



PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

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PROFILE SUMMARY

SUMMARY OF THE PROFILE

summary

Historical summary:

The dramatic situation of internal displacement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a result of events which started in the early 1990s. At this time, political instability, accompanied by inter-ethnic rivalry in the central and eastern regions, had already resulted in the displacement of several hundred thousand people. In October 1996, several factors caused an uprising against the Mobutu regime: general resentment against his regime, discrimination against the Tutsi population resident in Eastern Zaire, and the presence of Hutu militias who had fled Rwanda after participating in the 1994 genocide. A full-scale civil war and substantial displacement of the population in conflict zones followed. In early 1997 opposition forces under Laurent Kabila took the capital Kinshasa. Kabila became President in May 1997. After one year, a major rebellion against Kabila developed into a new civil war and more displacement followed. Since August 1998, the number of IDPs has doubled each year – reaching two million by the end of 2000 (OCHA 31 December 2000, p.6) – due to continued hostilities between Kabila's forces, armed contingents from several African nations, and three rebel factions, as well as conflicts between rebel groups, and various ethnic conflicts.

Under the auspices of Zambia, President Kabila's government, with its allies Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, signed a cease-fire agreement on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka with Rwanda and Uganda. On 31 August 1999 the major rebel groups also became parties to the Lusaka cease-fire agreement. Although the agreement called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and despite renewed commitment expressed during 2000 to respect a new cease-fire (IRIN 19 May 2000), both rebel groups and government-allied forces undertook several military offensives during 2000 (UN SC 18 April 2000 & 21 September 2000). Some observers have expressed careful optimism about the peace process following the assassination of President Kabila on 16 January 2001 (ICG 16 March 2001).

The Security Council authorized in November 1999 the deployment of a UN Mission (MONUC) to support the Lusaka peace process. In February 2000, it was decided that MONUC was to consist of up to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 observers (DPI 1 January 2001). By April 2001 the number of UN peacekeepers on the ground had reached 500 only (UN DPI 6 April 2001). The Security Council passed in February 2001 a resolution that emphasised MONUC's monitoring role and reflected a less ambitious approach with regard to its involvement in disarming non-conventional forces (UN SC 22 February 2001; ICG 16 March 2001, sect.IIB).

Current political situation:

There have been widespread reports of violations of humanitarian law by armed groups on both sides. The civilian population has suffered tremendously, especially in the central and eastern regions. Various armed factions, including local militia known as "Mayi-Mayi", members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (i.e. ex-FAR) or Rwandan militia (the "Interahamwe"), and the rebel forces, have been accused of continuously attacking civilians within the eastern part of DRC (AI 31 May 2000, HRW May 2000 & March 2001, UN CHR 1 February 2001). By the beginning of 2001 there were two major rebel coalitions fighting the government: the Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC), which emerged as a coalition between MLC and fragmented RCD-ML groups with support from Uganda, and RCD-Goma supported by Rwanda (HRW March 2001, sect.III). It was reported in February 2001 that as many as nine armed internal, international and internationalized internal conflicts were ongoing in DRC (UN CHR 1 February 2001, "Summary").

Regional aspects:

Displacement of civilians continued in 2001 in the following conflict areas:

North and South Kivu

In early 2000 Rwandan troops forcibly moved civilians within North Kivu (OCHA 15 February 2000).

Banyamulenge populations attacked by Mayi Mayi militias (AAH August 2000)

Rwandan Interahamwe militia conducted campaigns of intimidation (IRIN 16 November 2000)

Orientale Province

Fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in June 2000 caused substantial displacement in Kisangani (UN SC 4 December 2000)

Violent conflicts erupted between the Hema and Lendu people with involvement of troops from Uganda (HRW March 2001)

Fighting at the Government-Rebel frontline in the Equateur Province

Clashes occurred between rebel forces (MLC/Uganda) and government/Zimbabwean troops, forcing civilians to flee indiscriminate bombings and pillaging by soldiers (OCHA September 2000)

Fighting at the Government-Rebel frontline in the Katanga Province

Large number of IDPs remained displaced since 1998 fighting in northern Katanga (OCHA 11 July 2000)

Major fighting around Pweto broke out in December 2000, causing new displacements and threatening sheltered IDPs (UN SC 12 February 2001)

Humanitarian situation:

Several reports suggest that the IDPs and the general war-affected population share the same needs. Most IDPs have not sought shelter in camps, but have integrated into host

communities. The security of host communities and IDPs has been undermined by all armed groups (HRW February 1999). Coping mechanisms of communities hosting the displaced are seriously over-stretched (UN November 2000; RI 14 September 2000). The health care system, already in a weak state when the present conflict started in August 1998, has been degraded by looting, fleeing staff and lack of resources. It has been unable to cope with a sharp increase of epidemic diseases, such as haemorrhagic fever, measles and cholera (MSF 25 January 2000 & SCF 31 December 2000). In Katanga Province for example, the size of the town of Pweto has tripled due to the recent influx of displaced persons, and there is a desperate shortage of health care facilities (MSF 8 December 2000). Malnutrition rates among IDPs are alarmingly high in several areas, particularly in the Ituri, Kivus and Katanga districts (IRIN 24 March 2000, ACC/SCN 31 March 2000, AAH August 2000 & OCHA 14 February 2001).

The UN estimates that less than half the displaced communities and families are receiving assistance. Many who hide in the forests are inaccessible as a result of insecurity and constitute the most vulnerable IDP group (UN November 2000, p.15 & OCHA 31 December 2000). A high number of children are also in need of protection and humanitarian assistance, as war and displacement have broken down traditional coping mechanisms and have forced many to live on the street (SCF 31 December 2000).

Humanitarian responses:

Humanitarian access to vulnerable populations on both sides of the front-line was reduced in 2000 compared to 1999. Several agencies had to withdraw or scale down their operations because of armed attacks and insecure roads (AAH August 2000; WFP 27 October 2000). This was especially the case in eastern DRC, where security has deteriorated and where national staff of international NGOs and relief agencies are increasingly the targets of armed gangs (MSF 8 December 2000 & OCHA 20 December 2000). Many health zones remained inaccessible in early 2001 due to insecurity, and WFP had difficulties setting up nutrition programs and carrying out nutritional surveys (WFP 23 February 2001). Access authorizations depend on Kinshasa's highly centralized decision making procedures (OCHA 11 July 2000). The recent government's decision to allow freedom of movement in the entire country might improve access for the humanitarian community (OCHA 31 March 2001).

During 2000 the funding of humanitarian operations improved, but only enough to respond to a small proportion of the needs (OCHA 17 April 2000; UN November 2000). The majority of available resources were earmarked for food assistance. The Office of Human Rights received nothing, while programs in primary health, epidemic control and child protection received little or no funding (Oxfam 30 December 2000).

In some areas, however, there have been reports of improved delivery of aid. A wider humanitarian network has been established throughout the DRC since March 2000. The response to the internally displaced persons has become more systematic (UN July 2000), demonstrated by an effective humanitarian response to the Kisangani crisis in June (OCHA 11 July 2000). The UN capacity for coordination improved during 2000 with the establishment of three new OCHA sub-offices, in Mbandaka, Bunia and Gbadolite, in

addition to the existing ones in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Goma and Bukavu. Resources were made available for a flexible Emergency Humanitarian Interventions (EHI) program (UN November 2000). NGOs play a crucial role in distribution of humanitarian aid in Eastern DRC (UN November 1999, UNICEF 2 June 2000). However, security concerns have forced several NGOs to reduce their field presence, e.g. ACF, MERLIN, MSF and ICRC.

(Updated April 2001)

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

Main causes for displacement

Displacement caused by generalised violence involving numerous armed groups (1997-2001)

- After just about a year to recover from years of ethnic violence and the civil war which led to the ousting of Mobutu in 1997 the civil population became exposed to an armed rebellion against Kabila in August 1998
- Reports in early 1999 of major internal displacement in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Katanga as civilians were directly targeted by a growing number of armed groups in the east
- Exposure to tribal clashes causing considerable numbers of displacement (August 1999)
- Major displacement continued in eastern DRC as violent conflict escalates during 2000
- Fighting between troops from Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani caused major displacement in June 2000
- Reported in February 2001 that nine armed internal, international and internationalized internal conflicts were ongoing in DRC

"In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, nine armed internal, international and internationalized internal conflicts are going on with the participation of 6 national armies and 21 irregular groups. The most serious conflict is the one which pits Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, together with the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), against the Kinshasa Government. RCD has split many times and the pro-Uganda and pro-Rwanda factions have fought on Congolese soil, causing death and destruction in a foreign country. In another conflict, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) is fighting the Government of President Kabila. Another conflict, started by Ugandan soldiers, opposes the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. The victims of all these conflicts are always Congolese." (UN CHR 1 February 2001, "Summary")

First wave of internal displacement caused by the October 1996 -May 1997 war against Mobutu

"USCR site visits to eastern Congo/Zaire during 1997 concluded that up to half the population in some areas of the east were at least temporarily displaced during the war [that started in October 1996 against Mobutu]. Many were able to return home after several weeks, but thousands of families endured long-term displacement caused by lingering insecurity in their home areas. USCR estimated that up to 150,000 people remained internally displaced at mid-year, but a majority were "invisible to outsiders because they are dispersed," USCR's report noted.

[...]

In interviews with USCR and other agencies, displaced persons indicated [in 1997] that they fled during the civil war for various reasons: to escape generalized warfare, fear of Mobutu's retreating soldiers or the ADFL [Kabila's Alliance des forces démocratiques

pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre], fear of armed Rwandan exiles, and fear of Rwandan government soldiers. Some displaced persons said they were compelled to flee their homes by extremist Rwandan leaders who took them as virtual hostages." (USCR 1998, p.61)

During the rebellion led by RCD [Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie] against Kabila, which started in August 1998, a dynamic of displacement similar to the 1996-97 civil war continued:

"While the current level of human rights abuses against civilians in eastern Congo is already [by February 1999] cause for serious concern, the situation risks further deterioration and even more egregious abuses. The growing number of armed groups in the east—both militia and national armies, often with tensions among alleged allies—constitute a real threat to the civilian population. A primary concern is the large number of abuses committed against civilians in areas of combat between Interahamwe and Mai-Mai militia and their adversaries from the RCD [Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie] and its allies [...]. The militia groups use guerrilla warfare tactics against the RCD forces, which is often followed by heavy-handed reprisals against civilians by the RCD military. This has led to the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Katanga. Militia in North Kivu attack civilian vehicles, strangling local economies and making travel dangerous outside of urban centers. All sides act in an atmosphere of effective impunity with little or no regard for the protection of civilians, which fuels the cycles of attacks and counter-attacks." (HRW February 1999, chapt. IV)

"The tactics of guerrilla attacks and retreats displayed by so-called Mayi-Mayi groups, longing for warlord-type of supremacy and considering themselves not bound by traditional rules, have ruthless effects on the local population currently fleeing the now virtually indiscriminate violence of both the Rwandan troops and these warlords. As a result, areas between Uvira and Fizi or close to mining concessions (Kamituga) are highly exposed to sporadic insecurity and massive displacements." (UN OCHA 15 July 1999, "Access to War-Affected Populations")

The security situation facing civilians in eastern DRC showed no signs of improvements during 2000:

"In the complex conflict in eastern Congo, all the many combatant forces have attacked civilians, killing, injuring and raping thousands of persons and causing more than half a million others to flee their homes. During investigations carried out in March 2000 in areas controlled by the Goma-based Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD) and its allies, Human Rights Watch researchers documented cases of murder, rape, and pillage carried out by all of the armed groups now fighting in the region.

[...]

The repeated attacks on the civilian population of eastern Congo have caused more than half a million persons to flee their homes and created a growing humanitarian crisis in the region. According to the director of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Eastern Congo, Charles Petrie, the crisis has grown

substantially in recent months with about half the more than 500,000 persons displaced having taken flight since the first of the year. After Hutu combatants increased attacks on Kalonge in January, for example, some 10,000 took flight in the first week of February." (HRW May 2000, chapt. I, III)

"Events are playing into Kabila's hands. The long-standing ethnic tensions in the Kivus have been exacerbated by the continuing Rwandan occupation and reported atrocities committed by their troops against the Congolese civilian population. There has also been a recent upsurge in violence directed against civilians by Mayi Mayi and Interahamwe militias. The dramatic increase in violence directed at civilians could not have occurred at a worse moment given existing humanitarian needs. Continued fighting throughout both provinces places six million people at risk. An estimated 450,000 internally displaced people in the Kivus have fled towards the perceived safety of Goma, Butembo, and other city centers seeking shelter from marauding militias. But these areas are far from secure. Recent militia attacks have taken place only a few kilometers outside city centers. If the major cities become insecure, humanitarian assistance to fleeing populations will become even more difficult. At present, most of South Kivu is inaccessible to humanitarian organizations. Continuing attacks by Mayi Mayi against the Banyamulenge would likely trigger a strong Rwandan response which could scuttle the foundering Lusaka Accords. " (RI 30 March 2000)

As shown in the "population Section", the armed conflict has caused widespread internal displacement throughout Eastern DRC. Conflict induced displacement is both related to the warfare civilians are exposed to at the frontlines between the insurgents and the Government forces and the numerous armed conflicts that have emerged within Eastern DRC. By the beginning of 2001 armed conflict caused especially displacement in the following areas:

North and South Kivu (conflicts especially involving conventional troops from Rwanda, as well as the [ex-FAR/Interahamwe militia](#), [Mayi-Mayi](#) militias and Banyamulenge)
Orientale Province ([Hema vs Lendu](#) and [Kisangani](#) with troops from Uganda involved)
Fighting at the [Government-Rebel frontline in the Equateur Province](#) (MLC offensive during second half of 2001)
Fighting at the [Government-Rebel frontline in the Katanga Province](#)

Massive campaign of intimidation by Rwandan Interahamwe militia causes desperate displacement situation in the Kivus (November 2000)

- Villagers seek refuge in the forests at night
- Situation particularly bad in areas close to Goma
- Reports in early 2000 of Rwandan troops moving civilians within North Kivu in order to create a security zone to control infiltration into Rwanda
- Evacuation of civilians undertaken without civilian authorities' consent or involvement

"While the situation in the eastern Congolese town of Goma appears calm and relatively stable, the story in the surrounding forests and remote villages is completely different with people literally running for their lives.

According to humanitarian workers who recently visited these areas and spoke to local residents, the Rwandan Interahamwe militia is carrying out a "massive campaign of intimidation". Villagers said they were so afraid that they went to sleep in the forests at night when most of the attacks usually take place. In Goma hospital, 26 of 27 patients in the orthopaedics ward had received bullet wounds sustained in Interahamwe attacks.

"The pressure in the villages is so great that people can't live their lives," Nigel Marsh of the NGO, World Vision, told IRIN. Villagers, victims of both sides in the DRC conflict, also spoke of reprisal attacks carried out by soldiers of the governing Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD-Goma).

Marsh underlined the huge number of displaced people in eastern DRC. "A massive amount of work still needs to be done," he stressed. "The donors should not stop giving to Congo as we have to keep these people alive."

He said the situation was particularly bad in Kirotshe, near Goma, where World Vision is providing therapeutic feeding for about 200 malnourished people at any one time. Most of the patients at the small hospital are victims of Interahamwe attacks, either directly, or suffering the consequences of hiding out in the forests for long periods. Marsh warned that the patients at Kirotshe were just the tip of the iceberg. Hundreds of thousands more people were still believed to be in the forests with no help at all." (IRIN 16 November 2000)

"Displacement is a new phenomenon in northernmost areas of North Kivu, a region that remained relatively stable since the beginning of the war and local observers attribute it to Mayi-Mayi/Interahamwe clashes.

There have been concerted efforts by Rwandan troops to move large groups of civilians out of Rutshuru territory deep into the interior of North Kivu. Available reports indicate that the entire commune of Bwito (300,000 persons) has been already "evacuated" in order that a security zone be created to control infiltrations into Rwanda. Arbitrary displacements in North Kivu/Rwanda bordering areas have been known since 1997, however the ongoing one is being implemented by Rwandan military without civilian authorities' consent or involvement." (OCHA 15 February 2000)

See also: "[Displacement in the North Kivu province \(1999-2000\)](#)" [internal link]

Escalated conflict between Congolese Tutsis (Banyamulenge) and Mayi Mayi militias behind increased displacements in South Kivu (2000)

- Large increase in displacement during first half of 2000
- Concerns that 150,000 Banyamulenge risk violent attack by Mayi Mayi militias (March 2000)

"Hate speech and communal violence have increased alarmingly in the provinces of North and South Kivu, located in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The violence is directed at Congolese Tutsis (known as the Banyamulenge). An estimated 150,000 Banyamulenge are now at imminent risk of violent attack by Mayi Mayi militias. Despite having made Congo their home for two hundred years, Congolese authorities have questioned the Banyamulenge's right to citizenship. The Banyamulenge citizenship question was a key issue in the 1996 war which brought Laurent Kabila to power. Now, Kabila's promotion of ethnic tension threatens to bring down the Lusaka Accords and to plunge Congo back into full-scale war.

[...]

Feelings are running at fever pitch since rebel authorities, the Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie (RCD), refused to permit the Archbishop of Bukavu, Monsignor Kataliko, to return to his diocese. Public reaction to the RCD action has been immediate. Strikes and public demonstrations shut down Bukavu for several days. Public sentiment against the Banyamulenge has turned ugly. Recently, a dog was killed and dragged through Bukavu behind a car with crowds shouting, "This is how you treat Tutsis!" There are rumors that the local Mayi Mayi militias, who enjoy broad public support, are reportedly planning pogroms against the Banyamulenge. The Banyamulenge have reportedly armed themselves, determined not to suffer the same fate as Rwandan Tutsis in 1994[...]." (RI 30 March 2000)

"The fighting in the Kivus has also resulted in major population displacements since the beginning of the year. An estimated 60,000 newly displaced have fled to Uvira and along the Ruzizi plains, and reports indicate that 15,000 to 20,000 persons (mainly Banyamulenge) are from the Moyen Plateau. The total number of displaced in South Kivu is estimated at 300,000, with a further 250,000 people displaced in North Kivu. Meanwhile, most of South Kivu is inaccessible for the relief community.

Last month, some 700 Banyamulenge arrived in Bujumbura, fleeing fighting and attacks by armed groups in South Kivu. UNHCR received this group and undertook an evaluation of their assistance and protection needs. According to reports there is another group from the same area, estimated to be around 1,200 Banyamulenge, in Uvira being prevented from crossing into Burundi. Insecurity has prevented UNHCR from carrying out assessments in this area." (UN SC 18 April 2000, paras.65-66)

"The North and South Kivu provinces are the epicenter of this disaster. Base of the biggest rebel faction (RCD Goma), disputed home of the Banyamulenge and other Tutsi in Congo, the provinces are the point of convergence of armed groups (Mai Mai, Interahamwe, Burundian rebels, Banyamulenge militias, RCD soldiers, Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian soldiers). In South-Kivu, the Mai Mai, Interahamwe and FDD [Burundian rebel group] form a variety of alliances de facto supporting Kabila, fighting the Tutsi ethnic group, furthering their own cause against the regional regimes or committing acts of banditism. The lives of the Banyamulenge are being threatened or they risk to be expelled from the Congolese community. The RCD rebels have not been able to gain the acceptance of the population. The sheer number of actors and complex

motivations, the barbarism and multitude of human rights violations and the constant exaction on the civilians by all sides have made this area a true mosaic of misery.

[...]

Several observers have been warning that the Banyamulenge population may be the future victim of a continuation of the 1994 genocide. In recent incidents, Banyamulenge have been targeted during ambushes and shot dead because they were Tutsi. Aside from the fact that no humanitarian aid has been going to the Hauts Plateaux which are accessible only by plane or by foot and where the security is of concern, the absence of any international and independent witness is quite worrisome in this context." (AAH August 2000, sects. 1, 3.3)

See also: "[Displacement in the South Kivu province \(2000\)](#)" [internal link]

Violent conflict between the Hema and Lendu people in the Orientale province has caused major displacements since June 1999

- Conflict between the Hema and Lendu has previously occurred in 1972, 1985 and 1996
- Escalated conflict since mid-December 1999
- Reports of major destruction of villages and attacks on civilians having caused an estimated 150,000 displaced by end of January 2000
- Several interethnic clashes occurred in the region of Bunia during mid-August 2000
- Lendu launched a major attack on Hema villages in the region of Bunia in mid-December 2000
- Reprisal attacks on Lendu residents by Hema militiamen and soldiers of the APC (RCD-ML)
- FLC (new rebel coalition emerging in January 2001) managed to broker a peace agreement between representatives of the Hema and the Lendu peoples in mid-February 2001

" The clashes between the pastoralist Hema and agriculturalist Lendu ethnic groups in the Djugu area of Ituri began in mid-June [1999], essentially over long-standing local land disputes. But the presence of various Congolese and foreign armed groups, the easy availability of weapons, the war-ravaged economy, and a rise in "ethnic ideology" in the area have provided dangerous fodder for the conflict's rapid extension and ferocity, analysts told IRIN.

[...]

A UN assessment mission to Djugu estimated in October [1999] that over 100,000 people had been displaced and scores of villages burned to the ground. Though casualty figures were impossible to confirm, estimates ranged from 5,000-7,000 people killed, the mission report said.

[...]

Conflict between the Hema and Lendu has occurred several times in recent decades, including in 1972, 1985 and 1996. A local NGO involved in human rights and reconciliation issues told IRIN that the country's 1973 land law was an important source of the problem because, under the law, people can purchase already-inhabited property and then present title to the land two years later when it becomes incontestable in court. This practice has resulted in families being driven off their fields and out of their homes, the NGO said.

The latest violence started after members of the Hema group reportedly tried to extend their land holdings onto Lendu property, allegedly with land title documents falsified in collaboration with local authorities, sources told IRIN.

Djugu, with an estimated population of one million, is part of the "province" of Kibali-Ituri, created earlier this year by the Ugandan-backed Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie-Mouvement de liberation (RCD-ML), led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba. Reports indicate that Ugandan soldiers had fought in the conflict on the side of the Hema, in exchange for cash payments.

[...]

Wamba said the conflict was linked to long-term disparities in wealth and access to education, which had favoured the Hema. "Those inequalities, which are a colonial legacy, are now being exploited," he told IRIN." (IRIN 15 November 1999)

"[In December 1999 it was reported that] Ethnic clashes between the Lendu and Hema people in Ituri district of eastern DRC have broken out again in the past fortnight, displacing tens of thousands of civilians and greatly increasing humanitarian needs in an already difficult situation, the regional head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Philip Spoerri told IRIN on Tuesday.

[...]

The current clashes were at their most intense around Djugu, and had sent 20,000 to 30,000 displaced people towards nearby towns, particularly Bunia, for shelter, he said. In light of the renewed clashes, the ICRC hoped to reach 85,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in 10-15 sites in and around Bunia and Djugu by the end of January, Spoerri told IRIN." (IRIN 21 December 1999)

"On January 29, 2000, MSF withdrew its team from Bunia and all operations in the Itiru district of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were suspended.

In the past few months, the humanitarian situation in the Ituri district has steadily deteriorated. Besides the conflict between rebels and government forces, there has been increasing violence between two ethnic groups, the Hema and Lendu.

The conflict in the district has cost the lives of thousands and caused over 150,000 people to be displaced within the region. Many villages have been razed to the ground; the fields that were used for crop cultivation are totally deserted. The conflict has led to the collapse of the already fragile healthcare system. In the past six months, the area has been ravaged by various epidemics including measles, the plague, and cholera." (MSF 2 February 2000)

"Human Rights Watch [...] express its deep concern about the reported flare up in the fighting between members of the Lendu and Hema ethnic groups in the northeastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. We have learned that in the week of August 14 several interethnic clashes occurred in the region of Bunia, the headquarters of the Ugandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML),

including one, on August 14, in which about a hundred people, mostly Hema, were killed. We fear that these incidents may prepare the ground for the resumption of this deadly interethnic conflict, leading to more violence." (HRW 23 August 2000)

"Lendu and associated militia of Ngiti people together with less organized bands of villagers, most of them armed with traditional weapons, launched a major attack on Hema villages in the region of Bunia in mid-December [2000]. According to some survivors, some Lendu also had automatic rifles. The fighters brought the violence into Bunia on January 19 when they attacked UPDF headquarters at the airport. They apparently wanted to disable a helicopter gunship that the UPDF had used against them in earlier attacks. They also wanted to occupy the airport to prevent the triumphal return of local Hema leaders, who were increasingly appearing as the winners in the negotiations going on in Kampala.

Some eighty attackers were slain by UPDF fire, including gunfire from the armed helicopter. Retreating Lendu militia ruthlessly massacred some sixty Hema residents in outlying residential areas and the villages of Soleniema and Mwanga north of Bunia. In the hours after the attack was repulsed, Bunia residents reported seeing UPDF officers encouraging Hema youth in several quarters of the town to arm themselves and to identify and kill Lendu infiltrators. This call apparently set the stage for reprisal attacks on Lendu residents by Hema militiamen and soldiers of the APC loyal to Mbusa. According to some witnesses, at least 150 to 250 Lendu were slaughtered, many of them Lendu intellectuals and community leaders.

[...]

Some 20,000 people fled in all directions inside Ituri as an estimated 10,000 others, mostly Hema, sought refuge in Uganda in the first week of January. This latest fighting made Ituri the scene of one of the bloodiest conflicts fought in the shadow of the Congo's broader war. The resulting displacement and movement of refugees to Uganda is one of the largest humanitarian emergencies in Congo today.

Mediation Efforts and Reconciliation

By mid-February, the Front for the Liberation of Congo appeared to be reestablishing control in the area. Violence diminished and hopes for peace increased. Following a three-day conference attended by some 160 traditional chiefs and notables of Ituri province, the FLC managed to broker a peace agreement between representatives of the Hema and the Lendu peoples. Signed on February 17, the agreement called among other things for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of all militia groups. Olivier Kamitatu, national secretary of the FLC, told Human Rights Watch that the new front, "as public authority," undertook to implement these and other provisions of the agreement, including to dismantle training centers for militia, control movements of soldiers, secure border crossings, and guarantee the free movement of goods and people along roads." (HRW March 2001, sect. IV)

It is recommended to read the comprehensive report issued by Human Rights Watch in March 2001 for further details about the linkages between rebel forces, the Uganda army and the Lendu-Hema conflict- as well as information about the Front for the

Liberation of Congo (created in January 2001). Regarding the February 2001 peace treaty, see also AFP 18 February 2001.

For other background information about this conflict and the dynamics of the violence and displacements it created in early 2000, see IRIN 3 March 2000 "Special Report on the Ituri clashes" [Part One](#) and [Part Two](#).

Fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani caused substantial displacement (June 2000)

- Violent clashes emerged in August 1999
- Clashes in June 2000 lasted for six days, killing and wounding numbers of civilians in the indiscriminate bombing by both sides
- Some 65,000 residents sought refuge in the nearby forests
- Reported in February 2001 that Rwanda and Uganda had withdrawn their forces at a distance of some 100 kilometres from Kisangani

"The city of Kisangani, located in the north-east of the country and at the geographical centre of the African continent, has been the scene of five conflicts in the last four years. The third largest city of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a commercial centre on the Congo River, Kisangani has effectively been cut off from the rest of the country.

[...]

Kisangani has been the theatre of several clashes between rebel and government troops and between erstwhile allies according to some observers. The most recent of these occurred from 5 to 11 June 2000, when the city was the scene of fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan troops which included widespread indiscriminate shelling by both sides.

[...]

Persisting tension between Ugandan and Rwandan troops degenerated into open and violent clashes for the first time in August 1999, the fighting spreading from garrisons and military camps into residential areas of the city. Another round of clashes was prevented from becoming outright war in mid-May 2000 when members of the Security Council's mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUC brokered a ceasefire agreement, including a disengagement plan. However, despite acceptance of the agreement by both the Rwandan Patriotic Army and the Uganda People's Defence Forces and the deployment of additional United Nations military observers, the situation remained highly volatile throughout May, and continued to disrupt economic trade and traditional food supply lines. By the end of the month the humanitarian community negotiated a resumption of air traffic with the belligerents to allow supplies to be flown in, as the city is not accessible by inland transport, thus preventing further deterioration of the population's health and nutritional status.

Hostilities once again broke out on 5 June and lasted for six days, killing and wounding numbers of civilians in the indiscriminate bombing by both sides. Losses among the civilian population were high and damage to the city's infrastructure and housing was

widespread. Over 760 civilians were killed and an estimated 1,700 wounded. Over 4,000 dwellings were damaged, destroyed or made uninhabitable [...]. Sixty-nine schools were partially destroyed or damaged [...], and other public buildings were badly affected. Power stations and the water-supply systems were severely disrupted. The fighting forced some 65,000 residents to flee Kisangani and seek refuge in the nearby forests. Around 3,000 internally displaced people were housed in a camp at Katele." (UN SC 4 December 2000, paras. 46, 54, 56, 57)

"Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), Rwanda and Uganda have continued to keep their forces at a distance of some 100 kilometres from Kisangani. However, RCD military elements have remained in the city, with its leaders maintaining that security concerns do not allow them to withdraw their forces before the arrival of United Nations troops. The area around Kisangani has been de facto divided into quadrants: RCD occupies the south and west; MLC and UPDF the north-west and the north; and UPDF solely the east. This dispersal is generally respected, except for isolated skirmishes usually between RCD and MLC/RCD-N in the diamond mining area to the north of the city." (UN SC 12 February 2001, para. 29)

See also "Swift response to major new displacements from Kisangani (June 2000)" [Internal link]

People flee fighting at the frontline in the Equateur Province (2000)

- Fighting in May 2000 between MLC and DRC/Zimbabwean troops on the Mobenzene axis
- Civilians fleeing indiscriminate bombings and pillaging by soldiers towards Congo-Brazzaville

"[By July 2000] Equateur remained the most active part of the frontline. In early May, combats pitted MLC and DRC/Zimbabwean troops on the Mobenzene axis and within a few days, MLC progressed more than 100 km in the direction of Mbandaka and captured Mobenzene, Maita, Buburu and Wenze settlements. Civilians have reportedly fled the areas of intensive combats and a few of them have arrived to Mbandaka, bringing the total number of IDPs to 14,000. Local sources in Kinshasa reported that at the end of May, the Government troops repulsed MLC positions in the course of fierce fighting at Buburu and Mboza, 250 km north of Mbandaka. End June-early July was the hottest period since January 1999, as an ultimatum sent by Kinshasa to MLC troops has been followed by fighting in the Basankusu area and increasing pressure on Mbandaka, from the other side of the river." (OCHA 11 July 2000)

"In this region, the conflict intensifies in Libenge, Basankusu, and Bolomba between government forces (FAC) and the troops of the MLC rebel movement, supported by the Ugandan army (UPDF). The civilian population, subject to indiscriminate bombings and pillaging by soldiers, flee toward the CAR or Congo-Brazzaville. According to some sources, the distances walked by this population has been up to 300 km. Such movements of population, notably toward lands that are as inhospitable as the marshes of Congo-Brazzaville, make plausible the testimonies of humanitarian sources, according to which

there have soldiers have pillaged and harmed civilians in villages situated along the stream as well as in Dongo." (OCHA September 2000, p.9)

"In mid-December, MLC began a military offensive across a broad front in northern Equateur, capturing Imese and Befale. Government and allied forces reinforced their positions around Mbandaka. In mid-January, MLC forces attacking Bolomba were repulsed after heavy fighting. Since 18 January, the military situation has become static, with no reports of significant fighting." (UN SC 12 February 2001, para.24)

See also "Displacement in the Equateur province (1999-2001)" [Internal link]

People flee fighting at the frontline in the Katanga Province (1998-2000)

- Majority of IDPs fled during the August-November 1998 fighting in northern Katanga
- Reported in 1999 that the IDPs are reluctant to return in fear of being considered rebel collaborators if Government regain control of return areas
- Major fighting around Pweto in December 2000 forcing civilians to flee towards Zambia

"Along with the first-wave displaced of the Kivus, the IDP caseload in Katanga is the oldest as it was mainly generated during the August-November 1998 fighting in northern Katanga. All major IDP categories (according to their mode of settlement) known in the DRC are represented in this province: there are IDP camps in Lubumbashi, IDP resettlement sites south of the provincial capital, IDPs hosted in local communities and finally those dispersed in an area as large as 50,000 km². In total, there are some 250,000 displaced persons scattered in Katanga on both sides of the frontline." (OCHA 11 July 2000)

"An OCHA led inter-agency mission in Northern Katanga (4-8 October [1999]) completed the initial assessment of displacement in this province, which was started in August 99. The mission visited Kalemie, Moba as well as a number of villages 12 Km. south of Moba. According to findings of the mission, only a part of Kalemie (80 percent) and Moba (30 percent) residents have returned after having fled their communities in November-December 98. Assessment mission witnessed a large-scale devastation of areas affected by combats. The situation of returnees and those who are still living in the bush (over 120,000 persons) was described as pre-catastrophic with wide-spread starvation. In spite of serious hardships, the displaced are reluctant to return partially as a result of radio messages emanating from Lubumashi warning the population that in case of their return to rebel-occupied towns they will be considered collaborators when DRC Government regains the control of Northern Katanga." (UN OCHA 15 November 1999, "Humanitarian Action")

"In late November [2000], following attacks by government forces (FAC) in Katanga, RCD and the Rwandan People's Army (RPA) launched a counter-attack which culminated in their capture of Pweto on 6 December. Thousands of combatants and refugees fled into Zambia to escape the fighting.

[...]

Owing to the continuing fighting in the Equateur region, North and South Kivu, Katanga and Province Orientale, the latest estimate concerning the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 2 million, and this figure is expected to rise further.

[...]

As a result of recent fighting in the Pweto region (Katanga), a considerable number of people have sought refuge in neighbouring Zambia; about 9,000 of them are hosted in a refugee camp near Kala in Zambia's northern province, and a further 15,000 have settled in villages in the same area." (UN SC 12 February 2001, paras. 20, 45, 47)

See also ["Displacement in the Katanga province \(2001\)"](#) [Internal link]

Background of the conflict

The build-up to the 1996-1998 civil war

- Substantial displacements while Mobutu still in power during the early 1990s
- Civil war ignited in October 1996 in the South Kivu region as Mobutu's government attempted to expel some 400,000 local ethnic Tutsi
- By the end of 1996 rebel troops (ADFL) fighting Mobutu had captured territory along Zaire's border with Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi causing Rwandan refugees (Hutu) to flee from their camps in the conflict zone

"In 1965, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu intervened in a power struggle following elections, seizing power and proclaiming himself head of the republic of Congo [...]. He headed an authoritarian regime for 32 years up to 17 May 1997 [...]. In 1971, Congo was renamed the Republic of Zaïre. The organization of opposition demonstrations in the 1980s prompted changes towards a multi-party political system in April 1990 [...], which marked the beginning of the transition to democracy.

[...]

The first major development in the political reform process was the establishment in 1991 of a Sovereign National Conference. The objective of the Conference was to inter alia draft a new constitution. From the start, the Conference was in conflict with the President, whose supporters in the Conference were in the minority [...].

A succession of short-lived governments was appointed, with alternates being simultaneously appointed either by the Conference or by the President. This resulted on many occasions in organs of the state being at odds with each other, and a demonstrated lack of any coordinated policy [...].

[...]

After 1992, President Mobutu's powers started to be eroded and the stability of the country deteriorated, as opposition forces gained popular support in politics during the

transition process [...]. The maintenance of a repressive system amid political liberalisation measures opened the door to an era of chaos and civil strife [...]." (UNHCR-CDR April 1998, sect.2.3)

In 1995, USCR reported that: "Zaire's unstable situation [had] produced a state of a state of anarchy in many regions. The country's economy was in ruins after years of neglect and official corruption. Unemployment was estimated to be as high as 80 percent. Zaire's historically undisciplined police and soldiers rioted and looted with impunity.

At the root of Zaire's crisis was President Mobutu Sese Seko's refusal to accede to democratic reforms. Mobutu's ability to stir division among his opponents and manipulate ethnic violence forced an estimated 700,000 persons from their homes in two regions of the country and left some 6,000 dead. The worst violence erupted in the southern region of Shaba and in the eastern regions of North Kivu.

In the Shaba region – formerly called Katanga – repeated violence occurred during 1992-93 between Katangans and persons of Kasai ancestry who had lived peacefully in Shaba for generations. Some 400,000 persons were forced to flee from Shaba to their ancestral homeland in the Kasai area in central Zaire. Thousands fled to neighbouring countries. Tens of thousands more remained in Shaba but sought refuge in camps administered by relief workers.

In North Kivu, some 270,000 were internally displaced by violence during 1992-93. The violence flared to disputes over land and the denial of Zairean citizenship to ethnic Banyarwanda." (USCR 1995, p.82)

Three years later the conflict had further deteriorated: "[In the Masisi zone of North Kivu] violence escalated in 1996, driven by several factors: long-standing inter-ethnic rivalries over economic and political power; efforts by Rwandan Hutu refugee leaders to force local populations out of the Masisi zone in order to resettle themselves in the area; and efforts by Zairian government officials to inflame tensions in order to expel political opponents.

[...]

"The presence of some 600,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the [Masisi] region...has greatly exacerbated the situation," USCR stated in a mid-1996 report, Masisi, Down the Road from Goma: Ethnic Cleansing and Displacement in Eastern Zaire. USCR's site visit to the conflict area found 'strong indications' that militia and former Rwandan soldiers operating out of the nearby refugee camps 'have access to sophisticated new weapons, are participating directly in the fighting, and are facilitating the ethnic cleansing of the area.' Zairian troops also participated in the violence, USCR and other investigators concluded.

The upheaval affected members of six ethnic groups. The conflict virtually destroyed the region's network of health clinics and schools. More than 80 percent of the area's economically important cattle herds were lost. Farming in the Masisi area one of Zaire's most productive agricultural zones was decimated. One relief agency reported child malnutrition rates near 40 percent in the worst affected areas.

Attackers routinely burned homes, making return by the owners difficult even when tensions eased in August. Zairian troops reportedly extorted money before allowing families to reclaim their properties.

[...]

Full-scale civil war erupted in eastern Zaire in October [1996]. By year's end, rebel troops captured a 400-mile long swath of territory along Zaire's border with Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.

The war originated in the South Kivu region of eastern Zaire when government authorities attempted to expel some 400,000 local ethnic Tutsi, known as Banyamulenge, who had been in Zaire for generations. Authorities formally nullified the Zairian citizenship of Banyamulenge in 1981. In 1996, officials intensified their claims that the Banyamulenge were not legitimate citizens. A local official warned that all Banyamulenge must leave the country within a week and threatened to confiscate their property. Violence gradually increased throughout September, as Zairian troops and civilian mobs attacked the homes and businesses of the Banyamulenge community.

The Banyamulenge armed themselves and counterattacked. By mid-October, Zairian troops were in retreat and large areas rapidly fell into rebel hands. The rebels stated that their movement, known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), included Banyamulenge as well as members of other political and ethnic groups opposed to the decades of corrupt and abusive mismanagement by Zaire's government and army.

The quick advance of ADFL troops, initially estimated to number 3,000 to 10,000 combatants, caused Rwandan refugees to flee from their camps in the conflict zone. ADFL rebels regarded soldiers and militia of the former Rwandan government in the camps as enemies, and attacked the camps as military bases. "Combatants should stop attacking refugees," UNHCR stated. Virtually all refugee camps in the Uvira area reportedly emptied by October 21. Most camps in the Bukavu area were vacated two weeks later.

[...]

Numerous NGO workers on the ground and international diplomats charged that Rwandan and Ugandan government troops crossed into Zaire and participated in the rebels' military offensive, contributing mightily to its rapid success. Rwandan and Ugandan officials acknowledged sending troops into Zaire on a limited basis." (USCR 1997, pp. 105-106)

Mobutu defeated and Kabila emerges to power (May 1997)

- Pockets of violence continued in eastern Congo/Zaire during the last half of 1997

"The civil war continued unabated in early 1997. UN efforts to mediate a peace agreement failed, despite a UN Security Council resolution urging "protection and security for all refugees and displaced persons, and facilitation of access to humanitarian

assistance." Mobutu's military offered little or no resistance against the advancing ADFL troops. The major city of Kisangani, in north-central Congo/Zaire, fell to ADFL forces in March. The key southeastern city of Lubumbashi was captured in April. Rebel troops and their allies seized Kinshasa, the capital, in May.

A majority of citizens appeared to welcome the defeat of Mobutu and his troops, who had continued to terrorize the population even during their retreat across the country. The victorious ADFL immediately installed its leader, Laurent Kabila, as president.

[...]

Pockets of violence continued in eastern Congo/Zaire during the last half of 1997, provoked by long-simmering ethnic tensions and the continued presence of Rwandan soldiers and militia members linked to the extremist former government of Rwanda. Shadowy insurgent groups sprang up to challenge ADFL control in some eastern areas." (USCR 1998, p.60)

Recovery from the 1996-1997 civil war interrupted by rebellion against Kabila (August 1998)

- Rebellion against President Kabila emerged as Rwandan soldiers were sent home
- New civil war became an impetus for a new wave of hostilities and flagrant violations of human rights affecting a wider area of the country than previous war

"In late July 1998, Congolese President Laurent Kabila sent home all Rwandan soldiers, thus officially breaking ties with the allies who, together with Ugandan forces, had helped sweep him into power fourteen months before. Rwanda and Uganda responded by invading Congo and joining forces with troops from the Congolese army (Forces Armées Congolaises, FAC) that had mutinied against the government in Goma and Bukavu. The RCD [Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie], composed of former Tutsi members of Kabila's government, former Mobutists, a number of intellectuals, and others, soon emerged as the political leadership of this coalition." (Human Rights Watch February 1999, chapt. I)

"This time Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi sent in troops to support the RCD, a conglomerate of Congolese with various motives to topple the Kabila regime. Once again, the Banyamulenge gave active support and many RCD cadres were chosen from their ethnic group. The RCD later split in two factions and another rebel group, the MLC, challenged Kabila in the Northeast. Kabila is backed by mainly Angolan and Zimbabwean troops. His "unofficial" allies include directly and indirectly, the Mai Mai, and some of the rebels groups against the current Rwandan (Interahamwe, ex-FAR), Ugandan (ADF, NALU) and Burundian governments (FDD, Palipehutu). The Banyamulenge are currently in an isolated position. Although well represented in the ranks of the RCD, they have a separate militia for self-protection. Having immigrated to the DRC over the centuries, they want to integrate in Congolese society but their support to the consecutive Rwandan interventions makes them seen as "collaborators" with what is perceived as an occupation force. Aside from a tense relationship with Rwanda and the

Congolese RCD, they are also being targeted by the Mai Mai, FDD, ex-FAR and Interahamwe." (AAH August 2000, sect. 2)

"Starting from August 1998 major changes in the humanitarian situation occurred in the DRC as a result of military confrontation simultaneously taking place in the eastern provinces of the country and in Bas Congo province, as well as in Kinshasa. The first three months of the military conflict put an end to one year-long progress of the relief community in rehabilitating destroyed infrastructure and reintegrating returnees. The war equally undermined the positive trends towards national reconciliation that had started to emerge in the Congolese society. It also became an impetus for a new wave of hostilities and flagrant violations of human rights. The immediate impact of this war was undoubtedly devastating for the population. However, in the longer run, it is fraught with even more serious consequences, as it has affected the fragile social tissue of the Congolese society as a whole. For the first time since the complex humanitarian emergency of 1994/95, the struggle in the east of the country echoed in the traditionally peaceful west, South and Upper Northern parts of the country. In contrast to the civil war of 1996, the area of military clashes significantly expanded in August-September 1998 and directly affected the civilian population of Bas Congo, Orientale and Kinshasa provinces.

Hence, the fundamental change in the humanitarian situation of the DRC is a further deteriorating socio-economic and security situation of the Congolese people as a whole. In more specific terms, the following emergency situations can be singled out: recurrent devastating displacement of populations in North Kivu and South Kivu; unprecedented plight of the population and destruction of economic infrastructure in Bas Congo province; weakened food security for the overwhelming majority of the country's urban population; threat of wide-spread famine in Province Orientale and notably in Kisangani; suspension of return and reintegration processes of Congolese refugees; absence of effective protection mechanisms for certain groups of refugees in the atmosphere of military confrontation and lack of access; physical insecurity for Hutu, Hunde and Banyavyura communities in Kivu provinces and certain ethnic minorities in Kinshasa and Katanga provinces." (UN December 1998, pp. 1-2)

"After nine months of conflict [by July 1999], over 700,000 persons on both sides of the frontline are either displaced or dispersed. Most remain inaccessible to relief organisations, while some are targeted by acts of reprisal or ethnic persecution. Fleeing widespread insecurity and military confrontation, some 80,000 Congolese streamed across the DRC border and have sought asylum in Tanzania and Zambia, while over 285,000 Angolan, Sudanese, Congolese (Brazzaville), Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian refugees remain in DRC." (UN July 1999, p.1)

Overview of the various armed conflicts ongoing in DRC by February 2001

"Stalemate in the war and lack of progress in the peace process led to a de facto partition of the country under four regimes, each depending on foreign troops for its survival. The

government is entrenched in the western half of the country, although its longstanding reliance on foreign allies became pronounced following the assassination in mid- January 2001 of President Laurent Kabila and his replacement by his son Joseph Kabila. One rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo, MLC), headed by Jean-Pierre Bemba, controls much of Equateur province in the north. By early 2001, it had established its sway over another, less well organized rebel group, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), which claimed to control parts of North Kivu, and Orientale provinces in eastern Congo. This merger brought together several of the RCD-ML leaders and created the Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front pour la Libération du Congo (FLC). Wamba dia Wamba, however, one of the first leaders of the rebel movement and founder of the RCD-ML, continued to oppose this merger, but with little apparent success. A third rebel group, the main part of the RCD, now known as RCD-Goma, controls parts of North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, Orientale, and Katanga provinces in the east and southeast.

[...]

In addition to the virtual partition of the country, the war has produced further divisions within the zones dominated by Uganda and Rwanda. Local leaders, seeking gain for their political parties or for themselves personally, have manipulated ethnic loyalties and have exploited external support to carve out their own areas of influence. The interaction between local leaders and actors in the broader war has exacerbated local ethnic tensions and created a volatile mix of inter-ethnic conflict that continues to have devastating consequences both in terms of violations of human rights and general suffering for the civilian population." (HRW March 2001, sect. I)

"20. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is bedevilled by various armed conflicts, some international (the Democratic Republic of the Congo against Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, which receive RCD support, in the east) and others which are not international, but which have been internationalized by the participation of foreign troops (the conflict between the Bahema and the Balendu in the north-east). Others again are conflicts between outsiders fought in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Republic of the Congo against various opposition militias; Angolan, Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan rebels against their respective Governments), which should be seen as outsiders' internal conflicts that have become internationalized [...]. At least six national armies and 21 irregular armed groups [...] are involved in the conflicts, which all take place entirely in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose population has been decimated.

A. The conflict between the Government and the Congolese Rally for Democracy

21. The conflict between the Government and RCD, which began on 2 August 2000 [sic! should read 1998] following Rwanda's invasion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is the most serious of the conflicts, not only because of its political and economic repercussions, but also because it restricts the enjoyment of the civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights of the entire region. The Security Council, in its resolution 1304 (2000), explicitly recognized that Uganda and Rwanda "have violated the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”. The Security Council had previously called those two countries “uninvited”.

22. On one side are the armies of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and RCD/Goma, together with its paramilitary group, the Local Defence Unit (ADL). During his visit to the country, the Special Rapporteur received evidence of the involvement, on behalf of the armies of Rwanda and Uganda, of Interahamwe deserters and Rwandan Bahutu prisoners, who were released and sent to the front. The mineral riches of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Katanga, Orientale province and Kasai Oriental have been so depleted by foreign troops and RCD that the Security Council established an expert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by occupying and rebel forces.

23. The Government has relied for its defence on its own armed forces (FAC) and on counter-rebel militias: it has open and confirmed ties to the Mai-Mai, a group that is gaining in popularity with a local population tired of being subjected to the control of forces they consider foreign. It also has informal ties to other “counter-rebels”: RCD deserters, Rwandan Bahutu Interahamwe (the “Mongol” militia), members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and Burundian Bahutu, among others.

24. The violence always follows the same pattern: it is unleashed by the attacks of the counter-rebels against military forces which they consider to be aggressors. The response of the Rwandan army, RCD and the Burundian army is to attack the defenceless civilian population, committing indescribable massacres, such as those that took place at Katogota, on 15 May, Kamanyola, Lurbarika and Luberizi, or the massacre in July on the Lusenda-Lubumba highway, as well as the events - denied, as others have been, by RCD/Goma - that took place in Mwenga in November 1999, in which 15 women were tortured and buried alive (see the report of the Secretary-General in document S/2000/330, para. 61).

25. Some Banyamulenges (Batutsi of Rwandan origin, not recognized as having Congolese nationality), who started the first war against the dictator Mobutu (1996-1997), have been responsible for violent incidents aimed at RCD, as they were fed up at being the target of the resentment of the Congolese over the abuses committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR).

26. Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), cited above, demands that Uganda and Rwanda “withdraw all their forces” from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that this withdrawal should be reciprocated by the other parties. The Secretary-General reported at the beginning of December that neither Rwanda nor Uganda had withdrawn their troops.

B. The conflict between the Government and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo

27. In Equateur province, MLC, with the support of Uganda and the involvement, for which there is convincing evidence, of the National Union for the Total Independence of

Angola (UNITA), is fighting the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), which are supported by Zimbabwe and Namibia. It is in this province that the parties have shown the least respect for the ceasefire and indeed the rebel leader has long maintained that he felt under no obligation to observe it. President Kabila contends that MLC has rendered the ceasefire agreement null and void.

C. Clashes between Ugandan and Rwandan military forces in Kisangani

28. The conflict that best illustrates Rwanda's and Uganda's lust for conquest is the one in Kisangani, the third largest city in the country, between the "uninvited armies" of Rwanda and Uganda (supported by RCD/ML). Kisangani was previously under the control of the two RCD factions, but, since the bloody clashes that destroyed the city on 5 and 9 May and 9 June, it has been ruled with an iron fist by Rwanda and RCD/Goma. The cause of the conflict is both economic (both armies want the huge wealth of Orientale province) and political (control of the territory).

29. The Special Rapporteur saw for himself the destruction wreaked on the city by the foreign armies, especially in the fighting in June. In addition to casualties among the soldiers, about 1,000 Congolese civilians died and thousands more were wounded.

30. Calls for a ceasefire, including from the Security Council, went unheeded and moves towards demilitarization were disregarded the very next day. Only the most recent agreement on the withdrawal of the troops from the city appears to have been complied with.

D. Tribal conflict between the Balendu and the Bahema

31. This is a political and artificial conflict caused by the Ugandan presence in the region, but it has been classed as a tribal conflict. Except for some incidents in 1911, 1923 and 1966, these two ethnic groups had lived side by side without major difficulties for nearly three centuries. However, since they arrived in the Ituri region, the Ugandan troops have encouraged and given military support to the Bahema (who are of Ugandan origin) to seize land from the Balendu, who have been in the region longer. All the officials appointed by the Ugandan soldiers are from the Hema ethnic group. The current confrontations, which flared up again in August 2000, have resulted in some 10,000 deaths and the displacement of some 50,000 people." (CHR 1 February 2001, paras. 20-31)

Warring parties involved in the post-August 1998 conflict: an overview

The table below presents briefly the major armed groups involved in the DRC conflict since August 1998. The information should be considered indicative only, and excludes numerous smaller armed groups and factions within and outside the main armed groups involved in the conflict. The table may not be updated with regard to recent changes in alliances. More detailed information is included below the table, but readers seeking further information may consider a review of the source documents.

"The number of non-state actors, often referred to as armed opposition, uncontrolled military groups, insurgents, etc. is continuously on the rise. In addition to domestic non-state armed groups, the DRC hosts a significant number of foreign rebel or insurgent groups, which consider the DRC as a rear base for launching raids on their respective countries. With the exception of Tanzania, Zambia and CAR, all other DRC neighbour countries attempt to neutralise their domestic armed opposition on the DRC soil. In simple terms, the internal struggles of Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and to a much lesser extent (in the past) Republic of the Congo have been spilling over into the DRC. In eastern province of the Kivu, there is a noticeable amalgamation of foreign and local insurgent groups that are not believed to be entirely under the control of any state-parties to the conflict, although they regard Rwandan and Burundian armies as their main target. Security-related problems encountered by relief personnel because of widespread insurrection have been regular and frequent and are expected to increase." (UN November 2000, p.21)

PRO GOVERNMENT FORCES	
Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)	Remaining part of the national army loyal to President Kabila. Comprised of soldiers from Mobutu's Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ), as well as Kabila's own core force of Banyamulenge and Katangan gendarmes
Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia	National armies
Mai-Mai (also Mayi-Mayi)	Indigenous militia involved in a number of uprisings in the Great Lakes Region since the colonial era, today encompassing many of the groups of indigenous militia of different ethnic origins in eastern Congo opposed to the RCD and its allies
Interahamwe militia & Ex-FAR	Interahamwe initially organized as a political party in Rwanda, major actor in genocide against the Tutsis, after fleeing to eastern Congo Interahamwe has become a term covering any ethnic Hutu combatant in Congo. Ex-FAR (i.e. members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces)
Forces pour la défense de la démocratie -FDD (Burundian rebel group)	The armed wing of a major Burundian opposition force (CNDD-FDD)
Alliance of Democratic Forces - ADF (Ugandan rebel group)	Ugandan rebel group traditionally fighting the Government of Uganda
MAJOR ARMED GROUPS FIGHTING KABILA'S GOVERNMENT	
RCD-Goma (Congolese Rally for Democracy/Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD)	Composed of former Tutsi members of Kabila's government, former Mobutists, a number of intellectuals, and others. RCD was initially one group, but split into two factions during second half of 1999, i.e. RCD-Goma and RCD-ML. Backed by Rwanda.
RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) – armed wing known as Armée Populaire Congolaise (APC)	Headed by Wamba-dia-Wamba and based in Bunia, Orientale province. Backed by Uganda
The Mouvement national de libération congolais (MNLC also MLC)	Anti-Kabila group led by businessman Jean-Pierre Bemba, with support from Uganda
Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC)	Emerged in January 2001 as a unification in of the armies of MLC, RCD-ML, and RCD-National. Wamba's support and role uncertain.
Defectors from the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)	Among others, the 10th Battalion (25,000 soldiers) which launched the rebellion on 2 August 1998 from Goma
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA/APR)	National Rwandan army

PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES (information about selected groups):

Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)

"When Kabila came to power, he decided to reform the army. This was to become an integrated force comprised of soldiers of Mobutu's Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ), and Kabila's own core force of Banyamulenge and Katangan gendarmes. However, neither of the latter elements was sufficiently well equipped or adequately trained to take command of the new FAC army. This explains the emergence of officers from the ranks of ex-FAZ troops, such as Jean-Pierre Ondekane, who is now leading the rebel movement. It also partly explains why Joseph Kabila, the president's son, was appointed FAC chief of staff. His initial military training was under the Tanzanians during the 1996 war, and he was receiving further training in China when the rebellion broke out in August 1998. Kabila has never won the loyalty of the ex-FAZ. They have not forgotten their humiliating defeat by the AFDL in 1996 and soon defected to the rebel side soon after this latest conflict began.

Most of the better-trained FAC troops belonged to the elite unit of the 10th Battalion stationed in Goma. It was this unit, numbering 25,000 men, which launched the rebellion on 2 August 1998 from FAC headquarters in Kivu. An official announcement that the FAC had started a war to liberate their country was broadcast over Radio Goma by one of their officers, Sylvain Mbuki. Kabila denounced them as traitors and puppets of Rwanda and Uganda. Their defection led directly to the loss of Kivu. They immediately started marching north towards Oriental and Equateur provinces, south to Northern Katanga and also towards the centre of the country; the FAC troops stationed in those provinces all defected to the rebel movement.

In response, Kabila has embarked on a massive recruitment exercise to plug the gap in the FAC's ranks. However, the deserters included the more experienced FAC soldiers and the new and obviously inexperienced recruits have not proved up to the job. Kabila has therefore had to co-opt more seasoned fighters from among the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias, soldiers who formerly fought for Idi Amin, and the Burundian FDD in order to beef up his war machine." (ICG 21 May 1999, "The Congolese parties to the Conflict")

Mai-Mai

"The term "Mai-Mai" has been used to describe indigenous militia involved in a number of uprisings in the Great Lakes Region since the colonial era. Mai-Mai fighters often undergo traditional initiation rites which are intended to make them invulnerable to bullets and other weapons of their enemies. Today, the term "Mai-Mai" is used to refer to many of the groups of indigenous militia of different ethnic origins in eastern Congo opposed to the RCD and its allies. It appears that these groups are not well-organized and economic hardship may have encouraged many young men to join. Some of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) in the east who did not join RCD forces and former members of the Zairian Armed Forces (ex-FAZ) also reportedly joined forces with groups of Mai-Mai." (HRW February 1999, chapt I)

"The Government's support for the Mai-Mai makes it responsible for the offences committed by the latter. While they generally attack Rwandan and RCD soldiers, they have also committed violence against civilians suspected of collaborating with those they regard as "the enemy". The high degree of popularity they enjoy among the Congolese does not absolve them of responsibility. Incidents involving brutality include those that occurred at Lubero in April and at Nyabibwe, Numbi (50 dead) and Kihuha in July." (CHR 1 February 2001, para. 138)

"The main armed group operating in Beni and Lubero-as elsewhere in the Kivus-is the Mai-Mai. This generic name applies to any one of a multitude of irregular forces fighting against what they perceive to be foreign occupiers of their traditional domain and their national territory. Many of the groups follow certain rituals thought to protect them in battle. They typically enter into or repudiate alliances with outside actors according to the priorities of their local agenda. Mai-Mai are generally thought to cooperate with local people, although they can also prey upon them if they fail to support the ends of the Mai-Mai." (HRW March 2001, sect.V)

Interahamwe

"The Interahamwe militia were organized by former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana's political party. During the genocide in Rwanda, the militia were transformed into bands of killers. Since the flight of many Interahamwe to eastern Congo following the genocide, Congolese increasingly referred to any ethnic Hutu combatant in Congo as Interahamwe, including Hutu who have lived in Congo for generations. Many residents of eastern Congo claimed that the Interahamwe had formed an alliance with the Mai-Mai in their fight against the RCD, Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian militaries, confounding the exact identification of militia." (HRW February 1999, chapt I)

"The Interahamwe, originally a Rwandan Hutu militia which helped lead the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, now include the remnants of that group plus others, both Rwandan and Congolese Hutu, who have joined with them in fighting the current government of Rwanda. Although Rwandan authorities and many others speak of the group as if it were composed exclusively of persons guilty of genocide, it is impossible to know how many of present-day Interahamwe were part of the force in 1994. Some are certainly former soldiers of the Rwandan army (Forces Armées Rwandaises, FAR) and of the original Interahamwe militias, while others are former civilians with no previous military experience." (HRW May 2000, chapt.I)

"Humanitarian sources told IRIN that the Interahamwe recruited young refugees after the camps in eastern DRC were dismantled in 1996. Rwandan commanders estimate that in North Kivu there are three battalions of Interahamwe, each with 2500-3000 troops, spread between the areas of Masisi, Walikale and Rutshuru. "We regularly engage them but over the last one month they have been moving in small groups, targeting civilians for looting and killing," Lieutenant-Colonel Alex Ibabaza, the Rwandan deputy brigade commander in charge of the border area, told IRIN." (IRIN 28 July 2000)

ARMED GROUPS FIGHTING KABILA'S GOVERNMENT (information about selected groups):

Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)

"The RCD [Congolese Rally for Democracy/Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie], composed of former Tutsi members of Kabila's government, former Mobutists, a number of intellectuals, and others, soon emerged as the political leadership of this coalition. The conflict in Congo grew during August and September [1998], eventually drawing in other states from the region, including Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad on the government side, and with Burundi apparently joining the Rwandans and Ugandans to support the RCD and the FAC defectors. Rwanda and Uganda claimed they had sent forces across the border to protect themselves against various armed groups which had been attacking them from bases in the eastern Congo, operating without hindrance from the Congolese government. Burundi continued to deny its involvement in the conflict despite regular sightings of their troops in South Kivu. The RCD proclaimed its goal to be the ouster of Kabila, while his backers stated they were protecting a legitimate government from foreign aggression. Outside observers suspected that the prospect of exploiting Congo's vast mineral wealth had attracted many of the warring parties. A number of other militia and rebel groups from the region joined the fray, while alliances between them and the warring parties were often unclear.

[...]

Victims and witnesses of abuses in eastern Congo frequently described perpetrators as "Rwandan," "Banyamulengue," or "Tutsi" military allied with the RCD, but were often unable to conclusively identify them as belonging to a particular army. Establishing the national identity of perpetrators was complicated by the fact that some Tutsi military among the Rwandan and Ugandan forces were born in Congo but have lived in all three countries; Kinyarwanda and Swahili are spoken in all three countries; and the use of uniforms by RCD forces was often haphazard. Commanders fighting on behalf of the RCD frequently wore civilian clothes and, in an apparent attempt to further hide their identity, often used their first names or pseudonyms only. Many residents of the east claimed that the RCD military was dominated by Tutsi from the Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundian or Congolese armies, increasing resentment among other Congolese ethnic groups vis-à-vis Tutsi in general." (HRW February 1999, chaps. I, IV)

"The founder members of the RCD are a heterogeneous coalition whose opposition to Kabila is the only common denominator. They come from diverse political backgrounds and only joined together in August 1998 to launch the rebellion against Kabila. The first three months of the conflict were spent attempting to co-ordinate the different interests of the various political factions within the rebel movement.

[...]

Most RCD officials interviewed by an ICG field researcher conceded that the multiplicity of political interests, including those of their major political backers, Uganda and Rwanda, are leading to a lack of cohesion in the movement. But these political differences are officially played down. In an interview with Reuters in Goma, RCD Vice-President Moise Nyarugabo said: "This is normal and it can happen that any movement may contain some differences. But the differences we are facing we are facing as a team." (ICG 21 May 1999, "The Congolese parties to the Conflict")

RCD split into RCD-Goma and RCD-ML during 1999

"The rebel Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) on Wednesday [19 May 1999] named medical doctor Emile Ilunga as its new leader after Ernest Wamba dia Wamba was ousted on Sunday [16 May 1999] in an internal power struggle. The movement retained military commander Jean-Pierre Ondekane and Moise Nyarugabo as first and second vice-presidents respectively. Wamba said he was a victim of a "coup", unilaterally ousted by his opponents within RCD." (IRIN-CEA 21 May 1999)

"Notwithstanding the successful holding of the JMC meeting on 11 and 12 October, the split between RCD-Goma and RCD-Kisangani (now renamed RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML)) has persisted. On 1 October, RCD-Kisangani moved its headquarters to Bunia, instituted a "transitional government" and declared the establishment of new provinces in the Province Orientale. RCD-Goma has reportedly indicated its intention of recapturing the territory controlled by the RCD-ML as they find the "artificial creation" of a Congolese province to be unacceptable." (UN SC 1 November 1999, para. 12)

"[Wamba-dia-Wamba], with a small part of the RCD, moved north to Bunia where his group claims to control parts of North Kivu and Orientale provinces. The main part of the RCD, based in Goma under Emile Ilunga, exercises its control over parts of South Kivu, Maniema, North Kivu, Orientale, and Katanga. RCD-Goma has created an administration, divided into a series of "departments," each with a "head," and has named governors and other officials. It does not call itself a government but claims to administer this area according to Congolese law." (HRW May 2000, sect.I)

"[T]here have been increasingly frequent reports of internal divisions within RCD-Goma, particularly between members of the Tutsi and those from other ethnic groups. Some Congolese Tutsi, commonly known as Banyamulenge, have clashed with Rwandese forces and dissociated themselves from the RCD-Goma. Some Banyamulenge have formed a new group known as the *Forces républicaines fédéralistes* (FRF), Federalist Republican Forces, which on 14 February 2000 called for a withdrawal of Rwandese forces from the DRC. It also accused Rwandese forces of systematic looting and arming members of other ethnic groups in South-Kivu. Talks on peaceful co-existence between some Banyamulenge and members of other ethnic groups have been reported." (AI 31 May 2000, sect. 2.2)

"The RCD-Goma Fifth Brigade carries out joint operations with the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) against the Interahamwe. Two ex-Rwandan government (ex-FAR) army officers - named as Major Haguma and Colonel Ndegeyeika - are said to be commanding the Interahamwe militia in North Kivu, according to Ibabaza. Joseph Bizimana, the captured Interahamwe, said the militia's main source of supplies "are air drops from the Congolese government." (IRIN 28 July 2000)

"The RCD faction based in Goma and known henceforth as RCD-Goma continued [after the 1999 split] to control the Congolese military contingent of the rebellion and the

Wamba-led faction, known then as RCD-Kisangani, initially had no significant military arm.

[...]

[I]n September 1999 he [Wamba] established the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), a reincarnation of RCD-Kisangani. He announced that Bunia, a small and until then quiet town in Orientale province near the border with Uganda, would be the headquarters of the movement.

Wamba appointed officials of his new government reportedly without much consultation with his aides, leading to the defection of several founding members of RCD-Kisangani in protest. [...] Appointed general commissar, or prime minister, of the RCD-ML, Mbusa Nyamwisi set up an RCD administration in his hometown of Beni, in the part of North Kivu province controlled by Uganda. Himself a businessman turned politician, Mbusa was a member of the economically powerful Nande business community. Tibasima Ateenyi, a former member of parliament from Bunia area and former chief executive of the Kilomoto gold mines, ran a parallel administration out of Bunia.

[...]

Neither Mbusa as general commissar nor Tibasima as minister of finance had the mandate to recruit soldiers, but both did so in early 2000, engaging in parallel and concurrent recruitment processes for the Armée Populaire Congolaise (APC), the military wing of the RCD-ML. They raised the army largely along ethnic lines, with Mbusa initially recruiting heavily among the Nande people and Tibasima enlisting mostly youngsters of his own Hema group. The two processes had one thing in common, though: the Ugandan army provided the instructors who trained and armed successive classes of hundreds of recruits at Nyaleke training camp in Beni and at Rwampara training camp in Bunia.

[...]

The APC had no chief of staff and battalion commanders were supposed to report directly to Wamba, who named himself defense commissar as well as president of the movement. Wamba reportedly suspected the loyalty of commanders identified with his deputies and so in early 2000 recruited his own Presidential Protection Unit (PPU). Elements were handpicked for the small PPU corps from experienced soldiers from the demobilized army of former President Mobutu or from deserters of President Kabila's Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC).

[...]

The Ugandan army's sector commanders in fact exercised ultimate authority over all military and security matters in each district. Some RCD-ML units and cadres operated directly under their command." (HRW March 2001, sect.III)

The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)

"A handful of Congolese exiles led by Jean-Pierre Bemba told the Ugandan president in October 1998 that they wanted to change their government at home, but did not want to join the RCD. Ugandan authorities sent the group to a crash military and ideological training course and weeks later flew them to Equateur to launch what would become the MLC. Less than two years later, "Bemba commended Ugandan soldiers for training 20,000 soldiers" for the MLC. Reporting on the September 2000 press conference at

Gebadolite during which Bemba acknowledged the UPDF's assistance, the *New Vision* quoted him as urging the UPDF to continue withdrawing troops from the DRC: "We are proud of the Ugandans. But why should they die for us when we (Congolese soldiers) are doing quite well at frontline positions?" Unlike the RCD-ML, the MLC was fighting an active war directly against the government alliance. With crucial battlefield support from the UPDF, the MLC was able to roll back a major government offensive in the second half of 2000. In contrast with the other two major rebel groups, the MLC was also reported to be financially self-sufficient, mainly from taxes levied on local produce" (HRW March 2001, sect.III)

The Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC) emerging in January 2001 as a coalition between MLC and fragmented RCD-ML groups

- Constant leadership disputes within RCD-ML during 2000
- Agreement behind the creation of FLC in January 2001 provided for the unification of the armies of MLC, RCD-ML, and RCD-National, but the three partners will remain separate for the purposes of the inter-Congolese dialogue mandated by the Lusaka accord

"Constant leadership disputes produced political and administrative confusion in the year 2000 in areas of northeastern Congo, which the RCD-ML claims to control. The three top officials of the RCD-ML, Wamba dia Wamba, on one side, and his two deputies Mbusa Nyamwisi and Tibasima Ateenyi developed parallel political and administrative structures in Bunia, the RCD-ML's capital, and in the town of Beni. The military wings of the RCD-ML reflected the leadership splits: most recruitment for the RCD-ML armed forces was carried out on the basis of personal and/or ethnic loyalty. The political struggle exacerbated ethnic tensions in the region and, at times, spurred widespread ethnic killings.

By the time it was de facto absorbed into a newly established rebel front in mid-January 2001, the RCD-ML had yet to adopt a basic platform as a political movement, to define its internal structures and their respective attributions, or to choose a leader acceptable to the various factions. Apart from a broad non-militaristic philosophy voiced by Wamba and a rhetorical commitment to the peaceful resolution of the war in Congo, the goals of the movement in the national war and its position on the war's complex regional dimensions were far from clear. The wrangling among the movement's top leaders often focused on mutual accusations of political ineptitude, misuse of funds, and the manipulation of ethnicity for narrow political ends.

Wamba's two deputies attempted at least three times to overthrow him in 2000, although he was nominally president of the movement. Uganda, which backs the rebel faction, ultimately intervened. At each upheaval, the three contenders and their top aides were summoned to Kampala for "consultations." The "foreign allies," that is, the Ugandans, in the meantime acknowledged no clear victor on the ground. This created the perception locally that they were in fact siding with both parties to the dispute at the same time.

[...]

The RCD faction based in Goma and known henceforth as RCD-Goma continued [after the 1999 spilt] to control the Congolese military contingent of the rebellion and the Wamba-led faction, known then as RCD-Kisangani, initially had no significant military arm. Attempts by the Ugandan army, the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), to train some Congolese recruits for RCD-Kisangani angered the Rwandan commanders in Kisangani. They sought to dismantle the training camp, actually arresting dozens of recruits under the pretext that they belonged to the extremist Hutu militia that perpetrated the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Furthermore, RCD-Goma and its Rwandan backers prevented Wamba from holding public meetings to rally the support of the population. Rivalry over the enormous mineral resources commanded by Kisangani, the third largest Congolese city, as well as the political and military frictions over RCD-Kisangani contributed to the unraveling of the remaining trust between Rwanda and Uganda. This helped precipitate the first military confrontation between Rwandan and Ugandan forces for the control of Kisangani in August 1999. During the battle, which was a defeat for the Ugandans, some 200 civilians were killed in the crossfire.

The battle for Kisangani was also sparked by disputes over which RCD faction would sign the Lusaka ceasefire accord, an agreement meant to end the war in the Congo and negotiated under tremendous international pressure. During the battle, Wamba and other leaders of the RCD-Kisangani miraculously escaped death during a Rwandan assault on a hotel they used as a residence and headquarters. Because neither faction could be eliminated and because neither would acknowledge the legitimacy of the other, all fifty founding members of the RCD flew to Lusaka to sign on behalf of the "RCD." The founders affixed their names to the treaty in alphabetical order to avoid further squabbles on who should sign first. No one questioned how a movement, which could not even agree on its representatives, could carry out its obligations under the accord.

The Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML)

After the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) defeated Ugandan forces in August in Kisangani, Wamba felt insecure there and relocated his office to a presidential guesthouse in Kampala. There in September 1999 he established the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), a reincarnation of RCD-Kisangani. He announced that Bunia, a small and until then quiet town in Orientale province near the border with Uganda, would be the headquarters of the movement.

Wamba appointed officials of his new government reportedly without much consultation with his aides, leading to the defection of several founding members of RCD-Kisangani in protest. While his stay in Kampala stretched into months, his two deputies took effective control on the ground. Appointed general commissar, or prime minister, of the RCD-ML, Mbusa Nyamwisi set up an RCD administration in his hometown of Beni, in the part of North Kivu province controlled by Uganda. Himself a businessman turned politician, Mbusa was a member of the economically powerful Nande business community. Tibasima Ateenyi, a former member of parliament from Bunia area and former chief executive of the Kilomoto gold mines, ran a parallel administration out of Bunia.

[...]

Neither Mbusa as general commissar nor Tibasima as minister of finance had the mandate to recruit soldiers, but both did so in early 2000, engaging in parallel and concurrent recruitment processes for the Armée Populaire Congolaise (APC), the military wing of the RCD-ML. They raised the army largely along ethnic lines, with Mbusa initially recruiting heavily among the Nande people and Tibasima enlisting mostly youngsters of his own Hema group. The two processes had one thing in common, though: the Ugandan army provided the instructors who trained and armed successive classes of hundreds of recruits at Nyaleke training camp in Beni and at Rwampara training camp in Bunia.

[...]

The APC had no chief of staff and battalion commanders were supposed to report directly to Wamba, who named himself defense commissar as well as president of the movement. Wamba reportedly suspected the loyalty of commanders identified with his deputies and so in early 2000 recruited his own Presidential Protection Unit (PPU). Elements were handpicked for the small PPU corps from experienced soldiers from the demobilized army of former President Mobutu or from deserters of President Kabila's Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC).

[...]

The Ugandan army's sector commanders in fact exercised ultimate authority over all military and security matters in each district. Some RCD-ML units and cadres operated directly under their command. Even in Beni, Bunia, and Butembo, towns where RCD-ML administrative power was concentrated, UPDF sector commanders overshadowed the Congolese political and military leaders.

[...]

The disorganization within the RCD-ML spawned even smaller splinter groups with limited personal or local agendas. Roger Lumbala, the founder of RCD-National and its only prominent member, originally belonged to the mainstream RCD-Goma and defected in February 2000 to Kampala. There he reportedly joined the RCD-ML and was deployed as mobilization officer to Bafwasende, northeast of Kisangani. Lumbala later told Human Rights Watch that the RCD-ML military unit that Wamba had placed in Bafwasende felt that it had been neglected for too long. [...]

[...]

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[...]

The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)

As the RCD-ML stood on the verge of collapse at the end of 2000, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) appeared to offer all that its Ugandan backers had hoped for and failed to get in their alliance with the RCD-ML. Under the firm grip of its leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, the MLC had a unified political and military command with none of the internal dissensions and spectacular defections that regularly rocked both the RCD-Goma and RCD-ML. According to reports by journalists and other visitors to its home

area, the MLC enjoyed a measure of popularity in the northwestern province of Equateur that none of the other rebel movements could claim in the territories they controlled.
[...]

The Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC): A Merger or Takeover?

Kampala Negotiations

As a way out of the RCD-ML crisis, Uganda in late November [2000] proposed a merger of all the Congolese rebel groups under its patronage: the MLC, RCD-ML, and RCD-N. Col. Kahinda Otafiire, UPDF chief of staff and advisor on the DRC to President Museveni, justified the proposed merger by arguing that "[i]t makes it easier for us and easier for the rebellion and that way the Congolese people can take care of their own matters," and adding "[w]e are tired of running the show for them. Let them assume their own responsibility entirely."

[...]

The Ugandans were determined to create the unified front, to be named the Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC), because a hotly contested presidential election campaign was propelling all aspects of Uganda's involvement in the Congo war to center stage. In addition, the conduct of Ugandan troops in the Congo had drawn closer and more critical international scrutiny following the third battle for the control of Kisangani in June 2000.

[...]

The merger agreement in late 2000 appeared to vindicate Bemba. In fact it hardly masked a move to what could have been an MLC take-over of the RCD-ML, which was sorely weakened by political divisions, a splintered military, and disorganized finances. It provided for the establishment of a joint executive committee for the three movements, with an annually rotating presidency that Bemba assumed for the first year. The agreement provided for the unification of the armies of the three movements, but guaranteed that each of the MLC, RCD-ML, and RCD-National parties would preserve its autonomy for the purposes of the inter-Congolese dialogue mandated by the Lusaka accord. The MLC is said to be readying to launch itself as a national political party in the post-war era." (HRW March 2001, sect.III)

Continued fighting despite the Lusaka cease-fire agreement (1999-2001)

- President Kabila, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia signing cease-fire agreement on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka
- Major rebel forces signing agreement on 31 August 1999
- Reported in September 2000 that the parties continued to conduct significant military operations and undertake intensive military preparations
- Continued stalemate means absence of solutions to the problem of massive displacement
- Behind rebel lines in the Kivu Provinces there is a mosaic of different sub-conflicts - many not covered by the Lusaka agreement
- The assassination of President Kabila on 16 January 2001 may move the peace process in a new direction

"The seven month long peace talks under auspices of Zambia between the parties to the DRC conflict concluded a first significant step- signature of a cease-fire agreement by the Heads of DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia on 10 July [1999] in Lusaka. Unable to overcome persisting internal divergences, the two factions of the RCD and the MLC abstained from signing the Lusaka agreement" UN OCHA 15 July 1999, "Context")

"Following intense diplomatic activity, especially by President Chiluba of Zambia and his Government and the Government of South Africa and others, representatives of the remaining rebel movement, RCD, signed the Ceasefire Agreement in Lusaka on 31 August [1999].

The signing by the RCD representatives was followed by a meeting, on 3 September, of the Political Committee established by the Agreement at the ministerial level to provide overall political coordination in the implementation of the Agreement. The Political Committee agreed that the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) should be full participants in its work and in that of JMC and that Zambia should have permanent observer status in the two bodies." (UN SC 1 November 1999, paras. 4-5)

"The signing of a cease-fire agreement in the summer of 1999, constituted a real prospect for bringing an end to the violent conflict in Congo DR. The agreement included the establishment of a joint military commission made up of African countries to monitor the implementation of the agreement and disarmament of the Interahamwe militia, another major goal included in the accord. The agreement also included the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC and opening a national debate among all domestic factions and civil society on the future of the DRC [the "Inter-Congolese dialogue]." (EPCPT October 2000, "prospects")

By November 2000 the implementation of the Lusaka agreement remained uncertain:

"During the reporting period [August-September 2000] the parties continued to conduct significant military operations. Moreover, there have been indications of intensive military preparations by the parties. These include the procurement of large quantities of weapons and military equipment, extensive recruitment of young males and freed prisoners, retraining of combat units, forward deployment of battalions and reinforcement of front-line units." (UN SC 21 September 2000, para. 21)

" Formally adhered to by all signatories, the Lusaka peace agreement is repeatedly violated on the battlefield and there is little progress in the national dialogue and reconciliation initiatives.

As a witness signatory to the Lusaka Agreement (Accord), the United Nations have been mandated by the parties to help implement the cease-fire provision of the agreement. The presence of MONUC [the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo] in the DRC has contributed to diplomatic exchanges between the warring parties, preservation of the status quo, reaffirmation of the territorial integrity of

the DRC, and partial implementation of the Lusaka Accord, despite continued fighting and obstacles placed in the deployment of peacekeeping troops.

Although regularly violated, the Lusaka Agreement coincided with the end of the prospect of full scale war.

Varying in its intensity [by November 2000], the military activity along the conventional frontline, could be best characterised as a sporadic stalemate. At times, skirmishes along the demarcation lines burst into major military confrontations spreading into new villages and urban areas. Paradoxically, the real threat in most instances is not emanating from the fighting but rather from the protracted status quo in areas on both sides of the frontline that are no longer considered combat zones. In absolute terms, the continued stalemate means absence of solutions to the problem of massive displacement, chronic under-nourishment, and isolation of millions of people from their traditional means of subsistence and, as a result, a high mortality rate." (UN November 2000, p. 5)

"The 'official' frontline separating Kabila and his international allies from the various rebels and their backers has remained fairly stable until the former unleashed a new offensive in July-August 2000. Behind rebel lines, the Kivu Provinces are the stage of a second front or rather a mosaic of different spin-offs and surrogates of the larger conflict. In south-Kivu, the Mai Mai, FDD, ex-FAR and Interahamwe converge in various changing alliances. It is usually unclear how they are structured and their motivation is blurred, from ethnic hatred and self-protection to political interest, financial gain and pure banditism. The RCD, Burundian and Rwandan forces each occupy the towns and villages in the Ruzizi Plains, along the Uvira-Bukavu road and south of Uvira upto Baraka parallel to the Lake Tanganyika shoreline. The road itself, the Ubwari peninsula, the Middle Plateaux and the edges of the High Plateaux are open game area for the Mai Mai, FDD and Interahamwe. In annex 1, the characteristics of these various armed groups are presented." (AAH August 2000, sect. 2)

"The UN on Monday [24 July 2000] announced that it had postponed the first scheduled deployment of peacekeepers in the DRC as a result of the government declaring at the weekend that the UN could not deploy any armed peacekeepers in government-controlled territory. President Laurent-Desire Kabila said on Congolese television that the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was not free to deploy in Kinshasa or Mbandaka (Equateur province).

[...]

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Yerodia said on Monday that the inter-Congolese dialogue provided for in the Lusaka ceasefire agreement was no longer feasible. "The inter-Congolese dialogue, of the type thought [possible] in July 1999, has become something that is no longer workable," Reuters news agency quoted Ndombasi as saying. "You can't have a dialogue without people to talk to. We are not going to organise the inter-Congolese dialogue with those who call themselves rebel leaders." (IRIN 25 July 2000)

The assassination of President Kabila on 16 January 2001 may move the peace process in a new direction:

"Eighteen months of deadlock in efforts to end the war in the Congo came to a sudden end with the assassination of President Laurent Désiré Kabila on 16 January 2001. The late leader had been compelled to sign what he came to see as an unfavourable cease-fire agreement in the Zambian capital of Lusaka in July 1999, and had since obstructed implementation of its every term. His replacement by his 29-year old son Joseph consequently gave new hope to the peace process.

The international community seized the opportunity afforded by the late president's murder and re-engaged in the DRC. Leaders in the U.S., Europe, and the United Nations immediately recognised the new president in order to give him the confidence to break from the policies of his father and implement the terms of the Lusaka cease-fire. In return, Joseph Kabila agreed to join an Inter-Congolese Dialogue facilitated by the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, and welcomed a quick deployment of MONUC, the UN military observer mission for the Congo. The UN Security Council responded to these gestures with the passage of Resolution 1341 on 22 February 2001.

Yet no matter how hopeful the signs, peace in the Congo still remains to be achieved. The interests of the foreign belligerents and their Congolese allies do not favour the creation of a strong, independent and democratic state. In Kinshasa a dangerous contest to become Joseph Kabila's foremost foreign patron has sprung up between Angola and Zimbabwe. Similarly, in the east, tensions persist between different rebel groups and their competing Rwandan and Ugandan sponsors. None of these "strongman" governments are enthusiastic about an Inter-Congolese Dialogue or creation of a transition government built around the principles of power sharing. The late president's obstructionist policies had largely obscured these contradictions. Now that he is gone, they are certain to come to the fore. [...]

The achievements of the 15 February 2001 regional summit on DRC in Lusaka and the 21/22 February Security Council meeting have revived hopes for a rebirth of the long-stalled peace process. The summit parties committed themselves to implement the Kampala and Harare plans for disengagement of forces, signed in April and December 2000. ² In addition, Joseph Kabila accepted the former president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire as the facilitator for the Inter-Congolese dialogue. The recent appointment of Brigadier General Njuki Mwanyiki of Kenya as the new Joint Military Commission (JMC) Chairman, as well as promises of UN cash, have revived the previously moribund organisation, which will soon be moved to Kinshasa.

Then on 22 February 2001 the United Nation's Security Council returned its attention to the Congo by passing Resolution 1341, which again demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces and urged the parties to the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement to adopt a 'precise plan and schedule' by 15 May 2001. The Council demanded that the parties abide in the interim by their promises and start carrying out the Kampala and Harare disengagement plans on 15 March 2001. It also adopted a new Concept of Operations for MONUC, and confirmed its commitment to disarming the 'negative forces'." (ICG 16 March 2001, sect. I & II)

"Mr. Kamel Morjane, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the DRC and Head of Mission (MONUC) [...] said that a perceptible change had occurred in the peace

process and the most serious chance for peace was now at hand. 29 March marked the end of troop disengagement operations, which had begun on 15 March and lasted two weeks in accordance with the Harare agreement provisions of 6 December 2000 and confirmed by the Lusaka Summit of 15 February 2001 and the Security Council on 22 February 2001. Therefore, on 29 March, all warring parties should withdraw to 15 kilometres behind the frontlines.

Also on 29 March, the first contingents of peacekeepers would arrive in Congo and they would come to Goma that morning from Uruguay. That company would be at the head of one of the four sectors of MONUC in Congo. If all went according to plan, these two positive developments would bode well for Congo's prospects for peace." (UN DPI 27 March 2001)

See also:

"Overview of the various armed conflicts ongoing in DRC (September 2000)"

"UN Peacekeeping mission to facilitate implementation of Lusaka peace agreement (2000)"

UN Security Council defines new approach to be taken by MONUC (February 2001)

See the regular reports by the Secretary General to the Security Council for more details about the peace process (list of sources below includes the latest).


POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

Total national figures

Over 2 million IDPs in DRC by end of 2000

According to UN estimates, there were 2,002,500 IDPs in DRC by the end of December 2000. (OCHA 31 December 2000, p.3) This represents a significant increase during the last of part 2000, since there were 1,4 million IDPs by June 2000 and 1,8 million by September 2000. (UN November 2000, p.15). This is despite the fact that an estimated 810,000 former IDPs have returned to their habitual place of residence. (OCHA 31 December 2000, p.6).

IDP growth since 1998



(OCHA 17 April 2000)

960,000 IDPs in DRC by end of 1999


"[By January 2000 there were] some 960,000 internally displaced persons in eight of the 11 provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and over 300,000 refugees from six of its nine neighbouring countries. Recent humanitarian Assessments reveal that

over 2.1 million people (internally displaced persons, refugees, urban vulnerable) or 4.3 per cent of the population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo face critical food insecurity. Another 8.4 million (mostly urban populations and farmers in the proximity of the front line), or 17 Per cent of the population, face moderate but rapidly growing food insecurity." (UN SC 17 January 2000, para. 24)

"The reporting period [1 October - 15 November 1999] saw new population displacements (Kibali-Ituri, Orientale; Walikale, North Kivu, and Mongala, Equateur) but also return of entire communities in South Kivu. Nevertheless, the overall number of IDPs grew from 830,000 to 916,000 (increase by 75,000), as illustrated on the

accompanying graph. This considerable increment is attributable to continued hostilities between Hema and Lemu ethnicities and volatile security in Haut Uele districts of Orientale province."

(UN OCHA 15 November 1999, "Humanitarian Action")



500,000 IDPs in DRC by end of 1998

"The number of IDPs is believed to have almost tripled since the outbreak of hostilities in the DRC and is estimated to have reached the level of 500,000 persons scattered in North and South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema, Kasai, Equateur and Katanga provinces. In rebel-held areas, the current conflict is marked by patterns some of which are similar to those that affected humanitarian action during the 1996-1997 war in former Zaire, i.e. all communities of Northern and Southern Kivu are considered - and consider themselves as - collective targets for military attacks. Massive, durable displacements are expected to have been amplified during the last three months. The situation is usually different in other parts of the DRC, where the populations are only afraid of looting and side-effects of military confrontations. Thus, they only leave their houses for as long as fighting, looting or take-over of a town will last at local level." (UN December 1998, p.14)

It should be noted that USCR apparently subscribed to a more careful estimate of IDPs by the end of 1998:

"The outbreak of renewed war in Congo-Kinshasa in August uprooted hundreds of thousands of people, some for a few days, others for the rest of the year. At year's end, displacement persisted primarily in the eastern one-third of the country.

Although an estimated 300,000 persons were internally displaced at year's end and some 130,000 were refugees in neighboring countries, some aid workers estimated that 80 percent of the population in some eastern regions<a million or more people<might have fled their homes temporarily for several days at different times during the year. Such estimates were impossible to confirm because much of the country remained inaccessible to local and international aid workers." (USCR 1999, p.59)

100,000 believed to be displaced by the end of 1997

- After the main civil war ended (May 1997), eruptions of violence in eastern Congo/Zaire pushed additional tens of thousands from their homes
- About 40,000 Congolese fled early in 1997 hundreds of kilometres westward with Rwandan refugees to the city of Kisangani

"The number of residents who became internally displaced during the civil war remains uncertain. More than 100,000 were already uprooted in eastern Zaire prior to the civil war due to ethnic conflicts. Poor roads, impenetrable forests, and pockets of insecurity impeded full assessments of humanitarian needs in the country's vast isolated areas throughout 1997.

A UN funding appeal in March estimated that nearly a half-million Congolese/Zairians were displaced. U.S. aid officials estimated in August that some 230,000 probably were uprooted within the country. A UN human rights official reported in mid-year that 250,000 to 400,000 were displaced. An international NGO put the number at 190,000. All sources agreed that the most pervasive displacement was in the chronically unstable Masisi zone of eastern Congo/Zaire, near the town of Goma.

USCR site visits to eastern Congo/Zaire during 1997 concluded that up to half the population in some areas of the east were at least temporarily displaced during the war. Many were able to return home after several weeks, but thousands of families endured long-term displacement caused by lingering insecurity in their home areas. USCR estimated that up to 150,000 people remained internally displaced at mid-year, but a majority were "invisible to outsiders because they are dispersed," USCR's report noted.

About 40,000 Congolese fled hundreds of kilometres westward with Rwandan refugees to the city of Kisangani early in the year. More than 70,000 fled to Tanzania. Smaller numbers entered Uganda, Burundi, Sudan, Zambia, and other countries as refugees. As many as 10,000 former Zairian soldiers and their families reportedly fled to Central African Republic.

[...]

In the second half of 1997, after the main civil war ended, eruptions of violence in eastern Congo/Zaire pushed additional tens of thousands from their homes. Some 8,000 people converged on the town of Goma in late April. At least 15,000 fled to Rwanda. Entire areas of Masisi zone, in the east, lay deserted, with 15,000 homes burned and 1,000 people dead." (USCR 1998, pp. 60-61)

400,000 believed to be displaced by the end of 1996

"Uprooted Zairians were the virtually forgotten victims of their country's widening civil war [after October 1996].

An estimated three million Zairians lived in the conflict zones. An estimated 400,000 became internally displaced, and approximately 50,000 others became new refugees in Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda. An additional 1,000 or more Zairian or Rwandan Tutsi fled to neighboring Congo to escape anti-Tutsi violence in the Zairian capital, Kinshasa.

In addition to the new Zairian refugees created during 1996, tens of thousands of Zairians remained refugees from previous years." (USCR 1997, p.107)

Disaggregated figures

Distribution of IDPs by province (July 1999, July 2000 and December 2000)

- The majority of displaced persons are now in North Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga and Equateur (December 2000)

Area	July 1999	June 2000	December 2000
Equateur	100,000	250,000	300,000
Orientale	70,000	215,000	160,000
North Kivu	160,000	287,000	640,000
South Kivu	195,000	220,000	350,500
Katanga	150,000	250,000	305,000
Maniema	20,000	110,000	137,000
Eastern Kasai	60,000	30,000	30,000
Western Kasai		140,000	80,000
Total	775,000	1,502,000	2,002,500

Source: UN OCHA 15 July 1999, 11 July 2000 and 31 December 2000 (p.11)

Displacement in the Maniema province (2000-2001)

- Displacement related to insecurity created by Mayi-Mayi activities and offensive by Kabila forces
- Report in February 2000 of 24,000 long-distance IDPs, coming mostly from war-affected zones of Eastern Kasai and Katanga
- Report in February 2001 that 68% of population in Maniema has been displaced

UN (OCHA) reported in February 2000 that: "Since the fall of Kindu in October 98, the humanitarian situation in this enclave-province was fairly stable. The majority of displaced persons, with the exception of an estimated 20,000 residents of areas bordering with Walikale (North Kivu) and Haut Plateaux (South Kivu), progressively returned and

resumed their activities. Since mid-December 99, Mayi-Mayi activity started to spread in a number of directions throughout eastern DRC, including Maniema. Compounded with the DRC forces' attempt to recapture Kindu in mid-January 2000, it created panic among the civilians in Kindu, but especially in Kalima and Kasongo. In addition, there is a considerable number of long-distance IDPs, coming mostly from war-affected zones of Eastern Kasai and Katanga (24,000). Local sources suggest that the situation of this particular group of IDPs is highly precarious. An estimated 70,000 persons fled these locations. Increased insecurity and imminent hostilities prompted humanitarian agencies to scale-down the already diminished humanitarian activities. After the withdrawal of Merlin expatriate personnel, FOMETRO an international medical NGO, is the only international institution remaining on the ground. Attempts are being made to trace the newly displaced populations with the help of Xaverien catholic mission in Kasongo." (OCHA15 February 2000)

UN (OCHA) reported in July 2000 that:

"An inter-Agency mission conducted by FAO in May 2000 appraised the number of IDPs remaining in the forest at 110,000, of the 980,000 or so who had fled the fighting before Kindu's fall to rebel forces in 1999." (OCHA 11 July 2000)

UN (CHR) reported in February 2001 that:

"In Maniema, over 68 per cent of the population has been displaced. Humanitarian relief is able to reach only 50 per cent of the displaced persons." (CHR 1 February 2001, para.42)

Displacement in the Katanga province (2000-2001)

- Some 250,000 displaced persons scattered in Katanga on both sides of the frontline (June 2000)
- UN expects 30,000 new displaced persons following intense fighting in Pweto (December 2000)
- In March 2001, fighting around Dubié forced the people displaced from Pweto and who had found refuge in Dubie to move toward their home town
- UN estimates that the displaced in the towns of Nyunzu and Kalemie amount to 150,000 persons (March 2001)

UN (OCHA) reported in July 2000 that:

"Along with the first-wave displaced of the Kivus, the IDP caseload in Katanga is the oldest as it was mainly generated during the August-November 1998 fighting in northern Katanga. All major IDP categories (according to their mode of settlement) known in the DRC are represented in this province: there are IDP camps in Lubumbashi, IDP resettlement sites south of the provincial capital, IDPs hosted in local communities and finally those dispersed in an area as large as 50,000 km². In total, there are some 250,000 displaced persons scattered in Katanga on both sides of the frontline." (OCHA 11 July 2000)

UN (OCHA) reported in December 2000 that:

"Notre équipe a été informée d'un mouvement significatif de déplacés à partir de Pweto, qui a débuté les 4-6 décembre. Rappelons que depuis le 19 décembre le nombre de déplacés a atteint 10.000 personnes. Etant donné, l'intensité des combats à Pweto et le risque de leur renouvellement on anticipe de nouvelles vagues de déplacement, estimées à 30.000 personnes environ. Vu les expériences précédentes de rétention des populations déplacées par les autorités militaires dans cette région, cet afflux ne manquera pas de générer des problèmes de protection de ces populations. [...] A également été rapporté à notre équipe un déplacement de populations (estimé à environ 50.000 personnes) en direction de Kabongo et peut-être en provenance de Kabalo." (OCHA 20 December 2000, "Katanga")

OCHA reported in March 2001 that:

"On signale des affrontements autour de Dubie depuis le 5 mars, les déplacés qui sont actuellement à Dubié et qui se chiffrent à 14 000 tentent de se rapprocher de leur localité d'origine. On dénombre 10.000 déplacés à Luanza, 1.2000 à Kilwa. Il existe d'autres poches de déplacés notamment entre Lukonzolwa et Nzwiba." (OCHA 8 March 2001, "Katanga")

"Les déplacés seraient estimés à plus ou moins 150.000 personnes dans les seules localités de Nyunzu et de Kalemie. Ces effectifs comprennent également les populations résidentes qui sont coupées de tout approvisionnement suite à l'enclavement de la ville et de la présence des Mai-Mai et interahamwe dans les localités environnantes;

D'autres déplacés seraient localisés dans les villages et la forêt autour de la ville de Moba. Celle-ci s'était vidée de ses habitants après des bombardements successifs. [...]

Un certain mouvement de retour, quoique timide serait observé vers la ville de Moba mais le mouvement des troupes, à la suite du retrait des alliés rwandais de Pweto, risque de ralentir ce mouvement." (OCHA 15 March 2001)

Displacement in the Orientale province, including Ituri and Kisangani (1999-2001)

- Substantial displacement caused by inter-ethnic clashes in the Ituri province (July 1999- December 2000)
- Intensified troop movement in western and southern regions hampers return of IDPs (November 1999)
- Sudanese (SPLA) rebel activity sustain displacement of an estimated 25,000 persons in Dungen area by end 1999
- Clashes during May and June 2000 in Kisangani resulted in displacement of estimated 65,000 residents, or roughly 10 percent of the city's population
- Reported that one out of three displaced by the Kisangani had not returned to their locality of origin as of September 2000
- Some 20,000 people fled renewed Lendu-Hema fighting in December 2000

UN (OCHA) reported in August 1999 that:

"Inter-ethnic clashes occurred in the Ituri district of this province in mid-July 99 uprooted an estimated 30,000 persons of Lendu and Hema tribes. The fighting is said to have diminished but sporadic clashes continue to date in an area delineated by the villages of Drodoro, Djigu, Fataki and Rethy. It is estimated that another 50,000 IDPs are still in western parts of the region (Opala), in upper north (Dungu) and around Isiro." (UN OCHA 24 August 1999, "Population Movement")

UN (OCHA) reported in November 1999 that:

"Two subsequent evaluations in Kibali-Ituri region of Orientale province allowed a more precise assessment of humanitarian consequences of the by now five month long inter-ethnic clashes (Gema/Gegere- Lendu) in the zone of Djugu. Although the causes of this violent confrontation are not yet clearly determined, local analysts suggest that it is perpetuated by a long-simmering [economic] antagonism between Hema/Gegere cattle-breeders and Lendu agriculturists. Some 100,000 persons are said to have fled the hostilities that resulted in heavy casualties (over 7,000 killed). The displaced are scattered in [Drodoro](#), [Djigu](#), [Fataki](#) and [Rethy](#) and are in dire need of food and medical assistance. MSF/H, ICRC, OXFAM and MedAir are providing emergency medical support to accessible IDPs (approximately 50,000 persons). Although the local authorities claim that the number of persons displaced in Djugu zone exceeds 200,000 relief agencies operating in the area are inclined to consider 100,000 IDPs as a more realistic estimation.

Intensified troop movement in western and southern regions of the province (Opala) is thought to have hampered the return movement of IDPs. It is estimated that in the second half of October and beginning of November additional groups of civilians fled harassment by various retreating military.

SPLA activity is the cause of a sustained displacement of an estimated 25,000 persons in Dungu area of Orientale. Exactly for the same reason the long-term Sudanese refugees in Dungu-Aba zone do not return to refugee camps and are dispersed in several locations. A persisting tensions between the local population of the area (especially displaced) and the Sudanese refugees is being observed. It is estimated that the number of Sudanese refugees reaches 70,000 persons, however only 40,000 are said to be compactly settled in refugee camps." (UN OCHA 15 November 1999, "Humanitarian Action")

UN (OCHA) reported in February 2000 that:

"The unsettled and long-simmering inter-ethnic conflict between Lendu and Hema tribes that had degenerated into an all-out war in June-July 1999, currently represents a major source of instability in eastern DRC. The epicentre of the conflict (Djigu) has rapidly expanded and by mid-January 2000 affected several adjacent densely populated districts of the province (Mahagi, Nioka, Mangbwalu, and the vicinity of Bunia). The alleged partiality of Ugandan military authorities currently controlling much of Orientale province is, in the view of local observers, one of the major factors fuelling the confrontation which has already resulted in a heavy death toll and the displacement of an estimated 180,000 civilians.

[...]

The security situation is rapidly deteriorating in other areas of the province as well: the major eastward shift of the frontline (approaching Opala - regions bordering with Equateur province) is, according to religious sources, prompting civilians to flee into the forest. Major waves of displacement must be anticipated in the direction of Opala-Kisangani should the frontline further move eastward." (OCHA 15 February 2000)

UN (OCHA) reported in July 2000 that:

"Two consecutive clashes [between troops from Uganda and Rwanda] during May and June in Kisangani have resulted in a mass displacement of civilians. An estimated 65,000 residents, or roughly 10 percent of Kisangani's population have fled during and after hostilities. Also, tense security situation and massive military presence around Kisangani have uprooted a number of rural communities along the Kisangani- Buta; Kisangani-Yangambi; Kisangani-Lubutu; Kisangani-Ubundu and Kisangani -Opala axes. Humanitarian assessment and rescue mission conducted in the early aftermath of the Kisangani cease-fire observed several layers of displacement, some of which occurred in 1998-1999. [...]. The great majority of urban IDPs is expected to shortly return to Kisangani following the stabilisation of the security situation.

SPLA troops are still allegedly controlling the Aba-Dungu area, two years after their attack against the town of Dungu (in an attempt to cut access and recruitment opportunities by Sudanese regular forces towards Sudanese refugees). As such, they have to be counted as another compounding element in the Congolese crisis. In Ituri, the IDP number for Bunia and its surroundings is currently estimated at 115,000." (OCHA 11 July 2000, p.7)

UN (OCHA) reported in September 2000 that:

"Kisangani is a city that still lives with the fear of new confrontations, one out of three displaced have not returned to their locality of origin because of the loss of their homes or because they do not yet feel safe." (OCHA September 2000, p.10)

HRW reported in March 2001 that:

"Lendu and associated militia of Ngiti people together with less organized bands of villagers, most of them armed with traditional weapons, launched a major attack on Hema villages in the region of Bunia in mid-December [2000].

[...]

[R]eprisal attacks on Lendu residents by Hema militiamen and soldiers of the APC loyal to Mbusa. According to some witnesses, at least 150 to 250 Lendu were slaughtered, many of them Lendu intellectuals and community leaders.

[...]

Some 20,000 people fled in all directions inside Ituri as an estimated 10,000 others, mostly Hema, sought refuge in Uganda in the first week of January. This latest fighting made Ituri the scene of one of the bloodiest conflicts fought in the shadow of the Congo's broader war. The resulting displacement and movement of refugees to Uganda is one of the largest humanitarian emergencies in Congo today." (HRW March 2001, sect.III)

See also the report (May 2000) by the International Crisis Group about the Uganda-Rwanda tensions.

Displacement in the North Kivu province (1999-2000)

- 155,000 newly displaced persons (since August 1998) were registered in all districts of the province with the exception of Masisi and Walikale
- Confirmation of 90,000 displaced from Rutshuru, northern Masisi and northern Walikale, Kanyabanyonga and the Grand Nord (June 2000)
- Reported in September 2000 that IDPs fleeing Masisi have sought refuge in Kanyabayonga (76,441), in Kirumba (21,085) in Kayna (10,110), and that up to 60,000 people have moved toward Kanyabayonga

UN (OCHA) reported in November 1999 that:

"The first phase of an IDP registration verification project co-sponsored by the UN (WFP and UN Humanitarian Coordination) was completed in the beginning of November. In total some **155,000** newly displaced persons (since August 1998) were registered in all districts of the province with the exception of Masisi and Walikale. The security situation in the latter two locations remains highly volatile as the rebel forces attempt to establish a full control in these areas known for a significant concentration of insurgents. The total figure of IDPs in North Kivu is expected to rise considerably once the Masisi and Walikale IDP figures are available. The population movement in these densely populated districts of North Kivu was intensive in October and is still ongoing." (UN OCHA 15 November 1999, "Humanitarian Action")

UN (OCHA) reported in February 2000 that:

"New waves of internal displacement were observed in North Kivu as well. An estimated 25,000 IDPs arrived in and around Minova as a result of renewed clashes both on South/North Kivu border and in Masisi region. Also there are reports of 14,500 newly displaced in Kanyabayonga area. Displacement is a new phenomenon in northernmost areas of North Kivu, a region that remained relatively stable since the beginning of the war and local observers attribute it to Mayi-Mayi/Interahamwe clashes" (OCHA 15 February 2000)

UN (OCHA) reported in February 2000 that:

"The displaced figures for North Kivu are currently stated at 282,000. Increase in figure is due to the confirmation of 90,000 displaced from Rutshuru, northern Masisi and northern Walikale, Kanyabanyonga and the Grand Nord. The IDP movement from Masisi to the coastal areas of the Kivu lake has gradually diminished after more than a two-month massive arrival of IDPs at a rate of 1000 person per week." (OCHA 11 July 2000, p.8)

IRIN) reported in July 2000 that:

"Humanitarian sources say that since April there has been massive displacement in the Beni-Butembo region, due to systematic incursions by "uncontrolled" armed groups. A UN-NGO assessment team to the area quoted local aid workers as saying people were

fleeing insecure areas due to a lack of protection. They named the most affected areas as Mutwanga and Buisegha in the north, Kibirizi in the south and Miriko, Ikobo in the west, saying that these villages were now practically empty."(IRIN 24 July 2000)

"Sake, some 30 km west of the border town of Goma, is crammed with internally displaced people (IDPs), forced to flee consistent attacks on their homes and livelihoods. As the humanitarian community and local authorities agonise over whether tens of thousands of people living in nearby camps should risk going home or not, people live in constant fear of attack." (IRIN 27 July 2000)

UN (OCHA) reported in September 2000 that:

"About 110,000 IDPs have been detected in Kanyabayonga (76,441), in Kirumba (21,085) and in Kayna (10,110). They are from the Masisi in the Rutshuru, and targeted by non -controlled armed incursions in Mutwanga, Buisenga, Kiribizi, Miriko and Ikobo. Over 40,000 to 60,000 people have moved from the Masisi toward Kanya-Bayonga (in the North Kivu), following an upsurge of violence between Rwandan forces. The incorporation of elements of the old army into the ranks of the Patriotic Rwandan Army (PRA), coupled with the significant presence of the Interahamwe, greatly contribute to the confusion over the circumstances of this violence. A clear result, however, has been the civilian exodus of Congolese. Only the German NGO Agro Action (AAA) has been able to intervene up to now." (OCHA September 2000, p.11)

Displacement in the South Kivu province (2000-2001)

- Sharply deteriorated situation in and around Uvira since mid-December 1999 has forced some 50,000 displaced people to hide in the bush
- UN estimated IDP figures for South Kivu at 220,000 as of July 2000
- Estimated in March/April 2000 that 15% of people in villages along the Baraka-Kamanyola Road were displaced
- Reported in November 2000 that 27,000 IDPs from Shabunda had sought refuge in the town of Kalima
- Reported in January 2001 that Ubwari had the highest number of displaced in South Kivu

IRIN reported in February 2000 that:

"Humanitarian sources report large numbers of people are still being displaced in South Kivu due to an upsurge in fighting between various rebel and anti-rebel groups [by February 2000]. According to some sources, around 10,000 people have fled from Kalonge towards Bukavu in the last 10 days. They say that exodus has most likely been triggered by Interahamwe activity around the northeastern edge of the Kahuzi-Biega national park.

However, the sources also report that more people are now fleeing from the area around Shabunda where fighting is believed to be taking place deep in the forest. There, the movements are believed to have been triggered by the activities of a mixture of Mayi-Mayi and Interahamwe and reprisal actions from the forces of the rebel Rassemblement

congolais pour la democratie (RCD) and their allies of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). Overall, however, the sources stress the picture is not clear. Some estimates now put the total number of displaced people in the area as high as 195,000. "The humanitarian space is shrinking and NGOs can no longer operate. It is not at all clear what the total number of displaced is and where they are," one senior humanitarian source told IRIN.

Sources also report tension between Rwandan Tutsis and Congolese Banyamulenge Tutsis in the area, saying the latter are fearful they will pay the price of the local population's resentment against the outside force. At the same time, the Banyamulenge remain deeply suspicious of the government of President Laurent-Desire Kabila and have declined to take part in a peace conference called by religious groups in Kinshasa, saying their safety would not be assured.

The situation in and around Uvira is also believed to have deteriorated sharply since mid-December with unconfirmed reports saying some 50,000 displaced people are now in the bush between Makobola, Luberizi and Bweyera and in a poor condition." (IRIN 9 February 2000)

UN (OCHA) reported in July 2000:

"IDP figures (220,000) for South Kivu are slightly higher than those used previously but are expected to rise dramatically as a result of ongoing assessment exercises being carried out by a mixed team of humanitarian actors. The team, comprising UN agencies, international NGOs and local NGOs will be gathering data on all aspects of displaced populations along for the following axes: Bukavu - Nyabibwe, Bukavu - Kabare, Bukavu - Burhinyi, Bukavu - Walungu. Information gathered will be used to orient integrated programmes as much as possible and will be the first of much information to go into the coordination/OCHA database on humanitarian needs in DRC. A group of 35,000 IDPs was identified in the Haut Plateau area [...]" (OCHA 11 July 2000)

Action Against Hunger reported in August 2000 that:

"[T]here is no way to verify them [population figures in South Kivu], only 40% of the villages' population is still present in accessible villages. Compared with the theoretical total population figure, i.e. 178,405, only 13% of the "theoretical" population is accessible.

[...]

It is impossible, due to inaccessibility of much of the area to paint an exhaustive picture of internal displacement in the Territories of Uvira and Fizi. At best, a few examples of some of the known larger waves of internal displacement can be given:

Vyura: 5,000 displaced arrived from Vyura (North Katanga) in October /November 1998, They are now fleeing towards the Hauts Plateaux. (source: local authorities)

Ruzizi Plains: In the middle of 1999 displaced arrive in the Plains from the Moyens Plateaux.

Lemera: In April, 2000 Lemera was attacked and looted. Consequently the population fled towards the Ruzizi Plains.

Baraka-Kamanyola Road: ACF-USA's local partner NGOs collected resident and displaced population figures from village chiefs in March/April 2000. According to this "census" the proportion of IDPs in the various area was as follows:

Total : 15 % of the population in villages is displaced
 South of Uvira : 18 % of the population in villages is displaced
 Ruzizi Plain : 11 % of the population in villages is displaced
 Middle Plateaux : 19 % of the population in villages is displaced.

Since the time when these figures have been collected, the population of Lemera fled and moved to the Ruzizi Plain, which has increased the proportion of IDPs in the Plain.

Waves of displacement are also signaled from the Uvira-Baraka road to the Ubwari Peninsula, controlled by the Mai Mai. There are no figures of population available for the Peninsula. ." (AAH August 2000, sects. 3.1-3.2)

WFP reported in October 2000 that:

"Displacement of population from Shabunda (South Kivu) towards Kalima and from Kalima towards Kindu continues. According to MERLIN, around 11,000 IDPs have gathered in Kalima (Maniema province) fleeing insecurity. The Catholic Mission in Kalima has provided a working figure of 15,000 IDPs for the area. Christian Aid reported the arrival into Kindu of IDPs from Kalima and an outbreak of cholera epidemics." (WFP 27 October 2000)

OCHA reported in November 2000 that:

"Some 27,000 people, displaced by fighting in Shabunda, near Bukavu, have descended on the town of Kalima and remain there without any humanitarian assistance, according to a report by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Kinshasa. It noted that only religious workers are operating in the area which continues to serve as a battleground between troops of the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD-Goma) and militias from the Mayi-Mayi and Interahamwe." (IRIN 7 November 2000)

WFP reported in January 2001 that displaced persons were in:

Localization	Displaced Figures	Returnees' figures	Sources
Walungu	63,000		HDW
Bunyakiri, Kalonge		122,859	PPH/SC
Kabare	15,000		ADSSE
Kalehe	10,000		ADSSE
Mwenga	43,200		MCZS
Bukavu	55,180		ICRC
Uvira	51,800	5,350	Local authorities
Ubwari	101,773		Local NGOs
Minembwe	17,205		UN mission

Shabunda centre	21,000		Missionaries
TOTAL	378,158	128,209	

(WFP/Bukavu 30 January 2001)

Displacement in the Equateur province (1999-2001)

- By mid-2000, Equateur remained the most active part of the frontline and civilians reportedly fled the areas of intensive combats
- Most of the population from the Sud-Ubangi, Mongala and Tshuapa districts on the move by January 2000
- Reported in November 2000 that about 55 000 IDPs had gathered between Boende, Bokungu and Yalusaka
- Reported in March 2001 that 3200 IDPs were staying with families in the regions of Lolanga and Mampoko

UN (OCHA) reported in August 1999 that:

"Full scale war in central Equateur has already uprooted an estimated 126,000 persons. This estimation is on the optimistic side, since it only includes the population of Ikela zone that has been a scene of fierce fighting since May 1998. Ikela town "changed hands" several times, prior to its capture by MLC forces in the early August. No additional movements of the population of Equateur across the DRC/CAR border was observed." (UN OCHA 24 August 1999, "Population Movement")

UN (OCHA) reported in February 2000 that:

"Much of Equateur's civilian population residing in Sud-Ubangi, Mongala and Tshuapa districts was on the move starting from the end of December 1999 but especially in early January 2000 when sporadic cease-fire violations transformed into an intense fighting on two fronts. In the direction of Ikela the DRC and allied forces launched a major offensive resulting in recapture of besieged town of Ikela and further advance towards Opala. The catholic parish of Ikela-Bokungu reports widespread devastation of this relatively densely populated region (over 550,000 persons) of Equateur. Although a large majority of civilians are reportedly returning to their home after having spent several weeks in the forest, there is still a considerable number of IDPs that would not be able to return soon mainly because of their long-distance displacement. The situation is especially critical around Ikela where an estimated 12,000 civilians remained besieged for almost six months along with the Zimbabwean troops." (OCHA 15 February 2000)

UN (OCHA) reported in November 2000 that:

"Une équipe conduite par OCHA a fait une brève évaluation des déplacés et des autres populations touchées par la guerre sur l'axe Mbandaka-Bokungu-Ikela du 27 au 17 Octobre. Les détails concernant cette mission seront publiés ultérieurement.

En général, cette mission a confirmé une présence massive de déplacés le long de cet axe. Environ 55 000 personnes sont regroupées entre Boende et Bokungu et Yalusaka. La

situation militaire tendue, à l'intérieur comme aux alentours de Ikela d'une part et les raisons de sécurité d'autre part, ont empêché l'équipe d'accéder à ce site pourtant très important.

Situation alimentaire et sanitaire des déplacés comme de leurs hôtes très préoccupante. Caractéristiques humanitaires principales des personnes déplacées évaluées : identiques à celles reprises dans l'appel Consolidé 2001 : catégories des personnes déplacées dans la forêt mêlées aux communautés locales. S'ajoutent à cette situation déjà précaire, les harcèlements de la part des militaires, le plus souvent des Fac. Les membres de la mission qui ont connu cette région avant la guerre se sont dit choqués par la détérioration et la destruction de l'infrastructure et des installations. Politique de « terre brûlée » systématique par les troupes en retraite." (OCHA 9 November 2000)

In March 2001, OCHA reported that:

"Des missions récentes font état de 3200 déplacés dans les régions de Lolanga et Mampoko (100 km) au nord de Mbandaka. Ces déplacés sont répartis dans des familles d'accueil et vivent dans des conditions précaires. [...]. La ville [de Befale] compte 8.000 résidents et 7.000 déplacés." (OCHA 15 March 2001, "Equateur")

Displacement in the Eastern Kasai province (1999-2000)

- Reported that local communities have received regularly since March-April 2000 IDPs coming from Ikela (Equateur) and Dekese (Western Kasai)
- Bulk of the displaced said to be hiding in the forest not far from their homes
- Conservative figure of 140,000 IDPs maintained for planning purposes (July 2000)
- Worsened security situation for women in Kabinda reported in September 2000

UN (OCHA) reported in August 1999 that:

"War affected eastern regions of this province remained completely inaccessible. According to missionary sources, the weakened military pressure exerted by RCD troops on the Kabinda direction of the frontline resulted in stabilisation of the population's mobility. The planning figure of 60,000 IDPs in this province, includes the population of Lubao and its vicinity that fled westwards in the early 1999 but are still inaccessible."(UN OCHA 24 August 1999, "Population Movement")

UN (OCHA) reported in September 1999 that:

"A joint WFP/French Co-operation mission to the rebel besieged town of Kabinda identified some 20,000 IDPs that fled war zones earlier in June 1999. The food situation of this group and that of the city's population was found to be alarming. An airlift of approx. 50 tons of food to Kabinda (French and Italian Coop. & WFP) is expected shortly. The planning figure of **60,000** IDPs in this province includes the population of Lubao and its vicinity that fled westwards in the early 1999 but are still inaccessible."(UN OCHA 15 September 1999, "Population Movement")

UN (OCHA) reported in April 2000 that:

"The latest statistics, according to local administration registration exercises, put the number of displaced at 141,700 for what is accessible to them from Mbuji-Mayi. Although there are 7,812 displaced registered in the town itself most of them are living with host families; there are no sites. The small amount of assistance it has been possible to deliver to Eastern Kasai has been centred on the war-affected population in Kabinda." (OCHA 17 April 2000)

UN (OCHA) reported in July 2000 that:

"Newly established contacts with religious sources in Lomela and Kole health zones of Sankuru district suggest that since March-April 2000, the local communities regularly receive IDPs coming from Ikela (Equateur) and Dekese (Western Kasai) in addition to long-date local displaced. The bulk of the displaced are said to be hiding in the forest, although not far from their homes. Although the need for relief supplies (mostly medicines) is great, local church sources prioritise the protection of displaced and give an appalling account of violence (systematic rape of school age girls) civilians are subjected to by Rwandan troops. At this stage it is impossible to accurately estimate the number of all IDPs in the province, especially given the relatively new influxes from Equateur. The conservative figure of 140,000 IDPs is maintained for planning purposes, until a more comprehensive assessment on both sides of the frontline can be undertaken." (OCHA 11 July 2000)

UN (OCHA) reported in September 2000 that:

"In Kabinda, the security situation for women has greatly deteriorated. Many cases of rape, occurring when women go to work in fields, have been reported. This situation has created a food shortage since women do not dare walk to the fields as well as an exodus of women toward Mbuji Mayi, the only accessible town from Kabinda." (OCHA September 2000, p.10)

Displacement in the Western Kasai province (2000)

"The frontline reached this western province of the DRC in November-December 1999, but substantial military activity was not noted before the February 2000 military campaign, when rebels attempted to capture Ilebo town, a major junction of the national railway connecting Kinshasa with Lubumbashi via Kananga. Intensive hostilities recessed after the signature of the 14 April Kampala agreement. Data on displacement, however, remains very scarce, as the movement of populations was pre-determined by the logistical advantages offered by the railway. Also a considerable number of residents of Bulape, Dekese, Katende and Demba zones moved eastwards in the direction of eastern Kasai where their chances of surviving would be higher. According to UNICEF - the only UN agency having a permanent presence in Eastern Kasai - most of the displaced are scattered along the railways. Although it is believed that the number of IDPs is rather high, as the frontline is intersecting the most densely populated zones, a preliminary assessment by UNICEF and OCHA on the basis of registrations by the Local Immigration Department, some 30,000 IDPs have been identified: in Kananga and

Demba (Cité Demba, Diofa, Bena-Leke). A rather high number of children – 18,000 or 60% is reported in all IDP communities." (OCHA 11 July 2000)

The civil war has caused a large number of displaced and unaccompanied children (1999-2000)

- 210,000 IDP children affected by the hardships accompanying internal displacement
- 10,000 children in need in protection in the urban areas of the Kivu region

"[An] increased numbers of abandoned or street children in all major urban areas of the DRC prompted UNICEF to support a census of minors in Kinshasa, Goma, Lubumbashi, Mbuji-Mayi and Kisangani. The number of street children is estimated between 12-15,000 in Kinshasa alone. According to SCF/UK, the number of children in need in protection in the urban areas of the Kivu - 10,000." (UN OCHA 15 July 1999, "Children in Need of Protection")

"Approximately 1,500 unaccompanied children remained displaced early in the year at a camp in the city of Kisangani, in north central Congo-Kinshasa. Some 360 children in the camp died of cholera and dysentery before government authorities agreed to close the camp and transfer the children to different locations in February. Government officials claimed the children were Mai-Mai combatants."(USCR 1999, "Renewed War")

"Children in the DRC are worst hit by the adversities of the political and military turmoil and the accompanied economic collapse. Negative developments in child protection in the DRC can be seen in the following appalling statistics:

- * An estimated 10-20,000 children under 15 were recruited as soldiers by all parties to the conflict;
- *A unprecedented increase is being observed in the numbers of abandoned and street children (estimated 50,000) in all major urban centres as well as an increase of minors (estimated 25,000) attending nutritional rehabilitation centres and child-prostitutes.
- * 210,000 IDP children are most affected by the hardships accompanying internal displacement (i.e., epidemic diseases such as measles and food shortages)." (UN November 1999, p.15)

"Abandoned children make up a substantial proportion of the displaced. In September, in the city of Kabina alone, there were 3,000 malnourished children out of a total population of 150,000, of which 15,000 were displaced persons (Hopital Catholique Sainte-Camille). In Lubumbashi too, the number of street children is growing fast. Estimates for this relatively new phenomenon are as high as 3,000 children. Perhaps this is an indication that essential family ties are no longer able to withstand the pressure of the circumstances." (MSF 25 January 2000, "Abandoned children")

See also: "Displaced children need protection from recruitment by armed groups (2000)"

Detention and forced displacement of ethnic Tutsi civilians (1998-1999)

- Reports of approximately 520 Tutsi in Katanga and 450 in Kinshasa being detained or interned by early January 1999
- Claims that the rebels have displaced many Tutsi, including from Burundi, to Kalemie, then on to Uvira (South Kivu) or Masisi (North Kivu) as part of a policy aimed at populating Kivu with Tutsi

"The Government's response to the [August 1998] rebellion was violent. Particularly serious was its incitement to hatred of the Tutsi (who were referred to as "viruses, mosquitoes, garbage" that should be eliminated), which prompted the civilian population to become involved in the conflict, placing it at serious risk of becoming a military target. There was a real policy of ethnic cleansing: "We have cleansed Kinshasa", said an official of the National Information Agency (ANR). This constitutes "an adverse distinction founded on race", contrary to article 3 (I) of the Conventions.

Then there was a positive reaction. On 12 August 1998, an Interministerial Committee was set up to deal with the effects of war, ensuring the protection of prisoners of war and those accused of treason for supporting the rebels. Before the fall of Kisangani, the Congolese authorities protected rebel sympathizers, but, after 23 August, following rebel attacks on the civilian population (in the course of which they destroyed and looted churches, such as St. Joseph in Tshopo and Christ the King in Mangobo), the population reacted with indignation and violence

[...]

In flagrant violation of the humanitarian principles embodied in article 17 of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, the rebels have displaced many Tutsi, including from Burundi, to Kalemie, then on to Uvira (South Kivu) or Masisi (North Kivu) as part of a policy aimed at populating Kivu with Tutsi and altering the population balance." (Commission on Human Rights 8 February 1999, paras. 45-46, 69)

"In addition to those facing trial by the military courts, another group of persons at risk of execution or other human rights abuse are ethnic Tutsi civilians in government-held territory, including those in detention or interned. As of early January, nearly 140 Tutsi civilians were in detention in Kinshasa at the military Camp Kokolo, headquarters of the 50th brigade of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC). Others are concentrated with the knowledge of the government in various private locations, including hotels and religious establishments that serve as temporary places of safety, totalling approximately 520 in Katanga and some 450 in Kinshasa by early January. An additional unknown number of Tutsi remained dispersed, often in hiding, in private residences throughout government-held territory, including Kinshasa and Katanga." (HRW February 1999, chapt. III)

For more information about the situation facing ethnic Tutsis following the August 1998 rebellion, see:

"Evacuation of Tutsis from Government controlled areas started in June 1999"

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Changed frontline and strategy by armed groups in South Kivu make the displaced flee greater distances (2000)

- Previously IDPs used to make efforts to stay near their villages and fields
- Anticipation of an all-out war, affected communities flee on far greater distances
- New strategy of uncontrolled armed groups to destroy villages forces IDPs constantly on the move from village to village in search for protection from attacks by the numerous armed factions

"For much of 1999 humanitarian agencies were able to trace and reach most of IDP communities, since their movement was generally stable once away from insecure areas, i.e. IDPs were on the move for some time and making efforts to stay near their villages and fields. The displacement patterns of South Kivu noticeably changed starting from November-December 99, but especially in January 2000 when the frontline stretched from western parts of Maniema province down to Shabunda and even Kalonge. The dramatic shift of the frontline that has also led to significant changes - the Mayi-Mayi activity is now perceived by the civilian population, especially in towns, as a resistance movement, with which it overwhelmingly sympathises. Thus a qualitative change in the patterns of displacement- in search of security and in anticipation of an all-out war, affected communities flee on far greater distances. If the current levels of tension were to be sustained for another month, the majority of rural areas of South Kivu might be deserted and a significant rise in refugee numbers in Tanzania might occur." (OCHA 15 February 2000)

" The fact that uncontrolled armed groups in the Kivus are much better armed and co-ordinated than previously results in focussed fighting of longer duration. On a number of occasions during the reporting period the uncontrolled-armed groups (UAGs) have gained the upper hand over RCD forces. A distinct change in the modus operandi of these groups has been observed: it would appear they no longer fight, loot and withdraw. In many instances they fight for control of villages or territories and remain there as an occupying force. This was notably reported by recent IDPs from Masisi in North Kivu. [...]

The most important pattern of displacement in South Kivu during the reporting period has been the change in strategies of attacks on populations and thus the change in displacement practices. Those dwelling in forests habitually displaced from settlements to camps further into the forest in order to be out of the way of whatever insecurity arising. This would be sufficient to keep them protected until their villages were safe and they could return. This method of self-preservation is no longer adequate. It would appear that there are previously unknown UAGs operating who are clearing entire areas with the express purpose that people do not return to their villages. As a result, waves of

people who had been living rough in forests are now being swept before UAGs, constantly on the move." (OCHA 17 April 2000)

"The continued fighting in North and South Kivu provinces in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has displaced nearly half a million people in recent months. Congolese have fled from village to village in an illusory search for protection from attacks by the numerous armed factions in the region. Host communities up to this point have welcomed internally displaced people (IDPs). Individual households have swollen to twenty or more people in some areas. However, African hospitality and limited international resources are reaching their limits." (RI 5 May 2000)

IDPs remain close to their places of origin (1999-2000)

- Most IDPs are not housed in camps but have merged into host communities
- Some communities already enduring the stress of the conflict has to shelter other displaced persons fleeing other more insecure areas
- People living along river and roads used by the armed forces settle in the nearby forests and hills
- Civilians flee to temporary sanctuaries in response to rumours of approaching troops
- When the relative calm during the day gives way to terror at night people seek refuge outside their villages

"In rebel-held areas, the current conflict is marked by patterns some of which are similar to those that affected humanitarian action during the 1996-1997 war in former Zaire, i.e. all communities of Northern and Southern Kivu are considered - and consider themselves as - collective targets for military attacks. Massive, durable displacements are expected to have been amplified during the last three months. The situation is usually different in other parts of the DRC, where the populations are only afraid of looting and side-effects of military confrontations. Thus, they only leave their houses for as long as fighting, looting or take-over of a town will last at local level." (UN December 1998, p.14)

"A characteristic feature of displacement in eastern DRC is the fact that IDPs are not housed in camps but have merged into host communities. Their conditions remain precarious due to lack of farming land, vital services and general insecurity. Remaining in proximity to their places of origin, the displaced are prone to be subjected to the same hazards and abuses that caused them to flee in the first place. On a number of occasions during 1998-99, the displaced and local communities were stranded in combat areas and were removed by military authorities in a bid to create security zones.

[...]

Having fled hostility, displaced communities (IDPs) live in forests in overcrowded, inadequate shelters, with insufficient food, contaminated water supplies and no sanitation. Adverse forces at times accentuated by persecutory practices and abuses perpetrate the vulnerability of this group. In most cases they have to endure the side effects of the war - looted property, destroyed infrastructure, including health facilities and often damaged housing, when they finally return to their hometown or village. In addition, a significant

number of such communities has to shelter other displaced persons fleeing other often more insecure areas." (UN July 1999, pp.8-9)

"Since the beginning of the war the roads and navigable rivers in DRC have become a source of danger for most civilians. These axes are used for movement of troops that are typically accompanied by looting and extortion. Hence, the strategy adopted by riverside and roadside populations, to settle in the nearby forests and hills where they could eventually cultivate. In case if the short-distance displacement took place within the harvest season, the prospects of losing the entire output are greater. On the other hand, in instances when the population has sufficient flexibility to prepare its displacement, certain belongings and food reserves are being spared. Because of widespread fears of the military, civilians often flee to their temporary sanctuaries in response to rumours of approaching troops. In high insecurity areas however, the population flees longer distances and for a longer time and eventually become "people in the forest" (see above). This phenomenon of proximity flight is especially noticeable on most significant axes. However, it is also the case with secondary axes overburdened with sustained presence of regular armies, passage or retreat of smaller groups of deserters or uncontrolled-armed groups." (UN November 2000, p.15)

"The number of displaced people around the Kahuzi Biega national park, near Bukavu, is increasing, independent humanitarian sources in the region told IRIN.

During the daytime, some of them work or go looking for food. At night, they seek refuge in banana plantations along the road towards Miti, Murhesa and Kafulumaye. The sources said they were fleeing attacks by Interahamwe militia, Mayi-Mayi and other armed groups hiding out in the forests. Relative calm during the day gives way to terror at night, when these militia groups carry out looting sprees, raping women and killing people who get in their way.

The forest-dwelling pygmies are not immune from attack. Aid organisations have requested them to integrate into society so that they can benefit from food distributions, as it is impossible to care for them in the forests." (IRIN 1 August 2000)

PROTECTION CONCERNS

Protection needs during displacement

Attacks on organised IDP camps in North Kivu show that humanitarian assistance may expose beneficiaries to armed elements (2000)

- Interahamwe and Mayi Mayi fighters reportedly attacked a camp for displaced persons at Sake, near Goma on 10 July

"The military and security situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in the Kivus, remained highly volatile. RCD has complained that pro-government armed groups continue to launch numerous attacks in North and South Kivu. One such attack occurred near Uvira on 9 July and resulted in the death of an international relief worker. Another serious incident took place on 10 July, when the Interahamwe and Mayi Mayi fighters reportedly attacked a camp for displaced persons at Sake, near Goma. On 26 August a grenade attack in Bukavu killed 8 and injured some 40 people. Although the armed groups responsible for these attacks are not signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, there are persistent reports that they receive arms and training from one of the parties." (UN SC 21 September 2000, para. 27)

"Security considerations affect humanitarian interventions in areas where there is military activity, or a strained military or political situation. While the security of relief personnel deployed in volatile areas is an ongoing concern, the safety of beneficiaries is increasingly a matter of a preoccupation. The decision not to intervene in a given emergency is therefore, a self-imposed policy on the part of CAP participants, whereby no risks or a minimum amount of risks to the security of the personnel and beneficiaries are taken. Recent attacks on organised IDP camps in North Kivu raised the issue of exposing the beneficiaries to predatory armed elements by providing them with humanitarian assistance." (UN November 2000, p.20)

Several IDP groups subjected to forced labour (2000)

- IDPs forced by armed groups to undertake agricultural activities, services and transportation

"Various field observations conclude that several IDP groups are being systematically subjected to non-remunerated activities, or basically forced labour. The most unfortunate ones find themselves in the hands of military, various militia groups and warlords, held as prisoners or hostage and employed for agricultural activities, services and transportation. Most strikingly, this category is not a rare sociological phenomenon, but a common arrangement practised in many parts of the country along the roads of exile. There are other categories of displaced that are being regularly exploited, however this kind of

subservient labour arrangement is of economic origin and is not coercive: extremely impoverished urban displaced, for instance, migrate into the country side in search of food for labour arrangements. Typically, displaced in this category remain in villages and are used as subservient labour force." (UN November 2000, p.15)

Displaced children need protection from recruitment by armed groups (2000)

- Alleged drafting by Interahamwe militia of Hutu minors left behind by their families

"[S]ignificant numbers of children (aged mainly 13-15) were observed during commemorations of the Congolese Independence Day, when thousands of child soldiers marched in military parades throughout the country. Compilation of statistics on child soldiers was a largely complicated task and was inalterably confronted with the absence of interlocutors and any possibility to monitor the process. Undoubtedly, all parties without exception (state and non-state actors) recruited minors into armed forces since the onset of the conflict. The worst of all is the alleged drafting by Interahamwe militia of Hutu minors (left behind by their families, Hutu refugees in 96-97) spread all over the DRC, from Mbandaka to Mbuji-Mayi. A speculative figure of 8,000 such children was put forward by independent sources. Although the veracity of this information is not irrefutable, it reflects the extent of the problem." (UN OCHA 15 July 1999, "Children in Need of Protection")

"For children who find themselves alone, joining one of the military groupings is one of the few remaining alternatives if they are to survive. There is no time to lose in setting up large-scale programmes to offer these vulnerable children an alternative option, so that they are not drawn into a violent environment and forced to contribute themselves towards the spiral of violence." (MSF 25 January 2000, "Abandoned children")

See also: "The civil war has caused a large number of displaced and unaccompanied children (1999-2000)"

IDPs in Orientale in dire need of protection (February 2000)

"The displaced populations are said to be in dire need of protection but also shelter, food, medical assistance and safe water. The malnutrition observed among accessible IDP communities is alarming: 11.6% global and 9.1% severe malnutrition. Widespread insecurity impedes adequate humanitarian response that would cover the displaced and affected communities in their entirety. In addition to diminishing accessibility, relief agencies operating from Bunia often encounter a hostile attitude of beneficiary communities suspecting humanitarian agencies of one-sidedness. After the withdrawal of MSF teams from the district [...], there are only two NGOs (OXFAM-UK and MedAir) and ICRC remaining in the area." (OCHA 15 February 2000)

Rebel authorities in eastern DRC do not protect the civilian population (2000)

- RCD claims to be legitimate authorities in the region
- Lack of response from RCD troops when protection is requested

"The RCD claim to be legitimate authorities in the region. They and their RPA allies have said they are seeking to protect the local population from Mai-Mai and bands of Hutu combatants. Yet in a number of cases, local people have appealed in vain for this protection. Numerous people displaced from Bunyakiri told Human Rights Watch researchers that their repeated calls for help had gone unanswered by RCD troops. As one witness reported, "We go to tell the RCD where the Interahamwe are camped, and they tell us, 'It is your affair. They are your family.'"

Displaced persons from Kalonge too reported that the RCD have refused to confront armed combatants. On January 23, 2000, James Ntwana was shot dead by militia just beside the RCD camp at Cifunzi. One man told Human Rights Watch, "When I saw that they could kill people even right there next to the camp and the soldiers would not respond, I realized that I had to flee."

When Hutu combatants attacked Cizenga in November and abducted a number of people to carry pillaged goods to their base in the woods, others sought help from RCD soldiers stationed about three kilometers away. The soldiers refused to intervene, reportedly saying, "The Interahamwe are your brothers." The next day villagers saw RCD soldiers with some of the looted goods and concluded that there was complicity between the attackers and the soldiers. It is equally possible that the soldiers in turn raided and seized the goods from the Hutu combatants. But that local people presume collusion between the two sides suggests the extent to which they have been disappointed in efforts to secure RCD protection from the combatants.

(HRW May 2000, chapt. III)

See also AI 31 May 2000, chapter 4. Violations of the right to life in areas under rebel and foreign forces

Security of host communities and IDPs undermined by all armed groups (1999-2000)

- Bombing of RCD-held areas by Kabila's forces and allies caused civilians casualties and damage on humanitarian infrastructure
- RCD has committed atrocities against villagers in retaliation for their supposed support of local militia groups
- Reports of disregard for humanitarian law standards by forces allied with Kabila
- Looting by Angolan forces reported throughout Bas-Congo
- Looting of food belonging to IDPs by MLC soldiers in Equateur (reported in March 2001)
- Civilians in the Kivu provinces especially exposed to violence
- Church sources in Eastern Kasai reported systematic rape of school age girls by Rwandan troops

"As the conflict continued, the situation in eastern Congo became particularly explosive. Forces backing the RCD committed numerous killings of civilians from almost all different ethnic groups in the east, creating a resentment of the RCD, its military backers, and ethnic Tutsi in general. Killings of villagers were often in retaliation for their supposed support of local militia known as "Mai-Mai," or former Rwandan soldiers or militia, known as "Interahamwe." Soldiers acting for the RCD movement arbitrarily detained many of its supposed opponents, often holding them in irregular facilities to which their families and humanitarian agencies had no access. Once arrested, some individuals were not seen again." (HRW February 1999, chapt. I)

"Accounts from witnesses in areas of combat of the behavior of the Congo-allied forces[...] from August through mid-January 1999 suggest that these [Humanitarian Law] standards were often disregarded. While information from areas of fighting or bombing was at times difficult to verify, reports of violations of humanitarian law were regularly received. NGOs, journalists, and missionaries on the ground gave eyewitness accounts to Human Rights Watch of the damage to civilians and humanitarian infrastructure following the bombing of RCD-held areas by the FAC and their allies, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad. Most reports of violations came from areas of combat during or shortly after fighting.

[...]

As they began their assault in the Boma area in mid-August and progressively recaptured towns in Bas-Congo, Angolan forces and FAC reportedly committed killings of civilians and rape during house-to-house searches for RCD soldiers in Boma and Moanda[...] Human Rights Watch also received several credible accounts of extensive looting by Angolan forces throughout Bas-Congo, including hospitals at Kangu and Kuimba, where even office furniture of the hospitals was taken[...] Following the recapture of the city of Boma by the Angolans on August 26, Angolan troops took part in widespread looting including theft from private residences, farm animals, and vehicles, many of which were transported to Angola[...]

[...]

Human Rights Watch received reports of civilian casualties and the destruction of medical and other civilian infrastructure due to aerial bombardments by FAC allies from August 1998 through mid-January 1999, raising the concern that bombings may have deliberately targeted civilian objects, or at best failed to take into account the obligation to protect civilians and civilian property. Witnesses in Shabunda stated that in mid-September, bombs from planes assumed to be allied with the FAC hit civilian targets including the Shabunda hospital [...] Reports from journalists and others in Kalemie and other cities under RCD control in Katanga and Maniema stated that dozens of civilians had been killed or wounded as a result of bombings by the Zimbabwean air force[...] Local sources confirmed that on the night of January 10 and 11, FAC-allied forces carried out bombing raids in Kisangani that killed at least sixteen civilians[...] These attacks appeared to be indiscriminate in that they did not distinguish military objectives from civilians and civilian objects." (HRW February 1999, chapt. III)

"The military situation from 31 August [1999] and onwards has been stable. Only two alleged cases of violation by the DRC forces of the cease-fire agreement were reported in Kote (Eastern Kasai) and Bokungu (Equateur). In spite of a relative stalemate, the civilian population of the areas situated in proximity of the frontline is continuously subjected to violence, extortion, and allegedly, mass killings. " (UN OCHA 15 September 1999, "Humanitarian Action")

Equateur

"The unconfirmed cease-fire violation by the DRC armed forces in Equateur province starting from 2 November 1999 has, according to MLC, resulted in numerous civilian casualties. Caught in the middle of an unexpected "general offensive" of allied forces, the civilian populations of Nkembe, Bekili, and Zongo settlements of northern Equateur suffered losses in human lives, estimated by MLC at over 100 persons. These allegations have not been confirmed by independent sources. An inter-agency humanitarian mission to Gemena (4 November) failed to find any evidence of bombings of civilian towns earlier reported by MLC. " (UN OCHA 15 November 1999, "Protection of Civilians")

In March 2001, OCHA reported that "les combats ont repris en Equateur. Les escarmouches ont lieu aux environs de la localité de Bolombo, entre le Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) et les FAC [Forces Armées Congolaises]. [...] Les soldats du MLC auraient [...] pillé de la nourriture appartenant à des déplacés du camp de Bolomba." (OCHA 15 March 2001, "Equateur")

Kivu Provinces

"Two third of the displaced (in particular those in the Kivu Provinces) can be considered as victims of targeted violence or collective fears of persecution or reprisals." (UN November 1999, p.9)

"Entire communities in the Kivus remained exposed to atrocities committed by militia and foreign troops. As was the case since the beginning of the DRC conflict, the civilian population suspected of sympathies with either cause is the victim of the "insurgent attack- reprisal by rebel and/or Rwandan army" scheme in the Kivu provinces especially in its southernmost regions. In October 1999 reports of massacres of civilians came from Kalambi and Kahungwe (both south of Uvira). Local sources in South Kivu and the DRC Human Rights Ministry claimed that the RCD operations in the above settlements resulted in killings of over 100 civilians (30 September and 24 October). The latter incident has been confirmed by Bukavu based media (the number of victims, however was stated at 14). The DRC Government made an appeal to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on 10 November to categorically and unequivocally condemn these acts." (UN OCHA 15 November 1999, "Protection of Civilians")

"During investigations carried out in March 2000 in areas controlled by the Goma-based Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD) and its allies, Human Rights Watch researchers documented cases of murder, rape, and pillage carried out by all of the armed groups now fighting in the region." (HRW May 2000, chapt. I)

Eastern Kasai

"Although the need for relief supplies (mostly medicines) is great, local church sources prioritise the protection of displaced and give an appalling account of violence (systematic rape of school age girls) civilians are subjected to by Rwandan troops." (OCHA 11 July 2000)

See also AI 31 May 2000 about human rights violations by the various armed forces.

Evacuation of Tutsis from Government-controlled areas started in June 1999

- More than 800 individuals of Tutsi origin evacuated out of DRC (July/August 1999)
- Another 600 Congolese Tutsi, Rwandan and Ugandan nationals are believed to be in hiding in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi (July 1999)

"Subsequent to the first repatriation and evacuation of internees of Tutsi (Rwandan and Ugandan origin) carried out by ICRC in mid June [1999], identical exercises were implemented at the end of June and beginning of July. The efforts made by the contact group (ICRC/UN/Embassies) on the minorities at risk began to pay off and closure of the "Tutsi dossier" appears to become more and more imminent. The following is the chronology of the main events related to the repatriation exercise:

Location	Internees
Lubumbashi	27 June : 190 flown to Kigali (ICRC); 28 June : 176 flown to Kigali and 12 to Bujumbura (ICRC) ; <i>Remaining in Pakita site : 180 persons</i>
Kolwezi	25 to 30 left in the site
Kinshasa	1 July : 9 flown to Canada 4 July : 109 flown to Kigali (ICRC) 80 left in the INSS site. Most of them want to leave.
Total*	290 remaining

* Another 600 Congolese Tutsi, Rwandan and Ugandan nationals are believed to be in hiding in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi.

Impact of the Lusaka peace agreement is considered negligible on the level of risk faced by this minority, taking into account the continued fighting and the prominent role of some Tutsi Congolese in the rebellion." (UN OCHA 15 July 1999, "Minorities at Risk")

"370 individuals of Tutsi origin were airlifted from the "protective custody" centre in Kinshasa to Cotonou (Benin) by IOM on 30 and 31 August [1999]. Of these 370 people 79 will shortly proceed to Belgium and another 30 Burundian nationals will be given refugee status and taken care of by UNHCR/Benin. Subsequent to the first evacuation exercise, the influx of ethnic Tutsi to the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights from places of their hiding in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi considerably increased. On average 50-60 persons a day arrived to HCHR office or to the Ministry for Human Rights. As of 15 September some 500 newly identified Congolese Tutsi and Rwandan nationals have been registered by the HCHR office in Kinshasa. The new arrivals are

being accommodated at the INSS site in Kinshasa. IOM advance team in Lubumbashi is preparing an identical exercise. "(UN OCHA 24 August 1999, "Minorities at Risk")

For more information about the situation of ethnic Tutsi following the August 1998 rebellion, see:

[Detention and forced displacement of ethnic Tutsi civilians \(1998-1999\)](#)

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)

General

Civil war inflicts unbearable hardship on women (2000)

- Violence perpetrated against women a feature of the war
- Absence of functional maternity wards

"Continued war in the DRC is a double-edged dilemma from a woman's perspective: an ever-present appalling violence and a blow to the most basic rights, pitted against an unprecedented opportunity to play a fairer role in the common response to the crisis. [...]"

The amazing endurance of the Congolese woman has been forged throughout the country's 30 years of social and economic decline, deadly natural and industrial disasters, and sporadic warfare since October 1996. The most striking effect of Congo's recent crises on women –small and major, natural and man-made – is reflected through the following:

The Ebola outbreak in Kikwit, Bandundu (peak in May-June 1995) showed images of Congolese and foreign nurses putting their own health at risk for their early commitment towards incurable patients with no protective equipment. The plane crash at Ndolo airport (January 1996), one of the worst aircraft accidents in history (more than 300 deaths) killed mostly female traders and buyers who were encouraged by "informal state structures" to push survival trade onto airport runways. Ever since the winds of war have swept through Congo, a country that strikes every visitor with its perpetual use of the word *maman*, violence perpetrated against women has become a morbid reflection of an increased resignation to the horrors of war. Massacres of Hutu Rwandan refugee women in Biaro or Mbandaka, massacres of mostly female and infant villagers in the Kivus (Kasika, Makobola), soldiers burying women alive in Mwenga, rumours of rape by HIV-infected soldiers in eastern DRC, forced labour of thousands of displaced communities at soldiers' disposal - these are but most visible features of woman's suffering.

A less visible mark, yet deadlier in the longer term, are problems associated with motherhood: the chances of a pregnant women finding a functional maternity ward and being able to afford to benefit from its services in today's DRC are the slimmest in four decades. Statistics of maternal mortality mentioned in the 2000 Appeal – 1,837 deaths per 100,000 births, one of the highest in the world – have been echoed by IRC findings in eastern DRC areas (3,000/100,000). Lack of hygiene and sanitary facilities coupled with massive displacements, poor nutrition and expanding spots of health deserts have produced a risky environment that is and will inevitably alter the country's demographic profile. Mothers carrying both their babies and a 20 kg load of wood in one subtly tied piece of cloth along the roads of South Kivu are more than an embodiment of women's

fate in today's DRC: behind their solid gait, they remind us of how frail the whole society has become." (UN November 2000, p.15)

IDPs seeking shelter in the forest constitute be the most vulnerable IDP group (2000)

- Forest dwellers lack access to health care and subside on wild foods
- This IDP category estimated at 200,000

"Tragically, it is estimated that less than half the displaced communities and families are receiving humanitarian assistance. Those vulnerable and displaced populations left without assistance are hiding in the forests, inaccessible as a result of insecurity and some who emerged for their hiding places in August [2000] were disturbingly described as 'living in animal-like-conditions.'" (OCHA 31 December 2000)

"This group of displaced is legitimately believed to be the most vulnerable among all IDP communities. Most commonly, these people have been displaced several times, having left their home communities seeking security in remote and barely accessible areas. Communities then cleanse a portion of forest and start cultivating. This category of displaced has practically no access to health care and is reduced to consuming wild berries and "non-human" and raw food. Ashamed of their physical appearance and nudity, precarious health conditions (infections, dermatosis, parasitosis, etc.), "forest dwellers" avoid any contacts with the outside world and seek to further distance and alienate themselves from the neighbouring communities. The previous (1996-1998) experience with similar groups of displaced suggested that practically every family loses on average one child under five. Because of its survival tactics, this group is the hardest to access and assist. The largest concentrations of people in the forest were observed in Shabunda (South Kivu) and Bokungu-Ikela (Equateur). The number of people in this category is estimated at 200,000." (UN November 2000, p.15)

Health

Dramatic resurgence of previously controlled diseases (2000)

- Over 60% of the blood transfusions not screened for HIV
- Increase in cholera and measles epidemic associated with ethnic conflict in the Ituri district (1999)

"The health situation in DRC is marked by the continued destruction of the medical infrastructure, a rupture in essential medicines stocks due to difficulties in a lack of supply, as well as a lack of resources. The maternal and infant mortality rates are excessively high. In 1999, maternal mortality ratio was estimated by the Ministry of Health and WHO to be 1,837 per 100,000 life births, with the infant mortality reported to be 127/1,000 life births. The average rate of HIV/AIDS infection was 4.1%: This broke

down to 6.3% for Kinshasa; 8.6% for Lubumbashi; 10% for Matadi; and 16% for Goma. The epidemiological profile was dominated by infectious diseases, exacerbated by increasing malnutrition rates, growing morbidity and precarious living standards. The dramatic resurgence of previously controlled diseases such as plague, TB, trypanosomiasis and onchocerciasis has negatively impacted on the socio-economic indicators. Additionally, there have been new emerging diseases, such as Marburg haemorrhagic fever, monkey pox, spastic paralysis 'Konzo', as well as the spread of cholera epidemics, dysentery, malaria and cerebrospinal meningitis.

[...]

BCC/SIDA findings indicated that over 20,000 people per year continued to be infected by HIV across the country, although it is widely believed that this annual figure of newly affected is an under-estimate. The cumulative figure of 47,292 new HIV cases reported since the detection of the disease in the country up to 1998 represents 2.5% of the global number of new cases, and 7.2% of the total number of cases detected on the African continent. In 1999 the cumulative number of HIV cases was 65,000, and the number of HIV/AIDS was approximately 800,000. Over 60% of the blood transfusions in the DRC are not tested on HIV/AIDS." (UN November 2000, pp. 24, 25)

"Conflict between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups in Ituri district, Province Orientale has led to a sharp increase in cholera cases and a measles epidemic according to reports recently received. The conflict, which began in mid-June, has made approximately 40,000 people homeless and resulted in a heavy death toll (up to 3,500 people). The displaced are reported to be living in conditions of poor hygiene. In addition, health centres in the region have been looted, torched or abandoned, leaving both the local population and the displaced without medical aid. In response to the measles epidemic MSF-H has launched a large-scale vaccination campaign targeting 30-35,000 children. It has also distributed anti-cholera drugs and water purification sets. [...]" (ACC/SNC 28 September 1999, p.14)

Appalling health conditions among IDPs in South Kivu (2000)

- Most common diseases are malaria, respiratory infections, diarrhea, malnutrition, anemia and amoebiasis
- Reported that cholera is endemic

"Most IDPs are in Kivu province on the Rwandan border and they live in extremely poor conditions. They are able to plant crops on an irregular basis. Malnutrition rates have risen and now stand at 10% of the population. Health services and education, which operate broadly on a pay-as-you-go system, have become increasingly inaccessible to the impoverished population. There have recently been epidemics, notably haemorrhagic fever, measles and most importantly, cholera, in the region." (SCF 31 December 2000)

"In the Sud Kivu : the FAO has described the situation in Shabunda and Mwenga as « frightening », because of the flight of the population into the forests as a means of fleeing RCD Goma rebels, the Rwandan army and the militias. The author of the FAO

report who met some of these people notes "... they don't have anything human except the shape of a body. The feet are inflated, with several wounds, an empty look... they mention a lot of cases of mortality in the forest for lack of healthcare. Their nutritional state is very disturbing." The number of these displaced in forests is estimated at more than 100,000 for the territory of Shabunda alone, out of a total population estimated at 475,000 people. " (OCHA September 2000)

"The situation in Shabunda, South Kivu, is reported as desperate. A UN mission, visiting the town in July, described the town as an "islet" controlled by RCD-Goma and surrounded by forces opposed to the RCD. About 34,000 displaced people have converged on the town itself, dislodged from their homes by fighting between the RCD and opposing forces such as the Mayi-Mayi and Interahamwe militias. These IDPs have little to eat, and no access to medical services and shelter." (UNICEF 10 October 2000)

"The most common diseases are malaria, respiratory infections, diarrhea, malnutrition, anemia and amoebiasis. Cholera is endemic. In May 2000 124 cases were reported in Uvira health zone. ACF-USA conducted 2 mortality surveys in the context of nutritional surveys in Lemera in January 2000 covering October-December 1999 and in Uvira in April, 2000, covering January March. They only include the accessible part of the health zones. Specifically the Hauts and Moyens Plateaux and the areas very close to the Burundian border are not included.

Zone de santé	Mortality rate under-fives (<5years)
Lemera	2.46 / 10,000 / day
Uvira	2.68 / 10,000 / day

For WHO, 2 deaths/10,000/day trigger a state of alert, while 4/10,000/day indicates an acute emergency (WHO under 5 mortality thresholds).

These figures are alarming but do not indicate massive mortality either. However, the studies only cover the areas that are most accessible and thus where relief has been provided. When compared with the dramatic figures of the recent IRC mortality survey in, for instance, an area such as Moba, south of Baraka, along the Lake Tanganyika in Northern Katanga, where no assistance was given in the past two years, it is clear that these alarming rates are only the top of the iceberg. Moreover, the ACF-USA surveys only cover three months. It is very likely that many deaths occurred before that period but are not included in the study. This is especially likely, given the near absence of health care, the lack of food security and the prevalence of severe malnutrition." (AAH August 2000, sect. 4.3)

Conflict causes degradation of the health care system (1999-2000)

- Scores of health institutions were looted or severely damaged in Orientale, North and South Kivu, Maniema, Katanga and Equateur provinces in the wake of the August 1998 rebellion

- Continued looting by soldiers, rebels or armed individuals affect many centres along the frontline and in unstable regions
- Health care systems paralysed in many provinces as qualified staff have fled war-affected regions
- Health personnel run the risk of being taken hostage or prisoner
- IDPs in Ituri district, Province Orientale, without access to medical services (September 1999)
- Vaccination statistics difficult to obtain because of the massive migrations of IDPs
- Shortage of health care facilities in Pweto (Katanga) due to influx of people displaced by the war (December 2000)

"Degradation of the health care system in the DRC continued at an accelerated rate throughout 1999. In addition to the already dilapidated health infrastructure, chronic absence of investments and qualified specialists, scores of health institutions, including those rehabilitated by relief agencies in 1997/98, were looted or severely damaged in Orientale, North and South Kivu, Maniema, Katanga and Equateur provinces. The health care management system is paralysed in many provinces as a number of qualified specialists (e.g. Chief Provincial Doctors) fled war-affected regions. A sharp increase in epidemic diseases such as cholera, measles, polio, meningitis, trypanosomiasis, and onchocercosis is being observed in all provinces. These reflect poor access to potable water (average 42 percent), feeble vaccination coverage (measles- 33 percent, BCG 46 percent), and limited access to primary health services (26 percent of the population). An estimated 34 percent of the country's population suffers from moderate to severe malnutrition. This percentage is believed to be especially high amongst the displaced children and women. Maternal mortality rate has increased from 870 per 100,000 in 1995 to approximately double this year according to WHO. Finally, forced displacements have increased exposure and vulnerability to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS)." (UN July 1999, p.10)

"The Congolese State appears to be unable to maintain the quality of the public health sector at an acceptable level. The Ministry of Health is suffering from a distressing lack of resources. The budget is inadequate and really only exists on paper. An eloquent example: of the eleven provincial health inspectors, only two have an official vehicle. Inspections and supervision by national or provincial medical services can virtually no longer take place, and certainly not outside the large cities. The irregular and extremely low salaries offer inadequate motivation to health workers to keep the 306 health districts running. When bilateral aid, mainly from the United States and Belgium, dried up in the early 1990s over 100 health districts were almost totally left to their own devices.

'La santé pour tous dans l'année 2000 - Health for all in the year 2000', the slogan adopted by the World Health Organisation in order to stimulate primary health care, is just an illusion: 79 health districts are more than 100 km from their referral hospital, and only 9% of health districts have a refrigerator for storing medicines. In the provinces of Maniema and South Kivu, there are no longer any lab technicians employed. The number of working health centres fluctuated in 1996 between 30% in Eastern Kasai and 86% in Bandundu.

[...].Looting and a "first come, first served" attitude by soldiers, rebels or armed individuals affect many centres along the frontline and in unstable regions. Health personnel run the risk of being taken hostage or prisoner. Imports of medicines via the rivers have come to a standstill for logistic or military reasons. Due to the disappearance and deterioration of equipment, the drying-up of spare parts supplies and the failure to maintain buildings, the quality of medical care provision is declining rapidly.

The life expectancy at birth of the average Congolese is decreasing. In 1996 the life expectancy for men was still 51 years and 54 for women. In 1999 it was estimated to be 47 years, partly as a result of AIDS. The number of people not living beyond the age of 40 amounted to 30% of the total population in 1995. According to WHO, the number of women dying in childbirth rose from 870/100,000 in 1995 to almost twice as much in 1999 (**OCHA 1999**). The poor quality of mother-and-child care also has consequences for infant mortality, which rose from 131/1,000 live-born children in 1972 to 111/1,000 in 1980 and to 141/1,000 in 1995 (**UNICEF**). Between 65% and 84% of deliveries take place outside health care institutions or without the help of qualified midwives.

Preventive work such as vaccination campaigns can no longer be carried out in a structured way. Overall vaccination statistics are difficult to obtain because of the inaccessibility of many areas and the massive migrations of internally displaced persons. The efficiency of one-shot actions such as national vaccination days still has to be analysed. Although these one-shot initiatives receive a massive response, the disastrous everyday reality of primary health care is pushed into the background. Epidemics are no longer detected in time, and are left to spread unchecked. In 1999 alone, a polio epidemic broke out in Equator province claiming over 200 victims." (MSF 25 January 2000, "primary health care")

"The town of Pweto is overpopulated due to the war presently raging in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The population of the town has tripled due to the influx of people displaced by the war and soldiers. There is a desperate shortage of health care facilities. Since the beginning of the year, 150 people have died of cholera, and 1,800 cases of cholera have been recorded." (MSF 8 December 2000)

Nutrition and food

Food security of host communities undermined by unbearable IDP influx (September 2000)

- Often two or three families are living in a single host family household
- Shortage of therapeutic dry milk at supplementary feeding centers

"Congolese people are known for their hospitality. In the African tradition, room must always be made for a guest or those in need. Hundreds of thousands of Congolese who have been displaced by the fighting in eastern DRC have benefited from this tradition.

Room has been made at the table in the homes of countless thousands of host communities throughout this war-torn region. Thanks to the generosity of the Congolese and their tradition of helping each other, large camps - so often the mark of similar crises - are not seen.

But this generosity comes at great cost. A household of six can host at most one extra person before the family's food security is seriously impacted. In the Kivus, this number is frequently far exceeded. On a recent mission to South Kivu, Refugees International interviewed displaced and host families where. The situation has reached a point in many communities where host families have exhausted their meager reserves of food and money, placing their own children at risk. When this point is reached, those displaced by fighting must move on in search of other shelter, thus repeating the process with a new host family.

Children, as usual, are being disproportionately impacted by the displacement. Therapeutic and supplementary feeding centers remain full. However, a shortage of therapeutic dry milk is being felt, and many local centers which care for hundreds of children are scrambling to supply this life-giving commodity. To deal with the shortage, UNICEF has focused its remaining therapeutic milk supplies on rural IDPs at the expense of those in city centers. Some international NGOs are making do by fortifying powdered milk purchased in Nairobi. Many local and church-run organizations that help host families care for unaccompanied children have been told that there will be no milk available until November. Last year, these centers received only four months supply of therapeutic dry milk from UNICEF.

The IDP crisis in DRC comes when the World Food Program (WFP) is experiencing significant shortfalls in donor response to its appeals, most notably from the European Union. [...] The serious WFP shortages are being felt in eastern DRC as well. NGOs are being told that food has run out and none will be available until November at the earliest. This is an especially hard blow for the IDPs and their host families. Now is known as the "hungry time," the time between the first rains in September and the first harvest in late December." (RI 14 September 2000)

Malnutrition on the increase among IDPs (2000)

- Malnutrition amongst displaced populations in Ituri being up to 40% worse than the resident population
- Major malnutrition among displaced children arriving in Lubumbashi
- Widespread malnutrition reported among IDPs in Katanga (2000-2001)
- Survey of IDP children in North Kivu reveals 14,7 percent acute malnutrition (September 2000)

"Most evidence suggests that malnutrition is on the increase, particularly amongst displaced populations in Eastern DRC. Evidence from Ituri 'province' is particularly worrying: up to 11.6% global malnutrition and 9.1% severe malnutrition with the status amongst displaced populations being up to 40% worse than the resident population. As an

indicator of the severity, of the estimated population of 326,672 there are 7,578 malnourished children in Bunia Health Zone under the age of five, of whom 5,900 are candidates for therapeutic feeding. A food security survey conducted by AICF/US in several districts of Kinshasa in September-December 1999 revealed an 8,7 percent global malnutrition (2.9 percent severe) among children under five. It is believed that the decline continues at a geometrical progression. The most recent study of AICF suggested that residents of poorest districts of Kinshasa eat one meal a day and that the only daily meal for a family of 6 members averages 5,000 kcal. which is by far below all acceptable norms. Food supply and reserves in western DRC are at exceptionally low levels, meeting only 45 percent of the demand and propelling high inflation rates at the market (22 percent increase in overall food prices in December)." (OCHA 15 February 2000)

"In the Eastern city of Lubumbashi (population 1 million people), the situation is worsening day by day with the massive arrival of rural populations displaced by insecurity in the war-affected zones of the republic. Approximately 20,000 displaced people live in camps or are hosted in families. A recent survey carried out by Action Against Hunger shows that over 5,000 children could be malnourished. The organization has recently opened 4 feeding centers." (AAH-USA 14 February 2000)

"A joint mission at the weekend by the DRC Ministry of Health, local and international NGOs, and the provincial administration of Katanga, has complemented and reinforced the prior impression of widespread malnutrition, prolonged displacement of civilians and severe economic depression, a report on Tuesday by UNOCHA, which coordinated the visit, stated. The residents of this frontline area, both host population and internally-displaced people (IDPs), were living in fear of confrontation and convinced of being unfairly forgotten by the world, it added.

Some 7,000 displaced had found refuge in Ankoro town, while 70,000 others were dispersed in an area of 20,000 square kilometres between Manono and Kabalo, the report said. The displaced emphasised their need for food and medicines, but also seeds and tools - indicating their wish to become self-reliant, it said." (IRIN 30 May 2000)

"In Katanga, massive displacement due to clashes between rebels and FACs for the control of Pweto, resulted in the displacement of more than 27,000 persons on the Kilwa-Pweto axis. According to MSF-Belgium, the health conditions are very precarious in towns located on that axis due to earlier looting of health centers. The mortality rate, particularly amongst infants, has reportedly increased among both the local population and IDPs. Around Malemba-Nkulu, the looting of harvests and seeds by FACs and Mai Mai is raising concerns of potential famine in the area." (WFP 23 Feb 2001)

"De nombreux cas de décès par anémie ont été détectés dans le camp de Kasomeno près de Kasenga. Cette situation s'explique par la fréquence de la malnutrition due à l'irrégularité de l'approvisionnement en nourriture et du paludisme." (OCHA 14 February 2001, "Katanga")

"The two civil wars both started in the province of South-Kivu. The first instigated by the AFDL of president Kabila aimed at uprooting the regime of Mobutu. The second, instigated by the RCD and supported by the once allied forces of Rwanda and Uganda attempting to oust the Kabila regime. Rwanda and Uganda accused Kabila of supporting the Hutu rebel groups that were responsible for the 1994 Rwanda genocide of the Tutsi and moderate Hutus.

A lot of fighting has been taking place in the Kivu region not only between the forces of Kabila and the RCD rebels, but also among the various warring militias – Interahamwes, ex-FARs, FDDS, Mai-Mai (Autodefense Populaire Forces "FAPS") resulting in the civilian population being caught in between with nowhere to turn. An unknown number – but estimated to be in the thousands, live in the forests having been chased from their homes by attacks or fire. They remain too terrified to return, despite precarious living conditions and health problems. As the war simmers on, areas that were left unaffected by the conflict have become increasingly unable to cope.

The balance of these two weighs heavily on the whole population of South-Kivu with the ensuing massacres, rape, looting, destruction of livelihood, displacement, destruction of dwellings, hospitals, schools, health centers, markets, etc." (Action by Churches Together (ACT) 19 January 2001)

"A study of 971 displaced children [in north Kivu] less than 5 years of age led by the NGO Solidarité revealed that 14,7 percent suffer from acute malnutrition (with oedema) and 19,9 percent global severe malnutrition in the three localities of Kanyabayonga, Kirumbas and Kaynas. The death rate is at 2,7%/10000/day. The malnutrition rate already affecting the region, has been aggravated by the arrival of displaced individuals because the local population shares the stocks of supplies with them. The prenatal death rate is of 32/1000 (OMS norm: 20/1000) and 17,8 percent of the children are born with a weight less than 2,5 kg (WHO norm: 15 percent)." (OCHA September 2000, p.6)

See also various nutritional reports by ACF-USA.

Evident signs of malnutrition among IDPs in Ituri (March 2000)

- Claims that people have died because of suspension of humanitarian aid
- Desperate humanitarian situation also expected among IDPs in hiding in the forests

"The situation of people in parts of the northeast Ituri district, which is subject to sporadic but serious clashes between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups, is "close to catastrophic", according to relief workers operating in the northeast of the country.

Aid agencies, who have been denied access to many parts of [Ituri](#) in recent months due to the Hema-Lendu conflict, found during an assessment mission from 15-19 March that "a very significant number of people" had already died, and more would die in the coming

days, due to the forced suspension of humanitarian aid. The clashes themselves resulted in the deaths of some 4,000-7,000 and have displaced an estimated 150,000 people.

The situation was particularly bad in Fataki and Rethy, where the vulnerable people identified were "possibly the most at-risk group currently accessible" in eastern DRC, aid sources told IRIN. More than 3,000 displaced were located in three different sites in Fataki and signs of malnutrition were evident in almost every person, with one small pot of leaves all a family of six could hope to eat for two to three days, they said.

Malnutrition was also evident in Rethy, alongside dramatic problems of hygiene and skin disease, and a lack of drinking water. Throughout the area, there was a rising incidence of malaria, measles, respiratory infections and the plague. Yet, it was "highly likely that other areas of equal need exist in Ituri district", particularly among those displaced people who remain in hiding in the forests. The humanitarian community is currently mobilising resources - with essential drugs, therapeutic milk, food and plastic sheeting among the priorities - and negotiating enhanced access to areas in need." (IRIN 24 March 2000)

Alarmingly high malnutrition rates among displaced and refugee children reported already by mid-1999

- Reports of alarmingly high malnutrition rates among displaced children (July 1999)
- Estimate that 250 000 people at immediate risk of life threatening levels of malnutrition in South Kivu (September 1999)
- Some 1 700 malnourished children being assisted at feeding centres in Kisangani
- Critical condition of 20,000 IDPs in Dubi and Pweto, in the North East of the Katanga province reported (September 1999)

"The conflict, which persists since August 1998, has increased not only the numbers of children in need of special protection measures-- especially displaced children, unaccompanied minors and refugee children, and other young children traumatised and affected by armed conflict-- but the precariousness of their situation. Malnutrition rates among displaced and refugee children are alarmingly high. Special efforts must be concentrated on the provision of needed care to these children, including shelter, health, nutrition, and tracing and reunification for those separated from their families. Psycho-social support must be provided to children who are growing up in a climate of war, displacement, and violence, separated from their families and deprived of basic education. Peace education must be instituted to help create a climate of peace and reconciliation."(UN July 1999, p.11)

"[...] Rates of malnutrition throughout Orientale Province and north Equateur are reported to be on the rise. Supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres in Kisangani are currently assisting some 1 700 malnourished children under five years, with the numbers requiring assistance increasing.

In South Kivu, a group of UN agencies and NGOs estimate that 250 000 people are at immediate risk of life threatening levels of malnutrition. The situation is due to drought, poor soil, erosion, an influx of refugees exacerbated by ongoing war in the region which caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. To address immediate needs, 15 000 tonnes of food are needed for distribution to displaced and local people, as well as 1 600 tonnes of seeds to allow planting for the main agricultural season this month." (FAO-GIEWS 9 September 1999)

"MSF Belgium made an assessment mission to monitor the situation of IDPs in Dubi and Pweto, in the North East of the Katanga province. The mission reported the situation of some 20,000 people displaced by war from Pweto to be critical. MSF-B warns that malnutrition may jeopardize lives of many children. WFP expects to reach the malnourished in Pweto when resources for EMOP 6110 are made available. In the meantime, an Italian donation of rice will be used to fill the gap between now and the start of the operation. Another joint mission including WFP, MSF, Caritas is scheduled to take place shortly." (WFP 1 October 1999)

Shelter

Rebel movement (RCD) critical about IDP camps (August 2000)

Excerpt from an interview with the leader of the DRC rebel Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD-Goma), Emile Ilunga:

"Q: Is the RCD going ahead with dismantling the internally displaced people's (IDP) camps?"

A: It is true there have been some problems between our movement and some NGO and humanitarian agencies regarding the existence of the camps. Our movement has an objective of providing security to all the people in the liberated zones, and we have involved the people by training local defence units which have been quite effective. There are some attacks by negative forces in areas such as Sake, which we have checked together with our allies and the people themselves, but the NGOs keep on saying there is insecurity directly or indirectly encouraging people to flee their homes and gather into camps. The NGOs and some humanitarian agencies are trying to create insecurity and use the camps as a fundraising gimmick...Since 1994, camps have become an industry for NGOs and this has led to the scenario where the population is totally dependent on relief. Kivu is a fertile area, people can grow their food and NGOs can supplement them in the villages without gathering them into camps. Humanitarian agencies and NGOs, which do not adhere to the new rules which are aimed at reducing the number of camps, will be politely asked to leave areas under our control." (IRIN 16 August 2000)

IDPs in eastern DRC seek shelter in towns (2000)

- Lack of camps for IDPs from the Kivus make people move in with family and friends or squat wherever they can in the towns
- IDPs in Ituri seek shelter at trading centres, churches and schools

"The largest groups of displaced are in Goma and Bukavu. One church worker told Human Rights Watch that at least a quarter of the population of Goma is now comprised of people displaced from the interior. But even in the small community of Kavumu in South Kivu there are more than 4,000 displaced persons, some 1,200 from Bunyakiri and Walikale and nearly 3,000 from Kalonge. These are the numbers of those officially registered and the actual number may be far higher. There are no camps for the displaced so they move in with family and friends, themselves already impoverished, or they squat wherever they can in the towns. As one church worker commented, "They have no work, no home, they're not accustomed to the city. They become beggars, are exposed to illnesses. They are the most affected by cholera, AIDS, and other diseases." Recently displaced persons told Human Rights Watch researchers that many of those who remained in their communities are too afraid of attack to spend their nights at home and sleep outside the house where they are exposed to inclement weather and to illnesses such as malaria." (HRW May 2000, chapt. III)

IDPs in the Ituri district also seek shelter in towns:

"The displaced are concentrated in isolated bush areas, major trading centres, around hospitals and in Bunia town. Bunia's population has significantly increased with villagers seeking refuge with relatives and friends. Every Friday, about 400 people are given two kg of food rations donated by MedAir, through a local women's organisation, Association des Mamans Antibwaki, in Bunia hospital grounds.

Numbers increased in February, with over 100 new cases. The organisation estimates some 75 percent come from displaced villages to collect the rations, and about 25 percent live in Bunia with relatives. Workers say resources are "very limited" and many people have to be sent away. One recipient said she moved near Bunia at the beginning of January when "Lendu fighters" attacked Ngongo village. After reuniting her scattered family, she came to stay with a relative in a one-roomed house that now tries to support 21 adults and children.

In Djugu, the displaced have congregated around the trading centre from different affected communities - Lendu, Hema and Ndo Okebo. Many of the women interviewed said they had to resort to "stealing" from the fields, and were brewing alcohol for soldiers to earn a small amount of cash.

[...]

In Drodoro, a large group of displaced people occupies two church buildings and a secondary school. Some have been there since the early months of the conflict, and are in pitiful condition - infected skin diseases, marasmic and malnourished children, chronic diarrhoeal diseases, vitamin deficiencies, as well as hepatitis and cholera cases. The

displaced say there are deaths "every day". A seven month-old baby was found dead, - tinged yellow and suffering from chronic diarrhoea - the morning IRIN visited the group. [...]

To date, many displaced Lendu and Hema co-exist successfully together in towns and trading centres. But there are rural areas where the conflict has caused extreme polarisation, especially around the Rethy area, and in previously mixed villages. Polarisation and hostilities are likely to increase if attacks continue and no settlement is reached, - escalating an already acute humanitarian crisis and further complicating humanitarian access." (IRIN 3 March, "Part Two")

Majority of IDPs are not housed in camps but have merged into host communities (1999-2000)

- In rural communities IDPs are often absorbed by host villages, accommodated and fed for the initial stages
- In urban areas it is not uncommon that continued stay of IDPs creates discontent

"A characteristic feature of displacement in eastern DRC is the fact that IDPs are not housed in camps but have merged into host communities. Their conditions remain precarious due to lack of farming land, vital services and general insecurity. Remaining in proximity to their places of origin, the displaced are prone to be subjected to the same hazards and abuses that caused them to flee in the first place. On a number of occasions during 1998-99, the displaced and local communities were stranded in combat areas and were removed by military authorities in a bid to create security zones." (UN July 1999, p.8)

"The number of IDPs countrywide is currently estimated at 1.8 million and this number is on the rise. The great majority of displaced persons are relatively well received by foster communities thanks to the family or tribal ties. In urban areas, IDPs are sheltered and fed by their foster families thus becoming an additional burden on the already poverty-stricken urban households. It is not uncommon that the continued stay of IDPs creates discontent that eventually bursts into a conflict with the subsequent expulsion of the displaced. In rural communities on the other hand, IDPs are often absorbed by host villages, accommodated and fed for the initial stages. With the approval of traditional chiefs, the displaced subsequently receive land plots and in due course overcome their dependence on the local community. Eventually, the relations between the displaced and their hosts improve, as the former start contributing to the general well-being of the community." (UN November 2000, p.18)

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

General

IDP children without schooling since 1998

"The educational process has been brought to a standstill in the great majority of conflict-affected areas. The absolute majority of IDP children have been deprived of proper or any schooling since 1998. In urban areas, there is a marked increase in the number of dropouts with primary school attendance declining, as many families are unable to afford exorbitant education fees. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the CHAP 2001 will attempt to revive the importance and value of the education sector, through launching a series of primary education campaigns in areas of population displacement." (UN November 2000, p. 28)

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

General

Many displaced women have become the head of the household (2001)

- In Maniema, at Kalonge, at Bunyakiri, at Shabunda, in northern Shaba, more than 60% of displaced families are headed by women

"The heavy displacement of populations mostly lead to dislocation of various families. Separated, women become responsible for their children future and have the obligation to guarantee the survival of the family in such a chaotic situation. According to various sources, in Maniema, at Kalonge, at Buyakiri, at Shabunda, in northern Shaba, more than 60% of displaced populations are from families of which husbands have ran away or have been enrolled in the army or in armed militia. In Maniema, they are estimated to be 80%. The monoparental system as imposed on women is a source of permanent tension. Moreover, it is to be feared that this extended conflict will have side effects in establishing a culture of violence considered as normal lifestyle of which women are actually victims. [...]

[However] Far from being uniquely silent victims of the present conflict, women have progressively granted themselves a leadership role trying to ward off the consequences of the conflict on their families and attempting by all means to reduce the side effects of the war on their communities." (OCHA 6 March 2001)

Orphaned and separated children, especially young girls, are exposed to neglect and abuse (December 2000)

- Poverty, war, HIV/AIDS, displacement, family separations and the breakdown of traditional coping mechanisms have forced growing numbers of children on to the streets

"There are large number of orphaned children in the DRC due to the high incidence of HIV/AIDS. Besides the trauma of being left without parental care, these children may be exposed to neglect, exploitation and abuse. They also lack access to education and vocational skills training and suffer immense psychological stress. [...]

Children on and of the street are criminalized and have become a soft target for round ups, recruitment and abuse by society at large; the high military presence in east and west of the country makes the situation even more acute. Issues that need to be addressed are the resettlement, care and protection of separated children, street children, child soldiers and children inappropriately placed in institutions.

Poverty, war, enlistment in the various armed forces, displacement, family separations and the breakdown of traditional coping mechanisms have forced growing numbers of children on to the streets or away from their original home environment in many foster families where they are often suffering from neglect and exploitation.

In North and South Kivu provinces, problems are concentrated in the cities and towns where a large group of vulnerable families have arrived as a result of general insecurity in the rural areas. [...] A much overlooked problem is the discrimination and abuse of women and young girls. Sexual violence against girls, adolescent pregnancies, abandoned child-mother, school drop-outs and girl sex workers are growing phenomena linked to the deterioration in work opportunities and a lack of family and community protection. " (SCF 31 December 2000)

Disruption of food production and coping mechanisms

Kisangani population, including IDPs, is still coping with trauma of June 2000 War (2001)

- Despite improvement of security, people still lack of food, seeds, farm tools, medical services and shelter

"The fighting in June 2000 in and around the city affected everyone. It caused about 800 civilian deaths, much injury (physical and psychological) and a large amount of displacement. There was severe destruction and looting of property, including crops. Most infrastructure have been reduced to an even worse state than before.

Since June 2000 the security situation has been improving slowly, at least within Kisangani City, and increasingly in surrounding areas. The Lusaka agreement and its implementation is now being co-ordinated by UN troops positioned in Kisangani and there is an increasing presence on the ground of UN and humanitarian agencies. [...]

Kisangani continues to be isolated from its main supply routes – road from Goma (400 Km) and Buvira (600 Km) and the river from Kinshasa. [...] The population continues to cope with the trauma of the June war and the ongoing insecurity. Their most pressing problems are severe lack of food, seeds, farm tools, medical services (including medicines) and shelter. Farming families are anxious to normalize their lives as quickly as possible and replant. Yet seeds are scarce due to looting by soldiers and feeding of the displaced which depleted nearly all-agricultural seeds." (ACT 19 January 2001, "Kisangani")

Civil war hinders agricultural products to reach traditional markets (2000)

"No significant positive changes in the household food security were observed during 2000. Domestic agricultural production continued to be curtailed and levels of food

imports were insufficient to cover the supply-demand gap. The size of this gap varies from region to region reaching at times levels of 35-40 %. In spite of wide spread shortages and the food market's lopsidedness, the agricultural production in many parts of the country remains considerable. The available produce, however, does not reach its traditional markets because of the prevailing military and security situation. Larger groups of IDPs and their host communities and numerous urban residents are affected by chronic food shortages and unaffordable prices." (UN November 2000, p. 26)

Displacement adds additional pressure on mechanisms for self reliance of host families (1997-2000)

- Most of population in eastern DRC already destitute after decades of exploitation by the Mobutu government and isolation from the outside world (1998)
- Several reports in 1999 of IDPs overstressing the capacities of host communities in conflict areas
- When host community's resources are exhausted both the hosts and IDP further displace in search of food and shelter

"Two USCR site visits to remote areas of eastern Congo/Zaire [in 1997] found that the needs of many uprooted Congolese/Zairians were the same as the needs of families who never left their homes. Decades of exploitation by the Mobutu government and isolation from the outside world had left much of the population destitute, whether at home or displaced." (USCR 1998, p.61)

"Local NGO sources report [April 1999] that some 31,000 people displaced from the Rutshuru area have moved towards Goma. The town is also hosting displaced people from Masisi, South Kivu and other areas. The displaced are staying with friends or relatives, which has compounded the difficult economic situation of the host families, humanitarian sources said. Over 1,400 malnourished children have been recorded in Goma, the sources added. Meanwhile, over 570 measles cases have been registered in six health zones of North Kivu since January, according to local health authority figures." (IRIN-CEA 2 April 1999)

"Hundreds of people are reported [July 1999] dead north of Bunia in Province Orientale as tribal warfare continues in the Djugu area. Sources in touch with the area told IRIN on Thursday fierce clashes between the Balendu and Wageregere groups had also resulted in the torching of thousands of homes and the displacement of thousands of people. Warning of a "humanitarian disaster in the making", the sources added that neighbouring ethnic groups such as the Alur and Nyali were overstretched due to the burden of providing food and shelter to people fleeing into their areas. Radio Candip in Bunia on Friday said a reconciliation meeting between the two warring groups began on Thursday and was continuing in a bid to resolve their differences." (IRIN-CEA 30 July 1999)

"The assessment mission [August 1999 in northern Katanga] noted that the coping mechanisms of host communities in Katanga were "seriously weakened" and they had difficulty supporting the displaced. Several IDPs and host communities were found to

need protection from arbitrary displacements, extortion, looting by retreating military elements and reprisals by belligerents. Vulnerable unaccompanied minors constituted a significant proportion of many displaced communities." (IRIN-CEA 20 August 1999)

"A remarkable feature of the Congolese crisis is the degree to which it spreads from region to region in the span of a few weeks. Population movement and massive presence of troops (both foreign and Congolese) serve as a vector for the spread of various deprivations into areas otherwise untouched by the conflict. A recent study conducted by FAO in northern Katanga suggested that each newly arrived displaced person creates a perceptible pressure on the host community's limited reserves (food, medicines) and reduces food consumption of an average four hosts. The size of impact would certainly vary from one host community to another depending on IDP/host ratio. When this ratio is high enough to dry up the host community's resources, both the hosts and IDP further displace in search of food and shelter, provoking a chain reaction. Although the behaviour of IDP and host communities varies from region to region depending on the availability of resources, the multiplier effect can be legitimately applied in every IDP hosting community." (UN November 2000, pp. 13-14)

Findings from ACF survey of coping and survival mechanisms of IDPs in South Kivu (April 2000)

- Host families do not necessarily have a prior relationship with the IDPs
- Proximity to the village of origin of great importance for continued food production
- Income is mostly generated by selling labor

"ACF-USA held a survey in April 2000 to gauge the survival strategies of the population. Two thirds of the IDPs in the survey say they have fled their homes without taking anything. The others could take some objects (manioc, kitchen utensils, clothes), a little money (max. \$5), goats (max. 2pc) and some medicines (some paracetamol tablets). They are very dependent on the host family for cooking ware, roofing, sleeping mats, etc.

Host families do not necessarily have a prior relationship with the IDPs. Mutual help is common. Only few charge rental money (in Uvira: Kasenga) at least during the first months. In exchange, the IDPs help with the farming (and sometimes household).

The income of IDP families varies according to:

- Their proximity to the village of origin. If the fields are not too far, the women and sometimes the men take the risk of harvesting their manioc.
- Their starting capital. If they were able to take some money, they invest in a few food items they can sell with a profit. Palm oil, salt, manioc and fish, for instance, can be bought in bulk and sold in detail. Or they can be processed before sale: manioc becomes manioc flour, fish is dried, etc. The added value can be increased by selling in Burundi and make a profit on the exchange rate if the border is nearby and the road is open.

Income is mostly generated by selling labor. One day on the field earns \$0.3 or a few manioc roots. This is limited to 2-3 days per week (at the time of survey, the season was off). Harvesting and selling wood, selling some of family belongings they were able to bring (e.g. piece of cloth or pagne) add to these resources. To compare, a medical visit costs \$0.3 for a child and \$0.6 for an adult, if the reduced rates are applied. The full rate is \$0.5 for a child and \$1 for an adult.

Most of the work is done by the women, especially when their husband was not a farmer before being displaced. Men only become involved if the wife is sick or near a full term pregnancy.

Expenses are therefore very limited. Food is the main expense, followed by health care and necessities such as soap. School attendance is rare. The health of IDPs is quite bad. They are weakened by their escape and families from the Plateaux are very sensitive to the change in climate, and more vulnerable to malaria. The very low quality and quantity of their food intake makes them even more vulnerable. They eat one meal per day, often 60-70% composed of fou-fou (preparation of manioc flour). Animal proteins stay below 10% of the intake." (AAH August 2000, sect. 6.3)

Conflict and displacement prevent cash crop production in South Kivu (2000)

- Breakdown of irrigation and infrastructure systems
- IDPs have lost both their land, their tools and other farming inputs
- Breakdown in cash crop production cause decreased expenditure on any non-food items, such as healthcare and education

"ACF-USA undertook a nutritional survey of children aged 6-59 months and mothers in Lemera health zone, South Kivu in January 2000 [...]. Lemera is part of the Moyens Plateaux food economy zone, its altitude (which determines the vegetation and cultivation type) varies from 1,200-2,000m. Prior to the wars in 1996 and 1998, cassava, beans, rice, bananas, sweet potatoes, maize and coffee were all grown. Much of the produce was sold. The war caused displacement and a breakdown of irrigation and infrastructure systems. Much of the population have moved off their land and have lost their tools and other farming inputs. The insecurity continues together with regular displacements and systematic looting. As reported above, this has resulted in very decreased expenditure on any non-food items, such as healthcare and education. ACF-USA provided seeds and tools to 10,000 households in September 1999 and plans to do so again later this year" (ACC/SCN 31 March 2000, p.15; original source ACF-USA January 2000).

Military operations cause general deteriorating food security (1999-2000)

- Estimated that 10 million Congolese on both sides of the frontline face food shortages of varying degree (February 2000)

- Major food producing areas devastated by the ongoing war (i.e. the Kivus, Northern Katanga, parts of Maniema, western and eastern Orientale, central Equateur)
- Majority of IDPs missed on average three planting seasons and is highly reliant on the support of host communities (November 1999)
- Farming has virtually ground to a stop in North Kivu although majority of IDPs have access to humanitarian assistance (July 2000)
- Increase in the number of parents abandoning children they had no means to feed in Kasai Orientale (July 2000)

"The majority of displaced populations has by now missed on average three planting seasons and is highly reliant on the support of host communities. The latter has to face economic adversities of the military crisis characterised by hyperinflation, rupture of economic exchanges and food deficit. The movement of IDPs is increasingly creating additional pressure on markets in the areas of their temporary settlement, thus exposing both IDPs and their hosts to severe food shortages." (UN November 1999, p.31)

"Two consecutive wars in 1996-1997 and in 1998 prompted a large number of people to flee their home communities. In most cases, the displaced have lost their belongings and survival means, such as agricultural tools and seeds. They are being hosted by other rural communities whose capacity for agricultural production is already extremely weak due to a continued economic crisis, severe shortages of agricultural inputs and ongoing hostilities. The whole agricultural production system is, therefore, on the verge of collapse as the output dramatically diminishes and the demand for basic produce is almost doubling in the host communities. The most critical issue is the availability of agricultural inputs." (UN July 1999, p.32)

"Starting from the end of 1999, a series of attempts were made by specialised organisations to quantify food needs in the DRC and envisage humanitarian interventions in a diversified manner to meet both war-inflicted needs and consequences of an economic collapse. It is now believed that some 10 million Congolese on both sides of the frontline face food shortages of varying degree. Furthermore, the current food crisis will inevitably lead of a sustained deficit for a relatively long period since: a) the majority of food producing and processing regions of the DRC (the Kivus, Northern Katanga, parts of Maniema, western and eastern Orientale, central Equateur) are seriously affected or devastated by the ongoing war; over 800,000 farmers have been displaced and lost their production capacity in eastern DRC alone; b) food importers are disengaging from western DRC; and c) road, fluvial and railway infrastructure is crippled by insecurity and appalling dilapidation.

An EU sponsored study- "Food Economy Zones in Eastern DRC" conducted by the Food Economy Group in conjunction with SCF indicated that already now there is an obvious decline in the quality and quantity of foodstuff consumed by farmers in traditionally wealthy agricultural regions of the Kivu." (OCHA 15 February 2000)

"In North Kivu where the United Nations has estimated the number of IDPs at 450,000 - the highest of any province in DRC - normal life seems to have come to a stop. Although

it is one of the only provinces in the country where the majority do have access to humanitarian assistance, according to humanitarian officials, farming has virtually ground to a stop.

An IRIN reporter saw crops in the area lying abandoned and many homes deserted or destroyed, their owners having fled clashes between the Interahamwe and Rwandan-backed Congolese rebels to seek shelter in the relative safety of market towns like Sake.

Bernadette Mwongo, president of the Women's Forum for Development in North Kivu told IRIN there were two main reasons people were being uprooted. "One is the fighting and violence between various militia groups and the Rwandan-backed rebels," she said. "The other reason is poverty and the lack of basic necessities of life in the villages. In the trading centres here like Sake, they can barely survive." (IRIN 27 July 2000)

"The civilian population of Kabinda in Kasai Orientale is reported to be facing an acute shortage of food and essential commodities, with access to agricultural land denied by the RPA and rebel Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD) that control the area, according to humanitarian sources in the DRC. A disturbing result of this situation was an increase in the past year in the number of parents abandoning children they had no means to feed, they said. The local administration was doing its best to help hundreds of deserted, homeless and orphaned children under 10 years of age, many of whom were in poor shape. Neither was there much promise of relief unless an NGO came through with assistance for the children, the sources added." (IRIN 24 July 2000)

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General

In South Kivu, people displaced in the forest for three years return to the city of Kasika (2001)

"Les mouvements de population dans la cité de Kasika, dans le territoire de Mwenga ont retenu l'attention de la communauté humanitaire du Sud Kivu. En effet, ce mouvement de populations a principalement consisté au retour des populations déplacées dans la forêt depuis plus de trois ans.

Par ailleurs, si les retournés de Kasika nécessitent une attention particulière aujourd'hui, il faut également mentionner que plusieurs déplacés ont entrepris de retourner dans leurs villages depuis la mi-octobre 2000: Kalonge, Bunyakiri, Lemara." (OCHA 8 March 2001)

Landmines prevent the return of displaced persons to Kisangani (August 2000)

"Landmines and unexploded ordnance are still a major impediment to the return of displaced people to their homes and to the resumption of daily life in the city. Mines were laid in strategic military locations to prevent the advance of troops and protect retreating forces. Around 18 mines were placed on the Tshopo bridge, the major link in the city. Reports indicate that some mines were laid after the ceasefire." (UN SC 5 December 2000)

UN strategy not to facilitate return home but to aid displaced communities where they have sought shelter (July 2000)

"In addition, health-specialist agencies such as the WHO, UNICEF and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) received "little or no funding for their operations in the DRC," Mogwanja [UN Humanitarian Coordinator for DRC] added. Of 1.6 million internally-displaced persons (IDPs) in the country, over half a million were inaccessible and only about a quarter of a million received "substantial and systematic assistance," he said. The food situation was also precarious, with food insecurity affecting millions of Congolese and the humanitarian response still weak in Equateur, northern Katanga and Kasai due to a lack of safe access, Mogwanja said.

At the moment, it often "could not be assumed that helping IDPs to return home was the best option" and aid would now be offered to displaced communities wherever they were found. The humanitarian community envisaged a dual approach of feeding and nutritional

projects, and attempting to restore a minimum producing capacity among IDPs, Mogwanja added. The DRC government had requested UNHCR for assistance with IDPs but, "because of difficult access, the requested assistance was often impossible [to deliver]", the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, added." (IRIN 24 July 2000)

Situation of returnees in Northern Katanga described as "pre-catastrophic" (November 1999)

- Displaced are reluctant to return because threatened to be considered rebel collaborators

"An OCHA led inter-agency mission in Northern Katanga (4-8 October) completed the initial assessment of displacement in this province, which was started in August 99. The mission visited Kalemie, Moba as well as a number of villages 12 Km. south of Moba. According to findings of the mission, only a part of Kalemie (80 percent) and Moba (30 percent) residents have returned after having fled their communities in November-December 98. Assessment mission witnessed a large-scale devastation of areas affected by combats. The situation of returnees and those who are still living in the bush (over 120,000 persons) was described as pre-catastrophic with wide-spread starvation. In spite of serious hardships, the displaced are reluctant to return partially as a result of radio messages emanating from Lubumashi warning the population that in case of their return to rebel-occupied towns they will be considered collaborators when DRC Government regains the control of Northern Katanga." (UN OCHA 15 November 1999, "population Movement")

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

Limitation of access caused by the conflict

Difficult access to Equateur, the Kivus and Mbandaka (2000-2001)

- OCHA mission to Katanga was not authorized to cross the limits of Lubumbashi city in December 2000
- MSF set up centers for treatment of cholera in November 2000 but had to stop activities in December 2000 due to renewed conflict
- WFP could not set up nutrition programs and assess needs in many health zones in January 2001

"Humanitarian space and issues of access have continued to be of concern [in DRC]. [...] Equateur, the Kivus and Mbandaka have witnessed fierce confrontations during the past months. In Equateur, the scene of violent and sustained confrontations from August to December [2000], access has been highly problematic. A simultaneous humanitarian operation into rebel-held Northern and Government-held Southern Equateur was severely restricted in accessing populations in need as a result of the fighting. The current fighting in Mbandaka, around Pepa and Pweto, has led, to date, to the displacement of many and the outflow of some 60,000 Congolese to Zambia. Efforts by the humanitarian community to reach the displaced have been severely curtailed. In fact, an OCHA mission to Katanga, 18-20 December was not authorized to cross the limits of Lubumbashi city. In the Kivus, access has been oscillating from poor to very poor." (OCHA 31 December 2000)

"After being unable to access Pweto for many months, MSF finally obtained agreement from the Katanga authorities to set up centers for the treatment and prevention of cholera. Work began in November 2000, but was then halted due to the renewed outbreak of the conflict. Even when peace is eventually restored, the people of Pweto will not have immediate access to a health facility capable of containing the epidemic. However, MSF continues to operate in the Kilwa and Kasenga health districts, where some 3,300 people displaced by the war are receiving care. Most are originally from northern Katanga (the towns of Pepa and Moba, in particular) and passed through Zambia before returning to DRC." (MSF 8 December 2000)

In January 2001, "[M]any health zones remained inaccessible due to security reasons making it difficult for WFP to set up nutrition programmes or carry out nutritional surveys and needs assessment." (WFP 23 February 2001)

Humanitarian access reduced during 2000

- Reduced access to government and rebel-controlled areas in 2000 compared to 1999
- Access depends on Kinshasa's highly centralised decision making procedures (July 2000)
- Several cases of harassment of relief personnel reported in 2000
- Poor access to South Kivu due to fighting among rebel groups, reprisal on civilian population and looting of relief supplies (August 2000)
- MSF-H suspended mission in South Kivu in February 2001, following violent fighting in Shabunda
- ICRC do not work outside towns because of poor security
- Major donors are based in Kinshasa and not in Eastern DRC due to travel restrictions

"The relatively good access to beneficiaries which agencies had in November 1999 did not last. Access problems are now being encountered in Government controlled regions of the country as well as in areas controlled by all three rebel entities – RCD, MLC and RCD-ML. However, there have been a number of unprecedented breakthroughs in some of the most critical conflict affected areas, including, Kasai, Northern Katanga, Equateur, Ituri, South Kivu. Equally, the deployment of MONUC observers helped in bringing a more regular relief in previously isolated areas, as part of its mandate to 'facilitate humanitarian assistance' (UN resolution 1291).

[...]

[...] Although the number of insecure areas where there is military activity, inter-ethnic tensions, and banditry, is much greater in eastern DRC, most security related interdictions have been imposed by the DRC authorities on agencies operating in western provinces of the country. Legitimate concerns of authorities as far as the accredited humanitarian personnel are concerned, do often go beyond the absolute necessity to maintain minimum security standards.

[...]

Vast areas of the country are considered unsafe because of the presence of unpaid soldiers, retreating deserters, etc. Military checkpoints established on major axes (roads, river, railway) are impeding free circulation of persons and goods even within entities controlled by the same forces. Because of an inefficient chain of command, the military field officers do not often obey written authorisations and permissions issued by central authorities to travelling relief personnel." (UN November 2000, pp.7, 20, 21)

"[Access depends] on Kinshasa's highly centralised decision making procedures. Authorisations are issued on case-by-case and person-by-person basis, which makes it difficult to plan even for a short-term intervention. As a result, a number of projects, namely in Eastern Kasai (e.g. FOMETRO and CRS) are simply put on hold. A UN (HC/OCHA) – donor (EU) – NGO (CRS, ACF, MSF) – Government committee on access issues is to be set up following a meeting with the Minister of Home Affairs (cf OCHA paper on Impératifs Humanitaires en RDC – March 2000). It is understood that exchanges on access will go beyond rhetorical considerations to reach time-saving

mechanisms and address issues related to routine trips and team shifts, rather than official, ground breaking missions. " (OCHA 11 July 2000, pp.3-4)

"Whereas several international relief agencies are operational in the Kivus, working out of the relative safety of Goma and Bukavu, only very few have been deployed in the southern part of South Kivu, the "Territoires" of Uvira and Fizi. Yet more than a third of its population is displaced either internally or in refugee camps in Tanzania. Both Territories are currently suffering the third consecutive drought, destroying a large part of the crops, while an epidemic disease (foot and mouth disease) has affected the cattle. The health care system has collapsed. Thousands of severely malnourished were being assisted by Action Against Hunger in feeding centers until most of those were looted or closed because it became too dangerous for the population to get there and for the relief workers to run them.

Over the past months, attacks on relief workers have sharply increased. Most organizations have given up these Territories or stopped their movements and the population is abandoned. Apart regular field visits from donors (USAID, ECHO), FAO and OCHA and a recent trip by UNHCR, no UN agency has been physically present in Uvira there since August 1998. Recently, only IMC, ICRC and Action against Hunger-USA had regular international staff presence. In June, a large part of their activities were suspended due to an ambush on an IMC vehicle. ACF-USA has just initiated a major dissemination campaign to help all the armed groups understand the principles and life-saving importance of humanitarian aid. At the same time, it demands unobstructed access to all those in need. ACF-USA intends to deploy again soon.

[...]

The situation [in South Kivu] is particularly unsafe with Mai Mai, FDD and Interahamwe organizing ambushes on the road and fighting regularly against RCD soldiers. These fights are often followed by reprisals against the civilian population. As a consequence they flee from village to village and return home a few days later or not at all. Initially, the main obstacle of humanitarian work was the harassment by the RCD military. Being underpaid and underfed, relief supplies and rides in relief vehicles became attractive commodities. More recently, the attacks by the Mai Mai, FDD and Interahamwe on relief workers have multiplied. This has not only diminished humanitarian access to a population in urgent need of assistance, but also gradually eliminated the only remaining witnesses to its plight. " (AAH August 2000, sects.1, 2)

In February 2000, OCHA reported that: "A Shabunda, de violents combats ont opposé les soldats du RCD et les milices composées d'ex-FAR, d'Interahamwe et de combattants Mai-Mai. Parmi les conséquences de cette attaque, on rapporte un déplacement des populations vers la forêt et les villages environnants (Byankungu) et la suspension de la mission de MSF-Hollande et des sœurs du Divin Maître." (OCHA 14 February 2001, "Sud Kivu")

"In general the ICRC, which is the main humanitarian organization operating in eastern Congo, can only reach people who have sought refuge in towns, because of the poor security situation. Between 10 and 15 April the ICRC, working in cooperation with the

National Red Cross Society, distributed cooking oil, maize flour, beans and salt to 43,355 especially vulnerable displaced people in Goma town." (ICRC 20 April 2000)

"Regrettably, many of the problems in delivering desperately needed aid to eastern Congo are due to the fact that all major donors as well as United Nations agencies are headquartered in Kinshasa. Most international staff have never visited the east due to travel restrictions imposed by donor governments reluctant to offend Kinshasa or give the appearance of lending support to the rebels. The lack of field experience results in a myopic view of the Congo. As a result, UN and donor government decisions about what is possible in eastern Congo are often based on conjecture and unfounded perceptions. This faulty analysis imposes undue hardship on the Congolese people." (RI 5 May 2000)

Frequent reports of harassment of relief personnel (2000)

- Detention of expatriate aid workers (MSF/Belgium in Bas Congo)
- Insecurity in Maniema province prompted MERLIN to evacuate its international staff from Kindu and Kalima in January/February 2000
- MSF-H vehicles hijacked in Bunia and used to transport covertly munitions and grenades
- UN and MSF offices hit by shells during the fierce fighting on 5 -10 June 2000 in Kisangani
- Ambushes on humanitarian workers force ACF-USA to reduce its nutritional program in South Kivu
- National staff of international NGOs and relief agencies are increasingly the target of uncontrolled armed gangs (December 2000)

"There were [during January – February 2000] several cases of harassment of relief personnel, including detention of expatriate aid workers (MSF/Belgium in Bas Congo), attacks on humanitarian convoys (MSF/France in Ituri, Orientale), AICF (Ruzizi plaine, Uvira zone), attempts to requisition humanitarian supplies and material (Agro Action Allemande, Goma). Although the above incidents were possible to address and ensure safety of the workers, their increasing numbers and seriousness constituted a real impediment often causing interruptions in the delivery of assistance. Heightening insecurity in Maniema province prompted MERLIN to evacuate its international staff from Kindu and Kalima. Likewise, the hostile attitude of vying Hema and Lendu communities that often suspect relief agencies of partiality, created unfavourable security conditions leading to withdrawal of MSF teams from the area." (OCHA 15 February 2000)

"There have been, worryingly, continued cases of harassment of aid workers and their property in the east. This has happened to a variety of agencies in a number of different places. In some instances stealing of aid goods has also taken place. Official complaints to civilian and military authorities are always made when the incidents involve RCD military. " (OCHA 17 April 2000)

"The reporting period [June-July 2000] saw a number of security incidents that had serious repercussions on the course of humanitarian interventions both in eastern and western DRC.

On 8-9 May, armed men some seventy kilometres from Bunia commandeered two MSF-H vehicles travelling from Kampala to Bunia. The vehicles were taken to Bunia and used to transport covertly munitions and grenades from Bunia into the forests. The drivers were forced upon death threats to collaborate, and were informed that NGO vehicles had been targeted in order to pass unhindered through checkpoints. The vehicles were returned and MSF drivers were shortly released unharmed. Captors had also stated that they would continue to use vehicles bearing the logos of NGOs in order to pass roadblocks safely and to carry out their activities without causing suspicion.

On 23 May an ACF team of an expatriate nurse, a local nurse and a driver was stopped by a group of armed men in Kadekezi, South Kivu, held at gunpoint and beaten-up while the car and their personal belongings were looted. Relief workers were forcibly brought to a village and all three were finally released the same day without injury after they had clearly stated that they were nurses and "in charge of treating patients". This incident, the latest in a long series, has prompted ACF to suspend its activities south of Uvira. Activities are also suspended around Ndolera off the road in the Ruzizi plain. However, in order to address the appalling humanitarian situation, ACF has been combining an intervention to strengthen agriculture and fishing activities with a nutritional program of therapeutic and supplementary feeding. Distribution of medical supplies had to be interrupted because of erratic access. An office in Moba is being set up to counter the downward spiral prevailing in Southern Kivu, in which humanitarian actors are seen as intruders.

On 14 May 2000, a team of UNHCR and Atlas Logistics evaluators undertaking an assessment mission by boat around Impfundo, Republic of the Congo was apprehended by DRC security forces in international waters, and accused of espionage. Team members were released several days later, as a result of a series of interventions. Staff members have been reportedly mistreated.

UN (including MONUC) and MSF offices have been hit by shells during the fierce fighting on 5 -10 June 2000 in Kisangani. Five national staff members of UNICEF, WHO, OCHA and MSF/Belgium have been slightly wounded. Although there is no direct indication at a deliberate targeting of humanitarian organisations, the above incidents, as well as the absence of humanitarian truces during the fighting period, were testimonies of a total absence of concern for civilian casualties." (OCHA 11 July 2000, p.4)

"The ACF-USA nutritional program [in South Kivu] has been reduced due to the security situation :

- The Lemera TFC and SFC were closed following the attack on Lemera on the 4th of April 2000.

- The Lweba TFC, the Swima, Lweba, Baraka and Ndolera SFCs were closed at the end of May 2000 following the ambush on an ACF-USA vehicle in Kasekezi and continuing insecurity in the Moyens Plateaux around Lemera and Ndolera.

- The Uvira, Kiliba, Runingu, Sange and Luberizi SFCs were closed mid July 00, following the ambush on an IMC vehicle and the consecutive decision by all NGOs and UN Agencies to stop movements in the Ruzizi Plain.

[...]

Until a few months ago, most incidents were of the nature of harassment at checkpoints, confiscation of vehicles or looting of supplies. At times, Mai Mai/FDD/Interahamwe took over areas or made them inaccessible by cutting off the road. A few agencies could work in the Territories of Uvira and Fizi, accepting regular interruptions, some loss of relief goods and a certain risk of being caught in one of many small attacks. But in the last six months, the presence of the underground armed groups such as the Mai Mai, Interahamwe or FDD has become widespread in the area. The increased hostilities directed against the Banyamulenge have added another explosive element. Whatever may be the reason, violent incidents, more and more involving relief workers, are clearly on the rise. (AAH August 2000, sects. 5.1, 7.2)

OCHA reported in December 2000 that in the Kivus, "Le personnel national des organisations non gouvernementales internationales et agences d'aide sont de plus en plus la cible des bandes armées non contrôlées (bandits et voleurs à main armée). Dernier exemple en date: attache d'un camion de la Caritas qui se dirigeait vers Nyangezi et Kaziba pour une livraison de vivres aux enfants atteints de malnutrition dans les centres nutritionnels. Les employés de Caritas effectuant ce transport ont été battus et dépouillés de tous leurs biens." (OCHA 20 December 2000, "Kivus")

Improved access to vulnerable populations during first months after the Lusaka cease-fire (July-September 1999)

- UN able in August 1999 to undertake first assessment missions to Katanga and Eastern Kasai
- Pockets of inaccessibility because of security problems in the Kivu region, Northern Katanga and in central Equateur (September 1999)
- Access granted to areas with fluid security situation by the DRC Government, MLC, RCD-ML and RCD-Goma by November 1999

"The accessibility of vulnerable populations both in RCD and Government controlled areas significantly improved in July and August. The increased accessibility of the war-affected populations should be attributed both to active lobbying on the part of the relief community as well as to the recognition by authorities at all levels of humanitarian imperatives. Undoubtedly, the Lusaka peace agreement had its role in improved accessibility of the vulnerable population. Although, long bureaucratic formalities required in order to access the war zones are still enforced, no cases of access denial by RCD or Government were reported in the last month. The cross frontline operations were carried out with the agreement of Kinshasa, Goma and Kisangani. The remaining pockets of inaccessibility are primarily defined a) by military activity in the northern (Equateur)

and southern (Katanga and eastern Kasai) fronts; b) protracted insurrection (the Kivus and Orientale [SPLA]); c) and the re-emerged tribal clashes in Orientale." (UN OCHA 24 August 1999, "Access to War-Affected Populations" & "Assistance to IDPs" p.7)

"A two-week assessment mission in northern Katanga identified more than 54,500 displaced persons in the area. The mission, sponsored by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), was the first for which the UN and its humanitarian partners had obtained "full and unconditional access" to areas affected by population displacement since the onset of war. Over 28,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were registered in Lubumbashi, of whom only 3,300 area were being assisted, the team found, adding that the influx of IDPs into the area was continuing. An estimated 125,000 residents of Manono area were also believed to be dispersed in "hardly accessible" areas of Kiluba. High morbidity and mortality among children was reported in most displaced communities assessed." (IRIN-CEA 20 August 1999)

"[By September 1999] Relief agencies continued to enjoy greater accessibility to war-affected populations. DRC authorities facilitated humanitarian missions to RCD besieged town of Kabinda in Eastern Kasai (WFP and French Co-operation) and Pweto in Katanga (MSF and Caritas). The geography of humanitarian missions expanded in rebel controlled areas as well, most notably in Equateur, where NID follow-ups were conducted by UNICEF and WHO. The security situation in eastern Orientale permitted MSF to assess the situation and assist populations affected by serious inter-ethnic clashes between agricultural and pastoral groups. The remaining pockets of inaccessibility are primarily defined by insurgency and counter-insurgency in the Kivus, insecurity in Northern Katanga, uncertain military situation in central Equateur and logistical and security problems in Maniema." (UN OCHA 15 September 1999, "Access to War-Affected Populations")

"[T]here has been adequate co-operation from civilian and military authorities with relief agencies on both sides of the frontline. Access was granted to areas with fluid security situation by the DRC Government, MLC, RCD-ML and RCD Goma. Direct flights across the front-line continued. However, the DRC authorities require that on their return the humanitarian plane transit via third countries (e.g. CAR). Although a number of operations, including the third phase of NIDs (see below) and assessment missions could be carried out, the overall accessibility of the vulnerable populations decreased as a result of a worsening security climate." (UN OCHA 15 November 1999, "Security and Access")

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National Response

Joseph Kabila asks UNHCR to assist the internally displaced (March 2001)

"Congolese President Joseph Kabila on Thursday met UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers in Geneva [...]. Kabila sought help for the return home of Congolese refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). He told the High Commissioner that he was "anxious" to see the return of Congolese refugees from the Great Lakes region.

He noted that his country was now in the process of reconstruction, which would enable refugees and IDPs to return to their homes. [...] He asked UNHCR to assist IDPs in his country, estimated to number around 1.8 million, which was more than the number of refugees. The IDPs were in accessible areas but lacked basic assistance, he said." (IRIN 30 March 2001)

Government's decision to allow freedom of movement in the entire country aims to facilitate the return of the displaced (March 2001)

- Following the UN's request, the government of DRC decided on March 24 to authorize freedom of movement for persons and for goods in the entire country, in compliance with the Lusaka agreement
- This measure should help to reunite families, the return of internally displaced to their homes and to improve a dire food situation

"Le gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo a décidé ce samedi 24 mars d'autoriser la libre circulation des personnes et des biens sur l'ensemble du territoire national, conformément à l'accord de Lusaka.

Dans une communication de presse, le ministre congolais des Affaires étrangères et de la coopération internationale, Léonard She Okitundu, a rappelé que cette décision fait suite à une requête de la Mission d'observation de l'ONU au Congo (MONUC) selon laquelle 'le cessez-le-feu est effectivement observé par toutes les parties de même que la mise en œuvre du plan de désengagement des forces.'

La libre circulation concerne les voies de communication terrestre, fluviale, lacustre, aérienne et maritime. Cette mesure se justifie par le souci de réunifier les familles séparées par la guerre et de faciliter le retour des déplacés de guerre dans leur lieux de résidence. Cette décision va aider également au rétablissement des échanges

commerciaux à travers toute l'étendue du territoire national afin d'enrayer la crise alimentaire qui sévit actuellement en RDC.

Toutefois, les modalités d'application pratique de cette décision ne semblent pas encore mises en œuvre. Le ministère de l'intérieur continue à délivrer des autorisations qui sont exigées à l'aéroport. Cependant, cette décision traduit une volonté du gouvernement de faciliter les interventions de la communauté humanitaire sur toute l'étendue du territoire." (OCHA 31 March 2001)

DRC ready to access to Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions which applies to non-international armed conflict (2001)

- Protocol aims to protect the civilian population and prohibits the use of forced displacement as a means of warfare

" The President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr Joseph Kabila, paid an official visit on 30 March to the headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), where he was welcomed by ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger and other senior officials. During his visit, Mr Kabila announced his country's forthcoming accession to Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions.

The ICRC welcomes the Democratic Republic of the Congo's participation in Additional Protocol II, which brings to 151 the number of States party to the treaty and marks another step towards universality for this important instrument. The Protocol applies to non-international armed conflict, setting out basic guarantees for all individuals who are not, or are no longer, taking part in hostilities, defining the rights of persons deprived of their freedom, laying down judicial guarantees, protecting the civilian population and civilian property and prohibiting the use of famine and forced displacement as a means of warfare." (ICRC 30 March 2001)

Response by the UN system to the ongoing conflict

UN Security Council authorises peacekeeping mission to facilitate implementation of Lusaka peace agreement (1999-2001)

- United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) authorised in November 1999
- On 24 February 2000, the Security Council authorized the expansion of MONUC to consist of up to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 observers
- As at 15 September 2000 MONUC had a total of 258 liaison officers and military observers within DRC
- Mandate further extended until 15 June 2001 by SC in December 2000
- By April 2001 the number of UN peacekeepers on the ground reached nearly 500

"The Security Council had previously expressed its deep concern in August 1998, after tensions in the region had broken into the open. At that time, the Council noted that the conflict constituted a threat to regional peace and security. It reaffirmed the need for all States to refrain from interference in each other's internal affairs and called for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces. The Council noted the need for national reconciliation respectful of the equality and harmony of all ethnic groups and leading to democratic elections.

In December 1998, the Council reaffirmed the obligation to respect the territorial integrity of DRC. It also indicated that it was prepared to consider the active involvement of the United Nations, in coordination with OAU, to help implement a ceasefire and an agreed process for a political settlement.

In April 1999, to further demonstrate his commitment to regional peace efforts, the Secretary-General appointed Moustapha Niasse (Senegal) as his Special Envoy for the DRC peace process, to be assisted by the Secretary-General's Representative for the Great Lakes Region, Mr. Berhanu Dinka, who had been appointed in December 1997. The Council welcomed the appointment of the Special Envoy in its resolution 1234 of 9 April 1999 and requested the Secretary-General to make recommendations on the role of the United Nations in the peace process.

In the same resolution, the Council, among other things, deplored the presence of forces of foreign States in DRC "in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations", and called on those States to end the presence of the uninvited forces. In June, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to preserving the territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the region and called upon all parties to participate with a constructive and flexible spirit in the upcoming Lusaka summit.

Based on the Secretary-General's recommendations in his report dated 15 July 1999, the Security Council, by its resolution 1258 of 6 August 1999, authorized the deployment of up to 90 United Nations military liaison personnel, along with necessary civilian staff, to the capitals of the signatory States, to JMC provisional headquarters, to the rear military headquarters of the main belligerents in DRC as conditions permitted, and to other areas deemed necessary by the Secretary-General. Deployment began once RCD had signed the Lusaka Agreement on 31 August.

On 1 November 1999, the Secretary-General recommended extension of the mandate until 15 January 2000. Although the survey team dispatched to the region had been unable to carry out the required reconnaissance visits, the Secretary-General sought prior authorization for the establishment of MONUC and the deployment of up to 500 military observers, provided the necessary military conditions were met. On 13 November, he appointed Kamel Morjane (Tunisia) as his Special Representative for DRC.

The Security Council, by its resolution 1273 of 5 November, extended the mandate until 15 January 2000. By its resolution 1279 of 30 November, the Council decided that the

previously authorized personnel would constitute MONUC and expressed its intention to take a decision on further deployment on the basis of recommendations by the Secretary-General. It requested the Secretary-General to accelerate the development of a concept of operations based on as-sessed conditions of security, access and freedom of movement, and cooperation on the part of the signatories to the Agreement.

On 24 February 2000, the Security Council, by its resolution 1291 (S/RES/1291 (2000)) decided to extend the mandate of MONUC until 31 August 2000 and authorized the expansion of the Mission to consist of up to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 observers, or more, provided that the Secretary-General determined that there was a need and it could be accommodate within the overall force size and structure, and appropriate civilian support staff in the areas, inter alia, of human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, child protection, political affairs, medical support and administrative support. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to recommend any additional force requirements that might become necessary to enhance force protection.

On 23 August 2000, the Council, by its resolution 1316, decided to extend the mandate of MONUC until 15 October 2000 to allow time for further diplomatic activities and for Council reflection on the future mandate of MONUC and possible adjustments to that mandate. The mandate was further extended, until 15 December 2000, by Council resolution 1323 of 13 October 2000." (DPI 17 October 2000)

"On 14 December [2000], the Security Council (SC) unanimously adopted resolution 1332 (2000) extending the mandate of MONUC until 15 June 2001 and called on all parties to the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement to cease hostilities and to continue dialogue to implement this as well as those agreements of Kampala, Maputo and Harare. The resolution also endorses the Secretary-General's proposal to deploy additional military observers in order to monitor and verify the parties' implementation of the cease-fire and disengagement plans. (OCHA 31 December 2000, p.12)

"The number of United Nations peacekeepers on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reached nearly 500, a UN spokesman reported today.

Spokesman Fred Eckhard said that the remainder of the 260-strong Senegalese guard unit had arrived today in Kananga, one of four sectoral headquarters for the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The first half of the unit arrived earlier this week.

According to MONUC, the Senegalese soldiers and all Guard Units in the country will be "to guard UN facilities, equipment and supplies." The guards will enhance the ability of the Mission's military observers to carry out their primary task of monitoring and verifying the disengagement of the parties to the conflict.

Some 200 Uruguayan soldiers have already been deployed to Kalemie, one of MONUC's four sector headquarters. The plan also foresees the deployment next month of a second Senegalese Guard Unit of some 280 troops to Mbandaka and the arrival in May of a

contingent of 200 Tunisian troops in Kinshasa to guard the Mission's main Headquarters." (UN DPI 6 April 2001)

"[O]n 22 February 2001 the United Nation's Security Council returned its attention to the Congo by passing Resolution 1341, which again demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces and urged the parties to the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement to adopt a 'precise plan and schedule' by 15 May 2001. The Council demanded that the parties abide in the interim by their promises and start carrying out the Kampala and Harare disengagement plans on 15 March 2001. It also adopted a new Concept of Operations for MONUC, and confirmed its commitment to disarming the 'negative forces'." (ICG 16 March 2001, sect.II)

See also:

[UN Security Council defines new approach to be taken by MONUC \(February 2001\)](#)

The [home page of MONUC](#) contains links to recent UN documents on DRC

UN Security Council defines new approach to be taken by MONUC (February 2001)

- New operations plan focused on verifying and monitoring the disengagement of conventional forces
- Disarmament of armed groups and the reconstruction of the Congolese Army a secondary task
- The revised plan foresees deployment of approximately 2,500 personnel and decreases armed troops from 3,400 to 1,900

"The long stalled MONUC has started deploying following passage of Resolution 1341 [on 22 february 2001]. This hopeful development results in part from the political thaw that accompanied Joseph Kabila's rise to power. At the same time, it is the consequence of serious rethinking within the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) on how to accomplish its mission more effectively.

The Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement originally called upon the UN to deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force under a Chapter VII mandate. The force's expected role was to supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of foreign forces, to collect and account for weapons held by civilians, and to provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict. The mission also included peace enforcement. UN troops were to track down and disarm non-signatory forces, screen them for mass killers and other war criminals, and hand over suspected 'génocidaires' to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

The enormity of the task of deploying a peacekeeping force to the DRC whatever its mandate was clear from the outset. Security Council officials in New York were loath to accept responsibility for what they expected to be a disaster. The U.S. Congress, which contributes one-third of any peacekeeping operation's budget, was equally wary of what appeared to be a dangerous Congolese quagmire.

Compelled to placate these conflicting concerns, the UN Secretary General decreed that the force deployed to the Congo must be both militarily credible and cheap. Armed with this guidance DPKO planners designed a Concept of Operations for MONUC, which was adopted on 24 February 2000 by the Security Council (Resolution 1291). In addition to 500 observers and support units, the UN would deploy four mechanised infantry battalions. This force was to establish four strong points in the DRC to which, in the event of trouble, the observers could retreat. The total mission would number 5,537 soldiers.

Over the next year the shortcomings of this plan became clear. The immediate task of the observers was to verify and monitor the disengagement of belligerents. The concept of operations implied, however, that this would have to wait for the deployment of the infantry battalions, which was expected to take at least six months. Moreover, planners could expect additional delays due to the uncertain availability and preparedness of units the member states had pledged. Finally, it was never clear what purpose these armed forces would serve once deployed. From the outset, pundits ridiculed the notion that a four-battalion strong MONUC was militarily credible or even capable of defending itself. UN officials agreed that only a massive force could realistically bring a semblance of security to the country. Anything less, they worried, would encourage false expectations among the Congolese that would probably lead to another humiliating peacekeeping failure.

While the revised Concept of Operations is a substantial improvement, it leaves some questions unanswered. Planners have once again side stepped how to disarm groups such as the Interahamwe in the hope that the belligerents reach a political consensus. UN officials now think 'the only solution to disarmament is co-operation between the government of Rwanda and the government of DRC'.

Prior to Laurent Kabila's death, DPKO began to revise its concept of operations for the Congo. Its motivation was above all the logistical difficulties involved in equipping and deploying the four infantry battalions. Planners were also afraid that the UN would be unprepared to seize the moment if the belligerents suddenly agreed to begin disengagement.¹⁵ In fact, this had occurred after the signing of the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan, when a lack of funds for leasing aircraft prevented the immediate deployment of observers.

Under the new operations plan, the re-tooled force is tailored to accomplish the limited mission of verifying and monitoring the disengagement of conventional forces. This is an achievable objective if the belligerents co-operate. The document identifies other likely missions such as the disarmament of armed groups and the reconstruction of the Congolese Army, but delays these tasks until a later stage.

The revised plan foresees deployment of approximately 2,500 personnel and decreases armed troops from 3,400 to 1,900. Based on the understanding that the primary threat facing the UN forces is theft or sabotage rather than armed attack, planners have decided to deploy 'guard and security companies' to protect MONUC equipment and

installations, instead of the logistically burdensome mechanised battalions. These armed troops will not be capable of rescuing at risk observers however, as was foreseen in the original concept of operations. Commanders must therefore remain vigilant to threats faced by the observers and be ready to withdraw them from regions where they might be at risk. The force is also to be augmented by additional command and control, aviation, logistical, and medical capabilities." (ICG 16 March 2001, sect.IIB)

International coordination mechanisms

UN mechanisms for coordination (1999-2000)

- Strategic coordination of humanitarian interventions and development of humanitarian strategies are the responsibilities of the UN country management team in Kinshasa
- Joint UN Humanitarian Offices headed by the lead Agency (UNICEF in North Kivu, WFP in South Kivu) established in March and June 1999
- Cooperation between the UN, Red Cross and NGOs handled by a Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA)
- Weekly UN Country Management Team Disaster Management Team meetings
- During 2000, OCHA established three new sub-offices, in Mbandaka, Bunia and Gbadolite in addition to the existing ones in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Goma and Bukavu
- 3 sub-offices in Lubumbashi, Kalemie and Kindu planned for 2001

"The countrywide coordination of humanitarian programmes falls under the responsibility of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC working closely with the UN country management team based in Kinshasa. Close links are being maintained with authorities, the Nairobi-based Regional Humanitarian Adviser, as well as with Humanitarian Coordinators in the neighbouring countries. The field coordination arrangements for the eastern part of the country will be delegated to the UN Humanitarian Offices (UNHO) in Goma and Bukavu and Kisangani who report to the Humanitarian Coordinator. The UN-Red Cross -NGO coordination matters are handled by a Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA) which was established within the framework of UN Disaster Management Programme." (UN July 1999, p.15)

"Currently [July 1999], the Office of the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator is equipped with a Senior Humanitarian Adviser, representing the UN system in the eastern provinces of DRC, a Humanitarian Affairs Officer in Kinshasa, and an Information Officer in Goma. A UNDP humanitarian adviser, who also runs programmes for UNDP-UNOPS, manages the Support Unit in Kinshasa. Since early May 1999, OCHA deployed an Assets Recovery Officer in Goma, to identify and recuperate assets belonging to the UN and other relief agencies that were looted or requisitioned at the onset of the current conflict in eastern provinces. The Office of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC intends to deploy an internationally recruited Information Manager in the East to provide regular analysis on the humanitarian situation and facilitate the coordination amongst humanitarian partners." (UN July 1999, p.44)

"UN humanitarian activities are conducted by Kinshasa-based agencies being WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, WHO, FAO, supported by UNDP, UNESCO, ILO and OHCHR. Joint coordination is ensured by the Humanitarian Coordinator. Joint UN Humanitarian Offices headed by the lead Agency (UNICEF in North Kivu, WFP in South Kivu), were established in March and June 1999. A Senior Humanitarian Adviser for eastern DRC- who reports to the Humanitarian Coordinator in Kinshasa - is responsible for monitoring and assessment of the humanitarian situation in areas not under Government control and liaises with authorities on matters of concern to humanitarian operations.

Operationally, coordination with all of the above listed actors is being ensured through weekly UN Country Management Team Disaster Management Team meetings (participation of all humanitarian partners), monthly donor briefings, human rights national and health sub-commissions' sessions, task force for minorities and regular consultations to which the DRC line Ministries and their provincial branches are closely associated." (UN November 1999, pp. 13-14)

"[During 2000] OCHA supported and contributed to large humanitarian initiatives by focusing on negotiating for humanitarian access, organising UN-NGO joint assessment missions to previously inaccessible areas and promoting international humanitarian law. The expansion of its structure through the establishment of 3 sub-offices, in Mbandaka, Bunia and Gbadolite in addition to the existing ones in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Goma and Bukavu, strengthened OCHA's information collection network, analysis and response capacities as well as sound and customised methodologies for collection and treatment of statistics on internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The overall management of the Emergency Humanitarian Intervention (EHI) Programme, key element for rapid response, enabled OCHA to help the humanitarian community break new grounds in identifying and reaching the most affected groups, through efficient, all-inclusive decision making mechanisms. Flexibility and rapid response capacity-building remain the most effective tool to respond to continued and diversifying emergencies.

In 2001, OCHA will also implement new strategies to support commercial exchanges inside the country and across the frontline, open humanitarian corridors to access most vulnerable population, negotiate with and promote awareness among all belligerents on rules of engagement and principles of humanitarian interventions.

Comprehensive support will be provided to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and through him/her to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in the DRC. This includes policy recommendations, analyses of social, economic and humanitarian situation, liaison with international and local humanitarian partners and the DRC Government.

To achieve these tasks, OCHA DRC will continue to expand its presence in the field through the deployment of additional Humanitarian Affairs Officers, and opening of 3 sub-offices in Lubumbashi, Kalemie and Kindu in addition to the existing 7 in Bunia, Kisangani, Goma, Bukavu, Gbadolite, Mbandaka and Kinshasa. Given these extensive objectives, the level of funds required by OCHA will considerably increase in 2001." (UN November 2000, p.83)

Principles of Engagement for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance in the DRC (November 1998)

- Principles elaborated at a meeting of the humanitarian community in Nairobi on 23 November 1998
- Principles based on the ICRC's Code of Conduct
- Principles endorsed by the Government and main rebel group

"Late last year [1997] the worsening humanitarian situation in the DRC together with increased security risks to humanitarian agencies made it necessary to seek consensus on a common approach to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, based on the application of agreed principles. This set of principles – the Principles of Engagement for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo – aims at increasing the efficiency and pertinence of aid and maximising the humanitarian space for the relief community. They are based on the ICRC's Code of Conduct and were first set out at a meeting in Nairobi on 23 November 1998.

The principles are addressed to the international humanitarian community as well as to the political and military authorities in the DRC. General overarching principles are defined as impartiality; neutrality; independence (aid based solely on need); human rights; participation with local partners; coordination between agencies; transparency of humanitarian actors; and accountability. In addition, some general protocols are mentioned with regard to accessibility, security and types of intervention, and monitoring and evaluation. The principles also set out some practical means for improving coordination mechanisms and monitoring compliance to the principles." (RRN November 1998)

"Shortly after the advent of the Congolese crisis, the humanitarian community developed 'Principles of Engagement for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance in the DRC' [...] as a basis for humanitarian interventions in the DRC. The document reflects basic international norms and practices governing humanitarian action, and was endorsed by UN agencies, various NGOs and donors, notably ECHO and the US.

During a mission of the Deputy to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to the DRC in January 1999, the 'Principles of Engagement' were accepted by the DRC government and the RCD in Goma.

The document laid the groundwork for the resumption of UN humanitarian activities in the eastern provinces and emphasised the non-political character of humanitarian action. As a result and through active engagement with authorities at national, provincial and local level, the relief community increased its access to beneficiaries. Direct positive results achieved in 1999 include:

Legal and humanitarian assistance to endangered ethnic minorities;
Access to war prisoners on both sides of the frontline;
Safe havens for Sudanese refugees, where possible;
Nation-wide polio immunisation campaigns on both sides of the frontline;
Commitment from authorities to stop child recruitment and demobilise child-soldiers;
Establishment of joint UN humanitarian offices in Goma and Bukavu"
(UN November 1999, p.65)

Text of the principles:

"Introduction

The worsening humanitarian situation in the democratic Republic of Congo, in particular in the Eastern part of the country, together with increased security risks both to personnel and assets of humanitarian agencies, made it necessary to seek consensus on a common approach to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, based on the application of a set of agreed principles. This set of principles aims at increasing the efficiency and the pertinence of the delivered aid and maximising the humanitarian space for the relied community.

The set of principles is addressed to the international Humanitarian community as well as to the political and military authorities. General overarching principles are defined under 1) while some general protocols, mainly on accessibility, security and types of interventions, monitoring and evaluation are mentioned under 2)

1) Overarching Principles

The present document, together with the 'Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief', which most assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its guiding principle is... 'The right to receive humanitarian assistance and to offer it is a fundamental humanitarian principle, which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to affected populations, is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility. The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. When we give humanitarian aid, it is no a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such'... (Reference: Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster relief, 7/9/98, p.2)

Impartiality:

Aid will be delivered without discrimination as to ethnicity, religious beliefs or political opinion. Humanitarian assistance should be provided solely on the basis of needs.

Neutrality-Apolitical nature of humanitarian aid:

Aid agencies will be neutral in providing humanitarian assistance and must stress the apolitical nature of humanitarian assistance. The action of aid agencies will not imply recognition of or confer legitimacy of the authority in control of the area in which humanitarian assistance is provided.

Independence:

The assistance provided will be depended solely on needs, giving priority to the most urgent and stressing situations, and will not be influenced by political, economic or military considerations.

Human Rights:

The promotion of human rights is an essential part of humanitarian assistance and may range from passive monitoring of respect for human rights to pro-active human rights advocacy. These activities will be guided by International Human Law and by the mandates given by International Instruments to various humanitarian organisations such as UNHCHR, UNHCR, and ICRC.

Participation:

Beneficiaries, local partners and local structures should be involved, wherever possible, in the need assessment, provision and monitoring of humanitarian emergency assistance, so as to provide sustainability in the long term.

Coordination:

Participating agencies commit themselves to enhanced co-ordination and mutual support using the existing co-ordination mechanisms.

Transparency:

Humanitarian programmes and aid agencies operating in the country must be totally transparent in all their workings and dealings with relevant authorities. Transparency should be achieved through the regular flow of information to the relevant authorities and vice versa. This principle should be applied without prejudice to the security of the beneficiaries.

Accountability:

Implementing partners hold themselves accountable to both those they seek to assist and those from whom they accept resources.

2) Protocol

Freedom of access:

Parties to the conflict should ensure unimpeded access for assessment, delivery and monitoring of humanitarian aid to potential beneficiaries. The assistance to affected areas should be provided in the most efficient manner and by the most accessible routes.

Security:

The relevant authorities are responsible for creating conditions conducive to the implementing of humanitarian activities. This must cover the security of local and international staff as well as all assets. The restitution of requisitioned assets is an essential indication of the goodwill of the authorities. Agencies look to the local authorities to take responsibilities for ensuring the return of assets wherever possible. The security of the civil population in conflict zones is the responsibility of the relevant authorities.

Escorts:

Armed escorts should only be used as a last resort for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas of serious insecurity. The co-ordinating body should evaluate the need for an armed escort on a case by case basis.

Joint assessments and types of intervention:

Where possible basic humanitarian needs and beneficiaries will be identified through joint assessment missions, which would also define the necessary package of assistance to mitigate and prevent life threatening situations. Interventions will involve local communities, wherever possible, and be designed to strengthen existing local capacities.

Monitoring and Evaluation:

Monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian assistance will be jointly undertaken by aid agencies and local partners, in cooperation with donors. Mechanisms will be put in place to monitor compliance with the principles of engagement. " (OCHA 25 January 1999)

International operational activities in 2000

Relative increase in assistance during 2000 but level still modest compared to needs (November 2000)

- Improved delivery of aid and the establishment of a wider humanitarian network throughout the DRC since March 2000
- Humanitarian response to the internally displaced persons consolidated and more systematic as opposed to sporadic interventions in 1998 and 1999
- Channelling of resources changed in favour of UN Agencies
- Refugees International regrets that there is no UN lead agency to respond to the needs of the displaced and urges UN agencies to develop a joint strategy

"The Year 2000 coincided with the emergence of a second front in the Kivus, intensified fighting in all parts of the conventional frontline and a drastically curtailed accessibility to beneficiaries. Within weeks, the humanitarian situation degenerated at an unprecedented pace, while the relief community was denied access in western DRC and faced increasing insecurity in eastern DRC. Starting in March 2000, humanitarian assessment missions and active engagement initiatives with authorities at all levels opened the way for the actual delivery of aid and the establishment of a wider humanitarian network throughout the DRC. Relief operations were launched and reinforced in Orientale, North and South Kivu, Katanga, Kasai and Equateur provinces that had remained inaccessible for humanitarian aid in months. Although intermittently, due to security and access granting tardiness, the institutions participating in the CHAP, partner NGOs and the Red Cross movement delivered assistance to the largest number of beneficiaries since the beginning of the DRC conflict in 1998.

[...]

Humanitarian response to the internally displaced persons, one of the most numerous category of affected populations, has been consolidated and became more systematic as opposed to sporadic interventions in 1998 and 1999. The geographical coverage of IDP assistance projects remained patchy, and primarily included the Kivus and to a lesser extent Orientale and Katanga provinces, while displaced communities of Equateur, Maniema, and the Kasai did not receive any substantial aid." (UN July 2000, pp.3-4)

"Funding of humanitarian interventions in the DRC crisis remained relatively modest in 2000 compared with the actual size of one of the most acute humanitarian emergencies in the world. The absolute volume of humanitarian funding, however, has undergone an upsurge as have funding sources. The distribution or channelling of resources has changed too, and most notably in favour of UN Agencies whose cumulative income reached its highest level since the beginning of the war in August 1998. The total funding for humanitarian interventions amounts (as of beginning of October 2000) to roughly US\$ 77 million. At first glance, this amount, divided among the UN Agencies, international NGOs, and bilateral programmes, is small relative to the extent of the emergency and the rapidly growing needs.

[...]

Non-humanitarian public aid from UNDP, FAO, WHO, Belgium, France, European Union, and Canada roughly amounts to US\$ 4 million. This is used in ongoing support for the civil service, structural improvements to health and commercial infrastructure, and small-scale road rehabilitation. These are activities that are primarily targeting central infrastructure, which mainly benefits Kinshasa, Bas Congo and Kasai provinces.

[...]

As stated above, the 2000 CA has already raised more funds than the total raised in the three similar fund-raising initiatives from 1998 to 1999. This increase in funding levels should be attributed to several "outside" factors, such as enhanced political and military settlement process and increased media interest in the DRC affairs, but also to the considerably expanded and flexible UN involvement in all aspects of the Congolese crisis. However, this relative progress should by no means lead to a conclusion that the outcomes of the 2000 CA were generally satisfactory: of 30 multi-sector projects presented in the Appeal only ten projects received partial funding; and 20 projects received no funding at all.

[...]

[T]he increased resources logically resulted in a larger programme delivery in 2000. In 1999 the UN Agencies received around 18% of the required funding and remained "stranded" in and around the three major operational bases: Kinshasa, Goma and to a lesser extent Lubumbashi. The expansion of UN humanitarian interventions should be seen in the context of a situation of dwindling accessibility. Put simply, with more funds but less access, in 2000 the UN delivered twice as much as in 1999." (UN November 2000, pp.7-8)

"The international community's response to the humanitarian crisis in the eastern Congo has been completely inadequate. Despite the magnitude of the crisis of displacement in the Congo, there is no UN lead agency to respond to the needs of the displaced. As for the US government, while Refugees International has been repeatedly assured by senior officials that response to the Congo crisis is an urgent moral imperative, the fact is that precious few new resources have been allocated to relief programs in the country. NGOs with operational programs in the eastern region have become frustrated with this failure and the lack of follow-through on promises to outline a coherent strategy and begin funding new proposals. [...]

The various agencies with the mandate to respond to humanitarian needs - including UNICEF, World Food Program, and UNHCR - need to develop a joint strategy for responding to the needs of the displaced and implement this strategy without delay. UN agencies must coordinate the shared responsibilities for meeting the needs of the internally displaced." (RI 15 December 2000)

The following overview of IDP related humanitarian response for 2000 has been compiled from the "Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin" prepared by OCHA DRC:

Orientale:

"Emergency medical assistance (UNICEF, WHO and MSF/Belgium) is being provided to urban IDPs through health centres along the displacement roads and to 12,500 IDPs sheltered in several sites in Kisangani.

[...]

The humanitarian situation of IDPs in Ituri is reportedly improving as a result of a multi-sector health, nutrition, sanitation, and food security humanitarian response implemented by German Agro-Action, ICRC, UNICEF, Medair, OXFAM/UK, COOPI, FAO, and MSF/Holland. In Bunia Oxfam GB has thus far provided an appropriate water and sanitation response to 45,000 people in communities made vulnerable by displacements. By the end of June the first phase of the intervention was ended and 60,000 were getting access to safe water. The second phase of the programme envisages more durable, water and sanitation solutions to 90,000 people."(OCHA 11 July 2000)

"Most of the assistance between July and December [2000] has focused on Kisangani City because of difficulty in accessing the rural areas. With improving security ECC [Eglise du Christ au Congo] and its member churches now feel that assistance should try to target the rural population around Kisangani. There is much concern about the situation in those areas which have until now been inaccessible, as the health centers continue to see increasing cases of malnutrition among individuals arriving from rural areas. [...] The consensus among international agencies on the ground is that, with the present level of security, there is an opportunity to address the humanitarian needs of the population in and around Kisangani in an effective manner, thus allowing these communities to recover from the June war and regain their basic self-sufficiency." (ACT 19 January 2001, "Kisangani")

North Kivu

"Humanitarian interventions targeted at displaced populations in North Kivu are consistently improving in terms of coverage and quantity of assistance delivered. WFP for instance, recently completed the largest food distribution campaign since the beginning of the war. Some 7,250 IDP families or roughly 36,000 persons have received supplementary food rations. Non-food supplies are being provided by OXFAM/UNICEF. German Agro-Action, will be addressing some of the needs associated with this population in the coming months with USAID funding. "" (OCHA 11 July 2000)

South Kivu

In March 2001, the UN reported that Shabunda had not been accessible since October 2000 and that humanitarian assistance would be delivered by plane

"Shabunda demeurée inaccessible depuis octobre 2000 présente une situation préoccupante du point de vue humanitaire. Une assistance alimentaire sera menée dans les semaines à venir sous forme d'un pont aérien.

Ubwari: environ 100.000 déplacés vivent dans cette presqu'île sans aucune assistance significative.

Kalemie et Nyunzu: Dans cette zone vivent de nombreux déplacés en provenance du Nord Katanga. La malnutrition et la mortalité y sont élevées. Là encore un pont aérien est prévu pour porter secours à ces populations vulnérables." (OCHA 31 March 2001)

Maniema

"Fish breeding seems to have been the most favoured response to the appalling state of economic remoteness throughout the province. Following initial assessment missions to Kindu and the surrounding areas and having supplied emergency water to 25,000 in need, Oxfam GB is in the process of defining projects for the next six months. With ECHO financing they will provide short and medium terms water and sanitation solutions for 7,000 IDPs, work through the parastatal REGIDESO to improve the water system and provide safe water to a further 42,000 people in the town of Kindu. For an extremely vulnerable 60,000 who have returned to town having been displaced due to insecurity they will be improving water sources. FAO is seeking financial support to seed and tool as well as fish breeding programmes."

Katanga.

"Since 1998 assistance to Katangan IDPs was mainly focusing on some 20,000 persons sheltered in camps, since access to interior of the province was severely restricted under the state of siege decree. Since the end of 1999 the attitude of authorities has considerably softened, thus allowing Caritas, MSF/Belgium and later on ACF to access areas hosting displaced. But it was only on 19 May 2000, that the DRC Government authorised an inter-agency multidiscipline humanitarian mission to areas conventionally called frontline, e.g. Ankoro. This OCHA led mission could, after a number of unsuccessful attempts since 1998, physically assess the conditions of some of the first victims of the Congolese war, largely abandoned by the world. Fishing is forbidden by the military on grounds that the enemy is across the river. Civilians on both sides are affected by the prevailing state of no-war no-peace. The mission noted much willingness on the part of displaced and host populations alike to help themselves. Practical arrangements were made by mission participants, e.g. UNICEF, ACF and OXFAM/Quebec to start emergency health and nutritional projects. FAO will attempt a sequenced assistance in which seeds and tools will take over from food distribution. In spite of enormous logistical and security constraints, WFP's food has started to arrive into central parts of the province – Malemba Nkulu. Simultaneously, ACF/US is planning to reach out IDPs in Moba, on the other side of the frontline (chapter on security). Since the outbreak of the latest war, no substantial international assistance has reached there."

Eastern Kasai

"The continued high level of military activity along the frontline and Government's restrictive access policies in southern regions of the province eventually contributed to make Eastern Kasai one of the least accessible provinces for humanitarian interventions. The very few interventions made possible on both sides of the frontline, reached out only an insignificant segment of war-affected populations and were by and large insufficient to understand the nature of displacement nor to identify beneficiaries. In April-May 2000, following an inter-Agency mission to Mbuji-Mayi [Organised by OCHA and comprised of the Minister of Health, WHO, UNICEF, UNHCHR, WFP Representatives, DFID (London), Belgian (Brussels), Italian and Dutch cooperation officials, MDM, MEMISA, ECHO, CRS. Funded through Dutch financial support to OCHA's Emergency Humanitarian Intervention mechanism.], Government controlled areas of the province

became more accessible thus resulting in more consistent relief operations in favour of IDPs in Mbuji-Mayi and Kabinda (20,000). The rebel controlled areas benefited from a one-time distribution of medicines (February 2000 CRS/MEMISA/CORDAID) which in spite of difficult security situation was dispatched to most health zones in the north of the province. Medical assistance is currently being provided by UNICEF through CRS to 221 health centres in the diocese of Tshumbe."

Equateur:

"The newly established UN Humanitarian Office in Mbandaka is closely monitoring the movement of displaced on this particular axis and around Ikela and Bokungu. In early July, a barge shipment of relief supplies (WFP food) left Kinshasa to Mbandaka, the first such operation since the onset of the war. Food commodities and other emergency supplies will be pre-positioned in Mbandaka and subsequently dispatched to Bokungu and Ikela and other areas affected by displacement, including across the frontline. Negotiations are currently underway with National and provincial authorities to expedite the delivery of badly needed assistance." (*OCHA 11 July 2000*):

See also OCHA's [Financial Tracking Database For Complex Emergencies](#) for information about funding of specific projects.

UN strategy for Emergency Humanitarian Interventions (EHI) during 2000

- EHI is a UN inter-agency rapid response structure
- EHI concept is meant to operate as first aid mechanism aiming at saving lives and restoring family and communal livelihood
- Around 30 EHI interventions, totalling US\$ 730,000 implemented throughout the DRC by early October 2000

"While designed to enhance the UN's emergency preparedness capacity, the EHI concept is meant to operate as first aid mechanism aiming at saving lives and restoring family and communal livelihood . The scope of interventions under EHI will be limited to emergency food, distribution of seeds, tools, medical assistance, emergency water projects and control of epidemics.

[...]

Emergency Humanitarian Interventions (EHI) is a UN inter-agency rapid response structure which will enable the system to respond to war-inflicted and other suddenly arising emergencies on both sides of the frontline. EHI is designed to assist 300,000 war-affected persons in remote and hardly accessible areas of the DRC with no permanent presence of relief agencies. The scope of interventions under EHI will be limited to emergency food assistance and distribution of essential non-food items (WFP, UNHCR), distribution of seeds and tools for affected communities with access to land (FAO), medical assistance, emergency water projects (UNICEF and UNFPA) and control of epidemics (WFP and UNICEF). Although WFP does not appeal for funds under this sector, resources solicited for its IDP feeding projects will be made available to EHI

operations, should the need arise. UNDP will contribute to EHI by strengthening the local capacities to manage and monitor the provided assistance.

EHI will be managed by the Office of the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in conjunction with the UN Country Management Team. All donor contributions for EHI are proposed to be channelled through OCHA and earmarked for a specific activity [...]" (UN November 1999, pp. 19, 57)

"Emergency Humanitarian Interventions (EHI) were initiated at the end of 1999, to answer the need for a rapid humanitarian response capacity to meet war-inflicted sufferings on civilian populations. EHI received considerable donor support to implement a series of activities ranging from assessment missions to facilitation of inter-agency actions. Unfortunately, the emergency response capacity of other institutions participating in the EHI initiative remained limited throughout 1999 and 2000, thus prompting modifications in the initial concept.

Modifications primarily affected operational synergies and methods of implementation while the main philosophy of EHI – immediate intervention to alleviate human suffering - remained unchanged. EHI was meant to be a “package deal” whereby each financial contribution would be distributed proportionally among various sectors and agencies. The package approach, however, was not implemented and by early 2000 the logistics, information collection and management components (OCHA/EHI) were almost fully funded while the requirements of emergency humanitarian supplies remained unmet. With the consent of donors and consultation with participating agencies, financial contributions are now channelled into an emergency fund accessible to all major humanitarian actors in response to crises. The definition of crises is relatively flexible and refers to all life-threatening situations encountered by civilians irrespective of the causes: war, natural disaster, human rights abuses, etc.

The May-June 2000 humanitarian crisis in Kisangani was a major test for EHI as an assistance concept, and as a coordination mechanism. Within days that followed the establishment of a cease-fire regime in this war-torn city, EHI consolidated resources of a large number of humanitarian actors, bilateral cooperation institutions and civil society, bringing badly needed relief to hundreds of thousands of Kisangani residents. EHI became the backbone of the international humanitarian response to the Kisangani crisis.

EHI survived chronic problems of insecurity, delayed access and prohibitions to travel often imposed by belligerents. The concept, however, needs substantial modification to address the changes in the nature of the crisis and offer a more diverse solution to emergencies that are otherwise covered by mandates of humanitarian actors currently present in the DRC. EHI and its successor are instrumental to the 2001 CAP and play a central role in linking activities at macro and micro levels to support this appeal's strategy: bolster the coping mechanisms of war-affected populations and enhance their self-sufficiency.

[...]

Equally, EHI initiatives helped the humanitarian community to better grasp the economic dimensions of the humanitarian crisis on all sides of the frontline. Surveys have been used in humanitarian co-ordination for strong advocacy on monetary policy matters in Government-held areas, and on tax income and redistribution in rebel-held areas. Inter-agency surveys on displaced and host families (notably in Kisangani), and on mortality-related statistics (in Kinshasa to obtain a countrywide methodology) have added useful tools for decision-making." (UN November 2000, pp. 81-82, 95)

Swift response to major new displacements from Kisangani (June 2000)

- First emergency operation in DRC reaching IDPs while fleeing
- Pre-positioned supplies airlifted from emergency stockpiles in Kinshasa and Goma,
- UNICEF has assisted 43 health centres providing of medical services to 212,000 people in Kisangani and surrounding areas
- UN Secretary General sends inter-agency assessment mission to Kisangani in August 2000

"Coordination mechanisms were set up in Kinshasa and Kisangani at the beginning of the crisis. In collaboration with the humanitarian agencies based in Kisangani, the UN agencies immediately responded to the most urgent needs with a few stocks already pre-positioned in town. In particular, UNICEF provided medical kits and chlorine to the Medical University of Kisangani. With fighting over, humanitarian agencies reinforced their presence in Kisangani and airlifted additional supplies from Goma. At the same time, the agencies in Kinshasa requested government authorisation to airlift emergency assistance directly from Kinshasa to Kisangani, initially with MONUC aircraft. The first flight, carried food aid to Kisangani on June 12. The heads of the humanitarian agencies, including the UNICEF representative and humanitarian co-ordinator a.i., accompanied this flight. They stayed in Kisangani for 2 days, conducting initial assessments of the damage and some interventions. Seven flights, carrying a total of 111 MTs of emergency assistance, were dispatched to Kisangani from Kinshasa on 12 - 23 June.

[...]

UNICEF sent 15.6 MTs of pre-positioned supplies from its emergency stockpile in Kinshasa, including emergency health kits (70), ORS (Oral Rehydration Salt – 7 carton of 1000), jerry-cans, plastic sheeting (626), BP5 (95) and a boat and engine. Additional supplies were also airlifted from Goma, where ICRC, some NGOs and UN agencies maintain pre-positioned emergency stocks. UNICEF sent 22.5 MTs of supplies from Goma including plastic sheeting (2,300), blankets (1,740), mosquito nets (5,000), ORS (50 cartons of 1000) and chlorine. To date, a total of 38 MTs of medical supplies and non-food items valued at US\$ 231,000 have been sent by UNICEF to Kisangani to assist health centres treating the wounded and displaced/affected population." (UNICEF 7 July 2000)

"Humanitarian response in the early aftermath of the Kisangani crisis was in many ways exemplary. This implies the quantity and quality of the assistance and most importantly its timing and co-ordination. The rescue operations carried out by MSF/Holland,

MSF/Belgium and ICRC and the UN system (WHO, UNICEF, WFP, OCHA) are still underway, but the preliminary results can be identified already. This is especially important for the UN system which had insignificant capacity in Kisangani before and during hostilities but succeed in mobilising internal (EHI) and external resources (Belgian, US, and Italian Governments, MEMISA, CRS, etc.) and in providing an efficient humanitarian response.

The vital importance of humanitarian assessments was felt immediately after the cessation of hostilities. For instance, medical needs covered by ICRC and MSF in the early days of crisis were commonly considered adequate, yet the first assessments revealed that there were a number of unmet medical needs such as coverage, type of medicine, need for additional surgeons and so on. The same was applicable to other sectors of intervention.

The Kisangani operation has also valuable methodological importance for the relief community. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the phenomenon of massive population displacement was assessed while happening. In the course of relief operations targeted at Kisangani residents along their exile roads, aid workers discovered numerous groups of rural IDPs who had fled their homes during and well before the June 2000 clashes. This invisible layer of displacement – a very important factor affecting the food security, is a reaction of farmers attributable to the protracted and massive presence of military (two armies and two rebel groups).

The successful implementation of the Kisangani demilitarisation plan is likely to create a large humanitarian space in the town and its vicinity (90 km in diameter). Throughout the two-year war in the DRC, this region remained virtually isolated from the rest of the country and was weakened to a greater extent than other urban areas in eastern DRC (e.g. very high malnutrition rates and an explosive epidemiological situation). The two-year long isolation has developed the region's internal resources and its population's coping mechanisms. Although these coping mechanisms practically collapsed in the course of the May-June fighting, their restoration is believed to be attainable through well-targeted humanitarian interventions already in the short-term.

Beyond the Rescue Phase

The rescue operations in Kisangani and on all major axes hosting displaced will continue as long as life saving activities are required (population movement has not entirely stabilised, there is still a number of wounded and severely malnourished, and the danger of epidemics remains serious). It may take another month before the transition to the post-conflict phase of the assistance is agreed to by all humanitarian actors." (UN July 2000, p.14)

"As part of the overall efforts of the international community to assist the population of Kisangani, badly affected by the war between the Rwandan and Ugandan troops in June 2000, UNICEF airlifted more than 38 tons of medical and essential non-food items at the onset of the crisis. With these UNICEF has assisted 43 health centres providing of medical services to 212,000 people in Kisangani and surrounding areas, emergency

health and surgical kits, essential drugs, ringer lactate and Oral Re-Hydration Salt (ORS). UNICEF distributed 2 plastic sheeting and 2 mosquito nets to each of 1,258 families whose houses were seriously damaged. Relief items including plastic sheeting, blankets, mosquito nets and jerrycans were distributed to 582 families who lost most of their belongings during the battle. An additional 2,000 mosquito nets were provided to ICRC for distribution to 1,000 families." (UNICEF 10 October 2000)

[In Resolution 1304 of 16 June 2000], "the Security Council expressed the view that the Government of Uganda and Rwanda should make reparations for the loss of life and the property damage they had inflicted on the civilian population in Kisangani, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and requested me to submit an assessment of the damage. Accordingly, [...] I send a mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo from 13 to 23 August to assess the loss of life and property damage inflicted on Kisangani as a result of the fighting between Uganda and Rwanda in June 2000." (UN SC 4 December 2000)

Food aid reached 840,000 displaced persons during 2000

- 17,000 children attended UNICEF sponsored nutritional centres
- All provinces of the country with high IDP concentration have benefited from assistance to grow their own food
- In 2000 WFP distributed two and a half times the amount of food it had distributed in 1999, the majority of which went to IDPs
- WFP reaching an average of 290,000 persons in North Kivu province of a total of 403,000 registered IDPs (October 2000)

"The impact of food and nutritional assistance is seen both on macro and micro levels: Clearly, the great majority of 17,000 children that attended UNICEF sponsored nutritional centres were saved from greater suffering and, in many cases, from death. This impact, however, is short-lived since after the recovery children return to their impoverished families where their daily meal is not always ensured. The impact of large-scale feeding project in favour of over 700,000 vulnerable, refugees, displaced, is more complex to depict: with the exception of refugees, and other non-mobile beneficiary groups (120,000 persons), the rest of beneficiaries has been attained sporadically, often just once. On the other hand, food aid and supplementary feeding saved lives in the aftermath of the Kisangani crisis or during massive influxes of displaced into Bukavu. Food injections of a total of 30,000 MTs of commodities, into various parts of the country had practically no impact on the supply side of the market, with a shortfall estimated at 1.2 million MTs in western DRC alone.

[...]

More than 17,000 children have been treated in 63 UNICEF sponsored therapeutic feeding centres: 8,750 children in North Kivu: partners- SCF-UK, World Vision and Caritas; 6,400 children in South Kivu; partners SCF-UK, Caritas, ACF-USA and Xaveriens mission. 2,000 children in Kinshasa, partner BDOM, AICF-USA; 562 children in Katanga – AICF-USA and Nova Frontiera's; 700 children in Eastern Kasai: partner CRS

[...]

An innovative logistical approach put in place by WFP is currently ensuring a simultaneous shipment of food commodities through four corridors: Goma, Lubumbashi and Matadi. Security and logistics constraints and a two-fold increase in the number of IDPs prompted WFP to review modalities of its projects: beneficiaries are currently receiving reduced monthly rations as opposed to daily supplementary feeding, to increase the number of beneficiaries and ensure the continuity of the programme.

[...]

Undoubtedly, the 2000 CAP food security initiatives made a significant impact. It can be seen in the 25% increase in market gardening produce in western DRC and in the number of uprooted farmers who resumed agricultural production in their new communities. The concept of this assistance, which is, basically, a skilful combination of economic recovery initiatives applied in an emergency, is greatly appreciated throughout the country.

[...]

130,000 refugees, displaced and host families have received agricultural inputs and resumed agricultural production. All provinces of the country with high IDP concentration have benefited from this assistance." (UN November 2000, pp.10, 11)

"In spite of the constraints, linked to insecurity, fighting an inaccessibility, WFP distributed 26,395 tons of food in DR Congo during last year [2000], which is two and a half times the amount distributed in 1999. WFP reached some 928,000 people of whom 840,000 IDPs and vulnerable groups and 88,000 refugees. " (WFP 16 February 2001)

"WFP generally assists an average of 290,000 persons in North Kivu province, from the total of 403,000 registered IDPs. Current shortage of cereals has prompted WFP to significantly reduce its activities and focus on vulnerable groups in nutritional centres. There were no deliveries since mid-September and the next distribution will take place following the arrival of 448 tons of cereals in late October." (WFP 27 October 2000)

Major distribution of non-food items by UNICEF (October 2000)

"UNICEF has started a major distribution programme of emergency non-food items to displaced populations. In North Kivu, Caritas distributed UNICEF relief supplies composed of plastic sheeting, blankets, jerrycans and mosquito nets to 5,000 displaced families who were temporarily relocated in the Rutshuru area. In South Kivu, *Pret Pour l'Humanité* distributed essential non-food items to 2,500 displaced families in the Kabare and Kahele areas; the Xaveriens brothers assisted 1,817 families in the Kitutu (Mwega), Kamanyola and Luvungi regions, and Caritas supported 2,082 families in the Walungu, Kabare and Kalehe areas. Such assistance, substantial in terms of volume and cost, still represents very limited support to the increasing numbers of displaced families in the region. These supplies were purchased with funds provided to UNICEF by the Swedish government and the US National Committee for UNICEF. Following the spontaneous return to Kasenga, in Katanga, of about 5,000 Congolese refugees from the refugee camp of Mpolokoso in Zambia, UNICEF provided 360 plastic sheeting to *Médesin Sans Frontière* (MSF) Belgium to establish a transit camp to accommodate the returning

families until their transfer to a relocation site situated 70 km from Kasenga. In the coming weeks, the distribution of non-food items will continue in North and South Kivu. Additional distributions are now planned to assist at least 6,000 displaced families in the Northern part of Katanga (Malemba Nkulu,) as well as Kasai Oriental, and the Southern part of the Equateur province (Bukungo, Boende, Ikela). Supplies were procured from funds provided by USAID/OFDA (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) and will be distributed with help from ACF-USA and World Vision." (UNICEF 10 October 2000)

Oxfam presses donors to improve humanitarian funding situation (December 2000)

"The UN consolidated inter-agency appeal for 2000 received only 61% of requested funding. In addition, over 82% of financial and in-kind donations was for food security and food assistance. The office of human rights received nothing. Programmes in primary health, epidemic control, child protection, and confidence building received little or no funding at all.

This is clearly not an integrated donor strategy in a country with more than 2 million displaced, a collapsed health and education system, and a population exhausted by years of war and decline. Importantly, the lack of funding makes it impossible to monitor human rights abuses, let alone carry out an effective programme of protecting civilians. Even just the presence of international monitors has been known to lower the incidence of abuse, and could initiate a more pro-active international engagement in the human rights situation in the DRC. MONUC, too, needs to be strengthened in numbers of personnel and should have better access to much more of the countryside.

Although the World Food Programme (WFP) did receive the majority of its required food in 2000, the agency experienced constraints on the food pipeline. This was mainly due to the delayed pledging and late arrival of donor contributions. The bulk of the food was received after the end of May, delaying emergency operations. WFP reports that this forced the suspension of general distribution programmes in the east.

For the whole of the country, however, the UN inter-agency appeal is only part of the picture. The European Community's Humanitarian Organisation (ECHO) donated 20 million Euros from June to December of 2000 and has allocated 35 million Euros for the year 2001.[10] The British Government's Department for International Development (DFID) donated £1,322,000 in 1999/2000.[11] The US government donated \$33 million in the fiscal year 2000, of which \$13 million is allocated to its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).[12] Other government bodies have been supporting NGO programmes as well, particularly in the eastern part of the country. [...]

Donors must work with longer-term strategies when considering assistance for people who have been displaced for over a year. A different kind of approach would incorporate education, health and shelter by working through local structures. UNOCHA's plan for consultative committees in affected communities is a good start in supporting and working through local civil society, including representatives of the displaced.

Some donors have objected to increasing their funding because of uncertain security and the consequent difficulties of getting access to those in need. There are very real concerns about security, relating both to the war and to lawlessness. [...]

However, there are accessible populations in urgent need of aid that could be reached if more humanitarian assistance was available. Due to the level of financial shortfalls, Oxfam GB and other NGOs have been unable to provide assistance to all those in need who are within reach. In addition, we are unable to provide assistance to the level of internationally-recognised standards for humanitarian aid. These standards, such as Sphere, were agreed upon, along with a humanitarian charter, as the minimum assistance to meet essential needs with impartiality and respect for life with dignity.

In the places where we have been able to assist, the improvements are impressive. In Djugu territory, for example, there were 599 cases of cholera in 1999. In 2000, after the start of a comprehensive water and sanitation programme, there were only 13 cases. Other water-borne diseases have declined rapidly as well.

Much more could and should be done. Under-funding humanitarian programmes is not an effective solution to the crisis. What is needed is significantly more humanitarian aid, and sustained international attention. Diplomatic pressure on the involved governments and warring parties to improve security, protect the civilian and displaced populations, and reduce the obstacles to delivery are crucial parts of a more effective approach to humanitarian aid and ending the war.

To ensure effective humanitarian assistance and to begin to find a long-term solution to DRC's war, Oxfam GB recommends:

Donor governments should quickly respond to the war in the DRC, recognising that it is one of the worst humanitarian situations in the world. Donors should immediately support the 2001 UN-OCHA Consolidated Appeal for the DRC, requiring US\$139.5 million (about £97 million). To avoid the pipeline problems experienced this year, pledges should come in the early months of the year. Donors should work with international agencies to reach international standards in relief - such as the Sphere standards." (OXFAM 30 December 2000)

International operational activities in 2001

UN strategy for 2001 focused on restoration of an environment that enables community survival

- Appeal based on the assumption that ingenious coping mechanisms have been eroded

"The [...] constraints and capacities' analysis lead to a conclusion that a simple and incremental growth in the volume of humanitarian assistance would basically produce a

negligible impact on the overall humanitarian situation in DRC, although it may bring short-term solutions to communities at a very local level. The CHAP in 2000 was very symptomatic in this respect: while co-ordinated and efficient in many respects, it remained highly dependent on the volatility of military, economic, security situation and often at the mercy of politicians on both sides of the frontline. Logistical miracles and emergency operations in practically all parts of the country in 2000 have failed to save lives of vulnerable peoples affected by conflict. This failure is shared by all humanitarian actions in the country. This failure will be inevitable in the future as well, unless there is a common understanding that survival is only possible if living conditions stabilise. Decades-long absence of any governance has taught the Congolese how to survive using ingenious coping mechanisms. This CHAP argues that the war has already eroded the bulk of this ingenuity: facing enormous hardships people are no longer able to operate within community or even a family framework; farmers are no longer able to feed various armies and militia, the agricultural barter economy is at a standstill in the absence of intra-regional exchanges, and heavy-handed economic policies prevent households from exercising their regular activities. The recognition of this erosion is at the heart of this CHAP.

CHAP 2001 is conceived as an integrated strategy tool, where individual activities are placed hierarchically as components within other initiatives and eventually within the global assistance concept. The ongoing humanitarian disaster in the DRC can only be contained and mitigated if humanitarian initiatives are taken in parallel with the restoration of an environment that enables community survival.

[...]

The [...] framework provides for a combination of several strategy inputs that will jointly serve a global objective – enhancing survival mechanisms of war-affected populations. The framework has sector (health, food security) specific, cross-cutting (inter-sector e.g. EHI) and global components (nation-wide activities)." (UN November 2000, pp.23, 24)

IDP related activities in the 2001 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal

The table below only includes planned activities in the 2001 Appeal that may have a direct impact on IDP. Several activities in the Appeal that are not included below are likely to benefit IDPs indirectly, and it is recommended to consult the [2001Appeal document](#) if more detailed information is needed. See OCHA's [Financial Tracking Database for Complex Emergencies](#) for more detailed information about funding of the 2001 Appeal.

Appealing Agency/Activity	Requirements in USD
UNICEF: Revitalisation of primary health services and vaccination (DRC-01-1/N01) Main IDP related assistance: UNICEF will provide kits of essential drugs to health centres to enhance their capacity to deliver health care at an affordable price to the most vulnerable.	3,000,000
UNICEF: Nutritional rehabilitation of malnourished children (DRC-01-1/N02) Main IDP related assistance: UNICEF will continue to support therapeutic feeding centres for the severely malnourished children (weight/height under 70%) by providing therapeutic milk, high protein biscuits, feeding kits and cooking sets and extend it's support to other therapeutic feeding centres if necessary.	1,500,000
WHO: Emergency and humanitarian health coordination (DRC-01-1/N03) Main IDP related assistance: Provide Technical assistance and support to MoH and NGOs	150,944
WHO: Management of major communicable diseases (DRC-01-1/N04) Main IDP related assistance: 1-To strengthen preparedness against epidemics 2- To ensure drugs availability and easy accessibility of drugs and vaccines needed to combat outbreaks of diseases.	75,790
WHO: Strengthening disease control programmes in Eastern DRC-five provinces (Maniema, Kasai Oriental, Kasai Occidental and Equateur) (DRC-01-1/N06) Main IDP related assistance: Provide assistance to functioning health centres and existing hospitals to ensure the availability of health services in provinces under occupation by the opposition army in DRC	769,560
WHO: Strengthening epidemiological surveillance system, early alert and monitoring of epidemics (DRC-01-1/N07) Main IDP related assistance: To strengthen the functioning warning system and to assist in building an integrated surveillance, preparedness and response system.	1,107,700
UNFPA: Reduction of maternal and neo-natal mortality (DRC-01-1/N08) Main IDP related assistance: To contribute to the reduction of maternal, neo-natal, child and unsafe abortion mortality in the war-affected cities of Bukavu, Goma, Kindu, Mbuji-Mayi and Kalemie.	1,161,828

<p>FAO: Support the integration of refugees or IDP families within their host community through agricultural activities (DRC-01-1/N09)</p> <p>Main IDP related assistance: Strengthen food security of target populations (IDPs, refugees, and host families) during the farming seasons of February and September 2001.</p>	5,650,000
<p>FAO: Emergency support to the rehabilitation of fisheries and aquaculture (DRC-01-1/N11)</p> <p>Main IDP related assistance: Support fishery and aquaculture activities to improve food security of affected populations [IDPs].</p>	400,000
<p>WFP: Emergency food assistance to IDPs, other war-affected populations of the DRC; Creation of assets and income generating activities to increase food security of households. (DRC-01-1/N13)</p> <p>Main IDP related assistance: focus on groups that have lost their coping mechanisms but which are logistically accessible. WFP will aim at supplying emergency assistance amounting to 46,710 MTs. of food to 844,000 persons in 2001 and 31,047 MTs to 555,000 persons in 2002. These beneficiaries consist of IDPs, malnourished children, vulnerable groups and refugees.</p>	61,573,336
<p>UNICEF: Assistance to the most vulnerable displaced and refugee children and women (DRC-01-1/N14)</p> <p>Main IDP related assistance: Meet urgent needs in essential non-food items of displaced and war affected populations</p>	4,500,000
<p>UNICEF: Protection of children affected by armed conflict (DRC-01-1/N15)</p> <p>Main IDP related assistance: Protect the most vulnerable groups of children in affected areas; meet the physical and psycho-social needs of affected children; trace families of unaccompanied minors and demobilised children and assist with reunification efforts.</p>	2,500,000
<p>IOM: Emergency enhancement of regional socio-economic conditions in Katanga through the provision of Transport, Logistics, Road and Rail Repair & Maintenance and targeted community development activities (DRC-01-1/N17)</p> <p>Main IDP related assistance: Relocate vulnerable IDPs from their present location to temporary settlement grounds</p>	3,955,000
<p>UNDP: Income generating activities in favour of fragmented households (DRC-01-1/N20)</p> <p>Main IDP related assistance: Develop craft activities to secure a revenue for households managed by women who lost their husbands during the war or displaced without their husbands, and for widows and orphans from victims of AIDS.</p>	550,000

UNICEF: Rapid educational initiative for internally displaced children in DRC (DRC-01-1/N21) Main IDP related assistance: To provide over 100,000 displaced children with basic literacy, numeracy and life-skills education, pending restoration of normal schooling.	3,500,000
OCHA: Emergency Humanitarian Interventions (DRC-01-1/N24) Main IDP related assistance: To enhance UN rapid response capacity in humanitarian emergencies; ensure effective coordination and management of humanitarian actions, ensure national coverage of State Exams, promote social, commercial and humanitarian exchanges across the frontline.	3,925,279
OCHA: Coordination of humanitarian assistance; peace and confidence-building initiatives (DRC-01-1/N25) Main IDP related assistance: Enhance the effective coordination and management of UN relief activities; Promote humanitarian principles and implement new humanitarian strategies for the DRC.	2,863,477

WFP formalizes agreement with DRC Government to supply food to IDPs and other vulnerable groups (2001)

"On 6 February [2001], WFP formalized its agreement with the Government for the implementation of the first PRRO [Protracted Relief Recovery Operation] in the country. Under the agreement, WFP is hoping to provide a total of 134,565 tons of food to the most needy Congolese, over two years, at the overall operational and support cost of USD 112.3 million. However, only 13,100 tons of food have been resourced to date. [...]

Through the PRRO, which follows several emergency operations in the region and country, WFP aims to supply food aid to 1.4 million beneficiaries this year and 1.16 million during 2002. The beneficiaries are mainly IDPs, malnourished children, vulnerable groups and refugees." (WFP 16 February 2001)

See list of sources for the document for the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
6274.00

UNICEF distributes non-food assistance to the displaced (2001)

UNDP to create a security network (2001)

- 7 Field security sub-offices planned

"The continued escalation of the conflict in the DRC curtailed UN Agencies and other humanitarian actors' activities in the field and particularly in Provinces along the front line. The proliferation of militias and armed groups and the incessant violations of the cease-fire agreement have made the security situation extremely difficult to manage.

The present project is aimed at creating a security network, which will cover the entire country through the establishment of 7 Field security sub-offices to ensure the safety of UN, NGOs' staff and infrastructures and promote a continued delivery of assistance to affected populations.

The establishment of such a security network requires considerable funds, mainly destined to the restoration of security infrastructure (most of them where looted in 1998 during the first days of the conflict).

Security-related matters will be under the overall responsibility of the UN Designated Official and the Field Security Officer based in Kinshasa and the operational coordination (in rebel held and government areas) will be handled by 7 Field Security Officers (Goma, Bukavu, Mbandaka, Kisangani, Mbuji-Mayi, Matadi and Lubumbashi) with the support of national staff.

The constraints linked to the non-existence of such network and the recent incidents occurred to the relief staff in the DRC and in the region have underlined the critical need for enhancing security measures. This project is indispensable for the fulfilment and the coordination of humanitarian assistance in the country." (UN November 2000, p.87)

UN Agencies assess food needs in city of North Kivu (2001)

- A joint mission of WFP, UN HCR, Caritas and the governorate assessed the needs of the people from Kibirizi, who fled attacks by Mai Mai and Interhamwe militias
- The displaced live far from their fields and suffer from malnutrition

"Une mission conjointe du PAM, du HCR, de Caritas et du gouvernement s'est rendue à Kibirizi (ville située au sud ouest du Parc National des Virunga, dans la collectivité de Bwito, territoire de Rutshuru). Comme les autres villages lointains de la province, cette cité fut aussi le théâtre d'attaques menées par les milices Mai Mai et Interhamwe. Ces attaques récurrentes ont entraîné des déplacements massifs de population.

La majorité avait pris la direction de Kanyabayonga, Kayna, Kirumba où plus de 100,000 personnes déplacées étaient enregistrées. La minorité s'était dirigée vers Rutshuru, Kiwanja, Nyamilima. Le reste de la population de Kibirizi s'était cachée dans les collines surplombant la cité.

Le manque des vivres au site d'accueil (zone de santé de Kayna) et l'amélioration récente des conditions de sécurité à Kibirizi ont poussé les personnes déplacées à retourner chez elles. C'est dans ce cadre que le PAM et la FAO ont conçu ce projet de réinstallation des personnes déplacées. Le PAM va octroyer deux mois de ration à ces retournés et la FAO leur distribuera des semences. Caritas s'est joint à ce projet de réinstallation pour rendre disponible les non vivres (casseroles, couvertures, jerricans, assiettes et gobelets).

La malnutrition s'est développé à Kibirizi à cause du déplacement des populations vers les sites d'hébergement très éloignés de leurs champs. Pour pouvoir se réintégrer dans la vie socio-économique dans leurs milieux d'origine, les retournés ont besoin d'intrants agricoles, des vivres et de non vivres pendant les deux premiers mois.

A Kibirizi il y a un centre de santé sans médicaments essentiels et sans aucun programme de nutrition fonctionnel. Caritas Diocésaine va y ouvrir un centre nutritionnel qui prendra en charge les enfants malnourris et organisera périodiquement les enquêtes nutritionnelles." (OCHA 28 February 2001, "Nord Kivu")

Response by Non Governmental Organisations

Local NGOs and church networks may be the best channels to reach displaced populations (December 2000)

"After four mission to the region [Eastern Congo] this year, Refugees International has concluded that it is possible to mount an effective response to mitigate the suffering of the neglected displaced populations of the Congo. The foundation of this response should be flexible funding provided to local non-governmental organizations and church networks that have the proven capability to reach communities affected by the conflict. These local NGOs have extensive networks in place, thereby allowing them to reach more people in distant communities and identify vulnerable populations. The following are examples of the types of programs that would benefit from greater support:

National Immunization Days in highly insecure areas have shown that communities can be mobilized around humanitarian initiatives.

Food security programs in Katanga province provide seeds and tools to some of the most isolated, air-only access areas where recent assessments have shown a 21% malnutrition rate.

A child soldier demobilization program in Bukavu incorporates mediation and dialogue with the local community awaiting the reintegration of the child

An AIDS education program is targeting street children living in and around Bukavu

Medical programs are exploring creative cost-recovery schemes for health care services." (RI 15 December 2000)

NGO activity by sector/area (2000)

"Overview of Humanitarian Interventions Outside CHAP

Health

Kinshasa (ICRC, SC(UK), MSF/F, MSF/B, IFRC, IRC, CRS and WV)
Bas-Congo (MSF/B, IRC, CRS, WV and MSF/F)
Bandundu (MSF/F)
Equateur (MSF/B, ACF-USA, COOPI, CARITAS and MEMISA/B)
Eastern Kasai (MDM, CRS and MEMISA/H)
Western Kasai (CRS)
Katanga (WV, MSF/B and ICRC)
Orientale (MSF/B, MSF/H, ICRC, MEDAIR, CARITAS and MEMISA/H)
North Kivu (ICRC, MSF/H, ASRAMES, CEMUBAC, CARITAS, SC(UK), MALTESER and FONDATION DAMIEN)
South Kivu (ICRC, MSF/H, APAMESK, SC(UK), MALTESER, IRC and JOHANITER)

Food Security

Kinshasa (ACF-USA, SC(UK))
Maniema (C.AID)
Eastern and Western Kasai (CRS)
Katanga (ACF-USA, FHI,)
North Kivu (ICRC, AAA, SC(UK), OXFAM/GB, OXFAM/QC, CARITAS and BOAD)
South Kivu (ICRC, CARITAS, C.AID, FHI, and SC(UK))

Food Distribution and Nutrition

Kinshasa (ICRC, CARITAS, BDOM, SC(UK) and MSF/F)
Bas-Congo (MSF/F)
Bandundu (MSF/F and ATLAS LOGISTIQUE)
Equateur (CARITAS and ACF-USA)
Eastern Kasai (CRS)
Katanga (ICRC, and ACF-USA)
Orientale (ICRC, MSF/H, CARITAS and COOPI)
North Kivu, WV, SC(UK), CARITAS and MSF/H)
South Kivu (ICRC, CARITAS, SC(UK), FHI, ACF-USA, CARITAS and JOHANITER)

Water and Sanitation

Kinshasa (IRC, ICRC, OXFAM/GB, MSF/B, MSF/F, ACF-USA, CRS and WV)
Bas-Congo (IRC and MSF/F)
Maniema (OXFAM)
Eastern Kasai (OXFAM)
Western Kasai (IRC)
Katanga (ACF-USA and WV)
Orientale (ICRC, MSF/H, OXFAM/GB and OXFAM/QC)
North Kivu (OXFAM/GB, ICRC and CARITAS)
South Kivu (MSF/H, ICRC, OXFAM/GB, IRC and CARITAS)

Rehabilitation and Environment

Kinshasa (UNDP, IRC and CRS)
Bas-Congo and Bandundu (MSF/F)

Orientale (MEDAIR)

North Kivu (CONCERN, CARITAS, SC(UK), BOAD, OXFAM/GB and AAA)

South Kivu (UNDP, MSF, CARITAS, SC(UK) and IRC)

Education, Child protection and Demobilisation

Kinshasa (IRC, WV, MDM, SC(UK) and OXFAM/GB)

Bas-Congo (WV)

Equateur (MEMISA/B)

Western Kasai (IRC)

Katanga (ACF, and WV)

North Kivu (SC(UK))

South Kivu (CARITAS, SC(UK))" (UN November 2000, pp. 92-93)

For more information about activities by American NGOs, see also InterAction (January 2001)

NGOs providing assistance to IDPs in South Kivu (August 2000)

- Major decline in NGO presence since 1998
- Additional NGOs withdrawn since mid-2000

"One would expect a major humanitarian response to address such important needs. Yet, since the latest war broke out in August 1998, almost no international assistance has come forward. The table below shows in the first column, the large international interest in the Territories of Uvira and Fizi before the second war. The two other columns show the organizations and international staff presence in June 2000. Since then, most organizations, including ACF-USA, have actually suspended or considerably reduced their presence and activities following the fatal ambush on the IMC vehicle on the 9th July 2000. There are very capable and dedicated local workers in both Territories, although many who had the means have fled. In addition, the presence of international staff has significant importance for an effective response. It reduces the risk of misuse of relief goods in a context where the local population is in great need. International staff presence offers the possibility of more independent and objective observation and witnessing and offers de facto protection. Finally, it increases the feeling of international solidarity.

Zone de Santé	Before August 1998 (pre-war)	Organizations active June 2000	International staff present June 2000
Uvira	UNHCR, ICRC, ACF-USA, IRC, Inter SOS, EUB, IHA, Caritas, WVI, WFP, UNICEF, Maltheser, FHI, SCF, Christian Aid, FAO.	ICRC, ACF-USA, IMC, IRC, Caritas, FAO Christian Aid	ICRC: 1 sporadic IMC: 2 (based in Uvira) ACF-USA: (7 based in Bujumbura)
Nundu	UNHCR, ICRC, ACF-USA, IRC, Inter SOS, EUB, IHA, Caritas, WV, WFP, FHI, FAO, UNICEF, Maltheser.	Caritas	0
Fizi	UNHCR, ICRC, ACF-USA, IRC, EUB, IHA, Caritas, WV, FHI, WFP, Maltheser, Christian Aid	Caritas	0
Lemera	UNHCR, ICRC, ACF-USA, EUB, IHA, Caritas, WV, WFP, UNICEF, MSF, Maltheser, Christian Aid, SCF.	0 (ACF-USA left after the attack on 4 April, 2000)	0

There is an undeniable fatigue that has set in among the international relief community regarding the Great Lakes. It has become hard for organizations to recruit experienced people willing to go there. It seems that whatever effort is poured into the region, the situation gets increasingly worse. The complexity of the many intertwined and multi-layered conflicts creates an image of hopelessness. Peace and stability seem elusive. Some agencies report a lack of institutional donor funds (Interaction meeting 31 July 2000, Washington, D.C.). Donors say funds are available as long as relief agencies are able to implement programs (ACF-USA is funded by USAID/OFDA and EU/ECHO). This is currently indeed the biggest question because the main factor that impedes relief work is insecurity. " (AAH August 2000, sects. 7.1-7.2)

Limited response by international churches toward the needs in DRC (2000)

- Evangelical Lutheran Church of Congo (ELCC) at the forefront of ecumenical response to the IDP situation in the Katanga province
- Churches' response is constrained by lack of funds
- ELCC particular concerned about some 5,300 displaced school-age children in Lubumbashi and nearby Likasi

"This war continues to kill many people", says Mundeke Kiluba working with the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Congo (ELCC) as coordinator for Action by Churches Together (ACT) in Katanga Province.

The ELCC has been in the forefront of ecumenical response to the needs of the tens of thousands displaced by two years of war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Some 40,000 found their way to Katanga Province in the first two to three months of fighting. At the beginning, local churches joined forces to provide bedding and medicine, and parishioners took displacees into their homes. "As the number of displaced persons grew larger, we sought outside help through Action by Churches Together," the global ecumenical response network, says Mundeke Kiluba.

The ELCC is a member of ACT, heading a 12-denominational effort to meet basic needs for food, medicine, clothing, bedding and pastoral care of now more than 125,000 displaced persons, including many unaccompanied children.

"The need is so great, so urgent," Mr. Kiluba comments on the situation in the war affected DRC. « But the churches' response is blocked by lack of funds. » In 1999, the global ecumenical community contributed nearly \$146,000 toward ACT/Katanga's "phase one" budget of \$180,300, but "phase two" response has been disappointing to say the least. Only \$20,000 have been received toward a \$331,343 appeal issued in October 1999, leaving Congo's churches frustrated and unable to plan.

The contribution from the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) enabled purchase and distribution of 541 50-kg. bags of corn flour, a staple food item, in March - enough for 3,246 people for a month. The funds also supported four staff salaries, field visits, meetings, communications, office equipment and the audit of the 1999 appeal.

ELCC Bishop Ngoy Kasukuti of Lubumbashi expresses particular concern for the some 5,300 displaced school-age children in Lubumbashi and nearby Likasi, « who are welcome in local schools but need notebooks, pens, uniforms and so forth before they can enroll. Will they continue to be out of school in September? »

Mr. Kiluba describes the pressure on towns that have absorbed displacees. For example, Songue, population 2,000, now supports more than 11,000 people. "Its fields have been ravaged," he says. "Residents need seeds and food assistance up to harvest time. But without guaranteed income toward appeals, how do we plan?"

According to Bishop Kasukuti, "the global response is discouraging. The international churches have been almost deaf toward the needs of the Congo. God can use us with the few resources we have to witness to the love of God. But we need accompaniment. We have an unjust war. We need accompaniment, encouragement." (ACT 9 August 2000)

23 international NGOs involved in relief operations (1999)

- Reported that funding requirements for emergency relief operations of international NGOs were met in 1999
- The church supports over 80 percent of the country's primary school network

"International NGOs in DRC have enlarged their network. Currently some 23 international NGOs are involved in relief operations across the national territory [...]. Funding requirements for emergency relief operations and several rehabilitation activities implemented by these NGOs have been mainly met. Presently, some 26 projects (with a budget over US\$ 23 million) are being carried out by international NGOs and their local partners in all provinces of the DRC. NGO activities are focusing in health, nutrition and refugee-related sectors and complement UN projects outlined in the present document.

ICRC is active in almost every province on both sides of the cease-fire, and has also been involved in health and sanitation activities.

The church is one of the traditional pillars of the Congolese society, which in the absence of state, sponsored social programmes, supports over 80 percent of the country's primary school network and provides primary medical care throughout the DRC. Close partnership in a range of projects is being maintained between the UN system and various religious missions throughout the DRC.

The existence of a strong civil society, including a large number of national NGOs is a characteristic feature of the DRC. Local NGOs are present even in remotest part of the country. While the war has curtailed their potential, the indigenous social structures remain a valuable asset for the delivery of international assistance on which the concept of Emergency Humanitarian Interventions EHI heavily relies." (UN November 1999, p.13)

LIST OF INTERNATIONAL NGOs OPERATING IN DRC

AAA	Agro Action Allemande
AICF/US	Action Contre La Faim
ASRAMES	Association Regionale Pour l' Approvisionnement en Médicaments Essentiels
Atlas	Atlas Logistique
Concern	Concern Ireland
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
EPICENTRE	
FHI	Food for the Hungry
FROMETRO	
HI	Handicap International
IRC	Internal Relief Committee
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MEDAIR	Medical Air Relief
MEMISA/B	Medical Missionary Assistance, Belgium
MEMISA/H	Medical Missionary Assistance, Holland
MERLIN	Medical Relief International

MSF/B	Médecins sans Frontières, Belgium
MSF/F	Médecins sans Frontières, France
MSF/H	Médecins sans Frontières, Holland
OXFAM/UK	Oxford Committee on Famine Relief, UK
OXFAM, Q	Oxford Committee on Famine Relief, Quebec
SCF/UK	Save the Children Fund, UK
WV	World Vision

Source: UN November 1999, p.77

NGO nutrition centres in Eastern DRC supported by UNICEF (June 2000)

"UNICEF assists 55 nutrition centres run by ACF USA (4 centres in South Kivu), SCF-UK (17 centres in South Kivu and 28 centres in North Kivu), Caritas (1 centre), and World Vision (5 centres) with therapeutic milk and nutrition equipment, for roughly 4,300 malnourished children, funded by the governments of Canada and Sweden. A new stock of 50 Mts. of therapeutic milk and OXFAM feeding kits arrived in Goma and was provided to the UNICEF partners in March/April 2000. In Ituri, as the nutritional situation significantly deteriorated in the past months in the region of Rethy and Fataki, UNICEF provided an emergency allocation of 5 Mts. of therapeutic milk to Coopi, an Italian NGO recently arrived in Bunia to start emergency nutritional activities. Three feeding centres have already been set up by this NGO, assisting around 250 children. In Lubumbashi, assistance is provided to the feeding programmes established by ACF-USA (1 therapeutic feeding centre and 3 supplementary feeding centres), benefiting 288 children. " (UNICEF 2 June 2000)

SCF: Improving health care and food security of displaced women and children (December 2000)

- SCF-UK has offices in Kishasa, as well as in Goma and Bukavu (North and South Kivus)

"Save the Children (UK) began working in what was then Zaire in August 1994, running a family tracing program for Rwandan refugees in camps around Bukavu. Having completed this work, SC UK ran down its operations in July 1996. Later that year, when civil war broke out in Zaire. SC UK was invited back as the lead NGO in the repatriation of Rwandan refugee children. In addition to family tracing in South Kivu SC UK also ran a therapeutic feeding programme for severely malnourished children, mostly IDPs and refugees.

[In addition to a country office opened in Kinshasa in January 1998] Save the Children (UK) continues to maintain field offices in Goma and Bukavu cities, Kivu province, on the Rwandan border. These areas are in rebel-held territory and work has been extremely difficult in terms of security and logistics. [...]

"The overall goal of SC UK's health programme is to improve the health status of the population in conflict affected areas of East DRC, with a special focus on children and also women and other vulnerable groups.

Rehabilitation of health facilities in some areas of North and South Kivu and their provision with basic equipment have allowed the re-opening of many health centers and improved the quality of care. [...] SC UK aims to reinforce the medicine supply system in south Kivu and North Katanga to ensure better vaccination coverage and offer more prevention services to fight the spread of epidemics such as cholera [...].

The fight against malnutrition, particularly amongst IDPs will be reinforced by supporting families of malnourished children by distributing agricultural items (hoes and seeds) in collaboration with the World Food Program (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation.

SC UK aims to assist IDPs who have returned home and to restore livelihoods in the communities they come from to allow easier re-integration. This work was informed by a household food economy assessment (HEA) carried out by SC UK and by a consultancy related to issues of land tenure in the in the Kivus, one of the underlying issues of conflict. (SCF 31 December 2000)

Action Against Hunger: Assistance to displaced families (March 2000)

- 12,500 IDP families assisted in Eastern DRC
- Initiative launched in August 2000 to sensitise the local community, authorities and possibly armed groups on humanitarian principles and assistance in the Uvira area of eastern DRC

"Action Against Hunger has distributed a package of corn, maize, bean, ground-nut and sorghum seeds to 12,500 families displaced by the War in the East of DR Congo.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, hundred thousands of families have fled the on-going civil war. In South-Kivu the fighting is intensifying between the RDC rebel troops, backed by Rwanda and the local Mai-Mai militias, backed by the Kinshasa Government. As a result, most of the villagers have fled to the neighboring hillsides, setting up temporary shelter in the remote fields. Almost all commercial activity has stopped and markets are only sporadically supplied.

The first planting season is right about to start. Most of the villagers have no access to seeds and the destruction which has been in effect for the last 20 months has left them with very few agricultural implements. But the only existing road south of Uvira has been cut off by militia troops. Trucks and cars have been restricted from passage, forcing the displaced population into complete isolation from the rest of the country.

Last week, Action Against Hunger decided to distribute the seeds anyway, and bypass the closed roads, by transporting the agro-packages via Lake Tanganika. They crossed over

from Burundi. Local fishing boats were used, and the farm supplies dropped off of the various pickup points along the lake shoreline. The team considered this approach to be risky, but was left without choice, other than abandoning their commitment to the expectant families. The distribution to 5,200 families was completed successfully. They join the 7,300 families who had already received seeds by road in the northern part of Uvira District, in the Rusisi plain, bordering Burundi.

This coming planting season is the first of two seasons. It is called “the small season” and most of its output is used to produce seeds for the next “main season”, whose crops provide the food basket for the year to come.

Action Against Hunger is today the only international organization providing assistance to these populations in the districts of Uvira and Fizi. A Nutrition Assistance project is caring for the most severely malnourished children and the program also aims at allowing the populations to secure their self-sufficiency.

This program, funded by USAID/OFDA, is a good example of the integration of long term sustainability in an emergency situation.

Action Against Hunger is also implementing food security and nutritional programs in the government controlled areas of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. (AAH-USA 27 March 2000)

"The international NGO, Action Contre la Faim (ACF) has embarked on an initiative aimed at sensitising the local community, authorities and possibly armed groups on humanitarian principles and assistance in the Uvira area of eastern DRC. An ACF official told IRIN on Tuesday that a meeting between ACF and the authorities, traditional chiefs and elders was held last week in Uvira." (IRIN 29 August 2000)

IDP related activities by the International Committee of the Red Cross (1998-2001)

- In 2001, ICRC conducts emergency assistance programs to internally displaced persons
- ICRC vehicles stolen in Uvira and Bukavu and its sub-delegation offices and delegates' residences looted when August 1999 rebellion started
- Water and sanitation facilities provided for displaced people and refugees at reception centres in Uvira and Goma
- 155.9 tonnes food and 32.7 tonnes of material assistance distributed to some 5,600 displaced and vulnerable families between August and December 1998

2001

"The United States will provide \$10 million for emergency refugee assistance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) [...], U.S. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher announced February. [...] Boucher specified that \$1.5 million of the money will be going to the International Committee of the Red Cross for emergency assistance programs to internally displaced persons." (U.S. DOS 1 February 2001)

"ICRC unites 137 unaccompanied children with their families. [...] The separation of family members is one of the most tragic consequences of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With the help of hundreds of volunteers from the National Red Cross Society, the ICRC is still trying to trace the relatives of 1,198 unaccompanied minors in both government-controlled and opposition-held areas of the country. (ICRC 23 March 2001)

1999

"The ICRC delegation is located in Kinshasa with a sub-delegation in Lubumbashi, a mission in Goma and offices in Bukavu, Bunia, Kalemie, and Kisangani.

[...]

Despite the security situation, the ICRC was able to carry out a number of assessments of humanitarian needs. In general, ICRC humanitarian assistance was targeted at both internally displaced people and local residents. In cities where the ICRC has traditionally provided material assistance, it became necessary to provide food as well. In some areas, the ICRC provided two meals a day to malnourished children and monthly food rations for families suffering from malnutrition.

Limited access to clean water resulted in an outbreak of cholera. In response, the ICRC began the construction of two reservoirs in cooperation with the Congolese water board. The ICRC also installed water tanks and improved hygiene by digging latrines and repairing and cleaning schools in which internally displaced people were housed." (ICRC 26 January 2000)

1998

"The ICRC's activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998 can be divided into those which were under way before the outbreak of hostilities in August and those conducted in response to the new crisis.

Prior to the conflict, the ICRC was present throughout the country, although restrictions on humanitarian operations in North Kivu meant that the ICRC sub-delegation in Goma was managed by local staff under the supervision of expatriates travelling from Kinshasa. On 7 April the ICRC opened an office in Bunia, the main town of one of the districts situated along the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Its main purpose was to work on a project to rehabilitate the water distribution system and to help Sudanese refugees living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo re-establish contact with their relatives by means of Red Cross messages.

After clashes broke out, the security situation steadily deteriorated. Several of the ICRC's vehicles were stolen in Uvira and Bukavu and its sub-delegation offices and delegates' residences were looted. As a result, the ICRC had to suspend its activities for the best part of a month and evacuate its expatriate staff. Before leaving the ICRC handed over medical and first-aid material to its Congolese staff and to National Society volunteers to supply hospitals where possible.

The ICRC resumed a few specific programmes in Kivu within the month, although the situation had not completely returned to normal by the end of the year.

[...]

[Food aid:]

- before the conflict, provided 279.2 tonnes of food and 202.2 tonnes of material assistance to more than 58,000 internally displaced people in the east, and 26,099 hoes and 83.5 tonnes of seed for agricultural rehabilitation;
- following the conflict, distributed 155.9 tonnes food and 32.7 tonnes of material assistance to some 5,600 displaced and vulnerable families;
- before the conflict, in cooperation with the National Society, provided material assistance (blankets, soap, jerrycans and mats) to 2,000 people transferred from the Kapalata camp, where a cholera epidemic had broken out, to "Site H" in Kisangani;
- in Lubumbashi in November and December, provided 640 displaced people, who had fled the fighting in the areas of Kalémié, Niemba, Nyunzu and Kabalo with 15.3 tonnes of food and 1 tonne of material assistance;
- implemented 4 reforestation projects in Murhundu, Idjwi, Kalole and Luwinja;
- rehabilitated 4 transit centres for displaced people from the highlands;
- supported "food for work" rehabilitation programmes, including road repairs, water and sanitation projects, National Society health centres and work on the ICRC compound and warehouse;
- continued to act as the logistic base for ICRC operations in the Republic of the Congo, dispatching a total of 355.7 tonnes of food and non-food items, as well as medical supplies and construction materials to Brazzaville;

[Health services]

- prior to the conflict, provided medicines and medical equipment on an ad hoc basis to hospitals and health centres treating the war-wounded or assisting displaced people in North and South Kivu; rehabilitated health centres and upgraded water-supply and sanitation facilities where necessary;
- delivered food and medicines for patients in the Kisangani general hospital and carried out sanitation and rehabilitation work;
- until August, through a project delegated to the Belgian Red Cross, carried out repairs and developed primary health care services in 7 of the 18 health centres in the Kabondo health district serving 152,000 inhabitants;
- until August, through a project delegated to the German Red Cross, rehabilitated the Uvira hospital with the aim to re-establish it as the region's referral hospital, provided the services of an expatriate medical/surgical team and gave seminars for health professionals on surgery, anaesthetics, pharmacy management, hospital hygiene and laboratory techniques; the hospital admitted 3,862 patients, performed 789 operations and treated 4,041 outpatients;
- after the outbreak of the conflict, in coordination with the health authorities, assisted 3 hospitals in Kinshasa (Kinshasa general hospital and the military hospitals at Kokolo camp and Ceta camp), which treated the war-wounded, provided material support to some 15 first-aid posts run by the National Society, and supported 4 hospitals in Lubumbashi, which also treated war casualties;

[Water supply]

- improved the water supply to hospitals and health centres in the districts of Mwenga (20,000 beneficiaries), Idjwi island (32,000 beneficiaries), Walungu (20,000 beneficiaries) and Kabare (6,000 beneficiaries);
 - continued to provide water and sanitation facilities for displaced people and refugees at reception centres in Uvira and Goma;
 - carried out rural water-supply and health programmes in the districts of Walungu (30,000 beneficiaries) and Idjwi island (2,000 beneficiaries);
 - carried out sanitation work at the Kinshasa general hospital, with the rehabilitation/construction of toilets, showers and a waste-disposal system for 2 wards, repairs on the incinerator building and rehabilitation of the booster station;
 - until August, by means of a project delegated to the Australian Red Cross, fitted 75 wells with hand-pumps and protected 47 springs in the Ruzizi plain and south of Uvira and organized 15 performances of a play promoting better understanding of water, sanitation and health issues for schools and communes in the area;
 - until August, by means of projects delegated to the German, American, Dutch and British Red Cross Societies, improved the water supply in Kindu, Lubumbashi/Likasi, Buta and Bunia respectively;
 - during the emergency phase, in order to prevent an interruption in water delivery, installed bladder tanks and distribution ramps at 2 hospitals, 2 health centres and 2 military hospitals in Kinshasa and supplied them by tanker truck;
 - following the outbreak of hostilities, distributed 40 tonnes of calcium hypochlorite and 13 tonnes of salt to ensure that the infrastructure could continue to function and to prevent a loss in the quality of the water supply;
 - supplied the electricity board with emergency materials to repair the high-tension lines supplying Kinshasa, thus guaranteeing the delivery of the voltage required for the water-treatment plants to function;"
- (ICRC 1 June 1999)

Churches Together (ACT) aims to answer urgent food, medicines, shelter and clothing needs (2001)

"The most urgent needs are food, medicines, shelter and clothing. The ACT alliance has been responding to some of the humanitarian needs and since the war started in 1998, five appeals have been issued for the DRC. The response to the appeals however, has been poor with only one appeal having a coverage of above 50% of the target. The concentration of the ACT response has been in the Eastern part of the country which accounts for a large number of IDPs in the country .

Eglise du Christ au Congo (ECC) in North, and South Kivu and the Lutheran World Federation / World Service (LWF/WS) working with the Eglise du Christ au Congo – Kisangani (ECC-Kisangani) are proposing programmes comprising the following:

- Food distribution
- Distribution of non food items
- Shelter
- Health, Water & Sanitation

- Distribution of tools and vegetable seeds" (ACT 19 January 2001)

MSF support to health structures on both side of the front line (1999)

"MSF supports 19 health districts in the territory held by president Laurent Kabila and is relaunching 18 in the rebel-held zone. Constant attention is being paid to the danger of elevating the quality of care to a standard which cannot be sustained by local means. More community involvement will be needed.

Following the outbreak of fighting in August 1998 in the capital, Kinshasa, MSF lent its support to 16 city health structures taking care of the wounded. Backup was also given to four hospitals, mainly in the form of medical supply and electrical and sanitation work. MSF also carried out a similar emergency programme in Lubumbashi. Security was so poor at this time that MSF teams were forced to evacuate from Kisangani.

MSF works in two hospitals in the Bas Congo region and provides medical and sanitation assistance to 15,000 Angolan refugees. MSF continues to support local health care in eastern Congo. This includes the reconstruction of devastated clinics, the distribution of medicine, mother and child care and water and sanitation assistance. The objective of MSF's AIDS/STD programme is to limit the transmission of HIV by improving care and carrying out a national information and education campaign. Treatment is provided through specialised centres but is also integrated in the horizontal programmes in health districts. Counselling and education are priorities.

In four health districts in Equateur province, MSF is involved in active screening for trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), supervision of patient care, supply of medicine and vector control. MSF has created an emergency pool of MSF volunteers who focus on accelerating and improving the organisation's reaction to medical and other crises. MSF has intervened in polio, measles, meningitis and cholera campaigns. In 1999, MSF ran a mass measles vaccination campaign for 50,000 children in Nsona-Mpangu and Kimpese. MSF provided water and sanitation assistance following an outbreak of Marburg fever in April and May 1999 and also provided nutritional assistance in Kisangani at the same time." (MSF 20 October 1999)

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