



Not Ready to Return: IDP Movement Intentions in Borno State

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About REACH

REACH is a joint initiative of two international non-governmental organizations - ACTED and IMPACT Initiatives - and the UN Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). REACH's mission is to strengthen evidence-based decision making by aid actors through efficient data collection, management and analysis before, during and after an emergency. By doing so, REACH contributes to ensuring that communities affected by emergencies receive the support they need. All REACH activities are conducted in support to and within the framework of inter-agency aid coordination mechanisms. For more information please visit our website: www.reach-initiative.org.

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SUMMARY

Conflict between the Nigerian government and armed opposition groups intensified in May 2013, when a state of emergency was declared across the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe in north-eastern Nigeria and armed groups took effective control of numerous local government areas (LGAs).¹ Since then, the region has seen increased levels of destruction of infrastructure, a dramatic erosion of livelihoods and the displacement of over 2 million people at the height of the conflict.² Most of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in north-eastern Nigeria fled their homes in 2014 and 2015,³ following further escalation of the conflict in mid-2014. As of July 2017, some 1.4 million are displaced in Borno State.⁴

In a highly dynamic context characterised by severe restrictions on access, and amidst limited evidence available to humanitarian partners for aid planning and delivery in north-eastern Nigeria, there is a need to understand if and where IDPs intend to move, what factors may contribute to their decision, what information they have about their areas of return or potential relocation and how they obtain it, and what support they may need upon their return or relocation.

In order to better understand future displacement dynamics and to provide an evidence base to facilitate planning by humanitarian actors, REACH, in partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), as well as the Protection Sector, conducted an assessment of IDPs' intentions to return to their homes, relocate or integrate in their current place of displacement. The assessment was conducted in the capital areas of 12 LGAs in Borno State hosting large numbers of IDPs and which had not been the subject of a large-scale intentions assessment before. NRC and DRC, as well as the Protection Sector, were closely consulted on the design of the assessment methodology and data collection tools. Primary data was collected through a total of 3,455 household surveys and 46 focus group discussions (FGDs) between 10 July and 9 September 2017.

Key findings

1. Displacement is likely to continue in the medium to long term

- **A significant proportion of IDP households can be expected to remain at their current locations in the near future**, as 23% of IDPs reported an intention to integrate in their current place of displacement and 63%, although intending to leave, did not have concrete plans nor a timeframe for their departure. Only 14% reported actively planning to leave.
- **IDPs perceived their current living conditions at IDP sites to be worse than prior to displacement.** This was largely due to the reportedly **worse conditions in terms of the needs IDPs conferred more importance to**, namely **access to shelter, land and cash and/or employment**. The prioritisation of these long-term needs reflects a displacement of protracted nature.

2. Response planning in support of IDPs needs to be adapted to the situation of protracted displacement

- **Protracted displacement has compounded vulnerabilities and increased dependence on aid from government and humanitarian actors to meet most of their basic needs.** IDPs themselves reported perceiving this aid dependency as a negative aspect of their displacement.
- Most of the IDP population was made up of **arable farmers and pastoralists**, with 59% reporting crop cultivation and 23% reporting livestock as main sources of livelihood. However, **43% reported lacking the means to ensure access to land**, which limits their livelihoods and **reinforces aid dependency in terms of access to food**. In a context where access to land can be severely limited due to security conditions, interventions in the areas of shelter and livelihoods should be mindful of the limited

¹ UN Human Rights Council, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons on his mission to Nigeria*, 12 April 2017, A/HRC/35/27/Add.1, para. 9, available at <http://bit.ly/2iae4cR>.

² OCHA (2017). *About the crisis [in Nigeria]*, available at <http://bit.ly/2h2rMx8>.

³ OCHA (2016). *Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017 – Nigeria*, p. 10, available at <http://bit.ly/2ge85Dk>.

⁴ OCHA (2017). *Nigeria Northeast: Humanitarian Overview (September 2017)*, available at <http://bit.ly/2xDaRER>.

land available for crop cultivation and raising of livestock, on the one hand, and for the construction of essential infrastructure, such as shelters, health facilities, schools and child friendly spaces, on the other.

- Contrary to the overall high levels of aid dependency, the majority of IDPs (51%) reported resorting to their own internal responses to ensure access to cash, mostly through trading. At the same time, **cash was an essential component of IDPs' own means to meet their basic needs**, as it was used to ensure access to food, water, health, education and shelter. However, **the reported lack of access to cash by some IDPs could be linked to limited possibilities of using cash** – for example, due to limited or no access to functioning markets.
- **Family separation, which affected 30% of all IDPs**, was also reported to have a negative impact on their livelihoods, as separated family members were also providers to the household before the crisis.
- Furthermore, **IDPs' dependency on armed actors to ensure their security could prompt further protection concerns**, such as attacks on IDP sites by armed groups. In addition, qualitative data indicates that at times armed actors could be directly linked to protection challenges, such as arrests, harassment and extortion.

3. The shift to longer-term solutions to support protracted displacement needs to be accompanied by response planning to prepare and accompany returns

- While **security was frequently reported as the main driver of displacement**, either as push or pull factors, a deeper analysis of reasons for displacement revealed that shelter conditions and access to food also figure prominently in IDPs' decisions to move, and would be essential to ensuring sustainable, durable return or relocation. A closer consideration of the role of these factors in influencing *temporary returns* reinforces their complementary nature – for example, as improved security in certain areas alone would not suffice to ensure IDPs' return or relocation.
- Even though an overall 45% of IDP households believed they would be able to re-inhabit their homes at their villages of origin, only 27% reported that their previous homes were undamaged. This suggests that **appropriate shelter conditions upon return would require the reparation and reconstruction of homes**.
- IDPs also reported a **need for support to re-establish their livelihoods** upon return or relocation, including through **initial capital** to start businesses, **livestock** for pastoralists and **agricultural inputs and farming tools** for arable farmers.
- Overall, 48% of IDPs have not received information from their villages of origin since their departure, and 71% have not received news on their planned place of relocation, which suggests a **significant information gap, potentially with serious implications on movement intentions**. In addition, 18% of interviewed IDPs, although intending to leave, reported not knowing where to go, and 9% had no information on the physical state of their previous homes. IDPs' reportedly fair levels of trust in information coming from United Nations (UN) agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on their villages of origin and potential places of relocation suggests that the humanitarian sector could play a key role in filling information gaps.

Recommendations

The findings above provide some direction for future engagement by humanitarian actors seeking to respond to the needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs in Borno State:

- The significant caseload of IDPs remaining at current locations indicates a need for a **better understanding of and support to living conditions** at displacement sites, and planning for **local integration**, including through **long-term humanitarian support, especially in terms of shelter conditions and livelihoods**.
- High levels of aid dependency and IDPs' overall underdeveloped internal responses to meet basic needs denote a need for **participation of different and multiple IDP communities at every stage of programming** to develop and implement **resilience-building activities**, based on the acknowledgment of communities' diversity and agency in addressing their own needs and vulnerabilities.
- The importance of cash in ensuring basic needs and access to services, along with a potential increased security in the coming year, points to an **opportunity for greater engagement in cash transfer programming across sectors, taking into consideration availability of services and goods**.
- Overall low levels of access to land, along with a high proportion of arable farmers and pastoralists, calls for a **deeper understanding of livelihood possibilities and tailored economic empowerment programmes, particularly for those intending to integrate in their current place of displacement**.
- Expected challenges upon return and relocation call for **comprehensive support to IDPs' return and relocation**, notably by assisting **reconstruction of homes** and **re-establishment of livelihood activities**.
- Overall lack of information and fairly high levels of trust in UN agencies and NGOs suggest that **the humanitarian sector can play a greater role in facilitating access to information on villages of origin and potential places of relocation**, notably through "go-and-see" visits, in which a group of representatives of IDP communities are taken to areas of origin and potential places of relocation, so that they can assess the situation themselves and relay the information back to their communities.

List of Acronyms

DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DTM	Data Tracking Matrix
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GSC	Global Shelter Cluster
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LGA	Local Government Area
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
ODK	Open Data Kit
UN	United Nations

Geographical Classifications

State	Form of governance below the national level
LGA	Form of governance below the state level
Ward	Form of governance below the LGA level

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INTRODUCTION

Conflict between the Nigerian government and armed opposition groups intensified in May 2013, when a state of emergency was declared across the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe in north-eastern Nigeria and armed groups took effective control of numerous local government areas (LGAs).⁵ Since then, the region has seen increased levels of destruction of infrastructure, a dramatic erosion of livelihoods and the displacement of over 2 million people at the height of the conflict.⁶ Most of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in north-eastern Nigeria fled their homes in 2014 and 2015,⁷ following further escalation of the conflict in mid-2014. As of July 2017, some 1.4 million are displaced in Borno State.⁸

In response to the crisis in north-eastern Nigeria, humanitarian assistance has been scaling up in the past year. The recent increase in access to LGA capitals has resulted in outreach by humanitarian partners beyond Maiduguri, with several NGOs establishing themselves in LGA capitals recently reoccupied by Nigerian forces. However, the existing humanitarian capacity is insufficient to respond to the scale of the crisis.

In a highly dynamic context characterised by severe restrictions on access, and amidst limited evidence available to humanitarian partners for aid planning and delivery in north-eastern Nigeria, there is a need to understand if and where IDPs intend to move, what factors may contribute to their decision, what information they have about their areas of return or potential relocation and how they obtain it, and what support they may need upon their return or relocation.

In order to better understand future displacement dynamics and to provide an evidence base to facilitate planning by humanitarian actors, REACH, in partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), as well as the Protection Sector, conducted an assessment of IDPs' intentions to return to their homes, relocate or integrate in their current place of displacement. The assessment was conducted in the capital areas of 12 LGAs in Borno State hosting large numbers of IDPs and which had not been the subject of a large-scale intentions assessment before. Findings in this report aim to explain movement intentions of the displaced population.

This report begins with an overview of the profile of displaced households. A second section examines displacement dynamics, between IDPs' village of origin and current location, including main causes and length of flight, means of arrival, multiple displacement and family separation. A third section analyses IDPs' intentions to return, relocate and integrate in their current place of displacement, offering estimated caseloads and analysing push and pull factors, including those influencing pendular displacement. A fourth section provides an overview of needs and vulnerabilities, with a more detailed analysis of protection, shelter and livelihood conditions. Finally, a fifth section examines IDPs' access to information and explores possibilities to fill information gaps.

⁵ UN Human Rights Council, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons on his mission to Nigeria*, 12 April 2017, A/HRC/35/27/Add.1, para. 9, available at <http://bit.ly/2iae4cR>.

⁶ OCHA (2017). *About the crisis [in Nigeria]*, available at <http://bit.ly/2h2rMx8>.

⁷ OCHA (2016). *Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017 – Nigeria*, p. 10, available at <http://bit.ly/2ge85Dk>.

⁸ OCHA (2017). *Nigeria Northeast: Humanitarian Overview (September 2017)*, available at <http://bit.ly/2xDaRER>.

METHODOLOGY

Research questions

With the objective of informing planning of humanitarian actors in Borno State, Nigeria, this study sought to answer the following research questions:

- What are IDPs' current locations, type of settlement (formal camps, informal camps and host communities) and demographics (composition and size of household)?
- What are IDPs' areas of origin, previous displacement patterns, push and pull factors and consequences of displacement (e.g. family separation)?
- What are IDPs' movement intentions (if any) and what reasons motivate them?
- What are the living conditions, vulnerabilities and responses to meet basic needs of IDPs in current location?
- What information do IDPs have on previous and future locations (including security and access to services) and how do they obtain it?

Methodology overview

REACH used a mixed-methods approach, beginning with a household level survey of IDPs, disaggregated by population groups based on primary housing location types (i.e., IDPs in formal camps, IDPs in informal camps, IDPs in host communities) across 12 LGA capital areas, including IDP sites within and in the vicinities of the capital. Both quantitative and qualitative data collection were carried out in all IDP sites (formal and informal camps, as well as host communities within which IDPs live) listed in the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Data Tracking Matrix (DTM), Round XVI, and accessible in the capital areas. A full list of sites assessed is available in Annex 1.

IDP sites outside capital areas were excluded from this assessment from its conception, mostly due to accessibility constraints. Although IDP sites outside capitals were accessible in Bama and Gwoza LGAs (namely, in the towns of Banki and Pulka, respectively), they were also excluded in order to maintain coherence, keeping the assessment focused on LGA capital areas only.

The structured household level data collection was followed by semi-structured qualitative data collection through FGDs, to contextualise household level data and explore topics in further detail. NRC and DRC, as well as the Protection Sector, were closely consulted on the design of the methodology and data collection tools.

Quantitative sampling

IDP households in all three population groups were randomly sampled. The initial sample sizes were calculated based on data derived from IOM DTM Round XVI.⁹ Some sample sizes were updated in cases where REACH field teams encountered clearly different sizes

Table 1: Sample sizes

LGA	LGA capital	Population group	Sample size	Total sample
Kaga	Benisheikh	IDPs in formal camps	146	425
		IDPs in informal camps	157	
		IDPs in host communities	122	
Ngala	Ngala	IDPs in informal camps	134	274
		IDPs in host communities	140	
Nganzai	Gajiram	IDPs in informal camps	136	288
		IDPs in host communities	152	
Bama	Bama	IDPs in formal camps	190	190
Monguno	Monguno	IDPs in formal camps	204	486
		IDPs in informal camps	138	
		IDPs in host communities	144	
Gwoza	Gwoza	IDPs in informal camps	152	303
		IDPs in host communities	151	
Dikwa	Dikwa	IDPs in informal camps	154	308
		IDPs in host communities	154	
Damboa	Damboa	IDPs in formal camps	137	294
		IDPs in informal camps	157	
Hawul	Azare	IDPs in host communities	148	148
Biu	Biu	IDPs in informal camps	135	298
		IDPs in host communities	163	
Kala/Balge	Rann	IDPs in formal camps	144	144
Mafa	Mafa	IDPs in informal camps	174	297
		IDPs in host communities	123	

⁹ IOM (2017). "DTM Nigeria Round XVI Dataset of Site Assessments" and "DTM Nigeria Round XVI Dataset of Location Assessments", available at <http://bit.ly/2z5cxbd>.

of IDP populations. In such cases, the sample size was recalculated based on information obtained on the ground from IOM officers, camp managers and/or community leaders. In some cases, some locations listed as formal camps were found to be informal camps, and vice-versa, which also affected sample size calculations.

Table 1, below, shows the final sample sizes, level of confidence and margin of error for each population group and for each of the 12 LGA capital areas assessed.

The data collection was finally carried out with a total sample of 3,455 households, representing 89,512 households.

Qualitative sampling

FGDs were conducted for each of the three population groups in each LGA capital area, and were gender-disaggregated within each population group. REACH field teams sought to ensure participants were of different age groups and had different areas of origin, in order to ensure a diversity of opinions were represented. Participants were gathered based on their availability at the time of assessment. REACH conducted a total of 46 FGDs, with 6 to 8 participants each, distributed amongst LGA according to research needs revealed during quantitative data collection.

Data collection

Data collection was carried out for a period of six weeks, spread between 10 July and 9 September 2017. Both quantitative and qualitative tools (i.e., questionnaire and FGD tool) were piloted in Maiduguri in July 2017 and modified based on testing and discussions with partners. Data collection in Kaga, Mafa, Monguno and Nganzai was conducted with a team of REACH enumerators, hired and trained in Maiduguri, while in the remaining LGAs, REACH hired and trained local enumerators.

Throughout the process, data collection was supervised by field coordinators, who ensured that the methodology was being followed correctly, checked forms, and provided advice when needed. Data collection was conducted using a smartphone-based survey form, which included constraints to limit error by the data collection team and allowed data to be uploaded quickly to a central server. Trained staff conducted data checks on a regular basis to ensure the quality of data collected, while daily briefings and debriefings ensured that enumerators could provide feedback on any difficulties they faced and seek clarification.

Limitations

As explained above, due to accessibility constraint, this assessment only covered IDP sites within and in the vicinities of LGA capital. Therefore, findings in this report do not reflect the specific needs of IDPs residing outside LGA capital areas.

In addition, even in areas covered, some sites had to be excluded. That was the case for the host community Zawuya, in Gamboru 'B' (Ngala LGA), where community members did not allow REACH team to collect data. It was also the case of informal camps "Gasarwa Pri School" and "Behind Secretariat", in Gajiram (Nganzai LGA), and in host community PAMA Whitambaya (Hawul LGA), which were inaccessible by car.¹⁰

Furthermore, during the assessment, anecdotal evidence indicated the presence of refugees amongst IDPs in certain locations, notably in LGAs bordering neighbouring countries. While refugees were systematically excluded from the assessment, the calculation of sample sizes relied on the total number of households in each location, which may have included refugee households.

The overall confidence level of 90% applies to those findings which pertain to the full sample. Any findings presented solely on subsets of the population – e.g. timeframe of planned departure for those IDPs who intend to leave their current location – inevitably have a lower confidence level. In particular, those findings which relate to a very small subset of the population should be treated as indicative only.

¹⁰ The first informal camp was in the bush and not safe to access; the second camp was not possible to locate.

FINDINGS


General demographics

This sub-section outlines findings related to the assessed population profile, namely the distribution of IDPs amongst age groups, the average size of household and the gender of the head of household. Profile variations amongst LGAs, where existent, are observed below.

Household composition

The IDP population predominantly consisted of children¹¹ (58%), with 24% being below the age of five. About 7% of the population was above the age of 60, whereas working-age adults corresponded to mere 35% (see Figure 1). The average size of household was 7.8 people. This was significantly higher in Kala/Balge LGA (14.2 people).


Figure 1: IDP population per age group



Households were mostly headed by men (71%), while 29% were headed by women. In Bama, Kaga and Gwoza, the proportion of female-headed households was significantly higher – 54%, 44% and 43%, respectively (see Figure 2). In Bama, anecdotal evidence as well as qualitative data from FGDs reveal that many men have been arrested on suspicion of collaboration with armed groups and have not been released yet, which can explain the high percentage of reported female-headed households.


Female-headed households were overall more likely to report settling at their current location (28% compared to 21% for male-headed households). Among those who intended to leave their current location, a lower percentage of female-headed households reported believing that they will not be able to reclaim their property upon return (31% compared to 40% of their male counterparts).

Figure 2: Gender of heads of households per LGA



¹¹ "Children" corresponds to all persons under the age of 18.

Map 1: IDP presence in the 12 LGA capitals¹² assessed



¹² Figures on the map do not correspond to the total IDP population in the LGA, but rather to the population in areas covered within LGA capitals. The total IDP population is significantly higher in Bama and Gwoza, where large numbers of IDPs are outside the LGA capital.

Displacement dynamics

The assessed population comes from a wide range of LGAs in north-eastern Nigeria (see Map 2), including from states other than Borno; however, most IDP households reported to have been displaced within their LGA of origin. Overall, IDPs fled their homes for similar reasons – mostly, insecurity – and experienced a considerably long journey, during which some settled in multiple locations, and some became separated from family members.

This sub-section outlines main trends and specificities in the displacement dynamics of the areas assessed.

Main causes of displacement

Across the 12 assessed LGAs, the overwhelming majority of IDPs (97%), reported that they had left their pre-crisis homes primarily as a result of insecurity. This was followed by a lack of food (65%) and lack of shelter (42%), and did not vary significantly across the different population groups. However, in Bama and Dikwa, IDPs reported **lack of health services**, instead of lack of shelter, as one of their top three reasons for leaving their villages of origin (46% and 22% respectively).

Table 2: Drivers of displacement (push factors) reported by IDPs, per LGA

	Insecurity	Lack of food	Lack of shelter	Lack of health services	Lack of water and sanitation	Lack of education services	Lack of cash/employment	Recommended by government/armed forces	Forced by government/armed forces	Lack of access to land	Separated, missing or deceased family members	Recommended by NGOs/UN
Bama	97%	69%	22%	46%	11%	19%	5%	3%	1%	9%	1%	1%
Biu	100%	71%	66%	11%	3%	6%	4%	0%	2%	1%	3%	1%
Dambo	92%	85%	50%	25%	9%	11%	9%	2%	8%	4%	1%	0%
Dikwa	93%	57%	17%	22%	13%	9%	9%	8%	12%	3%	9%	4%
Gwoza	95%	58%	33%	29%	5%	20%	11%	13%	7%	6%	3%	1%
Hawul	98%	70%	78%	3%	1%	3%	10%	0%	1%	4%	4%	0%
Kaga	96%	66%	71%	3%	2%	1%	3%	2%	0%	2%	3%	1%
Kala/Balge	100%	56%	38%	26%	27%	31%	13%	0%	1%	7%	1%	0%
Mafa	92%	71%	67%	8%	7%	1%	9%	1%	1%	6%	0%	0%
Monguno	99%	60%	52%	3%	4%	1%	8%	5%	1%	2%	2%	3%
Ngala	98%	79%	41%	27%	18%	7%	9%	5%	3%	2%	2%	1%
Nganzai	97%	66%	67%	4%	6%	1%	5%	3%	2%	6%	0%	1%
Total	97%	65%	42%	18%	11%	9%	9%	5%	4%	3%	3%	2%

Security was the most widely reported pull factor that attracted IDPs to their current location (79%), followed by food (71%) and shelter (47%). Although reported at different proportions, this set of pull factors mirrors main causes of displacement, and indicates that **IDPs' displacement is overall influenced by security, food and shelter conditions**.

The main reasons for displacement also varied through time. Table 4 below shows that, although insecurity has remained a highly reported factor of displacement throughout the crisis, lack of food and lack of shelter have been reported by lower percentages of IDPs displaced in more recent years. At the same time, lack of health services, water and sanitation, and education were more frequently reported by those displaced in 2016 and 2017.


Table 3: Drivers of displacement (push factors) reported by IDPs, per year of displacement

	Insecurity	Lack of food	Lack of shelter	Lack of health services	Lack of water and sanitation	Lack of education services	Lack of cash/employment	Recommended by government/armed forces	Forced by government/armed forces	Lack of access to land	Separated, missing or deceased family members	Recommended by NGOs/UN
2009	100%	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2010	90%	67%	67%	10%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2011	100%	89%	90%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	10%	6%	0%	0%
2012	91%	82%	58%	5%	15%	0%	5%	9%	6%	0%	0%	0%
2013	98%	75%	69%	11%	6%	7%	6%	1%	2%	3%	2%	0%
2014	97%	70%	51%	16%	12%	8%	10%	3%	2%	3%	2%	1%
2015	97%	64%	39%	20%	10%	6%	8%	5%	5%	4%	5%	3%
2016	97%	63%	38%	17%	9%	12%	9%	5%	5%	2%	3%	0%
2017	95%	63%	37%	23%	20%	14%	8%	8%	3%	4%	1%	4%
Total	97%	65%	42%	18%	11%	9%	9%	5%	4%	3%	3%	2%


Geographical scope of displacement

Overall, **78% of IDPs were displaced within their LGA of origin**. However, the proportion of **displacement across LGA borders was significantly higher in Biu, Damboa, Hawul, Monguno and Nganzai**. In **Biu**, 27% of IDPs came from Damboa and 10% from Gujba. In **Damboa** 22% came from Konduga; in **Hawul**, 11% came from Gujba; in **Monguno** 27% from Marte and 18% from Kukawa; in **Nganzai**, 42% came from Monguno.

Figure 3: % of IDP households displaced across LGA borders, per LGA




Map 2: LGAs of origin reported by IDPs in the 12 LGAs assessed



Length of flight

The average number of days IDPs took between leaving their village of origin and arriving at their current location (length of flight) was 160 (or 5.3 months). IDPs currently living in Gwoza experienced an average duration of flight of 433 days or 2.9 years, which may be due to a high percentage of IDPs who reported being displaced multiple times (41%), as seen below. Indeed, **the average length of flight was significantly higher for those who experienced multiple displacement (402 days)**. Long flights may also increase chances of family separation, as IDPs separated from family members reported a higher average length of flight (238 days).

Figure 4: Average duration of flight (in days), based on average dates of displacement and arrival, per LGA




Multiple displacements

While most IDPs have travelled directly from their villages of origin to their current location, **29% have been displaced to other locations** for at least a month. Rates of multiple displacement were significantly higher in **Ngala** (54%), **Gwoza** (41%) and **Bama** (35%), as seen below (Figure 5). Most of the IDPs who experienced multiple displacements were displaced twice – that is, they lived in only **one location (77%)** for at least a month before arriving at their current location. This was followed by 17% in two locations and 6% in three locations or more.

Existing literature suggests that **over time multiple displacements tend to increase IDPs' vulnerabilities and needs, with worsening levels of food insecurity**.¹³ Even though multiple displacement is common in the Lake Chad crisis, which affects Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger,¹⁴ **the specific impact of this phenomenon on IDP needs and vulnerabilities in north-eastern Nigeria remains largely unexplored**, and the possible implications it may have to the humanitarian response deserves more attention and a better understanding.

Figure 5: % of IDP households reporting having been displaced multiple times, per LGA



¹³ See, e.g., Beytrison, F., & Kalis, O. (2013). Repeated displacement in eastern DRC. *Forced Migration Review*, (43), available at <http://bit.ly/2xCMJSH>, and REACH Initiative (2017). *Afghanistan: Revealing the hidden vulnerabilities of prolonged IDPs living below the assistance threshold*, available at <http://bit.ly/2s6PpGX>.

¹⁴ IOM (2016). *Within and Beyond Borders: Tracking Displacement in the Lake Chad Basin*, p. 5, available at <http://bit.ly/2gB60hW>.

Displacement across international borders


Of the IDPs reporting multiple displacement, **22% have crossed an international border, which amounts to 6% of all IDPs**. This rate was significantly higher in LGAs which share a border with another country. This is in line with the predominant trend of displacement within the same LGA – that is, those that have crossed an international border have done so simply by leaving their LGA, rather than crossing multiple LGAs to reach another country. LGAs with higher percentages of IDPs reporting having been displaced to and returned from another country were **Ngala (27%), Kala/Balge (13%) and Bama (9%)**.¹⁵

Although this assessment was not specifically focused on the dynamics between internal and cross-border displacement, the data on multiple displacement collected can inform questions around the lasting effect of refugees' return, often deemed as a "durable solution" to refugee movements. **In north-eastern Nigeria, the return of once-refugees to their country, or even to their LGA of origin, does not equate to a stable solution (nor to resumption of livelihoods and adequate living condition), but rather leads back to a phase of displacement most have experienced before: within their own country.**¹⁶

Family Separation

Across all LGAs assessed, family separation has affected 30% of IDPs.¹⁷ In FGDs, most IDPs separated from family members reported that family separation had an impact both on their psychosocial wellbeing as well as on their livelihoods. **Of those who were separated, 57% were not in contact with separated family members.** As seen below (Figure 6), family separation rates were significantly higher in **Gwoza**, where it was also reported as a push factor for intending to leave their current location, and **Ngala**.

Figure 6: % of IDP households reporting separated family members and not having contact with them, per LGA



Overall, about 78% of IDP households reported becoming separated from family members before their arrival at their current location, while 44% reported that family members permanently left their current site *after* arrival.¹⁸ Amongst those separated prior to arrival, 41% of IDP households reported family separation was accidental, while 37% reported being forced to separate and 23% reported that separation was intentional.¹⁹

Amongst those separated after arrival, 41% reported not knowing why their family members left the site permanently. They also reported **insecurity** as a main reason for separation in most LGAs (35% in Monguno, 32% in Bama, 27% in Ngala and 25% in Kala/Balge). Family separation was also driven by a **lack of access to land** and a **lack of food** (22% and 17% in Kaga, respectively), and a **lack of access to cash/employment** (40% in Biu, 36% in Hawul, 31% in Dikwa and 25% in Kala/Balge). **These factors drove not only family separation, but also IDPs' movement intentions more broadly, as seen further below (sub-section "Movement intentions").**

¹⁵ The assessment that informs the present report was conducted with households of Nigerian origin who have been displaced in or after 2009 due to the current crisis. The assessment was not guided by any considerations of legal status within the IDP population – that is, regardless of whether a displaced Nigerian was registered with humanitarian and/or government agencies as an IDP or as a returnee. The assessment systematically excluded refugees who may live in the same sites as (Nigerian) IDPs.

¹⁶ For more on the interconnectedness between IDP and refugee movements, see Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2017). *Global Report on Internal Displacement*, p. 50, available at <http://bit.ly/2rOSQRI>.

¹⁷ Separation from family members may have been underreported, since many female-headed households reported no family separation, even though women reported to be married (not divorced nor widowed).

¹⁸ Percentages do not add up to 100% because some IDP households have experienced family separation both before and after their arrival.

¹⁹ IDPs were not asked details about their separation during displacement because piloting revealed the topic to be too sensitive.

Table 4: Reasons for family members' leaving current location permanently, as reported by IDP households reporting family separation after arrival, per LGA

	Insecurity	Lack of cash/ employment	Lack of food	Lack of shelter	Lack of education services	Lack of health services	Lack of access to land	Don't know
Bama	32%	0%	0%	0%	8%	4%	0%	52%
Biu	9%	40%	10%	6%	4%	1%	0%	31%
Damboa	10%	4%	13%	0%	5%	0%	0%	68%
Dikwa	13%	31%	3%	4%	0%	0%	0%	49%
Gwoza	18%	0%	3%	12%	4%	0%	0%	55%
Hawul	18%	36%	0%	9%	9%	0%	0%	27%
Kaga	0%	5%	17%	4%	0%	0%	22%	42%
Kala/Balge	25%	25%	17%	8%	8%	0%	0%	17%
Mafa	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Monguno	35%	10%	12%	11%	4%	0%	0%	24%
Ngala	27%	13%	7%	0%	7%	3%	0%	43%
Nganzai	11%	3%	5%	1%	2%	0%	3%	74%
Total	23%	15%	7%	5%	4%	1%	0%	41%

Impact of family separation

During FGDs, it became clear that family separation had a significant psychosocial impact on IDPs, not only because this was reported by IDPs but also because facilitators could notice the difficulty IDPs faced in talking about it. In some cases, family separation was reported to contribute to higher blood pressure.

In addition, FGD participants, and particularly female participants, reported that **family separation has negatively impacted their livelihoods, especially access to food**, since their husbands and children were the providers in the household before the crisis.

“We are now the ones responsible for providing food for our families, unlike when our husbands were around.”


FGD female participant in a formal camp

“My son that was killed [used to] take care of most of the responsibilities in the house. Now that he is no more, nobody can take that responsibility.”

FGD male participant in an informal camp

Whereabouts of family members


In cases of family separation prior to their arrival at current location, **48% of IDPs did not know the whereabouts of their separated family members**. In cases of separation after arrival, this proportion was 37%.

Figure 7: Reported whereabouts of separated family members

In cases of separation that occurred before arrival, the percentage of IDP households reporting having been separated from family members in **another country** was higher in **Bama (14%), Kala/Balge (16%) and Ngala (13%)**. These are the **same LGAs that have witnessed higher percentages of IDPs displaced to another country** – 9%, 13% and 27%, respectively.

Means of arrival

Figure 8: Reported means of arrival at current location




The majority of IDPs arrived at their current location by foot (70%). However, for those living within host communities, arrivals by foot amounted to a lower rate of 57%, with 33% having arrived by **private or rented vehicle**. **Half of the arrivals by private or rented vehicle were to host communities, whereas arrivals by foot were mostly to informal camps (48%) and formal camps (34%).**

Means of arrival also varied amongst LGAs. Arrivals by vehicle were particularly high in **Biu (71%)** and **Hawul (72%)**. The percentage of IDP households reporting arrivals with the **help of the government or armed forces** was higher in **Bama (53%)**.

Those who have arrived at their current location by private or rented vehicle show considerably lower levels of aid dependency²⁰ in terms of meeting most of their basic needs, particularly in livelihood-related areas. For example, whereas overall 83% of IDP households reported to rely on food provided by government or humanitarian agencies, this rate is considerably lower amongst those who had better means of arrival (by private or rented vehicle), with only 61% reporting to depend on external aid for access to food. Significant differences can also be observed in terms of health (77% of IDP households reported depending on external aid to ensure access to health, against a total average of 92% of IDP households), education (74%, against 86%) and shelter (60%, against 77%). **This may suggest that more affluent individuals were able to afford fleeing by car, and are also able to afford better food, healthcare, education and shelter. As more IDPs in host communities arrived by private or rented vehicle, it also suggests that IDPs living in host communities are overall more affluent than those living in formal or informal camps.**

Figure 9: Levels of aid dependency per need, comparing total IDP household population to IDP households which arrived at current location by vehicle



²⁰ The assessment of aid dependency amongst IDPs is based on reported rates of reliance on *external* actors (mostly NGOs and/or UN agencies, and the government and/or armed forces, but also private individuals) to ensure security and access to basic needs. An analysis on external and internal (IDPs' own) responses to needs and vulnerabilities is also done in detail for security, shelter, access to land and cash, under the sub-section "Needs and vulnerabilities".

Movement intentions

A significant proportion of IDP households can be expected to remain at their current locations in the near future, as the vast majority of IDPs in the areas assessed reported not to be actively planning to return or relocate. IDPs would therefore need increased and consistent support from government and humanitarian actors in their current sites of displacement, including those who plan to integrate in their current place of displacement in the long-term. **Across the assessed LGAs, 63% of IDPs reported an intention to leave their current location, but did not have a plan nor timeframe for their departure (i.e., they intend to leave in the medium to long term), while an additional 23% intended to integrate in their current place of displacement.**

In Dikwa, 41% of IDP households reported intentions to integrate in their current location, followed by 36% in Mafa, 34% in Hawul, 34% in Kala/Balge and 32% in Kaga. Intentions to integrate in current places of displacement were lower in **formal camps (18%)**, compared to 26% in host communities and 25% in informal camps.

Overall, **14% of IDPs actively planned to leave their current location.** This rate was lower for those living **within host communities (9%)**, compared to 15% in formal and informal camps.

As seen below (Table 6), the timeframe of their intended departure varied broadly amongst LGAs. Nonetheless, in **most LGAs the majority of IDPs actively planning to leave intended to do so within six months** after the assessment. In **Kala/Balge**, however, all IDPs planning to leave reported a timeframe of **more than six months** after the assessment. This could be indicative of potentially better conditions in the LGA, which had the highest percentage of IDPs reporting “**better**” or “**much better**” access to cash/employment (81%) than before displacement, and also a higher percentage of IDPs reporting intentions to integrate in their current place of displacement (34%).

Table 5: Timeframe for departure from current location as reported by IDPs actively planning to leave²¹

	Within the next month	Between 1 and 3 months	Between 4 and 6 months	In more than 6 months
Bama ²²	33%	43%	13%	10%
Biu	8%	10%	27%	55%
Dambo	19%	20%	16%	45%
Dikwa	9%	36%	52%	3%
Gwoza	29%	32%	2%	37%
Hawul	0%	15%	31%	54%
Kaga	1%	45%	17%	37%
Kala/Balge	0%	0%	0%	100%
Mafa	7%	33%	32%	28%
Monguno	4%	48%	40%	8%
Ngala	23%	38%	16%	22%
Nganzai	12%	36%	14%	37%
Total	14%	37%	27%	23%


Returns and relocations

The majority of all IDP households (57%) intended to return to their villages of origin, either “someday” or actively planning to return, while 18% have not decided on their future location. Of those intending to return, only 19% are actively planning to do so. Only 3% of all IDPs in LGAs assessed intended to leave for a place other than their villages of origin, of which only 10% were actively planning such relocation. The percentage of IDP households reporting intentions to relocate was higher in **Bama**, where 8% of all IDPs in the LGA intend to move to a location other than their villages of origin, followed by **Dikwa (6%)** and **Hawul (6%)**.


²¹ These percentages are based on a very small subset of the population – those who reported having active plans to leave (14%). Findings should be seen as indicative only.

²² Bama has recently witnessed protests by IDPs who wish to go back to their homes (see e.g., Daily Trust (2017). *Police arrest leaders of Bama-IDPs-Must-Return-Home protest*, available at <http://bit.ly/2i9TjOB>). This may corroborate the higher percentages of IDPs reporting an intention to return “within the next month” and “between 1 and 3 months” in Bama.

Map 3: Percentages of IDP households intending to integrate in their current place of displacement, to leave “someday” or actively planning to leave, per LGA




Map 4: Estimated number of IDP households intending to return or relocate, per LGA of destination



Based on IDPs' movement intentions, Map 4 shows the main²³ LGAs of destination for IDPs who reported an intention to leave their current location, either "someday" or actively planning to do so. It also features estimated caseloads of IDP households intending to go to each of these LGAs, disaggregating those that would constitute returns and those that would amount to relocations.

Figure 10: Movement intentions and timeframe of return/relocation reported by IDP households



As explained above, 78% of IDP households reported being displaced within their LGAs. For this reason, only those who reported an intention to leave for their *villages* of origin had their intention recorded as "return". Still, 45% of all IDP households intending to relocate have chosen a place of relocation within the same LGA.

Pull factors

Overall, 66% of IDP households intending to leave (either "someday" or actively planning) reported **access to food as a main pull factor** (i.e., attracting IDPs to their future location), followed by **security** (reported by 63%) and **access to shelter** (reported by 49%). **This has direct implications to humanitarian actors, especially in the shelter sector and the emergency food security and livelihoods sector, as most of the support IDPs reported needing upon their return or relocation falls with these main areas.**


While most LGAs presented the same combination of factors, there were a few exceptions. The top three pull factors for **Bama** and **Gwoza** were security (reported by 72% and 43% of IDP households intending to leave their current location, respectively), food (reported by 52% and 37%) and **health services** (reported by 39% and 38%). For Kaga, Mafa and Nganzai, they were food (reported by 70%, 65% and 75% of IDP households intending to leave, respectively), shelter (reported by 60%, 43% and 57%) and **access to land** (reported by 54%, 67% and 59%). **Insecurity was the main reported factor which would prevent IDPs intending to leave their current location from returning or relocating (reported by 84% of IDP households intending to leave).**

Pendular displacement and temporary returns

An analysis of pendular displacement, especially to IDPs' village of origin (temporary returns), is relevant to better understand movement intentions insofar as it provides indications to what IDPs need upon their return – and what drives them to leave their villages of origin once again if their basic needs are not met.

Overall, 13% of the IDP population reported having left their current location for at least a month and come back. This rate was significantly higher in Gwoza (26%). Of the total number of IDPs who experienced such pendular displacement, 41% (5% of the assessed population) reported having temporarily returned to their villages of origin and then back to current displacement site, a percentage significantly higher in Monguno (92%).

²³ Main LGAs of destination are those with an estimated caseload of at least 500 IDP households.

Figure 11: Pendular displacement and temporary returns across LGAs²⁴

A main reason for IDPs' decision to move back and forth between their current location and their villages of origin was **insecurity at their current location**, reported by 53% of those who experienced pendular displacement, followed by a **lack of food** (reported by 17%). Conversely, access to food and security were also the most common reasons attracting IDPs back to their displacement sites, reported by 28% and 15% of IDPs who temporarily went to their villages of origin and left again, respectively. The third most reported reason for going back to displacement sites was access to shelter, reported by 10% of those who temporarily returned to their villages of origin.

This seeming contradiction can be explained, firstly, by the **interconnectedness between push and pull factors**. **Of all IDP households who temporarily returned to their villages of origin due to insecurity at current location, 39% came back to their displacement sites in search of better access to food.** At the same time, **of those who temporarily returned to their villages of origin due to a lack of food at current location, 25% returned to their displacement sites in search of better shelter conditions.**

Secondly, a **lack of information on living conditions in their village of origin** (see sub-section "Access to information" below) **may also explain this seeming contradiction**. For example, although IDP households may temporarily return due to a lack of security at their current location, they might not be aware of the security conditions in their villages of origin, and decide to go back to their displacement site if such conditions do not meet their needs. **Indeed, 10% of the IDPs who returned to their villages of origin in search of better security went back to their displacement sites for the same reason.**

Security, food and shelter as main push and pull factors

Security was frequently reported as a main driver of displacement, either as push or pull factor. It was the main reason for IDPs' initial displacement, as seen in sub-section "Displacement dynamics", and a main consideration in IDPs' intended decisions to leave their current location. Nonetheless, access to food and shelter conditions were also key concerns reported by IDPs intending to leave their current location, including those who have experienced pendular displacement.

As a result, security, access to food and shelter appear complementary in ensuring sustainable, durable return or relocation. For example, the decision of IDPs who have returned to their villages of origin due to insecurity, to go back to their displacement site to better access food suggests that improved security would not suffice to ensure IDPs' return or relocation.

This complementarity is also relevant to ensuring the successful integration of IDPs who intend to stay at their current place of displacement, as will be seen below (see sub-section "Needs and Vulnerabilities", under "Livelihoods").

²⁴ These percentages are based on a very small subset of the population – those who reported having experienced pendular displacement (13%). Findings should be seen as indicative only.

Needs and vulnerabilities

During FGDs, most IDPs reported to perceive their current living conditions to be worse than prior to displacement. This was largely due to the **worse conditions in terms of the needs IDPs in FGDs reported conferring more importance to**, namely **access to shelter, land and cash and/or employment**. The prioritisation of these long-term needs reflects a **displacement of protracted nature**.

Protracted displacement has compounded vulnerabilities and increased dependence on aid from government and humanitarian actors to meet most of their basic needs, which IDPs themselves reported perceiving as a negative aspect of their displacement. **This suggests that resilience-building activities and long-term support in the areas of shelter, land and cash should be prioritised, both in terms of programmes in IDP sites as well as potential support for those wishing to return or relocate.**

The drivers of displacement reported by IDPs intending to leave their current location allow for inferring IDPs' perceptions on their current living conditions. In addition to **insecurity, lack of food and lack of shelter** were also main drivers of IDPs' decision to leave their current location. Table 7 below highlights that lack of health and education services was a reason to leave for a high percentage of IDPs in **Dikwa**; lack of food was reported by a higher percentage of IDPs in **Nganzai** and **Kaga**; and lack of access to land was a push factor to a higher percentage of IDPs in **Mafa**. Limited access to land is often linked to insecurity, as, for example in Mafa, IDPs cannot access land due to the presence of armed groups. This suggests that even in LGAs where **insecurity** was not widely reported as a reason to leave current location, it still **plays a role in influencing IDPs' movement intentions insofar as it affects their access to land** (and, thus, livelihoods).

The table also indicates that more than half of the IDP population in Hawul, Kaga, Nganzai and Biu reported lack of access to cash/employment as reasons for their intention to leave. In addition, in **Gwoza**, which had the second highest percentage of IDP households reporting being separated from family members (48%), "separated, missing or deceased family separation" was reported amongst the top three reasons for IDPs' further movement.

Finally, percentages of IDPs who reported being recommended by the government and/or armed forces to leave their current location were particularly higher than the average in Mafa (45%) and Hawul (38%), while 23% of IDPs in Hawul also reported being recommended to leave by NGOs and/or UN agencies.


Table 6: Reported reasons for intentions to leave current location, per LGA

	Insecurity	Lack of food	Lack of shelter	Lack of cash/employment	Lack of access to land	Lack of health services	Lack of education services	Lack of water and sanitation	Separated, missing or deceased family members	Recommended by government/armed forces	Recommended by NGOs/UN	Forced by government/armed forces
Bama	87%	53%	27%	23%	17%	10%	20%	27%	17%	10%	7%	0%
Biu	11%	73%	70%	52%	29%	8%	3%	0%	19%	26%	1%	0%
Damboa	58%	79%	41%	32%	13%	26%	15%	18%	15%	1%	1%	0%
Dikwa	87%	18%	9%	3%	0%	69%	69%	7%	6%	13%	18%	0%
Gwoza	26%	19%	60%	33%	54%	5%	11%	16%	47%	28%	1%	1%
Hawul	15%	46%	46%	62%	15%	15%	23%	0%	15%	38%	23%	0%
Kaga	10%	89%	63%	56%	61%	0%	0%	5%	1%	15%	0%	0%
Kala/Balge	36%	46%	82%	46%	55%	9%	9%	18%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Mafa	7%	55%	51%	50%	84%	0%	0%	0%	7%	45%	0%	0%
Monguno	71%	35%	59%	28%	25%	15%	13%	20%	8%	7%	8%	6%
Ngala	64%	62%	48%	35%	29%	14%	6%	16%	13%	6%	3%	0%
Nganzai	0%	98%	45%	56%	54%	0%	5%	3%	11%	28%	0%	0%
Total	61%	48%	48%	31%	27%	19%	17%	16%	12%	10%	6%	2%

Overall living conditions

Across the 12 LGAs assessed, the majority of IDPs have reported their current living conditions to be “better” or “much better” than at their villages of origin *before* the crisis with regard to **security (72%)**, **access to health (68%)**, **access to education (62%)**, **access to water and sanitation (56%)** and **access to food (51%)**.

Figure 12: % of IDPs reporting current living conditions as “better or much better” or “worse or much worse” than at village of origin *before* the crisis, per need²⁵



Despite living conditions being considered better in most aspects, findings from FGDs indicated a common perception among IDPs that their *overall* living conditions were worse than at their villages of origin before the crisis.

During FGDs, IDPs reported to confer greater importance to their living conditions in terms of needs which were mostly reported as “worse” or “much worse”, notably access to land (59%), access to cash/employment (55%) and shelter (48%), which could explain the overall perception of living conditions as worse than prior to displacement.

Perceptions of living conditions around these basic needs were more negative in formal camps, which may help explain why a lower proportion of IDPs (18%) intended to integrate in this type of settlement. This is notably so in terms of **access to land**, which 64% of IDPs in formal camps deemed “worse” or “much worse”, compared to 59% in host communities and 55% in informal camps.

Other reasons that could explain IDPs’ overall negative view on their current living conditions include their emotional attachment to their villages of origin, as reported in FGDs. **FGD participants also highlighted their dependency on external aid as a negative aspect of their current living conditions. This reiterates the need for the humanitarian sector to work alongside communities in order to build their resilience and livelihoods, in accordance with a shift from emergency to protracted displacement, from short-term interventions to long-term support.**

A few FGD participants reported that their current living conditions were better than before displacement. In such cases, they highlighted **security**, access to **food** and to **health** and **education** services, as contributing factors.

“We do not have a consistent source of income, we do not have access to land for farming and we pay for rents.”

FGD male participant in a host community

“Because [our village of origin] is where we were born and our father’s house.”

FGD female participant in a formal camp

“We used to give away to help others meet their needs. Now before we even get food to eat, we have to wait to get it from NGOs.”

FGD male participant in an informal camp

²⁵ Percentages of “better” or “much better” and “worse” or “much worse” do not add up to 100% because possible answers also included “same” or “I do not know”.

Table 7: Perceptions of current living conditions as “better” or “much better” compared to village of origin, per need and per LGA


	Security	Access to health	Access to education	Access to food	Access to water and sanitation	Access to shelter	Access to land	Freedom of movement within LGA	Access to cash/employment
Bama	90%	76%	73%	82%	83%	65%	19%	15%	12%
Biu	78%	70%	69%	41%	64%	43%	27%	56%	33%
Dambo	69%	75%	64%	52%	78%	63%	34%	55%	20%
Dikwa	52%	57%	48%	35%	37%	24%	18%	22%	15%
Gwoza	69%	64%	60%	58%	55%	43%	26%	41%	33%
Hawul	84%	73%	73%	52%	66%	53%	50%	60%	41%
Kaga	88%	89%	81%	46%	75%	60%	40%	59%	26%
Kala/Balge	92%	91%	91%	78%	75%	45%	42%	78%	81%
Mafa	92%	92%	79%	61%	85%	56%	45%	52%	32%
Monguno	81%	69%	64%	46%	48%	38%	26%	46%	33%
Ngala	62%	54%	47%	58%	56%	59%	60%	55%	57%
Nganzai	81%	82%	65%	43%	63%	50%	45%	51%	25%
Total	72%	68%	62%	51%	56%	44%	33%	45%	35%

Internal and external responses

Overall, IDPs relied heavily on external assistance, from both the Nigerian government and armed forces as well as humanitarian actors, to meet their most of their basic needs, as seen below (Figure 13). Only a small percentage of IDPs resort to internal responses, based on their own means to meet basic needs. The only exception was in terms of access to cash/employment, where 51% of IDP households reported relying on their own means, whereas only 20% reported to rely on external actors. Overall, 39% of IDPs reported ensuring access to food by their own means, which also indicates a more prominent role of internal responses in comparison to other needs; however, aid dependency is also high, as 83% reported relying on external actors.

The overall trend indicates a high level of aid dependency, which IDPs themselves have reported as a negative aspect of their displacement. This points to a need for the humanitarian sector to implement activities aimed at building the resilience of communities, understood both as agents in addressing their own needs and vulnerabilities, as well as diverse and plural. This will require involving communities at every stage of programming, and ensuring the participation of different communities composing an IDP population, even within the same camp or host community.

The need for resilience-building activities seem particularly relevant in the area of **protection**, since relying on armed actors to ensure security could prompt further protection concerns, such as attacks against IDP sites near military positions. At the same time, the cash exception points to an opportunity for greater engagement of humanitarian actors in **cash transfer programming across sectors**, where appropriate.


Figure 13: External and internal responses to IDPs' needs, per need

Protection

Overall, **72%** of IDPs reported current levels of security “better or much better” than those of their villages of origin *before* the crisis. This rate was considerably higher for IDPs living in **formal camps (85%)** and lower for those in **informal camps (64%)**, while **host communities** had a rate of **74%**.

IDPs reported worse levels of insecurity in the LGAs of **Ngala (38%)**, **Dikwa (34%)**, **Damboa (30%)** and **Gwoza (30%)**. FGDs with IDPs in those LGAs provided some clarity as to the security challenges they faced. In Ngala, Dikwa and Gwoza, IDPs reported a common **fear of being attacked by armed groups if they leave the camp (for example, to collect wood or earn cash)**. In Damboa, they **feared that men might get arrested by security forces under terrorist charges**.

Figure 14: % of IDPs reporting current security conditions as “better or much better” or “worse or much worse” than at village of origin *before* the crisis, per LGA



However, **16%** of all IDPs believed that there are some groups particularly more **vulnerable in terms of security** than others.

“[Men] are constantly arrested by the military in suspicion of being members of the insurgent group.”

FGD female participant in a formal camp

“Sometimes [the insurgents] kidnap the boys and train them as child soldiers.”

FGD female participant in a host community

These findings were triangulated with data from FGDs, which indicated that men and boys might be at increased risk. **Men** were reported to be specifically targeted during attacks by armed groups, and they were also reportedly vulnerable to harassment and arrest by security forces. **Boys** were vulnerable to kidnapping and forced recruitment by armed groups. Young **girls** were also reported to be vulnerable to abduction by armed groups.

Responses to ensure safety

As seen above (Figure 13), 93% of IDPs relied on external actors to ensure their safety, while only 17% employed self-protection mechanisms. Table 9 below provides a breakdown of external and internal responses to ensure IDPs’ safety, and shows that most IDPs reported that security was ensured by the presence of armed forces or the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF).

Despite IDPs’ reported perception that security is ensured by armed forces and the CJTF, relying on armed actors to ensure security could prompt further protection concerns, such as attacks against IDP sites near military positions. Furthermore, data from FGDs suggests that at times these security forces were the very source of the protection challenges IDPs faced, notably with regards to arrests, as seen above, and restrictions of freedom of movement outside camps, as seen below.



74%

reported security was ensured by presence of armed forces.



69%

reported security was ensured by presence of the CJTF.



19%

reported security was ensured by presence of NGOs and/or the UN.

“We don’t do anything on our own. The soldiers are very much present and they usually give us security updates, and whenever the need arise; they usually escort us to the bushes to get firewood and bring us back. We don’t do anything without getting approval from them.”

FGD male participant in a formal camp

Table 8: % of IDPs reporting external and internal responses to ensure safety, per LGA

	External responses			Internal responses			
	Presence of armed forces	Presence of CJTF	Presence of NGOs/UN	Avoid dangerous places	Go around in groups	Early warning mechanisms	None
Bama	52%	17%	29%	31%	1%	12%	1%
Biu	62%	64%	14%	16%	3%	2%	16%
Damboa	80%	65%	6%	2%	0%	0%	7%
Dikwa	60%	76%	13%	10%	9%	16%	2%
Gwoza	86%	60%	15%	11%	3%	0%	2%
Hawul	35%	48%	8%	24%	11%	3%	13%
Kaga	67%	74%	3%	3%	4%	1%	7%
Kala/Balge	97%	92%	63%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Mafa	94%	90%	1%	2%	0%	0%	2%
Monguno	79%	75%	22%	16%	2%	2%	0%
Ngala	84%	62%	15%	6%	2%	5%	3%
Nganzai	74%	72%	0%	4%	6%	1%	6%
Total	74%	69%	19%	11%	3%	5%	3%

Freedom of movement

As seen above (Figure 12), overall 45% of IDPs believed their freedom of movement within their LGA was better now than before their displacement. However, this varied significantly amongst LGAs, with high levels of perceived restrictions of freedom of movement in **Dikwa (53%)**, **Gwoza (43%)** and **Ngala (42%)**, which also reported lower levels of “better” or “much better” security (see Table 7), as well as **Bama (65%)** and **Monguno (44%)**.

During FGDs, some of the challenges that IDPs reported to curtail their freedom of movement were **harassment and extortion** by armed actors when moving around. While these issues were reported by IDPs in formal and informal camps as well as those living amongst host communities, other constraints to IDPs’ freedom of movement are specific to camp settings. The fear of being attacked by armed groups when leaving the camp, reported in FGDs as a security challenge, as seen above, also negatively affects their freedom of movement. Women in some formal and informal camps reported that while some were permitted to leave the camp, others were not – without clear rules and guidelines on the matter.

Furthermore, in **Dikwa**, women in host communities reported a **fear of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)**, which were reported to be daily found by armed forces.

Figure 15: % of IDPs reporting current freedom of movement within LGA as “better or much better” or “worse or much worse” than before the crisis, per LGA




Table 9 below shows that **44%** of IDPs that have reported an intention to leave their current location believed that it was **not safe to travel** for at least one member of the household – most notably children, both **girls (72%)** and **boys (60%)**. Particularly high percentages of IDPs reported that men were vulnerable to travel in Gwoza (61%), and women in Bama (64%).

Furthermore, during FGDs in formal camps in **Kala/Balge**, men reported that they needed authorisation from the CJTF prior to their travel. Women observed that travel to Cameroon was not safe for men because they risked getting arrested.

Table 9: % of IDPs reporting not to be safe to travel, disaggregated by gender and age groups, per LGA

	Not entire household safe to travel	For girls	For boys	For women	For men	For women aged 60 or above	For men aged 60 and above
Bama	54%	26%	30%	64%	41%	3%	22%
Biu	37%	78%	79%	11%	17%	0%	0%
Damboa	43%	60%	72%	31%	46%	4%	9%
Dikwa	44%	92%	87%	54%	43%	28%	28%
Gwoza	34%	21%	31%	27%	61%	24%	22%
Hawul	32%	67%	74%	31%	34%	0%	0%
Kaga	49%	85%	63%	51%	21%	43%	26%
Kala/Balge	29%	36%	32%	7%	43%	25%	11%
Mafa	54%	82%	71%	59%	42%	52%	36%
Monguno	41%	95%	39%	19%	11%	13%	7%
Ngala	55%	63%	77%	38%	39%	42%	38%
Nganzai	45%	84%	66%	53%	32%	30%	23%
Total	44%	72%	60%	35%	33%	24%	21%

Shelter

Shelter conditions in village of origin

Overall, half of IDPs reported that their homes in their villages of origin have been destroyed. The reported rates of home destruction varied significantly amongst LGAs, with higher levels in **Kaga (70%)**, **Dikwa (60%)** and **Mafa (65%)**, and lower levels in **Hawul (32%)**, **Gwoza (21%)** and **Kala/Balge (15%)**, as seen below (Figure 17).

Figure 16: Shelter conditions in village of origin





Figure 17: % of IDPs reporting that their homes were destroyed or damaged beyond repair, per LGA



Shelter conditions in current location


As seen previously (Figure 13), most IDPs (77%) relied on external responses to ensure access to shelter, while **only 24% reported resorting to internal responses, based their own means – i.e., building their own shelter, renting, buying/bartering for shelter, and/or squatting**, as seen in Table 11 below.

Table 10: % of IDPs reporting external and internal responses to ensure access to shelter per LGA

	External responses			Internal responses				
	Ensured by the government	Ensured by NGOs/UN	Hosted by a private individual	Built makeshift shelter	Rent	Bought/bartered	Squatting	None
Bama	34%	84%	3%	4%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Biu	11%	12%	16%	4%	54%	2%	2%	6%
Damboa	42%	80%	3%	2%	0%	0%	0%	6%
Dikwa	37%	78%	8%	12%	0%	1%	0%	3%
Gwoza	15%	40%	17%	5%	7%	4%	16%	12%
Hawul	6%	0%	44%	10%	38%	1%	0%	4%
Kaga	16%	51%	8%	10%	11%	2%	3%	5%
Kala/Balge	54%	76%	10%	4%	1%	2%	3%	0%
Mafa	12%	25%	9%	44%	5%	5%	1%	2%
Monguno	47%	47%	8%	18%	4%	5%	0%	2%
Ngala	52%	55%	5%	23%	1%	2%	1%	4%
Nganzai	20%	20%	12%	29%	10%	4%	3%	4%
Total	38%	56%	9%	14%	6%	3%	2%	4%

About 77% of all IDPs who rented or owned (bought/bartered for) the shelter they lived in in their current location did not have documentation which proved their ownership or rental. This proportion was significantly higher in **Damboa (100%), Dikwa (100%), Kala/Balge (100%) and Mafa (97%)**, as seen in Figure 18 below. **This could pose serious challenges, in particular to the local integration of those who intended to integrate in their current place of displacement, and potentially lead to risks of eviction and/or exploitation by landlords and previous owners.** Overall, those without documentation relied on **local community (51%), relatives (23%) and local authorities (14%)**, or simply had no one (11%), to prove their ownership or rental.

Figure 18: % of IDPs reporting not having documentation to prove ownership or rental of shelter, per LGA



Of those IDPs renting their current shelter, the vast majority (**94%**) paid their rent in cash, while **16%** paid in-kind (**10%** used both forms of payment).

Ability to access shelter in place of return²⁶

Of all IDPs who intended to return to their villages of origin, 82% reported having their own homes to return to, while 9% reported they used to rent, and 8% used to stay with family. Even though 55% of those who owned homes


²⁶ This section does not cover the ability to inhabit shelter in cases of relocation because that analysis would apply to a very small subset of population, and would be merely indicative. Whereas other indicative analysis were done in this report, in this case it seems that any findings would be misleading, since most of those who intend to relocate do not have actual plans to do so and, given limitations in access to information (see below) it is not likely that their knowledge of their expected ability to find shelter would be considerably accurate.

reported having no documentation to prove such ownership, 81% of them believed they would be able to reclaim their property. **IDPs' belief in their ability to reclaim their homes should not underplay the possibility of tensions over property claims upon return.**²⁷

In addition to potential issues of property claims, a main obstacle to appropriate shelter upon return would lie in the physical conditions of IDPs' homes in their villages of origin. Even though an overall 45% of IDP households believed they would be able to re-inhabit their homes at their villages of origin, only 27% reported that their previous homes were undamaged. Figure 20 below shows that in every LGA assessed the percentage of IDPs who believe they will be able to re-inhabit their homes surpasses the percentage of homes reported as undamaged, and in most of them it also surpasses the percentages of homes reportedly in need of repair. This suggests that **appropriate shelter conditions upon return would require the reparation and reconstruction of homes.**

In addition, **9% of IDPs did not know the physical state of their previous homes**, which suggests that IDPs need better access to information on their villages of origin (see sub-section "Access to information" below).

Figure 19: % of IDPs reporting to be able to re-inhabit their previous homes and % of IDPs reporting previous homes as undamaged or repairable, per LGA




During FGDs, **IDPs reported a need for significant support upon their return or relocation, including through the provision of construction materials to rebuild their homes.** To a lesser extent, IDPs also indicated a need for assistance in ensuring access to water, as water sources such as boreholes were believed to have been destroyed, and in ensuring health and education services, confirming that **access to basic services (shelter, water and sanitation, education, health) is key in returns.**

Livelihoods

Livelihoods before displacement

Most of the IDP population in the LGAs assessed was made up of **arable farmers and pastoralists**, as 59% reported crop cultivation and 23% reported livestock as their main sources livelihood. **This implies that access to land is a crucial factor in ensuring IDPs' livelihoods.**

Figure 20: Reported sources of livelihood before displacement




²⁷ For example, in Iraq, housing, land and property (HLP) issues has had considerable impact on the return of IDPs. See IOM (2016). *Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Issues facing Returnees in Retaken Areas of Iraq: A preliminary assessment*, available at <http://bit.ly/2fAFhD6>.

Livelihoods in current location: access to land

As seen previously (Figure 12), only **33%** of IDPs reported access to land to be “better” or “much better” than in their villages of origin *before* the crisis. This rate was slightly higher for IDPs living in **informal camps (38%)** and lower for those in **host communities (31%)** and **formal camps (28%)**. Figure 21 below illustrates variations in IDPs’ perceptions of access to land across LGAs, with significantly higher percentages of IDPs reporting “better” or “much better” access to land in **Ngala (60%)** and **Hawul (50%)**.

Figure 21: % of IDPs reporting current access to land as “better or much better” or “worse or much worse” than at village of origin *before* the crisis, per LGA



As aforementioned (Figure 13), **45%** of IDPs relied on external actors to ensure access to land, while only **12%** resorted to their own internal responses.²⁸ Most strikingly, **43% reported lacking the means to ensure access to land**, as seen in Table 12 below. **This indicates a heavy reliance on external assistance to ensure access to not only land, but also food, and reinforces aid dependency.**

Table 11: % of IDPs reporting external and internal responses to ensure access to land, per LGA

	External responses			Internal responses				
	Ensured by the government	Ensured by NGOs/UN	Ensured by a private individual	Unoccupied land (free)	Rent the land	Bought/ bartered for land	No need for land	None
Bama	42%	21%	5%	1%	0%	1%	3%	41%
Biu	2%	3%	10%	1%	21%	2%	8%	55%
Damboa	39%	15%	13%	3%	9%	0%	1%	37%
Dikwa	14%	17%	1%	0%	1%	1%	9%	64%
Gwoza	12%	14%	3%	0%	3%	1%	9%	62%
Hawul	2%	1%	24%	4%	39%	4%	7%	23%
Kaga	9%	0%	32%	8%	11%	2%	1%	39%
Kala/Balge	52%	20%	40%	1%	13%	5%	1%	1%
Mafa	16%	2%	24%	6%	4%	1%	3%	46%
Monguno	29%	10%	19%	9%	11%	1%	2%	38%
Ngala	33%	19%	14%	2%	2%	1%	3%	40%
Nganzai	15%	0%	43%	7%	13%	3%	1%	19%
Total	25%	13%	15%	3%	7%	1%	4%	43%


Even though the security situation in the LGA capitals assessed has improved, access to land beyond these areas can remain severely limited due to security concerns. Furthermore, land is also essential to ensuring not only access to livelihoods, through crop cultivation and raising of livestock, but also access to appropriate shelter and other services, insofar as it is needed for the construction of essential infrastructure, such as shelters, health facilities, schools, child friendly spaces and others. Therefore, government and humanitarian actors supporting IDPs at current place of displacement should be aware of such limitations, as well as of the centrality of land in responses across sectors.

²⁸ The percentage of IDPs who reported relying on external actors (45%) does not equal the sum of percentages for each external response because respondents could choose multiple answers. This also applies to the percentage of IDPs who reported relying on internal responses. Finally, the percentages of external and internal responses do not add up to 100% because IDPs also reported “no need for land” and “none”.

Livelihoods in current location: access to cash/employment

Overall, only **35%** of IDPs reported “better” or “much better” access to cash/employment than in their villages of origin *before* the crisis. This rate was slightly higher for IDPs living in **formal camps (40%)** and lower for those in **informal camps (33%)** and **host communities (33%)**. Variations amongst LGAs can be seen below (Figure 12), with a substantially higher percentage of IDPs reporting “better” or “much better” access to cash/employment in Kala/Balge (81%).

Figure 22: % of IDPs reporting current access to cash/employment as “better or much better” or “worse or much worse” than at village of origin *before* the crisis



Cash was the only need to which IDPs’ own internal responses (**51%**) outweighed external assistance (**20%**). Overall, IDPs ensured access to cash predominantly through **trading**. The (informal) **provision of services** was also a prominent mean to ensure cash in **Biu (42% of IDPs)** and **Hawul (35%)**, while **formal employment** was more common in **Kala/Balge (36%)**. Kala/Balge also presents significantly higher proportions of IDPs relying on external responses, namely access to cash ensured by the **government (52%)** and by **NGOs/UN (54%)**.

Bama stands out as the LGA with the highest proportion of IDPs having **no internal responses** to meet their needs for cash (**66%**). **Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is due mainly to the very limited possibilities of using cash in Bama, where the formal camp lacks a fully-functioning market and restrictions of movement prevent IDPs from accessing markets outside the camp.** These same constraints may also limit the use of cash in other LGAs.

Table 12: % of IDPs reporting external and internal responses to ensure access to cash per LGA

	External responses		Internal responses			
	Ensured by the government	Ensured by NGOs/UN	Formal employment	Provision of services (informal)	Trading	None
Bama	8%	11%	9%	4%	8%	66%
Biu	3%	6%	5%	42%	31%	22%
Damboa	6%	21%	20%	16%	26%	33%
Dikwa	9%	6%	12%	2%	32%	44%
Gwoza	7%	31%	13%	3%	20%	42%
Hawul	2%	1%	6%	35%	46%	14%
Kaga	0%	1%	3%	28%	39%	39%
Kala/Balge	52%	54%	36%	2%	41%	0%
Mafa	0%	0%	1%	20%	46%	41%
Monguno	18%	14%	7%	17%	28%	35%
Ngala	10%	15%	10%	11%	39%	29%
Nganzai	0%	1%	1%	26%	37%	41%
Total	13%	15%	11%	12%	32%	35%

At the same time, cash is an essential component of IDPs' own means to meet their basic needs, as overall 35% of IDPs reported resorting to cash to ensure access to food, water, healthcare, education and shelter. Detailed percentages per need can be seen in the infographic to the right.

The importance of cash in ensuring basic needs and access to services, along with a potential increased security in 2018, points to **an opportunity for a greater engagement of humanitarian actors in cash transfer programming across sectors**. However, **cash transfers should take into consideration availability of services and goods to be purchased**, as the constraints reported existing in Bama, as seen above, may also limit the use of cash in other LGAs.



28%

of IDPs reported using cash to purchase **food**.



11%

of IDPs reported using cash to purchase **water**.



9%

of IDPs reported using cash to pay for **healthcare**.



6%

of IDPs reported using cash to pay for **education**.



19%

of IDPs reported using cash to pay **rent**.

Ability to resume livelihoods

During FGDs, IDPs reported a need for support upon their return or relocation to re-establish their livelihoods, including through initial capital to start businesses, livestock for pastoralists and agricultural inputs and farming tools for arable farmers.

These indicative findings seem to corroborate the needs identified through the survey. IDPs' expected ability to resume their livelihoods upon their return or relocation varied according to their professional activity and across LGAs. Nevertheless, **only 28% of IDP households reported believing they will be able to access agricultural inputs, and only 17% to retrieve livestock, which stand out as major challenges to the re-establishment of IDP livelihoods**.


Some 51% of IDPs reported expecting to be able to resume professional, casual and skilled labour upon return; 59% to resume trading, 61% to resume fishing and 59% to resume their education. In addition, 73% believed to be able to access land upon return/relocation; however, **low levels of expected access to agricultural inputs dim the prospects of an easier livelihoods resumption for arable farmers**.

Table 13: IDPs' expected ability to resume livelihoods upon return, per LGA

	Resume professional, casual and skilled labour	Resume trading	Access land (crop cultivation)	Access agricultural inputs	Retrieve livestock	Resume fishing	Resume education
Bama	64%	62%	76%	21%	8%	44%	0%
Biu	48%	56%	86%	31%	6%	40%	0%
Damboa	53%	59%	75%	42%	6%	75%	0%
Dikwa	48%	46%	63%	21%	50%	47%	0%
Gwoza	56%	65%	56%	32%	0%	60%	62%
Hawul	54%	56%	78%	31%	13%	0%	0%
Kaga	41%	52%	87%	33%	6%	63%	0%
Kala/Balge	84%	89%	90%	43%	34%	92%	0%
Mafa	46%	46%	76%	26%	3%	0%	0%
Monguno	29%	23%	52%	16%	6%	33%	0%
Ngala	77%	82%	86%	31%	5%	77%	90%
Nganzai	57%	59%	85%	29%	5%	59%	0%
Total	51%	59%	73%	28%	17%	61%	59%

IDPs' expected ability to resume livelihoods also varied according to intentions to return and to relocate. Overall, the ability to resume professional, casual and skilled labour, as well as fishing activities, was reported by higher percentages of IDPs with an intention to relocate than those intending to return to their villages of origin. On the other hand, the ability to resume access to land and necessary inputs for crop cultivation and raising of livestock, as well as trading activities, was reported by a higher percentage of IDPs with an intention to return.

Figure 23: IDPs' expected ability to resume livelihoods for those planning to return or relocate



“We need to farm, rear and graze our animals, live in our own houses rather than on camps, put back our lives together and restore all what we have lost and reclaim our properties.”


FGD male participant in an informal camp

During FGDs, a recurring reason for IDPs' preference for returning to their place of origin, rather than relocating, was their expected access to land upon return (along with re-inhabiting their previous homes).

Access to information

Overall, **48% of IDPs have not received information on their villages of origin** since their departure. This proportion was even higher with regards to information on their planned place of relocation (**71%**).

Figure 24: Last time IDPs received news from their villages of origin and of relocation



Priority topics of information

Across all 12 LGAs assessed, **69%** of IDPs reported **security** as one of the top three topics they would like to have information on. Security was the first priority topic reported by IDPs in most LGAs, except for Kala/Balge and Monguno, where IDPs' priority was information on the **wellbeing of family members**.



69%

reported security as a priority topic.



59%

reported wellbeing of family members as a priority topic.



51%

reported access to food as a priority topic.

Table 14: % of IDPs reporting to seek information on specific topics, per LGA

	Security	Wellbeing of family members	Access to food	Access to shelter	Access to health	Access to land	Access to employment/cash	Access to water and sanitation	Access to education
Bama	64%	54%	43%	15%	45%	18%	13%	13%	22%
Biu	77%	66%	43%	47%	14%	10%	7%	4%	10%
Damboa	62%	64%	56%	32%	29%	19%	16%	11%	5%
Dikwa	67%	63%	50%	19%	22%	18%	19%	4%	3%
Gwoza	57%	47%	36%	35%	31%	25%	22%	11%	12%
Hawul	63%	63%	49%	59%	12%	7%	20%	0%	10%
Kaga	87%	41%	56%	58%	5%	25%	16%	4%	3%
Kala/Balge	69%	76%	52%	24%	25%	15%	5%	19%	15%
Mafa	90%	48%	47%	51%	2%	20%	15%	2%	1%
Monguno	66%	74%	48%	52%	10%	18%	11%	10%	6%
Ngala	72%	38%	62%	38%	40%	13%	20%	12%	2%
Nganzai	85%	45%	57%	52%	7%	26%	16%	2%	2%
Total	69%	59%	51%	37%	23%	17%	15%	9%	7%

Sources of information and levels of trust in information received from them

IDPs across all 12 LGAs reported **community leaders**, the **Nigerian armed forces** and the **radio** as their most common sources of information, both on their villages of origin and on their future relocation sites. These three sources of information were also amongst the most trusted ones; however, **large percentages of IDPs do not actually received information from the sources they trust**, as the percentage of IDPs reporting to receive information from each source are generally lower than the percentage of IDPs reporting to trust each source. This was also the case for **NGOs and UN agencies**, as well as **civilian government agencies** such as NEMA – these actors were also perceived as considerably trustworthy, but were not very common sources of information.

Figure 25: Most common sources of information on village of origin and levels of trust²⁹





Figure 26: Most common sources of information on place of relocation and levels of trust



IDPs also reported considerable levels of trust in persons who are currently in their village of origin or place of relocation, who have been there or who have contacts in the area. Qualitative data from FGDs corroborated this, as IDPs have reported receiving information, for example, from new IDPs who had recently arrived at their current location.

“We get our information from the new arrivals who recently came from there. We trust them because is from the source.”

FGD female participant in a formal camp

The considerably high levels of trust in UN agencies and NGOs that can be observed above suggest that the humanitarian sector could play a key role in filling in information gaps. However, engaging in the provision of information could have adverse impact on other programmes – especially if IDPs perceive the information relayed as wrong, which could lead to breaks in trust. Instead, **humanitarian actors can facilitate IDPs’ access to information. This can be done, for example, by facilitating “go-and-see” visits, in which a group of representatives of IDP communities are taken to areas of origin and potential places of relocation, so that they can assess the situation themselves and relay the information back to their communities, building on the reported high levels of trust in people who had direct contact with the area, as seen above.**

²⁹ Note that levels of trust for “Someone there” are the same, regardless of whether information from them came via phone or via satellite phone. Also note that there is no level of trust for “In person”(not applicable).

CONCLUSION

Through an assessment of movement intentions and key aspects of living conditions of concern to IDPs, this study allows for a better understanding of the needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs in north-eastern Nigeria, at their current locations and upon return/relocation, and points to potential directions of future humanitarian engagement.

Key Findings

The findings of this assessment lead to three main conclusions. Firstly, **IDPs' movement intentions indicate that displacement is likely to continue in the medium to long term**. Secondly, and consequently, **response planning in support of IDPs needs to be adapted to the situation of protracted displacement**, with greater focus on resilience-building and long-term support. Finally, **the shift to longer-term solutions to support protracted displacement needs to be accompanied by response planning to prepare and accompany returns**, with an attention to multiple factors necessary to ensure the sustainability and durability of such returns.

The specific findings that support these conclusions can be seen below.

1. Displacement is likely to continue in the medium to long term

A significant proportion of IDP households can be expected to remain at their current locations in the near future. About 23% of the total IDP population represented reported an intention to integrate in their current place of displacement, while 63%, although reporting an intention to leave, did not have concrete plans nor a timeframe for their departure. Only 14% reported actively planning to leave.

IDPs perceived their current living conditions at IDP sites to be worse than prior to displacement. This was largely due to the reportedly **worse conditions in terms of the needs IDPs conferred more importance to**, namely **access to shelter, land and cash and/or employment**. The prioritisation of these long-term needs reflects a displacement of protracted nature, and suggests a need for comprehensive, long-term humanitarian support to IDP populations, as seen below.

2. Response planning in support of IDPs needs to be adapted to the situation of protracted displacement

Protracted displacement has compounded vulnerabilities and increased dependence on aid from government and humanitarian actors to meet most of their basic needs, which IDPs themselves reported perceiving as a negative aspect of their displacement. This suggests a need for **prioritising resilience-building activities and long-term support**, particularly in sectors essential to successful long-term integration.

In terms of protection, **most IDPs reported to depend on armed actors, namely Nigerian armed forces and the CJTF, to ensure their security**. Such dependency is problematic insofar as it **could prompt further protection concerns**, such as attacks on IDP sites by armed groups. In addition, qualitative data indicates that at times armed actors could be directly linked to protection challenges, such as arrests, harassment and extortion.

Most of the IDP population was made up of **arable farmers and pastoralists**, with 59% reporting crop cultivation and 23% reporting livestock as main sources of livelihood. However, **43% reported lacking the means to ensure access to land**, which limits their livelihoods and reinforces aid dependency in terms of access to food. Moreover, **in a context where access to land can be severely limited due to security conditions, interventions aimed at supporting the local integration of IDPs in their current place of displacement should be mindful of the limited land available for crop cultivation and raising of livestock, on the one hand, and for the construction of essential infrastructure, such as shelters, health facilities, schools and child friendly spaces, on the other.**

Contrary to the overall high levels of aid dependency, the majority of IDPs (51%) reported resorting to their own internal responses to ensure access to cash, mostly through trading. At the same time, **cash was an essential component of IDPs' own means to meet their basic needs**, especially in terms of food security, as 28% of IDPs reported using cash to purchase food, and shelter, as 19% reported using cash to pay for rent. To a lesser extent, cash was also used to purchase water (by 11% of IDPs), and pay for health (9%) and education (6%) services.

However, **the reported lack of access to cash by some IDPs could be linked to limited possibilities of using cash** – for example, due to limited or no access to functioning markets.

Finally, humanitarian support to IDPs should also bear in mind that **family separation, which affected 30% of all IDPs, was also reportedly having a negative impact on their livelihoods**, as separated family members were also providers to the household before the crisis.

3. The shift to longer-term solutions to support protracted displacement needs to be accompanied by response planning to prepare and accompany returns

Security was the main driver of IDPs' initial displacement and a main consideration in IDPs' decisions to leave their current location. Nonetheless, access to food and shelter conditions were also key concerns reported by IDPs intending to leave their current location. **A closer consideration of the role of these factors in influencing IDPs' movement intentions reinforces the complementary nature of security, access to food and shelter in ensuring sustainable, durable return or relocation – for example, as improved security in certain areas alone would not suffice to ensure IDPs' return or relocation.**

In terms of shelter, even though an overall 45% of IDP households believed they would be able to re-inhabit their homes at their villages of origin, only 27% reported that their previous homes were undamaged. Accordingly, **IDPs reported a need for support in repairing and rebuilding their homes upon return.**

IDPs also reported a **need for support to re-establish their livelihoods** upon return or relocation, including through **initial capital** to start businesses, **livestock** for pastoralists and **agricultural inputs and farming tools** for arable farmers.

To a lesser extent, IDPs reported a need for help in re-establishing access to water sources and in ensuring access to health and education services, reinforces a trend that **access to basic services is key to returns.**

Overall, 48% of IDPs have not received information from their villages of origin since their departure, and 71% have not received news on their planned place of relocation, which suggests a **significant information gap, potentially with serious implications on movement intentions.** In addition, 18% of interviewed IDPs, although intending to leave, reported not knowing where to go, and 9% had no information on the physical state of their previous homes. **IDPs' reportedly fair levels of trust in information coming from UN agencies and NGOs on their villages of origin and potential places of relocation suggests that the humanitarian sector could play a key role in filling information gaps.**

Recommendations

The findings above provide some direction to future engagement by humanitarian actors seeking to respond to the needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs in Borno State.

- The significant caseload of IDPs remaining at current locations indicates a clear need for a **better understanding of and support to living conditions** at displacement sites, and planning for **local integration**, including through **long-term humanitarian support, especially in terms of shelter conditions and livelihoods**.
- High levels of aid dependency and IDPs' overall underdeveloped internal responses to meet basic needs denote a need for **participation of different and multiple IDP communities at every stage of programming** to develop and implement **resilience-building activities**, based on the acknowledgment of communities' diversity and agency in addressing their own needs and vulnerabilities.
- The importance of cash in ensuring basic needs and access to services, along with a potential increased security in the coming year, points to an **opportunity for greater engagement in cash transfer programming across sectors, taking into consideration availability of services and goods**.
- Overall low levels of access to land, along with a high proportion of arable farmers and pastoralists, calls for a **deeper understanding of livelihood possibilities and tailored economic empowerment programmes, particularly for those intending to integrate in their current place of displacement**.
- Expected challenges upon return and relocation call for **comprehensive support to IDPs' return and relocation**, notably by assisting **reconstruction of homes** and **re-establishment of livelihood activities**.
- Overall lack of information and fairly high levels of trust in UN agencies and NGOs suggest that **the humanitarian sector can play a greater role in facilitating access to information on villages of origin and potential places of relocation**, notably through "go-and-see" visits, in which a group of representatives of IDP communities are taken to areas of origin and potential places of relocation, so that they can assess the situation themselves and relay the information back to their communities.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: List of Assessed IDP Sites

LGA	Ward	Site Name	Type	No. of IDP households	Latitude	Longitude
Kaga	Benisheikh	GSS Benisheikh	Formal camp	542	11.80053	12.47642
		Low Cost / SDP	Informal camps	302	11.8032	12.49541
		Magistrate		497	11.80758	12.49841
		NRC Camp		379	11.81643	12.49404
		Low Cost 2		201	11.80091	12.49478
		Aisha Buhari Camp		574	11.81253	12.49944
		Fulatari Lamido Camp		109	11.8064	12.49989
		Usman Garden Husheru		114	11.81069	12.48483
		Lawanti Kura	Host community (hosting IDPs)	220	11.80597	12.49292
		Lawanti Gana		252	11.81241	12.4934
		20 Housing Unit		40	11.81262	12.50531
Ngala	Ngala Ward	International School Camp	Informal camp	9137	12.35897	14.16962
		Wulari	Host community	51	12.34336	14.1882
		Adjacent Gen Hospital		35	12.34371	14.18658
		Central Mosque		48	12.34	14.18667
	Old Gamboru 'A'	Kanumburi		153	12.36534	14.21466
		Gamboru Dina		119	12.37033	14.21616
		Abuja		161	12.36637	14.20805
	Gamboru 'B'	Ghana		123	12.37355	14.21753
	Gamboru 'C'	Bash Wade		67	12.37143	14.19371
		Kasuwa Shanu		75	12.28686	14.20261
		Alhaji Fokki		13	12.37143	14.20712
Nganzai	Gajiram	Gajiram Central Pri. Sch. 1	Informal camp	112	12.39403	13.20774
		Gajiram Central Pri. Sch. 2		198	12.49443	12.21672
		LG Quarters		789	12.48498	13.21142
		Boarding Primary School		243	12.48175	13.20683
		Government Sec.School Nganzai		19	12.47675	13.20433
		Bakkasi Camp		426	12.28444	13.122648
		Ajari	Host community	483	12.49274	13.21017
		Bulabulin		344	12.29093	13.125694
Bama	Kasugula	General Hospital Bama	Formal camp	3006	11.53139	13.68721
Monguno	Monguno	Government Girls Secondary School (GGSS)	Formal camp	3471	12.67951	13.62306
		Ngumo		1122	12.68559	13.62026
		Kuya Primary School		2530	12.66375	13.61947
		Gana Ali		1018	12.67141	13.62484
		Gardener Low Cost		197	12.67223	13.61961
		Water Board		1381	12.68441	13.6149
		Government Day Secondary School (GDSS)		1069	12.67309	13.60536
		NRC 1 & 2		571	12.66615	13.62409
		GSSSS Monguno		5192	12.68008	13.61071
		Veterinary	Informal camp	1606	12.67	13.60701
		Fulatari Camp		185	12.67535	13.60172
		Kuya	Host community	630	12.66454	13.62051
		Shuwari		498	12.66667	13.60671
		Fulatari		117	12.67293	13.60385
		Low Cost		134	12.67357	13.61743
		Marina Bololo		360	12.66691	13.61369
		New Lawanti		448	12.67	13.613

Gwoza	Gwoza Town Gadamayo	20 Housing Unit	Informal camp	667	11.06997	13.690063
		Gwoza Wakane/Bulabulin		228	11.08896	13.68755
	Gwoza Town Gadamayo	Ajari	Host community	1094	11.08515	13.70355
		Hausari		1145	11.0755	13.69297
		Gadamayo		1391	11.08012	13.69839
	Gwoza Wakane/Bulabulin	Bulabulin		1023	11.08812	13.6863
		Gwoza Wakane		771	11.08945	13.69195
Dikwa	Dikwa	Sangaya	Informal camp	3986	12.03103	13.91637
		Mohammed Kyarimi		683	12.39255	13.15033
		Bulabulin IDP Camp		160	12.03994	13.90474
		Agric IDP Camp		2887	12.03417	13.896667
		Motor Park IDP Camp		748	12.03042	13.8944
		Shehuri Camp		456	12.04036	13.9197
		Kulagaru		1648	12.02986	13.91725
		Ajari Camp		742	12.03124	13.920955
		Shehu Musta li		1379	12.0474	13.92322
		Alhaji Modu Faltami Camp		839	12.04003	13.81347
		Kamchijin Prayer Ground		688	12.0038	13.92155
		Bulabulin Biafra	Host community	1007	12.03917	13.9092
		Shuwari		218	12.04036	13.9197
		Bulumkutu		173	12.03629	13.91247
		Chingo Zarma		1182	12.03619	13.91924
		Bulabulin(Gana)		82	12.03623	13.912909
		Kanuyibuba		890	12.03281	13.91917
Damboa	Damboa	General Hospital Damboa	Formal camp	1158	11.16594	12.76259
		SSS Quarters	Informal camp	69	11.16969	12.76536
		Central Primary School Damboa		1174	11.16132	12.75673
		Mobile Clinic		58	11.15779	12.75843
		Old Secretariat Camp		164	11.16253	12.7597
		Upper Court		114	11.16467	12.75887
		Police Barrack		126	11.16437	12.7611
		Estate Camp		95	11.14646	12.75608
		Hausari Primary School Damboa		1242	11.14815	12.75235
Hawul	Bilingwi	Bilingwi	Host community	104	10.52564	12.25731
	Kida	Yimir Shika		38	10.52602	12.24632
	Hizhi	Azare		796	10.52601	12.28931
	Shaffa	Shaffa		1112	10.50694	12.32501
Biu	Kenken	Zonal Education Center Camp, Biu	Informal camp	336	10.61525	12.1796
		VTC Camp B		285	10.61631	12.1726
	Dugja	Dugja	Host community	1094	10.62699	12.18594
		Tabra		85	10.62432	12.161111
	Kenken	Galdimare		1798	10.60607	12.19586
	Sulumthla	Sulumthla		326	10.60762	12.19873
	Zarawuyaku	Zarawuyaku		167	10.61722	12.19782
		Mbulamel		209	10.62527	12.18674
Kala/Balge	Rann "A"	Rann IDP Site	Formal camp	5254	12.26917	14.46383
		Boarding Primary School		853	12.26702	14.47046
		General Hospital Rann		537	12.26579	14.46957
Mafa	Mafa	Mafa Primary School Camp	Informal camp	325	11.92446	13.59835
		Government Girls Secondary School	Host community	751	11.5521	13.35481
		Ajari		64	11.92382	13.60142
		Bulamari		78	11.92628	13.60097
		Hausari		59	11.92622	13.60077
		Tukuleri		51	11.92284	13.60353
		Wulari		68	11.92731	13.59969