



PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : SOMALIA

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Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project
Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59
1209 Geneva - Switzerland
Tel: + 41 22 788 80 85
Fax: + 41 22 788 80 86
E-mail : idpsurvey@nrc.ch

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PROFILE SUMMARY

Following some ten years of inter-clan warfare, recurrent drought and flooding, the state of Somalia finds itself in complete disarray -- its people some of the most vulnerable individuals in the world. At the end of 2000, between 300,000 and 350,000 persons were reportedly displaced within the country itself. Some 425,000 refugees and asylum seekers were said to live in other countries (USDOS February 2001, Freedom of Movement; UN March 2001, p. 114; USCR 2000, p. 115).

Unabated fighting between rival clan factions, particularly in the south-central regions of Somalia, has been the primary cause of displacement in the country (UNRC 4 February 2000, p. 3). At the same time, persistent food insecurity caused by frequent flooding and drought has been a major factor in the continued displacement of civilian populations throughout Somalia. The drought of 1999-2000 has left an estimated 400,000 persons food insecure. Staggering though it may be, this figure is, in fact, a significant drop from the 750,000 persons considered food insecure at the end of 2000 (UN March 2001, p. 57). A successful rain season and "Gu" harvest at the end of 2000 are reportedly the main reasons for the decrease in numbers of acutely vulnerable persons (WHO 30 September 2000, sect. 1)

Since the fall of Siad Barre's dictatorship in 1991, the state of Somalia has functioned without a central government. In the absence of a national authority, the country has fallen victim to rampant violence and lawlessness. Infrastructure is non-existent. Kidnappings, looting, and killings have become commonplace. Whilst the autonomous administrations of "Somaliland" and "Puntland" have managed to assert a relative degree of control and stability in these northern provinces, dismaying levels of insecurity persist in the south (CHR 26 January 2000).

Still, the most recent peace-building work concluded in September 2000 does offer reason for hope. During the Djibouti Peace Conference, hundreds of Somali civil society leaders came together to create a transitional national assembly which, in turn, elected an interim president (UNICEF 7 September 2000, para. 1). Members of the new government cabinet were named in October 2000 (AFP 25 January 2001). Since that time, the government has taken part in a number of international conferences and has received at least the tacit support of several international governments (IRIN-CEA 28 February 2001).

However, many influential clan leaders remain opposed to the Djibouti Peace Process and all government posts that have emerged from it. Several faction leaders opposed to the government, including the leaders of "Puntland", the Rahawein Resistance Army (RRA) and the Somali National Front (SNF), met in Ethiopia in February 2001 and called for the establishment of a federal system for Somalia (IRIN-CEA 19 February 2001). Thereafter, the leaders dismissed the National Reconciliation Conference in Arta, Djibouti and asked for fresh talks inside Somalia (IRIN-CEA 1 March 2001).

In the context of these major political changes, life for the hundreds of thousands of Somali displaced persons remains one of survival. The majority of displaced persons live in an estimated 150 to 200 camps in and around Mogadishu (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116). For the most part, these camps are overcrowded, disease-infested and offer little in terms of clean water and proper sanitation. Huts are often made of nothing more than scavenged paper, sticks and cloth. In camps where nutritional assessments have been made, under-five mortality rates and malnutrition levels have generally been higher than those recorded in non-displaced communities (UN November 2000; ACF-F study as reported in WHO 30 September 2000, sect. 2.3). Recent estimates note malnutrition amongst internally displaced populations in rural areas at an alarming 40% (UNICEF 20 June 2000, sect. 2). As concerns the most vulnerable, women and children are said to top the list, often living in extreme poverty with little protection from sexual violence and abuse (UN March 2001; UNICEF 2000, CHR 26 January 2000).

With continued fighting in the south-central provinces and still worrisome levels of food insecurity present in many parts of the country, successful and durable return is considered realistic in only a handful of regions. While there are reports that displaced families returned home during 2000, little data is available about their numbers, locations, or conditions of reintegration (USDOS February 2001, Freedom of Movement). Indeed, the nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyle of so many Somalis makes it difficult to establish a precise picture of population movements in the country as persons regularly move to and from water sources, grazing areas, and humanitarian assistance locales to ensure resources for they and their families (UN March 2001; Jama 13 December 2000; Redding and Hansen 1998).

Chronic insecurity throughout much of Somalia, but in particular, in Lower and Middle Juba, Bay and Bakool regions, has impeded the safe and consistent delivery of humanitarian aid for years (UN 17 July 2000, "Executive summary"). Mogadishu, which accommodates the majority of internally displaced persons, has been completely off-limits to United Nations agencies over the last couple of years, and only Action Contre la Faim-France (ACF-F) operated with international staff out of the capital during the year 2000 (UN Sub-Committee on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 31). The humanitarian community was again reminded of the dangers of working in Mogadishu when nine aid workers were abducted in March 2001 (AI 28 March 2001; IRIN 6 April 2001). Though the staff members were later released, the incident revealed the ease with which such kidnappings can take place - even in the presence of a new national government.

The northern region is generally considered the safest part of Somalia. However, even there, access and security are not guaranteed. In May and June 2000, two international aid groups reportedly suspended operations in the province of "Puntland" in response to death threats and an attempted grenade attack (USCR 28 August 2000, paras. 5-6). As concerns those persons displaced in the highly vulnerable south-central regions of Somalia, international aid organizations can only respond "in absentia" through a skeleton local staff. And in the most dangerous regions, the persistent insecurity permits no one to work on a regular basis.

After a decade of conflict, the installation of a new government in Somalia certainly offers a glimmer of hope for the country. Furthermore, the apparent break in severe drought conditions means that the international humanitarian community can at last look at return, reintegration and rehabilitation needs in addition to keeping an eye on food security and other emergency requirements. For 2001, the UN Consolidated Appeal requests some USD 129,555,919 for humanitarian programming (UN March 2001). The current request follows a relatively poor donor response to the 2000 Appeal. According to the UN Resident Coordinator, only 35% of proposed activities for the 2000 Appeal were ultimately covered by international donor governments (UNRC 31 December 2000). It is now time to see if the new government in Somalia can gain the confidence of the international community as well as the Somali people in order that the country can be pulled out of its battered past.

(April 2001)

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

Main causes for displacement

Mass displacement began with outbreak of civil war in 1988

- Hundreds of thousands displaced in northern Somalia after outbreak of civil war in 1988
- War moved into the streets of Mogadishu by late December 1990
- Some 400,000 persons said to be internally displaced by end of 1990

"The outbreak of civil war in northern Somalia in mid-1988, and the Somali government's brutal retaliation against civilians in northern Somalia . . . led more than 400,000 Somalis to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti and displaced hundreds of thousands of other Somalis within northern Somalia. Renewed fighting in northern Somalia led another 31,000 Somalis to flee to Djibouti. Other armed insurgent groups joined the battle against the government of President Siad Barre during 1990. Two of these groups, the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) scored major successes against the government, bringing the war into the streets of Mogadishu, the Somali capital, by late December [1990]. At year's end, chaos prevailed in Mogadishu. Foreigners were evacuated, tens of thousands of the city's residents had fled, there was fighting in the streets between government and rebel forces, indiscriminate shooting, raping, and pillaging by armed persons, and the bodies of the dead littered the capital. USCR estimate[d] that by late 1990 there were a minimum of 400,000 internally displaced Somalis." (USCR 1991, p. 53)

The cruel combination of clan conflict and climatic extremes resulted in repeated displacements throughout the 1990s

- Clan conflict persisted in the face of a complete collapse of government structures
- An incursion from Ethiopia forced thousands of persons to flee in 1996
- Major flooding in late 1997 resulted in the displacement of hundreds thousands more Somalis

General:

"As political confrontation and civil war degenerated into clan conflict, the remnants of government structures collapsed. What remained of Somalia's physical, economic and social infrastructure was largely destroyed. In 1991-92, the heavily populated inter-riverine areas (between the Juba and Shabelle river valleys) were very vulnerable. With crop failures and the escalation of the conflict combined with drought and flood, thousands of people became destitute. Famine resulted in mass population displacement, and widespread loss of life." (UN December 1998, p. 4)

Incursion by Ethiopian troops forced thousands of persons from their homes in 1996:

"In Western Somalia, several hundred thousand persons were temporarily uprooted [during 1996], when Ethiopian troops attacked an armed religious group based in Somalia. Most families displaced by the incident reportedly returned to their homes by September." (USCR 1997, p. 93)

Major flooding in late 1997 was particularly devastating to Somali populations:

"[F]loods inundated much of southern Somalia's fertile land in late 1997, killing approximately 2,000 people. The floods destroyed food stocks, decimated 60,000 hectares of planted crop land, displaced 230,000 people, and left a total of one million affected." (USAID 1998 Annual Summary, para. 2)

"Heavy flooding during late 1997 and early 1998 affected an estimated 600,000 people and exacerbated harsh humanitarian conditions in southern areas of Somalia. More than 2,000 people died and up to 200,000 became temporarily homeless because of the floods. The floods destroyed crops – the harvest was one-third smaller than the previous year – and ruined about 40 tons of grain in storage.

The floods particularly harmed populations already displaced by the country's warfare. Heavy rains washed away makeshift huts housing displaced families in Mogadishu. Other displaced families in the capital continued to live in abandoned government buildings, schools, factories, and houses left empty by the country's decade of instability." (USCR 1999, p.88)

Thousands forced to flee human rights abuses in Aideed-controlled areas during late 1990s

- Aideed's militia allegedly committed serious human rights abuses against people of Baidoa
- Individuals of Rahanwein minority were particularly at risk
- Due to abuses, Baidoa was called "city of death"

The Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Secretary-General reported the following after her visit to the region in late 1999:

"The independent expert visited Baidoa [Banadir region] on 17 and 18 November 1999. Aideed's militia had held this town, which was dubbed, during the peak of the Somali famine, 'the city of death', for the previous four years. During this period, the people of Baidoa and its surroundings left. Allegedly, individuals were massacred, women were raped, wells were destroyed, and villages were looted and burnt. Persons were allegedly detained without charge or trial, sometimes in containers. Their families were forced to pay to secure their release. As a result, the town, mainly inhabited by Rahanweins, was

largely deserted. The Rahanwein are a minority group in Somalia, who have been widely discriminated against.

[...]

During the time Aideed's troops controlled the area, the village (Doynounay) [near Baidoa] was allegedly looted and burnt. The only building spared was said to have been the mosque.

[...]

Many serious violations allegedly took place in Doynounay. [T]he independent expert met a man who had allegedly survived a massacre. He told her that about 60 men from the village were rounded up and taken to Baidoa, where they were shot...During that time, women were allegedly raped, wells were destroyed and the village itself was burnt." (CHR 26 January 2000, pp. 20- 21)

War and drought were once again causes of major displacement in 1999-2000

- Violence forced 50,000 persons to flee their homes in first half of 1999
- Thousands of families moved to Gode town following absence of seasonal rains in 1999
- 6,000 persons displaced by flooding of Shabelle river in 2000
- Drought severely affected families in central and southern Somalia during 2000

In the year 1999:

"A deadly combination of warfare, drought, and food shortages pushed tens of thousands of people from their homes during the year [1999], joining hundreds of thousands of Somalis uprooted in previous years.

[...]

Violence in southwestern Somalia forced at least 50,000 persons to flee their homes in the first half of 1999, including about 20,000 who fled to Kenya and 10,000 who reportedly crossed into Ethiopia. Thousands of other families reportedly fled to Mogadishu from war-racked and drought-ridden southern regions during the year, while thousands of Mogadishu-area residents temporarily fled their homes when heavy fighting erupted in Mogadishu." (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116)

"In an average year, the Deyr rains are sufficient to replenish water resources and regenerate grazing land for the well-being of the herds. This allows pastoralists to manage their herds for the duration of the Jilal dry season. This year [1999], both the urban and rural people of Gode zone and many other parts of Somali region are not likely to be able to withstand the coming Jilal since they already appear to be in a weakened condition. Local officials estimate that more than 1000 households migrated to Gode town during the month of November [1999], and that the number continues to increase day by day.

[...]

It is likely that the stress in the rural areas is extensive. Many poor rural people are said to be too weak to come to the urban centres in search of food. The UN-EUE field officer was told that in some cases people migrating to town had died along the way, and he

observed first-hand people eating the meat from animals that had died from weakness or disease." (UNDP-EUE 14 December 1999, pp.1,4)

In the year 2000:

"Some 900 families or about 6,000 people have been displaced by flooding in central Somalia after the Shabelle River burst its banks, a local official said Monday [in May 2000].

[...]

The floodwaters are increasing and have forced people to flee. The displaced people are now in urgent need of food shelter and medical assistance." (AFP 22 May 2000)

"The impact of this drought is having major effects on up to 1,200,000 people, including 300,000 children under 5 years, in the districts of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Hiran and Middle Shabelle in Southern and Central Somalia, and the area will remain at risk up to the next harvest following the next Dyer season (January 2001). Women, children and other vulnerable people in Bakool are now starting to move in search of water, food, and basic health services." (UNICEF 20 June 2000, para. 2)

Jiddu clan fighters in Qoroley, southern Somalia displaced other farmers in land dispute (October 2000)

"Fighting between different clans with rival claims to land has left at least 10 dead and 15 injured in Yoroley, 75 km south of the Somali capital Mogadishu, the Associated Press agency (AP) reported on Monday [23 October 2000]. The fighting, which began on Sunday and continued sporadically Monday, pitted members of the Jiddu sub-clan, which claims to own all the land around Qoroley, and farmers from other clans who it claims have occupied its land, the report said. 'The Jiddu clan fighters have started displacing all of the other farmers, by either setting their animals to graze in the others' farms or just destroying them,' AP quoted a traditional elder Abdullahi Khalif Kobleh as saying. So far, six members of the Jiddu and four from other clans had been killed." (IRIN-CEA 24 October 2000, "Ten reported dead in Qoroley land struggle")

General background to present situation

Conflict in Somalia began with struggle to topple Siad Barre in late 1980s

"Siad Barre seized power in 1969 and increasingly employed divisive clan politics to maintain power. Civil war, starvation, banditry, and brutality have wracked Somalia since the struggle to topple Barre began in the late 1980s. When Barre was deposed in January 1991, power was claimed and contested by heavily armed guerrilla movements and militias based on traditional ethnic and clan loyalties. Savage struggles for economic

assets by the various factions led to anarchy and famine." (Freedom House 1999, "Overview")

With no central government authority, clan divisions have led to violence and lawlessness since early 1990s

- Somalia has always been divided along clan – rather than religious or ethnic – lines
- Absence of central government authority has left vacuum where violence and lawlessness prevail
- All government infrastructure has been destroyed
- The "black hole" of Somalia is said to attract criminals and subversives

"Clan loyalties are the basis for most civil organization in the vacuum left by the disappearance of central authority. Harsh Islamic law has returned a semblance of order to some areas, including parts of Mogadishu long plagued by lawlessness. Islamic courts are imposing sentences that include executions and amputations in accordance with Shari'a law. Right to free expression and association are ignored. Few autonomous civic or political groups can organize or operate safely. Several small newspapers and newsletters are published in Mogadishu, but the few independent journalists are under constant threat. International correspondents visit only at great risk. Radio stations are mainly operated by various factions, although the United Nations now sponsors new 'peace programming'. During the year, several journalists were arrested in Somaliland for criticizing the local government and suggesting that full press freedom does not exist." (Freedom House 1999, "Political rights and civil liberties")

"Virtually all the infrastructure of government - from buildings and communications facilities to furniture and office equipment - has been looted. All government archives and records, libraries, files and museums have been totally destroyed. In most of the country, there are no police, judiciary or civil service. Communications, apart from private satellite and cellular telephones and radio links, are non-existent. Electricity is not available on a public basis, but only to those who can afford generators. There is no postal service.

[...]

In both informal and formal discussions of the Security Council, member States have expressed concern about the increasingly evident effects of the lack of a functioning central government in Somalia. Somalia is being seen as a 'black hole' where the absence of law and order is attracting criminals and subversives. The Prime Minister of Yemen told my Representative that his Government was concerned about refugee flows from Somalia. He expressed fears that Somalia was being used as a transit-point for the trafficking of narcotic drugs and as a haven for terrorists. President Moi of Kenya called on the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to repatriate tens of thousands of Somali refugees living in north-eastern Kenya. He accused the Somalis of abusing Kenyan hospitality by smuggling arms into the country. To worsen the situation, a Somali militia group disarmed a Kenyan platoon on 1 July 1999 and stole its equipment. Most of the stolen goods were returned after the Government of Kenya threatened punitive action against the perpetrators. A batch of fake Somali shillings, with

an estimated value of \$4 million, arrived in Somalia on 9 and 10 April 1999, followed by a second batch, worth about \$5 million, on 8 June 1999. As a result, the value of the Somali shilling fell from about 7.5 shillings to the dollar to over 10,000 shillings to the dollar. There are now four different Somali shillings in circulation in Somalia.

As a country without a national government, Somalia remains unique. The functions that states perform, such as the provision of social services, including health and education, the regulation, for example, of the movement of goods and persons, control of the environment, airspace and coasts, and so on, as well as the representation of the Somali people in intergovernmental and international fora, are absent, notwithstanding the fact that administrations in some parts of the country, notably in north-western Somalia ('Somaliland') and north-east Somalia ('Puntland'), have begun to provide some basic services to their people.

Somalia is different from other African societies in crisis, given its fundamentally homogeneous character. There is no major religious divide, ethnic division or dispute over the allocation of wealth derived from natural resources. Rather, Somalia is a polity in crisis. It is divided on clan lines, with each clan fearful of the incursions of others. The violence, where it is not simple banditry, is mainly defensive in nature. The crucial missing ingredient is trust. Without trust, there can be no peace or security in Somalia and no central government can be re-established." (UNSC 16 August 1999, paras. 61- 64)

"Somalia is an example where effective government and the accountability of political power are no longer coterminous with a defined national territory. The growth of regional problems across boundaries creates overlapping communities of fate: the fortunes and prospects of individual communities are increasingly bound together. One of the major relationships has been the weather – drought or flooding has had an enormous impact on the whole region." (UN November 1999, p. 6)

International community responded to conflict and famine in Somalia with UN peacekeeping operation (1992-1995)

- UN deployed troops in 1992 despite threatening stance posed by Somali faction leaders
- UNOSOM troops experienced ambushes and suffered casualties in 1993
- All UNOSOM forces were pulled out by 1995

The international response to the armed conflict and the displacement situation was slowed by insecurity due to marauding factions and rampant banditry. Massive infusions of relief aid during the period from August through November 1992 helped to mitigate the impact of famine, but could not eliminate its causes (UN December 1998, p. 4). The continued violence prompted the formation of a UN peacekeeping force known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Soon after their deployment the leaders of some of the contending Somali factions began to take an aggressive, threatening stance toward the United Nations. (UN 1996, p. 9)

"Extensive television coverage of famine and civil strife that took approximately 300,000 lives in 1991 and 1992 prompted an American-led international intervention in Somalia. The armed humanitarian mission in late 1992 quelled clan combat long enough to stop the famine, but ended in urban guerrilla warfare against Somali militias.

The last international forces withdrew in March 1995 after the casualty count reached the thousands. Approximately 100 peacekeepers, including 20 American soldiers, were killed. The \$4 billion United Nations intervention had little lasting impact. Today, neighboring countries and others as far afield as Libya and Egypt are reportedly backing competing warlords." (Freedom House 1999, "Overview")

"In June 1993 Hussein Aïdeed's militia attacked Pakistani UNOSOM peace-keepers in South Mogadishu. Sporadic clashes between UNOSOM II forces and Aïdeed's militia continued until October 1993 when a small US force was ambushed, suffering heavy casualties. The United States withdrew its forces, and by March 1995 all remaining UNOSOM forces had left." (UN December 1998, p. 4)

De facto regional governments have been established since the fall of Barre government (1991-1998)

- Northwestern "Somaliland" region proclaims independence in 1991; it has exercised de facto independence since that time
- Northeastern "Puntland" was created in 1998; it does not consider itself a separate entity but a regional government of Somalia
- Benadir regional administration (Mogadishu) set up in 1998 with Aïdeed and Ali Mahdi as heads

Somaliland:

The overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 led to a *de facto* division of Somalia, with the self-proclamation of the northern Republic of Somaliland on 18 May 1991 as one of the results. (Africa South of the Sahara September 1996, pp. 842-45)

"The Republic of Somaliland has exercised de facto independence since May 1991. It is headed by President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal and based in Hargeisa, where resistance to the Said Barre dictatorship in the 1980s was most intense. Egal has said that a referendum on independence will not take place until a peace agreement covering the rest of the country has been reached. Somaliland is far more cohesive than the rest of the country, although reports of some human rights abuses persist." (Freedom House 1999, "Political rights")

"In 1991, when the central Government of Somalia collapsed, 'Somaliland' declared itself independent and sought separation from Somalia, citing the massive discrimination its people had suffered during the regime of Siad Barre. Although, the international community and the United Nations, which upholds the territorial integrity of Somalia, have not recognized the separate status of 'Somaliland', the international community has

acknowledged with deep appreciation the good level of security and stability that 'Somaliland' has achieved over the years." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 22)

"Despite pockets of crisis, 'Somaliland' in the northwest clearly represents an area of transition and recovery. There is a functioning administration demonstrating leadership in both policy and conflict-management and with whom agencies and regional administrations can work. Basic services, such as health, water and education, are available on a wide scale, though still at the lowest levels and, to varying degrees, these are financed by the administration. Other public services such as police, licensing and immigration are functioning, albeit also at basic levels. Economic renewal and investment are occurring; the local currency is relatively stable. Voluntary repatriation and the spontaneous return of the Somali diaspora and asylum-seekers are readily apparent." (UN December 1998, p. 25)

Puntland:

"In contrast with 'Somaliland', 'Puntland' does not consider itself a separate entity. Rather, it describes itself as a regional government of Somalia. In her report to the previous session of the Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/1999/103), the independent expert reported on how 'Puntland' came into being in 1998. The 'Puntland' Constitutional Conference was held in Garowe, between 15 May and 30 July 1998. It was attended by 470 delegates from the Bari, Nugal, Sool and Sanaag regions, as well as hundreds of observers. None of the delegates were women. The conference ended by formulating a new 'social contract' as a basis for the restoration of effective State authority in these regions." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 28)

"The area described as the North-east of Somalia or 'Puntland' has the largest surface and the longest coastline in the country. It is an arid area with low potential for developing water resources or rain-fed agriculture. The majority of the largely nomadic population depends on the livestock trade and to a much lesser extent on fishing and dealing in frankincense. Relative peace and security have allowed an export-oriented economy to develop and the north-east is increasingly developing as a region of transition and recovery. Although a government was elected in September 1998, only the President, Vice President and nine ministers [had been appointed as of December 1998]. One of the first priorities of this Administration has been to establish proper security forces (police and prisons) and a judiciary system." (UN December 1998, p. 26)

Benadir:

The Benadir regional administration, which includes Mogadishu, was set up in August 1998. It is composed of co-presidents Hussein Aïdeed and Ali Mahdi, of the *Saad/Habir Gidir* and *Harti/Abgal* clans, respectively; four vice-presidents from smaller factions: Osman Ato, Muse Suudi Yalahow, Mohamed Qanyere Afrah and Abdi Osman Farah, and a 50-member Supreme Council of Benadir. Hussein Ali Ahmed was named governor of Mogadishu. (Africa Confidential 18 December 1998; AFP 3 September 1998)

The Benadir administration in Mogadishu agreed in August 1998 to set up a police force headed by Abdi Hassan Qaybdid and consisting of over 2,000 men (70 per cent of them ex-militia members and the remainder ex-policemen) and 67 bullet-proof vehicles. Deployed in December 1998 to "ensure respect for the law, using force if necessary", the police force faced multiple problems: most notably, opposition by Islamic *Shari'a* tribunals, who warned that they would not obey the police; the refusal by men hired by certain warlords to protect the city's main market and other commercial establishments to turn over their responsibilities to the new force; strong opposition by other local warlords to a police force established by many of their rivals, mainly Ali Mahdi Mohammed, Hussein Mohammed Aïdeed and Mohamed Qanyare Afrah. The police force was also confronted by financial problems resulting from the joint administration's failure to institute a tax collection system to finance its activities. (AFP 3 January 1999) In April 1999 the joint police force was "disbanded for lack of food and non-payment of salaries. . .700 militia men-turned-police took away with them their weapons and equipment, including guns, 40 battle wagons mounted with heavy machine guns and anti-tank weapons". The police force, whose establishment had been assisted by a US \$800,000 donation from Libya to finance it for three months, had not been paid for four months. (UNDP-EUE 21 April 1999)

Eritreans and Ethiopians both accused of being involved in Somali civil war (1999-2001)

- Ethiopia recently accused of arming clans opposed to interim government
- Ethiopia and Eritrea have both been suspected of supporting clans in the Somali conflict for some time

Ethiopia in particular is accused of supporting clan factions opposed to new interim government:

"The Somali Prime Minister, Ali Khalif Galayr, has accused neighbouring Ethiopia of arming factions opposed to the interim government. Speaking on Djibouti radio and television, Galayr said that Ethiopian arms destined for faction leaders opposed to his government had recently reached the Somali capital, Mogadishu.

The interim Somali government had grown weary of keeping a low profile on Ethiopia's activities in Somalia, Galayr said. 'Ethiopia is obstinately and flagrantly continuing its interference in Somalia and is seeking to revive the civil war', AFP quoted him as saying. Galayr also alleged that an attempt to kidnap Somalia's parliamentary speaker, Abdalla Derow Issak, on Saturday [6 January 2001] had been carried out by a team armed and supported by Ethiopia." (IRIN-CEA 9 January 2001)

"By hosting a group of Somali warlords and other dissidents who this week joined forces in calling for the new regime in Mogadishu to be replaced, Ethiopia has once again shown itself to be a key player in Somalia's political turmoil.

The support Addis Ababa initially lent Somalia's nascent transitional government (STG) – by attending the talks in Arta, Djibouti last year that led to its formation – has proved short-lived.

While the United Nations, the Arab League and the Organisation of African Unity all back the STG, Ethiopia quickly became critical of its top officials, such as President Abdulkassim Salat Hassan, Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galaydh and Speaker of Parliament Abdallah Derrow Issak.

After two weeks of talks in the southern Ethiopian town of Awasa, the Somali faction leaders and other opponents of the STG on Thursday set up a Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in order to prepare the way for yet another national reconciliation conference which, in theory, will lead to the establishment of a 'legitimate' and more representative government in Mogadishu." (AFP 23 March 2001)

Eritrea and Ethiopia are said to have been involved in the conflict in Somalia for some time:

"Eritrea and Ethiopia were directly involved in the inter-factional fighting, with Ethiopia supplying troops, hardware and humanitarian support to the Rahenweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in Bay and Bakol. The RRA used its increased military power to contain the advances of Hussein Aideed's forces. Ethiopia also reportedly supported the Somali Salvation Democratic Front which had formed a government in the self-proclaimed Puntland State, and a faction of the United Somali Congress–Peace Movement. Eritrea and Yemen provided arms to the Somali National Alliance (SNA) militias of Hussein Aideed. Around 200 fighters from the Ethiopian armed opposition group the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), supported by Eritrea, were also involved in the Somali conflict on the side of the SNA. Hussein Aideed attended a series of meetings on peace and reconciliation with Ethiopian government officials in October [1999]. His forces subsequently disarmed a group of OLF fighters in their base in Mogadishu." (AI 2000, "Background")

"Mogadiscio est toujours divisée entre différentes factions, avec d'un côté une alliance de circonstance entre Aideed et Mahdi, visant à mettre en place une administration centrale dans la région, et de l'autre une opposition puissante. Les deux alliances sont soutenues respectivement par l'Erythrée et l'Éthiopie, et donc indirectement parties prenantes du conflit." (ACF 2000, "Contexte")

Djibouti peace process resulted in creation of interim government (August 2000)

- Transitional National Assembly elects interim president at peace talks
- International community supports process and president

The Djibouti peace process:

"The peace process, which focuses on civil society groups rather than on faction leaders, was initiated last September [2000] by President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti. The peace conference started with a civil society technical symposium on 21 March [2000] in Djibouti and is scheduled to end on 15 July." (UNHCHR 10 July 2000, para. 5)

"A major Somali peace conference – the thirteenth peace effort since 1991 – got underway in neighboring Djibouti, attended by some 900 official Somali conferees and more than 1,000 other Somali observers. The gathering, known as the 'Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference,' was still underway at the end of July [2000]." (USCR 28 August 2000, para. 12)

"The three months have been dominated by the conference in Arta, Djibouti, hosted by the Djibouti government. Several thousand Somalis from all walks of life, many of them living in exile, succeeded in electing a clan-based 245 member parliament after four months of deliberations." (IFRC 18 October 2000, para. 4)

Creation of Transitional National Assembly and election of Somali President:

"After 10 years of civil war, Somali parliamentarians of the Transitional National Assembly at the Djibouti Peace talks held in the town of Arta elected Dr Abd-al Qasim Salad Hasan as President on the morning of 26 August 2000." (UNICEF 7 September 2000, para. 1)

"In contrast to the anarchy and civil war that had prevailed in Somalia for the past 10 years, the recent creation of the National Assembly ushered in a new era for peace and stability and constituted the first step of restoring order and central authority in the country, the President of Somalia told the fifty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly this morning, as it continued its general debate.

The spontaneous reaction of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, he said, demonstrated vividly that they wanted to leave years of civil war behind and open a new era of peace, tranquility, good governance, restoration of the rule of law and national unity. He called upon the warlords to review their positions, hear the voice of reason and respect the legitimate aspirations of the Somali people to achieve national unity, social and economic development, and durable peace." (UNGA 15 September 2000, paras. 2 and 3)

International community supports Somali assembly and newly-elected President:

"On 16 August [2000], the UN Security Council met in informal consultations after which the current President of the Council gave a statement welcoming the Somali parliament and called on all political forces in Somalia to join the ongoing peace process." (UNCU 18 August 2000, para. 2)

"The European Union hopes that the election of Mr. Abdulkassim Salat Hassan as President of Somalia by the National Transitional Assembly meeting in Arta will contribute to the restoration of the State, to the preservation of national unity and to the

territorial integrity of the country, as longed for by the Somali people and desired by the international community. The Union wishes the elected President every success.

The European Union is willing to enter into dialogue with the new Somali authorities and, once they have established their authority, to support their efforts to rebuild the country, while continuing to give its backing to recovery measures in all areas of Somalia where stable conditions exist.

The European Union calls on the authorities of Somaliland and Puntland to establish constructive relations with the institutions which have emerged from the Arta process. It also urges the future transitional government to establish a constructive dialogue as soon as possible with the aforementioned authorities for the purpose of re-establishing national unity in peace and with respect for the elements of stability achieved." (EU 8 September 2000, paras. 1-3)

For a detailed analysis of the Arta peace process, see November 2000 report by Ken Menkhaus [\[External link\]](#).

New government faces daunting challenge amid strong opposition from clan faction leaders (2000-2001)

- Endemic political instability is main challenge for new government
- Most armed faction leaders do not recognise posts emerged from Djibouti process
- Some clan leaders have called for the establishment of a new federal system for Somalia

"The Abdiqasim administration inherits a political and economic situation inside Somalia that has not measurably improved since 1995, and which poses a daunting challenge. Endemic political instability is the main problem; the administration will have to reassert public security and law and order if it is to establish legitimacy. Asserting its authority will be even more difficult because of the number of strongmen, warlords, and autonomous polities, which reject the transitional national government. At this writing, the collection of groups opposing the new administration includes the Somaliland administration; leaders of the Puntland administration; five of the largest remaining factional militias in the Mogadishu area (the militias of Hussein Aideed, Osman Atto, Musa Sude, Hussein Bod, and Qanyare Afrah); much or most of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army, led by Colonel Hassan Mohamed Nur 'Shatigudud'; the Southern Somali National Movement (the Bimaal clan); and followers of General Adan Abdullahi Nur 'Gabio' of the Aulihan clan. Collectively, that constitutes a significant bloc of clans, regions, and militia which the administration will either have to co-opt or defeat." (Menkhaus November 2000, p. 3)

Strong opposition to interim government has been constant since its appointment:

"Three Somali factions, who met in Garowe, capital of the northeastern autonomous territory of Puntland, on 27 October [2000], have described the establishment of the

government of President Abdiqasim Salad Hasan as 'a hostile action', and called for four regional states to join in a new Federal Republic of Somalia. Puntland leader Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad, the commander of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), Hasan Muhammad Nur 'Shatigudud', and Adan Abdullahi Nur 'Gabyow' of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) suggested that the four federal states should be the self-styled independent republic Somalia, and a fourth in the southwest, Agence France Press (AFP) reported. The outcome of the Garowe meeting was endorsed by the chairman of the Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM), Abdullahi Shaykh Isma'il, who asked the international community 'to show political and diplomatic restraint, and not to extend financial assistance [to Abdiqasim's government], which could provoke further violence in Somalia.' (IRIN-CEA 3 November 2000, "Somalia")

"Inside Somalia, particularly Mogadishu, there continue to be demonstrations of support for the SNPC. Yet there still remain those opposed to the process such as Osman Atto; Mohamad Qanyare Afrah; Hussein Aidid and Musse Sudi." (UNCU 18 August 2000, para. 10)

"Leader of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeastern Somalia, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed said that Puntland nationals who attended the Djibouti-hosted Somali peace talks would be charged in court. [...]

Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf has said he will not talk to the newly elected interim president Abdiqasim Salad Hasan in a national capacity, but only as a clan leader. He refused to attend the Djibouti-hosted peace talks, saying they would lead to renewed conflict." (IRIN-CEA 21 September 2000, "Somalia")

Some faction leaders called for the establishment of a federal system for Somalia in February 2001:

"Faction leaders opposed to the Somali interim government, meeting in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, called for the establishment of a federal system for Somalia.

The official radio of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeastern Somalia, reported on 16 February [2001] that Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Puntland leader, had issued a statement calling for the establishment of a federal state. The statement was also signed by Hasan Mohammed Nur 'Shatigudud' of the Rahawein Resistance Army (RRA), General Omar Haji Masale of the Somali National Front (SNF) and Hasan Abdulle Qalaad, Governor of Hiraaan Region (central Somalia). They said they were preparing for a reconciliation conference, which would be open to scrutiny by 'international media and organisations.'" (IRIN-CEA 19 February 2001, Somalia; Opposition calls for a new conference)

"More than eight Somali faction leaders, including Hussein Aideed, Osman Ali Hassan Ato and Mussa Sudi Yalahow (who joined force against the Transitional National Government of Somalia (TNG) on March 2 [2000], held talks in Ethiopia to settle their differences and establish a single administration opposed to the TNG. In reaction to the

talks being held in Awassa, the Somali government accused the Ethiopian government of interfering in Somalia's national affairs and undermining the TNG's efforts to bring peace in Somalia. However, Osman Ali Hassan Ato said the initiative was not an Ethiopian one, and that no Ethiopian officials had been met. He said Ethiopia was being used as 'neutral ground' for the meeting." (UNDP-EUE 22 March 2001, para. 4)

For detailed information on the political situation in the country, refer to the November 2000 paper of Ken Menkhaus [\[External link\]](#).

IRIN-CEA chronology of the conflict in Somalia (1960-2000)

"NAIROBI, 1 September (IRIN) - The following is a chronology of recent events in Somalia leading up to the establishment of a new interim administration which will govern the country for three years, pending elections:

26 June 1960: The former British Somaliland Protectorate gains independence

1 July 1960: The former Italian colony becomes independent. The former British (northwest) and Italian (south) colonies unite

15 October 1969: Democratically elected President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke is assassinated by one of his police bodyguards

21 October 1969: The army under Major-General Muhammad Siyad Barreh overthrows the civilian government, after parliament hits deadlock trying to select a new president. The army suspends the constitution, bans all 86 political parties, and promises to end corruption. Siyad Barreh heads the 25-member Supreme Revolutionary Council, consisting of army and police officers

21 October 1970: The army junta declares Somalia a socialist country and adopts "Scientific Socialism". This signals a shift towards Soviet backing, and security organs and intelligence networks are given greater powers

21 October 1972: A written script for the Somali language is established. A modified Roman alphabet is adopted as the official orthography for the Somali language

1974: Somalia becomes a member of the Arab League

July 1977: A low-level war of attrition between Somali-backed insurgents and the Ethiopian army becomes an all-out battle between Somalia and Ethiopia, when Somalia declares war on Ethiopia. The war goes down in history as the fiercest Cold War battle on the continent, played out in the Ethiopian Ogaden region

13 November 1977: Somalia expels about 6,000 of Russian, Cuban and other Soviet allies, after the Soviet Union switched sides and allied itself with the Ethiopia

March 1978: The Somali Government announces the withdrawal of its forces from the Ogaden

8 April 1978: After the defeat of the Somali army, a group of army officers try to topple the Siyad Barreh regime. The attempted coup is crushed and Siyad Barreh tightens his grip further. He begins a process of putting power into the hands of his relatives, and sub-clan, the Darod Marehan. He also empowers the related Dulbahante and Ogadeni sub-clans

May 1988: The Somali National Movement (SNM) mounts an offensive in the north of the country, as a result of the regime's brutal post-Ethiopian war policies. Siyad Barreh responds by bombing the area. Hundreds of thousands of civilians are displaced, and many killed. It is the first real challenge to Siyad Barreh's rule, and the beginning of the proliferation of armed opposition to the regime

May 1990: A manifesto is published in Mogadishu calling for an all inclusive national reconciliation convention to avert protracted civil war. It is signed by 144 people, including politicians, religious leaders, professionals and business people, representing all Somali clans

December 1990: Armed uprising erupts in Mogadishu.

27 January 1991: Siyad Barreh flees Mogadishu. Forces loyal to the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) capture the city

28 January 1991: The Manifesto Group of USC appoints an hotelier, Ali Mahdi Muhammad, as president. The military wing of USC, led by General Muhammad Farah Aydid, rejects the appointment

17 November 1991: Full-scale fighting starts between the two factions of the USC

3 March 1991: A ceasefire comes into effect between the warring factions in Mogadishu

1991: Fighting erupts in the northeast region between the Al-Ittihad Islamic fundamentalists and militia loyal to the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), lead by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad

18 May 1991: The former British Protectorate of Somaliland declares independence from the rest of Somalia, in the town of Burao

July 1991: A conference was held in Djibouti, in which Ali Mahdi in which was chosen as interim president

April 1992: The United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM I, begins work in Somalia

December 1992: UNITAF forces under American leadership land in Mogadishu

February 1993: A three month conference in Borama seeks a new leader for the self-declared state of Somaliland. Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, a former prime minister, is elected in May

March 1993: The next serious attempt at peace talks. An Ethiopian initiative evolves into a joint UN-Ethiopian sponsored reconciliation conference held in Addis Ababa

4 May 1993: UNITAF hands over to UNOSOM II

5 June 1993: 23 Pakistani peacekeepers are killed by Aydid loyalists

12 July 1993: American helicopter gunships kill over 50 unarmed Somalis holding a meeting in a private house in Mogadishu, increasing local hostility to the international intervention forces

3 October 1993: American-led forces looking for Aydid's senior aides are involved in a shoot-out, which leaves 18 Americans and hundreds of Somalis dead. The body of a dead American is dragged through the Mogadishu streets, and, caught on camera, sparks an international outcry

August 1996: Aydid dies of gunshot wounds sustained in operations against his former lieutenant, Osman Ali Atto. His son, a former American marine, Husayn Muhammad Aydid, is chosen by the clan to replace his father

November 1996: Ethiopian government-sponsored reconciliation conference brings most of the factions together. But it is boycotted by Aydid's son

November 1997: All faction leaders met in Cairo, with limited success, leaving Somalia without a national leader and Mogadishu still divided and insecure

2 May, 2000: On the initiative of the Djibouti government, the Somali National Peace Conference brings together more than 2,000 participants in Arta, Djibouti. It is the first conference where the warlords do not have control of the conference agenda

26 August, 2000: A 245-strong Transitional National Assembly, based on clan representation, elects Abdiqasim Salad Hasan as the new president of Somalia

27 August, 2000: President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan is sworn in an inauguration ceremony attended by the heads of governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, and the host country Djibouti, along with representatives from the UN, EU, Arab league, OAU, France, Italy, Kuwait, and Libya." (IRIN-CEA 1 September 2000, as found in UN Consolidated Appeal March 2001, Annex III, p. 128)

POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

Global figures

An estimated 300-350,000 persons said to be displaced in Somalia (1999-2001)

- 300,000 is global figure cited by international observers in 2001
- Some 350,000 persons were estimated to be displaced at end of 1999

"There are approximately 300,000 internally displaced persons in the country, representing approximately 4 percent of the population." (USDOS February 2001, Freedom of Movement)

"In Somalia, an estimated 350,000 of the country's 7 million inhabitants are internally displaced. This figure includes some 40-50,000 Somalis displaced in 1999. During the war to oust the Siad Barre regime, political violence, banditry and lawlessness produced famine conditions and induced mass population displacement. While there was a gradual return of IDPs to their locations of origin between 1993 and 1995, continuing violence, food insecurity and water shortages have exacerbated their living conditions." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"An estimated 350,000 Somalis were internally displaced [at end of 1999]." (USCR 2000, p. 115)

Total figures of internally displaced for 1992-1998 period

| Year | Estimated number of IDPs | Source |
|----------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| End 1998 | 250,000 | (USCR 1999, pp. 87-88) |
| End 1997 | 200,000 | (USCR 1998, p. 92) |
| End 1996 | 250,000 | (USCR 1997, p. 92) |
| End 1995 | 300,000 | (USCR 1996, p. 66) |
| End 1994 | 500,000 | (USCR 1995, p. 74) |

"At the peak of Somalia's upheaval in 1992, more than 800,000 Somalis were refugees in neighboring countries, and as many as 2 million people were internally displaced. Large numbers gradually returned to their home areas during 1993-95, despite sporadic violence and new population flight in some regions. Only 5,000 repatriated in 1996." (USCR 1998, p. 92)

Geographical distribution

Majority of displaced persons reside in and around Mogadishu (1999-2000)

- Between 100,000 and 200,000 persons said to be displaced in and around Mogadishu
- Thousands of newly displaced reached Mogadishu in early 2000
- Internally displaced reportedly make up 20 to 25% of Mogadishu population

"More than 350,000 people are internally displaced and tend to live off subsistence wages for unskilled day labour, including over 100,000 in Mogadishu." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"Mogadishu remained crowded with displaced families. The city contained some 230,000 internally displaced persons in 200 camps, an international aid organization estimated. Other estimates of the capital's uprooted population were somewhat lower, though still substantial." (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116)

"During the first half of the year [2000], thousands of newly displaced Somalis descended on the capital, Mogadishu; gunfights in Mogadishu and at other locations left hundreds dead; a local aid worker was killed and two international relief workers were kidnapped; and floods damaged two displacement camps and killed thousands of livestock." (USCR 28 August 2000, para. 2)

"Benadir State has been hosting over 240,000 IDPs since 1991. They live in 160 camps, having moved from the Bay and Bakool regions to look for employment in Mogadishu and also because of a shortage of food and insecurity. Approximately 1,050 families arrived in Mogadishu during June and July [1999] due to fighting in Bay region. They have been integrated within the existing population." (UN Sub-Committee on Nutrition 20 December 1999, p.31)

Estimates on the number of camps in and around Mogadishu vary: according to the Somali Refugee Agency SORA, there are 138 camps in Mogadishu, north and south, in which 30 per cent of the population are refugees, while the non-governmental organization Action Contre la Faim estimates that 234,000 displaced Somalis live in 201 camps in Mogadishu (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999), whereas another source indicates the number of IDPs in Mogadishu is almost 250,000 in about 150 camps in open areas, comprising approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the population of Mogadishu. (USAID/FEWS 26 February 1999)

Northern provinces host tens of thousands of displaced persons (2000)

- IDPs are said to make up 30% of population in Bossaso

- There are currently four IDP camps in and around Hargeisa

"In Bossaso, for instance, IDPs are estimated to make up 30% of the population. IDPs often come from the minority groups (Bantu) and clans with low status in the community...

"In and around Hargeisa, there are now four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house area." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"Tens of thousands of people remained internally displaced in relatively calm Somaliland and Puntland, according to aid agencies. Thousands of residents from southern Somalia fled to northern areas, particularly to Puntland, hoping to escape Somalia by boat to Yemen. Hundreds drowned in overcrowded boats en route to Yemen. Another 7,000 reached Yemen during the year." (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116)

Fighting in southern Somalia results in continual displacements in the region (1998-2000)

- At least 5,000 persons newly displaced as result of fighting in south central Somalia
- Conflict forces families to move from Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle regions

"Somalia

Newly uprooted = 5,000 minimum. [Higher estimates = 25,000]

Cause = civil strife

Minimum estimate includes new internally displaced persons in south central Somalia in March.

Minimum estimate does *not* include likely displacement caused by violence in key town of Belet Wein in August, fighting south of Mogadishu in July, violence in Baidoa in June, and violence north of Mogadishu in Jowhar." (USCR 6 September 2000, "Somalia")

In February 1999, WFP reported that populations continued to move steadily from the Bay and Bakool regions towards Gedo and the Kenyan border, and that an estimated 30,000 people have moved since the onset of the emergency in November/December 1998. (WFP 12 February 1999). Five months later the UN reported that: "Over 40,000 persons move to Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba and to Mogadishu." (UN July 1999, p. 1)

"The RRA [Rahanweyn Resistance Army] referred to the situation of the internally displaced persons from Lower Shabelle region who are coming to Baidoa. The harsh conditions in the town make their absorption difficult. The RRA also emphasized that the

Rahanwein in Lower Shabelle are still living under oppressive conditions." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 21)

Geographic location of those persons internally displaced since 1998:

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Geographic location of those persons internally displaced since 1998:

Somalia—Location of Internally Displaced People Since November 1998




Figure 1

Source: UN Coordination Unit
FEWS, April 1999

Figure 1 (USAID/FEWS 29 April 1999)

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Somalis are largely nomadic making it difficult to assess patterns of displacement (1993-2001)

- 80% of Somalis are said to be "pastoral nomadic" with only 20% as "urban agricultural"
- Even prior to conflict, people travelled great distances in search of food, pasture and water
- Over last years, there has been continuous movement of people from rural to urban centres

"Quantifying displacement is extremely difficult in Somalia given the prevalence of nomadic and semi-nomadic social structures. Even prior to the collapse of the central state, populations travelled great distances in search of food, pasture and water during times of stress. The protracted nature of displacement offers its own analytical challenges, particularly given the recurrence of multiple 'waves' and directions of displacement.

Displacement trends are also changing. With the decreasing volume and regularity of food relief distributions, 'food camps' no longer exist. Households now move from drought- and conflict-stricken areas toward riverine and urban areas, returning when situations improve. Populations communicate over long distances to ascertain better knowledge of localised conditions before deciding on their direction of movement. Many long-term IDPs have dispersed in large towns. They are destitute populations living in shanty camps and abandoned buildings in peripheral urban areas." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"The Somalis are largely nomadic, roaming throughout the Horn of Africa. They live in small, temporary hamlets that are dismantled and loaded on to camels for quick and easy migration. Because of this nomadic way of life, social units tend to be small and self-sufficient...

Roughly 80% of the Somali population is 'pastoral nomadic' and only 20% can be described as urban agricultural. The social and economic life of Somalia is therefore defined by a nomadic, rural style of life with trade consisting mainly of agricultural products. Over many years there has been a continuous movement of the population from the rural areas to the big urban centres in the south like Mogadishu, where there is a now large permanent urban population, mostly dependent on agriculture." (Jama 13 December 2000 in Humanitarian Affairs Review, Nomadic culture)

"More than two-thirds of Somalia's populace are nomadic or semi-nomadic. During the dry season the nomads concentrate in villages near water sources; when the rains begin they disperse with their herds. Traditionally, nomadism is the most desirable life-style.

Somalis constitute the vast majority of the population. Cultural divisions between pastoral nomads (the *Samaal*) and sedentary cultivators and herdsmen (the *Saab*) have been weakened by large migrations from the countryside into towns, but most Somalis maintain a strong loyalty to one of many clans and sub-clans." (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia, 1993, p. 4)

Conflict coupled with drought has forced people to move to riverine and urban areas (1998-2000)

- Somali populations can travel great distances in times of stress
- Displacement trends change over time, making figures difficult to determine
- Families using information acquired by radio to determine movements
- People often return to original "clan" areas in face of conflict

2000:

"In times of stress – due to conflict, food insecurity and water shortage – populations in Somalia can travel great distances. Moreover, displacement trends are changing over time, making population figures difficult to determine. In the early 1990s, vulnerable groups moved toward urban areas and camps as a survival strategy.

With the decreasing volume and regularity of food relief distributions, households are now moving from drought-stricken areas, across regional and national borders, toward riverine and urban areas. Populations communicate over long distances to ascertain better knowledge of localised conditions before deciding on their direction of movement. This year, population movements have been gradual, increasing as humanitarian conditions have worsened. Currently, the primary vectors and destinations of displacement include the following:

Southern and Central Somalia:

Over the first three months of the year, drought-affected populations in northern Gedo, Bay and Bakool moved in a number of different directions: toward riverine areas in Gedo, north into Ethiopia, south toward Baidoa and Mogadishu, and as far northeast as Bossaso and Las Anod. Factors affecting population movements include access to land for cultivation, opportunities for employment and the sale of bush products, and food distributions. In April, people started returning to their areas of origin in expectation of rain and planting. Flooding in the Juba and Shabelle River valleys raises concern over further population movements in these areas.

Northwest:

Pastoralists from Somali Region 5 in Ethiopia have moved into the Boroma, Odweyne and Gebile areas of Somaliland in search of pasture and employment.

Northeast:

In addition to receiving new arrivals from southern and central Somalia, small movements continue from central Mudug and Nugal regions toward Galkayo." (UNCU 2000, "Sectors")

Also reported in April 2000:

"The impact of water and food shortages have included:

Abnormal population movements

Out-migration from drought regions, particularly Bay and Bakool, toward riverine areas, north to Ethiopia and economic centres such as Mogadishu, Las Anod and Bossaso . . .; Reports indicate that about 30-40 percent of the Bakool population have (sic!) moved over the last six months – due to water shortage and in search of relief. An NGO reported that about 11,000 Somalis have moved from Bakool to Mustahil and Ferfer in Gode district in Region 5 over the last six months. Others are now returning for the planting period or moving south toward Baidoa." (UNCU 2000, "Current Humanitarian Conditions in Somalia")

"The dispersion of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other destitute groups amidst populations with more assets and higher living standards renders plight less visible." (UNICEF 16 October 2000, "Estimated 500,000 people remain vulnerable")

"Luuq town is situated some 80 kms from both the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders and is situated on the banks of the Juba river. . . Luuq has experienced influxes of displaced people due to the worsening of the drought conditions in Bay and Bakol and also insecurity in other parts of Gedo

[...]

The majority of the IDPs have been in the camps for at least three months, and reported having moved to the area from Bay and Bakol region mainly because of drought, hunger and insecurity." (ACF-F May 2000 in UN Sub-Committee on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 29)

"Population movements: However, population displacement is very difficult to determine, particularly as it is so dissipated. In 1999, population movements have been particularly diffuse over the last six months in the pursuit of survival. During the 1998/1999 emergency period, movements were much more concentrated particularly due to the continuing conflict between the RRA and SNA forces (in conflict households tend to stick together for safety). Further, households have changed survival strategies since the early 1990s when there was a preponderance for movements toward urban areas and camps. This year, particularly with less quantity and regularity of food relief, and with the greater prevalence of high frequency radios, households are using communication and having a greater understanding of conditions elsewhere in order to determine their movement. Such movements have therefore been gradual starting as individual and becoming more collective as conditions have worsened. Rather than concentrating in 'food camps' - where conditions are visible to aid agencies and the media - households have moved from drought-stricken areas toward riverine areas in Gedo, moving up north

into Ethiopia, moving south toward Baidoa and Mogadishu and as far northeast as Bossaso and Las Anod (where FSAU has reported families arriving in small numbers from Bakool in the last few weeks)." (UNCT 31 March 2000 "population movements")

In 1998 - 1999:

"By the end of 1998, food insecurity and deterioration in health conditions were rife in central and southern Somalia due to the conflict and climate. The crisis continued as of mid-1999. Unusual population displacement, the most obvious sign of severe stress, had begun by November 1998. Sedentary farmer households began to move from the worst areas of Bay and Bakool (normally the breadbasket of Somalia) to other areas in search of food, better security and water. Over 40,000 persons moved to Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba and Mogadishu." (UNSC 16 August 1999, para.48)

"IDPs tend to group around larger towns and relief programmes where they will have the chance to get resources. Informal local protection has developed along the lines of clan and sub-clan affiliation and alliance in some areas". In south Mogadishu, recent IDP cases "seem to be coming from villages to the urban centres, suggesting that the prevailing drought conditions might have as much to do with the movements as the endemic insecurity." Moreover, "many female-headed families, whose men are either serving with the clan militias or dead, have gravitated toward the urban centres in search of food and health services for their malnourished children. [While] in the northwest the government has followed a policy of giving land to IDPs for agriculture to re-establish them, in other areas of the country IDPs are outside the mainstream of Somali society." (Redding and Hansen 1998, pp. 83-84)

"There has also been a rapid transformation within the boundaries of Somalia. Clan warfare has resulted in households returning to original 'clan' areas. In turn, impoverishment and conflict has been a great 'push' factor in urbanisation. Over the last ten years, there has been a dramatic increase in the growth of the cities, such as in Mogadishu, Bossaso and Hargeisa." (UN November 1999, p. 5)

Somali families reportedly move regularly and even split up in order to reach resources (1999-2000)

- Families in 'Puntland' sometimes split up so that at least some benefit from refugee assistance
- More than two-third of Somalis are nomadic or semi-nomadic
- Somalis have repeatedly moved to Mogadishu seeking relatives and opportunities

"The independent expert in her report to the Commission in 1998 (E/CN.4/1998/96) reported about the situation of the internally displaced. She said that Bosasso hosted tens of thousands of internally displaced persons, who constituted about one third of the city's population. She reported that many internally displaced preferred that part of their family became refugees by crossing the Gulf of Aden by boat to Yemen in order to be eligible

for refugee status and to be assisted by UNHCR, or that they continued to Saudi Arabia." (CHR, 26 January 2000, p. 32)

"Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route – even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority [of IDPs] said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little cash by providing 'carrying services' to people in the market – earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

PROTECTION CONCERNS

General

Internally displaced women and children at risk (1999-2000)

- Rape and sexual abuse are common in internally displaced persons camps
- Thousands of displaced children live on the streets and in orphanages; others attached to militia groups
- Bantu, Ogadenis and Rahanweyn minorities often marginalised and even targeted in some cases

"All children in Somalia can be considered as being in 'especially difficult circumstances' but, there are subgroups who have special social problems and needs – and have a right to – special care, protection and, in some cases, social reintegration over and above the basic survival and development needs of children in general.

There are tens of thousands of displaced children, youth and women living in camp conditions in extreme poverty; many thousands of children living on the streets; hundreds of children live in orphanages; large numbers of physically and mentally disabled and handicapped children; and, unknown numbers of children attached to militia groups.

While many benefit from some forms of support from the traditional clan assistance mechanisms, some, mostly minority groups such as Bantus and Ogadenis, who are generally marginalised by the Somali society, are particularly vulnerable, and often suffer from deprivation and abuse." (UN March 2001, p. 76)

"There are believed to be substantial numbers of children and women living in camps in extreme poverty;

[...]

Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in decision-making and access to resources. Violence against women and girls, resulting either from tradition or the civil war, includes the almost universal practice of female genital mutilation and sexual violence against the displaced, particularly against members of rival clans and minority groups." (UNICEF 2000, paras. 7 and 8)

"Human rights defenders reported to the independent expert that there are many cases of sexual abuse of women and children, particularly among the internally displaced population. The situation with regard to internal displacement is making the number of street children rise. Although most of these children are 'Somalilanders', there are also other groups, including Ethiopians. An increase in the use of alcohol and hashish among children has also been cited." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 26)

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in Somali society, where the rights of women in both the private and public spheres are seriously undermined. Rape, which was uncommon in Somalia before the war, has become a weapon of war for the militia and bandits, as well as in camps for displaced persons and returnees. Women belonging to minority groups, such as the Bantus and the Rahanweyn, are particularly subject to these crimes." (CHR 18 February 1999, para. 74)

Internally displaced persons targeted in South (1999)

- Armed conflict in South has led to repeated displacement of local populations
- Security problems prevalent in displaced persons camps in Mogadishu

In March 1999 the ICRC reported that "armed conflicts in the south continue unabated and alarming levels of insecurity persist. Repeated clashes between different clans or factions have shaken the Juba, Bay and Bakool regions and have been characterized by attacks and counterattacks, the burning and looting of towns and village, the destruction of food storage pits and the targeting of displaced communities in these parts. As a consequence, local populations have sought shelter and refuge in remote villages in the Bay and Bakool regions, but have often been repeatedly forced to move on. Others have fled further afield to the neighbouring regions of Gedo, Hiran, Lower Shebelle, Middle Juba and Mogadishu." (ICRC 11 March 1999).

Managers and volunteers at IDP/refugee camps in Mogadishu "complain of security problems with thieves and outbreaks of fighting inside the different sections of the camp." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

Discrimination against Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities makes them particularly vulnerable to displacement and other human rights abuses (1999)

- Bantu peoples subject to human rights abuses and the taking of land by militia and bandits
- Rahanweyn minority has also been subjected to dispossession and displacement

"Non-discrimination is a fundamental principle embodied in the first paragraph of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Although Somali society appears to be homogeneous, there are several minority groups in the country. These minorities have been the main victims of the famine and the civil war. The Bantu minority lives along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle rivers, which constitute the life lines of Somalia. The Rahanweyn minority lives between these two rivers, in Bay and Bakool. While the Bantus are largely unarmed, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army is armed to some extent, although insignificantly compared to the other groups. Other minorities live in the coastal areas.

The Bantus, who are thought to descend from slaves brought to Somalia from other east African countries in the eleventh century, are considered a low-status ethnic group. They

frequently suffer discriminatory practices and violence. For instance, the Bantus in the Hiran region require permission to go to Belet Weyne, the main town of the region. They have their own market and they are not allowed to mix with the rest of the population. They are brought into town for hard labour. They have less access to education and fewer economic opportunities than other Somalis. Their villages have been burnt, and Bantu women have been raped. During the civil war, the Bantu population has been systematically pushed off their land towards the river by militias or bandits. They are now so close to the river that they face a real risk of their settlements being washed away during floods.

[...]

The Rahanweyn minority lives on fertile agricultural land and is more advanced in agriculture. It too has been subjected to dispossession and displacement." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 77-80)

"In Somaliland and Puntland, there are problems of discrimination against minorities and internally displaced persons. (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 5)

Most Somalis ensure personal security by residing in clan "home areas" (November 2000)

- Rule of law, guarantees of personal security and protection from human rights abuses vary from location to location
- Much of Somali countryside - especially Somaliland, Puntland and pockets of southern Somalia - are considered safe
- Politically weak groups such as the Bantu and Bajuni are least able to secure protection from extortion, rape and other abuses

"Notwithstanding the general perception of Somalia as 'anarchic', basic law and order is in fact the norm in most locations. Though hard data is not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the Somali countryside – especially Somaliland, Puntland, and pockets of southern Somalia – is safer for local residents than is the case in neighbouring countries. There are, to be sure, shifting zones of very dangerous banditry and criminality in places like Jowhar, the lower Jubba valley, and parts of Mogadishu. It is also true that both Somali nationals and foreigners associated with an international organization or a profitable business are frequent targets of kidnapping for ransom, especially in Mogadishu. But it is important not to confuse the security problems of international aid agencies with security problems for average residents.

Public order, rule of law, and personal security throughout the country continue to be based on a combination of traditional mechanisms: kinship protection, or mutual obligations within blood-payment groups (*diya*); clan-based customary law (*xeer*) and mediation structures provided by elders or respected sheikhs; and protection of weaker social groups via the practice of *shagad*, or adoption into a stronger clan.

[...]

In practice, rule of law, guarantees of personal security, and protection of human rights in Somalia vary from location to location and according to the social standing of the individual. Most Somalis ensure their personal security by residing in the 'home areas' of their clan, where they are assured full status and protection by their kin group. Ironically, for many Somali urbanites, this arrangement can lead to a situation in which they are simultaneously 'at home' in their clan's territory, but 'internally displaced', in that they are forced to live in areas far from their actual homes in the capital city. Somalis are increasingly able to both visit and live in cities outside their clan's traditional domain, but typically as a guest of more dominant clans, an arrangement which requires time and sometimes protection money to ensure. Politically weak social groups, such as the Bantu and Bajuni, are least able to secure protection from extortion, rape, and other abuses by criminal elements of more powerful clans; they remain somewhat vulnerable no matter where they reside." (Menkhaus November 2000, p. 9)

Human rights abuses remain commonplace in many parts of Somalia (1998-2000)

- Widespread abuses by armed militias and clan-based factions
- Islamic courts involved in human rights abuses
- Women and children are primary victims

"Somalia continued to witness widespread abuses of human rights by armed militias of clan-based factions, who operated with impunity. Somalia has had no judiciary or functioning court system since the central government collapsed in 1991. Islamic (Shari'a) courts formed militias and were themselves involved in human rights abuses. They condemned to death several prisoners who were subsequently executed. Scores of deliberate and arbitrary killings of unarmed civilians were carried out by clan-based militias. Human rights abuses included abductions and hostage-taking. Forced recruitment of child soldiers and rape were widespread." (AI 2000, para. 1)

"The right to life is inherent and inalienable, governing the actions of all human beings. The full spectrum of this right is defined by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, and international humanitarian law, and cannot be violated through the arbitrary act of any individual or institution. The lack of respect of the fundamental principles of protection has led to violence against life, in particular murder, mutilation, and cruel treatment and torture; the taking of Somalis, as well as international relief workers as hostages; the operation of irregular judiciary without guarantees of fair trial; and other violations. Non-combatants, women, children and other vulnerable groups have been the main victims of these practices." (UN December 1998, p. 17)

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)

Food/nutrition

Internally displaced most vulnerable to malnutrition (1999-2001)

- Internally displaced, children from female-headed households, and recent returnees are most vulnerable groups
- Malnutrition rates amongst the internally displaced in rural areas reportedly as high as 40%
- High mortality rate of children under five reflects the poor conditions in which IDPs live
- In northeastern Somalia, worsening nutritional conditions in Bosasso camps are cause for concern

General:

"Micro-nutrient deficiencies, notably Vitamin A, Iron and Iodine, remain prevalent in Somalia, leading to increased mortality and morbidity among women and children. Non-optimal child-care practices contribute to malnutrition among children-under-five even during normal times. The most vulnerable groups include IDPs, children from female-headed households and recent returnees." (UN March 2001, p. 22)

"Good health is inextricably linked to good nutrition. UNICEF has conducted nutrition surveys in southern and central Somalia finding an average global malnutrition rate of 23%, (average severe malnutrition rates of 5%). Rates vary across regions and among different population groups and can be as high as 40% in areas with high concentrations of displaced families. UNICEF will continue to support targeted feeding in addition to a focus on behavioural changes in caring and feeding practices of children." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper, p. 9)

"UNICEF's recent five nutrition surveys indicate that the average global malnutrition rates stand at 24.4% and the average severe malnutrition rates at 4.2%. The problem is worsened by the fact that around 30% of population are recent returnees and 20% of households are female-headed, making them more vulnerable. In rural areas and amongst IDP populations the malnutrition rate is around 40%." (UNICEF June 2000, sect. 2)

"ACF has undertaken a nutrition survey in the displaced people's camps in Mogadishu. The nutrition status is not good and the mortality rate of young children in recent months is reflective of the appalling conditions in which the tens of thousands of displaced people in the city try to survive.

In the Gedo region, reports from the ACF therapeutic feeding center in Luuq show an overall decrease in the number of beneficiaries but admission of severely malnourished cases continue. An increase in the number of admissions from the El Bon area has been

noted. The health and nutritional status of the population in Garbahare and Burdubo continues to be a cause of concern." (USAID/FEWS 30 August 2000, "Survey Confirms")

In Bosasso:

"Concerns have been raised over the deteriorating conditions in the Bosasso IDP camps. The livestock ban has limited opportunities for day labour, as well the opportunity to receive assistance from kin. The need to conduct a full nutritional assessment to help target food and other assistance has been raised." (UNCU 25 January 2001)

"In N/Eastern Somalia, IDPs in Bossaso (economic migrants from various food economy groups) and Margago camps (mainly destitute pastoralists) have received intermittent food assistance over the last 12 months. Their food security status is deteriorating for several reasons: lack of casual job opportunities (recession from collapsed livestock trade and port activities); less assistance from relatives/neighbours in urban centers (who are also affected by the economic downturn; irregular food distributions." (FEWS January 2001, Food Aid Distribution)

Nutritional status of internally displaced has improved over last months (September 2000-January 2001)

"The overall welfare and nutrition status of the population in general has improved over the past six months. Improved food availability has enabled the majority of families to recover from the prolonged period of hardship that affected many regions. More favourable security has enabled some health related interventions to resume." (FEWS January 2001, Nutrition Update)

"Following the gu rains [in second half of 2000], the situation rapidly improved, despite the fact that food aid deliveries were well below planning figures. Results from the only post-harvest nutrition survey thus far carried out are expected soon. In view of a reasonable to good harvest, improved (safe) water availability and decreasing morbidity, the general expectation is that the nutrition situation has improved." (WHO 30 September 2000, sect. 1)

"Nutrition surveys conducted during the past months generally indicate an improvement of the nutrition status of the various populations since the previous surveys. Although food security has generally improved in many areas of Somalia in recent months, malnutrition rates remain well in excess of pre-war levels." (USAID/FEWS 15 October 2000, "Highlights")

First nutritional survey in five years conducted in displaced persons camps in Mogadishu (June 2000)

- Nutritional survey conducted in camps accessible to ACF in June 2000

- Survey assessed 60% of the internally displaced population in Mogadishu
- Nutritional situation is categorized as poor but not catastrophic
- Nutritional situation for resident population is thought to be better than that for IDPs

"An example of varying humanitarian conditions even within the same geographical location was illustrated by Action contre la faim, which conducted a nutritional survey of the internally displaced populations in Mogadishu. The survey accessed 60 per cent of the internally displaced population on all sides of the 'green lines'. A total of 12.9 per cent global malnutrition, including 2 per cent severe malnutrition was observed. This is a significant reduction since the last survey in 1995, which identified a global rate of 26 per cent. Casual observation indicates that the situation in south Mogadishu is worse than on the north side of the city.

It is expected that conditions are generally better for the city's non-internally displaced resident population but worse for those internally displaced populations that the survey (and hence aid agency activities) could not reach." (UNSC 19 December 2000, sect. IV)

"An estimated 237,000 IDPs live in camps in and around Mogadishu. ACF-F undertook a nutritional survey of approximately 57% of the IDPs (those in the camps which were accessible to the NGO) in June. The majority of the IDPs sampled (97%) had been in Mogadishu for more than one year, although the ACF Health Education Team has collected data that indicates that there has been quite a large influx of IDPs into the city in the last 12 months. This is the first statistically representative nutritional survey of the displaced population in Mogadishu since 1995. The prevalence of acute malnutrition in children aged 6-59 months was estimated at 12.9%, including 2% severe acute malnutrition. Oedema was recorded in 0.6% of the sample.

[...]

While there is no information on the nutritional situation of the resident population, it is assumed that IDPs are more vulnerable than the residents because their income-generating activities and employment opportunities are more limited. In addition, IDPs are twice as likely to visit ACF's Therapeutic Feeding Centres in Mogadishu than residents (although this may be because of the referral system).

[...]

The situation is poor but not catastrophic. Moreover, the period before the *gu* rains is the hungry season when malnutrition is expected to be high.

[...]

The nutritional situation of the IDPs in the camps that are inaccessible to ACF is not known. The authors of the survey speculated that they may be worse off, as they do not benefit from referral to Therapeutic Feeding Centres, Health Education Sessions and Water and Sanitation work." (UN Sub-Committee on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 31)

Health

Disease poses major threat to displaced persons (1999-2000)

- Displaced suffer from cholera, malaria and tuberculosis among other diseases
- Vaccination coverage is low among internally displaced

General disease information:

"Malaria, diarrhoeal diseases and respiratory infections are the main killers of children and are the most common causes of illnesses among all age groups in Somalia. Malaria is hyper-endemic in the riverine areas of Shabelle and Juba. In other parts of Somalia, incidence rates correspond to the rainy season (October-January). Cerebral malaria accounts for around 95% of the cases. Diarrhoeal diseases and dehydration are due to the poor quality of water and lack of sanitation. Combined with malnutrition, the rate of fatality due to diarrhoeal diseases is high, especially among children and IDPs. Outbreaks of *Shigella* have been reported in Lower Juba and Bay regions." (UN March 2001, p. 27)

"As a summary statement, the status of the population's health and the health system in Somalia is very poor with periodic limited short life span improvements. The trend is downward with a few area based and disease specific exceptions. Cholera is now an annual phenomena with seasonal peaks. Exacerbated by the floods in the South, malaria continues to be a major killer. Health care for many is only available from drug vendors or traditional healers. Mental health is a growing concern.

[...]

The incidence and prevalence of communicable diseases, especially malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera remain high with sexually transmitted diseases continuing to increase. The often untenable security situation in many zones adds to the problem, rendering the delivery of health care services difficult or impossible." (WHO 6 January 2000, paras. 1 and 7)

"Poor personal hygiene and environmental sanitation are major causes of diseases among children. Improving hygiene and sanitation is critical to reducing mortality and morbidity among infants, children and mothers, especially in crowded urban, peri-urban areas and displaced persons camps. The main problems relating to personal and domestic hygiene are inter-alia: no hand-washing before eating; unhealthy food; use of contaminated water sources for drinking; and contamination of water during household handling and storage. There is little access to excreta disposal facilities, particularly in towns, IDP camps and schools." (UN November 1999, p. 30)

Measles:

"Although measles mass vaccination campaigns are carried out regularly (UNICEF conducted nine campaigns in these regions during the last year), coverage and frequency seem insufficient to reduce transmission. Data show that coverage between and within districts varied considerably, ranging from less than 10% to more than 60%. In particular among IDPs and in rural areas coverage was low." (WHO 30 September 2000, sect. 2.3)

Cholera:

"As described in a recent WHO evaluation of this year's cholera epidemic response, emergency preparedness was minimal and case fatality rates were extremely high in areas with either medically weak international NGOs or none at all. Such was the case in parts of Bay and Bakol region until emergency support was provided by UNICEF and Medecins Sans Frontieres." (OCHA 28-29 July 2000, draft report, sect. 2)

An outbreak of cholera was reported in March 1999 in the town of Bardere, where the IDP population is 20,000, and UNICEF has set up a treatment centre. (ACC/SCN 26 March 1999) On 28 April 1999, local elders in southern Somalia reported that a rampant cholera epidemic had killed at least 240 people in the last week, and that dozens more were becoming infected on a daily basis. "The spread of the disease has been aided by an influx of farmers and nomads to Dinsor in the last few weeks, after drought and insecurity drove them from the countryside to search for food and water in the main towns. Dinsor lies 120 km south of Baidoa, which is out of bounds for aid workers because of frequent bouts of fighting between feuding militia groups." (Reuters 28 April 1999) More than 200 people are reported to have died of cholera in southern Somalia between November 1998 and March 1999. (AFP 21 April 1999) In Mogadishu, staff on duty at Bardeira hospital say they have received about 50 suspected cases of cholera a day since mid-March 1999, although the numbers are now declining. (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999) WHO reported in April that the recent cholera outbreak in southern Somalia has been contained in urban areas but expressed concern over its possible spread to smaller villages where adequate health care may not be available. Efforts by UNICEF to chlorinate water supplies in IDP camps have also helped contain the disease." (USAID/FEWS 29 April 1999)

Tuberculosis:

In February 1999 a doctor in Hudur, in the Bakool region, stated that "tuberculosis had spread massively among the internally displaced, who usually share their little food and water, using the same plates and cups . . . [and that] . . . essential drugs to combat this serious illness are unavailable, and it could affect the entire population of Hudur." (AFP 3 February 1999) The district commissioner of the nearby Bay region also reported that at least 700 internally displaced people in Bardale lacked food, medicine, water or shelter, and that "scabies and other skin diseases are rampant among the refugees, who mostly die of acute dysentery and respiratory-related illnesses." (AFP 3 February 1999)

Infant mortality rates amongst displaced are above average (1999-2000)

- Under five mortality rate of 6,6/10.000/day in Luuq camps
- Poor hygiene and sanitation are major threats in overcrowded camps

"ACF in April 2000 reported an under five mortality rate of 6,6/10.000/day in the IDP camps in Luuq and 5,8/10.000/day in Luuq town, suggesting an extremely alarming situation. Similar alarming rates of 6,0/10.000/day and 6,7/10.000/day were found in two villages near Luuq. Rapid assessments, carried out in July, indicated that in other towns under five mortality was 5,83/10.000/day and 3,23/10.000/day respectively." (WHO 30 September 2000, sect. 2.3)

"Poor personal hygiene and environmental sanitation are major causes of diseases among children. Improving hygiene and sanitation is critical to reducing mortality and morbidity among infants, children and mothers, especially in crowded urban, peri-urban areas and displaced persons camps. The main problems relating to personal and domestic hygiene are inter-alia: no hand-washing before eating; unhealthy food; use of contaminated water sources for drinking; and contamination of water during household handling and storage. There is little access to excreta disposal facilities, particularly in towns, IDP camps and schools." (UN November 1999, p.30)

In Luuq IDP camp in the Gedo region, a joint assessment conducted in March 1999 by Action contre la faim and FSAU revealed that the mortality rate among children up to five years of age was 10.6 per 10,000 per day, more than double the rate at December 1998. Moreover, the "imminent rains of the *Gu*, the low measles vaccination coverage, weak housing and no assets are considered additional risk factors to this vulnerable population." (FSAU 8 April 1999)

Internally displaced have had minimal access to health services (1998-1999)

- Displaced persons cannot afford health care treatment and drugs
- Displaced who are constantly on the move find themselves outside health coverage system

"There has been an influx of the drought displaced people into the main towns of Gode, Imey and Danan. Many of these migrants are said to be affected by diseases such as diarrhea, tuberculosis, and pneumonia. In addition, some measles cases have been reported by Gode Hospital. The zonal Health Department is attempting to provide emergency outreach services and free provision of drugs to the migrant population since nearly all of the displaced people cannot afford to pay for health care treatment and drugs. However there are not sufficient drugs and facilities in the hospital to be able to provide this service for long without provision of additional drugs.

[...]

The existing health facilities [in Gode] are poor. There is only one hospital and one health center in the whole zone. Because of lack of capacity and vehicles, management of the health institutions throughout the region is weak. Some drugs will need to be provided freely; however, this is likely to quickly drain medical supplies and drug stocks." (UNDP-EUE 14 December 1999, pp. 2,6)

"The civil war and the absence of a central government have wiped out the government health service. Health care is provided by NGOs and through market channels at a cost. IDPs are outside the system of health coverage and are constantly on the move, so cannot access health cards, or undergo any long-term treatments. There are too few clinics to provide for the settled population, let alone the IDPs, who come and go." (Redding and Hansen 1998, p. 83)

Water/sanitation

Few Somalis have access to clean water (1999-2000)

- Less than 20 percent of Somalis have access to clean water
- Limited access to safe water leads to serious health problems
- Many people have dug their own wells that offer dirty, unsanitary water
- New government has sanitation workers and equipment but they are yet to be mobilised

"Where Mogadishu residents used to have clean running water at the turn of a shiny brass tap, they must now depend on hand-dug wells. Dirty water, hauled up from about 30 metres underground, sells at Somali shillings 2,000 (US \$0.20) per drum. People and animals use the same water supply. Among the devastated buildings, in the maze of broken streets, women with jerry cans join the goats and camels, and the queues of donkey carts. The wells are owned – but not maintained – by individuals. Aid agencies occasionally provided chlorine to treat the drinking water, but no one really monitored its use or distribution, health workers said.

Once the water system had collapsed, many people dug their own wells. The wells that used to provide the city with running water are now in the hands of militia. One set of wells is on the Afgoi road between Mogadishu and Afgoi town; the other to the north of the city, between Mogadishu and Balad. The wells are in total disrepair.

So far, efforts by the new interim government to start tackling the 10 year-old waste dump - once a beautiful coastal capital - have barely touched the tip. Mogadishu has lacked government structures and services for almost a decade. 'You can't clean up 10 years of piled-up rubbish without a complete campaign, with the right equipment,' said one Mogadishu resident. Sanitation workers and equipment are available, but have yet to be mobilised, signed up and funded. Since establishing itself in October, the new government is struggling with other priorities: funding, peace and reliable personnel. And in a city where money, militia and warlord-run mafias have ruled since 1991, even rubbish is 'owned', explained the resident. Gangs expect nothing less than a cut from sanitation projects." (IRIN-CEA 20 December 2000)

"Less than 20 percent of Somalis have access to clean water. As families flee conflict areas, the few safe water sources that do exist are being abandoned or destroyed. Wells, generators, pumps, and pipes have been destroyed or intentionally contaminated by

warring factions. Out of 175 wells in Bay and Bakool, at least 101 have been destroyed beyond repair. Only 20 wells are still functioning and the remaining 44 are being repaired." (US Fund for UNICEF 6 September 2000, "Water and sanitation")

"In largely arid Somalia, access to water is limited for human and animal consumption. Livestock, Somalia's main export, is the mainstay of the economy and is dependent upon rainfall for adequate pastures and upon ground water for watering. People require daily access to safe sources of water. In most areas however, community access to any water source is restricted, especially in the dry seasons, and access to safe water (typically from ground water sources) is available for only about 30 percent of the population, mostly in urban areas.

Poor access leads to higher prices (stretching poorer incomes to the limit) and greater distances in water collection (increasing the workload of women and girls). In turn, diarrhoeal diseases, cholera epidemics, and malnutrition of children are all directly or indirectly caused by limited access to safe water and poor personal and environmental hygiene practices.

Ground water constitutes the principal source of potable water in most areas of Somalia. Studies show that there is sufficient quantity of good quality ground water to cover the domestic needs of the whole population of Somalia. Though they are seasonal, rainwater catchments are a major water source. These reservoirs include: ware, an excavated reservoir, sometimes lined with plastic sheets, common in the south; bally, a depression in the ground which may be natural or artificial; maxiid, a hand-dug vertical pit; and berked, a cemented underground catchment mostly found in the central and northern regions." (UN November 1999, p.30)

Shelter and non-food items

Internally displaced live in meagre, make-shift housing (1999-2000)

- Displaced in Mogadishu congregate in make-shift camps
- Others live in abandoned government buildings, schools and factories
- Huts are made of scavenged paper, sticks, sacks and cloth

In Mogadishu, "an overwhelmingly poor but tenacious population has made homes amongst the shell-shattered houses and offices, or congregates in makeshift camps for the internally displaced. International development aid has effectively been suspended, and those displaced by war and hardship are left to a precarious hand-to-mouth existence." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

"Heavy rains in early July [2000] caused flash floods in Mogadishu, damaging buildings and washing away several hundred of the shanty structures in the displaced camps in the

south of the city. The floods brought a tide of sewage through the shanty towns, raising concerns about the potential for the spread of disease." (IRIN 7 July 2000 in UN Sub-Commission on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 31)

"The floods [of late 1997 and early 1998] particularly harmed populations already displaced by the country's warfare. Heavy rains washed away makeshift huts housing displaced families in Mogadishu. Other displaced families in the capital continued to live in abandoned government buildings, schools, factories, and houses left empty by the country's decade of instability." (USCR 1999, p. 88)

"Makeshift camps of displaced Somalis and refugees (primarily originating from Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s) have mushroomed in the city since the fall of Siad Barre's government in 1991. Most of the dome-shaped huts are made from paper, sticks, sacks and cloth scavenged from the growing mountains of rubbish, with barriers of scrap metal delineating different sections of the camps. Some camps receive rudimentary help from humanitarian agencies or Islamic organizations, but the vast majority of internally displaced people must rely on their own survival skills." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

The overall situation of the IDPs is reported to be poor. During the rains in November [1999] they are forced to live under leaking huts with little or no plastic sheeting. Coping mechanisms include selling ground nuts, cigarettes, local tooth brushes and supplying water or cooking meals. There is a need for food, shelter and healthcare." (ACC/SCN 20 December 1999, p. 31)

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

General

Minimal access to education for the population in general (1999-2000)

- Only about one in ten children of primary school age are enrolled in schools
- Today's youth constitutes a "lost generation"
- Quality of education on offer is generally very poor

From UNICEF's Somalia Basic Data sheet – June 2000

| | |
|---|-------------|
| Child population (millions, under 18 years): | 5.0 |
| Literacy (% male/female) (1990): | 36/14 |
| Primary school enrolment/attendance (% net, male/female) (1998) | 11/6, 21/13 |
| Primary school children reaching grade 5 (%) (1999) | 20 |

(UNICEF June 2000, "Somalia Information")

"The future of Somalia is bleak as long as its children continue to be denied of their fundamental right to basic education. Few children in Somalia today, particularly girls have access to basic education - opportunities to develop their capabilities or learn skills that will enable them to improve their lives and that of their society. There are increasing opportunities for investment in the education sector over the long run in particular in the northern region; however, most of Somalia's children remain today uneducated, illiterate and unskilled; its present youth constitutes a 'lost generation'.

On average, only about one in ten children of primary school age are enrolled, and only two thirds of them are boys. Of the youth aged 14-18 years, almost all are out of school and without access to education or other basic services. The few operational primary schools function mainly through community and parental support. All secondary education remains confined to highly urbanised areas.

The quality of education on offer is generally very poor. About 40 percent of all teachers are unqualified; many have not completed their own primary education. The absence of a central educational authority has led to a lack of consistency in educational standards, including acceptable curricula and textbooks. Much of the pre-war school infrastructure has been destroyed. Poor families, communities, and local authorities have insufficient funds to meet even the very basic expenses related to teachers' salaries and effective supervision. The absence of any learner assessment or certification system has rendered the appraisal of the quality of education impossible.

Koranic schools have continued to operate throughout the conflict, with the support of parents and communities. These schools do not offer opportunities for secular education and are primarily religious institutions imparting knowledge of the Koran. Pilot projects have been initiated for the inclusion of some elements of basic education in the daily teaching of selected Koranic schools and the results are awaited.

Private language schools are mushrooming in most towns and some rural communities teach informally, borrowing curricula and textbooks from other countries. Some language and vocational education schools are also integrating some primary subjects on an ad-hoc basis. There is, however, a near-total lack of early childhood education, alternate forms of primary education, and adult informal education in Somalia. The potential of reaching excluded communities, such as by way of satellite schools, informal education centres, and radio, is as yet untapped." (UN November 1999, p.32)

"The civil war dealt another devastating blow to the formal education system, which completely collapsed in 1990. Many teachers and pupils were displaced and forced to seek security in their clan areas or flee to refugee camps abroad. . . . The aftermath showed that about 90% of school buildings in the country were either completely or partially destroyed. In addition, many were occupied by internally displaced persons. Almost all educational materials and equipment were looted." (UNDP 1999, Chapter 3, "History of education in Somalia")

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Self-reliance and food security

Reports in 2001 indicate a lull in severe drought conditions of 1999 and 2000 (2001)

- Estimated number of Somalis facing food insecurity has decreased from 750,000 to 400,000
- Pause in severe drought conditions attributable to successful November/December 2000 rain season
- Improved conditions come at a time when coping strategies were starting to fail

International agencies report that humanitarian needs have decreased significantly in last months:

"Following the severe drought that lasted from the end of 1999 through the first quarter of 2000, humanitarian needs have decreased significantly across most of Somalia. This change has occurred since June [2000], primarily owing to favourable environmental conditions. As a result, the estimated number of Somalis facing food insecurity has declined from 750,000 to below 400,000. In response, UN agencies are now developing assistance strategies to promote the mid-term recovery of the livelihood of poor and displaced populations.

In a drought prone country with little natural resource, vulnerable Somali communities require continued international assistance to support recovery efforts in the drought-affected areas of southern Somalia and the Haud. In turn, the current lull in relief requirements enables aid agencies to focus on emergency prevention and support for local, community-based emergency preparedness and coping initiatives.

[...]

The November/December [2000] rain season was successful –with above average estimates for the winter 'Deyr' harvest. Yet, certain geographical areas – such as Middle and Lower Juba – received little rain, and certain marginalised groups, such as the displaced, have had little opportunity for long-term recovery. Without further improvements in their livelihood, many communities will face more food and water insecurity in the coming months. Long-term processes of destitution, including land alienation, internal displacement, economic collapse and the destruction of productive infrastructure, have not affected all households equally. These processes have stratified livelihood conditions between rich and poor households within Somali communities and generated grave disparities in the distribution of humanitarian need. The dispersion of displaced persons and other destitute groups amid populations with more assets and higher living standards renders their plight less visible to the international community and decreases the perceived urgency of humanitarian responses." (UN 2001, Emergency Consolidated Appeal for the Drought in the Horn of Africa, p. 57)

"The 2000 Gu harvest for southern Somalia is the second largest in the post-war period and it followed a good Deyr season. Given certain assumptions, the overall need for emergency food assistance is predicted to be minimal up to the end of the year." (USAID/FEWS 15 October 2000, "Highlights")

As opposed to reports from 1999 and early 2000:

"More than 200,000 people are already internally displaced within Somalia. If the drought persists, this number could increase considerably. Emergency food supplies distributed so far in this area are inadequate to cope with a deteriorating situation. Coping mechanisms are failing. Wells, where any water remains, are drying up due to overuse, and water sources are polluted as people crowd round them with their animals.

Northern regions of Somalia might also suffer from drought since some limited movements of population have been reported. It should be emphasised that these traditionally dry areas have developed some coping mechanisms that are based on cross border trade with Ethiopia. With the alarming situation in Ethiopia, it is unlikely that such trade can continue." (UNICEF 20 June 2000, paras. 3-4)

"Within Somalia, fragile livelihoods and infrastructure have been stressed repeatedly by the combined effects of drought and flooding. The cycle of environmental degradation and rain failure has resulted in dwindling pasture reserves and limited livestock production. In turn, it has led to the silting of rivers, already flood-prone due to lack of coherent river embankment protection." (OCHA 17 July 2000, "External Environment")

"Acquiring food, shelter, access to safe water, health and education are among the most basic of human pursuits. In the context of Somalia in general, and southern and central Somalia in particular, the ability of the Somalis to achieve these basic needs has been seriously undermined. The impact of conflict, compounded by several seasons of below normal crop and livestock production, and the degradation of civil and productive infrastructure has led to chronic depletion of resources and capacities to cope. Communities in these areas are now perilously vulnerable to further shocks.

[...]

With traditional coping mechanisms virtually exhausted for most households due to the successive crop failures, more than 1.2 million people face serious food shortages and are in need of international assistance. Poverty and food insecurity is now widespread amongst small-scale agriculturists and agro-pastoralists, seasonal agricultural labourers and the urban poor, particularly in the hard hit regions of Gedo, Bay and Bakol." (UN November 1999, pp. 17, 26)

"It is estimated that some 751,000 persons are experiencing livelihood vulnerability. By region, the figures are estimated to be:

| | |
|-----------|---------|
| Bay | 193,000 |
| Mogadishu | 120,000 |

| | |
|-------------|---------|
| Bakool | 104,000 |
| Gedo | 106,000 |
| Galgadud | 72,000 |
| Somaliland | 67,000 |
| Puntland | 50,000 |
| Middle Juba | 20,000 |
| Hiran | 19,000 |
| Total | 751,000 |

(UNDP 2000, Humanitarian Section, "Affected population and Movements")

Latest FEWS food security information by region (March 2001)

- Negative impact of livestock ban coupled with high rates of inflation are affecting populations in northern regions in particular
- Pastoralists in some areas are coping through water sales, charcoal burning, the export of incense and fishing
- Severe water shortage in Hagar, Juba Valley has forced many families to move to Afmadow
- Deteriorating water availability in the Lower Shabelle has also obliged families to move

By region:

NW AND AWDAL

This month coincides with the Kaliil season which is characterised by extreme heat and high temperatures during daytime. With regard to the traditional calendar, length and severity of the Kaliil season depends on the Todob rains along the Oogo plateau between mid-February and mid-March. On the Hawd plateau south of Hargeisa, pasture availability is decreasing and hand feeding of remaining cattle and sheep with pods shaken from acacia trees, the main browsing for camels and goats, is very common. In the coastal and sub-coastal areas east of Lughaye, some of the pasture plants preferred by the cattle were either depleted or dried up earlier than normal. These phenomena resulted from severe overgrazing induced by heavier migration to the area over the past 3-4 months. Shorter distance migration of camels, shoats and cattle within the coastal/sub-coastal zones and in-migration herds of huge numbers were competing for pasture during past few months. Negative impacts of reduced food consumption levels are expected to surface soon.

SOOL

All ecological zones seem to contain sufficient water for the Jilaal months. The general livestock condition is considered fair to normal except for less mobile stocks in Ainabo and lower Nugal areas, where an estimated 2,700 households are considered highly vulnerable to food insecurity due to lack of Deyr rains and to their reliance on sheep markets. High numbers of livestock present in the region have increased pressure on pasture and needs close monitoring. Pastoralists will rely on meat/milk consumption from

camels and to a lesser extent from small ruminants as main food source. Despite declining milk production as a result of the growing distance between water points and range-lands and some cases of parasites infestations and respiratory diseases (without epidemic character), pastoralists cope through milk and meat production. Relatively high sales of stocks at lower prices, increased remittance flow into the region and WFP-FFW and self employment were observed. The coming months will show to what extent these coping mechanisms can still be stretched.

SANAG AND TOGDHEER

The Hawd area and El-Afwein are considered the most food insecure areas in these regions. Livestock from these areas migrated to Zone V in Ethiopia in search of better pasture. The livestock ban combined with the high rates of inflation have had several negative consequences for the area: a) Reduced business investments. b) Reduced employment and income earning opportunities. c) Market prices for local and imported goods have increased. d) Reduced household expenditure as terms of trade deteriorate. e) The daily labour wage has decreased during the last 12 months from 3,4USD to 2,2USD. f) Increased consumption of wild foods. g) Livestock prices have fallen during the last 12 months (export quality shoats from 25 USD are being sold on the local market for 9-10 USD). The cost of local cereal has increased from the previous month due to reduced supply, increased local demand (which is normal for this time of the year), and high inflation rates.

N-NUGAL AND S-BARI

TT have continued to deteriorate due to the livestock ban. High prices as a result of inflation and the Jilaal season are increasing stress on urban and pastoral households. For example shoat/rice TT have declined by 17-32 %. The high inflation rates caused some traders to close their shops as market prices were so unstable while others increased the price of their goods. The high inflation rates caused street demonstrations in Bossaso. In Gardo district there has been an increase in food stealing indicative of the deteriorating situation. Many young shoats in Gardo did not gain sufficient weight during the Deyr and it is anticipated that many will be too weak to walk the increasing distances to water sources and will die along the journey. El- district remains the most food secure due to the good Deyr rains and the thriving lobster fishing. Livestock condition, production and reproduction are similar in Gardo, Garowe and El. Livestock are now moving to the dry season grazing areas. Goat milk is declining and many of the local quality goats are not physically fit as they have been exploited for milk for so long. Camel milk continues to be abundant.

BARI

In this Jilaal, the lack of income through low livestock sales and the influx of new banknotes are increasing pressure on livelihoods and food security for the whole region. Normal pasture and grazing conditions and seasonal nomadic movements from the coastal grazing sites to their original destinations (Karkaar, Qoodad, Kodmo) were observed during the month. However, heavy tick infestation in Dharoor prompted abnormal livestock movement to Uuraled and Karkaar. Production is considered normal but milk prices are very low due to inaccessible external markets. While water

availability remained normal throughout the region, in Taager and Washington berkads dried up forcing villagers to buy water from tankers. TT remained unfavourable for pastoralists (1 goat fetched 25-30 kg of rice) and newly printed banknotes caused an increase of imported food prices of 10-15 %. Pastoralists are coping through water sales, charcoal burning, fishing, credit and most importantly, the export of incense (. 120 %). Poor pastoralists and poor urban FEG are becoming increasingly vulnerable to food insecurity.

N-MUDUG AND S-NUGAL

The overall livestock population is estimated to have increased by 20% in the last rains. Livestock condition and production is slightly above normal, with the exception of Goldogob. Here, in the Hawd, berkads are empty and prices for watering herds increased to above normal. The increase in the livestock population has the potential to cause added pressure on water and pasture resources before the next Gu rains. Most of the milk (camel) produced is being consumed and is contributing to approx 50-60% of the households energy requirements. There are reports of camel pneumonia, high tick and mite infestation, which are expected at this time of the year. However, due to the pastoralists' reduced income levels many will be unable to treat their animals. There has been low market activity due to the unstable currency and therefore increased food prices. Tension grew between consumers and traders forcing some traders to close their shops.

GEDO

The general livestock condition in the current Jilaal is weakened and production levels declined for all species due to deteriorating fodder condition. Deyr rains were sporadic in northern parts of the region. Fodder is currently available in riverine areas but grazing is limited due to Tsetse fly infestation. Continuing inter and intra regional movements indicate the dry conditions in the area. While cereal availability has been good and prices low for many months there are concerns in northern Gedo about peoples' ability to purchase foods - low purchasing power and low asset bases may be the cause. Rainfed production was limited in northern areas and high input costs (fuel) and low producer prices (for cereals) may limit profitability for riverine groups

JUBA VALLEY

The riverine group continues to receive food assistance while a severe water shortage in Hagar has forced many families to move to Afmadow. Off season production of sesame, maize and cowpea from the flood waters of last November are starting to be harvested, which should ease the difficulties of the riverine group. Non-riverine households' food security status is considered near normal though poor rains and harvests in the last 2 seasons in many areas and high cereal and imported commodity prices are putting stress on all communities.

Alleviating the situation is the positive market conditions in Kenya for cattle from the Valley. However, cattle from agro-pastoralists and pastoralists are having to move away from the border to riverine area and other permanent water points (e.g. Afmadow). Milk production is therefore also low. Charcoal production has also been an important source of income for some time in the region, with obvious environmental implications.

BAKOL

Although the last Deyr rains have improved pasture and water availability in most parts of the pastoral food economy zone, the high potential agricultural areas received poor rains and a poor harvest. Although the food security situation in general is stable, due to the very good rains in the Gu, there may be pockets of stress due to water problems and crop failures. Prices of livestock products were high because of market opportunities. Livestock are reported to be coming in to the region from Ethiopia (Kalafo). Cereals are available at affordable price in the local markets. Normal coping strategies (collection of firewood, wild foods, construction materials) are effective.

BAY

Good rains, crop and livestock conditions in the last 2-3 seasons continue to promote recovery from previous crises. However relatively high malnutrition levels (see nutrition section) highlight the need for further research to unravel underlying causes or problems. Localised poor rainfall and resultant problems need to be monitored closely e.g. Tigow, Somow and Banow Hussein Aden villages, but are assumed to be manageable given the generally good conditions in the region. Cereal prices have increased significantly, as in most areas, due to the influx of new Ssh notes.

Imported commodity prices have also increased for the same reason. Livestock prices remain good due to high demand from Garissa market in Kenya and Mogadishu. Job opportunities are normal. Self-employment activities (collection and sale of bush products) have increased which is normal during the Jilaal season.

HIRAN

Overall, food security status is near normal, though there are indications of developing problems, due to the poor rains and crop production in the past Deyr season. Pastoralists, with their browsing goats and camels are fine, while riverine and agro-pastoral groups with grazing (and browsing) animals (cattle) will be facing increased difficulties as HH cereal stocks are depleted and food and non-food prices are rising (new Ssh).

Dairy cattle moved further from settlements while lactating livestock have moved to the villages and towns to feed on the crop residues. Cereal prices increased by 30-40% compared to last month due to poor seasonal production, reduction of cereal supply from Ethiopia (food aid and production), and fewer FFW projects. Employment opportunities are below normal, the poor now relying more on self-employment (collection/ sale of bush products).

COWPEA BELT

Rains and crop production (cowpeas and sorghum) were good in the Deyr as in the last Gu. Livestock conditions have been good though this area is affected by the livestock ban, reducing demand and value for livestock. Localised problems exist along the coast where pastoralists from Gawaan (Mahas/ Dhusamareb areas) have arrived due to water problems in their areas. Decreasing water and pasture prompted the usual seasonal movements of pastoralists to better locations. However, below normal livestock body

condition due to shortage of water and pasture increased the vulnerability of populations in the Addun and coastal belt areas. Coping mechanisms of this group will be highly constrained and they may not be able to adequately address household food security.

Water prices are rising as some water points in Elder, Adenyabal, X/Dhere and Hobyo have not been rehabilitated. The continued introduction of new Somali shilling notes increased imported items while local products remained stable.

MIDDLE SHABELLE

Normal stress factors associated with the season are evident: water levels are dropping, pasture and grazing conditions are deteriorating forcing cattle to gather in riverine areas and other animals to walk further between water and pasture/ browsing. Irrigated production was good but rain-fed production poor in the recent Deyr season. Old stocks, livestock access and other income opportunities compensate for the disappointing rainfed crop harvest. Maize harvesting is over but sesame harvesting is ongoing. Riverine households continue to do well and are able to grow high value alternative crops - sesame.

Assistance was provided to Barey and Bananey villages, burnt in clashes last month. Children are reported to be suffering from respiratory infection there. Local cereal and pulse prices have increased dramatically since last month, the influx of Ssh being the major cause. 1 local goat fetched 2 bags of sorghum and unskilled labour is worth 5 kg of sorghum. The price of charcoal decreased by 10 % due to over supply.

LOWER SHABELLE

Deteriorating water availability and cattle conditions are of concern in this dry season. Some villagers have moved to improve access to water, while cattle diseases are increasing mortality rates in Afgoi. The recent Deyr season saw good irrigated but poor rainfed production. This is reflected in the above water and cattle problems. Other livestock, such as camel and shoats are fine. Access to food is considered good due to low prices, past production levels/stocks and other income opportunities.

Irrigation farmers were encouraged to grow sesame this season (Deyr) due to low cereal prices. Sesame harvesting is ongoing. Many rainfed farmers also rented or share-cropped land as a result of poor rains in their areas. Sesame and other cash crops (watermelon, tomato) harvesting is on-going and land preparation for the next season has started. The crop failure in rainfed areas, the demand from Mogadishu and M.Juba and the devaluation of the Somali shilling increased maize prices. A sharp raise in imported food items (sugar and rice) was reported. Population health is considered normal despite new cases of cholera." (FEWS 8 March 2001, pp. 15-6)

Livestock ban has led to major income deficits for pastoralists in the North (2000-2001)

- Gulf countries impose livestock ban in September 2000 following reports of Rift Valley Fever
- Somaliland is particularly hard-hit with shortfall in export earnings of US 2.4 million

- Urban poor and internally displaced populations in North are said to be most severely affected by ban

Livestock ban imposed by Gulf countries in September 2000:

"The first reported outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outside of Africa, in Saudi Arabia, has resulted in a regional ban on imported livestock from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti.

[...]

Most seriously affected by the regional ban is likely to be Somalia, a country which depends heavily on export of livestock. It lacks an established government and institutions to cope with the ban, and has very limited opportunities for economic diversification. Without a recognised central government for almost a decade, Somalia has struggled to find ways to get livestock certified for export.

[...]

According to one Somali livestock expert, the ban 'reflects not just on export quality but also on local markets and the environment. It will result in the over-production of herds, without the usual market outlet, which will cause environmental damage.'

Somali sources told IRIN that there was an urgent need for international agencies to assist by helping to establish systems to 'investigate the health of animals.' The source said there were also 'hopes that the newly elected president would talk about it and get something done effectively.' (IRIN-CEA 22 September 2000, "Introduction" and "Somalia")

"The current livestock embargo was initially imposed by the Saudi government on the 19th September 2000, following a reported outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in early September. Many of the Gulf countries followed suit some days later, banning the importation of all livestock from the main livestock exporting countries in the region. If this ban remains, and is a comprehensive ban involving all livestock species and all of the Gulf market (as was the case in the previous ban), the implications for the economy and food security are very grave. Latest reports regarding the embargo revealed sharp declines in livestock prices in northern and central regions. The knock-on effects of restricted trading are expected to reduce employment opportunities and effect access to other important income sources. The economy in the northern and central parts of the country being most susceptible." (USAID/FEWS 15 October 2000, "Highlights")

Ban has resulted in significant loss of income at macros and micro levels for Somalis:

"As a result of the ban imposed by Gulf states on livestock imports from the Horn of Africa last year, the self-declared state of Somaliland is faced with a shortfall in export earnings of US\$2.4 million. A report from the Food Security Assessment Unit (FASU) stated that the ban has brought loss of income at macro and household level especially for the urban poor and internally displaced." (UNDP-EUE 21 February 2001, Somalia)

"The [joint FSAU and FEWS December/January 2000] report documents the impact to date of the Rift Valley Fever ban on livestock from Somalia imposed last year by the Arab States. There has been substantial loss of income at macro and household levels, which had limited the purchase of many goods, including medicine, and had accelerated the depletion of assets. Market failure because of the livestock ban would 'threaten livelihoods for many groups'. FSAU monitors and nutritionists said there was particular concern for the urban poor and Internally Displaced Population (IDPs) in and around most towns in the north. Burao, in Somaliland, was marked out as of particular concern as it was a 'heavily livestock dependent'. Bosaso and Galkayo in the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeast Somalia, were also of concern, the report said. However, the worst effects of the livestock ban on food security had been mitigated by 'unusually good livestock production and reproduction', resulting in a high level of milk for consumption and sale." (IRIN-CEA 12 February 2001, Somalia)

"General household income levels, remittance flows, and imports of commodities have not changed appreciably in the past three years. But several new trends could threaten to pull the slow southern Somali economy down still further. First, and most dramatic, is the livestock import ban which Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states imposed in September 2000. The ban, issued because of a fatal outbreak of Rift Valley fever in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, targets livestock from Horn of Africa and East Africa, including Somalia. The last time the Saudis issued such a ban, in 1998, it was only partially enforced, due to widespread smuggling through Yemen. This time, however, Yemen appears to be clamping down as well, making this episode potentially much more disruptive. If the last ban is any guide, it will be at least a year or more before the ban is lifted." (Menkhaus November 2000, p. 7)

Somalis "displace" themselves to reach resources and opportunities (1998-2000)

- Repeated displacement of persons to Mogadishu where they beg and work for food
- Somalis families "displace" themselves and split up in order to access relief channels

"Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route – even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority [of IDPs] said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little cash by providing 'carrying services' to people in the market – earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

"The character of Somalia's displaced people is complicated by several factors. Since the civil war, virtually everyone has either had to leave the country or has been permanently displaced following fighting. A large part of the population is nomadic, and so has no fixed residence. The war has taught Somalis how to be resourceful and, therefore, they can easily 'displace' themselves if there is an opportunity to gain something by it through

relief channels. These factors make it almost impossible to put a fixed number on IDPs within Somalia at any one time.

[...]

IDPs tend to group around larger towns and relief programmes where they will have the chance to get resources. Informal local protection has developed along the lines of clan and sub-clan affiliation and alliance in some areas". In south Mogadishu, recent IDP cases "seem to be coming from villages to the urban centres, suggesting that the prevailing drought conditions might have as much to do with the movements as the endemic insecurity." Moreover, "many female-headed families, whose men are either serving with the clan militias or dead, have gravitated toward the urban centres in search of food and health services for their malnourished children. [While] in the northwest the government has followed a policy of giving land to IDPs for agriculture to re-establish them, in other areas of the country IDPs are outside the mainstream of Somali society." (Redding and Hansen 1998, pp. 82-84)

Families from "Puntland" often split up so that some may benefit from refugee assistance:

"The independent expert in her report to the Commission in 1998 (E/CN.4/1998/96) reported about the situation of the internally displaced. She said that Bosasso hosted tens of thousands of internally displaced persons, who constituted about one third of the city's population. She reported that many internally displaced preferred that part of their family became refugees by crossing the Gulf of Aden by boat to Yemen in order to be eligible for refugee status and to be assisted by UNHCR, or that they continued to Saudi Arabia." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 32)

Recurrent drought and chronic conflict over the last decade has resulted in poor food insecurity for most all Somalis (1998-2001)

- IDPs constitute nearly two-thirds of all Somalis living in a state of chronic humanitarian need
- Recurrent drought and civil insecurity have lead to loss of livelihood for all Somalis
- Impact of poverty particularly acute in crisis zones of central and southern parts of the countr
- FAO ranked Somalia as one of three "hungriest" countries in the world in 2000

"Most of Somalia is suffering from the delayed impact of sustained conflicts. Millions of people have been displaced, both internally and internationally, and deprived of any means of subsistence. Former militiamen, migrants in search of security, and refugees exceed one million people. Peace, security and the possibility of making a living are the prerequisites for their successful transition back to productive life. The loss of productive assets and infrastructure, the drop in incomes, the disruption of commercial flows and the outflow of skilled people are all major obstacles in reactivating these regional economies.

[...]

Somali IDPs have usually lost most of their belongings, including livestock, and have little access to stable employment. Varying levels of vulnerability faced by individual IDPs can be partly attributed to clan and sub-clan affiliations. A degree of protection is offered through kinship networks to IDPs living amongst fellow clan members. However, other IDPs receive little community protection and are acutely vulnerable. Today, IDPs constitute nearly two-thirds of all Somalis living in a state of chronic humanitarian need." (UN March 2001, pp. 104, 114)

"In a recent report, FAO ranked Somalia as one of the three 'hungeriest' countries in the world (with Afghanistan and Haiti). FAO found that hungry Somalis lack about a quarter of their daily energy requirements, reflecting an underlying and chronic deprivation of food." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper for Somalia, p. 7)

"In Somalia, evidence of both livelihood loss and serious under-nutrition are increasingly obvious, as a result of recent drought conditions, but also due to the structural vulnerability caused by 10 years of conflict and lack of public services (i.e. health, water, infrastructure)." (USAID/FEWS 30 August 2000, "Early Warning")

"The severe poverty prevailing in many areas of Somalia is reflected as inadequate food security at the household level and the widespread lack of viable livelihood opportunities. The impact of poverty is particularly acute in the crisis zones of central and southern Somalia, where chronic insecurity and inadequate governance constrain food production and trade, economic recovery and the development of sustainable livelihood options. The impact of poverty in the country is uneven, with populations in zones of recovery in the northwest and northeast enjoying more stable and higher levels of health, education and income than their counterparts in central and southern Somalia." (UN December 1998, p. 9)

Public participation

Gender discrimination barrier to public participation (1998-2000)

- Women prevented from participating in decision-making and from accessing resources
- Increased role in commerce sometimes makes women more vulnerable to discrimination

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in decision-making and access to resources. Violence against women and girls, resulting either from tradition or the civil war, includes the almost universal practice of female genital mutilation and sexual violence against the displaced, particularly against members of rival clans and minority groups." (UNICEF 2000, paras. 7 and 8)

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in Somali society, where the rights of women in both the private and public spheres are seriously undermined. Rape, which was uncommon in Somalia before the war, has become a weapon of war for the militia and bandits, as well as in camps for displaced persons and returnees. Women belonging to minority groups, such as the Bantus and the Rahanweyn, are particularly subject to these crimes." (CHR 18 February 1999, para. 74)

"Female-headed households are particularly vulnerable; in some areas half of the households are headed by women, who shoulder all household responsibilities while generating family income through commerce or farming. There is throughout Somalia an increased role of women in meeting household needs, in participating in community affairs, in agricultural production and in business activities. Since the collapse of the state, the role of women in commerce has grown markedly. The element of rapid change has been important; for many women it has made them more vulnerable, while for others it has opened vistas of opportunity virtually impossible in Somalia before the war.

[...]

In line with this changing role of women in post-war Somali society, evidence is emerging of women gaining political awareness. However, gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional, socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in formal decision-making processes and bodies." (UN December 1998, pp. 7, 47)

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

General

Widows and children often left to fend for themselves (2000)

- High number of children in need of special care and protection is an indication of the complete social breakdown in Somalia
- Erosion of community social structures has meant less traditional support for widows

"An indication of social breakdown is the number of children in need of special care and protection. Categories include the internally displaced, children from minority groups, children from the very poor, orphans, children of divorced parents, illegitimate children, working children, children living in the streets, militia children, child prisoners and disabled children. UNICEF will implement projects aimed at providing services to various categories of children in need of special protection and at ensuring the best interest of the child." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper p. 12)

"The conflict in Somalia, which has been rooted in traditional clan rivalries, has killed an estimated half million Somalis and displaced tens of thousands of people, mainly women and children. Many women were widowed or do not know the fate of their husbands, who are missing or who disappeared as a result of the conflict. The war led to high unemployment affecting every household; this in turn has resulted in an erosion of the traditional support given to widows by the community. Widows and their children are often left to support themselves. The Somali Red Crescent has initiated a project to make credit available to women affected by the war. More than 300 widows or husbandless households have benefited from loans to improve their living conditions." (ICRC 8 August 2000)

Lineage identity is central organizing force in Somalia (1998-1999)

- Clan is main organizing force in Somali society
- Clan networks provide physical and social security for Somalis

"In addition to conflict, technological change, trade, religion, migration patterns and the return of the Somali diaspora have broken down geographical and social boundaries. This has resulted in fundamental local and familial changes. In the absence of a central authority, the clan represents the lowest denominator in providing group and individual protection and social security. Yet, the clan remains the most potent force in contributing to social and political division and diffusion." (UN November 1999, p. 4)

"The social context of human development in Somalia cannot be understood without reference to clan affiliation. Lineage identity is a central organizing force in Somali society. At the grassroots level, clan elders and other community leaders play a vital role in providing most of the day-to-day governance throughout Somalia, in the absence of effective state authority, and are often instrumental in maintaining local stability. One of the paradoxes of contemporary Somalia is that some of the most powerful social and economic forces are simultaneously sources of both stability and insecurity. On the one hand, clan networks provide an essential level of physical and social security to many Somali households; the clan is a vital source of group protection, social security and customary law in the absence of state infrastructure. On the other hand, clannism is a powerful force contributing to unstable alliances, diffusion of power and communal conflict over scarce resources. In the period of state collapse, it has proved to be a divisive and destructive tool in the hands of political leaders. A second force, economic and business interests, at times promotes inter-clan and inter-factional accords for the sake of improved market conditions. However, these players also resort to armed conflict in pursuit of market control and price-fixing." (UN December 1998, p. 7)

PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Inter-clan fighting results in land disputes and dispossession (1999-2000)

- IDPs from minority clans with a low status in the community are unable to buy land (2001)
- Jiddu clan fighters in Qoroley displacing other farmers in land dispute (October 2000)
- Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities forced off lands (1999-2000)

IDPs of minority clans only able to rent land:

" IDPs often come from minority groups (Bantu) and clans with low status in the community. One problem of the IDPs is that the major clans will not sell land to 'outsiders'/members of other clans. IDPs therefore only have access to rented land." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

Jiddu sub-clan claim to own all land in Qoroley:

"Fighting between different clans with rival claims to land has left at least 10 dead and 15 injured in Yoroley, 75 km south of the Somali capital Mogadishu, the Associated Press agency (AP) reported on Monday [23 October 2000]. The fighting, which began on Sunday and continued sporadically Monday, pitted members of the Jiddu sub-clan, which claims to own all the land around Qoroley, and farmers from other clans who it claims have occupied its land, the report said. 'The Jiddu clan fighters have started displacing all of the other farmers, by either setting their animals to graze in the others' farms or just destroying them,' AP quoted a traditional elder Abdullahi Khalif Kobleh as saying. So far, six members of the Jiddu and four from other clans had been killed." (IRIN-CEA 24 October 2000, "Ten reported dead in Qoroley land struggle")

Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities forced off lands:

"During the civil war, the Bantu population has been systematically pushed off their land towards the river by militias or bandits. They are now so close to the river that they face a real risk of their settlements being washed away during floods.

[...]

The Rahanweyn minority lives on fertile agricultural land and is more advanced in agriculture. It too has been subjected to dispossession and displacement." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 77-80)

"Bantus continue to be forced off their land, their property continues to be looted and their villages destroyed." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 17)

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General

International agencies promote durable return and reintegration where possible (2000-2001)

- Security conditions in north of Somalia conducive to return
- UNHCR, UNDP and IOM involved in return and reintegration of IDPs
- Initiatives aim to minimize disparities between displaced and host communities

"UNHCR and UNDP's joint efforts in Somalia are part of the Regional Programme for Refugee reintegration recognising the need to promote integrated and comprehensive development to returnees and resident populations alike, in areas of return as well as former host communities. The comprehensive and lasting reintegration and rehabilitation of returnees and IDPs cannot be sustained without rebuilding the productive capacities of the affected areas.

UN agencies and NGO have extensive programmes and projects in areas where return and reintegration are targeted. The challenge for international actors is to give greater attention to the inter-relationship between on-going efforts and to improve their combined impact. The overall goal for Somalia is to reinforce on-going rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation processes by supporting populations affected by the past conflict and living in extreme poverty. Hence, SACB partners must address return and reintegration across the various sectors described above. Technical assistance and social mobilisation to promote realisation of human rights, gender equity and eradication of all forms of discrimination in Somalia are issues of paramount concern in the design of such aid programmes." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"UNHCR promotes sustainable reintegration by providing multi-sectoral assistance to sedentary, agro-pastoral and nomadic pastoral returnees and local communities including IDPs and demobilized militia. The aim is to foster the returnees and local communities alike in food self-sufficiency, sustainable income generation and employment opportunities in a secure environment.

"IOM is undertaking preliminary studies with agency partners to develop a programme for return and resettlement of IDPs. IOM is planning large-scale activities to ensure an effective plan for movement and reintegrating of displaced populations into places of origin. This action plan will include pre-departure assistance, medical screening and profiling. On arrival, inputs such as income generation projects and agricultural implements will be provided. UNICEF will continue to provide resettlement kits to returning IDPs in Somalia." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper, pp. 11-12)

"Prevailing security conditions in many regions – particularly the northeast and northwest of Somalia – have prepared the way for the return of refugees and displaced populations. . . .

UN Agencies recognise the limited absorption capacity of many war-affected communities. While further returns will be facilitated, the agencies have provided material support to displaced populations as well as urban planning support to local authorities to increase the potential and durability of reintegration. UNHCR has implemented reintegration projects in the key sectors of water, health, education, crop production, livestock, income generation and community services to provide basic facilities and services so as to stabilise the returning populations. The basic strategy adopted for this sector has remained the same, although the planned number of interventions has had to be scaled back. UNHCR is currently experiencing a serious global funding crisis and responses to the appeal have not been as good as anticipated. This has effectively resulted in a significant 20% reduction in the number of interventions to be undertaken.

[...]

This year, UNHCR and UNDP have commenced a joint initiative aimed at a region-wide strategy of repatriating and resettling refugee populations throughout the Horn of Africa in collaboration with host administrations and NGO partners. Past experiences have demonstrated that success in reintegrating returning refugees and displaced persons is best achieved where all resident populations stand to gain equally from the interventions supporting repatriation. In this regard, the joint UNHCR-UNDP initiative will endeavour to minimise cross-border disparities between refugee, displaced and host communities in Somalia and Ethiopia to stop 'revolving door' movements across border." (UN 17 July 2000, sect. 5)

Displacement and return are occurring simultaneously as populations move to access resources (1998-1999)

- Refugees and IDPs apparently have returned to their homes with improved security conditions in many parts of the country
- Families move repeatedly to access relief aid
- Large part of the population is nomadic, moving away from homes and back again with seasons

"As security conditions continued to improve in many parts of the country, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned to their homes..." (USDOS February 2001, Freedom of Movement)

"Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route – even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority [of IDPs] said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little

cash by providing 'carrying services' to people in the market – earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

"The character of Somalia's displaced people is complicated by several factors. Since the civil war, virtually everyone has either had to leave the country or has been permanently displaced following fighting. A large part of the population is nomadic, and so has no fixed residence. The war has taught Somalis how to be resourceful and, therefore, they can easily 'displace' themselves if there is an opportunity to gain something by it through relief channels. These factors make it almost impossible to put a fixed number on IDPs within Somalia at any one time." (Redding and Hansen 1998, pp. 82-83)

Return in Somalia is threatened by landmines (1999)

- "Somaliland" is particularly risky area
- Populations wish to return to their communities of origin once mines are removed

"Somalia, including Somaliland, is one of the most mined countries in Africa. The independent expert is pleased that work to de-mine Somaliland is finally under way, with the support of UNDP and its Somali Civic Protection Programme. So far, up to 500 mixed anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, unexploded ordinances (UXO), artillery shells and bullets have reportedly been collected. The work is being carried out by 63 local people, trained by UNDP for the National De-Mining Agency, which was established in 1996.

Hargeisa was de-mined, although not fully, in 1993. Work on de-mining the town of Burao, mined in 1995 during the civil war, started in July 1998. De-mining resolves some of the problems of displacement. It has been noted that as soon as an area is de-mined the population return to their former places of living. Although the government has recently passed a law committing itself to destroying the mines that are being collected, this is still not carried out." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 112-113)

Refugees and displaced persons have had little reason to return in the past (1998)

- No social services or infrastructure in communities of origin
- Poor security is impediment to return and reintegration

"It is unlikely that the Somali diaspora can be attracted to return to a country where mere survival is often the main priority, development beyond aspiration and where social services and economic and administrative infrastructure have collapsed. Effectively addressing these gaps in services is crucial to the reintegration of the absolute poor, including returning refugees, IDPs and the poorest sectors of the urban and rural populations, who live on the brink of disaster.

[...]

Until security issues are addressed, recovery or progress towards it through reintegration, will remain under threat. Insecurity is a key component of recurrent emergencies in Somalia and one that needs to be taken into account in order to find viable and enduring solutions. Rehabilitation and reintegration interventions have significant potential to reduce insecurity. In particular, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-militia during rehabilitation phases contribute to overall security in a region. Settling the militia has been a pre-requisite for lasting peace and security in current zones of recovery and transition." (UN December 1998, p. 10)

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

Abduction of international staff members in Mogadishu reveals level of continued insecurity in the capital (March 2001)

- Nine aid workers abducted in Mogadishu during inter-factional fighting on 27 March 2001
- Two of the aid workers were held until 4 April 2001

Nine humanitarian aid workers abducted on 27 March 2001 in Mogadishu:

"Nine humanitarian aid workers were abducted in Mogadishu on 27 March 2001 after gunmen loyal to Musa Sudi Yalahow, a faction leader whose militias control part of Somalia's capital, attacked the compound of the international aid agency Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) – Spain in northern Mogadishu. The aid workers included three expatriate staff of the international aid agency MSF and six Nairobi-based UN staff who were in Mogadishu on a three-day visit to assess ongoing polio and cholera projects.

In heavy fighting that ensued between militia members loyal to Musa Yalahow and troops supporting Somalia's new Transitional National Government (TNG), an unconfirmed number of people, including possibly over a dozen civilian bystanders, are reported to have been killed and an unknown number of persons wounded.

Although five of the hostages were released and handed over to the TNG early this morning [28 March 2001] after negotiations between a local politician and militia members, four UN staff are still held captive at two separate locations in northern Mogadishu. A spokesman of Musa Yalahow has been quoted as saying that the hostages had been taken to show the international community that Mogadishu was still not safe.

[...]

The security situation in Somalia, and particularly Mogadishu, has deteriorated in recent weeks and several armed clashes between different militias, as well as between militia members and a newly established TNG police force have left at least 20 people dead, many of them civilians. In an attack on the provisional headquarters of the TNG in Mogadishu, three people were killed on 22 March 2001 and several others injured." (AI 28 March 2001)

Two of the hostages were held until 4 April 2001:

"The two UN hostages held in Mogadishu, who were released on Wednesday [4 April 2001] by their captors, arrived in Nairobi, Kenya at 1625 local time. A UN press statement said Roger Carter and Bill Condie of the UN security office were transferred to Jazira airstrip, where they were picked up by a UN plane. Jazira is an airstrip southwest

of Mogadishu, jointly controlled by faction leaders Usman Ato and Muse Sudi Yalahow. The two were kidnapped on 27 March by militia loyal to faction leader Muse Sudi. The released hostages arrived in good health, and were met by a physician and a psychologist, the UN said." (IRIN-CEA 6 April 2001, Somalia: Released UN hostages)

New government is hoped to improve security and humanitarian access (2000)

- Security situation is new president's biggest challenge and main priority
- Opposition to new government is generating new forms of instability in the country
- Mogadishu business community currently providing 300,000 USD per month toward establishment of security force
- UN Humanitarian Coordinator believes new president will push humanitarian agenda

"In Somalia, the Transitional National Assembly and the new Government have stated their determination to address the chronic insecurity prevailing in the South and other areas of Somalia. Opposition to the establishment of a new Government is generating new forms of instability with potential regional dimension that may pose a security concern for the humanitarian community." (UN 2001, p. 13)

"The biggest hurdle is the security situation, particularly in Mogadishu - which the new government decided was nevertheless secure enough to move to. Although the security situation has improved considerably over the last two years, businessmen and international humanitarian staff still rely on protection from militia, and an absence of law and order means fire fights between gunmen and clans can break out without restraint. Talking to reporters after his arrival, Abdiqasim said the security situation would be his priority.

Over the last one month the new government has been encamping militia in three designated camps in Mogadishu. So far, the militia has been encamped on a clan basis, with exception of the Islamic court militias. This has attracted criticism that the new government is providing for its support base rather than dealing with the militia allied to the faction leaders and other clans. Head of the National Commission for Security, General Muhammad Nur Galal said this was a temporary measure and an early means of organising the demobilisation effort. He said all the militia would eventually be integrated into new security force.

Somali political sources pointed out that, in order to succeed, the government must have a cohesive cross clan force that answers only to a centralised authority, and not to their respective clans. Presently, the militia and their 'technicals' - jeeps mounted with heavy weaponry - belong to the clan. "We have to break the link between the security forces and the clans" said a businessman. Previously, faction leaders proved unable to break the clan's grip on the militias and their weapons. They depended on clan allegiance to utilise gun men they were otherwise unable to pay or equip.

As a central authority, the interim government now faces the challenge of finding the means to pay its nascent security force - and also equip it. The Mogadishu business community, tired of large overhead costs on security, have so far pitched in to the tune of \$300,000 a month toward the establishment of a security force for Mogadishu. 'How long can they sustain this?' a Mogadishu resident posed.

Local and international expectations will focus on the ability of the new government to get a grip on Mogadishu. During the Djibouti peace process, when clan representatives negotiated power, the Hawiye, who control the capital, were given the presidency in recognition that it was the only way to reestablish peace and security in Mogadishu - after a decade of competing Hawiye sub-clans laying waste to the city. 'The Hawiye created this mess, they have to sort it out', one of the clan representatives said during the peace talks.' (IRIN-CEA 16 October 2000, "Security")

In an interview with Randolph Kent, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, the following question was asked and answered:

"QUESTION: What difference does the election of a Somali president and a transitional national assembly make to the humanitarian community?

ANSWER: I think it makes a tremendous difference on at least three levels. In the first instance we are assuming that, with a government that is seemingly increasingly recognized by the people of Somalia, we will have a partner to push the humanitarian agenda and so be able to bring food to people in all the affected areas. We will have partnership to pursue humanitarian access. I think it is also going to be very important to have a government built upon a concern for the people; no longer will we have to deal with separate groups, who had up to now been antagonistic. Now we can work with a government that I believe represents the people. Of course, we will have to remember that the government – like ourselves – will still have to deal with security. [We need] the assurance that humanitarian workers not only have access but are themselves safe in providing assistance. I also think that we now have an interlocutor who understands its obligations with regard to the Geneva Convention, humanitarian access, humanitarian assistance and the rights of the Somali people." (IRIN-CEA 4 September 2000, paras. 2-3)

Poor access remained major impediment to implementation of humanitarian programming (1999-2000)

- Large areas of Somalia are off-limits to aid organisations
- Various agencies granted permission to work in northern Somaliland and Puntland
- Mogadishu, Lower and Middle Juba, parts of Gedo and Lower Shabelle are not accessible
- UN seeks to move more coordination, decision-making and security responsibilities to the field from Nairobi

"Numerous international organizations operated in the country during the year [2000], including the Red Cross, CARE, the Halo Trust, Save the Children, and various other demining agencies. The Somaliland and Puntland administrations permitted visits by U.N. human rights representatives during the year. Sporadic security problems complicated the work of some local and international organizations, especially in the South. There were reported incidents of harassment against NGOs, including attacks on aid convoys and airplanes, which disrupted food distribution and U.N. flights into and out of the country (see Sections 1.b.and 1.c.). A number of humanitarian workers were killed in such attacks and one NGO suspended its programs as a result (see Section 1.a.)." (USDOS February 2001, Governmental Attitude Regarding International...)

"Somalia remains one of the most difficult operating environments in the world. All UN Agencies have a permanent presence in Somalia but international aid agencies since 1995 have been based in Kenya, and as with all cross-border operations, the provision of assistance is extremely expensive and arduous. With such an operation there are a number of over-arching constraints including:

restricted and unpredictable access due to insecurity;
elongated logistical lines and expensive support systems;
lack of presence in much of southern and central Somalia of international partners;
limited or late funding curtailing prevention and longer-term activities;
community expectations and needs heavily outweigh capacity of many agencies." (UN November 2000, p. 7)

"Large areas of Somalia remain off-limits for regular aid programmes due to insecurity (in particular, for all aid agencies – most of Lower and Middle Juba, and for the UN – Mogadishu). The number of aid agencies present in Somalia's emergency areas decreased remarkably since the departure of UNOSOM in 1995. Until recently, most agencies located staff with policy – and decision-making responsibilities to Nairobi. At times, this has prevented adequate, coordinated responses to emergencies. Further, it has reduced the capacity of the aid community to assess the causes of vulnerability – particularly continuing high malnutrition rates – and design strategic interventions."(UN 17 July 2000, "Executive Summary")

"At times Somalia is one of the most dangerous operational areas on the planet: in the last twelve months, six aid workers from the UN and NGOs have been killed. In the last two years, eleven NGOs have ceased to operate in certain areas of southern Somalia. In the last six months, ten NGOs have withdrawn or been forced to evacuate. UN Agencies do not currently operate in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Middle Juba, and parts of Gedo." (UN November 1999, p. 16)

"The food supply situation in southern Somalia gives cause for serious concern following an upsurge in inter-clan fighting which has disrupted food production activities and assistance to civil war and drought victims. Mounting civilian casualties, destruction of property, a large-scale population displacement and a number of starvation-related deaths have been reported. The food crisis has been exacerbated by the extension of roadblocks

and obstruction of aircraft runways that are hindering the movement of goods and food commodities, including food aid. Latest reports indicate that nearly 1.6 million people in Mogadishu, Lower and Middle Juba, parts of Gedo and Lower Shabelle are not accessible to humanitarian agencies. The escalation of violence against humanitarian workers has further reduced the flow and distribution of humanitarian assistance." (FAO-GIEWS 4 November 1999)

However, new UN Principles of Engagement may lead to more 'progressive engagement':

"UN agencies are now moving more coordination, decision making and security responsibilities to the field as part of plans for 'progressive engagement' with Somali communities, in line with the UN Principles of Engagement agreed by all UN Agencies in November 1999. First, this will greatly enhance efforts to monitor the evolving humanitarian situation more closely, gain greater access to vulnerable populations, and prevent future security incidents by strengthening inter-agency communication and community liaison. To this end, inter-agency security will be strengthened." (UN 17 July 2000, "Executive Summary")

See also Security and Access map [\[Internal link\]](#) as well as UN Agencies and Main International NGOs map [\[Internal link\]](#) .

Aid workers have continually been targeted by clan factions (1998-2000)

- Killings and kidnappings of aid workers are commonplace
- More than 10 persons died in attacks on relief agency vehicles in 1999
- Many agencies have withdrawn or been forced to evacuate areas of Somalia

2000:

"As in previous years, the relatively small number of humanitarian aid organizations attempting to operate amid Somalia's chaos came under fire. A local CARE employee was killed in January [2000] several miles north of Mogadishu. In February, a 15-truck aid convoy encountered an ambush and landmines that killed 20 local aid workers, guards, and attackers. In May and June, two international aid groups suspended operations in northeast Somalia's Puntland area, in response to death threats and an attempted grenade attack against one of the agencies.

In June, humanitarian organizations suspended relief flights to the town of Merca, 50 miles south of the capital, after a relief plane was hit by bullets. In July, assailants kidnapped two expatriate aid workers. Negotiations for their release continued at the end of July." (USCR, 28 August 2000, paras. 5-6)

1999:

"There was a pattern of killings of local and international staff working for humanitarian aid and relief agencies. More than 10 people died in attacks on relief agency vehicles and a number of aid workers were targeted and killed.

*In September Dr. Ayub Yarrow Abdiyow, a Somali doctor working for UNICEF, was killed by gunmen who ambushed his car between Afgoi and Jowhar town.

*Deena Umbarger, a US national consultant for the Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), was shot and killed on March 20 as she was taking tea with town elders, allegedly by the militia *al Itihad*. (AI 2000, "Killing of aid workers")

1998:

"At times Somalia is one of the most dangerous operational areas on the planet: in the last twelve months, six aid workers from the UN and NGOs have been killed. In the last two years, eleven NGOs have ceased to operate in certain areas of southern Somalia. In the last six months, ten NGOs have withdrawn or been forced to evacuate. UN Agencies do not currently operate in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Middle Juba, and parts of Gedo." (UN November 1999, p.16)

"There were many incidents of hostage-taking [during 1998]. Ten International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff in Mogadishu were kidnapped in April by gunmen who threatened to kill them. The kidnapping, ostensibly for ransom, seemed to have a political motivation too, and some connection to clan militias. All 10 hostages were released unharmed after two weeks. A Somaliland opposition leader, Suleiman Mohamed Aden (also known as "Gal"), was kidnapped by gunmen in May in an inter-clan dispute and held for two weeks. There were attacks on UN staff and workers for non-governmental organizations (NGOs); some were killed, others were abducted for short periods. In October a new Islamic court in south Mogadishu sentenced six gunmen to one-year prison terms for kidnapping an Italian nun. In general, there was no rule of law or consistent application of justice in most parts of the collapsed state." (AI 1999, p. 303)

International presence in Mogadishu on a visiting basis only in 1999 and 2000)

- ACF is only international NGO in Mogadishu
- Poor security has chased rest of international aid community out of capital
- Most international organisations work out of Nairobi
- Without permanent presence, information is scarce

"ACF is the only international NGO in Mogadishu with a permanent presence in both north and south Mogadishu." (UN Sub-Committee on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 31)

"The vulnerability of Somalia is exacerbated by the pull-out of most international humanitarian organisations, leaving Mogadishu very isolated. The threat to aid workers in Mogadishu was such that aid moved out of the capital and almost exclusively into the

regions - particularly Somaliland, Puntland, and areas of southern Somalia - with expatriate presence in Mogadishu on a visiting basis only. In Mogadishu, since the pull-out of the humanitarian and military operation, expatriate staff are, in many ways, seen as a "commodity" or a "resource". Hostage-taking has sometimes resulted in huge pay-outs by local businessmen. Likewise, aid programmes are seen far more as an economic opportunity than a humanitarian effort - in terms of employment, finances and equipment. Not only an economic asset, the expatriate aid worker is also a political target, with resentment over the international military and humanitarian effort still a factor.

International organisations have therefore headquartered themselves in Nairobi and operate 'in absentia' through a skeleton local staff, which results in large proportions of available funding being used for logistics and salaries - and has increased feelings of resentment. One consequence of this is that Mogadishu has become one of the most isolated capitals in the world. Apart from the strictly controlled aid flights, no commercial flights as such operate from the capital - chartered small aircraft from Nairobi, carrying the stimulant plant qat, take only one or two passengers at a time. Information is therefore very scarce, and dependent on the security perspective of humanitarian agencies based in Nairobi - which try to act in concert over threats, kidnappings and killings in order to protect staff and programmes. This extreme isolation of Mogadishu and lack of information in itself inhibits development.

[...]

Western humanitarian organizations maintaining a rudimentary presence in Mogadishu are ICRC, MSF Spain, Action Internationale contre la Faim, Peace and Life (Sweden), and Daily Bread from Germany. United Nations offices include representatives from UNDP, FAO, UNHCR, WFP and WHO. These humanitarian agencies presently have no permanent expatriate presence and depend on a skeleton structure of local staff. Some local Somali humanitarian organizations have made efforts to work in the camps, but lack funding. For example, the Somali Refugee Agency SORA, founded in December 1998, has mapped out the camps and compiled lists of families, adults and children, as well as the main health and sanitation problems." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

Different operating environments and levels of aid access in Somalia (1999)

- Northern Somalia considered relatively stable and accessible
- Southern Somalia volatile, dangerous and inaccessible
- Most assistance to the south comes from across the border in Kenya

"The geography of access in Somalia: Aid agencies divide Somalia into two main operational areas: the north and southern and central Somalia – stretching from the 'green line' in Galkayo, Mudug region, southwards. This accounts for the two very different levels of access and operating environments in the two areas: one relatively stable and accessible; the other volatile, and at times dangerous and inaccessible.

In the North, operations have been relatively decentralised since the departure of UNOSOM in 1995. The main centres for aid agencies supporting the local authorities in the north are Hargeisa and Bossaso.

In the South, aid agencies have conducted a cross-border operation from Kenya since 1995. Some UN Agencies, particularly UNICEF, and some NGOs do have project offices in southern and central Somalia, but international presence is slowly diminishing.

Problem: Most assistance to the south, in terms of material supplies and personnel, comes from across the border in Kenya. The result is an expensive and logistically complex cross-border operation, which is always susceptible to political, security and climatic change.

Sea and Land Routes: The main material supply line is from Mombasa (Kenya) to the Somali open ports of Marka and Brava. Supplies are then taken by Somali sub-contractors and delivered to areas of need. Other routes used are by land across the Kenya border, usually through Mandera, into Somalia. All sea routes to Somalia are off-limits from July to September due to the monsoon season. Access to the ports in Somalia is contingent upon the prevailing security in those areas. Land access across the Kenyan border has been affected by the recent closure of the border, in August 1999, by the Kenyan Government, due to reports of smuggling and arm flows. Although it has been stated that this policy should not restrict humanitarian agencies, reports suggest that agencies are finding this a restraint upon movements from Kenya into regions, such as Gedo. Land access within Somalia is restricted during the rainy season, which can make roads impassable.

Air Routes: The UN, ICRC and the Economic Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) operate flights into Somalia based from Nairobi. These are mostly used for flying in personnel, but also for shipping supplies (such as medicine and vaccines). Air-dropping or air-lifting of food has not been used since the UNOSOM era, except during the 1997 flood emergency. For the UN Common Air Service (UNCAS), the centres of operation are Nairobi, Mandera in Kenya, Marka and Hargeisa in Somalia. The border closure by the Kenyan Government initially affected humanitarian flights, but subsequent arrangements have been made between the Kenyan Government, the UN and SACB establishing modalities for flight access to Somalia.

The greatest challenge to aid agencies accessing vulnerable populations, both in terms of reaching a destination and delivering assistance, is the level of insecurity. Too frequently, inter-factional conflict results in aid agencies not being able to reach vulnerable populations and to withdraw from areas in the south. At this time, there are four major areas where there is little international presence: Kismayo and Lower Juba, Middle Juba, parts of Gedo, and Mogadishu. It is estimated that these areas have a population of about 1.6 million. Nearly one quarter of the Somali population is inaccessible to aid agencies. It should be noted that in certain areas, aid agencies operate with different security guidelines to the UN. Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) Spain, operate servicing in particularly difficult environments such as Mogadishu." (UN November 1999, pp. 15-16)

Humanitarian principles not respected (1998-2000)

- Militias/bandits have little respect for humanitarian principles
- Somali aid workers can be pressured by members of their clan for the allocation of goods

"None of the factions respected the principles of international humanitarian law, which regulate the conduct of armed conflict and protect civilians. The International Committee of the Red Cross distributed copies of the Geneva Conventions among clan militias, but unarmed civilians continued to be killed indiscriminately. Civilians were neither warned nor evacuated before areas were attacked, and were not spared in the fighting. In fighting in the south, factions did not differentiate between combatants, civilians and wounded soldiers." (AI 2000, "Protection of civilians in conflict")

"Effective assistance in zones [of crisis] has proven to be particularly difficult and costly. Humanitarian aid workers are at high risk in trying to bring resources to the most vulnerable groups. Militias or bandits have little respect for humanitarian principles, rendering anyone who has relatively unprotected resources to be vulnerable to kidnappings, or theft of property, and endless haggling or even threats over how aid resources are to be allocated at the local level.

[...]

At times, self-interest groups take the attitude that if they do not obtain what they consider to be their rightful allocation of aid goods, they may take retribution against the humanitarian workers, or against competitors for aid goods. In zones of crisis, where governance is weak, the strength of clan affiliations makes it unwise to leave such allocations exclusively in the hands of Somali UN staff. Frequently some of their own clan members will not comprehend why all UN resources are not given entirely to his or her own clan. Therefore, with few exceptions, it is imperative that international UN staff take responsibility for such allocation and for monitoring. The unrestricted and safe access of all staff, including expatriates, to any operational area is therefore a determining factor as to whether or not international assistance can be delivered." (UN December 1998, p. 5)

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National response

The Somali Red Crescent has provided medical aid to the drought-affected (2000)

"Although it faces difficulties in maintaining effective leadership and lacks secure resources, the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) is still the only indigenous nationwide humanitarian institution in Somalia. It provides health care for vulnerable groups as well as activities in the field of disaster preparedness and relief. The SRCS has paid special attention to the promotion of fundamental principles and humanitarian values, disaster preparedness and disaster response, and health and care in the community. It has also tried to improve the capacity and performance of its branches despite the difficulties of operating in a fragmented society with no central administration. Core activities have included first aid training and tracing services for people dispersed by the conflict.

[...]

With the support of the Federation, the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) has managed to survive during the civil war and maintain operations in favour of vulnerable groups where all other formal structures and services have collapsed. To respond to the humanitarian needs and to continue providing the required support to SRCS, the Federation formulated a strategy intended to support SRCS efforts by focusing programme activities primarily on the health sector, and more specifically: providing essential health services through the SRCS Integrated Health Care programme; supporting the Garoe Community Hospital; improving the institutional development of the National Society; introducing a community based first aid programme in some regions of the country; and improving the emergency response capacity at branch level. Federation activities will be coordinated with the ICRC which is the lead agency in Somalia, as well as with the United Nations agencies." (IFRC 18 October 2000, paras. 1 and 3)

Islamic organizations have provided assistance in Mogadishu displaced persons' camps (1999)

"In the IDP camps, Islamic organizations provide some assistance to the displaced, but mainly during Muslim festivals. Some 20 or 30 head of sheep are delivered to each camp for the Eid festival. Otherwise, Islamic organizations are concentrating on orphanages, funding Koranic schools, or injecting money into business ventures. The main Islamic organizations operating in Mogadishu are the International Islamic Relief Organization; Al Haramayn; Al-Islah Charity; Monazamat Al-da'wa; African Muslim Agency and Muslim Aid UK." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

In the absence of a central government, Islamic (Shari'a) courts have been established in various parts of the country (1998)

- A combination of traditional and customary law, Islamic Shari'a law and the pre-1991 Penal Code is applied in most regions

In the absence of a normal government authority, Islamic (*Shari'a*) courts continued to operate in various parts of the country: traditionally ruling in cases of civil and family law, they have extended their scope to criminal proceedings in some regions since 1994. (US DOS 26 February 1999) In September 1998, the new governor of the Benadir administration (Mogadishu and environs) urged the *ulemas* (Islamic leaders) to uphold the application of *Shari'a* law for the new administration. He also stated that Islamic tribunals would be installed in the different administrative regions of Benadir. (La Lettre de l'Océan Indien 26 September 1998) In November 1998, the self-declared Republic of Somaliland also indicated the forthcoming institution of *Shari'a* law, under which there would be separate classrooms for boys and girls, separate hospital care for men and women, and women would be required to wear traditional Islamic attire. (AFP 27 November 1998)

"The judiciary in most regions relies on some combination of traditional and customary law, Islamic Shari'a law, the penal code of the pre-1991 Siad Barre government, or some combination of the three. For example, in Bosasso and Afmedow, criminals are turned over to the families of their victims, [who] then exact blood compensation in keeping with Somali tradition.

[...]

In Bardera (Gedo region), the courts apply a blend of Islamic *Shari'a* law and the former penal code, whereas in areas where *Shari'a* law is particularly entrenched such as north Mogadishu, a part of south Mogadishu, the Middle Shabelle and parts of the Gedo and Hiran regions, harsh punishments are meted out for some offenses, including public whippings, amputations and stoning. According to some Somali human rights organizations, "proceedings in the north Mogadishu *Shari'a* court often contravene the norms of *Shari'a* law." (US DOS 26 February 1999)

International planning for 2001

IDP-related activities included in 2001 Consolidated Appeal for Somalia (selected)

The total funding requested for Somalia in 2001 is USD 129, 555, 919.

The table below only includes selected activities in the 2001 Appeal that may have a direct impact on IDPs. Several activities in the Appeal that are not included below are likely to benefit IDPs indirectly, and it is recommended to consult the [2001 Appeal document](#) if more detailed information is needed.

| Appealing Agency/Activity | Appeal Requirements |
|---|--|
| UNICEF: Nutritional supplementation | USD 1,475,000 |
| WHO: Control of Priority Communicable Diseases | USD 1,333,500 |
| UNICEF: Support to Children in Need of Special Protection | USD 520,000 |
| ILO: Economic Recovery, Employment Creation and Support to Decentralisation | USD 12,000,000 (for phase one) |
| UNDP/FAO: Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons | USD 20,018,260 - UNDP USD 180,000 - FAO |

(UN March 2001)

IOM is also requesting USD 5 million for the resettlement of internally displaced communities (UN November 2000, p. 12)

International agencies will support reintegration projects with an inter-sectoral strategy (2000-2001)

- UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR and UNOPS will support water access, health provision, education, crop production and livestock health
- Aim is to foster the returnees and local communities alike in food self-sufficiency and sustainable income generation
- IOM is requesting US\$5 million for resettlement of internally displaced communities

"Past experiences have demonstrated that success in reintegrating returning refugees and displaced persons is best achieved where all resident populations stand to gain equally from the interventions supporting repatriation. In a joint initiative, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR and UNOPS will support reintegration projects with an inter-sectoral strategy to support water access, health provision, education, crop production, livestock health and income generation that will stabilise the livelihoods of returning populations." (UNRC 31 December 2000, sect. Three, 2)

"UNHCR promotes sustainable reintegration by providing multi-sectoral assistance to sedentary, agro-pastoral and nomadic pastoral returnees and local communities including IDPs and demobilized militia. The aim is to foster the returnees and local communities alike in food self-sufficiency, sustainable income generation and employment opportunities in a secure environment.

"IOM is undertaking preliminary studies with agency partners to develop a programme for return and resettlement of IDPs. IOM is planning large-scale activities to ensure an effective plan for movement and reintegrating of displaced populations into places of origin. This action plan will include pre-departure assistance, medical screening and profiling. On arrival, inputs such as income generation projects and agricultural implements will be provided. UNICEF will continue to provide resettlement kits to returning IDPs in Somalia.

[...]

IOM is requesting US\$ 5 million for resettlement of displaced communities." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper, pp. 11-12)

WFP will reorient its programme towards rehabilitation through food for work (November 2000)

- WFP will continue to implement its PRRO through June 2002
- WFP seeks some 16,000 MTs to meet food needs in Somalia in 2001
- Programming will move towards rehabilitation through food for work programmes

"WFP implements a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) which began on 1 July 1999 and extends for a three-year duration to 30 June 2002. The programme provides a broad framework for integrated rehabilitation, while maintaining flexibility to both grasp development opportunities and respond to emergency requirements. Based on the annual projection of requirements reflected in PRRO 6073, and taking into consideration projected carry over stocks, WFP is seeking some 16,000 MTs to meet food needs in Somalia during 2001.

Given the improved food security situation, WFP will continue to re-orient its programme towards rehabilitation through food for work, while at the same time retaining a readiness to respond to emergency situations in locations and at periods during the year where this is considered necessary. In collaboration with UNICEF, projects for the provision of water through the rehabilitation of wells and water catchments, as well as assistance in the reestablishment/improvement of schools, will be given priority. WFP will also support small-scale horticultural programmes in collaboration with FAO and the International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), road rehabilitation and income generation, as well as the provision of shelter for the war displaced. A provision to support possible demobilisation efforts in southern Somalia has also been included in planning." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper, pp. 7-8)

International financing in 1999-2000

Only between 35 and 60% of UN Consolidated Appeal for Somalia was funded (December 2000)

- UN Resident Coordinator reported in December 2000 that the UN Consolidated Appeal only received donor commitments to cover 35% of proposed programming
- UN Secretary-General indicated in his December 2000 report that the Appeal had received funding to cover 60% of programming

"In developing strategies for transitional programming, it is important to recall that the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2000 has only received donor commitments to cover 35% of the programming designed for Somalia. Due to this lack of funding, the

United Nations remains severely hindered in responding to this positive turn of events [the establishment of an interim government]." (UNRC 31 December 2000, sect. Three, 1)

"In view of Somalia's long-standing conflict, economic collapse, lack of media coverage and donor fatigue, the response to previous appeals for humanitarian assistance has been limited. The consolidated appeal for 2000 to date has received contributions covering some 60 per cent of the requested funding. Mid- and long-term programmes needed to sustain and rehabilitate livelihoods remain poorly funded. The aid assistance required to act as a buffer against future emergencies, such as rehabilitation of water sources, repair of river embankments, education programmes, eradication of female genital mutilation, prevention of HIV/AIDS infection and protection of assets for pastoral communities, has not been forthcoming." (UNSC 19 December 2000, sect. IV)

Financing in 2000 went primarily to drought-affected populations

- Only 37.5% of 2000 Consolidated Appeal funding provided by June
- New emergency appeal for US\$378 million launched thereafter
- 2000 budget for ICRC is nearly 34 million Swiss francs
- US\$23.2 million provided by U.S. government in 2000

UN:

"As of 26 June [2000], only US\$19,054,190 or 37.5% of the funding requested in Consolidated Appeal (CA) 2000 has been provided by UN member-states.

[...]

With only limited funding provided by UN member states and the small number of non-governmental implementing agencies with whom to partner, responding to the complexity and fluidity of the emergency situation in Somalia has required the UN to adopt a flexible, but structured approach to emergency prevention, preparedness and response." (OCHA 17 July 2000, "Executive summary")

"United Nations relief agencies and partners launched an emergency appeal for US\$378 million to address the immediate needs of the 13.3 million people affected by the drought in the Horn of Africa. Besides, the interagency approach aims at supporting efforts to build local capacities to mitigate and prevent similar levels of distress in the future." (USAID/FEWS 30 August 2000, "Highlights")

"Under the coordination of FAO, the Seed Working Group of the SACB Food Security Sectoral Committee has appealed for seeds, particularly sorghum seeds for southern Somalia, at the beginning of the gu 2000. After intensive inter-agency discussions, the international donor and NGO communities have responded by providing about 830 MT of the FSAU estimated seed requirements of almost 1,500 MT in the most vulnerable area." (USAID/FEWS 30 August 2000, "Gu 2000 Seed Distribution")

"During the week, Canada announced an additional contribution of 13 million dollars in humanitarian assistance, for victims of drought and conflict in the Horn of Africa, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Somalia. A remarkable portion of this contribution, in all five countries, will be channeled for food aid through WFP. The European Union announced that they will be sending an additional 25,000 tonnes of cereals to Kenya, through WFP, to help ease a food shortage caused by the drought there." (WFP 21 September 2000, part c.

ICRC:

"The 2000 budget for ICRC [is] Somalia SFr 33,806,293." (ICRC 26 January 2000, "Budget and Staff")

Bilateral donors:

"The European Commission has cleared humanitarian aid for Afghanistan, Somalia, Angola and Sierra Leone totally euro 11 million. The funding made available through the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) makes up the Commission's contribution to the annual provision of humanitarian food aid to the victims, mainly displaced people, of on-going conflicts in these countries. These programmes will be implemented by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This contribution to the ICRC's programmes includes emergency food aid and food security (for example, supply of seeds, fertiliser and equipment) support to war affected and displaced families. The needs addressed are multiple, ranging from basic survival to assistance in resettlement and the re-launch of economic activity." (ECHO 26 October 2000)

"Hong Kong has granted a donation of 3 million HK dollars (385,000 U.S. dollars) to the United Nation's Children's Fund for emergency relief to drought victims in eastern Africa. [including Somalia]" (Xinhua 21 July 2000, para. 1)

According to a USAID funding table, the U.S. government is providing \$15.2 million in food aid and \$8 million in non-food aid to Somalia in 2000. The total aid in the sum of \$23.2 million is targeted to assist a population of 1,200,000 persons. (USAID 1 August 2000, funding table)

"USAID/OFDA is also providing almost \$1.9 million in logistic support to humanitarian operations through a grant to UNICEF for air support and a grant to the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) to increase the capacity of the port in Bossaso and Berbera." (USAID 11 September 2000, "USAID/OFDA")

"The Board of Directors of the African Development Bank (ADB) approved a US\$4.5 million grant to the United Nations World Food Programme for drought-relief assistance in nine countries of the Greater Horn of Africa.

The funds will be used by WFP to purchase and transport emergency relief supplies to Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Tanzania, countries

affected by drought. WFP is implementing a US\$445-million operation for some 16 million people in the region." (ADB 16 August 2000, paras. 1-2)

1999 funding for Somalia focused on continuing emergency

- 60 percent of UN Consolidated Appeal money received
- Emergency appeal seeking \$9.6 million for drought is launched in March 1999

"[T]he Official Development Assistance to Somalia in 1999 was approximately US\$64 million, a decrease of about one-third from the estimate of about US\$90 million the previous year. Aid flows to Somalia are not well known nor easily quantified. The situation in Somalia, given that it has no central government and only fledging regional authorities in some areas, is that data on financial flows in general, and aid flows in particular, are sketchy.

[...]

[A]bout \$64 million was sought in the 1999 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, and about about \$43 million – 60 per cent – was received. . .An appeal for \$9.6 million in urgent funding in order to respond to the emergency [drought] was launched [in March 1999]." (UNRC 4 February 2000, sects. 1.3, 1.4)

"Generally, UN Agencies have received inadequate funding for the rehabilitation and early development work needed in Zones of Transition and Zones of Recovery. 1999 is not the first year that the UN has made it clear that early development assistance in Zones of Recovery should be seen by donors as excellent investments. Apparently a major reason for this reticence is that only a few donors have taken seriously the positive strategy of providing the relatively secure and peaceful areas with a 'peace dividend.' It may also be that some donors simply do not place much credence in the plans presented by the UN in its Appeal, and therefore seek other implementing partners, e.g. direct contracts or financing of multiple NGOs. Surely, however, a key reason is that for many donors, Somalia is viewed as a single emergency situation, not as three kinds of zones; the internal rules and procedures of the donor may therefore only permit funding of emergency relief.

Indeed, and in contrast, donor contributions have been relatively generous for life-saving humanitarian relief operations in Zones of Crisis, in which a few UN and NGO agencies are the relief operational entities of choice. Many external observers, both individually and as a team, have noted the competence and consistently good performance of these relief agencies. Once the relief requirements have been clearly identified and a consensus has emerged between the UN, NGOs and SACB in general, the donors have by and large responded promptly and generously to emergency relief efforts." (UN July 1999, p.16)

1999-2000 international activities (selected)

Activities in 2000 aimed to improve food security, health and nutrition

- WFP focuses on food-for-work and supplementary feeding programmes in addition to general food distributions
- WFP and CARE food pipelines are considered adequate until year end
- ADRA, UNICEF, ACF, and Norwegian People's Aid conducting water and sanitation activities in south-central Somalia
- Some 2 million persons benefiting from the support of health facilities and provision of medical supplies

Food security:

"WFP also changed its strategic focus in Bay and Bakool regions towards food-for-work. Food-for-work programmes have now begun in both regions.

[...]

The first phase of the supplementary feeding programme to 18 IDP camps and 3 MCHs in Mogadishu was started in March [2000]." (WFP 31 May 2000, "South")

"WFP has recently reviewed its planned distribution level in Somalia for the coming six months in light of recent program experiences and anticipated needs levels. With a planned level of distribution of 2,000 MT per month, the pipeline is now considered adequate until year-end. . . . WFP is currently endeavouring to limit free food distribution especially in south Somalia and to concentrate instead on developing a viable Food For Work program together with other more targeted interventions such as support for MCH programs and education interventions of other agencies." (USAID/FEWS 30 August 2000, "WFP, CARE pipelines adequate")

"From January to May 1999, WFP distributed over 9,800 MTs of food commodities to 500,000 drought victims in Bay, Bakool and Gedo region. In addition, 21,000 households were assisted through FFW projects and institutional feeding in Middle Shabelle, Hiraan, Lower Shabelle, Garbahare of Gedo region, and north-west Somalia.

Given the socio-economic and political environment of the south, geographic targeting, community-based targeting, and institutional targeting were employed to reach needy households. Continued access to certain groups and areas, as well as the capacity of partners to undertake programming and targeting remained a constraint in some areas. An extensive network of field monitors proved essential in assessments, prioritisation and the design and implementation of interventions. Community-based programming and participation in all stages of implementation proved essential for successful implementation and outreach to remote areas.

A food voucher system was deployed for general food distributions to drought affected populations, through delivery and distribution points in the Bay and Bakool regions, with the involvement of local authorities and traditional leaders.

WFP Somalia commissioned a nutritional and market analysis study, with the participation of FSAU, Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) and UNICEF, to obtain further information on the impact and effects of emergency food aid interventions from November 1998 to June 1999." (UN July 1999, pp. 11-12)

"CARE plans to distribute 18,000 metric tons (MT) of food in calendar year 2000. WFP plans a level of distribution of 2,000 MT per month for the next five months. Both CARE's and WFP's food pipelines are adequate until year-end." (USAID 11 September 2000, "Food Aid")

With a planned monthly average distribution of 2,400 MT in southern Somalia, CARE's stocks and pipeline are healthy." (USAID/FEWS, 30 August 2000, "WFP, CARE pipelines adequate")

"[T]here are studies or evaluations being conducted by UN Agencies that illuminate the progress - or lack thereof - of UN projects in Somalia. A recent example is illustrative. WFP together with the FSAU and UNICEF has initiated an 'Impact Assessment of Emergency Food Distributions.' Teams of national staff have been engaged in close contact inquiries with local communities in order to assess the impact of food deliveries. Preliminary findings confirm that timely food assistance from November 1998 through April 1999 probably averted large-scale population movements and famine in the drought affected areas in Bay, Bakool and Gedo. In an environment of constant insecurity and recurrent warfare, WFP's contracting system with Somali transporters proved efficient and ensured that many of the most needy were reached at the village and sub-village level. Recurrent distributions of emergency food rations helped to stabilise market prices of basic food commodities, and probably contributed to affordable access for the poor. The study also observes that, in the absence of a legitimate government structure, the close working relationship with communities and District Management Groups was widely accepted and contributed to enhancing dialogue among rival factions. In general, WFP food assistance played a positive role in enhancing the coping mechanisms of a population that has been struggling with a series of man-made and natural disasters, since the floods of 1997/98." (UN July 1999, p. 18)

"WFP Somalia started implementing a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) in July 1999. The PRRO extends over a period of three years to July 2002 and requires 63 104 tonnes of food commodities, of which 52 708 tonnes are cereals, targeting 1.3 million vulnerable Somalis annually. The PRRO provides a broad framework for integrated rehabilitation programmes while maintaining flexibility to both grasp development opportunities and respond to emergency situations. The goal of the PRRO is to contribute to improved household food security and promote/strengthen local economies in Somalia through rehabilitation and recovery assistance, support to social institutions and emergency relief assistance." (FAO/GIEWS 3 September 1999)

Health and nutrition:

"Somalia: USAID will provide \$4.4 million in aid to Somalia, for projects to provide primary health care services and access to safe water, and to transport food and medicine. USAID also announced it would provide \$300,000 to improve the port of Berbera, which is a critical part of the region's infrastructure . Somalia has 1.2 million people at risk from the drought, and the U.S. government is responding by providing \$14.6 million in food aid." (USAID 31 May 2000)

"In FY 2000, USAID/OFDA has committed approximately \$8.4 million in emergency water, health, nutrition, and logistical support programs in response to the current drought and ongoing complex emergency in Somalia. Of this total, approximately 23% is targeted purely to drought response activities.

USAID/OFDA is supporting the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), UNICEF, ACF, and Norwegian People's Aid, at a total level of \$1.7 million, for water and sanitation activities in Benadir, Bakool, Bay, Togdheer, and Bari regions, including rehabilitation and cleaning of wells and boreholes, construction of pit latrines, protection of natural springs, and training and equipping water pump operators. These water and sanitation interventions are helping to provide clean water to more than 150,000 beneficiaries.

In the health and nutrition sector, USAID/OFDA is providing approximately \$4.3 million to support UNICEF, International Medical Corps (IMC), Aktion Africa Hilfe (AAH), and the U.N., Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) for immunization coverage, maternal and child health, training of health workers, provision of medical equipment and essential drugs, therapeutic and supplementary feeding programs, and nutritional surveillance. These activities are benefiting almost two million people throughout Somalia." (USAID 11 September 2000, "USAID/OFDA")

Action Contre la Faim continued work to assist displaced in Mogadishu (2000)

- ACF is one of only aid organizations working in north and south Mogadishu
- ACF programmes work to fight malnutrition and support clean water access

"Etant l'une des rares organisations humanitaires encore présentes à Mogadishu, tant au sud qu'au nord de la ville, Action contre la Faim intervient tant auprès des populations déplacées dans les camps qu'auprès des résidents, marqués par des années de guerre civile. Elle s'emploie maintenant à lutter contre la malnutrition de la population, notamment des déplacés vivants dans la capitale et a pour objectif de développer le réseau d'eau potable. De plus, et afin de répondre à la grave crise alimentaire dans le sud, Action contre la Faim a récemment ouvert un programme nutritionnel dans la ville de Luuq, région de Gedo. Enfin, et afin d'apporter un soutien logistique à ces deux bases, Action contre la Faim vient également d'installer une base arrière dans la ville de Merca." (ACF 2000, "Contexte")

UNICEF programmes benefited internally displaced persons (1999)

- Displaced children given special attention in vitamin supplementation and immunisation campaigns
- UNICEF has constructed water storage tanks and *berkeds* for displaced persons

"Much emphasis has been placed on providing Vitamin A supplementation and immunising young children in areas of crisis. In Bay and Bakool areas, over 120,000 children were reached between November 1998 and the end of May 1999. Special attention was given to children in IDP receiving areas. The same activities were carried out in north-eastern Somalia as part of the drought emergency response during March, April and May. A national immunisation day is planned for October 1999." (UN July 1999, p. 9)

"In its Water and Sanitation programme UNICEF has focused on drought mitigation since January 1999, when an acute lack of water became an important new element of the crisis. Wells and ponds, which normally provided water year-round, were drying up, due to the dramatic reduction in rainfall over the past six months. UNICEF continues to rehabilitate many water sources such as bore-holes and hand-dug wells to counter the problem. In addition to chlorinated water, trucking to 11 Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs) camps in Bardera (Gedo Region), UNICEF had between November 1998 and May 1999 built 11 concrete storage tanks and eight *berkeds* for 4,000 IDPs, mainly comprising women and children. UNICEF also supported the NGO ADRA to complete four bore wells in Hiraan Region benefiting 32,000 people and 2 bore-wells in Middle Shabelle serving 16,000 people. The Bossaso urban water supply project progressed and is expected to result later this year in a system of several standpipes." (UN July 1999, p. 10)

Interational coordination structure

UN takes new approach following Djibouti peace process (2000)

"The United Nations operating in Somalia on Tuesday [31 October 2000] launched 'First Steps: An Operational Plan to Support Governance and Peace-building in Somalia', outlining how they could help the emerging Transitional National Government, as well as the peaceful autonomous areas of 'Somaliland' and 'Puntland' in the north of the country. The UN was calling for almost US\$20 million in donor support to fund phase one of the plan, through to the end of this year, a UN press release stated. 'Now is the time for Somalia's international friends to support Somali's struggle for peace in real and tangible ways,' said UN resident Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator Randolph Kent." (IRIN-CEA 3 November 2000 "Somalia")

UN agencies also recently drafted the Framework for UN Engagement in Somalia. The Framework includes eight principles on more effective and sustainable intervention by the United Nations. (UNRC 4 February 2000, annex 7)

International community has been putting together a post-Djibouti planning process which it discussed during the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group Meeting of 14-15 September 2000 (OCHA 14-15 September 2000, minutes of meeting)

To see the Framework for UN Engagement in Somalia, see UN Resident Coordinator 4 February 2000 document [[Internet link](#)].

To see the UN Operation Plan, "First Steps", see UN Resident Coordinator 31 October 2000 document [[Internet link](#)].

The Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) (1998)

- The Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) establishes humanitarian ground rules

"Since 1993 aid assistance to Somalia has been influenced by a unique experiment aimed at consensual decision-making between donor community, UN Agencies and NGOs. After the Humanitarian Assistance Conference in December 1993, in Addis Ababa, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was established to undertake most of the tasks associated with aid coordination including information sharing, common planning and implementation. It consists of donors, the UN Country Team, the NGO Consortium, and The Red Cross Movement. The NGO Consortium is a voluntary association of the approximately 60 international NGOs working in Somalia. The Red Cross Movement includes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS).

Six years on, the SACB has become an important forum whereby the main aid constituencies in Nairobi share information within the various sectors and themes of emergency and developmental assistance. Over time the SACB has developed into a system of committees and working groups that facilitate the coordination of aid agencies. It comprises a policy level (Executive Committee) and an operational level (led by the Sectoral Steering Committee) and a public interface (the Consultative Committee)." (UNRC 4 February 2000, sect. 1.4.A.3)

The UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) and the UN Country Team (UNCT) (1998)

- The UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) is responsible for facilitating coordination among the UN Country Team (UNCT) in Nairobi and in operational areas

"The UN Country Team (UNCT) is comprised of 13 UN agencies, several large project teams, as well as a number of organizations with observer status. Each of these organizations has a responsibility for good management towards effective achievement of its individual mandate. In addition to their individual agency responsibilities for good

management, collectively the UNCT is responsible for good management in four main areas affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of interventions in Somalia" (UN December 1998, p. 19). These are (i) ensuring ongoing consensus on the priority problems, the strategies to address them, and the division of labour among UN agencies and their partners; (ii) strengthening of its 'area-base' approach through the necessary flexibility to take into account differing circumstances and attitudes in different parts of Somalia, as well as employing participatory approaches and emphasizing Somali leadership and responsibility; (iii) improving the monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian assistance and development activities, as a management tool, and (iv) continuing to seek ways to reduce and to share the high cost of operation in Somalia, such as the transport savings achieved through the UN Common Air Services.

[...]

Primary responsibility for IDPs rests with their governments. In the case of Somalia, where there is no central government, local authorities must in principle accept this responsibility, though in practice these entities are not yet sufficiently capable to provide IDPs much protection. The international community therefore must do its utmost to assist. Recently, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator was given the mandate to ensure the protection of and assistance to IDPs, and to coordinate implementation of the activities by UN Agencies and partners which are operational in Somalia.

[...]

The UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) is responsible for facilitating coordination among the UN Country Team in Nairobi and in operational areas. In Nairobi UNCU helps to assure representation of UNCT interests in various multi-agency forums, particularly the committees of the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB). In Somalia the UNCU is responsible for facilitating and, where appropriate, assisting operational UN agencies to coordinate among themselves in terms of common issues of policy, administration, logistics, security, planning and programme implementation. UNCU's main functions are: (i) secretariat support to the UN Country Team; (ii) support to UN humanitarian affairs in Somalia; (iii) human rights advocacy, and (iv) monitoring of and reporting on UN activities in Somalia." (UN December 1998, pp. 20, 53, 64)

The NGO Consortium (1998)

- The NGO Consortium is a voluntary association of international NGOs working in Somalia

This is "a voluntary association of virtually all the international NGOs working in Somalia, i.e. currently about 25 active agencies. The Consortium, with its seven-member Executive Committee, has three main aims: exchange of information of common interest and concern, including technical information and lessons learned; orientation of NGOs new to Somalia; and a 'cascade' system for rapidly notifying members of urgent matters. Consortium members meet in Nairobi and in Hargeisa every month. Its elected executives help to represent NGO interests in the various SACB committees." (UN December 1998, p. 63)

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|----------|--|
| AFP | Agence France Presse |
| CEDAW | Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women |
| DSA | Digil Salvation Army |
| EU | European Union |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation |
| FEWS | Famine Early Warning System |
| FFT | Food-For-Training |
| FFW | Food-For-Work |
| FSAU | Food Security Assessment Unit |
| HIV/AIDS | Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (AIDS) |
| ICAO | International Civil Aviation Organization |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| ICS | International Committee for Somali |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IGAD | Inter-governmental Authority on Development |
| MRR&R | Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction |
| MSF | Médecins Sans Frontières |
| MT | Metric Tonne |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OAU | Organization of Africa Unity |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OHCHR | Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| RRA | Rahanwein Resistance Army |
| SACB | Somalia Aid Coordination Body |
| SPM | Somali Patriotic Movement |
| SSNM | Southern Somali National Movement |
| UMCOR | United Methodist Committee on Relief |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNCHS | United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development |
| UNCU | United Nations Coordination Unit |
| UNDP EUE | United Nations Development Programme - Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia |
| UNESCO | United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNIFEM | United Nations Development Fund for Women |
| UNITAF | United Task Force |
| UNOPS | United Nations Office for Project Services |
| UNOSOM | United Nations Operation in Somalia |
| UNPOS | United Nations Political Office for Somalia |
| UNV | United Nations Volunteers |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Agency |
| VAW | Violence Against Women |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

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