

Pakistan: Situation der Ahmadi

Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse

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1 Einleitung

Einer Anfrage an die SFH-Länderanalyse sind die folgenden Fragen entnommen:

1. Welche Informationen gibt es bezüglich der aktuellen Situation der Ahmadi, einschliesslich in der Provinz Punjab?
2. Inwiefern hat sich ihre Situation in den Jahren 2016, 2017 und 2018 verschlechtert?

Die Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche (Schnellrecherche) in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die der SFH derzeit zur Verfügung stehen, sowie auf den Informationen von sachkundigen Kontaktpersonen.

2 Situation der Ahmadi

2.1 Rechtlicher Rahmen, staatliche Verantwortung

Hintergrundinformationen zur Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft. Gemäss den UNHCR-Richtlinien zur Einschätzung des internationalen Schutzbedarfs von Mitgliedern religiöser Minderheiten in Pakistan vom Januar 2017 und New York Times (NYT, 19. Oktober 2017) wurde die Ahmadi-Bewegung (*Ahmadiyya Jama'at*) 1889 in der Stadt Qadian im heute indischen Teil von Punjab als Reformbewegung innerhalb des Islam gegründet. Schätzungen zur Zahl der Ahmadi in Pakistan reichen gemäss UNHCR (Januar 2017) von 126'000 bis mehrere Millionen. NYT (19. Oktober 2017) berichtet von Schätzungen zwischen 500'000 und vier Millionen; viele Ahmadi identifizierten sich in der Öffentlichkeit nicht als Ahmadi, andere nahmen nicht an Volkszählungen teil. Laut NYT (19. Oktober 2017) werden Ahmadi auch als Qadiani bezeichnet, was sie selbst als abwertend empfänden. UNHCR (Januar 2017) erwähnt darüber hinaus die Bezeichnungen Lahori oder Mirzai.

Die Zentrale der Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft in Pakistan befindet sich laut UNHCR (Januar 2018) in der Stadt Rabwah in der Provinz Punjab. In Rabwah gehören gemäss von UNHCR (Januar 2017) zitierten Berichten mehr als 97 Prozent der Bevölkerung der Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft an. Ahmadi identifizieren sich selbst als Muslime. Einige ihrer Glaubensvorstellungen unterscheiden sich von sunnitischen Interpretationen grundlegender islamischer Konzepte und werden daher von einigen Muslimen als unislamisch und blasphemisch angesehen. Die muslimische Mehrheitsgesellschaft in Pakistan wendet sich offenbar hauptsächlich gegen unterschiedliche Glaubensvorstellungen bezüglich des Propheten Mohammed, der in ihrer Vorstellung der letzte Prophet ist. Laut NYT (19. Oktober 2017) behauptete *Mirza Ghulam Ahmad*, der Gründer der Bewegung, die Verkörperung eines in islamischen heiligen Texten versprochenen Messias zu sein, und stellte sich damit gegen den Glauben der Mehrheit der Muslime, dass Mohammed der letzte Prophet des Islam ist. Gemäss *Matthew Nelson*, ein von EASO (Februar 2018) zitierter Pakistan-Experte, der am SOAS-Institut der Universität London forscht, betrachtet die muslimische Mehrheitsgesellschaft Pakistans die Ansicht der Ahmadi, der Gründer ihrer Bewegung sei ein nach-mohammedanischer Prophet, als Häresie (Ketzerei).

Pakistanische Verfassung verneint muslimische Identität der Ahmadi. Die UNHCR-Richtlinien vom Januar 2017 heben hervor, dass die pakistanische Verfassung Mitglieder der religiösen Minderheit der Ahmadi seit 1974 als Nicht-Muslime kategorisiert, obwohl diese sich selbst als Muslime betrachten.

Zusätze zum Strafgesetz («Anti-Ahmadi-Gesetze») diskriminieren und kriminalisieren Ahmadi und schränken ihre Religionsfreiheit ein. 1984 hat der damalige Präsident Zia ul-Haq gemäss UNHCR (Januar 2017) die Anti-Ahmadi-Stimmung in Pakistan durch Zusätze zum Strafgesetz (Abschnitte 298B und 298C, durch Verordnung Nr. XX) weiter institutionalisiert. Diese Zusätze werden allgemein als «Anti-Ahmadi-Gesetze» bezeichnet, definieren bestimmte religiöse Praktiken der Ahmadi als illegal und werden weithin dafür kritisiert, das Grundrecht der Ahmadi auf Religionsfreiheit und weitere Rechte zu verletzen. So kann laut Abschnitt 298B die Benutzung von Beinamen, Beschreibungen und Titeln, die für gewisse heilige Persönlichkeiten und Orte bestimmt sind, für Ahmadis Gefängnisstrafen von bis zu drei Jahren und einer Geldstrafe zur Folge haben. Abschnitt 298C verbietet es Ahmadis, «sich direkt oder indirekt als Muslim_innen auszugeben», «ihren Glauben als Islam zu bezeichnen» und «zu predigen und ihren Glauben zu verbreiten».

Beide Abschnitte beinhalten gemäss UNHCR (Januar 2017) diskriminierende Massnahmen: Ahmadis werden daran gehindert, ihre Religion auszuüben, im privaten oder öffentlichen Rahmen zu beten, religiöse Lehren zu verbreiten und religiöse Materialien zu veröffentlichen und zu verteilen. Diese Massnahmen verbieten es ihnen auch, ihren Gründer als Propheten, ihre heiligen Personen mit ihren religiösen Anreden und ihre Gottesdienstorte als Moscheen zu bezeichnen, ausserdem die traditionelle islamische Form des Grusses und den islamischen Gebetsruf (*Azan* oder *Adhan*) zu verwenden und ihren eigenen Gebetsruf als *Azan* zu bezeichnen. Darüber hinaus ist die Sprache in den beiden Abschnitten vage und erlaubt sehr verschiedene Interpretationen der gesetzlichen Regelungen, was Missbrauch fördere. So sieht Abschnitt 298C vor, dass Ahmadis, die «durch gesprochene oder geschriebene Worte oder durch sichtbare Repräsentation oder durch irgendeine beliebige Art die Gefühle von Muslim_innen verletzen, bestraft werden». Abschnitt 298C sieht Gefängnisstrafen von bis zu drei Jahren und/oder Geldstrafen vor.

Festnahmen und Verurteilungen von Ahmadi im Rahmen des Antiterrorismusgesetzes. Hinzu kommt, dass Mitglieder religiöser Minderheiten einschliesslich Ahmadi laut von UNHCR (Januar 2017) zitierten Berichten aus den Jahren 2016, 2015 und 2013 im Rahmen des Antiterrorismusgesetzes von 1997 festgenommen und angeklagt wurden.

Ahmadi werden der Blasphemie bezichtigt, auch nach Freispruch besteht Risiko weiter. In einigen Fällen haben Richter laut UNHCR (Januar 2017) wegen der vagen Sprache von Abschnitt 298C den Ausdruck religiöser Glaubensvorstellungen durch Ahmadi als eine Form von Blasphemie (Gotteslästerung) interpretiert. Gemäss NYT (19. Oktober 2017) kann das Wiederholen einer blasphemischen Äusserung oder Handlung ebenfalls Blasphemie darstellen; daher würde in Blasphemiefällen oft nicht allzu genau nachgefragt, worin die blasphemische Handlung bestand.

Gemäss USDOS (20. April 2018) wendeten Gerichte Gesetze zum Verbot von Blasphemie auch im Jahr 2017 unverhältnismässig gegen Schiit_innen, Christ_innen, Ahmadi und Mitglieder anderer religiöser Minderheiten an. Erstinstanzliche Gerichte verlangten oft keine angemessenen Beweismittel in Blasphemiefällen, und verurteilte Personen würden oft Jahre

in Haft verbringen, bevor ein höheres Gericht die Verurteilung zurücknimmt oder eine Freilassung anordnet. Der Jahresbericht 2017 der unabhängigen *Menschenrechtskommission Pakistans* (HRCP) vom März 2018 bestätigt dies: Der Unschuldsbeweis in falschen Blasphemiefällen sei ein langer Prozess, und Angeklagte würden bis dahin acht bis zehn Jahre im Gefängnis verbringen.

Auch nach einem Freispruch in einem Blasphemiefall ist die angeklagte Person gemäss HRCP (März 2018) Risiken ausgesetzt. In den meisten Fällen würden Opfer von Blasphemiefällen nach ihrer Freilassung an einen anderen Ort umziehen, um Problemen aus dem Weg zu gehen. In der jüngeren Vergangenheit bestand der Trend laut HRCP (März 2018) allerdings darin, Ahmadi zu töten, anstatt sie wegen Blasphemie anzuklagen.

Beispiele von Festnahmen und Verurteilungen von Ahmadi, einschliesslich zur Todesstrafe. Laut HRCP (März 2018) wurden drei Ahmadi aus Bhoiwal am 11. Oktober 2017 in Ferozewala in der Provinz Punjab dafür zum Tode verurteilt, dass sie im Mai 2014 angeblich einen Anti-Ahmadi-Aufkleber oder eine Anti-Ahmadi-Broschüre zerrissen hatten. Ein vierter im gleichen Fall angeklagter Ahmadi war in Polizeigewahrsam getötet worden. Ein weiterer Ahmadi wurde am 1. Juli 2017 in Rawalpindi, ebenfalls in der Provinz Punjab, wegen angeblicher Schändung des Korans zu lebenslänglicher Haft verurteilt. Er war am 20. November 2015 in Jhelum, Provinz Punjab, nach einem grossen Brandanschlag eines Mobs auf die Spanplattenfabrik eines Ahmadi festgenommen worden.

Im Dezember 2016 führte gemäss UNHCR (Januar 2017) das *Counter Terrorism Department* (CTD) der Provinz Punjab eine Razzia in der Zentrale der Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft in Rabwah durch. Vier Ahmadi wurden festgenommen. Es gab strafrechtliche Anklagen gegen neun Personen für das angebliche Veröffentlichen verbotener Schriften. Gemäss USDOS (20. April 2018) verurteilte ein Antiterrorismusgericht zwei während der Razzia festgenommene Ahmadi im Mai 2017 zu drei Jahren Gefängnis. BAMF (5. März 2018) zitiert aus dem Jahresbericht 2017 einer Ahmadi-Organisation, dass im Jahr 2017 77 Ahmadi wegen Vorwürfen nach dem Religionsstrafrecht angeklagt worden waren. Neun Ahmadi seien Ende 2017 wegen solcher Anklagen inhaftiert gewesen. Laut *Al-Jazeera* (12. Oktober 2017) verurteilte ein Gericht in Sheikhpura in der Provinz Punjab drei Ahmadi wegen Blasphemie zum Tode. Sie waren festgenommen worden, nachdem sie religiöse Poster von einer Wand gerissen hatten. Ein vierter Angeklagter wurde im Polizeigewahrsam erschossen.

Ein Drucker von Ahmadi-Veröffentlichungen verbrachte zwei Jahre und einen Monat im Gefängnis, bevor er am 5. Mai 2017 von einem Antiterrorismusgericht freigesprochen wurde. Er war unter dem Blasphemie-, dem Anti-Ahmadi- und dem Antiterrorismusgesetz für das Predigen des Ahmadi-Glaubens angeklagt worden.

Anti-Ahmadi- und Blasphemie-Gesetze ermöglichen es staatlichen Akteuren, Ahmadi zu drangsalieren, zu diskriminieren und ihre bürgerlichen und politischen Rechte einzuschränken. Die Anti-Ahmadi- und Blasphemie-Gesetze werden laut von UNHCR (Januar 2017) zitierten Berichten oft von staatlichen Behörden dazu benutzt, Ahmadi und zum Ahmadi-Glauben konvertierte Personen zur Zielgruppe zu nehmen und sie zu drangsalieren. Ahmadi sind aufgrund staatlich sanktionierter Massnahmen, die ihre bürgerlichen und politischen Rechte einschränken, Diskriminierungen ausgesetzt. *Matthew Nelson* (zitiert in EASO, Februar 2018) verweist darauf, dass die pakistanische Verfassung die Religionsfreiheit garantiere, jedoch nur, solange diese die öffentliche Ordnung nicht gefährde. Die religi-

öse Minderheit werde damit als Urheber einer Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung angesehen, und der Staat schränke die Religionsfreiheit der Minderheit bisweilen ein, um die öffentliche Ordnung wiederherzustellen.

Laut *Reuters* (9. März 2018) entschied das Hohe Gericht von Islamabad im März 2018, dass jede Person, die sich für eine Arbeitsstelle bei der Regierung bewirbt, ihre Religion angeben muss. Es würde erwartet, dass dieses Urteil die Ahmadi in Pakistan noch weiter unter Druck setzen wird. Gemäss der Nachrichtenseite *Christian Century* (5. April 2018) muss auf allen Geburtsurkunden, Identitätskarten, Pässen und Wählerlisten der Glauben einer Person angegeben sein.

Pakistanische Pässe enthalten laut von UNHCR (2017) zitierten Berichten Informationen über die Religionszugehörigkeit. Muslime, die einen Pass beantragen, müssen eine Erklärung abgeben, dass sie den Gründer der Ahmadi-Bewegung als falschen Propheten und seine Anhänger als Nichtmuslim_innen verurteilen, und dass sie glauben, dass Mohammed der letzte Prophet ist. Für Ahmadi bedeutet dies, dass sie entweder ihren Glauben verneinen oder auf einen Pass verzichten müssen. Es bedeutet auch, dass sie Regierungsprogramme zur Finanzierung und Organisation von Pilgerreisen nach Mekka nicht nutzen können. Wenn Ahmadi die verlangte Erklärung unterzeichnen, riskieren sie eine Bestrafung gemäss Abschnitt 298C des Strafgesetzes dafür, sich als Muslime «ausgegeben» zu haben. USDOS (20. April 2018) zitiert Berichte von Ahmadi-Vertretern, laut denen bei Ahmadi, die die Unterzeichnung der Erklärung verweigerten, das Wort «Ahmadi» auf den Pass geschrieben wurde. Nationale Identitätskarten enthalten laut UNHCR (Januar 2017) zwar keine Informationen bezüglich der Religion, allerdings sammelt die *National Database and Registration Authority* (NADRA) Informationen über die Religion der Antragsteller, und muslimische Antragsteller müssen eine ähnliche Erklärung wie beim Passantrag abgeben.

Ahmadi dürfen sich laut UNHCR (Januar 2017) weiterhin nicht auf der allgemeinen Wählerliste, sondern müssen sich auf einer separaten Wählerliste für Ahmadi registrieren. Ein Gesetzesvorschlag, der Ahmadi die Teilnahme an Wahlen erleichtert hätte, wurde laut BAMF (5. März 2018) nach wochenlangen Blockaden durch islamistische Gruppen in Islamabad zurückgenommen. Gemäss dem Jahresbericht 2017 der unabhängigen *Menschenrechtskommission Pakistans* (HRCP, März 2018) sieht der *Elections (Second Amendment) Act, 2017* vor, dass der Status von Ahmadi (oder von Personen, die nicht an die «absolute und unveränderte Endlichkeit des Prophetentums Mohammeds» glauben) unverändert bleibt. Wenn eine Person sich als Wähler_in registriert hat und ein Einspruch bei der *Revising Authority* deponiert wird mit dem Inhalt, die Person sei kein/e Muslim_in, muss die betroffene Person innerhalb von 15 Tagen erscheinen und eine Erklärung unterzeichnen, die ihren Glauben an die «absolute und unveränderte Endlichkeit des Prophetentums Mohammeds» bestätigt. Wenn sie sich weigert, diese Erklärung zu unterzeichnen, wird ihr Name von der gemeinsamen Wählerliste entfernt und auf der Liste der nicht-muslimischen Wähler_innen eingetragen.

Gemäss von UNHCR (Januar 2017) zitierten Berichten verweigern einige Behörden ausserdem die Registrierung der Heirat von Ahmadi.

Bei der Bewerbung um einen Platz in einer staatlichen oder privaten Bildungsinstitution müssen Bewerber_innen laut UNHCR (Januar 2017) ebenfalls ihre Religionszugehörigkeit angeben, und Muslime müssen erklären, dass sie glauben, Mohammed sei der letzte Pro-

phet, was Ahmadi ausschliesst. Wer seinen Ahmadi-Glauben angibt, ist gemäss Berichten Diskriminierung beim Zugang zu höheren Bildungsinstitutionen ausgesetzt. Am 20. März 2018 berichtete *Rabwah Times* von Protesten islamischer religiöser Anführer gegen die in ihren Augen «betrügerische Falschdarstellung des Glaubens» eines Schülers in Gojrah in der Provinz Punjab. Der Schüler sei Ahmadi und habe sich fälschlicherweise als Muslim bezeichnet, um an Prüfungen teilnehmen zu können.

Staatliche Behörden verbieten Ahmadis laut UNHCR (Januar 2017) ausserdem seit 1983, Konferenzen oder Versammlungen abzuhalten, und der Verkauf von religiösen Publikationen der Ahmadi ist ebenfalls verboten.

Die Versammlung der Provinz Azad Kashmir verabschiedete gemäss HRCP (März 2018) am 26. April 2017 eine Anti-Ahmadi-Erklärung, die dazu aufrief, Ahmadi als Nichtmuslim_innen zu registrieren. Muslim_innen, die sich der Ahmadi-Bewegung anschliessen, sollten zu Apostaten (*murtad*) erklärt und strafverfolgt werden.

2.2 Kultur der religiösen Intoleranz, Drangsalierungen, gezielte Tötungen von Ahmadi

Kultur der religiösen Intoleranz, Strafflosigkeit weit verbreitet. Repressive und diskriminierende Gesetze fördern gemeinsam mit staatlich sanktionierten diskriminierenden Praktiken in Pakistan gemäss von UNHCR (Januar 2017) zitierten Berichten eine Kultur der religiösen Intoleranz und Strafflosigkeit. Mitglieder der Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft seien daher Missbrauch, Gewalt einschliesslich Tötungen, Drangsalierung und Einschüchterung durch Mitglieder der Mehrheitsgesellschaft ausgesetzt. Anschuldigungen von Blasphemie gegen Ahmadi hätten zu Massenausschreitungen und Tötungen geführt. Gemäss USDOS (20. April 2018) gab es auch 2017 Berichte von Massenausschreitungen und Gewalt gegen religiöse Minderheiten einschliesslich Ahmadi.

Drangsalierungen und Gewalt gegen Ahmadi bis hin zu gezielten Tötungen. Laut USDOS (20. April 2018) starben während 2017 mehrere Ahmadi durch offenbar gezielte Tötungen. So erschossen Unbekannte drei Ahmadi in drei verschiedenen Angriffen am 30. März, 7. April und 3. Mai 2017. BAMF (5. März 2018) zitiert aus dem Jahresbericht 2017 einer Ahmadi-Organisation, wonach im Jahr 2017 vier Ahmadi wegen ihres Glaubens getötet worden seien. Gemäss *Muhammad Amir Rana*, Direktor des Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) (zitiert in EASO, Februar 2018), wurde im Oktober 2017 von einem weiteren Angriff auf Ahmadi berichtet, so dass es zwischen Anfang Januar und Mitte Oktober 2017 sechs Tötungen von Ahmadi und fünf Angriffe auf diese Gemeinschaft gegeben habe.

HRCP (März 2018) berichtet, dass zwischen der Verabschiedung der Anti-Ahmadi-Gesetze im Jahr 1984 und Ende 2017 264 Ahmadi wegen ihres Glaubens getötet wurden, 182 von ihnen in der Provinz Punjab. Zwischen März und Mai 2017 seien drei Ahmadi erschossen und eine vierte, eine pensionierte Professorin, in ihrer Wohnung erstochen worden. Im Juni 2017 überlebte ein weiterer Ahmadi in der Nähe von Lahore einen Mordversuch, nachdem er Todesdrohungen seitens der Verwaltung eines Spitals erhalten hatte, die sein Grundstück gegen seinen Willen erwerben wollte. Im April 2017 wurde ein Universitätsstudent in der Provinz Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Opfer eines Lynchmordes, da er angeblich den Ahmadi-Glauben auf Facebook zu verbreiten versuchte.

Im Oktober 2017 berichtete die Nachrichtenseite *Rabwah Times* von der Erschiessung eines Rechtsanwalts, seiner Frau und seines zweijährigen Sohnes in ihrer Wohnung in Rehman Garden, Sheikhpura, Provinz Punjab. Die Polizei vermute, dass es sich dabei um einen «Ehrenmord» handle, da die Familie der Ehefrau ihre Heirat mit einem Ahmadi acht Jahre zuvor nicht unterstützt habe. Die Polizei verdächtige den Bruder der Ehefrau, den Mord verübt zu haben.

ACCORD (23. Januar) berichtet von den bereits erwähnten und von weiteren Fällen von Tötungen von Ahmadi wegen ihres Glaubens in den Jahren 2017 und 2016.

Angriffe auf Ahmadi-Moscheen, neuer Plan zum Schutz von Gebetsorten in der Provinz Sindh schliesst Ahmadi-Moscheen aus. Gemäss HRCP (März 2018) setzte im August 2017 ein Jugendlicher die Ahmadi-Moschee in Muridke im Distrikt Sheikhpura in der Provinz Punjab in Brand. Der Brand wurde gelöscht, bevor er sich ausbreiten konnte. Die Ahmadi-Moschee in Dulmial, ebenfalls in der Provinz Punjab, die 2016 verwüstet worden war, blieb trotz einer Anweisung der staatlichen *National Commission for Human Rights* verplombt, so dass die örtlichen Ahmadi weiterhin keinen Gebetsort haben. Der neue Plan der Regierung der Provinz Sindh zur Videoüberwachung von Gebetsorten religiöser Minderheiten zu ihrer Sicherheit schliesst Ahmadi-Moscheen laut HRCP (März 2018) aus.

Barelvi und weitere islamische Gruppen hetzen gegen Ahmadi, Daseinszweck von 84 von 247 religiösen Organisationen in Pakistan richtet sich gegen religiöse Minderheiten. Laut *Matthew Nelson* (zitiert in EASO, Februar 2018) griffen in den letzten Jahren besonders Mitglieder der salafistischen Gruppe der Barelvis (für die ihr eigenes Verständnis des Prophetentums besonders wichtig ist) die Ahmadi wegen ihres abweichenden Verständnisses bezüglich des Prophetentums an. *Muhammad Amir Rana* (zitiert in EASO, Februar 2018) berichtet von der starken Zunahme an religiösen Organisationen in Pakistan. Von 247 aktuell tätigen Organisationen hätten 84 eine rein konfessionelle Agenda, das heisst, ihr Daseinszweck richte sich gegen religiöse Minderheiten einschliesslich Schiit_innen, Ahmadi, Hindus oder Christ_innen. Diese Gruppen beeinflussten zunehmend den politischen Mainstream.

In der Provinz Sindh stammte laut HRCP (März 2018) die Mehrheit der Beschwerden gegen Ahmadi zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt im Jahr 2017 von einem einzigen religiösen Prediger in einer Stadt in der Nähe von Hyderabad. Die angeblichen Vergehen reichten vom Schreiben von «Bismillah» in einem privaten Brief bis hin zum Predigen des Ahmadi-Glaubens.

Öffentliche Stimmungsmache und Hassreden gegen Ahmadi, einschliesslich durch hochrangige Politiker. Im ganzen Land wird laut UNHCR (Januar 2017) von Versammlungen und Hasskampagnen zur Förderung von Intoleranz und Diskriminierung von Ahmadi durch traditionelle Medien oder die Verteilung von Pamphleten, den Gebrauch von Aufklebern und Wandgraffiti berichtet. Die unabhängige *Menschenrechtskommission Pakistans* (HRCP, März 2018) berichtet ebenfalls von einer unbarmherzigen Hasskampagne gegen Ahmadi, die sich während des Jahres 2017 fortsetzte, einschliesslich Transparenten an Rickshaws, Presseerklärungen durch religiöse Anführer und Reden religiöser Fanatiker während Seminaren und Konferenzen, die Ahmadi als Ungläubige und des Todes würdig (*wajib ul qatal*) bezeichneten. Besonnene Stimmen in den Medien wurden durch Drohungen zum Schweigen gebracht oder gezwungen, das Land zu verlassen. Rana Tanveer, ein Jour-

nalist, der für Berichte zu religiösen Minderheiten bekannt war, wurde am 9. Juni 2017 von einem schnell fahrenden Auto überfahren, nur Tage, nachdem sich die Polizei geweigert hatte, Todesdrohungen gegen ihn zu untersuchen. Er überlebte.

Laut HRCP (März 2018) wird Massengewalt gegen Ahmadi üblicherweise in den ländlichen Teilen der Provinz Punjab durch religiöse Anführer der Barelvi angestachelt. Beispielsweise hätten führende Persönlichkeiten der Barelvi während einer Konferenz in Nankana Sahib die Todesstrafe für Apostasie (den Abfall vom Glauben) gefordert und geschworen, Ahmadi bis zum letzten Atemzug zu verfolgen. Teile der Medien unterstützten Diskriminierung von Ahmadi und verherrlichten religiöse Anführer, die Gewalt gegen Ahmadi rechtfertigten. Dies beeinflusse die jüngere Generation, der nicht bewusst sei oder die ignoriere, dass Ahmadi gemäss der pakistanischen Verfassung die vollen Bürgerrechte besitzen.

HRCP (März 2018) erwähnt eine Reihe von Anti-Ahmadi-Kundgebungen und Konferenzen, die im September 2017 in Erinnerung an den Anti-Ahmadi-Verfassungszusatz von 1974 in ganz Pakistan veranstaltet wurden. Darüber hinaus reichte Allah Wasaya, ein religiöser Anführer der Barelvi-Gruppe *Tehreek-i-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat* (Bewegung für die Endlichkeit des Prophetentums), beim Hohen Gericht in Islamabad eine Petition ein, in der er die Einrichtung einer separaten Datenbank für beim Staat angestellte «Qadiani/Lahori» durch die pakistanische Regierung forderte, damit sie in Zukunft nicht in Positionen kommen, in denen es um sensible Themen geht.

NYT (19. Oktober 2017) berichtet von einem Fernsehinterview mit dem pakistanischen Außenminister, *Khawaja Muhammad Asif*, nach dessen Besuch in den USA. Er sei bezichtigt worden, dort Ahmadi getroffen zu haben. Im Interview habe er sich sehr deutlich bemüht, zu erklären, er habe noch nie in seinem Leben einen Ahmadi getroffen.

Cyril Almeida, Journalist bei der pakistanischen Zeitung Dawn (zitiert in EASO, Februar 2018), berichtete von der Parlamentsrede eines Abgeordneten der Regierungspartei *Pakistan Muslim League* (PML-N) gegen die Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft, die live im Fernsehen übertragen wurde. Der Abgeordnete – der Schwiegersohn des ehemaligen Premierministers Nawaz Sharif – forderte die Umbenennung eines nach Pakistans erstem Nobelpreisträger, einem Ahmadi, benannten Universitätsgebäudes; die Identifizierung und Entfernung aller Ahmadi aus dem pakistanischen Militär; die Unterzeichnung einer neuen Erklärung durch jede_n muslimische_n Beamten/in, Parlamentarier_in und Staatsvertreter_in, dass er/sie ein_echte_r Muslim_in sei und sich gegen den Gründer der Ahmadi-Bewegung ausspreche; und die Identifizierung und Entfernung aller Ahmadi aus der zivilen Atomkommission Pakistans. Gemäss *Cyril Almeida* und HRCP (März 2018) stellte sich kein/e Parlamentarier_in gegen die Rede des Abgeordneten. Auch die PML-N distanzierte sich laut *Cyril Almeida* nicht von der Rede. Nur einige wenige Parteimitglieder versuchten sich in den Sozialen Medien davon zu distanzieren. Schliesslich gab der ehemalige Premierminister Nawaz Sharif eine Erklärung heraus, in der er die Entschlossenheit der PML-N bestätigte, die Rechte von Minderheiten zu schützen.

Laut *Cyril Almeida* (zitiert in EASO, Februar 2018) signalisieren solche öffentlichen Stellungnahmen hochstehender Persönlichkeiten, die alle paar Jahre oder manchmal alle paar Monate stattfinden, der pakistanischen Gesellschaft, es sei in Ordnung und salonfähig, gegen Ahmadi Stimmung zu machen, öffentlich darüber zu reden und danach zu handeln. Die Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft würde als politischer Blitzableiter benutzt: Immer wenn ein/e Politi-

ker_in unter Druck sei, könne er/sie die Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft brandmarken und dadurch politische Unterstützung durch den Rest der Bevölkerung gewinnen.

Hassreden gegen Ahmadis in Bildungseinrichtungen und im beruflichen Umfeld, Verlust der Arbeitsstelle wegen Anschuldigungen von Blasphemie und Druck durch Arbeitskollegen. Auch in Bildungseinrichtungen gibt es gemäss UNHCR (Januar 2017) Hassreden gegen Ahmadis. Anschuldigungen von Blasphemie haben in einigen Fällen zur Entlassung von zur Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft gehörende Lehrpersonen geführt. Gemäss Berichten von Ahmadi-Gruppen sind laut UNHCR (Januar 2017) auch in anderen Branchen tätige, zur Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft gehörende Angestellte Drangsalierungen ausgesetzt und mussten in einigen Fällen wegen des Drucks von Arbeitskollegen ihre Arbeitsstelle verlassen, als ihre Identität als Ahmadi bekannt wurde.

Boykotte von Unternehmen, die Ahmadi gehören. Zur Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft gehörende Berufstätige und Kleinunternehmer sind laut UNHCR (Januar 2017) Boykottkampagnen ausgesetzt und sahen sich gezwungen, ihr Unternehmen in eine andere Gegend zu verlegen. Laut HRCP (März 2018) trugen um die 90 Prozent der Läden in Nankana Sahib und mehrere Läden in Lahore und im Süden der Provinz Punjab die folgende Warnung: «Der Zugang von Qadianis (Ahmadis) ist verboten.»

Religiöse Anschuldigungen gegen Ahmadi als Vorwand bei persönlichen oder geschäftlichen Streitigkeiten. Laut UNHCR (Januar 2017) werden Mitglieder der Ahmadi-Gemeinschaft religiöser Vergehen oft aufgrund falscher Behauptungen oder zur Beilegung persönlicher oder geschäftlicher Streitigkeiten bezichtigt.

2.3 Staatlicher Schutz

Kaum Schutz durch den Staat. Gemäss UNHCR (Januar 2017) versagen die staatlichen Behörden häufig darin, Ahmadi angemessenen Schutz zu bieten. Verbrechen und Gewalt gegen Ahmadi werden gemäss Berichten nicht konsequent untersucht, und die Urheber solcher Verbrechen werden nur selten zur Rechenschaft gezogen. Einschüchterungstaktiken und Druck auf Behörden durch islamische fundamentalistische Gruppen tragen zum Unwillen des Staates bei, in religiöse Gewalt und Verbrechen einzugreifen, diese zu untersuchen und strafrechtlich zu verfolgen.

Darüber hinaus gibt es gemäss UNHCR (Januar 2017) Berichte, dass Polizeiangehörige Gewalt gegen Ahmadi ausübten oder Gewalt gegen Ahmadi in ihrem Schutz nicht verhinderten. Laut USDOS (20. April 2018) versagte die Polizei auch im Jahr 2017 beim Schutz von Angehörigen religiöser Minderheiten einschliesslich Ahmadi. USDOS zitiert darüber hinaus Berichte von Ahmadi-Organisationen, gemäss denen inhaftierte Ahmadi oft Missbrauch ausgesetzt sind.

Gemäss USDOS (20. April 2018) nahmen pakistanische Gerichte auch im Jahr 2017 regelmässig ihren Auftrag, die Rechte religiöser Minderheiten einschliesslich der Ahmadi zu schützen, nicht wahr.

Staatliche Behörden tolerieren und dulden laut UNHCR (Januar 2017) die öffentliche Stimmung gegen Ahmadi. Die Regierung wird dafür kritisiert, wegzuschauen und beim Aufhalten von Extremisten, die Hasstiraden verbreiten und zur Gewalt gegen Ahmadi anstacheln, zu

versagen. Die Behörden schränken laut Berichten Hasstiraden gegen Ahmadi und das Anstacheln zur Gewalt gegen Ahmadi, einschliesslich durch islamische Gelehrte, grösstenteils nicht ein und/oder bestrafen sie nicht.

2.4 Verschlechterung der Situation der Ahmadi

Verschlechterung der Situation der Ahmadi in den letzten Jahren. Laut dem Jahresbericht 2017 der unabhängigen *Menschenrechtskommission Pakistans* (HRCP, März 2018) wurden Ahmadi im Jahr 2017 noch stärker verfolgt als im Jahr zuvor. Sie sind in Pakistan grosser Intoleranz ausgesetzt, und ihre Verfolgung wird offenbar durch die Regierung unterstützt. Gemäss *Muhammad Amir Rana*, Direktor des Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) (zitiert in EASO, Februar 2018), haben die Angriffe gegen Ahmadi 2017 im Vergleich zu 2016 etwas zugenommen.

ACCORD, 23. Januar 2018:

«Im Mai 2017 berichtet die pakistanische Tageszeitung *The Express Tribune*, dass ein 62-jähriger Ahmadi im Distrikt Rahim Yar Khan (Provinz Punjab) erschossen worden sei. Das Motiv für den Mord müsse noch festgestellt werden, ein Sprecher der Ahmadiyya-Gemeinde habe jedoch erklärt, dass der Mann wegen seines religiösen Glaubens zum Ziel geworden sei:

„A 62-year-old Ahmadi man was shot dead on Wednesday night in Saddar area of Rahim Yar Khan district. Basharat Ahmad was on his way to his house in Green Town from a petrol pump situated in Zahir Pir Road when unidentified assailants intercepted him. He was taken to a local hospital where doctors pronounced him dead on arrival. The 62-year-old sustained two bullet wounds. The reason behind the murder is yet to be ascertained. However, Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya spokesperson Saleemuddin claimed Ahmad was targeted because of his religious beliefs.” (*The Express Tribune*, 4. Mai 2017)

Im April berichtet die pakistanische Tageszeitung *Dawn*, dass eine ehemalige Assistenzprofessorin an der Punjab-Universität in der Stadt Lahore (Provinz Punjab), die Ahmadi sei, in ihrem Haus auf dem Universitätsgelände ermordet aufgefunden worden sei. Ein Sprecher der Ahmadiyya-Gemeinde habe angegeben, dass die Gemeinde dabei sei zu eruieren, ob die Frau wegen ihres Glaubens zum Ziel worden sei:

„Another member of the Ahmadi community — this time a woman, a retired assistant professor of molecular genetics at Punjab University — was found murdered in her house on Tuesday. Tahira Malik was found dead at her residence on the premises of the university. Her throat had been slit. Saleemuddin, spokesperson for the Jamaat-i-Ahmad-iyya Pakistan, told Dawn that Prof Malik was Ahmadi. ‘We are trying to determine whether she was targeted because of her faith.’” (*Dawn*, 19. April 2017)

Ebenfalls im April 2017 berichtet *Dawn*, dass ein Veterinärmediziner in der Stadt Lahore, der Ahmadi sei, vermutlich aufgrund seines Glaubens erschossen worden sei:

„Veterinary doctor Ashfaq Ahmed, 68, was shot dead on Friday in the Sabzazar area of Lahore in what appeared to be a faith-based targeted attack. The doctor, who was from the Ahmadi community, was being driven by his grandson when a motorcyclist pulled up next to

their car and fired at point-blank range, killing him on the spot. His grandson, Shahzeb, remained unhurt, while the attacker, who was wearing a helmet, fled the scene.” (Dawn, 7. April 2017)

Im März 2017 berichtet Dawn, dass ein Rechtsanwalt, der Ahmadi sei, in der Stadt Nankana Sahib (Provinz Punjab) durch Mitglieder der verbotenen fundamentalistischen Gruppierung Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) al-Alami erschossen worden sei. Der Sohn des Rechtsanwalts sei bei dem Vorfall leicht verletzt worden:

„A senior lawyer and prominent member of the minority Ahmadiya community was gunned down in Nankana Sahib on Thursday in an attack claimed by the banned sectarian outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) al-Alami.

Malik Saleem Latif – a member of the Nankana Bar Association and relative of Pakistan’s first Nobel Laureate Dr Abdus Salam – was riding a bike being driven by his son Advocate Malik Farhan when an assailant shot him only a few metres away from their home. They were on their way to the Nankana district courts.

A police officer, Nazim Ali, told AFP news agency that a bullet hit Mr Latif in his chest and he died on the spot. His son, on the other hand, suffered minor injuries.

Hours after the attack, the LeJ sent journalists a statement claiming responsibility for the ghastly attack. Its spokesperson Ali bin Sufyan said Latif had been killed ‘for spreading Ahmadi beliefs in the region’.

Our Correspondent in Lahore adds: Police in the city of Nankana Sahib said they had arrested a suspect in the case, known as Rashid.

Earlier, they had claimed that the assailant was wearing a security guard’s uniform. After shooting Mr Latif, the attacker was seen fleeing from the crime scene in a rickshaw.” (Dawn, 31. März 2017)

The Express Tribune schreibt im März 2017 unter Berufung auf einen kürzlich erschienenen Bericht der Ahmadiyya-Gemeinde, dass während des Jahres 2016 mindestens sechs Ahmadis in Pakistan aufgrund ihres Glaubens getötet worden seien (The Express Tribune, 30. März 2017).

Fälle von Tötung von Ahmadis während des Jahres 2016 werden unter anderem in folgenden Medienartikeln berichtet:

· Dawn: DSP, Ahmadi man shot dead in Karachi, 28. November 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1299140/dsp-ahmadi-man-shot-dead-in-karachi>

· Dawn: Doctor belonging to Ahmadi community shot dead in Karachi, 20. Juni 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1266124>

· Dawn: Man from Ahmadi community shot dead in Attack, 4. Juni 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1262748>

. *The Nation: Ahmadi man murdered outside his house, 25. Mai 2016, <https://nation.com.pk/25-May-2016/ahmadi-man-murdered-outside-his-house>*

. *Singh, S. Binodkumar: South Asia Intelligence Review (South Asia Terrorism Portal, SATP), Band 14, Nummer 51, 20. Juni, 2016, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair14/14_51.htm» Quelle: ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Pakistan: Situation von Ahmadis, insbesondere in Gujranwala (rechtlicher Rahmen; Vorgehen staatlicher und nichtstaatlicher Akteure); interne Fluchtalternative [a-10478], 23. Januar 2018:
www.ecoi.net/en/document/1423146.html.*

Al-Jazeera, 12. Oktober 2017:

«Three members of Pakistan's persecuted Ahmadi sect have been sentenced to death for blasphemy by a court in the central town of Sheikhpura, a community spokesperson said. Mubasher Ahmad, Ghulam Ahmed and Ehsan Ahmed were convicted by the court on Wednesday for insulting Prophet Mohammad under the country's strict blasphemy laws, Ahmadi community spokesperson Saleemuddin told Al Jazeera.

The three men were arrested in May 2014 after they tore down religious posters in Bhoiwal, a village about 22km southwest of the city of Lahore. Khalil Ahmed, a fourth accused, was shot and killed in police custody just days after the incident took place. While the accused claimed the posters carried anti-Ahmadi slogans, the prosecution said they carried religious significance and that tearing them down was tantamount to insulting the prophet. Saleemuddin said that the Ahmadi community would challenge the trial court's decision in the high court.»
Quelle: Al-Jazeera, Three Ahmadis sentenced to death for blasphemy, 12. Oktober 2017:

www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/ahmadis-sentenced-death-blasphemy-171012081709423.html.

BAMF, 5. März 2018:

«*Situation der Ahmadis*

Auf der Internetseite der Ahmadiyya-Gemeinde „The Persecution of Ahmadis“ wurde im Februar der Jahresbericht „A Report on Persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan During the year 2017“ veröffentlicht. Hierin werden u.a. die Ereignisse um die geplante Änderung des Wahlgesetzes beschrieben, die es den Ahmadis erleichtert hätte, an Wahlen teilzunehmen. Islamistische Gruppen hatten durch wochenlange Blockaden in Islamabad erreicht, dass der Gesetzesvorschlag zurückgenommen wurde. Weiterhin wird berichtet, dass im vergangenen Jahr 77 Ahmadis wegen Vorwürfen nach dem Religionsstrafrecht angeklagt. Neun Ahmadis wären Ende 2017 wegen entsprechender Anklagen in Haft gewesen. Vier Ahmadis wegen ihres Glaubens ermordet worden seien.» Quelle: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF), Briefing Notes vom 05.03.2018, 5. März 2018, S. 3-4:

www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1426088/5734_1520417204_deutschland-bundesamt-fuer-migration-und-fluechtlinge-briefing-notes-05-03-2018-deutsch.pdf.

Christian Century, 5. April 2018:

«A high court in majority-Muslim Pakistan recently ruled that citizens must declare their religious affiliation before joining the civil service, military, or judiciary. All birth certificates, identity cards, passports, and voting lists must also indicate the person's faith. The judgment, a victory for hard-line clerics pressuring the state to single out minorities, adds that all Muslim candidates for national or provincial assemblies must swear that Islam's Prophet Muhammad was the last of God's prophets.

This move has spread fear among Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and other religious minorities already under pressure in the South Asian nation. Ahmadis, who believe another Muslim prophet came after Muhammad, feel especially targeted. (...)

In its March 9 ruling, the Islamabad High Court argued that citizens should be easily identifiable by their faith and that applicants for public offices should declare their beliefs before being considered for employment. Justice Shaukat Aziz Sid-diqui, in a remark many see as aimed at Ahmadis, said it was "alarming that one of the minorities was often mistaken for being Muslims" because their names and general attire were like those of Muslims.

The court's ruling outraged human rights activists, who fear it will lead to more persecution. The independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan called on the government to counter it immediately. "It is essential that the government acts in aid of its minority citizens by appealing this ruling," said Mehdi Hasan, chair of the commission. "Forums for justice such as the Islamabad court should play their due role in safeguarding the fundamental rights of the most vulnerable sections of society." (...)

The campaign against Ahmadis has gained momentum in the run-up to Pakistan's general election, slated for July. A new ultraconservative religious party shut down Islamabad for three weeks late last year with protests against a new election law that seemed to ease some restrictions on Ahmadis. Last December, lawmaker Muhammad Safdar Awan called for a ban on Ahmadis from joining the armed forces. Safdar is the son-in-law of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif. "These people are a threat to this country, its constitution and ideology," Safdar said at the time. "A person who doesn't believe in the jihad in the path of Allah, that person cannot be a part of our pious army."» Quelle: Christian Century, Pakistani court requires citizens to identify religious affiliation, 5. April 2018: www.christiancentury.org/article/news/pakistani-court-requires-citizens-identify-religious-affiliation.

EASO, Februar 2018:

«2. Sectarian politics

Matthew Nelson, Reader in Politics, PhD, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London

(...)

2.1 Constitution

(...) With reference to the Constitution, and I will say more about this later, **we often hear about the second amendment in the Constitution. This is the amendment that basically rejected the Ahmadi self-identification as Muslims, and it is a constitutional amendment saying that, although the Ahmadiyya may identify themselves as Muslim, the state will not legally recognize them as Muslim.**

(...)

The other clause, which I actually think is more salient, is somewhat surprisingly the religious freedom clause concerning fundamental rights in Pakistan. And this clause, just as in the European convention - this is a clause in Pakistan that is drawn explicitly from the Irish Constitution, the Indian Constitution and from many international conventions, and it says that religious freedom is protected 'subject to public order'. It is actually this second phrase, the derogation phrase 'subject to public order', that has become more interesting and important. In the past, religious vigilantes who would attack religious minorities in Pakistan were accused of disturbing the peace for acting against religious minorities in defiance of State authority. Nowadays this pattern is increasingly reversed. Religious minorities, the Ahmadi, figured prominently here. The minority is often considered a disruptive provocateur and thus a source of public disorder. That religious difference is regarded as agitating the public, and the difference, on its own, is regarded as 'provoking' the rest of the population. This means that the State becomes implicated in identifying potential provocation as a source of public disorder, and then trying to reduce the provocation. Reducing the provocation sometimes means restricting the religious freedoms of the minority in order to prevent public disorder.

Basically, this notion that religious freedom is protected subject to public order gets turned around. **So, where there is a risk of public disorder, the 'religious freedom' (regarded as a provocation) can be derogated.** That is a complex legal development that I think deserves more attention. The clauses in the Pakistan Constitution about religious freedom are usually regarded as a space of protection for religious minorities. This is not always the case where the religious minority is regarded as a provocation to public disorder. (...)

2.2.3 Salafi

(...) **Barelvis, given their particular focus on the prophet, have been particularly energetic in recent years in attacks on the Ahmadiyya. The Ahmadiyya are regarded as a group that has what might be called 'a latter-day prophet'. But the Barelvis, as I said, have a particular focus on the prophet, so any alternative understanding of how prophecy works will be regarded as particularly concerning for them.** (...)

2.3 Ahmadiyya

Even beyond the intermediating space of sheikhs and shrines, the idea of intermediation for the Ahmadiyya stretches to the space of prophecy itself, **including what might be described as a latter-day prophet, known as Ghulam Ahmad, who emerged in the Punjab in the late 19th century.** And just to familiarise you with the concept that they have - you may be familiar with the Mormon community in the Christian context, and the idea of the

*Mormons like The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. The idea that there are subsequent inspirations after Jesus Christ. And the Ahmadiyya, I don't want to make the comparison too close, but the idea is that after Mohammed there is a further iteration of prophecy. **And this idea that there is a later prophecy is regarded by other Muslims as a form of heresy. The idea is that the prophet Muhammad is the seal of the prophets; he is the last prophet, never to have a further prophecy. So the idea that there could be a Latter Day prophecy filling in the space of guidance is regarded as heresy.***

(...)

In 1974, there were again public disturbances on a relatively wide scale. These public disturbances prompted a parliamentary debate about how to address the issue of public disturbance and the Ahmadiyya and, this time, the parliamentary debate culminated in a unanimous vote for a constitutional amendment. There were a few abstentions, but otherwise a unanimous vote for a constitutional amendment legally redefining the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim. So again, the Ahmadiyya might define themselves as Muslim, but the state would not accept that self-identification. Even then, in 1978, this is after Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1978, the Supreme Court again decided that, although constitutionally the Ahmadiyya were now not Muslim, they were still entitled to religious freedom. The Ahmadiyya still, as citizens, have the right to religious freedom and can practice their religion peacefully as they wish. So the constitutional amendment was a difference of nomenclature. Just the naming – Muslim or non-Muslim. Religious freedom is still accessible for all.

*Unfortunately, this decision, **this Supreme Court decision holding on to a conventional understanding of religious freedom, prompted a series of amendments in the Pakistan penal code. The amendments in the Pakistan penal code basically made the Ahmadi peaceful practice of their religion a crime. Now, how do they make the peaceful practice of religion a crime? Basically, what they said is that the Ahmadiyya are “posing as Muslims” by calling themselves Muslims, and this is regarded as outraging the feelings of other Muslims. They have, basically, a claim to ‘false identity’. And this outrages the rest of the community, and so these changes in the penal code are regarded as efforts to protect public order. Protect against public disorder that might emerge from the outraged population. So, in order to protect public order, we have to criminalize provocation.***

*Finally, in 1993 there is a landmark judgment, a Supreme Court judgment in the case Zaheeruddin. Zaheeruddin is a case that upheld the constitutionality of these penal code amendments. And they were upheld because the amendments were said to protect public order. And therefore, **criminalizing the peaceful practice of the Ahmadis was not a violation of a fundamental right to religious freedom because a fundamental right to religious freedom is protected only subject to public order. So if the law privileges public order, it is not inconsistent with the right to religious freedom. So in order to protect public order, the Ahmadiyya practice “must be restricted.”***

(...)

*Most importantly, I want to mention a group—not a strictly Barelvi group (but largely Barelvi)—known as the **Majlis-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat, the society to protect the***

finality of the prophethood of Mohammed. This group is known for targeting the Ahmadiyya, not only in Pakistan, but abroad. The UK recently has struggled with a couple of very important cases where activists associated with Khatm-e-Nabuwat have killed Ahmadis in Glasgow, for instance. (...)

Having said that, it is crucially important to note that, although Christians and especially the Ahmadiyya are targeted with blasphemy allegations, the majority of blasphemy allegations still target other Muslims. **As a proportion of their population, the Ahmadiyya are vastly over-represented in allegations concerning blasphemy.** As a proportion of the population, Christians are vastly over-represented in these allegations of blasphemy. But, in total numbers, the difficulties surrounding Pakistan's blasphemy laws affect Muslims more. (...)

5. Religious minorities

Muhammad Amir Rana, Director, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)

(...)

5.2 Inter-religious drivers

(...) **Right now there are 247 religious organizations operating in Pakistan and just six months ago there were 234.** Suddenly, 13 organizations have been added to this number. And what kinds are these organizations? **Out of 247, 84 have a pure sectarian agenda, whether it is against the Shia community, the Ahmadiyya community, or against Hindus and Christians. Gradually, what we have observed is that these groups are encroaching on mainstream politics.** (...)

6. Security situation in different regions and emerging trends

Muhammad Amir Rana, Director, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)

(...)

6.2.1 Target killing

(...)

During the last few years, target killing has become a major tactic for all the militant actors, whether sectarian or Islamic militants or Nationalist insurgents. This is important in your context, that even if it is not suicide bombing or the mass level of terrorist attacks, **it increases the vulnerability of the individuals whom the militants consider the enemy. They could belong to the Shia community or Ahmadiyya or any non-Muslim community, or the secular segment of the society.** The vulnerability of this kind of individual is increasing, particularly in Peshawar valley, Karachi and Quetta. (...)

Last week another violent incident against the Ahmadiyya community was reported, increasing the number of killings to six and the number of attacks to five. Attacks against the Ahmadiyya community is therefore a bit higher than last year. (...)

9. Political life in Pakistan

Cyril Almeida, Assistant editor and journalist, Dawn newspaper, Pakistan

(...)

*Starting with the broader issue about how groups are demonized in Pakistan, **last week unprovoked and seemingly out of the blue, a member of a National Assembly stood on the floor of Parliament and delivered what was a quite astonishing 15 minute speech against Ahmadis in Pakistan. Ahmadiyya, the Ahmadi or the Qadiani community are the same. There's no real context to the parliamentarian's speech, it was not in the agenda for the day. It was a very vicious and violent speech. He refers to Ahmadis as "these people". He called for them to be crushed like snakes. This was aired live on TV. The MNA, this parliamentarian went on to make four very specific and seemingly unusual demands.***

First of all, last year the Physics centre in Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad was renamed in honour of Pakistan's first Nobel Prize winner, Abdus Salam, who was an Ahmadi. The parliamentarian said this is an affront to Muslims in Pakistan to have an Ahmadi's name on this Physics department and the centre should in fact be renamed for some famous or pioneering Muslim figure. This was his first demand.

The second demand of the parliamentarian was that because the Ahmadi is what he called a "fake religion" and Ahmadis are clearly not Muslims, they cannot possibly support the idea of jihad and therefore they should be barred and banned from the Pakistan military, which is an astonishing comment. Here was a parliamentarian publicly calling for Ahmadis in the Pakistan Army to be identified and removed from service.

And the third demand was that every bureaucrat, every parliamentarian, every public official who is a Muslim in Pakistan ought to be asked to sign a new form declaring themselves to be true Muslims and against the founder of the Ahmadi religion, Ghulam Mirza Ahmad.

The fourth demand was that any Ahmadi in the Atomic Commission of Pakistan, which is a civilian Agency and doesn't have anything to do with the military nuclear program, should be identified and removed from the commission.

This manifesto against the Ahmadiyya community delivered from the floor of the National Assembly last week was by a parliamentarian of the ruling party, the PML-N Pakistan Muslim League. There was no denunciation of this by the party. Some members of the party tried to distance themselves from the comments over social media. Supporters were praising the parliamentarian's boldness and his defiance. Finally, the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif put out a statement saying that he reaffirms the PML-N's determination to protect the rights of minorities.

Now, this was not just a dog whistle, this was a call to arms really, against the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan. And whenever you have this kind of public statement, they're not as frequent as people may think but they do occur every few years or perhaps sometimes every few months, it sends out a signal to society that anti-Ahmadi sentiment is OK and it can be publicly talked about and acted on. Days after the speech, a local TV channel broadcast a report showing the number of non-Muslims who work in the vari-

ous departments and Ministries of Pakistan State, the Federal Government. Simply stating that 227 non-Muslims work in the Pakistani Government meant that somehow the State of Pakistan is being undermined and weakened by the presence of non-Muslims in the state apparatus. It was clearly a reference to the Ahmadiyya community.

The background is that the parliamentarian who made this speech is the son-in-law of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif. He is the husband of the Prime Minister's daughter, Maryam Nawaz, who's thought to be the heir apparent of the PML-N. And he himself is a parliamentarian from Rawalpindi, an urban constituency very close to Islamabad. Why was this man suddenly, so close to the heart of power in the present government and political structure in Pakistan, making a speech from the floor of the Parliament against the Ahmadiyya community? The background is, two things have happened, again in the very recent past. A few weeks ago, the Pakistani Parliament tried to consolidate the electoral laws in our country. The old laws were a mess, a hodgepodge of eight different Acts and Bills of Parliament, and parliament attempted to simplify the law in the form of a single bill that was passed with a parliamentary consensus. And the new law was passed by the Parliament, there was a sudden enormous public outrage generated from the right wing in the country and it was again on the specific issue of the Ahmadiyyas. If you are a Muslim candidate for public office in Pakistan you are required to legally sign a form declaring not only that you are Muslim but that you are against the founder of the Ahmadiyya community, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.

In the new set of electoral laws that was passed, the language which used to be "I solemnly swear", was for some reason changed to "I declare". There is no real legal repercussion, no legal difference between the two, but it was used by the right wing in Pakistan to attack the PML-N government for somehow undermining the consensus that the Ahmadiyya community are not Muslims and somehow undermining the definition of who is true Muslim in Pakistan. The government found itself under a great deal of right wing pressure in the run-up to the speech made by the parliamentarian, the son-in-law of Nawaz Sharif. And the other thing that happened just a couple of months ago was the by-election to the seat that had been won in the 2013 general election by Nawaz Sharif, our disqualified Prime Minister. The by-election was contested by Sharif's wife and she won. That was the headline, but the biggest story in Pakistan was that two new political parties, ultra-right wing, religious parties, captured 11% of the vote. And as a result the PML-N, a centre-right party, was under pressure from the right.

If you look at the background, the parliamentarian, the son-in-law of Sharif, himself caught up in the anti-corruption, accountability trials involving the Sharif family, stands up on the floor of the Parliament to either deflect from his own accountability issues or to try and shore up the right wing support of the PML-N, with the party under attack on the Ahmadiyya issue. **So it's just that Ahmadiyya community has been constitutionally declared to be non-Muslim, the community is used as a punching bag, they are used as a political tool. Every once in a while when somebody is under pressure or in trouble for different political reasons, they can denounce the Ahmadi community as a way to shore up support with the rest of the population.**» Quelle: European Asylum Support Office (EASO), EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017; Rome, Februar 2018, S. 25, 28-30, 31, 34, 36, 39, 44-45, 48, 50, 54, 60, 61, 80, 81-82:

www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1426168/90_1520500210_easo-pakistan-meeting-report-october-2017.pdf.

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), March 2018:

«Moreover, the **Elections Act** was also passed which raised a furore due to a mistaken perception that it offended religious sensibilities. As a result, **a regressive amendment was passed to the Act which stated categorically that the status of Ahmadis was to remain unchanged and any person not signing an oath regarding the finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH) was to be deemed non-Muslim and added to the non-Muslim electoral roll.** (...)

The Elections (Second Amendment) Act, 2017 inserts section 48A into the 2017 Act which stipulates that the status of Ahmadis [or a person who does not believe in the 'absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH)] is to remain unchanged. The provision further states that if a person has enrolled himself as a voter and an objection is filed before the Revising Authority that the voter is not a Muslim, he will be issued notice to appear within 15 days and is required to sign a declaration regarding his belief in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH). If he refuses to sign this, he shall be deemed non-Muslim and his name deleted from the joint electoral rolls and added to a supplementary list of voters as a non-Muslim. If he/she does not appear after receiving notice, an ex-parte order may be passed against him. (...)

Ahmadis

The persecution of Ahmadis was harsher in 2017 than the previous year, and the killings continued unchecked. A hate speech reared its head in Parliament. The Ahmadi places of worship were attacked. Their burials were denied in common cemeteries. Demands were made by clerics at the Faizabad sit-in to further strip Ahmadis of their rights as citizens. Ahmadis have faced the worst intolerance in Pakistan and their persecution apparently has the support of the administration.

The mob violence against Ahmadis is usually instigated in rural Punjab by Barelvi clerics. In a conference in Nankana Sahib, Barelvi leaders called for the implementation of the death penalty for apostasy. Speakers vowed to persecute Ahmadis until their last breath.

Some sections of the media sanction discrimination against Ahmadis and glorify clerics who justify violence against them. The younger generation is influenced by the rhetoric, unaware of, or choosing to ignore, the fact that Ahmadis are entitled to full citizenship rights enshrined in the Constitution.

Since the promulgation of the anti-Ahmadi Ordinance XX in 1984 by General Zia, 264 Ahmadis have been killed for their faith. Of these, 182 were murdered in the Punjab alone.

Between March and May 2017, three members of the Ahmadiyya community were gunned down and a fourth, a retired female professor, was stabbed to death in her home.

In June, Ahmad Ibrahim survived an attack on his life. He was travelling to work in Thokar Niaz Baig, Lahore when assailants fired several bullets at him which narrowly missed him. His home is adjacent to Ittefaq Hospital and the administration of the hospital wanted to buy his house, but he had not agreed. A year earlier, they attempted a forced takeover of his house which he resisted. They had threatened him with dire consequences.

An eyewitness at the scene of the shocking lynching of Mashal Khan at Abdul Wali Khan University in Mardan said Mashal and Abdullah, two Mass Communication students, were attacked because they were believed to be 'promoting the Ahmadi faith on Facebook'.

Places of worship have also come under attack. In August, the local Ahmadiyya mosque in Muridke, District Sheikhpura, was set on fire by a youth. It was extinguished before it could spread. The Ahmadiyya mosque in Dulmial, vandalised in 2016, remains sealed despite an order from the National Commission for Human Rights, leaving local Ahmadis with no place of worship. Since the declaration of the Ahmadiyya community being beyond the pale of Islam, 27 of their worship places have been demolished, 33 sealed, 21 set on fire, 17 forcibly occupied, and authorities have barred the construction of 17 worship places.

Ahmadis have also been targeted in blasphemy cases. Mubashir Ahmad, Ghulam Ahmad and Ihsan Ahmad of Bhoiwal were sentenced to death in Ferozewala on 11 October 2017 for allegedly tearing up an anti-Ahmadiyya sticker/pamphlet in May 2014. Khalil Ahmad, the fourth accused in the same case, was killed while in police custody.

Qamar Ahmad Tahir was awarded life imprisonment on 1 July 2017 in Rawalpindi for allegedly defiling the Holy Quran. He was arrested on 20 November 2015 after a major arson attack in Jhelum by a mob on a chipboard factory owned by an Ahmadi.

Two Ahmadis, Idrees Ahmad and Sabah-ul-Zafar, were sentenced to three years' imprisonment by a judge in Faisalabad on 31 May 2017. These two Ahmadis were among the four arrested and seven charged in the case registered after the raid by the Counter-Terrorism Department on the Ahmadiyya central offices in Chenab Nagaron on 5 December 2016.

Tahir Mahdi Imtiaz, a printer of Ahmadiyya publications, was one of six Ahmadis booked for preaching Ahmadiyyat. He was prosecuted under the blasphemy law, anti-Ahmadi law, and anti-terrorism law. He had been at his home over 150 kilometres away at the time of the alleged preaching, and was acquitted by an anti-terrorism court on all counts on 5 May 2017. He had been incarcerated for two years and one month.

Social boycotts of Ahmadis prevailed. Approximately 90 percent of shops in Nankana Sahib and several shops in Lahore and southern Punjab carried this warning: 'Entrance of Qadianis (Ahmadis) is prohibited'. At one point, the majority of complaints against Ahmadis in Sindh were filed by a single preacher in a town near Hyderabad. The offences varied from writing 'Bismillah' in a private letter to preaching the Ahmadi faith. In the Punjab, several Ahmadis were targeted when they were merely delivering their

monthly magazine to subscribers, or had made the mistake of buying a goat in the days preceding Eid ul Azha.

The Azad Kashmir (AJK) Assembly passed an anti-Ahmadi resolution on 26 April 2017, calling for Ahmadis to be registered as non-Muslims. Those who did not comply were to be punished in accordance with the law. Muslims who joined the Ahmadiyya sect were to be designated apostates (murtad) and subjected to effective penal action.

A relentless hate campaign against Ahmadis continued throughout the year, including banners on rickshaws, press statements by clerics, and speeches in seminars and conferences by bigots, branding them infidels and calling them wajib ul qatal (worthy of death). Sane voices in the media were either silenced through threats or forced to leave the country. Rana Tanveer, a journalist known for reporting on religious minorities, was run over by a speeding car on 9 June. The incident came just days after the police refused to investigate death threats against him.

Anti-Ahmadi rallies and conferences are organised all over Pakistan in September to commemorate the anti-Ahmadiyya 2nd Amendment to the Constitution. This amendment was introduced by the Bhutto government in 1974, through which Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims. The amendment opened the floodgates of persecution of the Ahmadis in Pakistan.

While the Jama'at-i-Ahmadiyya is denied permission to hold public gatherings, seminars and even sports functions, extremists are free to organise as many gatherings as they want to vent their hatred against a peaceful minority.

An anti-Ahmadi conference was organised by Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith in Lahore with the support of the Ahle Hadith Students' Federation. Tehreeki-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah took out a procession, led by Khadim Hussain Rizvi in Lahore. He exhorted the participants to wage a holy war against Ahmadis. Another Khatam-e-Nabuwwat conference was held in Lahore.

Speakers urged the audience to socially isolate Ahmadis. Yet another Khatam-e-Nabuwwat conference was held at the shrine of Hazrat Shafee Nizami, Fayyaz Park. Speakers urged people to banish Qadianis from Pakistan. A Tajdar-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat conference was held in the Jamia Masjid Madni to urge the masses to boycott Ahmadis.

On 7 September 2017, Jamiat Ulema Pakistan led a motorcycle rally from the Quaid-e-Azam interchange to Data Darbar in Lahore. Another anti-Ahmadi conference was held in Jamia Masjid Anwar-e-Medina, Lahore. Here also, clerics urged the audience to boycott Qadianis as 'they are busy in destroying the beloved country and Islam.'

In a petition submitted to the Islamabad High Court, cleric Allah Wasaya of Tehreek-i-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat demanded that the court direct the Federal Government to maintain a separate database of individuals belonging to the Qadiani/Lahori group entering the civil service so that in future they may not be posted to offices involving sensitive matters.

When a parliamentarian from the ruling party stood up in the National Assembly and called for discriminatory actions to be taken against the Ahmadis, he was neither chal-

lenged nor his statement condemned. Only after a question was raised in the British Parliament did the ruling party distance itself from the remarks.

HRCP condemned in the strongest possible terms the targeting of any Pakistani religious minority group, and deplored the use of the National Assembly floor to advocate discrimination, hatred and exclusion for citizens in this manner, without challenge or condemnation. (...)

Blasphemy laws

(...) Although the religious minorities, especially Christians, continued to suffer because of the misuse of the law, a large number of Muslims are also in jail under blasphemy charges. **The trend in the recent past has been to kill Ahmadis rather than level blasphemy allegations against them. Even after an acquittal in a blasphemy case, the accused is still at risk. In most cases, after proving their innocence, blasphemy law victims relocate to avoid trouble after their release from prison. Proving innocence in a false case of blasphemy is a very long process and by the time the accused is cleared, they will already have spent eight to ten years in prison. Asia Bibi has been incarcerated for the past seven years and the hearing of her case is not expected anytime soon.** (...)

A positive step

In the first project of its kind for religious minorities in Pakistan, the Sindh government has proposed a plan to bring hundreds of places of worship of non-Muslims across the province under video surveillance for their security and monitoring of their infrastructure. Four religious minorities, Christians, Hindus, Parsis and Sikhs, have been selected for the project. This is welcome news but **the exclusion of the Ahmadiyya places of worship is deplored.** However, as of December 2017, no progress on the project has been evident. (...)

Intimidation, threats and attacks on journalists, media houses and press Clubs

(...) **9 June: Days after finding graffiti on the main door of his house, Rana Tanveer survived an attempt on his life when a car tried to run him over in Lahore. The threat and attack is believed to be in connection with his reporting on minorities, especially stories on the Ahmadi community.** (...)

The long-persecuted Ahmadi community, forbidden to call themselves Muslim, have suffered victimisation and violence, as reported elsewhere in this publication. Ahmadis are denied the right to freely and fairly vote in local, provincial and national elections and thus lacked representation at national, provincial and district level. In a possible bid to win the support of conservative voters, a lawmaker in the National Assembly called for Ahmadis to be barred from employment in the government, judiciary and military, and his remarks were not censured at the time. (...)

The Election Act 2017

The Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reforms (PCER), set up on 25 July 2014, a little more than a year after the 2013 polls, was able to complete its report after three years and it was submitted to the National Assembly on 21 July 2017, in the form of The Election Bill 2017. The Bill unified eight election laws: the three laws on preparation of electoral rolls, de-

limitation of constituencies, and conduct of elections; the two election orders of 2002; the Senate election law; and the two laws on political parties and allotment of symbols to parties/candidates. (...)

Soon after the new election law was enacted some members of parliament declared that the State's adherence to the principle of the finality of prophethood had been compromised by a change in an affidavit for Muslim candidates and the deletion of two Ahmadi-related provisions (Sections 7-B and 7-C) from the rules General Musharraf had made in 2002.

The government's defence was that the impugned changes were immaterial and they did not affect the status of the Ahmadiyya community. Besides, the government claimed, the provisions of the new law had been approved by a parliamentary committee on which all parties, including the religio-political ones, were represented. Both these contentions were substantially correct.

But, fearing a strong mob agitation, the government soon conceded the critics' argument, hurriedly amended the Election Act, and undid the changes to which objections had been raised. This was taken, not unexpectedly, as a confession of guilt and a new religio-political group [the Lahore-based Tehreek-i-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (LYRA)] was given an opening to mount an assault on the government that had already been weakened by the ouster of its head, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, from the prime minister's post.» Quelle: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), State of Human Rights in 2017, März 2018, S. 12, 17, 85-88, 93, 95, 113, 137, 145, 147: <http://hrcp-web.org/publication/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/State-of-Human-Rights-in-2017.pdf>.

NYT, 19. Oktober 2017:

«This country has a poor record of protecting its religious minorities, but we outdo ourselves when it comes to Ahmadis. Members of the sect insist on calling themselves Muslims, and we mainstream Muslims insist on treating them like the worst kind of heretics. (...)

It is always prudent not to ask what blasphemous act is said to have been committed, because under the law, repeating something blasphemous can itself constitute blasphemy. According to one newspaper report, the men were on trial for attempting to remove from a wall religious posters that incited hatred against Ahmadis. That's right, they were sentenced to death for taking down posters that incited people to kill them. (The prosecution argued that since the posters were religious, removing them was an insult to the Prophet Muhammad.)

The Ahmadi (or Ahmadiyya) sect is a reformist movement founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad toward the end of the 19th century in the city of Qadian, in what is today the Indian part of Punjab. Ahmad claimed to be the incarnation of a Messiah promised in Islamic holy texts. That challenged the mainstream Muslim belief that Muhammad is Islam's last and final prophet. Ahmad was accused of being an agent of the British Empire.

There are no reliable statistics about the number of Ahmadis in Pakistan today. Many Ahmadis don't publicly identify as Ahmadis; others refuse to take part in the census. Estimates range from 500,000 to four million. (...)

In 1974, Pakistan's elected Parliament declared Ahmadis to be non-Muslims. Religious parties had held street protests demanding this, and even though Parliament back then was full of liberals and socialists, there was hardly a dissenting voice when the time came to pass the law.

*Our Parliament today is still at it. **Last week Muhammad Safdar, a son-in-law of the recently deposed prime minister, thundered against Ahmadis, demanding they be banned from joining the armed forces. He also demanded that a physics department of a university in Islamabad be renamed because in 2016 it was named after Abdus Salam, the only Pakistani scientist to become a Nobel laureate. The Pakistani government had already taken close to four decades to name anything after Mr. Salam, a theoretical physicist, because he was Ahmadi. It appears that not a single parliamentarian spoke up against Mr. Safdar's diatribe.***

(...)

*The word "Ahmadi" was hardly even used during the debate in Parliament. **We prefer to call the Ahmadis "Qadianis," meaning from Qadian. Ahmadis consider the word derogatory, which is why we use it.*** (...)

Early this month, I saw Pakistan's foreign minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, give an interview on television. He had just returned from a tour of the United States and had been accused of hobnobbing with Ahmadis while there. He was at pains to explain that he had never met an Ahmadi in his life. To prove his point, he said that once, while he was sitting in a restaurant in Islamabad, two boys came up to get a selfie with him. "I asked them, 'I hope you are not Qadianis.'" The foreign minister and the show host shared a hearty laugh.» Quelle: New York Times, Pakistan, Land of the Intolerant, 19. Oktober 2017: www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/pakistan-muslims-ahmadis.html

Rabwah Times, 20. März 2018:

«Islamic clerics in Pakistan have lodged a protest against what they call 'Fraudulent misrepresentation' of faith by a student in Gojrah, a city 160 kilometers (100 miles) southwest of Lahore.

Speaking at the local press club the clerics demanded action against the 'fraudulent misrepresentation' of faith by Bilal Ahmed, a high school student from Chak-297GB. Clerics, Qari Noor Ahmad, Khalid Rizvi, Rana Tariq and others claimed that the teenager had falsely obtained permission to privately sit in high school level exams by misrepresenting his faith as Islam, even though he was Qadiani (Ahmadi).

The clerics added that they had formally lodged a complaint against the student with DSP & Assistant Commissioner Police Gojrah but they refused to take action and referred them to the anti-corruption department. The clerics requested DPO Police Usman Akram Gondal to take up their request and formally charge the student.» Quelle: Rabwah Times, Pakistani clerics protest against 'fraudulent misrepresentation' by Ahmadi Student, 20. März 2018: <https://www.rabwah.net/pakistani-clerics-protest-against-fraudulent-misrepresentation-by-ahmadi-student/>

Rabwah Times, 11. Oktober 2017:

«A lawyer, his wife, and 2-year-old son were shot dead by unidentified gunmen who on early Monday stormed their home located in Rehman Garden in Sheikhpura and opened fire. The five-year-old son of Advocate Rauf Ahmad Thakur miraculously survived the attack by hiding under the bed.

Thakur who was of Ahmadiyya sect of Islam married Abida Bibi against the wishes of her family around 8 years ago, Ahmadis are considered heretic under Pakistani law and are not considered Muslims. Police suspect the incident is another case of an 'honour killing'.

According to police sources, the primary suspect is believed to be Rafique, the lawyer's brother-in-law. Police said that Rafique, who is from Ferozwala had a long-running dispute with her sister over her marriage to Thakur. Bibi's parents and brother did not approve of her marriage to an Ahmadi.

According to reports Rafique along with his accomplices barged into his sister's house and started spraying bullets at the family. As a result of the firing, Advocate Rauf Thakur, his wife Abida Bibi, their two-year-old son Sarim were killed while his five-year son Wali bed survived the attack by hiding himself under the bed.» Quelle: Rabwah Times, Ahmadi Lawyer, wife and son shot dead in Pakistan, 11. Oktober 2017: www.rabwah.net/ahmadi-lawyer-wife-son-shot-dead-pakistan/.

Reuters, 9. März 2018:

«A Pakistani court ruled on Friday that all citizens must declare their religion when applying for identity documents, a move human rights advocates say is another blow for the country's persecuted minority communities.

The ruling will pile further pressure on the Ahmadi community, who are not allowed to call themselves Muslim or use Islamic symbols in their religious practices, a crime punishable under Pakistan's blasphemy laws.

The Islamabad High Court ruled that citizens who disguised their religious affiliation were guilty of betraying the state and ordered that anyone applying for government jobs should declare their faith.

"The Government of Pakistan shall take special measure ensuring availability of correct particulars of all the citizens," Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui said in the judgment.

"It should not be possible for any citizen to hide his/her real identity and recognition."

If no appeal is launched, the court's directives will have to be followed.

The vast majority of Pakistan's 208 million people are Muslims, with minorities accounting for about 3 percent of the population, according to a 1998 census.

The Ahmadi community has been a target of mob violence and attacks since legislation categorized the sect as non-Muslim in 1974 and have been vilified as blasphemers by leaders of new ultra-religious political party Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan.

The judge "is not only attacking everybody's religious freedom in Pakistan but he is also focusing on one particular sect, which is the Ahmadis," said Human Rights Watch representative Saroop Ijaz.

"A judgment like this would enable and incite violence."

The order was issued as a result of a petition brought forward by Tehreek-e-Labaik in connection with a change in wording to an electoral law. The amendment sought to replace a religious oath with a simple declaration, which Tehreek-e-Labaik said was blasphemy.

The government blamed the change on a clerical error and swiftly restored the original format.

Last year, Tehreek-e-Labaik shut down the nation's capital for nearly three weeks with protests against the change.

Seven people were killed and nearly 200 wounded in a failed police bid to disperse protesters, leading the government to give way to their demand that a minister accused of blasphemy resign.

Insulting the Prophet Mohammad is punishable by death in Pakistan and even a rumor of blasphemy can spark mob violence.

"All his (the judge's) specific instructions are about ensuring and finding out who is an Ahmadi," human rights lawyer Jibrán Nasir told Reuters, adding that the order would automatically provide the government with specific lists about who belongs to which minority group.

"Every day they are being institutionally reminded that they are a minority," he added. "It is a bigoted order."

Pakistan's minority Shi'ite Muslims regularly come under attack by Islamist groups. Members of its small Hindu and Christian communities have also sometimes been accused of blasphemy.» Quelle: Reuters, In blow to minorities, Pakistani court orders citizens to declare religion 9. März 2018: www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-religion-law/in-blow-to-minorities-pakistani-court-orders-citizens-to-declare-religion-idUSKCN1GL28T.

UNHCR, Januar 2017:

«C. Penal Code: Anti-Ahmadi Laws

As noted above (see Section III.A), since 1974 Ahmadis have been categorized as non-Muslim by the Constitution, even though they consider themselves to be Muslim.106 In 1984, then President Zia ul-Haq further institutionalized anti-Ahmadi sentiment in Pakistan through amendments to the Penal Code which introduced Sections 298B and 298C into the Penal Code through Ordinance No. XX.

Commonly referred to as the “anti-Ahmadi laws”, these amendments render certain Ahmadi religious practices illegal and have been widely criticized for violating the Ahmadi’s fundamental right to freedom of religion and other rights.

(For a detailed analysis of the anti-Ahmadi laws, see Section V.1.a, Risk Profiles: Ahmadi, Legislative Framework Concerning Ahmadi Individuals.) (...)

F. Counter-Terrorism Laws

The legal framework for the government’s approach to combating terrorism through law enforcement, include the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 (ATA). Members of religious minorities have reportedly been arrested and charged under the ATA, in some cases in addition to charges under the blasphemy or Anti-Ahmadi laws. (...)

In June 2016 police in Pakistan’s southern district, Badin, reportedly registered a FIR against five Ahmadi under Sections 6 and 7 of the ATA and under the Explosives Act. According to an article from a local media source, a 12-year old Ahmadi and four members of his family were arrested after a pipe bomb was thrown at their house; the boy was reportedly injured in the attack. (...) In December 2015 the owner and manager of an Ahmadi bookstore in Rabwah were reportedly arrested and charged under Section 298C of the Penal Code, as well as under Section 8 of the ATA. (...) In April 2013, a FIR was reportedly lodged against the manager, publisher, printer and three others under Sections 295B, 295C of the Penal Code and Section 11(W) of the ATA for printing and circulating the Al-Fazl, an Ahmadi publication. (...)

Potential Risk Profiles

1. Ahmadi

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at (or Ahmadi movement) was established in 1889 in India as a reformist movement within Islam. Estimates for the size of the Ahmadi population in Pakistan vary from 126,000 to several million. The headquarters of the Ahmadi community in Pakistan are in Rabwah, Punjab province, where Ahmadi are reported to constitute over 97 per cent of the population.

Ahmadi self-identify as Muslims. However, they hold beliefs that differ from mainstream Sunni interpretations of fundamental Islamic concepts, which are viewed by some Muslims as un-Islamic and blasphemous. Opposition to Ahmadi from the mainstream Muslim community in Pakistan reportedly mainly stems from differences in belief with respect to the Prophet Muhammad, in particular the belief that Prophet Muhammad is the final Prophet. According to research conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2011, 66 per cent of Muslims in Pakistan responded that Ahmadi are not Muslims, while only seven per cent accepted Ahmadi as Muslims. In December 2015, at a meeting of Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology, the chairman reportedly called on the gathering to consider whether Ahmadi should be considered murtads that have rejected Islam.

a) Legislative Framework Concerning Ahmadi Individuals

Pursuant to a constitutional amendment in 1974, Ahmadi were declared a ‘non-Muslim’ minority, and consequently are prohibited from belonging to the Muslim religious community in Pakistan. In 1984, former President Zia ul-Haq introduced Sections

298B and 298C into the Penal Code through Ordinance No. XX.190 (See also Section III.C.) Pursuant to Section 298B, Ahmadis' use of epithets, descriptions and titles reserved for certain holy personages and places constitutes an offence punishable with imprisonment for up to three years and a fine. Section 298C prohibits an Ahmadi from "directly or indirectly" "pos[ing]" as a Muslim, from "call[ing], or refer[ing] to, his faith as Islam", and from "preach[ing] or propoagat[ing] his faith". These sections impose discriminatory measures: Ahmadis are prohibited from practising their religion, from worshiping in private or in public, from any form of religious instruction and from publishing or disseminating their religious materials. These criminal provisions also make it illegal for Ahmadis to refer to their founder as a Prophet or to refer to their holy personages by their religious salutations; to refer to their places of worship as mosques; to use the traditional Islamic form of greeting; to use the Islamic call to prayer, known as the Azan (or Adhan), or to refer to their own call to prayer as Azan.

Moreover, the language used in Sections 298B and 298C allows for a broad range of interpretations, reportedly creating scope for abuse. For instance, Section 298C stipulates that any person of the Ahmadi group who "by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the feelings of Muslims shall be punished".¹⁹⁵ Ahmadis who are convicted under Section 298C may be sentenced to up to three years imprisonment and/or a fine.

Through these anti-Ahmadi laws, the State has imposed severe restrictions on the non-derogable right to freedom of religion of Ahmadi individuals in Pakistan. The anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy laws are reportedly often used by State authorities as well as by members of society to target and harass followers of, and converts to, the Ahmadi faith. The vague wording of Section 295C has reportedly particularly affected Ahmadi individuals, as in some cases, judges have reportedly interpreted the expression of Ahmadi religious beliefs by Ahmadis as a form of blasphemy. In 2015, according to Ahmadi groups, authorities charged 11 Ahmadis with offences in religion-related cases during the year, of whom six were taken into custody. According to reports, members of the Ahmadi community are often accused of religious offences on false grounds or to settle personal or business disputes.

b) Situation of Ahmadi Individuals in Pakistan

Ahmadi individuals face discrimination as a result of State-sanctioned measures which impose limitations on the civil and political rights of Ahmadi individuals. Pakistani passports reportedly include information about the bearer's religious affiliation. Muslims who apply for a passport are required to make a declaration to the effect that they denounce the Ahmadiyya movement's founder as a false prophet and his followers as non-Muslims, and must declare that they believe the Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet. This declaration effectively means that Ahmadis must either deny their faith or forego the possibility of obtaining a passport. It also means that Ahmadis cannot rely on government programmes to fund and facilitate hajj travel. While national identity cards do not display information about the bearer's religion, the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) collects information about the applicant's religion, and Muslim applicants must make a similar declaration as for passport applications. Ahmadis who register as Muslims and who sign the declaration may be at risk of being prosecuted for "posing" as Muslims under Section 298C of the Penal Code.

Between 1985 and 2002, the electoral system required non-Muslims to register on a separate voting list from Muslims. In 2002, the Electoral Commission of Pakistan implemented reforms and abolished this discriminatory requirement and segregation between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, despite these changes, Ahmadis are reportedly still forbidden to register on the general voters' list, and must still register on a separate list maintained solely for Ahmadis. In October 2015, Ahmadis in Lahore and other districts of Punjab province reportedly boycotted the local polls and elections in protest of being registered on a separate voting list.

There are also reports that some Cantonment Boards refuse to register the marriages of Ahmadi individuals.

Despite the Constitution prohibiting discrimination on religious grounds with regard to admission to any State-funded educational institutions, prospective students must reportedly declare their religious affiliation on their application forms for both State-funded and private educational institutions. Those who identify themselves as Muslim must declare in writing that they believe in the finality of the Prophethood, a requirement that excludes Ahmadis. Those who identify as Ahmadis are reported to face discrimination in access to higher education.

Although pursuant to section 298B(1) of the Penal Code Ahmadis are forbidden from calling their places of worship mosques, there are reportedly no formal restrictions on establishing places of worship. In practice, however, local authorities reportedly often refuse Ahmadis permission to build places of worship, and existing ones are at times closed, destroyed, desecrated or illegally expropriated, with the authorities reportedly often supporting such acts or being complicit in them. Non-Muslim missionary activity is reported to be permitted provided that there is no preaching against Islam and that the missionaries acknowledge that they are not Muslim, which excludes Ahmadis.²¹⁵

Ahmadis have also reportedly been prohibited by State authorities from holding conferences or gatherings since 1983. ²¹⁶ The sale of Ahmadi religious publications is reportedly banned. ²¹⁷ In January 2016, a store owner in Rabwah was reportedly sentenced to five years in prison on blasphemy charges and three years on terrorism charges, for propagating the Ahmadi faith by selling copies of the Quran and Ahmadi publications.²¹⁸ There are reports that in the wake of the adoption of the NAP, measures that were announced with the objective of furthering the protection of religious minorities, such as steps against hate speech, have in practice been used to prohibit Ahmadi publications.²¹⁹ On 5 December 2016, the headquarters of Pakistan's Ahmadi community in Rabwah were reportedly raided by Punjab's Counter Terrorism Department (CTD): four Ahmadi individuals were reportedly arrested and First Information Reports against nine individuals in total were registered under Sections 298B and 298C of the Penal Code for allegedly publishing banned literature.²²⁰

State authorities are reported to frequently fail to provide adequate protection to Ahmadi individuals (see also Section IV, Situation of Religious Minorities in Pakistan).²²¹ Crimes and acts of violence against Ahmadis are reportedly not consistently investigated and perpetrators of such crimes are reportedly rarely brought to justice.²²² Intimidation tactics and pressure on authorities from Islamic fundamentalist groups reportedly contribute to the unwillingness of the State to intervene in, investigate, or to

*prosecute religious violence or crimes. For example, State authorities have reportedly failed to bring to justice those responsible for the attacks against members of the Ahmadi community which resulted in the deaths of a grandmother and her two grandchildren in July 2014.*²²³

*On 28 August 2015, the Punjab Provincial Assembly was reported to have passed a resolution criticizing the former Pakistani High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, for publically questioning the anti-Ahmadi law.*²²⁴

*Furthermore, there are reports of the police perpetrating violence against Ahmadi individuals, or failing to act to prevent violence against Ahmadi individuals in their care.*²²⁵

*Anti-Ahmadi sentiments are reportedly tolerated and condoned by the authorities. The government has been criticized for “looking the other way” and for failing to stop extremists who engage in hate speech and incite violence against Ahmadi communities.*²²⁶ *Anti-Ahmadi hate speech and incitement of violence against Ahmadis, including by Islamic scholars, reportedly remains largely unchecked and/or unpunished by the authorities.*²²⁷

*State authorities reportedly also themselves discriminate against the Ahmadi community. For example, in March 2016 an advertisement for the auction of residential and commercial land in Chiniot district by the Punjab and Town Planning Agency (PHTPA) reportedly stated that “anyone related to the Qadiani/Ahmadi/Lahori/Mirzai sects cannot participate in the Area Development Scheme Muslim Colony, Chenab Nagar”, which is where the Ahmadi headquarters are situated.*²²⁸

c) Treatment of Ahmadi Individuals by Non-State Actors

*Repressive and discriminatory legislation coupled with State-sanctioned discriminatory practices have reportedly fostered a culture of religious intolerance and impunity.*²²⁹ *Consequently, members of the Ahmadi community are reportedly left vulnerable to abuse, violence including killings, harassment and intimidation at the hands of members of the community. Since the attack in 2010 on two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore where an estimated 94 people were killed,²³⁰ religiously motivated violence and targeted killings of Ahmadis have reportedly continued.*²³¹ *For example, in June 2016, an Ahmadi man was reportedly shot and killed by armed men outside his house in Attock;*²³² *in May 2016, an Ahmadi man was killed in Karachi by armed men;*²³³ *in March 2016 an Ahmadi man was reportedly stabbed and killed as he came out of his house in Sheikhpura district in Punjab;*²³⁴ *and in January 2016, an Ahmadi man was shot in Rabwah by armed men and died later in hospital.*²³⁵ *According to the Jinnah Institute, collecting data on crimes against Ahmadis remains a challenge, with one of the largest hurdles being self-censorship by local and national media in reporting instances of hate crime and violence against Ahmadis.*²³⁶ *According to available data, in 2014-2015, 39 Ahmadis were killed in religiously inspired attacks.*²³⁷ *The majority of incidents against Ahmadis reportedly occur in Punjab and Sindh, with some incidents reported in Balochistan.*²³⁸ *There are also continued reports of the destruction and desecration of Ahmadi mosques.*²³⁹ *In December 2016 hundreds of people were reported to have attacked an Ahmadi place of worship in the Chakwal district of Punjab.*²⁴⁰ *Members of*

Ahmadi communities report living in constant fear of harm.²⁴¹ The traditional style of clothing worn by Ahmadi women reportedly increases their visibility and thus their vulnerability. According to Ahmadi groups, Ahmadi women no longer feel safe to attend Ahmadi mosques for prayers or other ceremonies, even their own marriage ceremonies.²⁴²

Allegations of blasphemy against Ahmadi individuals are reported to have led to mob violence and killings. For example, on 20 November 2015 a mob reportedly torched a factory in Jhelum owned by an Ahmadi man, after it was reported to a local cleric that pages of the Quran had been thrown in a furnace in the factory.²⁴³ The following day a mob reportedly broke through a police cordon and set fire to an Ahmadi place of worship in Jhelum.²⁴⁴ In July 2014, in response to allegations of an Ahmadi man posting blasphemous content on his Facebook page, a large mob reportedly attacked the man's house, and set fire to other houses in the area, resulting in the death of a grandmother and her two grandchildren.²⁴⁵

Rallies and hate campaigns promoting intolerance and discrimination against Ahmadis, whether through traditional media, or the distribution of pamphlets, use of stickers and wall graffiti, are reported across the country. ²⁴⁶ In September 2016, the Council of Complaints of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regularity Authority reportedly dismissed complaints from members of the Ahmadi community against "provocative" remarks about Ahmadis by two hosts of Neo TV station; the meeting held by the Council was reportedly interrupted by a group of lawyers led by the Lahore High Court Bar Association who demanded the Ahmadis' complaint be quashed.²⁴⁷ In April 2016 during a speech at a political rally, former Prime Minister (2012 – 2013) and PPP leader Raja Parvez Ashraf reportedly referred to "the Problem of [Ahmadis]" and claimed that his party "shut them up, broke their neck and buried the [Ahmadi] problem".²⁴⁸ In December 2015, a shopkeeper at a large shopping centre in Lahore reportedly put up a poster containing derogatory remarks and barring Ahmadis from entering the shop. After social media spread the news that police had arrested the shopkeeper, hundreds of people reportedly gathered outside the shopping centre to protest.²⁴⁹ Anti-Ahmadi groups, including the Khatm-e-nabuwat (meaning the Finality of Prophethood) reportedly organize regular rallies and conferences against the Ahmadi community; according to media reports, some anti-Ahmadi groups, including the Khatm-e-nabuwat "call upon followers to consider killing Ahmadis a religious obligation".²⁵⁰

Hate speech against Ahmadis has been reported within educational institutions; ²⁵¹ allegations of blasphemy have in some cases reportedly led to Ahmadi teachers being fired.²⁵² Ahmadi groups report that Ahmadi employees in other sectors have also been harassed and in some cases forced to leave their job by co-workers once their identity as an Ahmadi was revealed.²⁵³ Ahmadi professionals and small business owners have reportedly been subjected to what they described as "economic exclusion campaigns" or "economic boycotts" primarily by "local religious groups from all sects of majoritarian Islam"; as a result many Ahmadi business owners have reportedly had to relocate to other areas.²⁵⁴» Quelle: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan, Januar 2017, S. 18, 20, 21, 28-38, Fussnote 129: www.refworld.org/docid/5857ed0e4.html.

USDOS, 20. April 2018:

«Prisoners who were members of religious minorities generally received poorer treatment than Muslims and often suffered violence at the hands of fellow inmates. **Representatives of Christian and Ahmadiyya Muslim communities claimed their members were often subjected to abuse in prison.** (...)

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

(...) **Police often failed to protect members of religious minorities--including Ahmadiyya Muslims, Christians, Shia Muslims, and Hindus--from attacks. Mob violence often accompanied blasphemy allegations, and individuals accused of blasphemy from both majority and minority communities were killed during the year.** (...)

Trial Procedures

(...) **Courts routinely failed to protect the rights of religious minorities. Courts discriminatorily used laws prohibiting blasphemy against Shia, Christians, Ahmadis, and members of other religious minority groups. Lower courts often did not require adequate evidence in blasphemy cases, and some convicted persons spent years in jail before higher courts eventually overturned their convictions or ordered them freed.** (...)

g. Abuses in Internal Conflict

(...) **Multiple Ahmadiyya community members died in what appeared to be targeted killings. Unknown gunmen killed three Ahmadis in three separate attacks on March 30, April 7, and May 3.** (...)

Censorship or Content Restrictions:

(...) **Blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi laws restricted publication on certain topics.** (...)

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

(...)

Authorities generally prohibited Ahmadis, a religious minority, from holding conferences or gatherings. Ahmadis cited a December 2016 Punjab provincial police raid on the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community headquarters in Rabwah as evidence of worsening conditions for the community. In May an antiterrorism court sentenced two Ahmadis who were arrested during the raid to three years in prison. (...)

Foreign travel:

(...) **Passport applicants must list their religious affiliation and, if Muslims, affirm a declaration that the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement was a false prophet. Ahmadi representatives reported the word "Ahmadi" was written on their passports if they refused to sign the declaration.** (...)

[Political] Participation of Women and Minorities:

(...) The government requires voters to indicate their religion when registering to vote and requires Ahmadis to declare themselves as non-Muslims. Ahmadis consider themselves Muslims, and many were unable to vote because they did not comply. (...)

Other Societal Violence or Discrimination

Societal violence due to religious intolerance remained a serious problem. There were occasionally reports of mob violence against religious minorities, including Christians, Ahmadiyya Muslims, Hindus, and Shia Muslims.» Quelle: US Department of State (USDOS), Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Pakistan, 20. April 2018:

www.ecoi.net/en/document/1430102.html.