Narrative Report

Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon: Wave II

January 2018
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Beirut, Lebanon

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Executive Summary

This report presents an analysis of data from the Second Wave of the UNDP Regular Perceptions Survey on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon. Funded by the Government of the Netherlands, it focuses both on changes in public opinion over a three-month period from May to August 2017, and on developing a geographically-specific understanding of the structural, evolving and proximate drivers of tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities. The findings presented here are representative to the district-level of the total adult Syrian and Lebanese populations in Lebanon, providing a comprehensive evidence base for partners to understand the evolution of tensions. This section provides a short overview of the report’s key findings.1

As the Syrian crisis enters its seventh year, host community fatigue with the protracted presence of Syrian refugees remains prevalent. A significant plurality (49%) reported that inter-communal relations have deteriorated since 2014, while 37% stated that relations had stayed the same. When examining changes over the last three months, 40% of Lebanese respondents reported that relations with Syrians worsened. At the same time, inter-communal relations remain stable with only 12% of Lebanese characterising these relations as ‘very negative’, and 91% of both populations affirming that the Lebanese people have been good hosts to Syrian refugees, while no major incidents of inter-communal violence were reported. Moreover, changes in tensions were largely only incremental; an expected finding, given the fact that perceptions generally evolve only slowly over time.

However, under this overarching narrative of relative stability and only incremental changes in perceptions, lies significant variation by geography. For instance, notable improvements between communities in areas such as Tripoli–where only 2% reported that relations were ‘very negative’–stand in sharp

1With the combined first and second wave samples, together including over ten thousand interviews, these survey results are representative of and generalizable to the total adult Lebanese and Syrian population resident in Lebanon, with a margin of error of less than ± 5% within most of the country’s twenty-six districts and a margin of error of less than ± 2% nationally.
contrast to perceptions in relatively nearby areas such as Bcharre—where a concerning 83% came to that judgement. Equally, in Mount Lebanon, negative perceptions in Baabda were widespread (78%), while in the nearby Chouf, relations were much less tense (19%).

**Competition for lower-skilled jobs remained the primary source of tension (64%),** especially in areas with the highest concentration of refugees, such as in Bekaa (92%). Yet, the data also revealed that there was limited overlap between the sectors in which the two communities work, as 75% of Syrians indicated that they work in construction and agriculture compared to only 15% of Lebanese. Notwithstanding the primacy of competition over lower-skilled work as the most significant driver of tensions, **competition for services and utilities as a driver increased by 11 percentage points during the reporting period,** with particularly high figures in Beirut (58%), and Mount Lebanon (43%) for this metric. Notably, in certain areas such as Zgharta (61%), Matn (56%), and Bcharre and Batroun (50%), respondents were more likely to state that tensions were caused by differences in culture.

Perceptions of refugee population pressures were not found to be only dependent upon personal experience or direct interactions with refugees. **Rather, these perceptions were more significantly dependent upon historic and structural factors.** For example, Lebanese who agreed with statements such as, ‘memories of the Syrian army occupation still impair relationships with Syrians’ were also significantly more likely to consider refugee population pressures as mounting, irrespective of their personal experiences with refugees. This finding carries implications for conflict and development partners that seek to reduce inter-communal tensions through addressing historical grievances between Syrians and Lebanese communities.

Nevertheless, echoing a finding from the first wave of this research, the data also demonstrates that social forces do play at least some role in determining the quality of relations between refugees and host communities. For instance, **greater interaction between Syrians and Lebanese was associated with lower tensions and less concern over refugee population pressures.** Given this finding, it was concerning to find that **segregation has entrenched in areas hosting the most refugees.** In Akkar, the proportion of people reporting to never interact with members of the other community rose from 22% to 55% during this reporting period. The proportion on this indicator remained high in central Bekaa (37%), Rashaya (77%), and West Bekaa (68%). This finding is concerning, given the aforementioned finding that links perceptions with levels of interactions. At the same time, the findings demonstrate that
NGOs and the UN could play a key role in mitigating tensions in this regard as 52% reported that their interactions with other communities are at sites or events organised by these actors.

**While perceptions of safety in communities generally remained high, both Lebanese and Syrian respondents demonstrated an increased propensity to violence** over the reporting period. Those agreeing with the statement ‘Violence is sometimes necessary when your interests are being threatened’ rose from 53% to 64%, as Nabatiyeh (82%) and Zgharta (78%) stood out as areas where this propensity was particularly high. Peoples’ willingness to contemplate violence to defend their interests also increased in the South by 24 percentage points, and in Akkar by 21 percentage points.

**Assistance is increasingly seen as unfair by Lebanese communities,** as 85% feel that vulnerable Lebanese have been neglected by international assistance. The proportion of people who agreed that assistance went to the people who most deserved it decreased from almost half of the respondents to a third during the reporting period. This deterioration was observed most clearly amongst vulnerable Lebanese households, as households with a combined monthly income of less than 1,000,000 L.L. were less likely to regard assistance as fair, as were those residing in households that were multi-dimensionally more-vulnerable. In addition, notably, those who were more satisfied with the quality of services in their area were also more likely to regard international assistance as fair. Finally, in areas where there were more Syrian refugees per capita, the public also generally had more positive perceptions of the impact of assistance.

**Areas included in the ‘251 most vulnerable cadasters map’ meaningfully differed from other areas, as they were poorer, less safe, somewhat tenser and had poorer basic service delivery.** The survey data demonstrated that the categorisation of cadastres by vulnerability-level adequately accounted, not only for the fraction of Syrian refugees in a given area, but also for Lebanese vulnerability. Lebanese were at least as likely as Syrian refugees to live in vulnerable-designated cadastres. Both Syrian and Lebanese households in these areas were more likely to be vulnerable as measured by multiple metrics. Respondents in these areas were more likely to have incomes of less than 1,000,000 LL monthly and to contend with food insecurity, fuel insecurity and medical insecurity. They were also significantly less likely to be satisfied with basic service delivery in their areas and were nearly half as likely to rate their neighbourhood as ‘safe’ than people residing in non-vulnerable areas. Moreover, Lebanese perceptions of refugee population pressures and prejudice
against Syrian refugees were also marginally higher in these areas. However, these negative attitudes were, to some extent, counterbalanced by greater solidarity as well as more confidence in their community’s ability to work together—including with Syrian refugees—to solve social problems.

Overall, the key takeaway is that a tense status quo remains as an uneasy stability between the two population groups persists. Despite this, a high level of geographical variation exists, and a number of new considerations for conflict and development actors that seek to address relations between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities have emerged.
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1. Introduction

The primary objectives of this report for Wave II of the Regular Perceptions Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon is to extend the analysis provided in the report for the first wave of the surveys, by focusing specifically on governorate and district-level variation, as well as by identifying significant changes over the three-month period between Wave I and Wave II of the surveys. Four waves of surveying are scheduled to be conducted over the 2017-2018 period; the report is for the second wave. The analysis of the data from the first wave sought to validate the Stabilisation Monitoring Framework (SMF) (see Fig. 1.1). In short, this initial research found evidence of clear linkages between the structure, proximate and evolving causes of tension and the report of ‘trigger’ events or exposure to the negative effects of inter-communal tensions. Rather than seek to expand upon this initial analysis, the analysis in this report highlights key geographic trends, recognising that conflict dynamics or inter-communal tensions may vary across Lebanon on the basis of a number of current and historical factors, with the intent to provide local partners and decision-makers with results and analysis disaggregated at a ‘local-enough’ level to inform stabilisation and relief programme design and implementation.

Even for a country, relatively limited in size with an area of approximately 10,452 square km, disaggregation with the district (qada) as the unit of analysis requires a rather large sample size. For the survey question items, with the more than 10,000 interviews conducted to date, over the first two waves of surveying, estimates with a margin of error of less than 5% were obtained within most districts, though in some instances, it was necessary to combine two or more contiguous districts in the analysis to ensure that results were comparable with similar margins of error. As is described more fully in the following section of this report, the surveys were designed in such a way as to intentionally oversample areas with greater assumed refugee population pressure. That is, sampling was conducted on the basis of both population size and levels of vulnerability. This helped ensure that sufficient data was collected in areas
that—while potentially less populous—were also amongst those areas most likely to contend with the social, economic and other pressures of hosting a larger fraction of the Syrian refugees currently resident in Lebanon.

The surveys collected data from both Lebanese and Syrian refugee respondents; however, the primary objective of the surveys are to identify variation in Lebanese host community attitudes toward Syrian refugees, in order to identify factors that may mediate or moderate tensions between these Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees in these host communities. Thus, the focus of this reporting is on Lebanese attitudes, though sufficient effort has been made to compare and contrast Lebanese and Syrian attitudes and experiences, where this is relevant and where the subsample of Syrian respondents was sufficiently large to make these comparisons robustly. In order to more fully understand refugee and host-community dynamics, this report should be read in conjunction with other current research conducted specifically with Syrian refugees in the country, for example, the multiple waves of the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR) surveys.

This report of results from the Wave II of the Regular Perceptions Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon proceeds with a brief summary of sampling methods and the survey protocol. This is followed by a description of results, which has been organised to reflect the ‘descending’ causes of tension or conflict given in the SMF. The description of results begins with an enumeration of ‘trigger events’, including personal and household reports of assault, exposure to violence and other forms of victimisation. This is followed by a summary of the evolving and proximate causes of tension, and finally the structural causes of tension. The report concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of the research for the design and implementation of stabilisation programming.

This report is organized thematically, on the basis of the SMF. For readers with a narrower interest in conflict dynamics in specific areas or geographies, significant developments or changes in experiences or public opinion within thematic areas are summarised in this report. However, brief ‘fact sheets’ for each governorate have also been appended to this report, summarising key findings in specific geographies. These fact sheets provide a quick ‘snapshot’ of current and evolving conditions in each area.
Figure 1.1: Stabilisation Monitoring Framework (SMF)

- **Trigger**

- **Proximate**
  - Sense of security and inter-group relations
    - Inter-community contact
    - Sense of safety and security
    - Concern over prolonged presence of refugees
    - Quality of relations between communities and level of prejudice
    - Propensity for collective action

- **Evolving**
  - Trust in institutions & local community
  - Refugee population pressure
    - (Vulnerability Map)
  - Basic needs and livelihoods
    - (Change in Socio-economic status and Access to services)
  - Capability and fairness of service provision and international assistance

- **Structural**
  - Tension and resilience landscape
    - (history of conflict, pre-disposition to accept refugees)

**Escalation of violence**
2. Sampling Methods and Protocol

Given the research objectives of the survey and with the sample size of 5,000 interviews per wave, there was adequate statistical power to assess meaningful differences in outcomes with precision at the governorate (muhafaza) level, as well as differences across levels of vulnerability indicated in the ‘Most Vulnerable Localities in Lebanon’ map. A complex sample design was required to optimise the efficiency of the sample across the two dimensions of (a) district geographies and (b) vulnerability-level geographies, while at the same time (c) minimising the margin of error for total-sample statistics. The survey was implemented with a multistage stratified cluster design.

In the first stage of selection, the sample was stratified across districts, with a formula including a vulnerability weight. Approximately 40% of the sample was allocated on the basis of the vulnerability weight, and the remaining 60% of the sample was allocated across districts proportional to population size. In other words, interviews were allocated on the basis of population size, but this allocation was then adjusted to over-sample more vulnerable areas. Thus, all districts were included in the sample, but relatively fewer interviews were allocated to districts like Jbeil, Kesrouan, Bcharre and Batroun, which had fewer vulnerable Lebanese and fewer Syrian refugees per capita.

Table 2.1: Number of surveys conducted by wave and district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Wave I</th>
<th>Wave II</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akkar</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baalbek</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermel</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashaya</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Beqaa</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahle</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aley</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on next page
In the second stage of selection, cadasters within district strata were sampled probability proportionate to population size (PPS) with replacement. No additional steps were taken to oversample more vulnerable cadasters. A post-stratification weight for district size was required for the estimate of total-sample statistics and estimates across vulnerability-levels. Because the second stage sample was taken with PPS methods, no sampling weight was required for within-district estimates.

In the third stage of selection, for the allocation of clusters, a number of random GPS coordinates were generated equal to the number of clusters allocated to each cadaster, and this coordinate indicated the starting point for household selection. Enumerators began with the residential building closest to the random GPS coordinate and conducted an interview with a random adult in this building. Using a random number table, the enumerators then walked in a random direction, skipping a random number of homes, and then conducted the next interview in the next home. This proceeded until six interviews per cluster

**Table 2.1:** Number of surveys conducted by wave and district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Wave I</th>
<th>Wave II</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chouf</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jbeil</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keserwan</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matn</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batroun</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bsharri</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koura</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miniyeh-Danniyeh</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zgharta</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bint Jbeil</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasbaya</td>
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<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marjeyoun</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>169</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nabatiyeh</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidon</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jezzine</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4,997</td>
<td>5,034</td>
<td>10,031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
were completed. In the event of refusal, households were substituted within clusters, but individuals were not substituted within households.

Regarding the selection of primary respondents, in the fourth stage of selection, the enumerators alternated between selecting the adult male householder who celebrated his birthday most recently and the adult female householder who celebrated her birthday most recently. Up to three attempts were made to contact the selected respondent if the respondent was not at home at the time of the visit. If after three attempts the respondent could not be contacted, the household was substituted within the cluster.

2.1. Syrian Subsample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section Key Findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 84.0% of Syrian refugees entered the country prior to 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 66.3% of Syrian respondents registered with UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 19.6% of respondents reported that no members of the household had valid permits.</td>
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</table>

While this was not one of this study’s primary research objectives, given the policy-implications of this, some effort was made, on the basis of the survey results, to estimate the fraction of the resident population of Lebanon comprised of Syrian refugees. This effort was made more complicated by some methodological challenges or limitations. First and foremost, there was no reliable information on the size or distribution of either the Lebanese or Syrian resident-population in Lebanon. Lebanon has not conducted an official census since 1932, and most estimates of the distribution of the Lebanese population are based on a 1994 survey of buildings conducted by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Likewise, concerning the size of the Syrian refugee population, numbers registered with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) are known to differ from the actual size of the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon, given restrictions on the registration of refugees imposed by the Government of Lebanon. Additionally, UNHCR considers only those Syrians who established permanent residence in Lebanon post-2011 as refugees. Thus, while one may estimate the fraction of Syrian citizens in a survey sample, with no reliable benchmark for true population sizes, generalizable estimates of the size of the Syrian population in Lebanon may
not be precise; however, given the lack of other reliable estimates, even less-precise estimates may have significant implications for policy or programming.

Over the two waves, 8,269 respondents identified as Lebanese, 1,590 as Syrian, 23 as both Lebanese and Syrian, 123 as Palestinian refugee from Lebanon, 26 as Palestinian refugee from Syria, and 18 as other nationality.

Of Syrian respondents, 16.1% entered the country prior to 2011, 16.6% during 2011, 51.2% between 2012 and 2014 and 16.0% during 2015 or after. Male respondents (19.8%) were more likely to have moved to Lebanon prior to the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, compared to female respondents (11.4%), whereas female respondents were more likely to have entered the country between 2013 and 2014 (38.6% relative to 27.8%). These numbers correlate with the Government of Lebanon’s (GoL) policies on Syrian refugees, with 84.0% of Syrian refugees entering the country prior to 2015, when the government’s October 2014 Policy Paper and subsequent General Security Office (GSO) directives began to restrict the entry of Syrian nationals into the country.¹

Syrian respondents were also asked whether they were registered with UNHCR, to which 66.3% of respondents reported they were. Female respondents were slightly more likely to state this (68.3%) compared to male respondents (64.9%). Slightly less than half (48.1%) of Syrian respondents reported that ‘the entire household moved from Syria to Lebanon together’, a further 36.1% expressed that ‘one householder moved to Lebanon and was later joined by other householders’, and 15.8% noted that ‘no other householders have moved from Syria’. Male respondents (21.4%) were more likely to state that ‘no other householders have moved from Syria’, while only 8.5% of female respondents did so.

Over half (61.1%) of respondents reported that the male head of household had a valid residency permit in Lebanon, 29.6% of female heads of households had valid permits, 22.8% of respondents reported that more than one child had residency valid permits, while 5.8% reported that only the eldest child had such a permit. Furthermore, 19.6% of respondents stated that no members of the household had valid permits. Respondents in non-vulnerable cadastres (23.2%) were more likely to report that no householders had valid permits, compared to 17.4% of those in vulnerable cadastres.

3. Trigger and Conflict Events

Trigger events are incidents that escalate tensions when many proximate, evolving and structural drivers of conflict culminate. Exposure to trigger events should be assumed to be highly time-sensitive, and even with frequent surveying at three-month intervals, the prevalence of trigger events may not be precisely estimated. Measuring trigger events was not identified by UNDP as a survey priority. Nevertheless, some personal and household exposure to violent conflict and other forms of victimisation was assessed in this survey, in order to obtain the data required for better understanding the relationships between the varying levels of conflict causes.

3.1. Exposure to Armed Violence

**Section Key Findings**

- 31.7% of respondents in the governorate of Baalbek-Hermel reported personally witnessing armed violence in their area, compared to 14.9% of respondents in the first wave.
- In Beirut, 27.2% of respondents personally witnessed a physical or verbal confrontation in their area, down from 35.4% during the first wave.

Respondents were asked, ‘In the last three months, have you personally witnessed armed violence, for example, with a knife, gun or explosives in your area?’ In the second wave 11.4% of respondents stated that they had, compared to 14.0% who said the same during the first wave. This decreased rate of exposure to armed violence was observed in both vulnerable (14.9% down from 18.0%) and non-vulnerable cadastres (6.2% compared to 8.0% in the first wave).
During the second wave, 10.9% of Lebanese respondents witnessed acts of armed violence compared to 13.8% during the first. Compared to the first wave, a noticeable increase in the percentage of respondents who witnessed such acts was seen in Baalbek-Hermel, with 31.7% reporting exposure to armed violence, compared to 14.9% of respondents in the first wave. This was likely due to the operations that took place in Arsal and Qusayr. A similar increase was apparent in Western Beqaa, where and increase from 3.8% to 11.0% of respondents reporting exposure to armed violence was observed. However, in other governorates, the percentage of such reported incidents decreased, particularly in Mount Lebanon, Nabatiye, and the North. Meanwhile, the fraction of Syrians reporting exposure to armed violence remained about constant across both waves, at around 13.0%.

Over districts, respondents in Sidon and Jezzine (42.6%), Baabda (29.4%), and Baalbek and Hermel (23.2%) were amongst the most likely to report exposure to armed violence, compared to those in Chouf (2.9%), Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (2.5%), and Rashaya and West Bekaa (1.2%), where rates of exposure were the lowest.

Respondents were also asked, ‘In the last three months, have you personally witnessed a physical or verbal confrontation in your area?’ On average, there was a slight increase in the percentage of respondents reporting physical or verbal confrontation in second wave, with the rate of exposure increasing from 21.3% to 23.7%. This was driven largely by an increase in the percentage of Syrian respondents who witnessed such actions, up to 29.1% from 20.6%. Compared to vulnerable cadastres, respondents in non-vulnerable cadastres reported 4.6 percentage point increase in the rate of witnessing such transgressions, with this fraction reaching 17.9%; whereas, 27.5% of respondents in vulnerable cadastres reported the same during the second wave, up from 26.6% during the first.

With the exception of Beirut (27.2%, down from 35.4%) and Mount Lebanon (21.9%, down from 28.6%) which saw a decrease in the percentage of respondents who reported witnessing verbal and physical violence between both waves, the remaining six governorates saw an increase in this rate of exposure, particularly in the Beqaa (32.9 percentage point increase from the first wave), the South (14.0 percentage point increase), and Baalbek-Hermel (11.0 percentage point increase).

Across districts, Baabda recorded the highest percentage of respondents who witnessed verbal and physical violence (49.9%), followed by Sidon and Jezzine (39.1%) and Zahle (32.0%); whereas, in Tripoli (9.1%), Miniyeh-Danniyeh
Figure 3.1: Witnessing verbal or physical confrontation by district.

"In the last three months, have you personally witnessed a physical or verbal confrontation in your area?" by district, combined waves.
(7.7%), and Akkar (3.1%), respondents reported the lowest rates of witnessing physical or verbal confrontation.

These findings are in line with Lebanon Support's ‘Geo-located Mapping of Conflicts in Lebanon’.\(^1\) During the period from 1 January to 25 September 2017, 38 armed conflicts events were reported in Sidon, with the majority of those occurring in the ‘Ayn el-Hilweh camp. While the Palestinian refugee camps were not included in the sample, given the high degree social interaction between the Palestinian and Lebanese communities in and around ‘Ayn el-Hilweh, it was expected that the events in ‘Ayn el-Hilweh would influence perceptions of safety and security in surrounding areas. Furthermore, on 2 July 2017, clashes broke out between electricity generator owners in Sidon, another example of a conflict ‘trigger’.\(^2\) Lebanon Support’s Conflictivity Index further showed that during the first half of 2017, Baalbeck, Hermel, and Baabda were at the centre of several armed conflicts, while Zgharta, Batroun, and Bsharri experienced no armed conflicts on the same scale.\(^3\)

### 3.2. Experience of Assault and Other Victimisation

**Section Key Findings**

- In the Bekaa governorat, 17.9% of respondents reported verbal harassment compared to 2.4% during the first wave.
- 67.8% of those surveyed reported no victimisation, compared to 72.6% during the first wave.
- 32.0% of household who experienced an assault during the second wave said they notified the authorities, compared to 24.1%.

In both waves, participants were asked if they or their family members had experienced one or more of a number of forms of victimisation. Between both

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\(^3\)http://civilsociety-centre.org/cap/ci/armed_conflict
waves, the overall report of any form of victimisation increased somewhat. In results from the second wave, 67.8% of households reported no victimisation, compared to 72.6% during the first wave, meaning that there was an overall increase in household exposure of 4.8 percentage points. This increase in exposure to assault and other forms of victimisation also corresponded to a 4.5 percentage point increase in reports of verbal harassment.

Across governorates in the second wave of surveying, rates of exposure remained stable relative to the first wave, with the exception of the Beqaa, the North and Nabatiye governorates, where there was an increase in reports of victimisation. By far, the greatest observed increase in household exposure to any form of victimisation was in the Beqaa, with nearly half (49.1%) of households reporting some form of victimisation. Reports of verbal harassment also increased to 17.9% in the second wave, relative to 2.4% in the first wave. Also in the Beqaa governorate, 13.0% of households reported incidents of theft or robbery, and 13.5% reported exposure to community violence/disputes.

In the governorate of the North, verbal harassment was where the needle moved the most, with a jump of 7.5 percentage points, along with reports of assault or physical harassment doubling to reach 3.4% in the second wave. In Nabatiye, the percentage of households reporting assault or physical harassment increased from 2.9% to 5.0%.

The district of Tyre saw the lowest rates of victimisation, with 92.1% of respondents reporting having not experienced any form of victimisation over the two waves. Following the lowest reports in Tyre, most households also reported no form of victimisation in the districts of Akkar (86.6%) and Rashaya and West Bekaa (83.5%). However, the rate of exposure to any form of victimisation was relatively higher, with lower reports of not experiencing any form of victimisation, in the districts of Baalbek and Hermel (62.9%), Baabda (49.9%), and Sidon and Jezzine (44.5%). In Sidon and Jezzine, 24.7% of respondents also reported exposure to verbal harassment, the highest rate in across all districts.

Additionally, while reports of all forms of victimisation were collected from both Lebanese and Syrian respondents, reports of confiscated IDs, fines and raids each increased significantly for Syrian respondents only. The rate of these forms of victimisation rose to around two per cent over the two waves of surveying. Though still a relatively small fraction, Syrians were much more likely to have been exposed to these sorts of victimisation. The percentage of Syrian respondents who reported being victims of raids (2.6%) or detentions (1.5%) both doubled between the first and second waves. For Syrian households, these reports were highest in the Beqaa. This greater report of victimisation
**Figure 3.2:** Rates of assault and other forms of victimisation by wave and governorate.

'I'm going to read you a short list of experiences either you or a member of your family have experienced each of the following in the last three months? by governorate.'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Wave I</th>
<th>Wave II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>Fine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confiscated ID Paper</td>
<td>Detention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Deposits between children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits between children</td>
<td>Sexual assault/harassment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual assault/harassment</td>
<td>Employer deducting salary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer deducting salary</td>
<td>Displacement/dislocations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacement/dislocations</td>
<td>Community violence/disputes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community violence/disputes</td>
<td>Theft/robbery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft/robbery</td>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>Extortion/Beats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion/Beats</td>
<td>Physical harassment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical harassment</td>
<td>Verbal harassment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Area     | Baitar-Herma | Beirut | Beqaa | Mount Lebanon | North | Nabatieh | South |

Wave: Wave I, Wave II
amongst Syrian households in the Beqaa was most likely due to the military operations in the Beqaa, where Syrians were more likely to interact with government security agencies or Hezbollah.

After respondents were asked about their exposure to these forms of victimisation, the respondent was then asked if they or any other member of their household did anything as a result of the one more incidents of assault or other forms of victimisation. Respondents were also given the option to report that they ‘did nothing’ as a result. Where respondents reported that they did not take in action, this most likely indicated a restricted or more limited perception of their access to justice or dispute resolution mechanisms. Where statistics are given in this report of the percentage of households taking any action (including no action) these percentages are of the households reporting any form of victimisation, rather than for the total sample.

Relative to the first wave, results from the second wave indicated a ten percentage point increase amongst Syrian households of any report of victimisation. The percentage of Syrian respondents who experienced verbal harassment climbed to 27.8% from 20.3%. While Lebanese reports of verbal harassment also increased over this period, the change in exposure to verbal harassment for Lebanese (3.2 percentage points) was significantly lesser than for Syrian respondents (7.5 percentage points).

Of those households reporting any form of victimisation, 33.7% did not seek help from any institution or person, a slight drop from the 34.0% who reported the same during the first wave. However, 32.0% in the second wave said they notified the authorities, compared to 24.1% in the first wave. Across governorates, households in Akkar were least likely to ‘do anything’ following an incident of victimisation. In Akkar, 63.0% of households reported not taking any action following an incident, representing a 25.5 percentage point increase over the two waves of surveying. This was matched by 8.8 percentage point decrease of households in Akkar who said they reported the incident to the authorities. Likewise in Nabatiyeh, reports of taking steps to resolve or address incidents of victimisation were lesser, where 29.6% of households said they did not taking any action in the first wave, and 45.4% said they did not take any action in the second wave. In the North, 17.3% of respondents reported incidents to the authorities during the second wave, compared to 44.2% of households during the first wave. In the North, households were more likely to rely on more informal means of dispute resolution, with a decline in the number of households stating that they reported incidents to authorities matched by an increase in the number of households stating that they resolved an incident.
Figure 3.3: Of those experiencing assault or victimisation, reported means of help-seeking and redress, by nationality and wave.

'And when this (assault) happened, did you or someone in your family do anything about it? What did they do?' by nationality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lebanese</th>
<th>Syrian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notified NGO or UN Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited movement afterwards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confronted offender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolved through family or friends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported to shawish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported to employer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported to landlord</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notified authorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved / changed residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wave ○ Wave I ● Wave II
‘through friends or family’ (24.2%), a 17.8 percentage point increase in reports of reliance on this informal means of dispute resolution in the governorate. However, the opposite trend was observed in Beirut, with a 34.4 percentage point increase in report of notifying authorities and a 27.5 percentage decrease in those turning to friends or family for assistance.

Across districts and across both waves, 78.8% of respondents in Miniyeh-Danniyeh who were victimised said they did nothing as a result, followed by similarly high reports of not taking any action in Tripoli (59.7%), and Matn (56.0%). In Rashaya and West Bekaa (14.7%), Zgharta (13.8%), and Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (5.4%) households were more likely to report taking some action. In Batroun, Bcharre and Koura (58.5%), Jbeil and Keserwan (55.7%), and Chouf (48.9%) respondents were most likely to report their victimisation to the authorities. Beirut (46.1%), Zgharta (36.0%), and Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (27.3%) are where respondents were most likely to resolve these issues through friends and family. And in Nabatiyeh (24.7%) and Jezzine (22.5%) of households were most likely to ‘confront the offender directly’.

Reflecting efforts to reduce the influence of the shawish, only 0.6% of Syrian households stated they resorted to the shawish to assist in solving their problems in the second wave, compared to 4.0% of Syrian households in the first wave. The fraction of Lebanese acting through shawish to resolve incidents with Syrians, nevertheless, increased marginally, with 2.3% of Lebanese respondents stating that they took action with the assistance of the shawish during the second wave compared to 1.6% of Lebanese who reported doing so in the first wave. Respondents in Tripoli (14.4%), Minieh-Danniyeh (13.2%), and Akkar (5.2%) were most likely to resort to the shawish.

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4. Proximate Causes of Tension

Proximate causes of conflict are factors contributing to a climate of exacerbated tensions. Proximate causes of conflict tend to be directly related to deeper evolving and structural causes. For example, the availability of small arms is a common proximate cause in protracted conflicts, and it is one of the proximate causes assessed in this survey.

4.1. Tension Factors

Section Key Findings

- Competition for lower-skilled jobs remains the most cited cause of tensions, with 63.6% of respondents mentioning this, compared to 60.6% during the first wave.
- The greatest gains in reports of there being ‘no tensions’ were observed in the governorates of Nabatiye (up to 19.7% in the second wave from 4.2% in the first wave) and the South (up to 20.3% in the second wave from 11.5% in the first wave).

Respondents were asked, ‘what do you think some of the main sources of tensions between Lebanese and Syrians are in your community, or do you think there are no real tensions?’ For this question enumerators did not read the responses but coded the closest answer(s) on a pre-arranged list. As in the results from the first wave, competition for lower-skilled jobs remained the most-cited causes of tension between Lebanese and Syrian communities, with 63.6% of respondents during the second wave mentioning this, compared to 60.6% mentioning this during the first wave. However, the fraction of those citing competition for higher-skilled jobs as a cause of tensions decreased to 10.1%, a drop of 8.9 percentage points. The fraction of respondents who stated
that the competition for services and utilities was a primary cause of tensions increased by 11.0 percentage points to reach 33.6%.

During the second wave, 11.3% of Syrian respondents expressed that there were no tensions between the two communities, compared to just 4.5% of Lebanese. While this reflected only a marginal increase among Syrian respondents of the perception of lesser tensions, the percentage of Lebanese respondents who believed there were no tensions between the two nationalities doubled from 2.1% to 4.5%, a statistically significant but relatively modest improvement in Lebanese public perception of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The greatest gains in reports of there being ‘no tensions’ were observed in the governorates of Nabatiye (up to 19.7% in the second wave from 4.2% in the first wave) and the South (up to 20.3% in the second wave from 11.5% in the first wave).

In the second wave of surveying, respondents in all governorates except Akkar and Mount Lebanon were more likely to see ‘the political situation nationally and regionally’ as a cause of tensions, with the fraction of respondents citing this as a cause of tensions increasing 21.5 percentage points in the South, 19.5 percentage points in the Beqaa and 19.5 percentage points in Baalbeck-Hermel.

Competition for services and utilities remained a frequently cited source of inter-communal tensions, with 58.3% of respondents in Beirut stating that this was a source of tensions, compared to 15.6% in the first wave. In the Beqaa (18.8%) and Mount Lebanon (18.5%) respondents were also more likely to cite competition for services as a primary factor.

Compared to the first wave, respondents in the South (12.2 percentage point decrease), Nabatiye (10.3 percentage point decrease), and Baalbeck-Hermel (8.4 percentage point decrease) were less likely to attest that cultural differences were a cause of tensions. Marriages between Lebanese and Syrians were more likely to reported as a cause of tensions in the Beqaa with 9.4% reporting that it is a cause of tension during the second wave, compared to 0.2% during the first wave. Similarly, child marriage as a driver of tensions in Nabatiyeh increased to 22.3% in the second wave from 10.0% during the first wave.

In the North (18.1 percentage point increase), Akkar (15.4 percentage point increase), and the Beqaa (12.3 percentage point increase), differences in religion, nationality, place of origin were more often cited during the second wave as compared to the first.
Figure 4.1: Tension factors by wave and governorate.
Competition for lower skilled jobs was cited as a primary cause of tensions across all districts; however, it was in the districts of Zgharta (97.3%), Zahle (93.3%), and Rashaya and West Bekaa (93.1%) where respondents were most likely to pin tensions on this factor.

In Zgharta (61.2%), Matn (56.3%) and Bcharre and Batroun (50.0%), respondents were somewhat more likely to state that tensions were caused by differences in culture; while in Jbeil and Keserwan (37.9%), Aley (34.7%), and Matn (25.4%), respondents were more likely to attribute tensions to differences in religion, nationality, or place of origin.

The political situation nationally and regionally was also cited as a tension factor, especially in Beirut (64.2%), Jbeil and Keserwan (43.8%), and Baalbek and Hermel (43.4%). Respondents were more likely to state that the media also played a role in exacerbating tensions in Miniyeh-Danniyeh (15.4%), Baalbek and Hermel (12.9%) and Aley (10.7%).

4.2. Peace Factors

### Section Key Findings

- 24.2% of respondents stated that social bonds between the communities improved relations, relative to 17.3% of respondents in the first wave.
- Over the two waves, 90.1% of respondents in Zgharta stated that nothing contributed to better relations between the two communities.

In addition to being asked about sources of tension, respondents were asked about factors they believed had contributed to better relations between Syrians and Lebanese in their area. Nationally, in the second wave, the fraction of respondents who said that nothing had contributed to better relations decreased marginally to 41.8%, from 45.9% in the first wave. And, 24.2% stated that social bonds between the communities improved relations, relative to 17.3% of respondents in the first wave. Those who indicated that local authorities helped improving relations increased by 5.9 percentage points to reach 9.0%.

Over the two waves, 90.1% of respondents in Zgharta stated that nothing contributed to better relations between the two communities, and this sentiment was also especially prominent in the districts of Batroun and Bcharre (83.3%) and Matn (62.0%). On the other end of the spectrum, in Miniyeh-Danniyeh,
only 9.6% of respondents stated that nothing lead to better relations, with also similarly positive reports in Tripoli (14.9%) and Nabatiyeh (19.7%). Compared to results from the first wave, Akkar saw an increase in the percentage of respondents who stated that they thought nothing had improved relations (60.3% compared to 41.3%), and a similar increase was observed in the North (54.8% compared to 37.6%). However, perceptions did improve somewhat in other districts, notably in the Beqaa, where the percentage of respondents who could name at least one factor that contributed to better relations increased from 25.9% in the first wave to 63.7% in the second wave. The fraction of those naming at least one peace factor also increased 17.4 percentage points in in Baalbeck-Hermel. Considering all the peace factors assessed in the survey, Syrians were significantly less likely to name any factor in the second wave, with the percentage reporting that ‘nothing improved relations’ increasing to 25.6% from 19.3%.

Six specific ‘factors for peace’ were coded, in addition to options for ‘other’ and ‘nothing helps improve relations’. The six primary factors considered were: ‘pre-existing relationships between Lebanese and Syrians’, ‘social bonds between the communities (intermarriages, relatives, friendships, etc.)’, ‘the positive role of local authorities (municipality/religious authorities)’, ‘better services by the municipality’, ‘assistance and community projects by NGOs/international organizations’, and ‘restrictions on refugee movement and access to jobs’. Disaggregated by geography, different factors for peace were more prominent in different areas, and there was also some indication of change in the prevalence of specific factors for peace in some geographies. Of note, not all of the perceived factors for peace were necessarily socially just, as some factors like ‘restrictions on refugee movement or access to jobs’ could be perceived by Lebanese as ‘protective’, despite placing restrictions on refugees’ rights.

Assistance and community projects by NGOs/international organisations were seen a positive influence in Nabatiyeh (46.1%), Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun (28.5%) and Rashaya and West Bekaa (27.1%), more so than in other districts. In the Beqaa, respondents conveyed strong support for this during the second wave, with a 30.2 percentage point increase in positive perceptions of the roles of NGOs and international organisations. Support for this measure among Lebanese and Syrians remained relatively stable.

In the Chouf (53.0%), Beirut (43.9%) and Aley (40.3%) respondents considered pre-existing relationships between Lebanese and Syrians as a primary factor improving relations between both communities. Additionally, respondents in the Chouf (54.0%) and Beirut (47.5%) stated that social bonds between the
Figure 4.2: Peace factors by governorate and wave.

'And can you think of anything that might have facilitated good relations between Syrians and Lebanese in your area, or would you say that nothing has helped improve relations?' by governorate.
two communities had to better relations between both groups. Nationally, the fraction of Lebanese regarding social bonds as a factor for peace increased significantly from 15.2% of Lebanese in the first wave to 21.6% in the second wave.

However, only a minority saw the positive role of local authorities (such as municipality/religious authorities) as an important factor for better relations in Beirut (23.9%), Tyre (18.1%) and Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun (15.1%). Over the two waves, an increase of 30.0 percentage points was recorded in support of the positive role of local authorities in Beirut. During the second wave, 9.0% of Lebanese respondents evinced that the positive role of local authorities leads to better relations, compared 2.9% during the first. A similar increase to 9.5% from 4.6% was witnessed among Syrian respondents.

Likewise, only a minority of respondents agreed that better services provided by their municipalities resulted in better relations. Even where this was most likely to be cited as a factor in Sidon and Jezzine just 19.8% of respondents specified this factor. There was, however, a moderate increase in the fraction naming this factor in the South (14.0%), Beirut (9.6%) and Beqaa (6.6%).

In Nabatiyeh (40.3%), Jbeil and Keserwan (22.1%), Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun (20.7%) respondents were most likely to agree that ‘restrictions on refugee movement and access to jobs’ had contributed to better relations between the two communities. Accross governorates, Mount Lebanon (13.1 percentage points), Beqaa (16.8 percentage points), and Baalbek-Hermel (13.9 percentage points) saw the most drastic increases in support for such restrictions. With a large percentage of respondents agreeing that ‘nothing leads to better relations’, as well as participants believing that negative social policies such as curfews lead to better relations, it is worth noting that respondents by and large reported that relieving resource pressure does not necessarily lead to better relations.
4.3. Inter-Community Contact

**Section Key Findings**

- 63.4% of respondents in Akkar stated they interacted only ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ with the other nationality at work, compared to 39.2% from the first wave.
- 49.9% of respondents in the Beqaa interacted ‘daily’ or ‘regularly’ with the other nationality in social settings, relative to 22.5% during the first wave.

Respondents were asked to report on the frequency of contact they had with persons of the other nationality in a number of scenarios: at work, in social circles, paying rent, in the street, at the shop, at religious events and at activities organized by NGOs or local organizations. Nationally, respondents who stated that they interacted with the other nationality ‘in the street’ ‘daily’ or regularly’ decreased by 9.6 percentage points over the period between the two surveys, to reach 69.9%, which was still nevertheless the majority of respondents. This change in the level of interaction between Lebanese and Syrians included a moderate decrease in Lebanese reporting frequently interaction, counterbalanced by a similar increase in Syrians reporting frequent interaction with Lebanese.

There was a decrease in the percentage of respondents reporting frequent social interaction ‘at work’ in Akkar. Akkar saw an increase in the percentage of respondents who stated they interacted only ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ with the other nationality at work, with an increase from 39.2% to 63.4%. However, the Beqaa and Baalbek-Hermel governorates saw an increase of respondents who interacted with the other nationality at work by 23.6 and 22.6 percentage points respectively.

Apart from the North, all governorates saw an increase in the percentage of respondents who reported ‘daily’ or ‘regular’ interaction with the other nationality. Beirut witnessed a drastic change in the percentage of respondents who interact frequently with the other nationality in social circles, rising to 80.8% from a mere 5.0%. A similar rise was noticed in the Beqaa were frequent interactions increased from 22.5% to 49.9%. No major shift was noticed in the percentage of respondents who interacted with the other nationality while paying rent. Interactions between both nationalities ‘in the street’ decreased in the North, Mount Lebanon, and the Beqaa dropping to 43.3%, 80.2%, and
Figure 4.3: Change in rate of inter-community contact/interaction by wave in various scenarios.
73.6% from 76.9%, 94.9%, and 78.9% respectively. All other governorates reported an increase.

In Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun (94.6%), Nabatiyeh (94.0%) and Matn (90.2%) respondents stated they contact the other nationality at work ‘daily’ or ‘regularly’. Similarly, these districts saw the highest level of inter-community contact during social events, with 95.0%, 93.5%, and 92.4% of respondents in Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun, Nabatiyeh, and Matn respectively reporting they interact with the other nationality ‘daily’ or ‘regularly’ during such events.

Inter-communal interactions taking place during activities organized by NGOs increased in frequency in Beirut, reaching 48.1% from 5.0% during the first wave. This may be explained due to the summer months during which the survey took place. With the lead up to Eid Al Adha, several NGOs and faith-based organisations hosted events, in addition to the scores of public events organised during the period. These events likely helped contribute to increased interactions between the two communities.

More frequent interaction at religious events was highest in Sidon and Jezzine (53.5%), Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun (50.4%) and Matn (40.4%).

4.4. Quality of Inter-Community Relations

**Section Key Findings**

- In the South, significant shifts in perceptions on relations were witnessed, with a 22.5 percentage point decrease in respondents who stated relations were negative and a 29.9 percentage point increase in the per cent who said they were positive.
- 41.3% of Syrians reported positive relations during the second wave compared to 50.2% during the first wave.

Respondents were asked, ‘How would you describe current relations between Lebanese and Syrians who live in this area? Would you say they are positive or negative’. Nationally, 25.8% of respondents rated relations as ‘very positive’ or ‘positive’ during the second wave, down from 30.6% of respondents in the first wave.

Over the two waves, attitudes in the Akkar governorate shifted from positive (25.3 percentage point decrease) to neutral (22.3 percentage point increase); those in the Beqaa shifted from positive (19.4 percentage point decrease) to
negative (32.4 percentage point increase). Similarly, in the North, attitudes shifted from positive (18.5 percentage point decrease) to negative (32.1 percentage point increase). Beirut also witnessed a 14.6 percentage point increase in respondents who described relations as ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’.

The most noticeable shift from negative perceptions to positive perceptions was in the South, where there was a 22.5 percentage point decrease in respondents who stated relations were negative and a 29.9 percentage point increase in the per cent who said they were positive. In Nabatiye, opinions shifted from negative (13.6 percentage point decrease) to neutral (12.5 percentage point increase).

Across both waves, respondents in the districts of Tripoli (61.8%), Nabatiyeh (47.1%) and Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun (45.6%) rated relations between the two communities as ‘very positive’ or ‘positive’, in contrast to respondents in Baabda (78.1%), Zgharta (73.5%), and Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (58.9%) who rated their relations as ‘very negative’ or ‘negative’.

While Syrian views on current relations remained more positive as compared to Lebanese in absolute terms, over the two waves, both nationalities reported a decrease in the percentage of respondents who rated relations as ‘very positive’ or ‘positive’ and an increase in those who rated them as ‘very negative’ or ‘negative’. Nationally, 41.3% of Syrians reported positive relations during the second wave compared to 50.2% during the first wave. The drop among Lebanese respondents, however, was less pronounced, with 22.5% of Lebanese respondents rating relations as positive compared to 27.9% during the first wave.

Over the course of both waves, respondents were asked, ‘Would you say that compared to three months ago, relations between Lebanese and Syrians in your area have improved a lot, improved a little, stayed about the same, worsened a little, or worsened a lot?’ Respondents were most likely to state that these relations had ‘stayed about the same’, with 46.9% of respondents during the second wave specifying this compared 44.6% in the first wave. During the first wave 20.0% of respondents said that relations had ‘improved a lot’ or ‘improved a little’ compared to 14.7% during the second wave.

Over the past three months, over the period between the two waves, respondents in Baalbek-Hermel expressed more polarized perceptions with a 40.6 percentage point drop in the percentage of respondents who assessed relations as ‘having stayed about the same’. During the second wave, 62.3% of respondents in Baalbek-Hermel assessed relations over the past three months
Figure 4.4: Current rating of quality of inter-community relations, by governorate and wave.

'And how would you describe current relations between Lebanese and Syrians who live in this area? Would you say they are positive or negative?' by wave and governorate.
'And would you say that compared to three months ago, relations between Lebanese and Syrians in your area have...' by wave and governorate.
as having ‘worsened a little’ or ‘worsened a lot’, compared to 33.4% during the first wave. In the Mount Lebanon governorate, respondents provided more neutral reports of the change in the quality of relations, with a 17.9 percentage point increase in those who rated relations as ‘having stayed about the same’. A similar trend was observed in the governorate of Nabatiye, where those who rated relations as having ‘stayed about the same’ increased by 32.3 percentage points. The most significant report of perceived worsening relations was in Beirut, with a 39.4 percentage point increase in the fraction of respondents who rated relations as having ‘worsened a little’ or ‘worsened a lot’. In contrast, the greatest observed increase in the quality of perceived relations was in the governorate of the South, where the per cent of respondents who rated relations as having ‘improved a lot’ or ‘improved a little’ increased by 24.5 percentage points.

In Tripoli (71.2%), Miniyeh-Danniyeh (54.7%), and Sidon and Jezzine (51.8%) respondents indicated that relations had ‘improved a lot’ or ‘improved a little’, as opposed to the worsening situation reported in Zgharta (85.8%), Baabda (83.5%), and Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (68.7%), where respondents indicated that relations had ‘worsened a little’ or ‘worsened a lot’.

While Syrian respondents reported that inter-communal relations improved during the three months preceding the first wave, the report of the change in the quality of relations amongst Syrian respondents in the second wave worsened somewhat, with only 15.5% of Syrians nationally stating that relations had ‘improved a lot’ or ‘improved a little’, compared to 27.7% during the first wave. Lebanese who saw relations as having ‘worsened a little’ or ‘worsened a lot’ increased to 39.9% from 36.6%.

Respondents were also asked about the change in relations over a longer time-period: ‘Would you say that compared to three years ago (Since 2014), relations between Lebanese and Syrians in your area have improved a lot, improved a little, stayed about the same, worsened a little, or worsened a lot?’ There was significant regional variation in responses. As compared to 2014, respondents stated that relations had mostly improved in the governorates of the South (40.9%) and the North (34.6%). However, respondents stated that relations had mostly worsened most in the Beqaa (77.3%), Baalbek-Hermel (71.0%) and Beirut (68.2%) governorates. Both Lebanese and Syrians indicated that relations had ‘worsened a little’ or ‘worsened a lot’ since 2014, with a plurality of 48.8% of Lebanese and 43.2% of Syrians indicating this.
4.5. Intra-Lebanese Relations

Section Key Findings

- 34.2% of Lebanese respondents judged that Syrian refugees were a driver of Lebanese tensions.
- 61.0% of second wave respondents answered that relations between different Lebanese groups were ‘much better’ or ‘better’ compared to 67.4% during the first wave.

Lebanese respondents were asked three questions to assess the quality of intra-Lebanese relations. First, they were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement, ‘In this area, Lebanese from different confessions live peacefully among each other.’ Only Lebanese respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with this statement. Compared to the first wave’s 85.7%, only 78.2% of Lebanese respondents ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with this statement.

Results from the first and second waves indicated that in Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (97.5%), Zgharta (96.0%), and Akkar (94.5%), respondents were more likely to ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ with this statement, as opposed to respondents from Miniyeh-Danniyeh, Baalbek and Hermel, and Sidon and Jezzine, were only 66.1%, 59.7%, 56.2% of respondents respectively agreed with the statement.

Over the two waves, the percentage of respondents in Beirut who ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with statement fell from 96.4% to 75.6%, with those who ‘strongly disagreed’ or ‘disagreed’ jumping to 20.6% from a low of 3.3%. Besides Baalbek-Hermel, Akkar, and Nabatiyeh, all the remaining governorates saw a slip in this indicator. This trend may be explained by political developments which were linked to the Parliament’s budget for 2017, the new taxes and salary scales, which generated a considerable degree of inter-confessional debate. This trend can also be seen across sectarian lines, with support for this statement decreasing among all sects. However, this drop was most drastic among Sunnis (13.8 percentage point drop) and Christians (7.5 percentage point drop).

Asked ‘Since 2011, do you think that relations between different Lebanese groups have improved or worsened?’, 61.0% of second wave respondents answered that relations were ‘much better’ or ‘better’ compared to 67.4% during the first wave.
Beirut was home to a stark descent in this indicator as well, with only 28.1% assessing relations as having gotten ‘much better’ or ‘better’ in the second wave, compared to 68.0% in the first wave. Along with Beirut, the governorates of Mount Lebanon and the Beqaa similarly saw decreases of 16.7 and 6.3 percentage points respectively in the per cent rating inter-communal relations as having improved. Akkar saw the greatest improvement with 90.6% of respondents stating that relations got ‘much better’ or ‘better’, compared to 57.6% during the first wave. The governorates of Baalbek-Hermel and the South saw similar rises of 20.8 and 18.2 percentage points respectively in the per cent rating inter-communal relations as having improved.

At the district-level, respondents in Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (91.3%), Chouf (87.0%) and Miniyeh-Danniyeh (86.3%) expressed that relations were ‘much better’ or ‘better’, whereas in Beirut (53.1%), Baalbek and Hermel (64.7%) and Baabda (81.5%), respondents indicated that relations were ‘much worse’ or ‘worse’.

Lebanese respondents were also asked, ‘what are three most important issues that have caused tensions between Lebanese members of this area?’ During the second wave, 13.4% of respondents said that there are no issues causing tensions between Lebanese members of their community, compared to 18.5% during the first.

In the districts of Akkar (91.3%), Tyre (54.6%), and Sidon and Jezzine (30.9%) respondents overwhelmingly stated that nothing caused tensions between the Lebanese members of their communities. In Zgharta (100.0%), Jbeil and Keserwan (93.2%), and Baalbek and Hermel (91.4%) political and sectarian conflicts was noted as a main driver of tension. Economic competition (Jobs and resources) was a notable driver in Chouf (97.5%), Aley (82.2%), and Beirut (56.9%). In Baalbek and Hermel (74.2%), Jbeil and Keserwan (64.8%), and Zgharta (64.0%) respondents blamed intra-communal tensions on cultural and religious differences. While differences in socioeconomic class was pinned as a source of tension in Miniyeh-Danniyeh (81.4%), Chouf (79.8%), and Beirut (76.0%).

While 25.3% of Christian respondents during the first wave reported that there were no intra-Lebanese tensions, 9.8% said so during the second. With this difference being attributable to political and sectarian conflicts as well as cultural and religious differences. Sunni Muslim respondents who noted no tensions between Lebanese increased to 12.5% from 9.9%. With those who credited the tensions on political and sectarian conflicts dropping from 66.4% to 49.9%. Both
Figure 4.6: Perceived change in quality of intra-Lebanese (confessional) relations, by wave and governorate. Lebanese only.

'And would you say that compared to three months ago, relations between Lebanese and Syrians in your area have...' by wave and governorate.
male and female Lebanese respondents felt the same about intra-Lebanese tensions, with responses for both genders being almost identical.

4.6. Sense of Safety and Security

**Section Key Findings**

- Asked about changes in the level of safety and security in their area, 68.3% of Lebanese respondents stated that the situation had ‘stayed about the same’ in the second wave, compared to 60.4% in the first wave.
- Perceptions of safety and security improved more in vulnerable cadastres, with 24.9% respondents residing in vulnerable cadastres claiming that the situation ‘improved a lot’ or ‘improved a little’, as opposed to 11.6% of respondents in non-vulnerable cadastres.

When asked 'Generally speaking, how would you rate the safety of your neighborhood during the day?', 94.6% of respondents stated that they felt ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’, up from 88.9% in the first wave. A 6.4 percentage point increase on the first wave left 95.1% of Lebanese respondents in the second wave feeling safe during the day in the second wave. However, no significant increase in Syrian perceptions of day safety was observed.

Responses were positive across the board, with 99.5% of respondents in Rashaya and West Beqaa rating their area as ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’, while in Sidon and Jezzine 75.6% of respondents rated their level as safety as high. Compared to the first wave, second wave results documented improved perceptions of safety and security in all governorates except for Beirut, where the percentage of respondents who rated their area as ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’ dropped to 93.5% from 99.4%.

As for their neighbourhood’s safety during the night, 86.3% of respondents said they felt ‘very safe’ or ‘safe’, compared to 78.3% in the first wave. Perceptions of night safety were greatest in Beirut, where 94.6% rated their neighbourhood as ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’, compared to the lowest ratings of night safety, in Sidon and Jezzine, where only 54.2% rated their area as ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’.

In response to the question 'Compared to this time three months ago, would you say you that you generally say that you feel more or less safe walking around your neighborhood at night? Would you say that security in your area
has improved a lot, improved a little, stayed about the same, worsened a little, or worsened a lot?’, 69.4% of respondents said the situation had ‘stayed about the same’ in the second wave, compared to 61.9% of respondents in the first wave. This marginal increase in the neutral response was due to a decrease in respondents who reported both positive and negative changes. Relative to non-vulnerable cadastres, 24.9% respondents residing in vulnerable cadastres expressed that the situation ‘improved a lot’ or ‘improved a little’ compared to three months ago in the second wave, as opposed to 11.6% of respondents in non-vulnerable cadastres.

4.7. Concern over Prolonged Presence of Refugees

Section Key Findings

- A plurality (50.8%) of respondents estimated that Syrian refugees would return home between one and three years.

Asked ‘And in your opinion, how long do you think it will take for Syrian refugees to return to Syria?’, 62.2% of respondents in the first wave estimated that Syrian refugees would return to Syria in five years or more. Second wave results showed 69.0% of respondents claiming that Syrian refugees would return to Syria in less than five years.

Whereas 63.3% of Lebanese respondents considered that Syrian refugees would return home in more than five years during the first wave, this number was halved in the second wave, with 49.6% of Lebanese respondents responding it would take between one and three years for Syrian refugees to return home. This was in line with the trend seen amongst Syrian respondents, with 51.6% of Syrian respondents in the first wave estimating it would take Syrian refugees more than five years to return home, this dropped to 23.6% in the second wave.

Except for Beirut, all governorates witnessed a decline in the percentage of respondents who thought it would take Syrian refugees more than five years to return home. In Beirut, the slight uptick in those respondents from 42.6% in the first wave to 47.2% in the second wave was combined with a 9.3% increase in the percentage of respondents there who believed Syrian refugees would return home in less than one year, as well as a further 10.5% increase in those who thought that refugees would return in between one and two years.
Figure 4.7: Perceived change in neighbourhood safety over previous three months by nationality.

'Compared to this time three months ago, would you say you that you generally say that you feel more or less safe walking around your neighborhood at night? Would you say...' by wave and nationality.

- Worsened a lot
- Stayed about the same
- Improved a lot
- Worsened a little
- Improved a little
4.8. Prejudice

Section Key Findings

- Average levels of Lebanese prejudice towards Syrian refugees declined somewhat in the second wave, for example, with the fraction of those who would find ‘sharing a workplace’ with a person of the other nationality as ‘disagreeable’ declining from 48.5% in the first wave to 36.9% in the second wave.

In order to assess levels of prejudice or ‘social distance’, respondents were asked how agreeable or disagreeable they found four scenarios. When asked about ‘sharing a workplace’ with a person of the other nationality, 36.9% of second wave respondents found this to be ‘disagreeable’ or ‘very disagreeable’, compared to 48.5% in the first wave. Across waves and governorates, attitudes towards working with the other nationality improved the most in Nabatiyeh, where 67.6% of respondents found this agreeable in the second wave compared to 43.9% in the first wave. On the other hand, in Akkar, those who found this agreeable dropped to 23.6% from 40.2%. Respondents in Nabatiyeh (68.8%), Aley (63.8%), and Chouf (60.2%) were amongst those who were most likely to agree that this scenario was somehow agreeable, whereas in Tripoli (33.3%), Akkar (33.2%), and Sidon and Jezzine (27.2%) respondents were more likely to find this scenario disagreeable.

When asked about ‘living next door’ to a family of the other nationality, those in Beirut (74.4%), Nabatiyeh (70.3%), and Tyre (69.2%) were amongst those most likely to find this agreeable, as opposed to those in Rashaya and West Bekaa (31.3%), Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (28.1%), and Sidon and Jezzine (25.9%) who were amongst those least likely to find this agreeable. In Nabatiyeh there was the biggest shift in responses to this statement, with 67.3% of respondents finding this agreeable in the second wave compared to 48.4% in the first wave.

Respondents in both waves found it considerably less agreeable ‘to send children to schools’ with children of the other nationality, with 40.2% of respondents in the second wave finding this to be ‘agreeable’ or ‘very agreeable’. In the North governorate, 23.6% of respondents found this agreeable, dropping from 35.6% in the first wave. In Nabatiyeh, 64.6% of respondents in the second wave found this agreeable compared to 50.0% in the first wave. Similar declines were observed in the Beqaa and Arsal, where the percentage of respondents who
Figure 4.8: Predjudice indicators by district, combined waves.

For each of the following scenarios would you say that you would consider this… by district.

- A family member marrying a member of the other nationality.
- Children in your family attending school with children from the other nationality.
- Living next door to a family from the other nationality.
- Sharing a workplace with a member of the other nationality.

Response colors:
- Very disagreeable
- Disagreeable
- Neither agreeable nor disagreeable
- Agreeable
- Very agreeable
found this agreeable dropped by around 10 percentage points in each of these governorates.

Lastly, respondents were also asked how agreeable they found ‘a family member marrying’ a person of the other nationality. Relative to the first wave’s 23.9% agreement with the statement, 24.6% of respondents agreed with this in the second wave. However, 16.7% of respondents ‘neither agreed or disagreed’ with the statement in the second wave, compared to 9.7% in the first wave. In Akkar, 27.6% of respondents found this scenario agreeable in the first wave, dropping to 12.8% in the second wave. In Baalbek-Hermel, a 10.2% percentage point increase left 28.2% of respondents finding this ‘agreeable’ or ‘very agreeable’. Intercommunal marriage was most likely to be perceived as agreeable in Beirut (45.1%), Nabatiyeh (32.6%), and Miniyeh-Danniyeh (30.4%), whilst it was least likely to be viewed as agreeable in Rashaya and West Bekaa (17.3%), Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (13.1%), and Zgharta (11.1%). In the second wave, Syrian respondents (69.8%) continued to find this more agreeable than Lebanese respondents (14.8%).

4.9. Propensity for Collective Action or Violence

**Section Key Findings**

- There was considerable support in most areas of the country for restrictions on refugees’ freedom of movement, with agreement with the statement, ‘When tensions are high, some restrictions on foreigners’ movement or curfews can help keep this area safe’ dropping only marginally from 93.4% in the first wave to 86.9% in the second wave.
- Support for violence as a means of redress also increased somewhat, with the fraction agreeing to some extent with the statement, ‘Violence is sometimes necessary when your interests are being threatened’ increasing from 50.1% in the first wave to 60.8% in the second wave.

To measure propensity for collective action, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement, ‘When tensions are high, some restrictions on foreigners’ movement or curfews can help keep this area safe’. While 88.7% of respondents in the first wave ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with this statement, marginally fewer (81.6%) did so in the second
wave. Over the two waves, all governorates barring the South saw declines in the percentage of respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with this statement. In Beirut, agreement with statement dropped from 100% to 81.5%. Noticeable declines in support for restrictive measures like this were also observed in the Beqaa (14.4 percentage point decrease) and Akkar (13.4 percentage point decrease). Despite these shifts agreement with this statement in the second wave did not fall below 60% in any governorates. Baalbek and Hermel (95.3%), Zgharta (92.5%), and Chouf (91.8%) were the districts where respondents agreed with this statement the most strongly.

In the second wave, 86.9% of Lebanese agreed with the statement, ‘When tensions are high, some restrictions on foreigners’ movement or curfews can help keep this area safe’, compared to 93.4% in the first wave, whereas only 56.6% of Syrians also agreed with this statement in the second wave.

Respondents were also asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement, ‘Violence is sometimes necessary when your interests are being threatened’. This was used as one of the key indicators of ‘propensity to violence’. A 10.7 percentage point increase left 60.8% of respondents agreeing to some extent with statement in the second wave, relative to the first wave. Respondents in vulnerable cadastres, however, were less likely to agree with this statement (56.8%) relative to those in non-vulnerable cadastres (67.0%). Agreement with this statement increased across all governorates in the second wave. In the South, a 24.4 percentage point increase left 69.0% of respondents agreeing with the statement, while in Akkar agreement rose from 26.8% to 47.9%. Baalbek-Hermel (78.9%) and Nabatiyeh (73.8%) remained the governorates where respondents were most likely to agree with this statement. This rise was observed within all confessional groups, as well, with the starkest intensification being a 15.3 percentage point increase amongst Christian respondents. Across districts, Nabatiyeh (81.9%), Zgharta (79.9%), and Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (78.7%) were home to those respondents who were most likely to agree with this statement, whereas Tyre (37.3%), Beirut (31.1%), and Tripoli (29.0%) were the districts where respondents were least likely to agree with this statement.

An uptick was also observed amongst both Lebanese and Syrians, with 64.5% of Lebanese respondents agreeing with the statement ‘Violence is sometimes necessary when your interests are being threatened’ in the second wave relative to 53.1% in the first wave. For Syrian respondents, a 12.3 percentage point increase meant 43.9% of Syrian respondents agreed with the statement in the second wave.
For the second wave for surveying, a number of additional items related to collective action and violence were added to the survey instrument; these were primarily adopted from the European Social Survey. These question items took the form of asking respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed that a fictional person in certain scenarios was ‘like them’.

In the first scenario, respondents were asked how much a person who ‘believes that people should do what they’re told. S/He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching’ was like them. No governorate had less that 60% of respondents agreeing with this statement, with agreement being lowest in Nabatiyeh (69.1%), Beqaa (66.4%), and the South (62.5%), whereas over 90% of respondents in Beirut (97.5%), Mount Lebanon (92.6%), and Baalbek-Hermel (92.5%) agreed with this statement. Syrian respondents were slightly more likely to agree with the statement (86.1%) relative to Lebanese (84.7%). Respondents in non-vulnerable cadastres were somewhat more likely to agree (89.1%) than those in vulnerable cadastres (82.1%). Compared to female respondents (87.0%), male respondents were somewhat likely to agree (82.8%) with the statement.

Next, respondents were asked if they agreed if a person whom ‘It is important to her/him to listen to people who are different from her/him. Even when s/he disagrees with them, s/he still wants to understand them’ was like them. Mount Lebanon (90.5%), Baalbek-Hermel (89.4%), and the North (88.2%) were the governorates with the most agreement. In Nabatiyeh, 79.1% of respondents agreed with this. Ninety-one per cent (90.9%) of respondents in non-vulnerable cadastres agreed with the statement compared to 85.1% of those in vulnerable cadastres.

When asked about their similarity to a person who ‘believes it is acceptable to hit someone who hits you first’, respondents in Nabatiyeh (91.1%), Akkar (80.1%), and Beqaa (79.1%) were the most most likely to agree that they were ‘like’ this person. Those in the South (62.0%), Beirut (60.4%), and the North (41.5%) were amongst those least likely to agree with the person in this scenario. Agreement with the statement was higher in non-vulnerable cadastres (67.3%) than in vulnerable ones (60.9%). Of Lebanese respondents, 64.4% saw similarities between them and the fictional person, compared to 58.9% of Syrian respondents. Nearly sixty per cent (59.6%) of female respondents said theyn ere similar to this person, compared to 67.2% of males.

With regards to a person who ‘would physically attack someone who verbally insulted her/him’, 69.5% of respondents in Nabatiyeh identified with this person, as did 54.9% of resepondents in the governorate of the South. Only 6.6% of
respondents in Beirut said they identified with this person. Relative to Syrian respondents, Lebanese were more likely to see themselves in this person with 32.8% of Lebanese relating to this scenario, relative to 23.4% of Syrians.

Finally, respondents were presented with a scenario where: ‘If s/he got in an argument s/he would be able to call on her/his friends to intervene’. In Nabatiye (81.5%), Baalbek-Hermel (77.7%), and the South (73.4%) respondents identified with this person, as opposed to respondents in Akkar (54.3%), Beqaa (41.9%), and Beirut (13.9%). Lebanese respondents were more likely to count on their network if they got in a fight, with 58.0% of Lebanese respondents identifying with this person, compared to 48.1% of Syrians. Over half of both male (58.5%) and female (53.9%) respondents saw themselves in this person. In non-vulnerable cadastres 64.3% of respondents agreed with the statement, compared to 50.9% of those in more vulnerable cadastres.
5. Evolving Causes of Tension

The evolving causes of conflict were considered across four dimensions: trust in institutions and trust in local community, refugee population pressure, basic needs and livelihoods and the capability and fairness of service provision and international assistance. To assess trust in institutions and trust in local community, respondents were asked a number of questions concerning whether government institutions, including security forces, have played a positive or negative role in responding to the refugee crisis in their area and to improving local quality of life. Respondents were also asked several questions about their neighbours or people ‘who live in their area’.

To measure trust in institutions and local community, respondents were asked to assess the performance of several organisation responding to the Syrian refugee crisis, additionally respondents were asked who they turn to settle disputes. Lastly, respondents were also probed as to their opinions on solidarity and cohesion in their communities.

5.1. Public Institutions

Section Key Findings

- In the South, 75.5% of respondents in the second wave articulated that the activities of the Lebanese Cabinet improved their lives compared to 49.9% during the first.
- In non-vulnerable cadastres, 76.0% said that municipal authorities had improved life ‘a lot’ or ‘a little’, compared to 68.1% of those in vulnerable cadastres.

Concerning government and public institutions, respondents were given with a list of six institutions and asked, ‘Thinking about the last three months
and the area where you live, will you please indicate whether their activities/interventions have changed life in your area for better or worse?’

Regarding the Cabinet or Council of Ministers, 54.4% of stated that it ‘had no effect on quality of life’ in the second wave, a 5.8 percentage point increase in this neutral response from the first wave. In non-vulnerable cadastres, 59.1% of respondents in the second wave said the Cabinet ‘had no effect on quality of life’, compared to 47.8% of respondents in the first wave. While in vulnerable cadastres, respondents’ who stated the cabinet improved life ‘a little’ or ‘a lot’ increased 5.9 percentage points, reaching 29.2% in the second wave, compared to the 22.6% of respondents who said the same in non-vulnerable cadastres.

Opinions in Baalbek-Hermel of the role of the Cabinet improved considerably during the three months between surveying, with 66.0% of respondents in the governorate stating that the cabinet improved the quality of life in the area, relative to 12.6% in the first wave. Similar improvements were observed in the North and Beirut. However, in the Beqaa, a 27.2 percentage point increase negative perceptions of the Cabinet left 35.8% stating that the cabinet worsened life. In Nabatiye, the percentage of respondents who expressed that the cabinet worsened life also increased to 67.3%, from 42.5% in the first wave.

Public perceptions of municipal authorities remained relatively stable, and on average, positive. Respondents in non-vulnerable cadastres continued to view municipal authorities in better light than those in vulnerable cadastres, with 76.0% of respondents in non-vulnerable cadastres expressing that municipal authorities improved life ‘a lot’ or ‘a little’, compared to 68.1% of those in vulnerable cadastres. While the opinions of Lebanese on municipal authorities did not change considerably over the reporting period, an 8.30 percentage point increase saw 74.74% of Syrian respondents during the second wave stating that municipal authorities had played a role in improving life in the area.

The governorate of the South saw the most notable improvement in perceptions of the role of municipal authorities, with 86.5% of respondents in the second wave providing a positive report, compared to 66.7% in the first wave. Similarly, in Baalbek-Hermel, positive perceptions of municipal authorities rose to 63.5% in the second wave, from 43.3% in the first wave. Opinions on the work of municipal authorities across all districts were generally positive, especially in Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun (85.07%), Matn (82.28%), and Sidon and Jezzine (82.24%). However, confidence in the ability of the municipal authorities was considerably lower than the national average in Tripoli, where only 47.2% provided a positive report.
Figure 5.1: Of those experiencing assault or victimisation, reported means of help-seeking and redress, by nationality and wave.

'And when this (assault) happened, did you or someone in your family do anything about it? What did they do?' by nationality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Lebanese</th>
<th>Syrian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Nothing                       | ![Graph](image)
| Notified NGO or UN Agency     | ![Graph](image)
| Limited movement afterwards   | ![Graph](image)
| Confronted offender           | ![Graph](image)
| Resolved through family or friends | ![Graph](image)
| Reported to shawish           | ![Graph](image)
| Reported to employer          | ![Graph](image)
| Reported to landlord          | ![Graph](image)
| Notified authorities          | ![Graph](image)
| Moved / changed residence     | ![Graph](image)
Respondents’ views on both the Cabinet and municipalities were likely driven by the country’s ‘policy of distancing’, which the country has applied since 2011.\footnote{Bassem Nemeh. ‘Precarious Republic’. Carnegie Middle East Center. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/72790} By October 2014, the Lebanese government adopted a policy paper dictating the government’s response to the refugee crisis.\footnote{Presidency of the Council of Ministers. ‘23 October 2014 Minutes of Meeting’. http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=6118} This policy paper paved the way for the General Security Office (GSO) to manage the flow of Syrian refugees and restricted entry of refugees into Lebanon. The policy also applied to the influx of Syrian refugees, which Lebanese political parties viewed as a ‘short-term crisis’.\footnote{Ghida Frangieh and Elham Barjas. ‘Interior Ministry Advisor: Lebanon Refugee Policy Based on Set of “Nos”’. Legal Agenda. http://legal-agenda.com/en/article.php?id=1770} As a result of this policy, municipalities had to shoulder much of the strain of the refugee influx, with an Oxfam discussion paper finding that,

Political deadlock at the central government level transferred the burden of crisis management to municipalities where the impact of the influx was immediately visible. Recent Oxfam research conducted in five districts in north Lebanon found that local authorities considered the central state to be absent and that the municipalities and the local communities were left alone to deal with the complex issues of the crisis, such as housing shortages, sewage treatment, healthcare service provision and security. Local authorities have limited administrative and governance capacities to address the protracted and massive refugee crisis.\footnote{OXFAM. ‘Lebanon: Looking Ahead in Times of Crisis’. Oxfam Discussion Papers. December 2015.} This has contributed to high levels of frustration among local populations.\footnote{Lama Mourad. ‘Inaction as Policy-Making: Understanding Lebanon’s Early Response to the Refugee Influx’. Project on Middle East Political Science. https://pomeps.org/2017/03/29/inaction-as-policy-making-understanding-lebanons-early-response-to-the-refugee-influx/#_ftn2}
Asked about the role of ‘NGOs or international agencies like the UN’, 44.7% of respondents in the second wave said they ‘had no effect on quality of life’, a 3.6 percentage point increase from the first wave. This was coupled with a decrease of the same amount among respondents who expressed that NGOs or international agencies improved life ‘a little’ or ‘a lot’. The trend was noticed across both vulnerable and non-vulnerable cadastres, with 5.1 percentage point increase in respondents from less vulnerable areas who said that the NGOs and international agencies ‘had no effect on the quality of life’, reaching 47.2% in the second wave. Similarly in more vulnerable cadastres, 43.2% of respondents said the same, up from 40.6% in the first wave.

5.2. Means of Dispute Resolution

Section Key Findings

- Most (55.3%) respondents said they would turn to their neighbours, family or friends for help in the event they were in a dispute.
- Syrian confidence in the ISF increased, with 37.8% of Syrian respondents saying would turn to the ISF for help in the second wave, compared to 25.8% in the first wave.

To further measure respondents’ trust in their local community and institutions, the survey queried respondents on the actors they would turn to in the event they were involved in a dispute or need help, including both formal and alternative means of dispute resolution. A 2.4 percentage point increase left 10.6% of respondents in the second wave saying they would turn to no one for assistance. The percentage of Lebanese respondents who reported turning to no one in the second wave increased by 2.7% to reach 10.8%, while 8.6% of Syrian respondents conveyed the same. Across districts, Matn (22.5%), Baabda (19.5%), and Sidon and Jezzine (18.2%) were the top districts where respondents said they would turn to no one for help.

Neighbours, family or friends remained respondents’ first resource for assistance in dispute resolution, with 55.3% of respondents stating they would turn to their neighbours, family or friends in the second wave, compared to 47.4% in the first. This increase was largely driven by respondents in non-vulnerable cadastres, where 59.8% of respondents in the second wave indicated they would turn to their neighbours and family, compared to 43.6% in the first wave. The share of both Lebanese (55.1%) and Syrians (57.4%) indicating these
Figure 5.2: Perceptions of capability and fairness in service provision by district.
relations as a source of assistance in dispute resolution each increased by about seven percentage points relative to the first wave.

Lebanese respondents continued to be more likely to resort to the LAF, ISF and other formal means for assistance in dispute resolution, relative to their Syrian counterparts. However, the second wave also saw a significant increase in the percentage of Syrian respondents who said they would turn to these agencies for help – 29.9% to the LAF and 37.8% to the ISF, compared to 14.3% and 25.8% respectively in the first wave.

In Baalbek-Hermel, 39.5% of respondents stated they would turn to the LAF compared to 12.4% in the first wave. However, those in the Beqaa who said they would do the same dropped from 80.0% in the first wave to only 39.6% in the second wave.

With only 9.0% of first wave respondents stating that they would turn to the municipal police, this increased to 21.0% in the second wave. Both Lebanese and Syrian respondents were more likely to seek dispute resolution assistance from the municipal police in the second wave, including 20.8% of Lebanese and 22.0% of Syrians. The greatest increased in support for the municipal police were observed in the governorates of Beirut, the South and Mount Lebanon.

The fraction who said they would turn to NGOs or ‘international organisations like the UN’ for such assistance remained low in the second wave, at less than 2%. Finally, those who said they would rely on the shawish for assistance remained low and dropped marginally from 4.4% in the first wave to 3.9% in the second wave.

5.3. Solidarity and Cohesion in the Community

Section Key Findings

- In vulnerable cadastres, 85.2% of respondents agreed with the statement People around here are willing to help their neighbours’ down from 91.8
- In the South, 89.1% of respondents agreed with the phrase ‘people in this area can be trusted’ compared to 78.2% during the first wave.

Three questions were asked of respondents regarding their perceptions of solidarity and social cohesion in the their community; these questions were adopted from the Arab Barometer surveys and R. Sampson’s studies of
collective efficacy. Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with three statements.

Solidarity, as measured by the level of agreement with the statement, ‘People around here are willing to help their neighbours’, decreased by 4.8 percentage points, de 87.7% in the second wave. This was driven largely by a 5.7 percentage point decrease in the fraction of Lebanese respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with this statement. Syrian agreement with this statement, however, remained relatively stable at 86.2% in the second wave. In more vulnerable cadastres, 85.2% of respondents agreed to some extent with the statement, down from 91.8% in the first wave.

Apart from the governorate of the South where a 5.2 percentage point increase led to 85.9% of respondents agreeing with the statement, all other governorates witnessed a drop relative to the first wave. In Beirut, 100.0% fell to 79.6%, the largest shift. Agreement with the statement did not fall below 75% in any district.

Respondents continued to largely agree with the statement, ‘people in this area can be trusted’, with 88.0% of respondents agreeing with this statement to some extent in the second wave. The change in the average level of agreement between both waves was not statistically significant, for either Lebanese or Syrians. This decrease was most acute in more vulnerable cadastres, where a 5.2 percentage point slip resulted in relatively fewer (85.7%) agreeing with this statement, compared to the national average, in the second wave.

Again, the only governorate where an improvement in this perception was observed was in the South, where 89.1% of respondents agreed with the statement in the second wave, compared to 78.2% in the first wave. Nevertheless, perceptions amongst respondents of communal trust were relatively high across all districts but were lowest in Tripoli at 78.5%.

The final question related to social cohesion in the community queried respondents on their communities’ sense of collective action, asking ‘how likely’ it was that neighbours would intervene to resolve a dispute, with the question, ‘If some of your neighbours got into a fight would someone intervene to resolve it?’ Revealing similarly high rates of social cohesion and collective efficacy, 87.3% of respondents said this was somehow likely in the second wave, compared to 90.7% in the first wave, a statistically significant but minor drop.

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Figure 5.3: Change in perceptions of social cohesion by wave.

Agreement with the following statements by wave.

Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together.

Lebanese and Syrians share many values and have compatible lifestyles.

The Lebanese people in this area have since 2011 been good hosts to refugees displaced by the Syrian conflict who are in need.

The presence of a large number of Syrian refugees in this community has contributed to more incidents of crime and violence.

The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon’s resources, like water and electricity.
In more vulnerable cadastres, a 6.1 percentage point decrease in the stated likelihood of such action left 84.5% of respondents agreeing with this statement in the second wave. Of Lebanese respondents, 87.9% said such intervention was somehow likely in their area, compared to 92.1% in the first wave.

Across all three items querying social cohesion, several common themes were observed. The sense of solidarity amongst respondents in more vulnerable cadastres declined modestly. All governorates saw a decline in respondents’ agreement with these statements except for the South, where there were considerably improved perceptions of social cohesion. And while still positive, on average, respondents in Tripoli and the Matn were nevertheless the least likely to agree with these statements.

5.4. Refugee Population Pressure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section Key Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In the second wave, 91.3% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘the Lebanese people in this area have since 2011 been good hosts to refugees displaced by the Syrian conflict who are in need’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nationally, 52.1% of respondents agreed with ‘Lebanese and Syrians share many values and have compatible lifestyles’ compared to 43.2% during the first wave.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To assess perception of refugee population pressures—and Lebanese perceptions of the impact of this pressure on host communities—respondents were asked some questions related to the impact of the refugee crisis on their communities.

Over both waves, respondents’ agreement with the statement, ‘the Lebanese people in this area have since 2011 been good hosts to refugees displaced by the Syrian conflict who are in need’ remained relatively stable, reaching 91.3% during the second wave. Similarly, agreement with this statement amongst both Lebanese (91.9%) and Syrians (88.4%) remained constant between waves, with Lebanese significantly more likely to agree with this sentiment.

Across geographic categories, the South saw the greatest increase in average agreement, with 15.8 percentage point increase in agreement, climbing to 90.7%. Agreement with this statement declined somewhat in the Beqaa,
however, from 94.0% in the first wave to 82.2% in the second wave. The level of agreement with this statement was relatively high across all districts; however, it was lowest in Sidon and Jezzine (83.1%) and highest in Zgharta (97.8%).

Agreement with the statement, ‘Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together’ increased by 5.2 percentage points, reaching 58.6% agreement in the second wave. This was driven primarily by an increase in the percentage of Lebanese respondents who agreed with this statement, which rose from 49.5% to 54.0%, relative to the 80.6% of Syrian respondents who agreed with the statement in the second wave.

In Akkar, where 39.6% of respondents agreed with the statement regarding Lebanese and Syrians working together to solve problems in the first wave, only 21.9% agreed in the second wave. The most prominent increases in agreement with this statement were in the governorates of Baalbek-Hermel, Mount Lebanon, and the South, where agreement rose by 13.9, 12.2, and 11.7 percentage points respectively.

While Lebanese respondents in all districts felt that ‘Lebanese were good hosts to Syrian refugees’, agreement with this statement was strongest in Miniyeh-Danniyeh, with 80.1% agreeing.

When asked their agreement with the statement, ‘The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon’s resources, like water and electricity’, the overwhelming majority of Lebanese agreed (92.9%), but 76.7% of Syrian respondents also agreed with phrase in the second wave, compared to 71.0% in the first wave.

In the South, 80.7% of respondents agreed with the statement, compared to 67.5% during the first wave. The fraction of respondents in Beirut who agreed with the statement fell from 99.7% in the first wave to 87% in the second wave. Perhaps indicating somewhat lesser perceptions of refugee population pressures in these areas, agreement with this statement also fell somewhat in Baalbek-Hermel, from 97.2% to 85.5%, and in Akkar, from 89.2% to 79.4%.

With regards to the statement ‘Lebanese and Syrians share many values and have compatible lifestyles’, 52.1% of respondents agreed with this compared to 43.2% during the first wave. Syrians were significantly more likely to agree with this statement than their Lebanese counterparts. In the second wave, 72.6% agreed with this statement. Similarly, while 41.0% of Lebanese respondents agreed with this statement in the first wave, this rose to 47.6% in the second wave. An increase in agreement with this statement was observed within
both vulnerable and non-vulnerable cadastres, with 46.7% of respondents in non-vulnerable cadastres agreeing with this statement in the second wave compared to 35.8% in the first wave. And in more vulnerable cadastres, 55.7% agreed with this statement, a 7.6 percentage point increase from the first wave. However, across geographics, a 21.1 percentage point drop in Beirut left 69.1% of respondents agreeing with this statement. Likewise, a decrease of 9.9 percentage points in Akkar left 20.6% of respondents in the governorate agreeing with this statement. On the other end of the spectrum, a 29.4 percentage point increase saw 77.1% of respondents in the South agreeing with statement. Similarly, in the Beqaa, 38.4% of respondents agreed with the statement in the second wave, compared to 15.1% in the first. In Mount Lebanon, agreement with this statement rose from 35.9% in the first wave to 50.7% in the second wave. Miniyeh-Danniyeh was the district with the highest agreement in the second wave, at 80.9%. And the level of agreement with this statement was lowest in the districts of Batroun, Bsharri and Koura and Zgharta, dropping in the second wave to 19.5% and 14.7% respectively.

In the three months between waves, respondents’ attitudes on the relationship between the presence of Syrian refugees and the incidence of crime and violence did not change significantly, with the overwhelming majority (78.1%) of respondents in the second wave still agreeing with statement, ‘The presence of a large number of Syrian refugees in this community has contributed to more incidents of crime and violence’. Syrians, of course, were less likely to agree with this statement; compared to the 42.5% of Syrian respondents who agreed with the statement in the first wave, 47.2% did so in the second wave. In more vulnerable cadastres, 80.7% agreed with the statement (relative to 82.8% in the first wave), and in non-vulnerable cadastres, 74.1% agreed (relative to 76.0% in the first wave).
5.5. Vulnerability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section Key Findings</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Of the multiple concerns or vulnerabilities queried, 33.5% of Lebanese in the second wave said they, ‘worried about the prevalence of weapons not held by Lebanese security services in the area where [they] live’ compared to 40.5% during the first wave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Despite some decrease in the level of food insecurity, significant levels of this vulnerability were still observed in areas, with 28.6% of households nationally worried ‘often’ or ‘all the time’ about ‘making sure [their] household has enough money to buy food before what food [they] have runs out’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The fear of crime decreased in some areas, with 36.0% of respondents in vulnerable cadastres worried about the ‘threat of crime’ in the second wave, down from 49.9% in the first wave.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To assess vulnerability - along with other measures of socioeconomic status and exposure to victimisation or violence - respondents were asked ‘how often’ they worried about nine different plausible threats to their or their family’s well-being. Possible response options for each item included, ‘never’, ‘sometimes’, ‘often’, and ‘all the time’.

Over the three months between both waves of the survey, the fraction of respondents who worried ‘often’ or ‘all the time’ about ‘making sure [their] household has enough money to buy food before what food [they] have runs out’ decreased to 28.6% from 35.5%. The greatest decrease in food insecurity was observed in Syrian households, with 41.7% of Syrian respondents worrying ‘all the time’ or ‘often’, compared to 61.5% of Syrian respondents during the first wave. Even with this decline in the level of food insecurity, however, the rate remained alarmingly high amongst this population. A decrease in food insecurity, albeit a lesser decrease than amongst Syrian households, was also observed amongst Lebanese respondents, with a 5.7 percentage point decrease in this rate to 25.7% of households.

In the first wave, 32.8% of respondents in vulnerable cadastres expressed concerns about food security, compared to 27.5% of respondents in the second wave. In non-vulnerable cadastres, a 9.4 percentage point decrease resulted in 30.3% of respondents worrying about this in the second wave. A decline in rates of food insecurity was observed in all governorates except Beirut. In Beirut,
43.2% of respondents reported worrying ‘often’ or ‘all the time’, compared to 15.2% of respondents in the first wave. In Matn, 62.4% of respondents said they worried about this, while in Rashaya and West Bekaa only 0.8% said so.

Concern about being able ‘to buy the fuel [they] need for cooking or heating [their] home’ decreased amongst both Lebanese and Syrian respondents. Amongst Syrian respondents, this reached 45.1% in the second wave, compared to 58.2% in the first wave. Of Lebanese, 27.1% stated that this worried about this ‘often’ or ‘all the time’, compared to 30.4% in the first wave.

The fraction of Syrians who said worried about ‘obtaining access to safe drinking water for [themselves] or [their] household’ decreased by 11.3 percentage points to 43.3%. This decrease was less pronounced for Lebanese respondents, with a decline in this rate from 29.1% in the first wave to 25.3% in the second wave. In more vulnerable cadastres, 29.8% of respondents said they worried about this, a decline from 32.3% in the first wave; while in non-vulnerable cadastres 31.0% said they worried about this in the second wave, compared to 37.3% in the first wave.

The fraction of respondents who said worried about ‘the threat of crime’ declined to 32.8% during the second wave. An acute decrease was observed in more vulnerable cadastres, where 36.0% in the second wave indicated they worry about the threat of crime, down from 49.3% reporting so in the first wave. In non-vulnerable cadastres, 27.9% said they worried about this, compared to 33.2% in the first wave. The fraction Lebanese respondents who said they worried about this decreased by 11.8 percentage points, reaching 31.0%. And 42.3% of Syrian respondents in the second wave said they worried about this, dropping from 45.7% in the first wave.

The Beqaa and the North were the only two governorates where concern about the threat of crime increased, reaching 31.7% and 39.6%, an increase of 12.6% and 8.9% respectively. In Akkar, those who reported worrying about this decreased from 63.7% to 16.9%. In Beirut, this rate dropped to 47.2%; however, respondents from Beirut, across both waves, were still the most likely to report being worried by this.

Likewise, respondents who worried about ‘the prevalence of weapons not held by Lebanese security services in the area where [they] live’ decreased by 6.0 percentage points, reaching 34.5% nationally. Of Lebanese, those who worried about this decreased to 33.5% from 40.5%, while Syrians who worried about this decreased to 40.2% in the second wave from 42.3% in the first wave. Respondents in more vulnerable cadastres who worry about the prevalence
Figure 5.4: Amongst Syrian households, greatest concerns and vulnerabilities, by wave.

'How often would you say you worry about each of the following? Would you say...' Syrian only.

- Access to medical care or medication for yourself or others in your household.
- Acts of terrorism targeting civilians, like car bombs.
- Being able to buy the fuel you need for cooking or for heating your home.
- Being able to travel within Lebanon safely, for work or to see family.
- Making sure your household has enough money to buy food before what food you have runs out.
- Obtaining access to safe drinking water for yourself or household.
- Raids conducted by security agencies.
- The prevalence of weapons not held by Lebanese security services in the area where you live.
- The threat of crime.

Response: [Almost never] [Sometimes] [Often] [All the time]
of such weapons decreased by 9.1 percentage points to reach 37.5%. In the North, those who worried about these weapons increased to 52.3% from 28.8%. However, in Beirut where 100% of respondents worried about this in the first wave, this dropped to 56.4% in the second wave. Similarly, respondents in the Akkar worried less about this, reaching 16.2% in the second wave. Across districts, in Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun 5.9% of respondents worried about this, whereas in Beirut 78.0% of respondents did so.

When respondents were asked how often they worried about ‘being able to travel within Lebanon safely, for work or to see family’, 44.5% said they worried ‘often’ or ‘all the time’ about this in the second wave, compared to 37.8% in the first wave. In more vulnerable cadastres, 33.7% of respondents said they worried about their ability to travel within the country, up from 28.4% in the first wave.

Asked about their concern over ‘raids conducted by security agencies’, 29.7% of Syrian respondents said worried about this in the second wave, compared to 37.9% during the first.

Finally, respondents were asked how often they worried about ‘acts of terrorism targeting civilians, like car bombs’. This concern, too, was lesser for respondents in the second wave, with the fraction of those who said they worried about this ‘often’ or ‘all the time’ declining from 42.2% in the first wave to 31.4% in the second wave. Lebanese respondents who worried about this decreased from 42.9% reaching 30.3% in the second wave, while for Syrian respondents, the fraction of those who said they worried about this ‘often’ or ‘all the time’ remained constant at 37.9%.

5.6. Socio-Economic Status and Employment

Over the two waves, 71.6% of Syrian respondents reported an average monthly household income of less than 1,000,000 LBP ($667), whereas a majority of Lebanese households (64.3%) reported an average monthly household income of between 1,000,000 and 3,000,000 LBP. Over governorates, average monthly household income was lowest in Akkar, where 60.3% reported an average of less than 1,000,000 LBP per month. In contrast, where the cost of living is also higher on average, the percentage of households in Beirut reporting an average monthly income of less than 1,000,000 LBP was 16.3%.

For the second wave of surveying, demographic questions were amended to include additional categories for employment status, for example, to further
differentiate between daily labour and part-time employment status and to
differentiate between working and non-working students. As such, the esti-
mates reported in Table 5.1 are from the second wave data only. It should
be noted, however, that using status codes from the first wave, between both
waves, employment statistics for both Syrian and Lebanese respondents did
not change significantly.

To assess and calculate the employment statistics given in Table 5.1, re-
pondents were asked about the number of household members and their
current employment status: how many members of the household (including
the interviewee) were working full-time, part-time, or as daily labourers, house
wives, students working, students not working, retirees, unemployed with a
disability, unemployed and actively seeking employment, unemployed and not
seeking employment and how many members had other employment statuses.
Over three quarters (78.1%) of the Lebanese active labour force was employed
on a full-time basis, compared to only 59.1% of the Syrian active labour force.⁷
Syrians were much more likely to be working in daily labour (20.5%) relative to
their Lebanese counterparts (2.1%).

Respondents were also queried regarding the sectors in which at least one
person in the household was employed. Second wave results indicated that
22.3% of Lebanese households had at least one family member employed in
wholesale and retail trade, while a further 20.7% of households had at least
one member employed in the professional services industry. Amongst Syrian
households, 30.7% had at least one member employed in the construction
sector, and a further 20.5% had at least one member employed in the
agricultural sector.

Households members employed on a full-time or part-time basis, daily labour-
ers, and students who were working were asked the employment type of
these family members, whether these members were employees, employers,
or own-account workers.⁸ Of such cases, 68.1% of employed Lebanese were
employees, compared to 86.2% of Syrians. Employers made up 18.0% of
Lebanese and 4.2% of Syrian workers. Finally, 13.95% of Lebanese workers
were classified as own account workers, compared to 9.6% of Syrian workers.

Respondents were also asked about their occupation. Answers were classified
according to the International Labour Organisation (ILO)’s International Stan-

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⁷Where the ‘active labour force’ refers to those employed or unemployed and seeking
employment, excluding the fraction unemployed and not seeking employment in any category.
⁸With the difference between an employer and an own-account worker being that an own-
account worker did not employ any additional persons.
Table 5.1: Employment status by nationality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Lebanese</th>
<th>Syrian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working full-time</td>
<td>78.10%</td>
<td>59.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working part-time</td>
<td>10.10%</td>
<td>8.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Labourer</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
<td>20.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House wife</td>
<td>17.50%</td>
<td>15.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student, Not Working</td>
<td>27.20%</td>
<td>19.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student, Working</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
<td>7.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>child too young for school</td>
<td>6.70%</td>
<td>12.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School aged child, not working not at school</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working, with disability</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working, actively looking for employment</td>
<td>4.80%</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working, not seeking employment</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employment status</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08), with responses manually coded to match those in the 'sub-major group'. Following the ILO standard, business owners were excluded in the calculation of these rates. With regards to the most prevalent employment categories, for employed females, 17.6% were classified as ‘teaching professionals’, further 15.3% as ‘sales workers’, and 10.5% as ‘health professionals’. For male workers, 12.4% were classified in ‘building and related trades workers, excluding electricians’, 9.1% as ‘sales workers’, and 8.1% as ‘personal service workers’.

Because competition over jobs has been a frequently cited source of tension, Lebanese respondents were asked, ‘Has anyone you know lost their job/business or occupation to a Syrian’. To which, 48.3% of respondents in non-vulnerable cadastres said they knew someone who lost their job/business to a Syrian in the second wave compared to 27.6% during the first, and 41.6% of respondents in vulnerable cadastres answered the same, a 7.9% percentage point increase from the first wave. Across governorates, the Beqaa saw the greatest increase in reports of hearing about jobs lost to Syrians, with a 27.7 percentage point increase and 53.5% of respondents in the governorate responding in the affirmative.
Of households with children (under the age of 16), 32.4% of Syrian respondents stated there was at least one child working, a 5.5 percentage point increase from the first wave, while significantly fewer Lebanese households (7.3%) reported the same. Rates of child labour were also higher in more vulnerable cadasters. In more vulnerable cadastres, 13.0% households reported at least one child working, relative to 10.9% in non-vulnerable cadastres. Reports of child labour in the second wave were highest in Nabatiye and the South.

5.7. Access to Essential Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section Key Findings</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In vulnerable cadastres, 29.3% of respondents rated their waste removal services as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In Nabatiye, only 1.5% of respondents rated their electricity service as ‘good’ or ‘excellent’, down from 7.0% in the first wave.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In order to measure respondents’ access to and satisfaction with a series of public services, respondents were asked to share their opinions on the quality of (and access to) several public services in their area: electricity, water, sewerage, waste removal, education, health services, social services, public and recreational space, and environmental services.

Compared to the first wave, fewer respondents rated their electricity service as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’; a 13.5 percentage point decrease left only 27.9% of respondents satisfied with this service. Furthermore, 33.1% of respondents rated their electricity service as fair during the second wave relative to 22.2% during the first. Across nationalities, 26.4% of Lebanese rated this service as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’, down from 41.0% during the first wave. Likewise, amongst Syrian respondents, this satisfaction rate dropped from 46.9% to 34.7%.

Across governorates, in Mount Lebanon, 27.7% rated electricity access as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’, a drop from 52.8%. Respondents from Nabatiye appeared to be least satisfied with this service, with only 1.5% of respondents rating the service as ‘good’ or ‘excellent’, down from 7.0% in the first wave.

The fraction of the public satisfied with their water service similarly dropped from 43.0% in the first wave to 26.0% in the second wave. The decline in satisfaction with water services was observed amongst both Lebanon and Syrian respondents, with the fraction of Lebanese satisfied with this service
falling from 41.0% to 26.4%, and with the fraction of Syrians satisfied with this service falling from 46.9% to 34.7%.

Similarly, satisfaction with sewerage quality nationally dropped 18.3 percentage points to reach 25.8% satisfaction in the public. Satisfaction with sewerage service was somewhat lower in more vulnerable cadastres (21.5%) compared to non-vulnerable cadastres (32.3%).

Across governorates, except for the Akkar and Baalbek-Hermel governorates, the percentage of respondents who rated their satisfaction with sewerage as 'excellent' or 'good' dropped. The greatest drop in satisfaction with sewerage services was observed in the Beqaa, where a 54.6 percentage point fall left only 13.4% of respondents in the governorate satisfied with their sewerage services. Additionally, in the North, only 12.3% of respondents in the second wave were satisfied with this service, compared to 44.3% in the first wave.

With regards to waste removal, 52.6% of respondents in the first wave rated their level of satisfaction as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’; however, this dropped to only 36.6% of respondents in the second wave. This decrease in average satisfaction with the quality of waste removal was observed in both more vulnerable and non-vulnerable cadastres.

Respondents’ satisfaction with educational services in their areas also declined, reaching 47.4% in the second wave, a 17.7 percentage point drop. Responses in more vulnerable and non-vulnerable cadastres were similar, with respondents reporting a decrease in educational services being perceived as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’ and an increase in those who rated the quality of the service only as ‘fair’.

All governorates witnessed an increase in the percentage of respondents who rated educational services as ‘fair’. In Nabatiye, the South, and Baalbek-Hermel governorates, this was largely driven by a decrease in those who rated this service as ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’, thus indicating some increase in more positive perceptions of this service in these areas. The quality of educational services was rated highest in the districts of Beirut (93.3%), Zgharta (92.1%), and Batroun, Bcharri, and Koura (82.4%), while in Baalbek and Hermel, only 14.3% of respondents rated this service as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’.

As with other services, satisfaction with health services saw a 9.4 percentage point decrease between both waves, to reach only 22.6% satisfaction in the second wave. Satisfaction with social services also fell to reach 18.1% in the second wave, down from 28.3% in the first wave. In the North governorate, a 23.3 percentage point increase left a majority (56.0%) in the second wave stating that access to social services was ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’. 
When asked to list the top three services or resources in their area in the greatest need of improvement, 18.4% of respondents cited medical care, followed by electricity (15.6%) and access to jobs (13.5%).

5.8. Capability and Fairness of Service Provision and Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section Key Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Just a third (32.8%) of respondents in the second wave agreed with the statement ‘International aid/assistance goes to the people who most deserve it’, compared to nearly half of respondents (48.5%) in the first wave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In the second wave, nearly all (90.3%) respondents in the most vulnerable cadastres agreed with the statement, ‘Vulnerable Lebanese have been neglected in international aid/assistance programmes’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reflecting fewer options for problem-solving amongst Syrians, only 38.9% of Syrian respondents agreed with the statement, ‘If I am dissatisfied with a service I am able to voice my concern with proper authorities’, compared to 55.7% of Lebanese respondents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were asked a series of questions to assess their opinions and views on the capability and fairness of service delivery in their area. Respondents were asked to what extent they agree with the statement, ‘International aid/assistance goes to the people who most deserve it’. Compared to the 48.5% of respondents who ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with this statement during the first wave, only 32.8% agreed during the second. In more vulnerable cadastres, 31.1% of respondents agreed with the statement during the second wave, an 18 percentage point decrease compared to results from the first wave. A similar trend was observed in non-vulnerable cadastres, where a 12.3 percentage point decrease saw 35.3% of respondents agreeing with the statement. This decrease was particularly acute amongst Lebanese respondents, among which a 16.6 percentage point drop left 31.8% of Lebanese respondents agreeing with the statement in the second wave, compared to 37.6% of Syrian respondents.

With regards to the level of agreement with the similar statement, ‘Vulnerable Lebanese have been neglected in international aid/assistance programmes’, 82.0% of respondents agreed with this statement in the second wave, compared to 87.9% of respondents in the first wave. In more vulnerable cadastres, 90.3%
of respondents agreed with the statement in the first wave, 84.6% agreed with this statement in the second wave. Also in non-vulnerable cadastres, a 5.7 percentage point decrease resulted in 78.1% of respondents agreeing with the statement during the second wave. In the Beqaa, 81.8% of respondents agreed with this statement in the second wave, compared to 95.0% in the first wave. Similarly, in the Baalbek-Hermel governorate, 93.1% agreement fell to 80.1%. In Nabatiye, 97.5% of respondents agreed with this statement in the second wave, compared to 95.7% in the first wave. Across districts, respondents in Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun were amongst the most the likely to agree with this statement, with 97.2% of respondents agreeing with the statement over both waves.

When asked about their agreement with the statement, ‘The municipality is doing the best it can to respond to the needs of people in this community’, 63.3% of respondents agreed with this in the second wave compared to 62.8% in the first wave. Whilst Lebanese respondents held similar opinions regarding this statement over the two waves, the fraction of Syrians in the survey who agreed with this statement increased 8.8 percentage points, to reach 64.8% of the population.

Finally, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement, ‘If I am dissatisfied with a service I am able to voice my concern with proper authorities’. In the second wave, 52.6% of respondents agreed with the statement, compared to 55.6% of respondents in the first wave. This decrease was reported across both vulnerable and non-vulnerable cadastres, with 49.3% of respondents in vulnerable cadastres in agreeing with the statement in the second wave of the survey, compared to 52.5% in the first wave. Syrian respondents continued to be less likely to agree with this statement, with only 38.9% of Syrian respondents agreeing with this statement in the second wave, compared to 55.7% of Lebanese respondents.

Across governorates, in the Beqaa, a 29.7 percentage point decrease left only 37.4% of respondents agreeing with the statement, ‘If I am dissatisfied with a service I am able to voice my concern with proper authorities’. In the South, 41.5% of respondents agreed with the statement, reflecting a 21.1 percentage point decrease in the level of agreement. Over the two waves, however, Beirut saw an increase of 20.4 percentage point increase in the fraction agreeing with this statement.
6. Structural Causes of Tensions

Structural drivers of conflict in the context of this report may be understood as the cornerstone of how the relationship between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities has evolved; the history of relations between these communities; and long-term socio-economic conditions in an area. Possible structural causes of tension or conflict would not be expected to change greatly over time but correspond to important environmental factors. Due to a greater focus in the research on understanding the proximate and evolving causes of conflict, relatively fewer questions in the survey related to structural causes of tensions.

6.1. Historical Causes

Amongst Lebanese respondents, in the second wave of the survey 73.4% of respondents ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with the statement, ‘Memories of the Syrian army occupation still impair relationships with Syrians’, an 8.2 percentage point decrease compared to results from the first wave. During the second wave, agreement with this statement was also asked of Syrian respondents, of whom 61.2% ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with this statement, reflecting a shared Lebanese-Syrian understanding of some historical causes of tension. In Beirut, the first to the second wave, agreement with the statement declined from nearly 100% in the first wave to 74.8% of respondents in the second wave. In Nabatiye, the percentage of respondents who disagreed with the statement rose from 25.6% to 50.2%. At the district level, agreement with the statement was highest in Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (92.7%), Zgharta (90.3%), and Jbeil and Keserwan (90.2%), and disagreement with the statement was highest in the districts of Tyre (50.3%), Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun (43.5%), and Nabatiye (41.5%).
6.2. Pre-existing Relations with Syrians

When asked about their agreement with the phrase ‘Relationships with Syrians who have lived in our area before the Syrian war are much better than with those who came afterwards’, 60.5% of Lebanese respondents said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ during the first wave, compared to 67.6% of Lebanese during the second wave. When Syrian respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with the same statement, 73.5% said they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’.

In the second wave, 54.8% of Lebanese respondents in Beirut expressed their agreement with the statement, compared to only 2.1% during the first. Likewise in Nabatiye, 74.4% of Lebanese respondents agreed with the statement in the second wave, compared to 51.9% in the first wave. Amongst districts, the level of agreement was highest in Zgharta (92.8%), followed by Baalbek and Hermel (87.3%), and Batroun, Bsharri and Koura (80.3%). Nationally, agreement with the statement amongst Sunni Muslims increased by 17.4 percentage points to reach 59.9% of the confessional group.

Over the two waves, Lebanese were more likely to agree in the second wave with the phrase, ‘Syrians have lived amicably in our area for a long time’, with those who ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with the phrase increasing by 10.5 percentage points nationally to reach 70.7% of the public. Agreement with the phrase amongst Syrians remained high in the second wave, with 83.2% agreeing to some extent with the statement. Lebanese respondents in Baalbek-Hermel were more likely to agree with the statement during the second wave (76.2%) than the first (53.2%). Amongst districts, the level of agreement was highest in Akkar (96.1%), Aley (91.0%), and Chouf (86.2%), whereas the level of disagreement was highest in the districts of Rashaya and West Bekaa (65.4%), Nabatiye (56.6%), and Beirut (55.4%).
7. Discussion

While this report focused on changes in perceptions and experiences over time, amongst both the Lebanese and Syrian refugee publics in the country, it should be emphasised that, on average, public opinion shifted only moderately over this relatively short three-month period, and it was expected that public opinion concerning tensions and social stability factors would change only gradually. Where notable shifts in public opinion were documented, these were, for the most part, directly attributable to security incidents or security agency operations, for example, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) operations in the Ras Baalbek area, which took place during the fielding of this second wave of the survey. For the interpretation of these results, the effect of such operations on public opinion should be assumed to be a short-term ‘shock’, in that while such operations may have had immediate positive and negative impacts on public perceptions, these would be expected to return to baseline levels after a period of relatively greater stability. Operations such as these tended both to heighten Lebanese perceptions of refugee population pressure, most likely due to the nature of news and reporting around the operations, but these operations also, on average, enhanced Lebanese perceptions of the capability of Lebanese government institutions, in particular, trust in the LAF and other security agencies.

7.1. Summary of Conflict Causes

Trigger and Conflict Events. The rate of exposure to armed conflict rose in some geographies, but once more, this was mainly attributable to security agency operations, for example, with the rate of witnessing armed violence doubling in the governorate of Baalbek-Hermel from 14.9% in the first wave to 31.7% in the second wave. Syrian refugees remained significantly more likely to experience assault and other forms of victimisation, and compared to their Lebanese counterparts, Syrians were less likely to report seeking help in the
event of any form of victimisation. Nevertheless, nationally, the rate of those who said they ‘did nothing’ upon a report of any form of victimisation fell from 32.0% to 24.1%, indicating in party greater public confidence in the police and other official authorities responsible for safety and protection.

**Proximate Causes of Tension.** *Competition for lower-skilled job remained the most cited Lebanese and Syrian driver of inter-communal tensions,* with the fraction naming this as one of the causes of tension rising marginally from 60.6% in the first wave to 63.6% in the second wave. Regionally, the greatest decreases in Lebanese perceptions of inter-communal tensions were observed in the governorates of the South and Nabatiyeh, where against multiple metrics, negative perceptions of Syrian refugees and their impact on host-community life improved. Asked, ‘How would you describe current relations between Lebanese and Syrians who live in this area?’ Nationally, only 25.8% of respondents rated relations as positive, down from 30.6% of respondents in the first wave.

While these perceptions generally improved in the South, the governorates of Akkar, Beqaa and the North saw the greatest loss in positive Lebanese perceptions of Syrian refugee and host-community relations. *Lebanese, on average, were not greatly concerned about safety and security, compared to other, i.e. socio-economic, drives of instability.* Nearly all (94.6%) said they felt ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’, and asked how the security situation had changed over the previous three months, the majority (68.3%) said that it ‘stayed about the same’. *Despite some decrease in the level of food insecurity, significant levels of this vulnerability were still observed in areas,* with 28.6% of households nationally worried ‘often’ or ‘all the time’ about ‘making sure [their] household has enough money to buy food before what food [they] have runs out’.

Greater levels of inter-community contact were associated with better respondent ratings of the quality of relations between communities and with lower levels of Lebanese prejudice toward Syrian refugees. *Lebanese and Syrians both named ‘social bonds’ and ‘pre-existing relations’ as amongst the most important factors for peace between the two communities.* Lebanese were most likely to have frequent contact with Syrians ‘at work’, ‘in the street’ and ‘in shops’. Lebanese and Syrian reports of interaction increased significantly in the governorates of the Beqaa and Baalbek-Hermel. And the level of inter-community contact remained the lowest in predominately Christian areas of the country, which also tend to host, on average, few Syrian refugees.

Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement, ‘Violence is sometimes necessary when your interests are being threatened’. This was used as one of the key indicators of ‘propensity to
violence’. A 10.7 percentage point increase left 60.8% of agreeing to some extent with this statement in the second wave. The level of agreement with this statement increased across all governorates in the second wave.

**Evolving Causes of Tension.** Most respondents regarded municipal authorities as playing a positive role in improving quality of life and managing host-community and refugee tensions; however, Lebanese were somewhat more likely to provide a positive report of the municipal authorities in non-vulnerable cadasters (76.0%) relative to more-vulnerable cadasters (68.1%). However, a majority of Lebanese also supported some more-negative actions that a municipality might take, with, for example, 86.9% of respondents supporting ‘restrictions on foreigners movement or curfews’. A majority of both Lebanese and Syrians agreed with the statement, ‘The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon’s resources, like water and electricity’. Perceptions of the capability and fairness of service provision declined somewhat, with only 32.8% agreeing with the statement, ‘international aid/assistance goes to the people who most deserve it’, compared to 48.5% in the first wave. This level of dissatisfaction with aid provision was most pronounced in districts with relatively fewer Syrian refugees-per-capita and likely reflected the targeting of aid to regions with a larger share of the refugees in the country. In the districts of Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, and Marjeyoun, 97.2% agreed with the statement, ‘vulnerable Lebanese have been neglected in international aid/assistance programmes’. Of households with children (under the age of 16), 32.4% of Syrian respondents stated there was at least one child working, a 5.5 percentage point increase from the first wave, while significantly fewer Lebanese households (7.3%) reported the same.

**Structural Causes of Tension.** Public opinion around a number of plausible structural causes of tension changed little over the two waves. While most Lebanese (70.7%) agreed with the statement, ‘Syrians have lived amicably in our area for a long time’, majorities also agreed with the statements, ‘relationships with Syrians who have lived in our area before the Syrian war are much better than with those who came afterwards’ (60.5%) and ‘memories of the Syrian army occupation still impair relationships with Syrians’ (73.4%).

7.2. Refugee Population Pressures

A scalar measure of the perception of refugee population pressure was constructed by summing agreement with a number of related items in the
survey, for example, agreement with the statements, ‘the presence of a large number of Syrian refugees in this community has contributed to more incidents of crime and violence’ and ‘the presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon’s resources, like water and electricity’. Multiple regression was then used to identify which other variables—or characteristics of respondents and their communities—were most strongly associated with a greater perception of refugee population pressure.

What the results of this analysis strongly indicated was that there were two separate ‘paths’ to the likelihood of perceiving a greater degree of refugee population pressure. The first was related to observed levels of other vulnerabilities and experiences. For example, Lebanese who said they personally knew someone who had lost their job to Syrian, and Lebanese in the lowest income category, were significantly more likely to report higher levels of the perception of refugee population pressure.

However, many of the strongest correlations with a greater perception of refugee population pressure—the second ‘path’—were not directly attributable to personal experiences or interactions between Lebanese and Syrians. For example, there was no direct relationship between individual satisfaction with service provision and the perception of refugee population pressure. This was also true aggregated at the district level. As depicted in Figure 7.1, the only districts where Lebanese dissatisfaction with service provision and the perception of refugee population pressures were both significantly higher than the national average were in the governorate of Nabatieh—though, perceptions of Syrian refugees in this geography did improve significantly from wave-to-wave.

Though income alone was not a perfect proxy for socio-economic status, the relationship between income levels and the perception of refugee population pressures was illustrative of the ‘two paths’ findings. Controlling for other factors, the lowest average perception of refugee population pressures was amongst the lower-middle income category of 1,000,000 - 2,000,000 L.L. per month. That is, the relationship between income levels and the perception of refugee population pressures was ‘J-shaped’, with average scores on the population pressure index declining from the lowest income category of less than 500,000 L.L. to this lower-middle minimum, and then increasing to a maximum amongst the highest income category of over 6,000,000 L.L. per month. Thus, after controlling for other factors, the greatest Lebanese perception of refugee population pressures was within households with the greatest monthly income.
These two separate ‘paths’ to the likelihood of perceiving a greater degree of refugee population pressure may be explained by a number of factors. The first is that Lebanese perceptions of the Syrian refugee presence are informed by a number of realities independent of personal experience or having been personally affected by host community and refugee dynamics. *Negative perceptions of refugees are heightened in some areas of Lebanon, even those with a minimal actual presence of refugees, by other political dynamics, including sectarian dynamics.* Even after controlling for socio-economic status, personal interaction with refugee communities, and other factors, Lebanese Christians, Shia and Druze were nevertheless more likely to have negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees, as measured both by the average level of prejudice in these confessional communities and as measured by the average assessment of the negative impacts of the refugee presence.

However, to suggest that these dynamics were solely a result of sectarianism would be an over-simplification. Many Lebanese Sunnis also had strong perceptions of negative refugee population pressures. And even after controlling for confessional identity and the fractional distribution of Syrian refugees in the country, meaningful variation in Lebanese perceptions of refugee population pressures remained. Even with a large fraction of Syrian refugees residing in the Bekaa, Syrian refugees in Lebanon nevertheless resided disproportionately in predominately Sunni areas. *Those areas with a larger fraction of refugees were also more likely to have received assistance, and there were other factors in these areas which also mitigated tensions and the perception of refugee population pressure.* For example, in areas where there were more Syrian refugees per capita, the public also generally had more positive perceptions.
of the impact of assistance, and amongst Lebanese, greater social interaction with Syrians in Lebanon (which was more likely to occur in more nationality-mixed areas) was also associated with lesser perceptions of tensions and less concern over refugee population pressures. Thus, more positive perceptions amongst Lebanese Sunnis, relative to their Lebanese counterparts belonging to other confessional groups, was also partially explained by these other mitigating factors.

Finally, the current perception of refugee population pressure also depended heavily on a number of historic or structural factors. *Lebanese who agreed with statements like, ‘memories of the Syrian army occupation still impair relationships with Syrians’ were also significantly more likely to consider refugee population pressures as mounting.*

### 7.3. Impact of Assistance

Regarding the fairness of assistance, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statements, ‘international aid/assistance goes to the people who most deserve it’ and ‘vulnerable Lebanese have been neglected in international aid/assistance programmes’. The level of agreement with the two items—coded in opposite directions—was used as the dependent variable to assess individual and regional correlations with the level of perceived fairness in the provision of assistance.

*The strongest predictors of positive perceptions of the impact of assistance were those that had to do with both confidence in and satisfaction with institutions responsible for service provision.* Those who were more satisfied with the quality of services in their area were also more likely to regard international assistance as fair. Those who had confidence in their municipalities, for example, those agreeing with the statement, ‘the municipality is doing the best it can to respond to the needs of people in this community’, and those who had confidence in other government authorities were also more likely to regard international assistance as fair – as also benefitting vulnerable Lebanese or Lebanese in need of assistance.

Syrians generally regarded assistance as ‘fair’ by these metrics. However, vulnerable Lebanese were less likely to agree. Households with a combined monthly income of less than 1,000,000 L.L. were less likely to regard assistance as fair, as were those residing in households that were multi-dimensionally vulnerable (see p. 55).
Even after accounting for a number of other social and demographic factors which might plausibly have affected perceptions of the fairness of assistance, there remained strong district-level differences in this outcome, which broadly fit into three tiers. Districts in which the perceptions of the fairness of assistance was significantly above the national average included Rachaya, Aley, the Chouf, Miniyeh-Danniyeh, Sidon, Jezzine and Tyre. Districts where the perception of the fairness of aid was significantly below the national average included Bint Jbeil, Marjeyoun and Nabatiyeh.

At the cadastral level, between vulnerable and non-vulnerable cadastres, there was a statistically significant difference between the perception of the fairness of assistance, but it was minor. The mean on the index used to assess the perception of the fairness of assistance in vulnerable cadasters was 2.7 and in non-vulnerable cadasters was 2.8. The difference between the two of 0.1 points was only equivalent to 0.07 standard deviations in the scale; the magnitude of this difference was negligibly small.

7.4. Vulnerability Levels

The ‘Most Vulnerable Localities in Lebanon’ designates two hundred cadasters in Lebanon as ‘vulnerable’. For those cadasters designated as vulnerable, these are further subdivided into five quintiles. This yields six levels of vulnerability: not-vulnerable, first most-vulnerable, second most-vulnerable, etc. These vulnerabilities levels were used as a basis for sampling, to ensure that more-vulnerable cadasters were adequately represented in the sample. In this brief discussion of vulnerability levels, correlations with a vulnerable designation on the ‘Most Vulnerable Localities in Lebanon’ map are examined to identify which constructs measured by the Wave I and Wave II surveys were most likely to differentiate vulnerable and non-vulnerable cadasters.

The analysis provided in the Wave I report on Regular Perceptions Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon did not find support for the differentiation between the five levels of vulnerability – the vulnerability quintiles. The analysis of the Wave II data confirmed this. While vulnerable and non-vulnerable cadasters differed in meaningful ways, there was less evidence that differences between vulnerability quintiles were as informative. Because of this, for the analysis of this survey data, only a binary measure of vulnerable vs not-vulnerable was used as an indicator. Given the relative size of the Lebanese and refugee populations, and the distribution of both populations
over cadasters, Lebanese were at least as likely as Syrian refugees to live in vulnerable-designated cadasters. This suggested that the categorisation of cadastres by vulnerability-level adequately accounted, not only for the fraction of Syrian refugees in a given area but also for Lebanese vulnerability.

Both Syrian and Lebanese households in more-vulnerable cadasters were also more likely to be multi-dimensionally vulnerable. That is, not only were households in the lowest income categories (with incomes of less than 1,000,000 L.L. monthly) more-prevalent in more-vulnerable cadasters, but households in more-vulnerable cadasters were also more likely to contend with food insecurity, fuel insecurity, medical insecurity, and physical insecurity. Indeed, after controlling for other factors, respondents in more-vulnerable casters were nearly half as likely to rate their neighbourhoods or villages as ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’. Households in more vulnerable-cadasters were also about 25% more likely to report one of any of the forms of victimisation queried in the survey, indicating that the lower perceptions of safety in these areas were at least partially explained by higher levels of personal experience of exposure to crime, violence or other victimisation.

In more-vulnerable cadasters, Lebanese were marginally more likely to perceive greater refugee population pressures and marginally more likely to hold prejudicial attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Respondents in more-vulnerable cadasters were also significantly less likely to be satisfied with the level of basic and essential service delivery in their areas. However, these negative aspects of vulnerability were, to some extent, counterbalanced by some other more positive features. Lebanese also had greater solidarity in this areas, evidenced by a higher degree of trust between neighbours and greater confidence in their community’s ability to work together— including with Syrian refugees—to solve social problems.

Vulnerable and non-vulnerable cadasters thus differed from each other in meaningful ways. Both Lebanese and Syrians were, objectively, more-vulnerable in more-vulnerable cadastres than in other areas of the country, confirming that these designations should be helpful for the targeting of aid and assistance. The one partial exception was the governorate of Nabatiye. Some cadasters in Nabatiye resembled, on most dimensions, those designated as vulnerable in other areas but were not designated as amongst the most-vulnerable cadasters in Lebanon. However, these cadasters did not host large fractions of refugees, whereas most vulnerable-designated cadasters did. Vulnerability and social instability in these areas thus most likely resulted from factors other than those related to refugee and host-community tensions.