

**SIERRA LEONE
PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS
14 MAY 2002**

**EUROPEAN UNION
ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION**

FINAL REPORT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 14 May 2002 Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone were the first since the end of the civil conflict, which claimed tens of thousands of lives and destroyed large parts of the country's infrastructure. The President officially declared the war over on 16 January 2002 and the State of Emergency was only lifted two months before Election Day. At the time of elections, some 17,500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers were deployed in the country and an estimated 400,000 people were still internally or externally displaced.

In this context, the organisation of elections naturally faced huge difficulties. These were partly caused by the limited time frame for preparation and the country's weak infrastructure, partly by the lack of experience and efficiency of the National Electoral Commission (NEC).

The registration process – both of the resident electorate and of the returnees – showed serious shortcomings in terms of logistics and organisation. Nevertheless, the majority of voters were able to register, i.e. 2.3 million voters out of an estimated 2.5 to 2.7 million eligible voters.

Electoral campaigning was carried out without fear or intimidation throughout the country, owing to a significantly improved security environment provided for by the local security forces, UNAMSIL and the British troops. Party officials and candidates could move freely all over the country, meet the public and organise rallies. Incidents of violence were limited and did not cause any casualties.

Opposition parties complained about the role of some Paramount Chiefs, who directly or indirectly exerted pressure in favour of the ruling party, the lack of co-operation of the NEC and the misuse of state assets by candidates of the ruling party.

The media – both the print and the electronic media – covered the elections extensively, with private papers showing different political tendencies. However, the state-run radio and television SLBS (Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service) gave disproportionate attention to the ruling party, despite provisions in the Electoral Laws Act that national radio and TV should allocate equal airtime to all the political parties.

Voting took place in a peaceful and transparent manner, with party agents and observers present in many places. However, there was initial chaos at some polling stations because of the late arrival of ballot papers and, the absence of erroneous voter lists. Also, a press release of the NEC, authorising people to vote even when their names were not on the voter register, created confusion, leading to lack of uniformity of polling procedures. In some districts, cases of under-age voting and double voting were observed. Serious fraud was discovered at one place in Koinadugu and dealt with by the authorities.

A lack of voter education became apparent on election day, slowing down the voting process at several places as a significant number of voters required information on voting procedures. This sometimes interfered with the secrecy of vote, as polling officials would go inside the polling booths to explain how to vote. In most places however, voting finished on time and counting could start immediately after the closure of the polling stations.

The collation of votes and counting took place in a transparent manner, though at some places there was a lack of polling personnel and the ballot boxes were not sealed. Not enough attention was given to the reconciliation of votes during the counting procedures, causing several problems in the tabulation process. The results were accepted by the majority of opposition parties. Only the main opposition party, All People's Congress (APC), contested the

results in two southern districts, Pujehun and Bonthe, where President Kabbah got respectively 99.4% and 99.2% of the votes.

The special vote for the army and the police was not handled according to the procedures. In six districts the vote of the army and police was counted separately and publicised by the media, thus compromising the secrecy of the army's vote.

The above limitations, however, did not affect the overall process. The political parties accepted the results but denounced the irregularities. Relatively few complaints were filed. The NEC, however, failed to respond adequately to the complaints it received.

It should be stressed that the election process benefited from extensive support at all levels by the International Community.

CONCLUSIONS

The voter registration faced several shortcomings but allowed the vast majority of voters to register. Parties could campaign throughout the country, however the opposition complained of obstacles in some places, especially in rural areas where it denounced instances of intimidation and coercion. The voting and counting took place in a transparent manner although some irregularities were observed. As expressed in the preliminary statement of 14 May 2002, the peaceful elections marked a first step to return to democracy in Sierra Leone, but the peace and the democratic process remain fragile.

To build on the election results, the government faces several challenges. It has to ensure that the peace and the democratisation process are consolidated, through respect of the opposition and of the independence of the judiciary. It also faces the huge challenge of rebuilding the country and providing solutions to the basic needs of the people, such as food security, education, health care, employment opportunities and basic infrastructure.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) would like to thank the European Commission Delegation in Freetown and the EU Presidency, held by the British High Commissioner, for their co-operation, hospitality and invaluable assistance in understanding the country, establishing contacts and carrying out its mission.

It wants to express its appreciation to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), including the military observers, peacekeepers and electoral experts, for their support in terms of logistics and security. Without the presence of UNAMSIL, these elections would have been difficult, if not impossible.

Thanks also to World Food Program for the provision of a helicopter, to Pacific Architectural Engineers for their help in providing transport, and to the International Organisation for Migration, the implementing agency.

The Mission also want to acknowledge the good co-operation with the National Electoral Commission (NEC), the political parties, the domestic observers of the National Election Watch (NEW) and the Council of Churches, the international observation missions of the Commonwealth, the Carter Centre and the Organisation of African Unity, as well as the civil society of Sierra Leone.

Lastly, the EU EOM would like to congratulate the polling officials and their staff for their admirable dedication and commitment, and the people of Sierra Leone who – by their peaceful and disciplined behaviour – demonstrated a clear desire for peace and a return to democracy in Sierra Leone.

1. MISSION BACKGROUND

- 1.1. On 4 January 2002, the Sierra Leone Government invited the European Union to deploy an Observation Mission for the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections on 14 May. Following the invitation, the European Commission sent an Exploratory Mission to the country between 22 and 28 January. Based on the findings of the Exploratory Mission the EU decided to send an Election Observation Mission.
- 1.2. The EU EOM, led by the Chief Observer Johan Van Hecke (MeP), consisted of six core team members, comprising the Deputy Chief Observer, a legal adviser, an electoral adviser, a media adviser, a Long Term Observers Co-ordinator and one logistics/security adviser. The mission's office in Freetown was opened on 2 April. On 17 April, 20 Long Term Observers (LTOs) arrived. They were deployed in teams of two in 10 of the 14 electoral districts. On 10 May, 64 Short Term Observers (STOs) joined the mission, including three members of the European Parliament led by the former EU-ACP Co-President John Corrie. Two LTOs from Norway and a few STOs from Switzerland were also deployed within the EU EOM. After the election, the mission downsized with the STOs leaving the country on 18 May and the LTOs on 21 May. The Mission was closed on 4 June.
- 1.3. During its presence, the EU EOM regularly met with political parties, the National Electoral Commission, domestic observers, and civil society. The EU EOM provided press releases to the media and informed the public about its activities through interviews on radio and television. A Preliminary Statement was released on 16 May, two days after the elections.
- 1.4. The EU EOM organised a helicopter trip to Bo and Kenema, in collaboration with the Commonwealth and the Carter Center Observer Groups. Delegates of the observation teams of ECOWAS and the Organisation of African Unity also joined the group. The trip allowed the five Chief Observers to share observations of the electoral process in the field. The day after the elections, the respective Chief Observers met again to exchange views. And on 16 May, the Chief Observers of the Carter Centre, the Commonwealth and the EU EOM presented their preliminary statements in a joint press conference. The convergence of observations, and the shared overall positive assessment of the election process, sent a clear message to the population, thus avoiding any confusion. The ECOWAS and the OAU presented their statements on 17 May, after their observers had returned from the districts.
- 1.5. During its stay, the EU EOM observed the nomination of candidates for the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, the electoral campaign, the registration of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the transfer of voting, the Special Voting for the security forces, the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, the counting and the collation of results.

2. POLITICAL BACKGROUND

- 2.1. Sierra Leone's history has been turbulent, with a series of coups and counter-coups since gaining independence on 27 April 1961. From 1978 to 1992, the All People's Congress (APC) was in power, under a one-party system. Voters backed the 1991 referendum for a multiparty system. President Joseph Momoh, however, was overthrown in a military coup the following year, before the system could be introduced. The coup installed the 26-year old Capt. Strasser as leader of the country. The Constitutions of 1991 and 1978 were suspended, the House of Representatives was dissolved and a state of emergency was imposed. Instead, a governing body known as the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was established. Strasser pledged to end the conflict in the country, which had started in 1991 with border incursions from neighbouring Liberia by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), joined by members of a Sierra Leonean resistance movement, known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh. In response to international pressure, Capt. Strasser announced a two-year transition programme for the registration of political parties and presidential and legislative elections.
- 2.2. In February 1996, the first multi-party elections since 1967 were held. They were conducted in difficult circumstances, with parts of the country still embroiled in civil conflict. The Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) won the majority of votes in the legislative elections, and its leader, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah won the presidential elections in the second round, with 59,9 % of the votes. Some months later, President Kabbah and Sankoh signed a peace agreement in Abidjan whereby RUF forces were to be demobilised and the movement was to be reconstituted as a political organisation, while all foreign troops were to be withdrawn from the country and replaced with foreign observers.
- 2.3. On 25 May 1997 dissident members of the armed forces, led by Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma, seized power, deposing Kabbah, who fled to neighbouring Guinea. Koroma announced the establishment of a 20-member Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), with himself as Chairman and Sankoh as Vice-Chairman. The Nigerian Government demanded that the junta relinquish power and increased its military strength in Freetown to about 3,000 troops. The United Nations Security Council, in a resolution, imposed sanctions against the regime in Sierra Leone. In early February 1998, the Nigerian-led West-African intervention force, Ecomog, stormed and occupied Freetown and the exiled president made a triumphant return on 10 March.
- 2.4. Less than a year later, in January 1999, rebels backing Sankoh reached Freetown and succeeded in taking control of parts of the capital from Ecomog forces. After weeks of bitter fighting they were driven out, leaving behind thousands of people dead and amputated and a devastated city. On 7 July 1999, a Peace Agreement was signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in Lomé, Togo. The rebels received posts in government and assurances they will not be prosecuted for war crimes. UN troops were to police the peace agreement. The peace agreement however collapsed in 2000 as rebels attacked UN forces and captured UN and British military personnel, while Sankoh himself was seized and jailed by government forces. In March 2001, UNAMSIL for the first time began to deploy peacefully in rebel-held territory and started disarming the rebels. By the beginning of 2002, an estimated 45,000 rebels had been disarmed and demobilised and the war was declared over, paving the way for elections in May.

3. LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK

- 3.1. The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Sierra Leone were governed by the Constitution of 1991 (especially chapter IV - related to the basic principles of the representation of the people, chapter V - regarding the election of the President and chapter VI - regarding the election of members of Parliament) and by the Electoral Laws Act of 7 February 2002. The Government of Sierra Leone had previously extended its mandate by two 6-month periods under emergency powers. The second extension ended on 28 March 2002, on which date Parliament was dissolved.

On 7 February 2002, the Constitution was amended with the addition of a paragraph to section 43, allowing in exceptional circumstances for the President to continue in office as if Parliament had granted an extension of the term by four months once election date was set. This meant that the President could continue in office until the 14 May 2002 elections.

- 3.2. According to the Constitution, suffrage is universal, equal and secret. Every citizen of eighteen years and above and of sound mind has the right to vote, and accordingly shall be entitled to be registered as a voter for the purposes of public elections (Constitution, section 31). The Register of Electors in any ward shall be conclusive evidence for the purpose of determining whether a person is or is not entitled to vote [Electoral Laws Act, section 27 (2)].
- 3.3. The election of the President (and the vice-presidential running mate) is organised on a national basis. The winning candidate must achieve 55 % of the national votes cast. In default of this, the two candidates with the highest numbers of votes shall participate in a second round. Nine candidates and their running mates contested the 2002 Presidential Elections.
- 3.4. Parliament consists of 112 members and 12 Paramount Chiefs. The Parliamentary Elections are organised on a district basis, according to a District Block Representation System, an innovation compared with the single seat constituency system previously used. With the new system people vote for party lists. Eight seats are allocated to each of the 14 districts. The seats are distributed proportionally within each district to the parties that have reached a threshold of 12.5%. Ten political parties nominated 1,351 candidates to contest the 2002 Parliamentary Elections.
- 3.5. According to the Constitution, the District Block System is a provisional arrangement. The absence of reliable and updated population data was used to justify the adoption of the District Block Representation System. Under the single seat constituency system the Constitution provides that "the boundaries of each constituency shall be such that the number of inhabitants thereof is as nearly equal to the population quota as is reasonably practicable" (section 38, 3). However, the breakdown of the number of registered voters by district does not render this argument as relevant.
- 3.6. Taking into account the basic principle of proportional representation on a district basis, there is a huge difference in the representation of the districts' electorate. This is the result of the allocation of an equal number of seats to every district, despite the fact that the number of registered voters is highly variable (ranging from one to four times the minimal figure). For instance, eight seats are allocated to Kenema District for a total number of 285,275 registered voters, or an average of

- 35,659 registered voters per seat. The same number of seats is allocated to Bonthe District for a total number of 70,883 registered voters, resulting in an average of 8,860 registered voters per seat.
- 3.7. The Sierra Leonean system presents some peculiarities, such as the requirement to collect 55% of the votes cast to be elected in the first round of the Presidential Election and the threshold of 12.5 % in the Parliamentary Elections. Also, twelve Paramount Chiefs have to be elected separately as members of Parliament on the basis of specific regulations.
 - 3.8. The composition and the nomination procedures for the NEC are as follows: The National Electoral Commission, consisting of five members, was set up as an independent body. Its task was to conduct and supervise the elections. For that purpose, it had the power to make regulations by statutory instrument. Four Regional Returning Officers (RROs), 14 District Election Officers (DEOs) and District Returning Officers (DROs) were appointed to conduct and supervise the elections in their respective areas. Five Polling Officers were assigned to each of the 5,223 polling stations. Polling time was set from 7:00 to 17:00. Counting took place in the same location immediately after the closing of the polls. Collation of the results and allocation of seats was conducted at the district level.
 - 3.9. Special provisions were adopted to allow some categories of people to vote on another day (the special vote for members of the police, army and election officers took place on 10 May 2002) or at another place than the one where they registered (transfer of vote). This was intended to make the process more inclusive.
 - 3.10. According to the Constitution, any candidate has to be officially nominated by a political party. There is no provision for independent candidates. A total of nineteen political parties were registered by the NEC. Only ten of them eventually contested the Parliamentary Elections.
 - 3.11. The human rights and fundamental freedoms usually exercised during a campaign are recognised and protected by the Constitution of 1991. Section 25 (1) of the Constitution states that "no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression. The freedom of expression includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference, [...] freedom to own, establish and operate any medium for the dissemination of information, ideas and opinions". Also, section 26 (1) states that "no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in particular to form or belong to any political party, trade unions or other economic, social or professional associations, national or international, for the protection of his interests".
 - 3.12. The electoral campaign period started on 5 April 2002 and ended on 11 May 2002 (i.e. lasting 37 days). As to the holding of political rallies, the amendment to the Electoral Laws Act of 21 March 2002¹ was a positive step: a written notification to the police replaced the previous procedure of authorisation by the Electoral Commission. Another section of the Act (118) provides that "no candidate or political party shall during the campaign period [...] abuse or engage in the improper use of Government property for political propaganda purposes". Where he believes that his rights have been violated, a candidate or a political party may

¹ Amendment to section 114 (1) of the Electoral Laws Act signed on 21 March 2002.

lodge a complaint with the Electoral Commission. The Electoral Commission must, upon receipt of a complaint, take all necessary steps to ensure that the issues raised by the complaint are properly addressed and any fault or defect is rectified without delay. The adoption of a code on election campaign ethics by the NEC, to which every candidate had to adhere formally, was another positive step.

- 3.13. A detailed list of offences and penalties is included in part VIII of the Electoral Laws Act².
- 3.14. The Electoral Laws Act also recognises the role of observers and party agents during the electoral process. Each political party contesting the election can appoint two persons (polling agents) to attend the voting and counting process at each polling station. Written notice of the appointment must be given by each political party to the District Returning Officer not later than three days before Election Day (section 62). The role of the party agent consists of detecting multiple voting and impersonation. More generally, she/he is entitled to draw the attention of the Presiding Officer to irregularities in any procedure at a polling station.
- 3.15. Both the Supreme Court and the High Court play an important role in the electoral process. Questions which may arise as to whether the provisions of the Constitution or laws relating to the election of the President have been complied with, or whether a person has been validly elected as President shall be referred to and determined by the Supreme Court [Constitution, section 45 (2)]. Any person who is a citizen of Sierra Leone may challenge the validity of the election of the President by petition to the Supreme Court within seven days after the declaration of the result of the Presidential Election [Electoral Laws Act, section 40 (1)].

The High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine any questions regarding whether a person has been validly elected as a Member of Parliament. The High Court shall give judgement within four months after the commencement of the proceedings. An appeal can be filed to the Court of Appeal, which shall give judgement within four months after the appeal was filed. The decision of the Court of Appeal is final (Constitution, section 78).

4. ELECTIONS AND CAMPAIGNING

- 4.1. There were nine presidential candidates, and ten parties contested the Parliamentary Elections. The main contenders were the incumbent SLPP, the former ruling party APC, the UNPP which challenged Kabbah in the second round of the 1996 Presidential Elections, and the PLP, led by the 1997 coup leader Johnny Paul Koroma. Smaller parties included GAP (Grand Alliance Party), MOP (Movement for Progress Party), NDA (National Democratic Alliance), PDP (People's Democratic Party), and YPP (Young People's Party). The Revolutionary United Front, which had transformed itself into a political party (RUF) participated in both the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, despite the former rebels'

² The provisions cover most of the possible cases: interference with lawful public meeting; prevention of election by force; undue influence; offences in respect of nomination papers, ballot papers, ballot box; improper practices by election staff; penalty for false answer; infringement of secrecy; falsification of election return; impersonation (attempt to vote in the name of some other person); bribery; prohibition of campaigning within the vicinity of the place of voting on the day of the election; prohibition of interference with voting materials; prohibition of unauthorised printing, manufacture and supply of voting and election material; prohibition of interference with free political canvassing and campaigning (sections 94 to 109).

- initial demand that their leader, Foday Sankoh, be released and eligible to stand as a candidate.
- 4.2. During the electoral campaign, both the opposition parties and the SLPP denounced the short-comings of the registration process, claiming that a significant number of voters were left out of the process or did not appear on the list despite their registration. In addition, they mentioned the need for voter education, made more critical due to the ten-year civil war and an illiteracy rate of more than 80%. These elements affected voting day (see also 10.15 and 10.16). Some opposition parties suggested the elections were premature and the government took advantage of the fact that the opposition parties were not prepared.
- 4.3. The electoral campaigning took place in a violence-free atmosphere. After a history of violent campaigns and a decade of civil war, this was a remarkable achievement. Towards the end of the campaigning, tensions increased between SLPP, APC and RUFF. Three incidents were reported: a stone-throwing confrontation between RUFF and SLPP supporters in Freetown on 9 May, which ended with the intervention of UNAMSIL and left seven persons slightly injured; riots by ex-combatants in Makeni, demanding the immediate payment of their training allowances, and the alleged forced displacement of opposition supporters from Kono.
- 4.4. The campaigning in general was conducted with a low profile, consisting mostly of small gatherings and door-to-door activities. Only SLPP and APC were able to organise some large rallies. The opposition parties complained about difficulties in accessing some rural areas, particularly in the southern region, as Paramount Chiefs acted in favour of the ruling party, practically denying access to other parties. There were reports of Paramount Chiefs exerting pressure on the population not to attend rallies of the opposition or advising opposition parties not to stop and rally in their chiefdom lest they would face negative consequences from the government³. Other complaints included lack of independence of the public administration, the misuse of official cars in support of the ruling party and incidents of intimidation by the RUPF⁴.
- 4.5. Only the SLPP disposed of structures all over the country, which allowed it to organise campaigns in all towns and villages. The APC and the smaller parties faced communication and transport problems and a general lack of resources, such as office space, office equipment or campaign material. Usually only A4 size paper was used for propaganda posters. Only SLPP and APC could afford billboards and only SLPP had colour posters. In addition, Sierra Leonean tradition requires that when a candidate visits a village, he/she should provide food or money as to pay respect and show that he/she has the capacity to support the village, putting additional strains on the smaller parties. For example, en route to the last political rally held by SLPP in Freetown on 11 May, beverages and food were distributed.
- 4.6. Only a few parties produced a manifesto and/or a political programme. In general, the political debate was limited to catchwords such as “decentralisation”, “health care”, “education”, “communication” and “transport”. More important than the

³ For example in Bo and Pujehun Districts the APC complained that some Paramount Chiefs prevented them from campaigning in their villages. Observers in Bo witnessed a Paramount Chief supporting SLPP.

⁴ On another occasion, military observers in Tonkolili witnessed a case of RUFF leaders openly threatening villagers to “cut their throats” if they voted SLPP.

political programme seemed factors like ethnicity, loyalty, patronage, and allocation of state resources.

5. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

- 5.1. At the national level, the NEC was assisted by 13 international consultants from the EU, Commonwealth and International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). These consultants were involved in all aspects of the electoral process, including the registration process, the preparation of the elections, and the training of the 25,000 registration and polling staff. Of particular importance was the expert in information technology who prepared the databases for the final voters lists and the polling stations lists.
- 5.2. UNAMSIL provided the logistical support for the elections. Their assistance was essential. Neither the NEC nor the government had the capacity and resources to overcome the huge communication and logistical constraints. The District Election Commissions were allocated only one vehicle each. Without the support of UNAMSIL, in terms of delivering material and equipment to the polling stations, the elections would not have taken place as smoothly as they did. In addition, the NEC received support from the US Embassy (two helicopters for the transport of ballot papers and other electoral material).
- 5.3. International observers had easy access to the NEC Chairman, Secretary General, the local staff and the international expert. Meetings with the Chairman often included regional NEC officials. Towards the end, almost daily meetings were held with the Secretary General who was forthcoming with information as it became available. There was a general willingness at the NEC to be transparent when dealing with the observation missions.
- 5.4. On the contrary, the political parties did not perceive the NEC as being transparent and were consistently suspicious of its decisions. A National Consultative Committee was set up to enable the NEC Chairman to regularly meet the political parties as to listen to complaints and explain policy. However, these meetings did not materialise until some weeks before the elections. They considerably improved the NEC's image in terms of communication, co-operation and transparency. Unfortunately, these consultative committees were not replicated at district level.
- 5.5. The main complaint about the NEC was that it did not meet legislative deadlines, including the posting of the notices of the polls, the publication of the polling station lists and the transfer voting list, and that decisions taken on the national level did not reach the districts quickly and effectively.
- 5.6. The NEC fully applied the Electoral Act section 126 to extend the period of voter registration by three days, the period of nomination of candidates by three days, and the period of refugee voting by three days. Also, the date of Special Voting was changed.
- 5.7. The NEC provided good reasons for not meeting the deadlines in all the above elements of the elections. The changes, however, undermined confidence in the system and in the NEC. There was always the underlying suspicion about the lack of adherence to the timetable foreseen by the law. In addition the delay in meeting the deadlines undermined the organisational capabilities of the parties. For example, the NEC's delay in providing the polling station lists which were received

- by political parties only two or three days before Election Day created many difficulties to the political parties themselves, but also to the electorate and domestic and international observers. A similar problem occurred for the candidates' registration.
- 5.8. The reasons for many of the delays were the lack of capacity within the organisation, lack of recent experience of elections and lack of management skills. These deficiencies rendered it difficult for the NEC to satisfactorily undertake the considerable and varied tasks required, in a very short amount of time.
 - 5.9. The NEC was capable of coming to quick decisions but the dissemination of the decisions was inconsistent. The organisation seemed unable to effectively communicate modified instructions or the decisions were not interpreted consistently. Early criticisms by the press and the political parties were the result of the manner the NEC released information. Regular meetings between the press and the NEC Chairman, which were later introduced overcame this to some extent
 - 5.10. A serious example of the problem above explained was the decision to change the rules relating to the transfer of vote on Election Day. In some areas there was no awareness of the decision; in other areas the information arrived too late to be useful, and when it was put into effect the implementation was inconsistent. It is essential for future elections that the structure of the organisation be examined and that management training and capacity building within the NEC are introduced. In addition, the introduction of a public relations expert in the build-up from January to Election Day would have been helpful.
 - 5.11. The district election commissions carry out the delegated functions at the district level. The post of District Election Officer (DEO) is a permanent one whose task is to liaise between the district and the NEC. DEOs are civil servants, appointed by the Public Services Commission, who have a permanent presence in the districts. They undertake a general training and assume an overseeing role before, during and after the elections. Twelve of the DEOs were not appointed until November 2001. Six of them had no previous experience of elections.
 - 5.12. The District Returning Officer (DRO) is a temporary appointment. The DEO with his assistant Returning Officers are responsible for the conduct and supervision of the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in the districts assigned to them. The returning officials work under the direct supervision of the Election Commissioner and the Senior Elections Officer of their respective regions and the District Election Officers of their respective districts. The training of officials is the responsibility of the District Returning Officer.
 - 5.13. The significance of appointing DROs specifically for the elections is to introduce a degree of independence to the administration of the election. The appointments are publicised and the electors have an opportunity to object to the appointments. Had the DEO, a civil servant, fulfilled the role of returning officer, he would have been seen as representing the government.
 - 5.14. The role of the DROs was extremely important in the running of the elections. Considering the lack of experience and the recent appointment of some DROs, their performance would naturally be of mixed quality.
 - 5.15. The Long Term Observers offered different opinions in respect to the performances of their respective DEC. They were consistent, however, in their view that the DEC

- needed to be strengthened and communication between the NEC and the DEC needed to be improved.
- 5.16. Other reasons for apprehension about Election Day were the concerns expressed by political parties and observers in relation to registration of voters, refugee and IDP voting, special voting and the transfer of vote process. Each of these essential aspects of Sierra Leone's elections had weaknesses that affected the accuracy of the voter registers. There were also problems relating to delivery of equipment, training of officials and voter education which affected voting on Election Day.
- 5.17. An early, essential element in the planning of the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections was the compilation of a voters register. In its preparation for the elections, the NEC faced two particular problems in this regard: the last census of the country was conducted 17 years before and the war had caused a large displacement of the population. The centres of population had changed and were not known to the authorities.
- 5.18. The registration of eligible voters was the first element in the electoral process. Some opposition parties sought to undermine the elections at the beginning by encouraging their supporters not to register. When they realised the elections would indeed take place, they changed their policy.
- 5.19. The previous registration system established in 1996 was conducted at household level where all registered voters were linked to an address and a household head. The NEC recognised many disadvantages with this system, particularly multiple families having the same address. Furthermore, the system did not direct the elector to any particular polling station. In order to overcome these problems, the NEC decided to change the system of registration.
- 5.20. The registration process was carried out from 24 January to 7 February. It was completed before the arrival of the core team. The logistical tasks of transporting staff and supplies to the 5,278 registration centres, spread over a country that in many areas was without useable roads and communication facilities, proved almost insurmountable. The registration process was consistently a subject of complaint by the opposition parties who suggested that, over and above the inherent inefficiency of the organisation and the logistical difficulties it faced, some of the failures were politically motivated.
- 5.21. Section 2 of the Electoral Laws Act states that for the purpose of voters registration the NEC may divide Sierra Leone into wards. Section 3 states that an elector cannot be registered in more than one. An important element of the new system is that the registered voter is required to vote at the centre or polling station at which she/he is registered.
- 5.22. In line with its rights from Section 11 of the 2002 Electoral Laws Act the NEC published a notice requiring all eligible voters⁵ to present themselves for registration at a registration centre from January 24 to 7 February inclusive. The notices were displayed at the registration centres, and registration officers were appointed. It was intended that the 5,278 registration centres would subsequently serve as polling centres.

⁵ An eligible voter is defined in the constitution as "A citizen of Sierra Leone being eighteen years of age and of sound mind shall have the right to vote and accordingly shall be entitled to be registered as voter for the purposes of public elections and referenda".

- 5.23. The process required the eligible voters to take the appropriate means of identification to the registration centre. In absence of this, two witnesses could testify that the applicant was qualified to register. Registrars then recorded the names, ages and addresses of the applicants on the Registration Forms, which the registrars kept, and gave the applicants a registration slip, containing the same information, for them to keep. To prevent double registration the registrant's left thumb was marked with indelible ink. The person then took the registration slip to a photo centre where the officials would check the thumb for ink, take a photo and provide a laminated Voter Photo-ID Card. According to the original regulation issued by the NEC, only people on the electoral role and in possession of a Voter-ID Card were to be allowed to vote on 14 May. The law actually does not require the ID card to have a photograph.
- 5.24. The main problems which arose during the registration process were lack of ink, materials, forms, films and staff. It was said that one of the problems with the photographing procedure was that the photographers absconded with the films. In addition, complaints regarding the location of the centres and the late arrival and inadequate photo equipment adversely affected the number of eligible voters wishing to register. The fact that not all the registration centres had cameras proved to be a particular problem. In order to overcome these problems, the NEC invoked the terms of Section 126 of the Act to extend the registration process by three days.
- 5.25. The three-day extension was considered by some political parties to be an empty gesture because the process continued to face the same shortcomings and not enough publicity was given to the extension period. The NEC feels they were able to overcome the problems during the extra days. In addition, due to the difficulties with the photographing process, the NEC decided to remove the need for the photograph on the Voter ID Card.
- 5.26. After the registration process, provisional registers were drawn up, which were exhibited at the registration centres from 9 March to 13 March. The aim of the exhibition was to enable people to file complaints, objections and omissions and to make the necessary corrections in the final voters register. The District Election Officer dealt with these issues at district level and a Revising Officer at national level considered further appeals. Many names were omitted from the provisional list. Some twenty thousand names were added, or 0.76% of the total registered. The impact of the exhibition process was limited due to high illiteracy rates and the fact that many people failed to check their names on the lists. This is confirmed by the fact that on Election Day, many registered voters did not find their names on the Final Voters Register. There were a total of 2,342,547 registered voters on the final register.
- 5.27. According to the Electoral Laws Act, eligible voters who had registered and whose names were not included on the final register would not be able to vote. Observers anticipated problems on Election Day.
- 5.28. Other complaints about the registration process included double registration and under-age registration. Some people were not able to register because the time of registration in rural areas did not fit with the farmers working hours. Indeed, the registration centres opened and closed when farmers were in the fields. There was a lack of adequate information regarding the location of the registration centres, and in some instances distances were too great. Also noted was a lack of sensitisation and education of eligible voters regarding the need to register, and insufficient time

to properly train staff. Lastly, voter apathy or political resistance were observed. Lessons could have been drawn from this for the rest of the electoral process.

- 5.29. In response to these complaints, the NEC emphasised that 85% of the expected eligible voters was able to register, and that by being flexible, it was able to overcome most of the logistical difficulties. The figure of 85%, however, is based on a 17-year-old census.

6. NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES

- 6.1. The period for the nomination of the presidential candidates was originally scheduled for one day (2 April 2002). It was extended by one day (to 3 April 2002) and reopened later for another day (9 April 2002) to allow the RUF to nominate a presidential candidate. This was decided in accordance with article 126 of the Electoral Laws Act, according to which "the Electoral Commission may, where the circumstances so require, by order, enlarge or reduce the time prescribed in this Act for the giving of any notice or for the doing of any act or thing". There were nine presidential candidates. For the Parliamentary elections, 1,351 candidates from ten different political parties were submitted. This was accordingly published in the Gazette, the official government publication.

Nomination of parliamentary candidates by districts (provisional data for Parliamentary Elections as published in the Gazette on 10 April 2002)												
DISTRICT	SLPP	APC	PDP	RUF	UNPP	PLP	GAP	YPP	MOP	NDA		
West-West	16	16	16	16	15	16	8	9	4	8	124	10 parties
West-East	16	14	16	12	16	15	13	7	5	8	122	10 parties
Kenema	15	16	16	16	16	4	9	16	7	0	115	9 parties
Tonkolili	16	16	16	16	16	16	9	0	0	0	105	7 parties
Moyamba	16	16	16	8	16	16	16	0	1	0	105	8 parties
Bo	16	14	16	16	5	8	4	16	8	0	103	9 parties
Port Loko	16	16	16	16	13	16	4	4	1	0	102	9 parties
Kambia	16	16	16	16	16	4	3	9	2	0	98	9 parties
Bombali	16	16	16	12	12	11	5	9	0	0	97	8 parties
Koinadugu	16	16	16	16	0	10	3	0	0	16	93	7 parties
Bonthe	16	14	16	16	15	0	0	0	7	0	84	6 parties
Kono	16	16	16	16	5	9	4	1	0	0	83	8 parties
Pujehun	16	9	16	11	5	2	6	0	0	0	65	7 parties
Kailahun	16	16	0	16	5	2	0	0	0	0	55	5 parties
	223	211	208	203	155	129	84	71	35	32	1351	

- 6.2. Only three political parties (SLPP, APC and RUF) were able to nominate candidates for the Parliamentary Elections in all 14 districts. Three other parties (PLP, PDP and UNPP) contested the elections in 13 districts. These six parties differ from the others with respect to the number of candidates nominated (more than one hundred).

- 6.3. The most contested districts were the two electoral districts of the Western Area (in the Freetown area). West-East district and West-West district were the only districts to have all the ten political parties participating in the Parliamentary Elections. On

the contrary, Kailahun had the lowest number of contesting parties (only five). The average number of contesting parties in a district was eight.

- 6.4. According to the Electoral Laws Act, any Sierra Leonean citizen has the right to object to a presidential candidate. Objections should be filed within seven days of the publication of the government notice of the nomination of the presidential candidates. Objections are handled by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall make a decision within thirty days of receiving the objection. Two objections were lodged against the nomination of presidential candidates (Electoral Laws Act, section 32).
- 6.5. The first objection was lodged against the candidature of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah by one citizen called Daniel Sankoh. The hearing took place on 22 April 2002. Neither plaintiff nor defendant appeared before the Court. A team of eight lawyers was mobilised by the defendant. The hearing was limited to procedural aspects and did not examine the merits of the case. The defendant argued that the originating notice of motion by the plaintiff did not meet the requirements of an objection and, consequently, that no formal objection was lodged. The Supreme Court followed this argument and rejected the objection.
- 6.6. The second dispute related to the disqualification of Abu Bakarr W. Jalloh, the running mate of the APC presidential candidate. The dispute was not settled in an appropriate way. On 24 April 2002, the NEC took two separate decisions to disqualify Abu Bakarr W. Jalloh, both as a candidate for Parliamentary Elections and as a vice-presidential candidate. It justified its decisions by stating a) that the candidate could not be a registered voter because he was physically out of the country during the period of registration of voters, and b) that his name appeared on two different APC district lists of candidates (he was indeed n°12 in West-West and n°1 in West-East, according to the official notice of provisional list of nomination of parliamentary candidates published in the Gazette on 10 April 2002).

Even if there could be legal grounds to disqualify the candidate, the EU EOM is of the opinion that the appropriate procedure was not followed, because the law grants exclusive competence to the Supreme Court to deal with such cases.

The EU EOM was also puzzled by some administrative aspects of the decision making process such as the timing of the decision, the special attention given to this case.

On 30 April 2002, the candidate lodged an appeal to the High Court against the two decisions. First scheduled on Monday 6 May 2002, the hearing was postponed due to the absence of any representative of the NEC. It eventually took place on 7 May 2002. Around fifty people attended the hearing, including the APC vice-presidential candidate, the APC secretary general and other key party members. The High Court judge first granted an injunction, temporarily restraining the NEC from publishing the final list of candidates. The matter was heard again on Thursday 9 May 2002. The judgement of the High Court was pronounced on the 10 May. The judge (the High Court is a single judge tribunal) declared the court incompetent to rule on the matter.

- 6.7. A total number of 1,351 candidates were registered on the provisional list for the Parliamentary Elections, as published in the Gazette on 10 April 2002. According to the legal adviser to the NEC, a total number of 145 objections were lodged against the nomination of parliamentary candidates. Taking into account that some

nominations were objected more than once, less than one percent of the nominations were challenged. The last day to object was 17 April 2002.

Of the 145 objections, 38 were granted and 107 were rejected. Most of the objections granted consisted of cases of withdrawal of the nomination by the candidate personally or with his/her consent.

Most of the objections rejected were based on the ground that a candidate is not qualified if he/she is a *public officer* [Constitution, section 76, 1 (b)] i.e. "a person holding or acting in an office the emoluments attaching to which are paid directly from the consolidated fund or directly out of moneys provided by Parliament" (Constitution, section 171). The strict enforcement of this provision would have led to the disqualification of a significant number of candidates. The position taken by the NEC was to leave this question to the competence of the High Court, as an interpretation of the Constitution is needed. In practice, the decisions taken by the NEC were final, since no further appeal had been lodged to the High Court (Electoral Laws Act, sections 55 and 56). This means that the qualification of a *public officer* to contest an election is a grey area in the legal framework.

7. REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

- 7.1. The transfer of vote procedure enables registered voters to apply for permission to vote at a polling station other than the place where they registered. It was introduced to address the post-war problem of refugees, who had fled the country and were gradually returning to their homeland. It also acknowledged the difficulty of internally displaced persons who had fled to camps in safer places. In Tonkolili, 60,000 IDPs were registered in the southwest of the district and another 40,000 elsewhere. While the concept of the transfer of vote was sound, the NEC did not have the capacity to administer and effect it in the given time-frame.
- 7.2. The DRO of the receiving station was responsible for compiling the lists of persons wishing to transfer their vote. The voter had to apply in person to the receiving station with a valid voter's ID card issued by the NEC. The form was in two parts and the DEC retained the top half to process the transfer. The transferee retained the bottom half for production at the polling station when he/she turned up to vote. The closing date for transferring the place of voting was fifteen days before Election Day.
- 7.3. The legislation recognises the particular problem of refugees. It was estimated that some 17,000 refugees had returned spontaneously from Guinea and Liberia. An additional 15,000 were repatriated by UNHCR.
- 7.4. Special centres were available for the returnees to register. The refugees had to provide evidence that they had returned under the auspices of UNCHR. Transfer of the vote was difficult for the returnees because it was centralised at the DEC's, making it difficult for people in the rural areas to transfer their votes. For example in Bombali, people wanting to transfer their vote had to travel to Makeni. Section 126 was invoked to extend the period for the transfer of vote to 5 May, nine days before the elections. De facto in some parts of the country such a deadline was not respected with transfer of vote taking place on Election Day itself.

- 7.5. Regrettably, many of the logistical problems that were evident during the registration process were repeated during the transfer of vote process, and the co-ordination between UNCHR and the DROs was lacking.
- 7.6. IDPs were able to register at food distribution centres for the polling station of their choice.
- 7.7. Because of the extension of the transfer period, the high demand for transfer and the difficulty to process the applications, in some areas the election officers were unable to prepare the transfer of voting lists. As a result, there were many problems in the polling stations on Election Day. Registered transfer voters were not allowed to vote because their name was not on the list of transferred voters or the transfer of voters list did not exist (see chapter 10).

8. VOTER EDUCATION

- 8.1. The political parties and civil society groups expressed an urgent need for voter education, especially in the rural areas, given the high illiteracy rate and the lack of experience with elections. Voter education was to be organised primarily by the NEC, but also by the political parties, the civil society and UNAMSIL.
- 8.2. Considerable obstacles, however, were the lack of funds as well as communication and logistical problems. The audio-visual media, particularly the radio, is the most effective means of communication in Sierra Leone. The national SLBS radio and Radio UNAMSIL contributed the most to voter education, with their radio phone-ins and information slots.
- 8.3. Voter education started late and was inadequate, often not reaching the rural areas. This was due to delays in the delivery of posters, that were held up in the customs, and due to last-minute cuts in the budget. The late arrival of the material meant that the NEC failed to distribute it in time to remote parts of the country. New publicity material, mainly from UNHCR and the EU, arrived late, 3 to 4 weeks before the elections.
- 8.4. Educational videos were prepared in various languages: Mende, Temne, Limba, Krio and English. The videos were shown in cinemas. Special programmes on voter education were also shown on SLBS television, but only ten days before elections.
- 8.5. The NEC did organise trips to the districts to sensitise representatives of the political parties about their role in voter education and their role in promoting a climate of political tolerance. Displaced persons camps were visited to disseminate information.
- 8.6. Opposition parties in some districts complained that the ruling SLPP party received the voter education material before the other parties, and got more of it. In Bo district, SLPP was the only party able to give voter education with sample ballot papers, as the other parties had no access to these samples.
- 8.7. UNAMSIL and their military observers contribute to voter education, through the use of comedians and programmes on radio UNAMSIL.

- 8.8. The inadequacy voter education became apparent on voting day. All observers reported a lack of knowledge among the electorate about voting procedures: people did not know where to vote, how to mark or fold the ballot paper, and some were even unaware of polling date. This resulted in polling officers, party agents and sometimes even UNAMSIL soldiers and the public becoming involved in explaining people how to cast their votes, at times interfering with the secrecy of vote.


9. MEDIA

- 9.1. There is a vibrant press in Sierra Leone, with more than thirty local newspapers and several radio stations. Only a few, however, are considered credible, and are accessible outside the capital Freetown. Consequently, the international media - as a reliable source of information - play an important role in the country.
- 9.2. Radio is the most important information channel in Sierra Leone. Only three radio stations - the state-owned SLBS⁶, Radio UNAMSIL⁷ and BBC - cover (almost) the whole country. They have the largest audience. Some private radio stations operate in Freetown and in the districts, such as Radio Democracy, Radio Kenema, Radio Kissi, Radio Tombo and Radio Mankneh. Some other foreign channels, such as Voice of America, the British Forces Broadcasting Service and Radio France Internationale, can also be heard in the capital.
- 9.3. Radio Democracy (FM 98.1), with coverage in Freetown, Lungi and Port Loko, is considered more pro-government than SLBS. The Voice of the Handicapped (FM 96.2) is more critical of the government and broadcasts only in the western area of Freetown. Another private radio station in the capital is BBN (FM 93.0) owned by a religious group and focused only on Christian music.
- 9.4. The state television SLBS is the only local TV channel in the country. Its reception is limited to Freetown and Lungi and although it is pro-government, it is considered credible among the population. Freetown also receives the signal of Guinean TV. CNN is the most viewed international channel in private houses, hotels or establishments of the capital which have a satellite antenna.
- 9.5. Newspapers enjoy less credibility. Their main area of diffusion is Freetown, with more than 30 papers registered. Their periodicity is variable, but none of them is published daily. Their information is often inaccurate and unreliable. In any case, their impact is minor because of their limited distribution and the high illiteracy rate. Poverty and difficult living and working conditions of journalists have led to corruption and practices of harassment. Their political tendencies are diverse, but most support the ruling party or the main opposition party, APC.
- 9.6. The electoral campaign was extensively covered by the local media, especially by SLBS Radio and TV, Radio UNAMSIL, Radio Democracy and the newspapers.
- 9.7. SLBS had special programmes on the elections with daily news reports, in-studio interviews and analysis. However, the state TV and radio (TV emissions were broadcast simultaneously on radio) failed in their obligation to allocate equal airtime to the political parties. According to the findings of the EU media monitoring team,

⁶ With local stations in Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Kono, broadcasting both in English and local languages.


⁷ With transmitters in Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Koidu, broadcasting both in English and local languages.

the ruling SLBS clearly received more coverage than the opposition parties. From 15 April to 11 May (end of the electoral campaign), SLPP got 6 hours airtime out of a total of 28.25 hours of information related to political parties, 2.5 hours more than MOP, the second most covered party.



9.8. Of the presidential candidates, Zainab Bangura (MOP) got the highest amount of airtime, with 1.5 out of almost seven hours. Although the incumbent President Tejan Kabbah was never interviewed in the SLBS studio, he still had the third-highest amount of airtime, with a total of almost 1.5 hours. The imbalance arose in the programmes and news reports.

9.9.



9.10. This was contrary to the amendment to the Electoral Laws Act of 4 April 2002, in which the NEC delegated to SLBS the responsibility of ensuring equal time to each party and candidate on national radio and TV. Thus, SLBS was both party and judge. The Electoral Laws Act (section 120.2) does not give specific instructions about the system to allocate airtime⁸. SLBS addressed this issue by offering one hour of free airtime to each political party contesting the elections⁹.

⁸ The Electoral Laws Act mentions only to “determine the time ... taking into account the number of candidates and political parties making a request”.

⁹ The time was not used by APC and UNPP, who alleged lack of formal invitation by SLBS. However, the Mission verified that the invitations were properly and publicly announced several times by SLBS.

- 9.11. Nevertheless, the opposition parties never filed an official complaint about the issue. Only APC made reference to the political use of SLBS by the ruling party in a public statement after the announcement of the final results.
- 9.12. Besides free airtime, political parties could also buy airtime. The rates, however, were unaffordable to most parties. SLBS applied special tariffs for the campaign period, increasing its original rates by 500%. After four weeks, SLBS readjusted its rates, reapplying the original tariffs for radio but keeping the inflated ones for TV. After this readjustment, five political parties (SLPP, APC, MOP, YPP and PLP) were able to buy airtime on SLBS. Given the huge difference in budgets between the big and minor smaller parties, SLPP was again in a favoured position¹⁰.
- 9.13. As to private radio stations, the Electoral Laws Act establishes in section 121.1 that “every candidate and political party shall enjoy the right to use private radio stations and television stations by contract with the owners”. Only Radio Democracy, one of the three private local radio stations in Freetown, covered the electoral campaign. Radio Democracy offered half an hour free airtime to political parties at the beginning of the campaign. It also covered the political rallies and broadcast jingles, programmes and songs financed by the parties.
- 9.14. Radio UNAMSIL broadcast special programmes on the elections and made an essential contribution to voter education and sensitisation. Political parties were not able to buy airtime on the UN radio station because of its non-commercial status. In compensation, a free one hour programme was offered to the presidential candidates. The initiative was halted after two programmes, according to UNAMSIL due to a lack of response from the part of the candidates.
- 9.15. After the elections, the media focused on broadcasting the results. Although official results were not declared by NEC until five days after polling day, SLBS and Radio Democracy continuously diffused results at the chiefdom level. On the one hand, this contributed to the transparency of the process. On the other hand, however, it shows a lack of regulation by NEC as to the presence of journalists inside the polling stations during the counting and their access to the results before official certification at the central level.

10. ELECTION DAY

- 10.1. Prior to the elections of 14 May, there was a special voting day for people who, because of the nature of their duties, would be unable to vote on Election Day at the polling station where they registered. This applied mainly to the army and police, who had to provide security throughout the country on Election Day, as well as polling staff and journalists.
- 10.2. Any person in the category of ‘special voter’, wishing to vote ahead of Election Day, had to submit an application in the prescribed form through his/her superior not later than twenty days before Election Day. The army and police failed to provide the names of their personnel in the given time-frame, so the NEC used section 126 of the Act to delay the date of Special Voting in order for the registers to be prepared.

¹⁰ While APC, PLP, MOP and YPP bought airtime on SLBS only twice during the campaign period, SLPP did it on 12 occasions.

- 10.3. The number of polling stations for special votes increased from 14 to 63, mainly following a request from the army. In Bombali, the political parties did not receive the information regarding the locations of the polling stations until the morning of the elections and, as a result, were not able to send party agents.
- 10.4. There was a lot of discussion concerning the time and place of counting of these votes. The legislation requires that the ballots are kept at a secure place and counted at the DEC at the close of the polls on Election Day. The "Guide to Election Officials" states "Please remember to enter the results of the Special Voting on the respective District Results Collation Report forms as the results of one polling station in the district".
- 10.5. Because of concerns of the army that their vote could be identified if counted separately, the rules were changed by the NEC. The change of rules was announced during the training of Presiding Officers, but in reality the approaches adopted differed. Some districts transferred the ballot papers to the polling station where the votes were cast, and then added the results to the count of the polling station. In other places, the special votes were mixed with the ballot papers cast at polling day. In six out of the 63 polling stations, the special vote results were announced separately¹¹. This was the more worrying as it showed that the military supported former coup leader Johnny Paul Koroma, while the police supported the APC. The NEC Chairman was quick to state that this was done by mistake¹² and to issue a press release, emphasising that Special Voting results did not only reflect the vote of the army and the police, but also of some civilian groups such as polling staff, doctors, and nurses.
- 10.6. The assessment of Election Day by the EU observers was overall positive. Based on the 572 polling day report forms, produced by 44 observer teams and processed at EOM headquarters in Freetown, 72.8% described the voting process as 'good' to 'very good', 15.8% called it 'fair'.
- 10.7. Problems centred on the late opening of the polling stations. This was the case for 25% of the 5,223 polling stations, mostly in the East and West regions. As UNAMSIL had overcome most of the logistical constraints, by providing vehicles to transport equipment to their various destinations, the delays were mainly caused by administrative factors, such as the absence or mix-up of registers or the lack of ballot papers. These were the responsibility of the Returning Officers and the Presiding Officers. Even of those polling stations which opened in time, one out of eight faced problems as to the delivery of material.
- 10.8. There were 199 polling stations with more than 1,000 registered voters. At these stations, double staffing was provided and both sets of officials were given copies of the register. Nevertheless, a shortage of staff was reported at some places, in particularly in Kambia district where the District Election Officer had arbitrarily reduced the polling staff from five to four.

¹¹ For instance, in Bo the District Returning Officer returned the special votes in their sealed containers to the place of poll, mixed the ballot papers with the votes cast on Election Day and thereafter counted the combined ballot papers. In other areas, the votes were counted separately and added to the count of the polling station. In the West Area and Kono, the count of the Special Vote was announced separately.

¹² Parties like MOP or APC alleged this was done intentionally to show that the army is not supporting the Kabbah government.

- 10.9. While the voting in general went smoothly and peacefully, the problems anticipated as to internally displaced people, transfer of votes, voter education and training of officials surfaced in various degrees. Also, under-age voting and double voting was observed in several polling stations. The greatest problem related to the transfer of votes. In many polling stations the list for transfer of votes did not exist. This prompted the NEC Chairman to issue a press release by radio and delivery, stating: "The National Electoral Commission wishes to inform all Presiding officers that they should allow all voters with valid voter ID cards to vote where they registered. If their names are not on the Register they should make sure they record their Names, Voter ID number, and PS code and allow them to vote. Voters with valid Transfer of vote slips should be allowed to vote and properly recorded." The press release arrived too late in many places in the interior and led to confusion as Presiding Officers at the polling stations interpreted the notice differently. In some polling stations, people who had registered in other districts or registrations centres were allowed to vote, in other places they were not. This created potential lack of uniformity of polling procedures. Moreover, some polling stations ran out of ballot papers because of this decision, thereby disenfranchising registered voters whose names were on the register¹³.
- 10.10. The lack of voter education became apparent at the polling stations. Observers witnessed voters being assisted in 66% of the polling stations visited. This sometimes compromised the secrecy of vote. In 16%, observers felt the secrecy was not respected. The high percentage of spoilt ballot papers also confirms the need for voter education.
- 10.11. A concern in the countryside was the pressure party agents in some polling stations exerted on the electorate. There were also complaints about Presiding Officers, considered to be SLPP supporters, not allowing party agents into certain polling stations.
- 10.12. An encouraging sign was the high number of domestic observers. In almost two thirds of the polling stations visited, EU observers found domestic observers. Local observers were trained and deployed by the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone and by NEW (National Election Watch), a coalition of eighteen civil society groups, labour unions, professional associations and religious organisations.
- 10.13. In 88.6% of the polling stations visited, the polling station closed in time, at 17.00 hours. Most voters came early; some started queuing up three hours before the opening of the polling station.
- 10.14. In all polling stations visited by the EU observers, the counting process was considered transparent. It was slow however, as the counting officer systematically took each ballot paper out of the ballot box and displayed it to the counting agents. A lot of time was also wasted dealing with void ballot papers.
- 10.15. The counting procedures inspired confidence in the political parties that results would be transferred accurately to the district commissions and to the NEC: ballot papers were counted at the polling station immediately after the closing of the polls, and signed forms with the results were provided to each party agent.

¹³ In Kailahun district, 13 out of 15 polling stations ran out of ballot papers by 11.30 hours. In Daru the same situation occurred. In other cases, the decision came into effect too late to be effective because of the predilection of voters to cast their vote as early as possible. In all cases where the Presiding Officer applied the change, they maintained a handwritten record of voters whose names were not included on any list and who presented a voter's ID card.

- 10.16. In 15.2% of the polling stations visited, the Presiding Officer did not follow the correct administrative procedures. Part B of each Statement of Poll and Declaration of Results tended to be completed at the end of the counting, rather than at the start as recommended in the "Guide to Election Officials". Filling in the forms manually by candlelight took a long time and the accuracy of the transposition was difficult to observe.
- 10.17. While the transparency of the counting process was generally considered good, the fact that the procedures were not followed in many of the polling stations observed indicates that the training was inadequate or not fully understood.

11. COLLATION OF VOTES

- 11.1. The assessment of the collation of votes by -EU observers differed considerably, from excellent in some districts to incompetent in other districts. Indeed, the collation process depended on the competence of the district returning officers and their assistants. They were responsible for securing the transfer of the ballot boxes from the polling stations to the district election centres, adding up all the votes cast in the district, entering the results on the "declaration of district results" forms, providing a copy to an agent of each party, and announcing the results of the elections on the district level. The NEC then had to carry out a double-check, and certify the results.
- 11.2. These procedures were not well followed, possibly because they had to be carried out in the dark and without the help of electronic equipment. Also, as stated earlier, the results of the districts were announced on the radio before they were certified by the NEC.
- 11.3. The allocation of seats from the district block was new and did not seem to be fully understood by all the DROs. Though the process was considered transparent by the EU observers, they did report a lack of understanding of the calculation procedures, and a lack of electronic equipment.

12. ELECTION RESULTS

- 12.1. The results of the Presidential Elections gave a clear victory to the incumbent President, Dr. Kabbah, who won 70% of the votes in the first round. In the Parliamentary Elections, his party won a majority in parliament with 83 seats. Only two other parties secured seats in parliament: APC (27 seats) and PLP (2 seats).
- 12.2. The 12.5% threshold necessary to obtain seats in parliament excluded the smaller parties. In a country coming out of a civil war, it could be useful to lower the threshold as to allow more political tendencies to be represented in parliament and in the decision-making process.
- 12.3. The SLPP won all the seats in the south (Bo, Kenema, Moyamba, Pujehun Districts), which confirmed the area as an SLPP stronghold. It also won seats in all of the other districts. The ruling party concludes that these results bridge the ethnic divisions, whereas other parties suggest the opposite.

- 12.4. The majority of the opposition parties accepted the result, though they did denounce several irregularities on polling day. The APC in particular pointed at exceptionally high numbers of votes for the incumbent President in the southern region: 99.4% in Pujehun, 99.2% in Bonthe, and 95% in Kenema.

13. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS

- 13.1. Specific procedures exist in the legislation to give the public the opportunity to challenge, object to or lodge a complaint at any step of the electoral process (registration of voters, nomination of candidates, electoral campaign and results - including the regularity of voting and counting procedures). It is a matter of concern that, despite numerous informal complaints by political parties and candidates, little use was made of these formal procedures by the main participants in the process. This could be due to a lack of trust in the system as well as to lack of information on these procedures, a lack of administrative response from the electoral bodies, and the cost and length of the judicial proceedings. In some specific cases, the litigation procedures and/or the institutions competent to settle disputes proved to be inappropriate or inefficient. The independence of the Judiciary is another issue that will have to be addressed in the future.
- 13.2. An Election Offences Court, established as a division of the High Court under section 111 of the Electoral Laws Act, was supposed to be responsible for trying any election offence under the Electoral Laws Act. However, the mechanism was never used and no petition was filed before the Election Offences Court.
- 13.3. As for the registration of voters, a few complaints were filed by some political parties and by civil society organisations. They related to under-age or double registration. This could be corrected by the exhibition procedure and by the final computerised register at the central level. In practice, an approximate total number of 20,000 additions were made to the register.
- 13.4. Regarding campaigning, the number of formal complaints was surprisingly low (not more than five). One of them related to the removal of posters. Consequently, on 22 April 2002, the NEC issued a statement to remind every contender that this kind of behaviour was an electoral offence and a breach of the code of election campaign ethics. Another complaint was filed on 25 April by Mrs Zainab Bangura, MOP chairperson, against the intimidating behaviour of SLPP supporters, preventing her from holding a meeting in Kenema. She claimed similar attacks against her supporters occurred in Kono and Freetown. On 7 May 2002, another complaint was lodged by the MOP, claiming that one of their supporters was fired from his position as civil servant for refusing to join the ruling party. No action was taken by the NEC to address any of these complaints, not even an acknowledgement of receipt.
- 13.5. Regarding the voting and counting processes, again few complaints were filed (only two). In Koinadugu, five political parties rejected the results claiming partiality of the Returning Officers, refusal of access to the polling station for some party agents, incorrect tabulation of the results, inflated number of valid votes and cases of multiple votes. The second complaint was filed by the APC Secretary General who asked for the invalidation of the elections in several parts of the country, alleging that the number of valid and rejected votes exceeded the total number of ballot papers issued to these polling stations. Again, no known action was taken by NEC to address these complaints. Nobody challenged the results with the Supreme

- Court (for the Presidential Elections) or with the High Court (for the Parliamentary Elections).
- 13.6. Observers noted a number of under-age people casting their vote. In some polling stations, some of them were turned away by the Presiding Officers. Surprisingly, the party agents did not seem to have made use of their right to challenge those voters.

14. PARAMOUNT CHIEF ELECTIONS

- 14.1. The constitution of Sierra Leone and the Electoral Laws Act provides that 12 of the 124 parliamentary seats be allocated to the Paramount Chiefs (one per district, excluding Freetown). The Paramount Chief elections are conducted separately and were originally scheduled for 5 May. As the Chiefdom Councillors' registration process was not complete, the date was postponed to 10 June.
- 14.2. Each of the 149 chiefdoms has a Chiefdom Council, which governs the chiefdom. The members of the Chiefdom Council choose the chief to represent the district in Parliament. Elections take place when there is more than one candidate. Only then is the NEC called upon to step in and conduct the elections on behalf of the Ministry of Local Government.
- 14.3. The Chiefdom Councils are comprised of the Paramount Chiefs, Chiefdom Speakers, Section Chiefs and Section Speakers, Town Chiefs, District Tribal Heads, Councillors (one per every 20 taxpayers, excluding women and children), and Divisional Heads.
- 14.4. The lists of the Chiefdom Council members have to be revised every three years. As the war prevented this, and the Ministry of Local Government failed to meet the deadline of the revision process, the Paramount Chief elections were delayed. There will be six elections - in the districts of Bombali, Koinadugu, Tonkolili, Port Loko and Kambia - and these will be held on 10 June.

15. RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU EOM would like to offer the following recommendations to the Sierra Leone authorities in order to improve the election framework in view of future elections.

15.1 Voter and Civic Education

Voter education needs to be strengthened and supported, both in terms of facilitating the voting process and assuring the secrecy of vote. Voter education should start earlier and be organised more effectively, through schools, civil society groups and political parties, as well as through the use of radio, interactive theatre and mobile training teams.

15.2 NEC Transparency and Communication

The NEC needs to improve its communication with the political parties and the general public, in order to enhance transparency and to diffuse information to the electorate faster and more effectively. It could do this by appointing a Public Relations Officer, who is easily accessible. On the district level, the DECs need to improve the transfer of information to the political parties. This could be done by replicating at the district level the National Consultative Committee, a body where party representatives liaise with the election administration. The international community and the EU in particular should assist by helping to rebuild the communication infrastructure in Sierra Leone, including the establishment of a telephone and electricity network.

15.3 Election Administration

- The NEC needs to be restructured and strengthened. Staff needs to be better trained and provided with clear job descriptions. In particular, there is a need for computer specialists, trainers in voter education, and experts on legal and electoral issues.
- District Electoral Officers and District Returning Officers need to be appointed earlier and should receive more means and training to achieve an effective electoral organisation at the district level.
- The International Community should continue its support to the NEC focusing on capacity building.

15.4 Election Procedures

- The register of voters should be maintained and regularly updated. The production of such a voter register could also take advantage of the upcoming national census.
- The method of appointing election and polling officers should be improved, taking into consideration recommendations from political parties and civil society groups.
- The procedures for special voting and the transfer of vote should be better communicated and handled, as to avoid confusion and thus suspicion of manipulation, and assure a uniformity of polling procedures.
- As for the counting, the number of invalid votes should be calculated during the counting and registered in the official protocol together with the results,
- special votes should not be announced separately, as to avoid stigmatisation of certain groups.

15.5 Electoral System

Replacing the District Block System by the Single Seat Constituency System would make the allocation of seats less complicated and more transparent, and provide a better representation of the districts' electorates.

15.6 Media

- The NEC should be responsible to ensure that the political parties are allocated equal airtime on state radio and television, as required by the Electoral Laws Act. A media watch dog should be established within the NEC to this purpose.

- The NEC should also ensure that the commercial rates, charged by SLBS, are affordable to most political parties.
- Finally, the NEC should establish rules as to access to polling stations by the press during the counting and the announcement of results.
- Workshops for local journalists, as organised by UNAMSIL and National Election Watch, should be increased in order to improve the quality and neutrality of reporting.

15.7 Political Parties

The political parties need to be supported, both in terms of material (computer, photocopy machine) and human resources (training, communication, information gathering). The EU should organise training programmes for the newly elected MPs, including helping them to get access to the Internet and to attend parliamentary debates in countries like Ghana, which has a vibrant Parliament.

15.8 Judiciary System

The government should seek to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, which would contribute to democracy and to consolidate the peace in the fragile post-conflict country.

ANNEXES

Annex 1 – Press Releases

THE EU ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

Freetown, 12 April 2002

On the invitation of the government of Sierra Leone, the European Union (EU) has established an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe the 14th of May Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Sierra Leone. The EOM is led by the Chief Observer (CO) Mr. Johan Van Hecke, Member of the European Parliament and Vice-President of the joint EU-African, Caribbean and Pacific Parliamentary Assembly.

As any EU Election Observation Mission, the key objectives are:

- To make a comprehensive and national analysis of the electoral process, and offer an impartial, balanced and informed assessment of the election.
- By the presence of the observers, to seek to reduce tensions, minimise instances of fraud, intimidation and violence, and increase confidence to contestants and voters to participate freely.

The Election Observation Mission in Sierra Leone was established on the 1st of April. It will remain in the country until the announcement of the final election results and follow up the complaints and appeals procedures. The Mission will have 20 Long Term Observers, who will observe the pre-election phase in the different districts of the four regions, as well as 56 Short Term Observers, who will observe the voting and counting procedures on and after election day. The Long Term Observers will be deployed on the 18th of April and the Short Term Observers will join the Mission in the first week of May.

The observation of elections is an important component of the EU's policy to promote human rights and democratisation throughout the world. In this respect the EU works on the basis of partnership with the host country, its objective being to develop national capacity.

The Election Observation Mission will take note of the registration of voters and candidates, the electoral campaigns, complaints and appeals by different candidates and political parties and the preparations for the election day. The Mission in Sierra Leone will also assess the electoral framework, the democratic and human rights framework, access to the media during the campaign as well as the voting, counting and tabulation procedures.

During its stay in Sierra Leone, the EU EOM will hold regular meetings with election officials at the national, regional and provincial level, and with candidates, representatives of political parties, the civil society and the media.

On polling day observers will be deployed in the field to follow the voting, counting and tabulation process. After the election, the Chief Observer will issue a preliminary statement based on the observation of the entire process. At a later stage, a more comprehensive report will be issued, comprising recommendations for improvements to the overall electoral process and the democratic situation.

The EU Election Observation Mission in Sierra Leone hopes that the forthcoming elections will reinforce Sierra Leone's commitment to democracy through a free, fair and peaceful electoral process with full participation of all the parties.

THE EUROPEAN UNION TO DEPLOY 90 OBSERVERS FOR THE 14TH OF MAY ELECTIONS IN SIERRA LEONE

Freetown, 10th of May 2002

A total of some 90 observers of the European Union Election Observation Mission, led by the Chief Observer, Mr. Johan van Hecke, and deployed in all the districts of the country, will be observing the 14th of May Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Sierra Leone.

Last Thursday 9th of May, 63 Short Term Observers coming from 13 different European countries joined the EU Election Observation Mission to observe the polling, counting and collation procedures on and after Election Day. Three of these Short Term Observers are Members of the European Parliament delegation led by Mr. John Corrie, former Co-President of the ACP-EU Joint Parliament Assembly.

Since last month, 20 Long Term Observers plus the 7 members of the Core Team (based in Freetown) have been observing the development of the electoral process throughout Sierra Leone. The observers have been taking note of the registration of refugees and returnees, the electoral campaigns, complaints and appeals by different candidates and political parties and the preparations for Election Day. The Mission has been also assessing the electoral framework, the democratic and human rights related to the electoral process and access to the media during the campaign.

The EU Election Observation Mission through its presence is seeking to reduce tensions, minimise instances of fraud, intimidation and violence, and increase the confidence of candidates and voters to participate freely in the 14th of May elections.

The Mission will remain in the Sierra Leone until the announcement of the final election results to follow up the complaints and appeals procedures. After the election, the Chief Observer, Mr. Johan Van Hecke, will issue a preliminary statement based on the observation of the entire process. At a later stage, a more comprehensive report will be issued, comprising recommendations for improvements to the overall electoral process and the democratic situation.

THE EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION TO DEPART SIERRA LEONE ON 4 JUNE 2002

Freetown, 1 June 2002

The European Union Election Observation Mission in Sierra Leone will end on 4 June 2002.

After the issuing of the Preliminary Statement on the election assessment by the Chief Observer, Mr. Johan van Hecke, on 16 May, the Mission is continuing to work on post- election observation activities and on the preparation of the Final Report that will be issued shortly. This report will consist of a comprehensive evaluation of the electoral process with recommendations for improvements to the overall electoral process. The Report will be issued to Political Parties, National Electoral Commission (NEC) and other institutions of Sierra Leonean society and international donors through the EC Delegation in the country.

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) was established in Sierra Leone on 2 April, following an invitation from the Government, to observe the 14th of May Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. For that purpose a total of 90 observers (including long and short term observers) were deployed throughout the country. The Mission observed not only the polling, counting and collation procedures, but also the registration of refugees and returnees, the electoral campaign, access to the media, complaints and appeals by different candidates and political parties and the preparations for Election Day.

The Mission wishes to express its gratitude to the NEC, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the Political Parties, the International Electoral Consultants, the Domestic and International Observers, the EC Delegation in Sierra Leone and all other organisations who, during our stay in the country, offered us their support and cooperation.

Likewise, the EU EOM wishes to congratulate the population of Sierra Leone for its eagerness on Election Day and, therefore, overt commitment to the democratic process and the future of the country.

Annex 2 – Preliminary Statement

**ON THE PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
IN SIERRA LEONE 14TH MAY 2002**

By Johan Van Hecke, Chief Observer, EU EOM Sierra Leone 2002

Freetown, 15th May 2002

The EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) has been present in Sierra Leone since the beginning of April 2002. The EU EOM is led by Mr. Johan Van Hecke, Member of the European Parliament and of the ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly and Human Rights rapporteur for 2002. The Mission consisted of a seven persons core team, 20 Long Term Observers and 64 Short Term Observers. On Election Day, the EU had the largest group of International Observers in Sierra Leone, deployed in all districts of the country.

The EU EOM will continue to observe the collating of votes at the different electoral levels and any complaints that might arise. A final report will be issued later, after the results have been announced.

The Mission wishes to acknowledge the good relationship with the NEC (National Electoral Commission), UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone), the Political Parties, and the Domestic and International Observers.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

“The peaceful 2002 elections mark a first step to return to democracy in Sierra Leone, but the peace and the democratic process remain fragile.”

The 2002 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Sierra Leone were violence-free, allowing free campaigning and voting in most of the country. Initial shortcomings in the registration process and the organisation of the elections, acts of intimidation and coercion in some areas during the pre-election period, and huge logistical constraints did not undermine the determination of the people to express their right to vote.

The turn-out was high. People showed an eagerness and commitment to vote. They came out with a clear message: ‘Let the ballot boxes decide on the future of this country, not the guns’.

The overall impression on Election Day was of a transparent and reasonably well administered voting process, considering the circumstances. Problems of under-age and double voting were highlighted in some areas. The presence of party agents and observers in most polling stations enhanced the transparency of the process. The deployment of UNAMSIL soldiers and the Sierra Leonean police around the polling stations gave an additional reassurance.

In the pre-election period, political parties were allowed to campaign throughout the country. However, in some instances in rural areas, opposition parties found it difficult to organise meetings or rallies. In some areas, the Paramount Chiefs exerted direct or indirect pressure in favour of the ruling party.

The NEC faced great organisational and logistical difficulties. The registration process and the transfer of votes were particularly problematic. To overcome some of these problems, the NEC took a late decision - through a press release on the morning of Election Day - allowing voters with valid documentation to cast their votes, even if their names were not on the register. However, the press release did not give clear instructions, leading to different interpretations by the presiding officers.

The disqualification of one of the vice-presidential candidates and the press release issued on the morning of Election Day by the National Electoral Commission are issues of concern for the EU EOM according to the provisions of the Electoral Laws Act.

The electoral process and the political campaign were well covered by the local media, with private newspapers showing different political tendencies. However, according to findings of the EU EOM media monitoring team, the state radio and television SLBS gave disproportionate attention to the ruling party, despite provisions in the Electoral Laws Act that national radio and TV should allocate equal airtime to all the political parties.

Voter education on the national and district level by the NEC was inadequate. As a result, the electoral process in some polling stations was slow as people were not aware of polling procedures.

1. Background and Environment

Ten years of civil war in Sierra Leone have left tens of thousands of people dead, thousands maimed for life, and hundreds of thousands internally and externally displaced. Three quarters of the country's infrastructure is in ruins. The cruelty of the war has served as a reminder, and has motivated the people to exercise tolerance and restraint.

During the Electoral Campaign the political parties were able to campaign throughout the country in a violence-free atmosphere. Nonetheless, several parties reported difficulties in campaigning in rural areas in particular, due to logistical constraints and intimidation by other parties. Some Paramount Chiefs were campaigning for the ruling party or preventing other political parties from organising campaign activities.

In the final days of the campaigning, increased tension between the parties was observed. This resulted in some isolated incidents, in which supporters of different parties were throwing stones at each other. The most serious incident was between supporters of the SLPP (Sierra Leone People's Party) and RUF (Revolutionary United Front Party) on 11 May in Freetown, in which seven people were slightly injured. (Initial reports of deaths were denied by the police and UNAMSIL).

2. Election Administration

The NEC was responsible for organising the elections. It was assisted by UNAMSIL (in terms of logistics) and by several international consultants (in terms of organisation, legal assistance, and voter education). The NEC faced several difficulties in accomplishing its task. This was partly due to the poor condition of the country's infrastructure (roads, communication, lack of electricity and transport), partly due to lack of efficiency, capacity and experience.

The NEC failed to distribute vital information to the political parties and the public in general and was unable to meet the deadlines for the publication of the candidate party list, and the polling stations list. Delays in providing the polling station list in particular created great difficulties for the political parties, the voters and the observers.

Voter education was recognised as an urgent need; more than 80% of the population is illiterate. Unfortunately, voter education started late (only in the last 10 days it was more noticeable), leaving many voters, particularly in the rural areas, without the necessary information on the electoral process. During the first three weeks of the campaign, voter education was minimal, consisting of only the sporadic broadcasting of NEC press releases and the “2002 Voter Education Songs”. Posters were delivered very late in the districts.

There were many shortcomings reported on the registration process. Though the EU EOM was not present during the general registration process in January 2002, many political parties complained about the lack or late arrival of registration equipment (tables, chairs, cameras, pens) and about the fact that a number of eligible voters were left out of the process. They also denounced the lack of registration information, under-age and double registration. The NEC tried to overcome these deficiencies by extending the registration process for three days. In addition, there was a verification period, as provided for by the Electoral Laws Act, in which voters could verify whether their names were on the list and present the necessary modifications.


Despite the reports of shortcomings, the number of registered voters was high. Of the 2.7 million eligible voters 2.3 million (85 percent) registered.

Lastly, the elections of the Paramount Chiefs, scheduled for 5th May, were postponed to an undetermined date, which may delay the opening of Parliament.

3. The Media

The electoral campaign was covered extensively by the local media. National radio and TV, Radio UNAMSIL, Radio Democracy and newspapers were the main actors providing information to the voters. Special programmes on elections were broadcast on radio and TV, including not only political party rallies but also analysis of the campaign and political debates. Newspapers published lists of parliamentary candidates and profiles of the presidential candidates.

Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS) established quality programming on the elections, with daily news, reports and interviews in-studio, including free airtime to the different political parties. However, the distribution of airtime in this special programming was not equal, with a strong imbalance in favour of the ruling SLPP. The monitoring of the media by the EU EOM showed that the state radio and TV allocated six hours and 12 minutes to this party (out of a total of 28 hours and 16 minutes). This was 2.5 hours more airtime than MOP (the second most presented party) which had almost 3.5 hours.



In this respect, it is important to remark that after the amendment of the Electoral Laws Act on 4th April 2002, responsibility for ensuring that equal time was allocated to each party on national radio and TV remained with SLBS itself. This made it both a media participant and regulator.

Newspapers offered diverse views of the campaign, sometimes with clear positions in favour of the two main parties (SLPP and APC), sometimes with inaccurate information about parties and rallies. In any case, the impact of these publications is minor compared to the radio stations, mainly because of their limited distribution and the high illiteracy rate in the country.

4. Election Day

The population of Sierra Leone turned out in great numbers to cast their vote. Some were waiting patiently for hours under the sun, demonstrating a strong commitment to the democratic process. No incidents of violence were reported. The voting process was transparent, with party agents and observers present in many polling stations.

In some polling stations, voting started late because the ballot boxes and ballot papers did not arrive on time or the voters lists were mixed up. In Daru and Kenema town, a large number of under-age voting was reported. In Tongo (Kenema District) cases of double voting were registered.

Several observers acknowledged the dedication of the polling officers, who went out of their way to explain people how to cast their vote. This sometimes slowed down the process considerably. Also, it sometimes interfered with the secrecy of vote, as polling agents would go inside the polling booths.

The press release during the morning of Election Day, authorising people to vote even when their names were not on the voter register, did create some confusion and arrived too late in many places in the interior. In some polling stations, people who had registered in other districts or registration stations were allowed to vote, in other places they were not. This created potential lack of uniformity of polling procedures.

In most places, however, voting finished on time and counting could start immediately after the closing of the polling stations.

*For further information, contact the EU EOM Media Adviser, Javier Gutierrez Dubon:
Tel. +232 (0) 76 635 490*

Annex 3 – Core Team

NAME	FUNCTION
VAN HECKE Johann	Chief Observer
ACCAME Carlo	Deputy Chief Observer
DE HERDT Vincent	Legal Expert
BAIRD Alister	Election Expert
BERNEHEIM Robert	Logistics & Security Expert
GUTIERREZ DUBON Javier	Media Expert
BLANCHET Delphine	LTO Co-ordinator

Annex 4 - LTO and STO Deployment

Team No.	Name of STOs	Name of LTOs	Area of Responsibility		
1		Philip Jol	Freetown		
		Claudia Leonini			
2	Emmanuel Geny				
	Despina Saraliotou				
3	Delphine Skowron				
	Antonio Vidigal				
4	Mariana Muzzi IOM				
	Karin Junker MEP				
5	John Currie MEP				
	Trang Ngyen				
6	Ann Mc Lauchlan				
	Pomes Ruiz				
7					
11		Mats Melin	Kambia/Port Loko		
		Isabel Menchon Lopez			
12	Peter Hazdra				
	Roxanne Bazergan				
13	Riccardo Leonini				
	Elizabeth Keane				
14	Siliana Laurenti				
	Valdimir Stehlik				
15	Thibault Heuze				
	Ann van Isacker				
21			Oskar Lehner	Bombali(Makeni)	
			Ragnhild Hollekim		
22	Michel Fourman				
	Antonio Dal Borgo				
23	Tanja Schumer				
	Jelske Kuijper				
24	Lars Bjorklund				
	Martim Freire				
31			Lars Tollemark		Tonkolili(Magburaka)
			Regina Tauschek		
32	Margareth Hammer				
	Katarina Smits				
33	Fabio Bargiacchi				
	Bernd Leber				
34	Christope Menou				
	Peter Egloff				
41		Paul Horsting		Koinadugu(Kabala)	
		Paavo Pitkanen			
42	Janet Andersson				
	Pedro Manuel Semedo				
43	Evangelina Vassiliadou				
	Nigel Ones				

Team No.	Name of STOs	Name of LTOs	Area of Responsibility
51		Heinz Jockers	Moyamba/Bonthe
		Maria Alborghetti	
52	Scipion du Chatenet		
	Christy Raschdorf		
53	Peter Detmer		
	Hazel Boylan		
61		David Throup	mobile
		Bard Thorheim	076-638304
62	Bernhard Heidiger		Bo/Pujehun
	Paula Swenker		
63	Kostas Sourmalis		
	Mercedes Cavaller		
64	Christer Robson		
	Suzana Fernandez		
65	Michael Coyne		
	Maria del Sagrario		
66	Erika Lundstrom		
	Germain Calleja		
71		Jerome Leyraud	mobile
		Soraya Usmani Martinez	076-638287
72	Astrid Ilper		Kenema
	Bjorn Tidblom		
73	Luis Gaviria		
	Demetrio Lazagna		
74	Erik de Feijter		
	Patricia Farren		
81		Gerard Le Marec	Kono(Koidu)
		Ongensa Nkweso	
82	Remo Galli		
	Louise Mallee		
83	Manuel de Rivera		
	Etienne Ringlet		
84	Tiina Heino		
	Gerhart Schneider		
91		Eckart Rohde	Kailahun(Daru)
		Rudolf Elbling	
92	Beatrix Ferenci		
	Martin Tooley		
93	Thalia Vassikiou		
	Walter Torres		

Annex 5 - Election Day Summary of Findings

Voting Process

During Polling Day 44 teams submitted reports to the Observation Mission HQs in Freetown, see deployment plan for further details. In total, 572 polling day report forms were processed at HQs on polling day and the following days. Forms were delivered by hand from the teams observing in Freetown LTO-area, and from the rest of the LTO areas the forms were delivered the following days by courier. Summary report forms were communicated via telephone to the LTO Co-ordinator in Freetown during the evening of the Election Day. The intention of the use of the summary forms was to get an overview of the Polling Day activities as quick as possible. The LTOs also gave narrative reports to the LTO Co-ordinator. In addition to the polling day report forms, 47 counting forms were submitted to the HQs in Freetown. The quality of some report forms was of surprisingly low standard (missing information, wrong Polling Station id etc), which indicate that there is a need for proper training of the observers on ground before they are deployed to the LTO-area. The normal instruction to stay in the Polling Station for about 30 minutes was not followed by several teams, see below.

Sierra Leone is divided into four regions (Eastern, Northern, Southern and Western) and each region is divided into a number districts. There are 14 districts in total in the country, but in this report two districts, West-West and West-East, is treated as one district, Freetown, which was one of the ten LTO areas. The districts are divided into 162 Chiefdoms (Wards in Freetown), but they are not a part of the Election administration. The allocation of seats etc is done at district level. The total number of polling stations in Sierra Leone, according to the list submitted to the EUEOM, is 5222.

The EU Election Observation Mission deployed 10 Long Term Observers Teams, each team consist of two observers. The 10 LTO teams covered all 14 regions, see table below. Four of the LTO teams covered two districts each.

On Election Day observer teams visited 547 polling stations, 21 were visited twice and two stations three times. The actual number of visited polling stations is higher due to the fact that some reports contained reports from two or more co-located stations. The actual number of visited polling station is 594 (47 co-located stations). The number of reports and number of teams per LTO area is shown in the table below.

LTO Area	Region	No of Districts	No. of Teams ^{*)}	No. of Reports	Per cent	
1	Freetown E/W	W	2	8	105	18.4
2	Kambia/Port Loko	N	2	5	54	9.4
3	Bombali	N	1	4	52	9.1
4	Tonkolili	N	1	4	52	9.1
5	Koinadugu	N	1	3	40	7.0
6	Moyamba/Bonthe	S	2	3	36	6.3
7	Bo/Pujehun	S	2	6	91	15.9
8	Kenema	E	1	4	61	10.7
9	Kono	E	1	4	37	6.5
10	Kailahun	E	1	3	44	7.7
Total		14	44**)	572	100.1	

*) Including the LTO Teams and Core Team members

***)10 LTO + 34 STO

The number of reports from each of the 14 districts is shown in the table below and in diagram 7 in the annex.

	Election District	No. of Reports	Per cent
1	Freetown - W	34	5.9
2	Freetown - E	71	12.4
3	Kambia	23	4.0
4	Port Loko	31	5.4
5	Bombali	52	9.1
6	Tonkolili	52	9.1
7	Koinadugu	40	7.0
8	Moyamba	30	5.2
9	Bonthe	7	1.2
10	Bo	84	14.7
11	Pujehun	6	1.0
12	Kenema	61	10.7
13	Kono	37	6.5
14	Kailahun	44	7.7
		572	

The number of reports per region is shown below in the table and in diagram 8 in the annex.

Region	No. of Reports	Per cent
East	142	24.8
North	198	34.6
South	127	22.2
West	105	18.4
	572	

The observer spent in average 23 minutes in the polling station during the polling process, see diagram 1 (in figures) and 2 (in per cent) below. It is a figure, which is clearly below the recommended standard time to stay in a Polling Station, and in future mission this must be emphasized in the training before the deployment. Some teams spent just 10 – 15 minutes in the Polling Stations, which is not acceptable from a professional observation point of view. The figure, 23 minutes, also includes the first polling station the observer visited. In the first Polling Station the observers normally spend more time than in the stations they are visiting during the rest of the day. So in fact the real average is lower than 23 minutes.




Diagram 1

Diagram 2

The highest number of reports handed in from one team to HQs was 36, see diagram 3. The average number of reports is 13, which is slightly higher than in other missions. One reason for the high average is that many polling stations were located in schools and it was possible for the teams to split up and visit two polling stations at the same time. If we also include the co-located stations the average is 14. To visit 26 and 36 polling stations in one day is not possible if you shall make a credible observation!




Diagram 3

The teams were instructed to be in the polling station prior to the opening to check the opening procedures, and in one out of eight polling station the observer teams reported problems regarding the delivery of the election material to the Polling Station. However, no major problems were reported. In 25% of the visited Polling Station the observers reported that the station was opened late. The majority of the reports about late opening are from the East and the West region. The late opening was spread over the districts in the two regions.

In 6.6% of the visited polling stations the observers reported that voters were not checked for ink prior to that they received the ballot paper. The figure is high, and in a country where the quality of the voter register is disputed this part of the process is essential. Furthermore the ink check is one of most important means the officials have to ensure that multiple voting is not taking place. On Polling Day the Election Authorities (NEC) issued a statement, which made it possible for people to vote even if they were not included in the voter register. This very late statement emphasises the importance of the ink.

The voting procedures, accept for the check of the ink, (id check, ballot papers etc) were followed according to the observer reports.

The secrecy of the vote was not ensured in 16% of the visited Polling Stations. The figure is high and there could be several explanations to the figure, such as small Polling Stations with bad layout or that the polling officers were keen to assist the process for the voter without any intension to influence the voters choice of candidate and party.

In four out of ten visited Polling Stations people were allowed to vote without being registered in that particular Polling Station. The high figure is, of course, explained by the fact that the Commission

issued a statement in morning of the Polling Day that it was possible to vote without being included in the register.

In approximately two thirds (64%) of the polling stations Domestic NGO Observers were present. The presence of Domestic Observers in the four regions is shown in diagram 4. The range is from 54% in the East to 76% in the Western region. The distribution by Election District is displayed in the table below and in diagram 9 in the annex.




Diagram 4

Election District	Domestic Observer present
BO	71,6%
BOMBALI	48,0%
BONTHE	85,7%
EAST DISTRICT	77,3%
KAILAHUN	56,8%
KAMBIA	56,5%
KENEMA	45,0%
KOINADUGU	52,5%
KONO	65,7%
MOYAMBA	48,3%
PORT LOKO	64,5%
PUJEHUN	83,3%
TONKOLILI	70,2%
WEST DISTRICT	96,9%

Party agents were present in almost every polling station visited by observers. The ruling party and the main opposition party were present in 85% and 61% of the visited Polling Stations. The distribution among the Election Districts is shown in the table below.

Election District	APC Party Agent present	SLPP Party Agent present
BO	50.0%	83.3%
BOMBALI	63.5%	92.3%
BONTHE	14.3%	100.0%

EAST DISTRICT	74.6%	81.7%
KAILAHUN	11.4%	68.2%
KAMBIA	91.3%	91.3%
KENEMA	31.1%	77.0%
KOINADUGU	77.5%	89.7%
KONO	55.6%	75.6%
MOYAMBA	23.3%	96.7%
PORT LOKO	100.0%	83.9%
PUJEHUN	0.0%	50.0%
TONKOLILI	84.6%	65.4%
WEST DISTRICT	82.4%	72.2%

In 514 out of 572 reports the observers reported that Party Agents were present in the Polling Station. In average 2.7 Party Agents were observing the process. In two cases all 11 Agents were present. The distribution is shown in diagram 5.




Diagram 5

To summarise the voting process the observers were asked to give an overall rating of the process, and in 72.8% of the visited polling stations observers rated the process as “Very Good” or “Good”. In 17 (3.1%) Polling Stations the overall assessment was reported as “Very bad”, and in 46 (8.3%) the process was rated as “Bad”. With four alternatives instead of five for the overall assessment the figure for Very bad/bad should have been higher. The figure for Very bad/Bad (11.4%) is higher here than in other countries observed (Cambodia/2002 – 3.7%, Sri Lanka/2000 – 10.2%, Sri Lank/2001 – 7.3%, Guyana/2001 - 2.5%). The overall assessment for the four regions is shown in diagram 6 below. For more detailed information about the overall assessment for the regions and the districts see annex. To get an idea how the teams answered on the Overall assessment question the numbers for Very bad/Bad by team and LTO-area is shown in the annex.




Diagram 6

A summary of the observer report forms for the polling process is shown in the annex.

Counting Process

After the close of the poll at 17.00hrs observers were instructed to follow the counting process. The counting started at the polling station immediately after that the poll was finished. After that the count was finished the observers followed the delivery of election material to the district centres. The observers reported that the material was secured and that the transportation of the election material to the district centres was carried out in a secure way.

47 counting reports were sent in to HQs by the observers.

No problems were reported for the closing procedures. In five visited Polling Stations the observers reported that the counting process was delayed mainly due to administrative problems.

The counting of the ballots was at all visited polling stations done in an open and transparent way according to the observer reports.


The handling of Invalid ballots was not handled according to the rules in 15% of the observed Polling Stations. Observers reported that the invalidation of Ballot papers were made in an inconsistent way, which sometimes created a tense discussion among the officials and Party Agents. Common criteria's were not applied in some Polling Stations.

Domestic Observers were present in four out of five Polling Stations.


The overall assessment of the counting process was rated better than the polling process. 82% reported "Very Good" or "Good" compared to 73% for the polling process. The number of report forms from the count is too small to draw any further conclusions about the process. It is just a few instances of problems reported.

Annex 6 - Summary of Registered Voters by Districts


Number of reports per District



Number of reports per Region



Domestic Observers present in Polling Station



Election Day Reports - Summary

No.	Question	YES	NO	No of forms
		%	%	
A. Environment				
1	Did you witness any active Campaigning on Election Day?	2.1	97.9	533
B. Opening of PS				
2	Were all the Polling Staff present to prepare for the opening?	89.4	10.6	113
3	Did the Polling Station receive all the necessary material from NEC?	87.2	12.8	141
4	Did the Polling Station open on time?	74.4	25.6	117
5	Was the ballot box verified to be empty then properly sealed ?	92.7	7.3	110
6	Turn out control	N/A	N/A	
C. Voting Procedure				
7	Did the official check for indelible ink on left thumb/elsewhere	93.4	6.6	501
8	Did the official check the voters' card/other relevant means of identification ?	99.2	0.8	506
9	Was the voter register marked in all cases?	90.8	9.2	501
10	Did the official appropriately mark ballot paper 1?	99.6	0.4	506
11	Did the official appropriately mark ballot paper 2?	99.8	0.2	505
12	Were the Ballot Paper marked in secrecy ?	84.4	15.6	500
13	Did people vote on behalf of others?	5.2	94.8	424
14	Were voters requiring assistance aided in the proper manner?	87.1	12.9	333
15	Were all people in the register permitted to vote ?	96.9	3.1	512
16	Were people not in the register permitted to vote ?	40.1	59.9	504
17	Was any voter intimidation observed?	2.7	97.3	517
F. Polling Station				
18	Were the Ballot Boxes properly sealed ?	97.2	2.8	563
19	Were the Ballot Boxes properly openly displayed in view?	98.9	1.1	555
20	Did the layout of the Polling Station allow the easy flow of voters?	92.8	7.2	552
21	Were Domestic Observers present?	63.7	36.3	551
22	Were Party Agents present?	91.9	8.1	545
	APC	335		
	CUPP	8		
	GAP	47		
	MOP	123		
	PDP	61		
	PLP	186		
	SLPP	462		
	RUFPP	142		
	UNPP	127		
	YPP	20		
	NDA	18		
23	Were any Unauthorised Persons present in the Polling Station?	3.9	96.1	534
24	At the close of the poll were people in the queue allowed to vote?	33.3	66.7	12
G. Assessment				
25	Was there cause for Complaint or a complaint registered?	9.8	90.2	501
26	Your Overall Assessment of the process in this Polling Station?	Very good	22.5	551
		Good	50.3	
		Fair	15.8	
		Bad	8.3	
		Very Bad	3.1	
Total Number of forms:		572		

Counting Reports - Summary

No	Question	YES	NO	No of forms
		%	%	
1	Was the counting process started immediately following the close of poll?	88.6	11.4	45
2	Were the Ballot Papers counted in an open and transparent manner?	100	0	47
3	Did the Counting Officer handle the Invalid Ballot papers according to the Act?	84.8	15.2	47
4	Did the Party Agents receive a copy of the Declaration of Results Form?	85.4	14.6	42
5	Did any Party Agent file a complaint at the Counting Centre?	11.1	88.9	46
6	Were the Copies of Declaration of Results Form sent separately to the NRO and DCO?	92.0	8.0	26
7	Were there Domestic Observers present?	82.2	17.8	46
8	What is your Overall Assessment of the Counting Process?			
		Very Bad	0.0	45
		Bad	6.8	
		Fair	11.4	
		Good	38.6	
		Very good	43.2	
Total Number of forms:		47		

Number of Reports per Team

Team	Region	No of Reports
1	Freetown (E/W)	5
2	Freetown (E/W)	14
3	Freetown (E/W)	12
4	Freetown (E/W)	17
5	Freetown (E/W)	26
6	Freetown (E/W)	8
7	Freetown (E/W)	13
9	Freetown (E/W)	10
11	Kambia/Port Loko	10
12	Kambia/Port Loko	12
13	Kambia/Port Loko	10
14	Kambia/Port Loko	11
15	Kambia/Port Loko	11
21	Bombali	16
22	Bombali	15
23	Bombali	10
24	Bombali	11
31	Tonkolili	10
32	Tonkolili	15
33	Tonkolili	15
34	Tonkolili	12
41	Koinadugu	15
42	Koinadugu	11
43	Koinadugu	14
51	Bonthe/Moyamba	9
52	Bonthe/Moyamba	13
53	Bonthe/Moyamba	14
61	Pujehun/Bo	36
62	Pujehun/Bo	11
63	Pujehun/Bo	12
64	Pujehun/Bo	17
65	Pujehun/Bo	11
66	Pujehun/Bo	4
71	Kenema	16
72	Kenema	15
73	Kenema	14
74	Kenema	16
81	Kono	10
82	Kono	7
83	Kono	9
84	Kono	11
91	Kailahun	16
92	Kailahun	15
93	Kailahun	13
	Total:	572

Overall Assessment - Region

<i>Region</i>	<i>Overall Assessment</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent in the region</i>
<i>E</i>			
	Very	20	15,4%
	Good	69	53,1%
	Fair	20	15,4%
	Bad	20	15,4%
	Very bad	1	0,8%
	Sum:	130	
	Percent	23,6%	
<i>N</i>			
	Very	41	21,0%
	Good	108	55,4%
	Fair	30	15,4%
	Bad	12	6,2%
	Very bad	4	2,1%
	Sum:	195	
	Percent	35,4%	
<i>S</i>			
	Very	46	37,4%
	Good	49	39,8%
	Fair	17	13,8%
	Bad	5	4,1%
	Very bad	6	4,9%
	Sum:	123	
	Percent	22,3%	
<i>W</i>			
	Very	17	16,5%
	Good	51	49,5%
	Fair	20	19,4%
	Bad	9	8,7%
	Very bad	6	5,8%
	Sum:	103	
	Percent	18,7%	
	Grand Total:	551	

Overall Assessment - District

<i>District</i>	<i>Overall Assessment</i>	<i>Frequence</i>	<i>Per cent in the district</i>
BO			
	Very	29	35,4%
	Good	31	37,8%
	Fair	11	13,4%
	Bad	5	6,1%
	Very bad	6	7,3%
	Sum:	82	
	Percent	14,9%	
BOMBALI			
	Very	8	15,4%
	Good	33	63,5%
	Fair	5	9,6%
	Bad	5	9,6%
	Very bad	1	1,9%
	Sum:	52	
	Percent	9,4%	
BONTHE			
	Good	6	85,7%
	Fair	1	14,3%
	Sum:	7	
	Percent	1,3%	
EAST DISTRICT			
	Very	5	7,2%
	Good	39	56,5%
	Fair	16	23,2%
	Bad	5	7,2%
	Very bad	4	5,8%
	Sum:	69	
	Percent	12,5%	
KAILAHUN			
	Very	5	11,6%
	Good	27	62,8%
	Fair	5	11,6%
	Bad	6	14,0%
	Sum:	43	
	Percent	7,8%	
KAMBIA			
	Very	9	39,1%
	Good	6	26,1%
	Fair	7	30,4%
	Very bad	1	4,3%
	Sum:	23	
	Percent	4,2%	
KENEMA			
	Very	11	21,2%
	Good	19	36,5%
	Fair	11	21,2%
	Bad	11	21,2%
	Sum:	52	
	Percent	9,4%	

KOINADUGU			
	Very	15	37,5%
	Good	22	55,0%
	Fair	2	5,0%
	Bad	1	2,5%
	Sum:	40	
	Percent	7,3%	
KONO			
	Very	4	11,4%
	Good	23	65,7%
	Fair	4	11,4%
	Bad	3	8,6%
	Very bad	1	2,9%
	Sum:	35	
	Percent	6,4%	
MOYAMBA			
	Very	16	57,1%
	Good	9	32,1%
	Fair	3	10,7%
	Sum:	28	
	Percent	5,1%	
PORT LOKO			
	Very	5	16,7%
	Good	17	56,7%
	Fair	6	20,0%
	Bad	2	6,7%
	Sum:	30	
	Percent	5,4%	
PUJEHUN			
	Very	1	16,7%
	Good	3	50,0%
	Fair	2	33,3%
	Sum:	6	
	Percent	1,1%	
TONKOLILI			
	Very	4	8,0%
	Good	30	60,0%
	Fair	10	20,0%
	Bad	4	8,0%
	Very bad	2	4,0%
	Sum:	50	
	Percent	9,1%	
WEST DISTRICT			
	Very	12	35,3%
	Good	12	35,3%
	Fair	4	11,8%
	Bad	4	11,8%
	Very bad	2	5,9%
	Sum:	34	
	Percent	6,2%	
	Grand Total:	551	

Overall Assessment - LTO Area / Team

<i>LTO</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Team</i>	<i>Overall Assessment</i>	<i>Frequene</i>	<i>Per cent</i>		
<i>1</i>	<i>Freetown</i>	<i>1</i>					
			Bad	1	6,7%		
			Very bad	1	6,7%		
		<i>2</i>			Bad	1	6,7%
					Very bad	1	6,7%
		<i>4</i>			Bad	4	26,7%
					Very bad	3	20,0%
		<i>6</i>			Bad	1	6,7%
					Very bad	1	6,7%
		<i>7</i>			Bad	2	13,3%
					Sum:	15	
					Percent	23,8%	
<i>2</i>	<i>Kambia/Port Loko</i>	<i>11</i>	Bad	1	33,3%		
		<i>14</i>	Bad	1	33,3%		
		<i>15</i>	Very Bad	1	33,3%		
			Sum:	3			
		Percent	4,8%				
<i>3</i>	<i>Bombali</i>	<i>21</i>	Bad	2	33,3%		
			Very bad	1	16,7%		
		<i>22</i>	Bad	1	16,7%		
		<i>24</i>	Bad	2	33,3%		
			Sum:	6			
		Percent	9,5%				
<i>4</i>	<i>Tonkolili</i>	<i>31</i>	Bad	2	33,3%		
			Very bad	1	16,7%		
		<i>32</i>	Bad	2	33,3%		
			Very bad	1	16,7%		
		Sum:	6				
		Percent	9,5%				

5	Koinadugu				
		41			
			Bad	1	100,0%
			Sum:	1	
			Percent	1,6%	
7	Bo/Pujehun				
		61			
			Bad	2	18,2%
			Very bad	4	36,4%
		63			
			Bad	3	27,3%
		65			
			Very bad	2	18,2%
			Sum:	11	
			Percent	17,5%	
8	Kenema				
		71			
			Bad	6	54,5%
		72			
			Bad	4	36,4%
		73			
			Bad	1	9,1%
			Sum:	11	
			Percent	17,5%	
9	Kono				
		82			
			Bad	2	50,0%
			Very bad	1	25,0%
		83			
			Bad	1	25,0%
			Sum:	4	
			Percent	6,3%	
10	Kailahun				
		91			
			Bad	5	83,3%
		92			
			Bad	1	16,7%
			Sum:	6	
			Percent	9,5%	
			<i>Grand Total:</i>	63	