unexploded ordnance. He is under pressure from both sides in the conflict to collaborate with the right party; he would in most cases like to stay as aloof as possible, but it is not always possible. For economic reasons, he might be forced to collaborate with the ISAF/government side, which spend billions on projects of various kinds and extensively use contractors. For security reasons, however, he might have to collaborate with the Taliban, almost the only force to maintain a stable presence in the villages. His access not just to employment, but also to education for his children is likely to be severely hampered, or even completely denied. He might not be too concerned with civil liberties, but he is likely to have to pay illegal taxes to either Taliban or police/militias, sometimes to both: even where government control is strongest, the Taliban often manage to collect their taxes. Taliban taxation is more regulated and predictable, but still a significant burden for most villagers, who are then often asked to provide food for the fighters from time to time. Only areas thoroughly controlled by pro-government militias (Local Police and others) or in close proximity of ISAF/Afghan government bases are immune from Taliban taxation. Even if the villager is careful not to get compromised with either side, he could still end up being accused of spying for ISAF or facilitating the Taliban.” (Landinfo Country of Origin Information Centre (9 September 2011) *Afghanistan: Human Rights and Security Situation*, p.10)

A UN Human Rights Council report, in a section headed “Taliban assassinations and “night letters” (paragraph 27), states:

“The Taliban routinely resorts to assassinations to coerce and punish civilians. In 2008, 271 such executions were committed. These killings are the tip of an iceberg of intimidation, epitomized by the ‘night letters’ distributed to civilians. Some letters are displayed in public places - nailed to a mosque door, a school, or in a public market - and contain general directives or threats to the local population.” (UN Human Rights Council (6 May 2009) Report of the Special Rapporteur on *Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions*, Philip Alston : addendum : mission to Afghanistan, p.15)

See also footnote 28 in this section of the report which states:

“The East and the South see different patterns of abuse by the Taliban. In the East, night letters tend to be fairly general admonitions not to cooperate with foreigners; whereas, in the South, night letters tend to be more specific warnings that particular individuals must desist from particular activities. And, in the East, individuals labeled as collaborators are more likely to receive multiple warnings and even to be released after being detained by the Taliban, while, in the South, such individuals are more likely to be beheaded. Statistical evidence on assassinations show that they are far more common in the South and Southeast than in the East. The Taliban administers some kind of ‘judiciary’ in a few areas, but most ‘punishments’ are decided upon directly by Taliban fighters. These are only generalizations - individualized warnings, harsh intimidation, and beheadings take place in both regions with alarming frequency - but, nevertheless, these differences suggests that the proper approaches to reducing the risks war poses to the civilian population might also differ in some respects between the two regions.” (ibid, p.16)

The UNHCR eligibility guidelines referred to above, in a section titled “Potential Risk Profiles” (sub-section headed “Other Civilians Perceived as Supporting the Government or the International Community”), states:

“AGEs are reported to kill civilians deliberately to punish them for supporting the government, with the killings intended to serve as a warning to others.<sup>209</sup> AGEs are also reported to use ‘night letters’ (*shab nameha*), threatening text messages and local radio broadcasts to warn civilians against supporting the Government.<sup>210</sup> In locations where AGEs have been unable to win public support, they are reported to harass and intimidate local communities, and to mete out punishments against the local population for supporting the Government. Civilians accused of ‘spying for’ the Government are reportedly subjected to summary trials in parallel and illegal judicial procedures operated by AGEs; the punishment for such alleged ‘crimes’ is usually execution.” (UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (6 August 2013) *UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan*, p.36)

An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to a request for information on night letters, in a section headed “Purpose and Prevalence”, refers to information provided by a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in California as follows:

“According to the Professor, night letters are a ‘primary method of Taliban communication’ to rural populations in Afghanistan, as well as in urban areas, to express the group's ‘desires and demands’. The Professor also indicated that night letters ‘often threaten violence or death if demands are not met’ and

may also 'advise' the audience (which can include an entire district, village, or community leaders) about forthcoming attacks or about expectations of conduct and behaviour . In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an independent analyst on Afghanistan explained that the intention of a night letter is usually to 'spread fear' and that the purpose of the messages is 'generally to threaten or to encourage compliance with Taliban instructions, often to ensure the local populace do not engage in any way with the Afghan government or international community'." (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (10 February 2015) *AFG105047.E – Afghanistan: Night letters [Shab Nameha, Shabnamah, Shabnameh], including appearance (2010-2015)*)

In a section headed "Targets and Recipients" this report states:

"The Professor explained that the primary 'target audience' for Taliban night letters is the 'local population,' specifically the population in Pashtun-dominated provinces of southern and eastern Afghanistan, regions that have traditionally been the support base of the Taliban. According to the independent analyst, the targets of night letters are generally 'specific individuals believed by the Taliban to be transgressing Taliban rules or instructions, or more generally to local community groups, such as a small village'. He explained that targets include people that could be perceived as 'low-level' targets, such as 'officials, women, teachers, junior employees working with international organizations,' among others." (ibid)

See also International Crisis Group report which states:

"Female teachers and civil servants often receive shabnamah (night letters), at times bearing the seal of the area's shadow Taliban governor, warning them to leave their jobs. Other working women face similar threats. Many have been killed. On 10 December 2012, the acting head of the women's affairs department in Laghman province in the east was assassinated, six months after her predecessor was killed in an attack attributed to the Taliban." (International Crisis Group (14 October 2013) *Women and Conflict in Afghanistan*, pp.21-22)

An Agence France Presse report on a suicide attack in Laghman province in January 2015 states:

"At least nine people were killed Thursday when a suicide bomber detonated himself at a funeral for the victims of a roadside bomb attack in eastern Afghanistan, provincial officials said. 'A suicide attacker detonated himself when he was identified by the police,' said Khawani, the deputy security chief of eastern Laghman province where the attack took place, who goes by one name. 'Nine people were killed -- five police and four civilians -- as a result of the attack,' he told AFP, adding that 34 people were also wounded by the bomb. Earlier a local official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said at least eight people were killed in the attack in the city of Mehtarlam. Laghman governor spokesman Sarhadi Zwak placed the death toll at 16, with another 39 wounded. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack but suicide bombings are a hallmark of the Taliban's war against foreign and Afghan security forces, now in its fourteenth year." (Agence France Presse (29 January 2015) *Suicide attack on Afghanistan funeral kills at least 9: officials*)

An Agence France Presse report on the death of civilians in Laghman Province in April 2015 states:

“At least five members of a family have been killed after an insurgent mortar hit their house in eastern Afghanistan, Afghan provincial authorities said Saturday. ‘Five Afghan civilians, four women and a man were killed in an enemy mortar attack in Alingar district of Laghman province late Friday evening,’ provincial police chief, Daud Amin, told AFP. Amin said eleven other members of the family were wounded in the mortar attack. Laghman provincial governor spokesman, Sarhadi Zwak, confirmed the mortar attack and gave the same death toll.” (Agence France Presse (25 April 2015) *Insurgent mortar attack kills five in Afghanistan: officials*)

The version of events described in the above AFP report is contradicted by a recent UN General Assembly report which, in a section headed “Human rights” (paragraph 32), states:

“Civilian casualties attributed to pro-Government forces included an incident on 24 April in Alingar District, Laghman Province, in which a mortar round fired by the Afghan National Army impacted a civilian residence, killing seven civilians and injuring eight. The national army reported that they had fired the mortar following an attack against an army check post.” (UN General Assembly (10 June 2015) *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, p.8)

A report published by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), in a section headed “Spies” (section 2.3), refers to the treatment by the Taliban of persons suspected of spying for the government as follows:

“Thomas Coghlan explained that spying on behalf of the government is widespread among the population. People use mobile phones to inform the IMF and Afghan Government about Taliban movements: the Taliban were paranoid about this. A commander interviewed in Lashkar Gah in 2008 explained how they executed two spies by shooting them in the head with 16 bullets each. Another anecdote from his side was about the wife of a spy who alerted them that her husband had a machine for contacting foreigners: he was also killed by the Taliban. The commander explained that the British gave coats with mirrors sewn into them to their spies. The spies also drop a tiny piece of metal on the roof of houses: this gives a signal to pilots so they can bomb it. The Taliban maintained secret networks in villages in order to identify potential spies. A Senator from Garmser explained in an interview in 2008 that the Taliban had an internal security institute called ‘The Commission’, which had been beheading those accused of spying. This was also the case for Zabul. Martine van Bijlert referred to cases in which Taliban judges pronounced death sentences for alleged spies in Dehrawud (Uruzgan). Christophe Reuter and Borhan Younus explained that, in Ghazni, the fear of the accusation of spying contributed to the popular support of the Taliban. One could easily be called a spy, for example if one treated the Taliban in an unfriendly or strange way. In 2010, a 7-year-old boy was hanged in the district of Sangin (Helmand) by the Taliban because his family resisted the insurgents in their area. The father and grandfather of the boy were tired of the intimidation and the violence attracted by the insurgents. They demanded that the insurgents stop using village compounds to stage ambushes and they refused to sell machine guns to the Taliban fighters: both

men had been denounced by the Taliban as spies for the US or the IMF.” (European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (December 2012) *Afghanistan: Insurgent strategies — intimidation and targeted violence against Afghans*, pp.72-73)

See also report from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) which, in a section headed “Beheadings of civilians for “spying for the Government”, states:

“Of the 1,114 civilian casualties from targeted killings and killings where the victim was in the custody of the perpetrators, UNAMA documented 12 incidents in which Anti- Government Elements beheaded 17 civilians.<sup>129</sup> In all but one incident where the motive could not be ascertained, Anti- Government Elements had abducted and beheaded 16 civilians, accusing them of spying for the Government or punishing them for supporting Afghan national security forces. In nine of the 12 beheading incidents, local residents and authorities attributed responsibility to the Taliban, one incident to Tahrir Taliban Pakistan and the remaining two incidents to other Anti-Government Elements.” (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (February 2015) *Afghanistan: Annual Report 2014 – Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, p.56)

This response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research and Information Unit within time constraints. This response is not and does not purport to be conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please read in full all documents referred to.

### References:

Afghan Analysts Network (18 August 2014) *Footsloggers, Turncoats and Enforcers: The fight along the eastern border*  
<https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/footsloggers-turncoats-and-enforcers-the-fight-along-the-eastern-border/>  
(Accessed 18 June 2015)

Agence France Presse (25 April 2015) *Insurgent mortar attack kills five in Afghanistan: officials*  
<http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/insurgent-mortar-attack-kills-five-afghanistan-officials>  
(Accessed 17 June 2015)

Agence France Presse (29 January 2015) *Suicide attack on Afghanistan funeral kills at least 9: officials*  
<http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/suicide-attack-afghanistan-funeral-kills-least-9-officials>  
(Accessed 18 June 2015)

European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (December 2012) *Afghanistan: Insurgent strategies — intimidation and targeted violence against Afghans*  
[https://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/192143\\_2012\\_5967\\_EASO\\_Afghanistan\\_II.pdf](https://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/192143_2012_5967_EASO_Afghanistan_II.pdf)

(Accessed 17 June 2015)

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (10 February 2015) *AFG105047.E – Afghanistan: Night letters [Shab Nameha, Shabnamah, Shabnameh], including appearance (2010-2015)*

<http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/ResRec/RirRdi/Pages/index.aspx?doc=455723&pls=1>

(Accessed 17 June 2015)

International Crisis Group (14 October 2013) *Women and Conflict in Afghanistan*

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/252-women-and-conflict-in-afghanistan.pdf>

(Accessed 17 June 2015)

International Crisis Group (27 June 2011) *The Insurgency In Afghanistan's Heartland*

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207%20The%20Insurgency%20in%20Afghanistans%20Heartland.pdf>

(Accessed 17 June 2015)

Institute for War & Peace Reporting (8 January 2015) *Long Delays, Harsh Conditions for Afghans Awaiting Trial*

<https://iwpr.net/global-voices/long-delays-harsh-conditions-afghans-awaiting-trial>

(Accessed 17 June 2015)

Landinfo Country of Origin Information Centre (9 September 2011) *Afghanistan: Human Rights and Security Situation*

[http://www.landinfo.no/asset/1745/1/1745\\_1.pdf](http://www.landinfo.no/asset/1745/1/1745_1.pdf)

(Accessed 17 June 2015)

Stars and Stripes (15 November 2015) *Insurgents in Afghanistan's Laghman province may win by not losing*

<http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/insurgents-in-afghanistan-s-laghman-province-may-win-by-not-losing-1.314358>

(Accessed 18 June 2015)

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (February 2015) *Update on the Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129*

[http://www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1226\\_1424867984\\_unama-ohchr-detention-report-feb2015.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1424867984_unama-ohchr-detention-report-feb2015.pdf)

(Accessed 18 June 2015)

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (February 2015)

*Afghanistan: Annual Report 2014 – Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/54e44e274.html>

(Accessed 18 June 2015)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (December 2011) *Police Perception Survey 2011: The Afghan Perspective*

[http://www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/2016\\_1332749155\\_pps-eng-version-2011-final-lowest-res.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/2016_1332749155_pps-eng-version-2011-final-lowest-res.pdf)

(Accessed 19 June 2015)

United Nations General Assembly (10 June 2015) *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*

[http://www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1226\\_1434530263\\_n1516911.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1434530263_n1516911.pdf)

(Accessed 18 June 2015)

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (6 August 2013) *UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan*

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/51ffdca34.html>

(Accessed 17 June 2015)

United Nations Human Rights Council (6 May 2009) *Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston : addendum : mission to Afghanistan*

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a1cfb632.html>

(Accessed 17 June 2015)

#### **Sources Consulted:**

Afghan Analysts Network

Electronic Immigration Network

European Asylum Support Office

Google

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

International Crisis Group

Landinfo

Lexis Nexis

Refugee Documentation Centre Query Database

UK Home Office

UNHCR Refworld