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Issue Paper SRI LANKA POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS UPDATE August 1996

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GLOSSARY

DUNF

Democratic United National Front

EPDP

Eelam People's Democratic Party

EROS

Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students

FIDH

Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme

FMM

Free Media Movement

HRTF

Human Rights Task Force

INFORM

Sri Lanka Information Monitor

JVP

Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna

LTTE

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

PA

People's Alliance

PEACE

Protecting Environment and Children Everywhere

PLOTE

	People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
TELO	Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
TRO	Tamil Refugees' Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNP	United National Party
UTHR(J)	University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna)

1. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

This paper is an account of the situation in Sri Lanka between October 1994 and May 1996. It updates the March 1995 DIRB Question and Answer Series paper entitled *Sri Lanka: Internal Flight Alternatives—An Update*, which contains information on the situation in Sri Lanka between January 1993 and August 1994. Please note that the DIRB has also published a Question and Answer Series chronology of events in Sri Lanka covering the period September 1992 to November 1994.

Thirteen years of war in Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese-dominated government security forces and the Tamil Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), led by Velupillai Prabhakaran, have cost over 50,000 lives (Reuters 14 Oct. 1995). The 9 November 1994 election of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, prime minister and leader of the People's Alliance (PA), as Sri Lanka's new president brought renewed hope for peace in the country (*The Economist* 21-27 Jan. 1995, 38; Minority Rights Group International Feb. 1996, 19). President Kumaratunga, who won the election by a wide margin, had centred her election campaign on making peace with the Tigers and promoting respect for human rights (HRW 1995, 171; *Libération* 11 Nov. 1994; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Nov. 1994, 2).

A first round of peace negotiations between the PA government and the LTTE was held on 13-14 October 1994 (AI 1995, 268; *Tamil Information* Jan.-Feb. 1995, 1; *Libération* 9 Mar. 1995, 12). At these talks, the LTTE put forth the following demands: 1) total lifting of the economic blockade against the north; 2) removal of the fishing ban in the north; 3) a safe travel route for civilians between the Jaffna peninsula and the mainland; 4) resettlement of displaced persons; and 5) a cessation of hostilities (*Tamil Information* Jan.-Feb. 1995, 1). During this round of negotiations, the government reportedly set a timetable to address the "day-to-day problems" of civilians living in the north and east (ibid.).

The year 1995 opened with a second round of peace talks during which the LTTE reportedly approved a government plan to spend \$800 million on rebuilding the north (*The Economist* 4 Mar. 1995, 37), and which culminated in the signing of a "cessation of hostilities" that came into effect on 7 January 1995 (*India Today* 31 Jan. 1995; *Tamil Information* Jan.-Feb. 1995, 1; USCR 1995, 108). The two parties held a third round of talks on 14 January 1995 with the LTTE focusing its demands on the lifting of the five-year economic blockade in the north, the removal of the Pooneryn army camp near Elephant Pass, as well as the opening of a safe

passage for civilians between Jaffna peninsula and the mainland (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1995b, 1; *Tamil Information* Jan.-Feb. 1995, 1). While the government agreed to completely lift the embargo on the remaining 22 items, 10 of these items, such as cement, plastic containers, tires and roofing sheets, reportedly continued to be banned (*ibid.*, 2-3; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1995b, 1). The LTTE complained that many of the previously banned items were not making their way into Jaffna (*The Economist* 4 Mar. 1995, 37; *Tamil Information* Jan.-Feb. 1995, 2). In January 1995 the government eased restrictions on fishing in the north (*Tamil Information* Jan.-Feb. 1995, 2; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1995b, 1). While the ban on fishing remained in certain areas, the government allowed fishing within two miles of the shore in the daytime between 5 a.m. and 5 p.m. (*ibid.*). However, the talks seemed to stall on the Pooneryn issue, with the LTTE insisting that the camp be completely removed (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1995b, 1; *The Economist* 21-27 Jan. 1995, 38; BBC Summary 8 Mar. 1995).

Following a unilateral decision, the government opened the Pooneryn-Sangupiddy and Elephant Pass routes on 24 February 1995 and said that, instead of closing the Pooneryn camp, it would shift it 500 meters west to allow a safe travel route for Tamil civilians and the transport of building materials to begin the reconstruction of the north (BBC Summary 8 Mar. 1995; AFP 24 Feb. 1995; *Tamil Information* Jan.-Feb. 1995, 2). However, because the government refused to completely remove the Pooneryn army camp, the LTTE maintained its own barriers on the Pooneryn-Sangupiddy and Elephant Pass routes (BBC Summary 8 Mar. 1995; *The Economist* 4 Mar. 1995, 37).

In February 1995 the president announced the \$800 million reconstruction plan for the north (BBC Summary 8 Mar. 1995; *FEER* 23 Feb. 1995; *The Economist* 4 Mar. 1995, 37; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Feb. 1995b, 1). However, because the LTTE apparently added "new conditions" to the peace process, the work did not begin on 1 March 1995 as planned (BBC Summary 8 Mar. 1995; *The Economist* 4 Mar. 1995, 37). Sources do not clearly outline what these "new conditions" were, but the LTTE's main demands at the time were the following: the total removal of the economic blockade in the north as well as of the remaining restrictions on fishing, the dismantling of Pooneryn army camp, and allowing LTTE members to carry arms freely in the east (Minority Rights Group International Feb. 1996, 19; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Mar. 1995b, 1).

The two sides held another round of peace talks between 10-13 April 1995, during which the government agreed to lift the ban on fuel and to further relax the ban on fishing (*The New York Times* 16 Apr. 1995, 8; *Le Devoir* 13 Apr. 1995, A6). However, the LTTE unilaterally broke the cease-fire on 19 April 1995, launching a suicide attack against two navy gunboats in Trincomalee harbour (HRW/A July 1995, 1; Minority Rights Group International Feb. 1996, 19; Reuters 22 May 1995; *The Washington Post* 20 Apr. 1995; *The Vancouver Sun* 6 June 1995). The attack killed 12 marines and injured 23 people, signalling the beginning of the latest phase of the war, known as Eelam War III (*ibid.*). After the attack, the government reimposed a ban on "essential items" to the north (*The Washington Post* 20 Apr. 1995). An embargo on some nine to ten items that could be used militarily by the LTTE remained in force as of 7 May 1996 (High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996). Moreover, as of the same date, the fishing ban continued in certain areas off the northern and eastern coasts near government army camps to prevent attacks by LTTE cadres disguised as fishermen, according to an official source (*ibid.*).

Amidst international outcry over the LTTE action (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Apr. 1995a, 1), Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran declared that he had resumed the war because he had "reached the brink of tolerance" and "lost faith" in the government, accusing it of failing to meet

LTTE demands during peace negotiations (*Lanka Guardian* 1 June 1995, 4; IPS 29 Apr. 1995; Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation 17 June 1995). Referring to the LTTE's "track record of duplicity," *India Today* suggested the LTTE used the cease-fire period to build up its troops (15 Dec. 1995). Another source states that the LTTE feared the peace process would ultimately jeopardize the group's hold on power in the north and, therefore, sought to undermine it (*FEER* 17 Aug. 1995, 17).

After the war resumed, the government decided to pursue the twofold strategy of hardening its military stance while politically promoting peace (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Dec. 1995a, 1). Since July 1995, government security forces have launched major military offensives against the north to weaken the Tigers militarily and, in this way, force them back to the negotiating table (see subsection 3.1) (*FEER* 6 July 1995, 28; *Courrier international* 23-28 Nov. 1995, 27; *Le Monde* 20 Apr. 1996, 5). The LTTE has responded with its own attacks in the north and the east as well as several attacks in Colombo and other areas in the south (see section 3).

While the president remains open to future negotiations with the LTTE (INFORM Mar. 1996, 7; *FEER* 15 Feb. 1996, 15; USCR Mar. 1996, 11) and even offered the rebels an amnesty, which leader Prabhakaran rejected (*FEER* 21 Dec. 1995, 22), she has made such talks conditional on a "substantial laying down of arms" (ibid. 15 Feb. 1996, 15; USCR Mar. 1996, 11).

On 3 August 1995 the government publicly presented a "devolution package" to grant greater autonomy to the provinces as part of its effort to solve the ethnic problem through greater power-sharing with the Tamil and Muslim minorities (*Tamil Times* 15 Mar. 1996a, 4; *FEER* 17 Aug. 1995, 17; INFORM Aug. 1995a). The government published a legal draft of the devolution proposals on 16 January 1996 containing some amendments (*Tamil Times* 15 Feb. 1996c, 10)^[1] and submitted it to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Reform, which began examining the proposals on 7 March 1996 (*Tamil Times* 15 Mar. 1996a, 4). The proposals, which define Sri Lanka "as a plural society and an indissoluble union of regions," but do not specify the unit of devolution^[2] (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1996g, 4), can only be adopted after a two-thirds majority vote in parliament followed by a national referendum (ibid.; *Lanka Guardian* 15 Dec. 1995, 3; ibid. 1 Oct. 1995, 6). As of 7 May 1996 no date had been fixed for the vote, although an official at the High Commission of Sri Lanka said it would be held before the end of 1996 (High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996).

Sri Lankan society appears divided over the issue of devolution: for example, while over 100 intellectuals issued a statement endorsing the package, calling it "a commendable measure of courage and political imagination" (*Sunday Leader* 6 Aug. 1995), 159 other professionals and academics issued a statement criticizing the proposals on the basis that they would further segregate Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese and, thus, break the "unitary character" of the country (*The Island* 13 Aug. 1995). Numerous Buddhist monks have also denounced the package, stating that it threatens the country's sovereignty (*The New York Times* 25 Sept. 1995, A2; *Tamil Times* 15 Mar. 1996a, 4; *Lanka Guardian* 1 Sept. 1995, 2). While generally supporting the government's initiative, four Tamil political parties, Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS)^[3], Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), have also proposed that three points be added to the legal draft of the package: 1) a secular state; 2) citizenship for all people who have lived in Sri Lanka for ten consecutive years; and 3) replacing the term "union of regions" with "union of states" (Xinhua 8 Jan. 1996; *Lanka*

Guardian 15 Jan. 1996, 1).

Although the LTTE announced at the end of January 1995 that it was prepared to replace its long-standing demand for a separate Tamil state with the demand for a "federal form of autonomy" (*The Times* 27 Jan. 1995; VOA 9 Jan. 1995; *Tamil Times* 15 Nov. 1995b, 9), some sources say the LTTE has dismissed the government proposals and rejected the possibility of peace negotiations with the government while the security forces occupy Jaffna (see subsection 3.1) (Reuters 4 Feb. 1996; *FEER* 15 Feb. 1996, 15). However, LTTE deputy leader Karikalan has reportedly suggested that the LTTE would examine the proposals (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1996e, 3). According to some sources, Muslims generally support the package (INFORM Aug. 1995b, 6; Minority Rights Group International Feb. 1996, 21).

NOTES

[1] This document is available at IRB regional documentation centres. [\[back\]](#)

[2] This has been left up to the Parliamentary Select Committee to decide (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1996g, 4). [\[back\]](#)

[3] In an interview published in the 28 January 1996 issue of *Sunday Leader*, LTTE deputy leader Karikalan stated that EROS was fighting government security forces alongside the LTTE (*Tamil Times* 15 Feb. 1996b, 9). The DIRB has been unable to corroborate this information. [\[back\]](#)

2. GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

Several sources indicate a general improvement in the human rights situation in Sri Lanka since Kumaratunga became president (FIDH Jan. 1996, 14; *Country Reports 1995 1996*, 1353; HRW 1995 171; INFORM 15 Feb. 1995, 8). In 1994, as a first step toward improving human rights, the Kumaratunga government lifted the state of emergency in most of Sri Lanka (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1259).^[4] However, on 8 April 1996 the emergency regulations formerly limited to certain areas became effective throughout the country (AFP 8 Apr. 1996; *Le Monde* 10 Apr. 1996, 2). According to *Country Reports 1994*, the emergency regulations that remained in effect after President Kumaratunga was elected in November 1994 were revised to remove some of the restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of association (1995, 1259). New emergency regulations reestablishing the Human Rights Task Force (HRTF) were issued on 7 June 1995 (The Nadesan Centre Sept. 1995, 2; AI July 1995a, 8; Minority Rights Group International Feb. 1996, 30)^[5], and on 16 June 1995 the government sent directives to the security forces to improve the protection of people arrested and detained under the emergency regulations (see subsection 2.2) (HRW 1995, 174; AI July 1995b, 3).

While Amnesty International reports there were around 700 detainees held under the emergency regulations or Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) at the end of 1994 (AI 1995, 268), the United States Department of State states the government had released 80 per cent of detainees in long-term security forces' detention by the end of 1994, with 380 detainees remaining (see Appendix I for a list of authorized places of detention) (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1259; *Country Reports 1995 1996*, 1355). The United States Department of State reports that with the resumption of hostilities in April 1995 this figure rose to 940 at the end of 1995 (*ibid.*). Amnesty International has expressed concern that people may be detained without charge for lengthy periods under the emergency regulations and PTA (see subsection 2.2) and that emergency regulations may be conducive to torture (July 1995a, 10-11, 13).

Prison conditions in Sri Lanka are reportedly poor and unsafe (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Feb. 1996c, 4; Canadian High Commission Jan. 1996b, 2; *Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1355). *The Sri Lanka Monitor* reports that on 19 February 1996 more than 100 prison officers in Colombo's Magazine prison attacked Tamil detainees "with metal rods, clubs and cricket bats" causing several injuries (Feb. 1996c, 4; *ibid.* Feb. 1996d, 1). The Sri Lanka Information Monitor (INFORM), a Colombo-based human rights organization, refers to this incident as "a clash...between some Tamil prisoners and some prison officials" (Feb. 1996, 8). Neither source indicates what provoked the incident, although the government called for an independent investigation (INFORM Feb. 1996, 8; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Feb. 1996c, 4). Despite the passing of an anti-torture bill in parliament on 25 November 1994 aimed at bringing national law in line with the United Nations Convention against Torture (INFORM 15 Feb. 1995, iii), sources indicate that torture in detention continued throughout 1995 (*Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1355; AI 1995, 268) and remained a concern of human rights groups in early 1996 (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Feb. 1996c, 4). However, based on information obtained from local and international NGOs, the Canadian High Commission in Colombo notes that people detained for short-term identity checks face a "very low" risk of abuse (Jan. 1996b, 2). Corroboration of this statement is not available among sources consulted by the DIRB.

Some sources indicate that, despite a reduction in the number of extrajudicial executions and disappearances committed by government security forces since the PA came to power, these human rights violations continued in 1995 (*Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1355; FIDH Jan. 1996, 15; *The Globe and Mail* 10 June 1995, A10). However, according to *Country Reports 1995*, the government "moved quickly to correct the worst relapses" (1996, 1352). For example, in August 1995 18 members of the security forces' Special Task Force (STF) were arrested in connection with the extrajudicial executions of 21 Tamils whose bodies were found floating in waterways in and around Colombo between May and August 1995, to deter others from committing such acts (see subsection 3.5) (*ibid.*).

In 1994 the Kumaratunga government indicted an army brigadier general and 10 other people involved in the disappearance of 32 schoolboys from Embilipitiya in the south in 1989 and 1990 (*Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1260; AI 1995, 269). While *Country Reports 1995* notes that this case remained at a standstill throughout 1995 (1996, 1354), a trial was reportedly held in the case on 20 February 1996 (INFORM Feb. 1996, 10). In 1994, the government continued to investigate the mass grave at Suriyakanda, which contains the remains of around 300 people, and opened investigations into other graves, such as that at Ankumbura, believed to contain the remains of 36 people who disappeared in 1989 (*Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1260). Investigations into these graves were stalled at the end of 1995 (*Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1354). Although the United States Department of State indicates that the government has made attempts to counter impunity of security forces personnel (see also subsections 2.1, 3.2 and 3.5) (*ibid.*), according to the Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme (FIDH), impunity remains a problem in Sri Lanka (Jan. 1996, 25). The organization states the majority of security forces' members responsible for violence and killings retain their positions and may even be promoted (*ibid.*). INFORM reports that the government granted awards on 4 February 1996 to two high-ranking members of the security forces allegedly involved in two disappearance cases (Feb. 1996, 10).

Information on human rights violations committed by the LTTE in 1995 is detailed in subsections 3.1 and 3.2.

2.1 Human Rights Commissions

Shortly after her election victory in November 1994 President Kumaratunga set up three commissions to probe and report on disappearances that had occurred in Sri Lanka since 1 January 1988 (AI Apr. 1995, 1, 4; INFORM 15 Feb. 1995, 5). The commissions, called Presidential Commissions of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal and Disappearances of Persons, respectively cover the following three regions: 1) Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa provinces; 2) Central, North Western, North Central and Uva provinces; and 3) Northern and Eastern provinces (ibid; AI Apr. 1995, 3). They began their investigations in mid-January 1995 (ibid.) and according to *Country Reports 1995*, by the end of August 1995 had received 61,300 complaints and investigated 7,600 cases of disappearance (1996, 1354). According to the FIDH, the commissions' work has stalled due to the ongoing war and because many suspects in the security forces are currently fighting the LTTE (Jan. 1996, 15). However, INFORM reports that investigations by the Central province commission led to the government appointment of a "special Police team" to carry out arrests of people involved in disappearances and killings between 1988 and 1990 (Jan. 1996, 9). The source does not say whether any arrests have been made.

The government also decided in November 1994 to establish a special presidential commission to investigate high-profile assassinations, such as those of Vijaya Kumaratunga, former politician and husband of the president, in February 1988, and Lalith Athulathmudali, former leader of the Democratic United National Front (DUNF), in April 1993 (*The Island* 25 Nov. 1994; Xinhua 25 Nov. 1994; AI Apr. 1995, 4). In March 1996 the Vijaya Kumaratunga commission reportedly submitted its findings, which provide no conclusive evidence regarding the people and motives behind the assassination but suggest a cover-up by the security forces under former president Premadesa's rule (INFORM Mar. 1996, 8; *Asian Political News* 3 Mar. 1996). According to a 7 April 1996 report, the commission investigating the assassination of Lalith Athulathmudali organized an "identification parade" during which the person who killed Lalith Athulathmudali was identified (Reuters 7 Apr. 1996). According to the source, the suspect, an alleged "local gangster," does not appear to be a Tamil rebel as had been assumed following the murder in April 1993 (ibid.).

2.2 Police Registration and Arrest and Detention Procedures

The emergency law requiring that the names of all house occupants and overnight guests be registered with the police was reportedly removed in June 1995^[6] when new emergency regulations were issued (Canadian High Commission Jan. 1996b, 2). While the Canadian High Commission in Colombo says this law was reimposed on 20 October 1995 following an attack against a major petroleum facility in Colombo (see subsection 3.5) (ibid.), Human Rights Watch indicates it was reimposed in September 1995 (1995, 175). According to this law, the onus is on householders to register their occupants (HRW 1995, 175; High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996). However, the Canadian High Commission points out that it is not clear whether all household residents or simply temporary residents must be registered, adding that the police usually assume the former (Jan. 1996b, 2).

Under the emergency regulations, people can be held in preventive detention on orders by the defence secretary for one year, after which they may be held on three-monthly detention orders issued by a magistrate, which may be renewed indefinitely (AI July 1995a, 6; *Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1355; The Nadesan Centre Sept. 1995, 3). People may also be arrested and detained under the emergency regulations for investigation of suspected offences (ibid., 4; AI July 1995a, 7). Based on information provided by the HRTF, the Canadian High Commission in

Colombo indicates that 90 per cent of Tamils detained for security checks are released within two days, 9 per cent within seven days, and the remainder are initially detained for three months (Jan. 1996c, 3). The emergency regulations require the security forces to provide the HRTF with the names of all those detained within two days of the arrest (ibid.; AI July 1995a, 8; The Nadesan Centre Sept. 1995, 7). The Canadian High Commission in Colombo notes that a country-wide average of approximately half of detentions are reported to the HRTF with compliance in Colombo "somewhat higher" (Jan. 1996c, 3). Moreover, directives issued by the government to the security forces in mid-June 1995 require the police to give detainees' family members "arrest receipts" indicating the name and rank of the arresting officer, the date and time of arrest and the place of detention (AI July 1995b, 4; The Nadesan Centre Sept. 1995, 6). However, this is reportedly "rarely" done (Canadian High Commission Jan. 1996b, 3; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Feb. 1996c, 4). Other directives issued at the same time aimed to provide increased protection for women and children detained under the emergency regulations (Canadian High Commission Jan. 1996b, 4; AI July 1995b, 4). According to these directives, all women and children under the age of 12 taken into detention may be accompanied to the police station by a person of their choice and should be held in the custody of a women's unit of the security forces (AI July 1995b, 4).

2.3 Women and Children

In an effort to improve the status of women and children, the government passed four bills in late September 1995 related to the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Marriage Registration Ordinance and the Kandyan Marriage and Divorce Act (IPS 29 Sept. 1995; FIDH Jan. 1996, 23). The legal minimum age of marriage for girls has been changed from 12 to 18 years, although Muslims are exempted from this law (*India Abroad* 4 Aug. 1995, 15; IPS 29 Sept. 1995; *Country Reports 1995 1996*, 1360). Amendments to the Penal Code added as new offences incest, grave sexual abuse, marital rape, cruelty against children, sexual exploitation and trafficking of children, and the use of children for indecent print, audio and video material (FIDH Jan. 1996, 23; Reuters 15 Mar. 1996). Under the new law pimps and paedophiles found guilty of sexually abusing young boys face possible imprisonment of 5-20 years (Reuters 18 Oct. 1995; *The Gazette* 28 Jan. 1996, B5; HRW 1995, 175).^[7] The police arrested six paedophiles from Western countries in 1994-95, although none had received a prison sentence by late January 1996 (*The Gazette* 28 Jan. 1996, B5). The Sri Lankan human rights organization, Protecting Environment and Children Everywhere (PEACE)^[8], which had pressured the government to introduce laws against child abuse (FIDH Jan. 1996, 17, 23), has pointed out the problem of their implementation in the context of limited resources, a flawed justice system and the ongoing war (Reuters 15 Mar. 1996).

While there appears to be little evidence of women being sexually harassed in the workplace, sexual harassment of women on public transportation is reportedly common in Sri Lanka (Reuters 14 Sept. 1995). A study by the Conference of Public Service Trade Unions released on 29 August 1995 found that 81 per cent of Sri Lankan women complained of sexual harassment on buses (ibid.). In response to these complaints, the government began a "women-only" bus service between Colombo and its suburbs in September 1995 (AFP 1 Sept. 1995).

According to a January 1996 report, government security forces planned to send women soldiers to fight the LTTE on Jaffna peninsula for the first time (Xinhua 27 Jan. 1996). However, on 7 May 1996 an official at the High Commission of Sri Lanka indicated women soldiers had been sent to the Jaffna peninsula to carry out administrative and clerical tasks, not to fight the LTTE (High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996). Another source states female soldiers act as

guards in border villages, carry out cordon and search operations and check female civilians at army checkpoints (IPS 28 Feb. 1996).

Throughout 1995 there were reports that in northern and eastern Sri Lanka the LTTE led an intensified child recruitment campaign, either abducting students in schools (Xinhua 10 Feb. 1995; Xinhua 16 Mar. 1995; *The Globe and Mail* 31 Oct. 1995, A16) or requesting parents to sign up their children for recruitment (Reuters 22 Oct. 1995). According to a UNICEF representative in Sri Lanka, children as young as 10 are recruited by the LTTE (Reuters 11 Dec. 1995). *The Sri Lanka Monitor* reports that the LTTE recruited around 3,000 children in Batticaloa District during the cease-fire period between January and April 1995 (July 1995a, 2). In addition, a January 1996 report indicates the LTTE had abducted and forcibly recruited 597 students since mid-1995 and kidnapped 17 school principals who were against the forced recruitment of students (Xinhua 22 Jan. 1996). Two of the principals have reportedly been killed by the LTTE (*ibid.*). Citing a Tamil journalist living in Canada, a *Maclean's* article indicates the LTTE recruits mainly in high schools and universities telling students their time would be better spent in the war effort than studying (18 Mar. 1996, 41).

A failed LTTE attack on four army buses at Kokilai, Janakapura, Jayasinghepura and Kokkutuduvai in the northeast on 28 July 1995 resulted in the death of around 332 rebels, most of whom were children (Reuters 29 July 1995; *India Abroad* 4 Aug. 1995, 15; *The Economist* 5-11 Aug. 1995, 32). The attack brought to light the movement's use of children to fight the war against government forces (*ibid.*). Also among the dead rebels were 128 women (*ibid.*). Reportedly, girls represent 30-40 per cent of the LTTE's recruits (*Maclean's* 18 Mar. 1996, 4) and, according to the Colombo-based human rights organization, University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) (UTHR(J)), some as young as 14 are used to torture female prisoners (8 Mar. 1995).

2.4 Homosexuals

Homosexual sex is punishable by 12 years imprisonment under the Penal Code (Reuters 18 Oct. 1995). Lesbians are exempted from this law (*ibid.*). The founder of the Sri Lankan gay organization, Companions on a Journey, has reportedly claimed that Sri Lankan homosexuals, whom he says represent more than the world average of 10-15 per cent of the population, are discriminated against by Sri Lankan society (*ibid.*). The organization, which on 21 September 1995 announced that it would hold a national conference in March 1996 with the theme "Emerging gay identities in Sri Lanka" (INFORM Sept. 1995, 12; Reuters 18 Oct. 1995), has stated that it has received telephone threats and police visits resulting from telephone complaints against it (INFORM Jan. 1996, 9). In April 1996 INFORM reported that the conference had been postponed until May 1996 "due to various incidents of harassment and intimidation, including death threats" (Apr. 1996, 12). The organization's coordinator was reportedly attacked on 31 December 1995 (INFORM Jan. 1996, 9).

2.5 Media

Several sources state that there is greater freedom of expression under PA rule than under the previous regime (*FEER* 23 Mar. 1995; FIDH Jan. 1996, 18; *La lettre de Reporters sans frontières* May 1995, 16-17). For example, the Kumaratunga government has granted privately owned television stations permission to produce information broadcasts (*ibid.*, 17; FIDH Jan. 1996, 18). In addition, shortly after the presidential election in November 1994, the government established five committees on media reform with the following respective mandates: 1) recommend changes to legislation related to media freedom; 2) provide "facilities and privileges"

for journalists; 3) make proposals for a "Sri Lanka Media Institute;" 4) make recommendations to improve the economic conditions and status of journalists; and, 5) recommend ways to widen the ownership of the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd. (Xinhua 21 Nov. 1994; *The Island* 21 Nov. 1994). Information on the current status of these committees is limited. In January 1996 FIDH reported that the state press had not yet been privatized, although the issue was being debated (Jan. 1996, 18). The committee to recommend improvements in the conditions and status of journalists made its recommendations in December 1995 (INFORM Dec. 1995, 7).

Despite these changes, several sources report some limitations on freedom of expression in Sri Lanka in 1995 (*Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1358; FIDH Jan. 1996, 18; *The Economist* 30 Sept.-6 Oct. 1995, 36; *La lettre de Reporters sans frontières* Nov. 1995). While President Kumaratunga criticized some sections of the media for "irresponsible" journalism in early 1995 (*FEER* 23 Mar. 1995; *La lettre de Reporters sans frontières* May 1995, 17; *The Economist* 30 Sept.-6 Oct. 1995, 36), a known government critic, *Sunday Leader* editor Lasantha Wickramatunge, and his wife were attacked on 6 February 1995 (*ibid.*; *FEER* 23 Mar. 1995; INFORM 15 Feb. 1995). It is not clear who was responsible, although some suggest that the president's media advisor, Sanath Gunathilake, was behind the attack (*La lettre de Reporters sans frontières* May 1995, 17-18; *FEER* 23 Mar. 1995). On 22 February 1995 the Free Media Movement (FMM) held its first public protest in Colombo to denounce the attack against Wickrematunge, among other things (*La lettre de Reporters sans frontières* May 1995, 18; AP 22 Feb. 1995).

In September 1995 police searched the offices of the local newspapers, *Sunday Leader*, *Lakbima* and *Hiru* as well as of the country's largest independent newspaper group after they had published articles criticizing the government (*Reporters sans frontières* 15 Sept. 1995; *Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1358). Further, on 21 September 1995 under the emergency regulations the government imposed media censorship on security-related news coming from sources other than the military, with violators possibly facing a three-month to five-year term of imprisonment (AFP 4 Oct. 1995; FIDH Jan. 1996, 18; *La lettre de Reporters sans frontières* Nov. 1995). On 25 September 1995, the government exempted the foreign media from this measure (*ibid.*; Xinhua 20 Dec. 1995). The censorship was lifted on 20 December 1995 (*ibid.*), but reimposed shortly after 19 April 1996 when government security forces launched Operation Riviresa II in the Jaffna peninsula (see subsection 3.1) (High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996; *The Christian Science Monitor* 23 Apr. 1996).^[9]

NOTES

[4] As of 4 September 1995 the emergency regulations were limited to the following areas: The municipal limits of Colombo, Dehiwala-Mount Lavinia, the Divisional Secretaries' Divisions of Nugegoda and Kolonnawa of the Colombo District, all the Divisional Secretaries' Divisions of the Gampaha District, the Northern Province, the Eastern Province, the Divisional Secretaries' Divisions of Kalpitiya, Wanathawilluwa, Karuwalagaswewa of the Puttalam District; the Divisional Secretaries' Divisions of Nochchiyagama, Nuwaragampalatha (Central), Medawachchiya, Kebithigollawa, Padaviya and Horowpathana of the Anuradhapura District and the Divisional Secretaries' Divisions of Dimbulagala and Lankapura of the Polonnaruwa District (*The Nadesan Centre* Sept. 1995, 1-2). [\[back\]](#)

[5] The HRTF was initially established under emergency regulations issued on 31 July 1991 to monitor the situation of detainees (Minority Rights Group International Feb. 1996, 30; AI July 1995a, 8). New emergency regulations issued in June 1993 required that the HRTF be informed of all arrests and detentions. When these emergency regulations were suspended on 15 July 1994 after the dissolution of parliament, the HRTF lost most of its powers, although it remained in existence under the Sri Lanka Foundation Law (*ibid.*). [\[back\]](#)

[6] For details on the registration law before June 1995, please see the March 1995 DIRB Question and Answer Series

paper *Sri Lanka: Internal Flight Alternatives—An Update*. [\[back\]](#)

[7] According to the FIDH, Sri Lanka has the second highest rate of child prostitution, after Thailand (Jan. 1996, 22). The organization further notes that 70 per cent of child prostitutes in Sri Lanka have mothers who work in other countries as migrant labourers (*ibid.*, 20, 23). [\[back\]](#)

[8] For more information on this organization, please see the February 1995 DIRB Question and Answer Series paper *Sri Lanka: Chronology of Events September 1992-November 1994*, pp. 17-18. [\[back\]](#)

[9] An official at the High Commission of Sri Lanka stated that the current censorship is less stringent than that in force between September and December 1995, although he did not provide any details (7 May 1996). [\[back\]](#)

3. SITUATION BY REGION

3.1 The North

The northern Tamils' desire for peace was manifested during a demonstration of some 10,000 people in the city of Jaffna on 19 February 1995 following a meeting between the LTTE and a government-led peace mission in Jaffna (Xinhua 19 Feb. 1995), and in some Tamils' calls to the LTTE leader to resume the peace process after he unilaterally broke the cease-fire in April 1995 (*ibid.* 26 Apr. 1995). Yet, despite these calls for peace, the war intensified over the course of the year (FIDH Jan. 1996, 7). Several sources have expressed concern about the LTTE's possession of anti-aircraft capabilities after they shot down two military planes on 28 and 29 April 1995 over Jaffna peninsula that killed all 97 passengers aboard (*The Washington Post* 1 May 1995; *The Vancouver Sun* 6 June 1995; *Asiaweek* 12 May 1995, 41). A recruitment and fund-raising campaign in the north in August and September 1995 contributed to sustaining the LTTE's stepped-up war effort (Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation 20 Aug. 1995; INFORM Sept. 1995, 5).^[10] A September 1995 INFORM report states that "families who express their unwillingness to give up a child to 'the cause' must pay exorbitant ransoms" (Sept. 1995, 5).

In July 1995 displaced Muslims in Puttalam District in the northwestern province received an ultimatum allegedly by the LTTE to leave the area by 1 August 1995 or face forcible eviction (AFP 21 July 1995; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* July 1995c, 3). The government responded to the ultimatum with a "special security forces operation" aimed at protecting people in the district (*ibid.*).

On 9 July 1995 government security forces launched Operation Leap Forward from northern and western bases on the Jaffna peninsula towards Jaffna town (*Le Monde* 11 July 1995, 5; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* July 1995b, 1). Around 65 people died and 150 were injured in one incident in Navaly during which the security forces dropped a bomb on St. Peter and Paul's Church, which was being used as a refuge by civilians (*ibid.*; *The Gazette* 12 July 1995; UTHR(J) 4 Sept. 1995). According to one source, the offensive led to the displacement of more than 200,000 civilians (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* July 1995b, 1).

Human rights sources have expressed concern about an airforce bombing that killed 34 schoolchildren and injured 150 in a school yard in Point Pedro on 21 or 22 September 1995 (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Sept. 1995a, 1; *Tamil Times* 15 Nov. 1995c, 21). According to the LTTE, 100,000 people in Jaffna subsequently marched in protest against the attack, calling on the government to cease air strikes (AFP 30 Sept. 1995).

On 17 October 1995 government security forces launched Operation Riviresa (Sunrays) in

Jaffna, their largest military offensive yet against the LTTE (*The Globe and Mail* 21 Oct. 1995, A-10; *Journal de Genève et Gazette de Lausanne* 27 Oct. 1995). On the eve of the security forces' capture of Jaffna in early December 1995, almost the entire population of the city, around 200,000 people, abandoned it at the LTTE's urging (*India Abroad* 1 Dec. 1995; UTHR(J) 6 Dec. 1995; UTHR(J) 8 Nov. 1995; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Oct. 1995a, 2; *ibid.*, Feb. 1996a, 2).

Since the operation, which cost the lives of at least 500 soldiers and almost 2,000 rebels (*Libération* 4 Dec. 1995, 10), the LTTE has moved its headquarters to Kilinochchi and LTTE leader Prabhakaran has reportedly retreated to his jungle base in Mulaitivu (*The Toronto Star* 23 Nov. 1995; *India Abroad* 8 Dec. 95b). As of late December 1995 LTTE territorial control in the north extended over Kilinochchi and Mulaitivu Districts, part of Vavuniya District, and the eastern Jaffna peninsula (*India Abroad* 22 Dec. 1995; High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996).

Figures on the number of displaced persons in the north at the end of 1995 vary somewhat. Some sources indicate that approximately 400,000-450,000 displaced persons were living with family and friends, or in "welfare centres"^[11] set up in public buildings such as schools (HRW 1995, 172; *Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1358; USCR Mar. 1996, 3, 5; High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996). However, INFORM quotes an official figure of nearly 600,000 people "drawing dry rations" in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya Districts by the end of 1995 (Jan. 1996, 6). Until late April 1996, around 221,000 of the displaced remained in Jaffna peninsula, primarily in the LTTE-controlled eastern area (USCR Mar. 1996, 3). Shelters for the displaced are overcrowded and in relief camps there are reportedly shortages of food and medicine, and school and education facilities are lacking (*India Abroad* 22 Dec. 1995; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Feb. 1996a, 2; USCR Mar. 1996, 8).^[12]

Displaced persons in government-run camps in Kilinochchi have reportedly refused to let their children go to school fearing their forced recruitment by the LTTE (BBC Summary 14 Jan. 1996). *Tamil Times* indicates that "thousands" of students displaced from Jaffna to the Kilinochchi and Vanni areas have reportedly been recruited by the LTTE (15 Mar. 1996b, 5).

In January 1996 *The Sri Lanka Monitor* reported that Mannar Island, under government control, was "vulnerable to LTTE attacks" (Jan. 1996c, 2) and INFORM reported in February 1996 that there were LTTE skirmishes in the border areas of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa Districts in the north (Feb. 1996, 6).

On 19 April 1996, exactly one year after the LTTE broke the truce, government security forces launched Operation Riviresa II to capture LTTE-controlled territory in Jaffna peninsula and Kilinochchi District (*Le Monde* 20 Apr. 1996, 5; High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996; *The Christian Science Monitor* 23 Apr. 1996). By 22 April 1996, the government had captured Kodikaman, a strategic area in the peninsula, and isolated Chavakachcheri (*Le Monde* 23 Apr. 1996, 4; *The Christian Science Monitor* 23 Apr. 1996; *Libération* 23 Apr. 1996, 12; *The New York Times* 23 Apr. 1996, A5). According to an official at the High Commission of Sri Lanka, by 7 May 1996 the entire Jaffna peninsula was under government control and Operation Riviresa II was continuing (7 May 1996).

Since it captured Jaffna, the government has begun rebuilding the northern peninsula (*India Abroad* 22 Dec. 1995; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Dec. 1995c, 2; High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996). In February 1996 INFORM reported a "poor" response by displaced civilians

from the Valikamam area to government attempts to persuade them to go back home during the month (Feb. 1996, 6). However, according to the Sri Lankan government, 200,000-250,000 people displaced in late 1995 have returned to their homes, mainly in Jaffna town and the Valikaman area, since Operation Riviresa II began in April 1996 (High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996; *The Economist* 11-17 May 1996, 34). According to government figures as of 7 May 1996, 460 public servants and 180 "pensioners" had returned to Jaffna to restore civilian administration there (ibid.). In addition, certain government ministries involved in rehabilitation work have sent some of their staff to the area, and 40 doctors have returned to Jaffna Hospital, which is reportedly ready to reopen (ibid.).^[13]

outhbound civilians arriving in Vavuniya reportedly have to wait several days or weeks while the authorities perform security checks on them (IPS 10 Jan. 1996; INFORM Mar. 1996, 5). According to one source, they first receive temporary three-hour passes, which allow them to contact friends and relatives in the south, and then undergo further checks before they can take the train southwards (IPS 10 Jan. 1996). INFORM states that after being checked people are "passed through 3 detention centers" and can only leave when they "satisfy the authorities of their reasons for travelling" (Mar. 1996, 5). Another source says some people have complained of having to show "sponsor letters" to go to Colombo (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1996c, 2). Some have also complained of being harassed at army checkpoints and of poor conditions at transit camps (INFORM Feb. 1996, 5-6).

Several sources report LTTE extortion of displaced civilians in Vadamaratchi, Kilinochchi and Vanni to finance its war effort (*Tamil Times* 15 Feb. 1996d, 16-17; *The Toronto Star* 23 Nov. 1995). In mid-January 1996 *Tamil Times* reported that since 21 December 1995, the cost of LTTE travel passes has ranged from Rs.200 (Cdn\$5) to Rs.1000 (Cdn\$25) (15 Jan. 1996, 6). In an attempt to prevent aid from falling into LTTE hands the government announced in early November 1995 that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would henceforth have to operate through the government to provide relief to displaced persons in the north (*The Globe and Mail* 7 Nov. 1995, A-12; *The New York Times* 8 Nov. 1995; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Dec. 1995b, 2). In addition, in late December 1995 the government issued a directive to financial institutions to withhold cash destined for LTTE-controlled areas in the north (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Dec. 1995d, 3).

Sources report the LTTE has not allowed young people to leave areas in the north under its control (*The Toronto Star* 23 Nov. 1995; *Tamil Times* 15 Feb. 1996d, 17; FIDH Jan. 1996, 25).^[14] *Country Reports 1995* adds that people who are allowed to travel must "leave all their property in escrow" and family members are often prevented from leaving at the same time to ensure that people return to LTTE-controlled areas (1996, 1358). The LTTE has also prevented people from returning to government-controlled Jaffna (*Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1358; Xinhua 21 Dec. 1995; *Tamil Times* 15 Feb. 1996b, 9). Instead, it has encouraged displaced persons to resettle in the Vanni area (see section 4) (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Dec. 1995b, 2). In Vadamarachchi the Tigers have reportedly clashed with civilians unhappy with LTTE travel restrictions (BBC Summary 17 Dec. 1995). In December 1995 *The Sri Lanka Monitor* reported that five displaced Tamils had disappeared after arguing with LTTE members (Dec. 1995a, 1), and according to other sources, several displaced persons warned the LTTE they would launch a death fast if the movement did not let them return to Jaffna (Xinhua 21 Dec. 1995; *Asian Political News* 25 Dec. 1995). In a 23 April 1996 telephone interview, Professor Bruce Matthews of Acadia University stated that no death fast had occurred. Despite LTTE travel restrictions, as mentioned earlier, between 200,000 and 250,000 people have reportedly returned to the Jaffna

peninsula since Operation Riviresa II began on 19 April 1996 (High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996).

3.2 The East

Human rights violations by government security forces in the east in 1995 included using civilians as mine detectors and human shields against attacks by the LTTE, arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and torture of Tamils (HRW/A July 1995, 2; *The Globe and Mail* 10 June 1995, A10; *Tamil Information* May-June 1995, 1). Human Rights Watch reports eyewitness accounts of the security forces "rounding up civilians from refugee camps and forcing them to march ahead of government troops into LTTE gunfire or through mine fields. Execution has been threatened of those who try to escape" (HRW/A July 1995, 8). Moreover, in June 1995 *The Sri Lanka Monitor* stated that the "'white van' associated with disappearances and death squads" during the previous regime had reappeared in Trincomalee town (June 1995, 2). By September 1995, at least 15 civilians had been forced into white vans in the area, according to this source (ibid. Sept. 1995c, 3).

In retaliation against a LTTE attack that killed two soldiers, government security forces killed 24 Tamil civilians and injured 25 in Kumarapuram village, Trincomalee District on 11 February 1996 (*Tamil Times* 15 Mar. 1996c, 29; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Feb. 1996b, 3; INFORM Feb. 1996, 4). A government-led investigation resulted in the conviction of 14 soldiers responsible for the killing (see section 2) (ibid.; *Tamil Times* 15 Mar. 1996c, 29; Reuters 26 Feb. 1996).

In 1995 the LTTE carried out several killings of Sinhalese and Muslim civilians in the east in an apparent effort to undermine the government's peace initiatives by exacerbating ethnic tensions (IPS 26 May 1995; *Country Reports 1995 1996*, 1354; MIRJE Oct. 1995, 4). For example, on 26 May 1995 in Dimbulagala, Polonnaruwa District the LTTE killed a well-known Buddhist monk, Kithalagama Seelalankara, who had publicly criticized the LTTE, ordained some Tamils as Buddhist monks, and encouraged Sinhalese settlement in the area (IPS 26 May 1995; AFP 26 May 1995; *India Abroad* 8 Dec. 1995a). On the same day the LTTE also killed 42 Sinhalese and Muslim civilians in Kallarawa village in eastern Trincomalee (*Country Reports 1995 1996*, 1354; AI Sept. 1995; IPS 26 May 1995; AFP 26 May 1995). In late October 1995 the LTTE carried out a series of civilian killings in the east (*Keesing's* Oct. 1995, 40777; MIRJE Oct. 1995, 1). In one incident some women were reportedly raped before being killed (ibid., 3).

Muslims in Kattankudy in Batticaloa District were reportedly threatened with death by the LTTE if they did not leave their homes by 1 July 1995 (Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation 19 June 1995, 56; AFP 21 July 1995). The government responded to these threats by expanding the paramilitary Muslim and Sinhalese Home Guards in war-affected areas in the north and east (*Country Reports 1995 1996*, 1352; AI July 1995a, 4).

Besides targeting Sinhalese and Muslim civilians, the LTTE has also threatened Tamils working for the government and attacked members of rival Tamil political groups (*India Abroad* 1 Sept. 1995, 14; INFORM Feb. 1996, 5; BBC Summary 31 Dec. 1995). For example, on 1 September 1995 *India Abroad* reported that the LTTE had issued an ultimatum to Tamil public office holders and Tamil police personnel in the east to drop their posts immediately or risk being killed (1 Sept. 1995, 14). In addition, the LTTE killed at least five members of other Tamil groups, including TELO and PLOTE, in the last week of December 1995 (BBC Summary 31 Dec. 1995). Furthermore, INFORM reports that in February 1996 LTTE "hit squads" executed

opponents in the Trincomalee area and continued attacks against rival Tamil groups' members and offices (Feb. 1996, 5).^[15]

The LTTE has continued to launch attacks against army personnel, having intensified its operations in the east following the capture of Jaffna in early December 1995 (*Le Monde* 26 Mar. 1996, 5; INFORM Mar. 1996, 3; *The New York Times* 7 Apr. 1996, 3). In mid-January 1996 the government tightened security in Trincomalee in response to LTTE skirmishes in the area (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1996f, 3).

In mid-January 1996 government security forces launched Operation Sun Eclipse to overrun LTTE camps in the Thoppigala jungles south of Batticaloa (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1996d, 3). The security forces reportedly captured 25 LTTE camps in the operation (*ibid.*; Reuters 20 Jan. 1996). Nonetheless, in late January 1996 the LTTE's deputy leader, Karikalan, claimed that the LTTE controlled 80 per cent of Batticaloa District (*Tamil Times* 15 Feb. 1996b, 8).

3.3 The Centre

Following the arrest of a senior LTTE cadre on 11 August 1995 in Maho a security forces' officer declared that the LTTE had infiltrated Plantation Tamils in the Hill Country districts (Reuters 17 Aug. 1995). The FIDH states that, despite their different historical backgrounds, Plantation Tamils are "systematically suspected of complicity" with northern Tamils (Jan. 1996, 13). In May and June 1995 the security forces reportedly carried out searches and arrests in Tamil homes and on estates in the Hill Country (*Tamil Information* May-June 1995, 2). In September 1995, *The Sri Lanka Monitor* reported that Plantation Tamils were increasingly subjected to violence and arrests "for merely talking in Tamil in public" (Sept. 1995b, 2). On 12 November 1995 in Kandy town police arrested six young Tamil Jesuit priests suspected of having links with the LTTE (AFP 13 Nov. 1995). They were reportedly released at the end of November 1995 (High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996). In December 1995 *The Sri Lanka Monitor* reported continuing search operations and arrests in the central districts (Dec. 1995e, 4). Nonetheless, Professor Matthews states that Plantation Tamils are "reasonably safe" (23 Apr. 1996).

3.4 The South

Despite tightened security to prevent LTTE attacks in the south after the cease-fire collapsed, on 5 June 1995 a bomb partially exploded in a parking lot at the international airport at Katunayake, 35 kilometres north of Colombo; no one was hurt (AFP 6 June 1995). The Ellalan Force, believed to be a front organization of the LTTE, claimed responsibility for the attack (*Keesing's* June 1995, 40603; Reuters 5 Aug. 1995). The government responded by bringing areas around the airport under the state of emergency already applicable in other parts of the country (see section 2) (All India Radio Network 9 June 1995).

The Ellalan Force has warned tourists to stay away from Sri Lanka saying that it would launch further attacks on the airport and in Colombo if the government did not look into the killings of Tamils in eastern Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation 20 June 1995; Reuters 5 Aug. 1995). Further, in a letter dated 30 July 1995 the group warned foreigners "not to import Sri Lankan goods, not to build hotels in Sri Lanka or be involved in any co-production or development projects" while the government pursued its military offensive in the north (*ibid.*).

Another bomb attack on a bus at the main bus station in Pettah on 9 June 1995 injured around four people (AFP 11 June 1995). This was followed by a bomb explosion across from a police checkpoint at the Galle Face Centre Road on 11 June 1995 (ibid.). It is not clear who was responsible for this series of attacks, although the security forces have blamed the LTTE (ibid.). The LTTE is also suspected of having killed 19 civilians in Kotiyagala village in October 1995, an incident described by *India Today* as "just one in a chain of killings of Sinhalese civilians carried out all over the country" (30 Nov. 1995).

On 2 June 1995 28 mainly Tamil-owned shops in Galle south of Colombo were set alight by around 1,000 people (*Lanka Guardian* 15 Sept. 1995, 3; UPI 5 June 1995; AFP 3 June 1995). These attacks were reportedly in reprisal for the LTTE assassination of a Buddhist monk in Dimubulaga in the east (see subsection 3.2) (ibid.). Agence France Presse reports that "rival business interests" at the market in Galle apparently planned the attacks (ibid.).^[16] While the police had a somewhat delayed response to the incidents, the government later promised compensation to the victims (*Lanka Guardian* 15 Sept. 1995, 3-4), imposed an indefinite curfew in the south and tightened security throughout Sri Lanka to prevent the spread of violence and ensure a peaceful funeral for the monk in Dimubulaga (AFP 3 June 1995).

Southern Sri Lanka witnessed a proliferation of strikes in mid-December 1994 (*Le Monde diplomatique* Feb. 1996, 40). Labour unrest combined with student agitation at several universities over the same period raised fears of a resurgence of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)^[17] in the south (*Le Monde diplomatique* Feb. 1996, 40; *The Economist* 15-21 Apr. 1995, 37; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Dec. 1994, 4). The government reportedly created special police units in the south to control worker unrest and a police intelligence unit to deal with the alleged JVP threat (ibid.).

At the end of 1994 and in early 1995 the JVP reportedly put up posters in Colombo and the south criticizing the economic policies of the government and calling on the government, among other things, to release political prisoners (ibid.; *The Economist* 15-21 Apr. 1995, 37; INFORM Feb. 1995, 10). JVP posters in areas surrounding Katunayake, Seeduwa, Ja-Ela, Kandana and Mahabage also called on the government to put an end to labour unrest in the region, to dismantle the special police units set up to counter the unrest, and to probe the assassination in 1989 of former JVP leader, Rohana Wijeweera (*The Island* 31 Jan. 1995). In late January 1995 the police arrested four JVP members putting up posters in these areas but released them on the same day (ibid.).

INFORM reports complaints by the Janatha Mithuro^[18] group on 10 February 1995 that JVP members had assaulted them in Galle (Feb. 1995, 10). A 24 September 1995 Reuters report states JVP members may also be responsible for a series of robberies of temples and antiques in the south which appear to have been used to purchase arms. While sources indicate that the JVP has reemerged (Matthews 23 Apr. 1996; Singer 25 Apr. 1996; BBC Summary 10 Apr. 1996; Canadian High Commission Jan. 1996b, 7), in January 1996 the Canadian High Commission in Colombo reported that there was "no evidence" of a current JVP threat nor of the security forces "persecuting members of the JVP past or present" (ibid.).

3.5 Colombo

Between May and August 1995 21 mutilated bodies believed to be those of Tamils were discovered floating in rivers and lakes in Colombo and surrounding areas (*Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1353; IPS 31 Aug. 1995; Reuters 28 Aug. 1995). While some of the corpses showed

evidence of starvation and torture, the LTTE claimed some also had organs, such as eyes and kidneys, removed (Reuters 28 Aug. 1995). According to the British Refugee Council, these and other killings in Colombo were carried out by "secret death squads linked to the Sri Lankan police" (Oct. 1995, 1). *Tamil Information* adds that these "death squads" abduct Tamils in white vans (July-Aug.-Sept. 1995, 16). Between 20 and 22 members of the security forces, who were arrested in connection with such killings, were released on bail in February 1996 (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Feb. 1996c, 4; INFORM Feb. 1996, 9).

Since the government revealed its devolution package on 3 August 1995, the LTTE has launched at least three major suicide bombings^[19] in Colombo. On 7 August 1995 a LTTE suicide bomber killed 21 people and injured around 40 in front of the offices of the chief minister of the Western province in Colombo (*FEER* 17 Aug. 1995; *Libération* 8 Aug. 1995, 7). On 20 October 1995, as government security forces pursued their offensive in Jaffna, the LTTE launched an attack against a large oil storage facility on the capital's outskirts, killing 25 people and destroying over 150,000 tons of crude oil and kerosene (IPS 23 Oct. 1995; *Libération* 20 Oct. 1995, 12). This was followed by a LTTE suicide bomb attack on the Central Bank in the heart of Colombo's business district on 31 January 1996 that left 86 dead and between 1,400 and 1,500 wounded, and destroyed several buildings (Reuters 1 Feb. 1996; Reuters 2 Feb. 1996; *Libération* 5 Feb. 1996, 11; *Time* 12 Feb. 1996; AP 3 Feb. 1996; *Tamil Times* 15 Feb. 1996a, 3). This bombing has been interpreted as an attack on the country's economy aimed at deterring foreign investors (*ibid.*; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1996a, 1). The LTTE attempted another suicide attack on 12 April 1996 also with the reported intention of further destabilizing the economy (*Daily News* 12 Apr. 1996; Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation 12 Apr. 1996). This attack targeting ships in Colombo harbour was foiled by the Sri Lankan navy (*ibid.*; *Daily News* 12 Apr. 1996; *ibid.* 16 Apr. 1996).

In the aftermath of the Central Bank explosion, the government tightened security in Colombo (*Tamil Times* 15 Mar. 1996b, 5). On 15 March 1996 *Tamil Times* reported that Colombo "is now under a siege mentality with increased checkpoints, roadblocks and armed patrols" (*ibid.*). LTTE attacks in Colombo and its vicinity have prompted regular police sweeps of Tamil-inhabited areas (British Refugee Council Oct. 1995, 2; INFORM Mar. 1996, 5). For example, INFORM reports that some 400 people were arrested in Colombo on 7 February 1996, one week after the Central Bank bombing (Feb. 1996, 7).^[20] According to the British Refugee Council, displaced Tamils living in lodges^[21] in Kotahena and Wellawatte, among others, are particularly vulnerable to arrest and Tamils without national identity cards are "routinely detained" with detainees often suffering "ill-treatment, assault and extortion" at the hands of the security forces (Oct. 1995, 2). According to Professor Bruce Matthews of Acadia University, young Tamil men continue to be the group most at risk of arrest and detention in Colombo (23 Apr. 1996). However, arrests of Tamil women increased in 1995, particularly in September when the government suspected the presence of a LTTE female suicide squad in Colombo (Canadian High Commission Jan. 1996b, 3). According to Professor Matthews, the elderly are not specifically targeted by the security forces, although they may find it more difficult to endure the humiliation of being arrested for identity checks (23 Apr. 1996). Reportedly, even people with proper identification are subject to arrest (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Nov. 1995, 4). Although the police keep a record of people detained while checks on their identity are made, this record is not made readily available to all police stations, with the result that people may be detained several times (Canadian High Commission Jan. 1996b, 3). Moreover, displaced Tamils in Colombo have reportedly complained of being robbed by police and "police imposters" (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Dec. 1995e, 4).

While highlighting the volatility of the Sri Lankan situation and the difficulties faced by Tamils in Colombo, a January 1996 report by the Canadian High Commission in Colombo states that Tamils in Colombo do not face "significant risk" of "'irreparable' harm" (1996c, 5). Similarly, after the Central Bank bombing, an official with the UNHCR in Colombo cited in a February 1996 report by the Canadian High Commission in Colombo reaffirmed the UNHCR'S position that rejected Sri Lankan asylum-seekers in the West could be returned to Sri Lanka "with prudence" (see subsection 5.2) (Feb. 1996, 2). Professor Matthews believes that Tamils are generally safe in Colombo, although he emphasizes the possibility that a few Tamils may risk being killed (23 Apr. 1996).

In January 1996 the Canadian High Commission in Colombo reported that, since mid-summer 1995, Muslims in Colombo "have come under closer scrutiny" by the security forces, as some Tamil rebels have dressed as Muslims to divert the security forces' attention (Jan. 1996b, 6; see also *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Oct. 1995b, 4). An article in the October 1995 issue of *The Sri Lanka Monitor* states that "a number of Tamil girls dressed as Muslims have been arrested which police say is the latest Tiger strategy" (Oct. 1995b, 4). Reportedly, some Tamil civilians have also attempted to pass for Muslims in order to make work arrangements in the Middle East (Canadian High Commission Jan. 1996b, 6-7). According to *Tamil Times*, the Sri Lankan state radio indicated on 29 February 1996 that some 20 LTTE cadres were also disguised as Buddhist monks in Colombo (15 Mar. 1996b, 5).

NOTES

[10] Funding for the organization also comes in the form of LTTE taxes imposed on Tamil businesses and factories in Colombo (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Sept. 1995e, 4) and from Tamils living abroad (ibid. June 1995b, 4; INFORM Sept. 1995, 5), with Tamils in Canada among the "biggest contributors," according to the Sri Lankan government (Reuters 14 Oct. 1995). The LTTE reportedly has a total annual revenue of over \$20 million (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Apr. 1995b, 3), with up to \$1 million a month coming from Canada (*Maclean's* 29 Apr. 1996, 23). [\[back\]](#)

[11] Based on information provided by relief agencies, the U.S. Committee for Refugees indicates that by mid-December 1995 there were around 91 welfare centres in the districts of Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar and Vavuniya (Mar. 1996, 5). In January 1996 INFORM reported that in the Vanni District 115 schools had become welfare centres (Jan. 1996, 6). [\[back\]](#)

[12] It is not clear whether it is the government or the LTTE which runs some camps in the north. While the government provides most of the food distributed to displaced persons (USCR Mar. 1996, 7), in December 1995 *The Sri Lanka Monitor* indicated that the LTTE has directed that all relief aid must go through the LTTE-founded Tamil Refugees' Organization (TRO) (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Dec. 1995a, 1). Moreover, the UTHR(J) reports that the TRO has been leading efforts to resettle displaced persons in Vadamaratchi, Thenmaratchi and Vanni (*Tamil Times* 15 Feb. 1996d, 17). [\[back\]](#)

[13] The hospital was closed in November 1995 during Operation Riviresa after its staff and equipment were moved to the Point Pedro area (*Tamil Times* 15 Nov. 1995a, 4). [\[back\]](#)

[14] Sources vary on the age range of young people prevented from leaving LTTE-controlled areas: a 23 November 1995 article in *The Toronto Star* states that people between 13 and 24 years of age are not allowed to leave these areas, while the UTHR(J) states the LTTE does not allow people aged 12 to 30 years to leave the north (*Tamil Times* 15 Feb. 1996d, 17). The FIDH states that people between the ages of 10 and 45 cannot leave LTTE-controlled areas (Jan. 1996, 25). A 21 December 1995 Reuters report cites one northern civilian as saying that people aged 12 to 40 years can only obtain LTTE passes if they have a "significant reason" to leave. [\[back\]](#)

[15] A 13 October 1995 news report indicates that, since 1986, the LTTE has killed over 3,000 Tamil political activists, the majority of whom the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) claims were its members (BBC Summary 13 Oct. 1995). [\[back\]](#)

[16] The source adds that minority Tamils control the wholesale trade in the area (AFP 3 June 1995). [\[back\]](#)

[17] A JVP-led insurgency in the south between 1987 and 1990 attempted and failed to overthrow the Sri Lankan state (Minority Rights Group International Feb. 1996, 7, 42). For more information on the JVP, please see the March 1995 DIRB Question and Answer Series paper *Sri Lanka: Internal Flight Alternatives—An Update*, p. 4. [\[back\]](#)

[18] Information on this group is scant and its links with the JVP are unclear. In one reference to the group, Professor Matthews stated in January 1995 that the JVP "continues to express at least some of its sentiments through such organizations as the Jathika chintanaya ('national ideology') movement in the universities and the *Janatha Mithuro* ('People's Friends') Party in the south" (19 Jan. 1995, 9). [\[back\]](#)

[19] LTTE members who undertake suicide missions are known as Black Tigers (*Tamil Times* 15 Mar. 1996b, 5; UTHR(J) 4 Sept. 1995; *Maclean's* 18 Mar. 1996, 41). An 18 March 1996 *Maclean's* article indicates that 250 Tigers have carried out suicide attacks since the first in July 1987 (ibid.). The article states that the LTTE does "not seek out specific candidates for suicide missions. Recruitment is broadly based, and non-coercive...One in five trainees eventually volunteers to be a Black Tiger, prepared to actively seek death. They are taken for special instruction, then returned to camp with a black head- or arm-band. Before a suicide mission, Black Tigers go to a secret location where they draw lots. The 'winner' is taken for a meal with Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. Tiger journals publish photos of the auspicious meeting after the martyrdom. The dead are also glorified at large monuments. Their families are given special treatment for life. And each year in late November, the entire Tamil region marks Great Heroes Week" (ibid.). [\[back\]](#)

[20] For additional information on the situation in Colombo since the bombing of the Central Bank, please see the 29 April 1996 DIRB Response to Information Request LKA23626. [\[back\]](#)

[21] The Canadian High Commission notes that, while the police have closed some lodges, new lodges have been opened, mainly in the Pettah area (Jan. 1996c, 4). [\[back\]](#)

4. RESETTLEMENT IN THE NORTH AND EAST

In March 1995 the government announced a plan to resettle displaced Tamils in 22 or 23 model resettlement villages around Trincomalee (INFORM Mar. 1995, 7; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Mar. 1995a, 4; Xinhua 15 Mar. 1995). According to the plan, resettlers are to receive Rs.7,000 (Cdn\$175) to build temporary shelters, another Rs.7,000 to purchase food and agricultural tools, and a grant of Rs.25,000 (Cdn\$625) to build permanent houses out of temporary shelters (INFORM Mar. 1995, 7; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Mar. 1995a, 4; Xinhua 15 Mar. 1995). The first model village with at least 600 new Tamil inhabitants opened on 5 March 1995 at Kappalthurai (ibid.). The Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation reported on 23 July 1995 that in the east 177 families each had received Rs.25,000 (Cdn\$625) worth of relief aid and another 800 were to be given Samrdi^[22] benefits. Some February 1996 reports indicate that around 500 displaced Tamils in Trincomalee were allegedly forced by the military to leave UNHCR-run transit camps and resettle in Kuchchaveli and Nilaweli villages (INFORM Feb. 1996, 6; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Feb. 1996b, 3; AFP 26 Feb. 1996).

The LTTE appears actively engaged in resettling displaced persons in LTTE-controlled areas in the north (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Dec. 1995b, 2). In December 1995 *The Sri Lanka Monitor* reported that in the Vanni area the LTTE was allocating land for cultivation to displaced persons from Jaffna, which was causing "tension with local people" (ibid.). The source added, "the Tigers are emptying Vanni schools of refugees and setting up work brigades to clear the jungles for new settlements" (ibid.).

NOTE

[22] Samrdi is a comprehensive plan for the eradication of poverty launched by the government in August 1995. According to the Sri Lankan government, 1,201,329 people throughout Sri Lanka have qualified to receive these benefits,

which include Rs.1,000 (Cdn\$25) per month for the poorest and Rs.500 (Cdn\$12.50) per month for the others (High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996). On 7 May 1996 an official at the High Commission of Sri Lanka said these benefits would be extended to people in newly captured areas in the Jaffna peninsula (ibid.). [\[back\]](#)

5. REPATRIATION

5.1 From India

Following visits to three refugee camps in the state of Tamil Nadu, south India in 1994, the Indian National Human Rights Commission stated that refugees were not forcibly returned to Sri Lanka and many expressed their desire to return soon (*The Island* 21 Dec. 1994). In contrast, the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC) based in New Delhi reported in 1995 that police harassment and poor camp conditions put pressure on refugees to repatriate (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Sept. 1995d, 4). Indian sympathy for Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka has reportedly declined since the suspected LTTE assassination of former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 (*India Abroad* 12 Jan. 1996).^[23]

Improvements in the security situation during the cease-fire in the first quarter of 1995 prompted many Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India to return to Sri Lanka under the UNHCR-monitored India-Sri Lanka repatriation programme, which resumed on 27 February 1995 (IPS 16 Mar. 1995; *The Sri Lanka Monitor* Feb. 1995a, 4; UNHCR 24 Feb. 1995). In a 24 February 1995 statement the UNHCR indicated it would continue to interview all families before they left India to confirm the voluntary nature of returns and assist those wishing to return to their home areas in either LTTE- or government-controlled territory.

In February and March 1995 more than 10,000 refugees left south India for Sri Lanka (Canadian High Commission Feb. 1996, 2). Half of them moved into three camps on Mannar Island (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Mar. 1995a, 4; Canadian High Commission Jan. 1996b, 7). *The Sri Lanka Monitor* has reported "serious housing and water shortages at Talaimannar Railway Station camp and Kathaspathri Welfare Centre" (Mar. 1995a, 4). Refugees have also complained that customs officials in Trincomalee confiscated most of their possessions (IPS 16 Mar. 1995). Although another 10,000 Sri Lankan refugees were due to repatriate from India in September 1995, the Sri Lankan government asked that this be postponed (Canadian High Commission Feb. 1996, 2). Apparently, no repatriation has been planned for the first half of 1996 (ibid.), although an official at the High Commission of Sri Lanka indicated that repatriation would continue in 1996 (High Commission of Sri Lanka 7 May 1996).

5.2 From the West

In a 3 February 1995 statement the UNHCR indicated that, despite the truce in effect at the time, the Sri Lankan situation remained fragile, and, therefore, recommended that rejected asylum-seekers from the West be repatriated "with prudence" (3 Feb. 1995, 1).^[24] The organization has maintained this position since the hostilities resumed (ibid. 23 June 1995; Canadian High Commission Feb. 1996, Appendix A).

The governments of Switzerland and Sri Lanka signed an accord on 12 January 1994 to repatriate rejected Sri Lankan Tamil asylum-seekers in Switzerland since 1992^[25] (UCSR 1995, 108). The accord formally expired in December 1995 but was renewed for another two-year period beginning 2 April 1996 (BBC Summary 10 Apr. 1996; Xinhua 3 Apr. 1996). According to the British Refugee Council, in mid-February 1995 Swiss government representatives visited Colombo to arrange the repatriation of 35,000 Tamil asylum-seekers from Switzerland under the

Swiss-Sri Lankan repatriation accord (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Feb. 1995a, 4). This contrasts with a report in the January 1995 issue of the *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, which states that, while Switzerland has granted refugee status to only 280 Tamils out of a total Tamil refugee population of 25,000, it planned to issue "humanitarian residence permits" to around 10,000 (*Swiss Review of World Affairs* Jan. 1995, 15, 18). By the end of September 1995, the Swiss government had reportedly returned 355 Sri Lankan Tamils under the accord (*Journal de Genève et Gazette de Lausanne* 27 Oct. 1995). The Swiss government reportedly suspended its repatriation programme after the war in the north intensified in the fall of 1995 (*The Vancouver Sun* 4 Nov. 1995). By February 1996 a total of 390 asylum-seekers had been returned since June 1994, according to information provided by the Canadian High Commission in Colombo (Feb. 1996, 2).

The Norwegian government, which had planned to repatriate some 300 rejected Sri Lankan asylum-seekers, sent three back to Sri Lanka in January 1995 (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Jan. 1995a, 4). In January 1996 *The Sri Lanka Monitor* reported France might begin a repatriation programme affecting some 35,000 refugees from Sri Lanka (Jan. 1996h, 4). A French delegation reportedly met with the Sri Lankan government in Sri Lanka in early May 1996 to discuss the possibility of an agreement to repatriate rejected Sri Lankan asylum-seekers in France (Reuters 13 May 1996).

NOTES

[23] In early June 1995 the government began processing India's request for the extradition of LTTE leader Prabhakaran, his intelligence chief Pottu Amman and women's wing leader Akila, all of whom India has accused of orchestrating Rajiv Gandhi's killing (AFP 4 June 1995). November 1995 reports indicate Akila was killed while fighting against the military invasion of Jaffna (*The Sri Lanka Monitor* Nov. 1995b, 3; *FEER* 23 Nov. 1995, 15). [\[back\]](#)

[24] The Canadian High Commission notes that, in a departure from previous statements on the situation in Sri Lanka, in its 3 February 1995 statement the UNHCR removed "the cautionary provision that failed asylum seekers be returned only if family or friends are permanently established in Colombo" (Feb. 1996, 2). [\[back\]](#)

[25] For details on this accord, please see the March 1995 DIRB Question and Answer Series paper *Sri Lanka: Internal Flight Alternatives—An Update*, p. 31. [\[back\]](#)

6. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Deputy Defense Minister Anurudha Ratwatte declared in mid-1995 that the government would defeat the LTTE within one year (IPS 29 June 1995). Although the government scored major military victories with the capture of Jaffna town in early December 1995 (*Lanka Guardian* 15 Jan. 1996, 1) and other areas in the Jaffna peninsula in late April 1996 (*The Economist* 11-17 May 1996, 34-35), according to an article in the 11-17 May 1996 issue of *The Economist*, the LTTE has not yet been defeated:

no one is ruling out the military threat the rebels continue to pose. Military observers say although the Tigers have lost considerable ground in this latest offensive, their ability to wage a guerrilla war has remained intact. They still control the northern tip of the island and operate freely in the east... (ibid., 35).

Moreover, the government has yet to consolidate its support among the Tamil people (ibid., 34-35), while maintaining its popularity with the Sinhalese majority (*Lanka Guardian* 15 Jan. 1996, 1).

APPENDIX I: AUTHORIZED PLACES OF DETENTION (as of 15 December 1994)

Places of Detention	Address
1. 6 th Floor, New Secretariat Building	Colombo 1
2. 4 th Floor, New Secretariat Building	Colombo 1
3. C.D.B. Headquarters	No. 50, Gregory's Road, Colombo 7
4. Security Co-ordinating Division	No. 32, Malalasekara Mawatha, Colombo 7
5. Wattala Police Station	Wattala
6. Ja-ela Police Station	Ja-ela
7. Wellampitiya Police Station	Wellampitiya
8. Welikada Police Station	Welikada
9. Mirihana Police Station	Mirihana
10. Negombo Police Station	Negombo
11. Kochchikade Police Station	Kochchikade
12. Pamunugama Police Station	Pamunugama
13. Harbour Police Station	Colombo
14. Foreshore Police Station	Colombo
15. Modara Police Station	Modara
16. Kotahena Police Station	Kotahena
17. Dematagoda Police Station	Dematagoda
18. Grandpass Police Station	Grandpass, Colombo
19. Fort Police Station	Fort, Colombo
20. Slave-Island Police Station	Slave-Island
21. Maradana Police Station	Maradana
22. Pettah Police Station	Pettah
23. Keselwatta Police Station	Keselwatta, Pettah
24. Maligawatta Police Station	Maligawatta, Maradana
25. Borella Police Station	Borella
26. Narahenpita Police Station	Narahenpita
27. Kirulapone Police Station	Kirulapone
28. Cinnamon Garden Police Station	Colombo 7
29. Colpetty Police Station	Colpetty
30. Bambalapitiya Police Station	Bambalapitiya
31. Wellawatta Police Station	Wellawatta
32. Special Task Force Camp	Akkaraipattu
33. Special Task Force Camp	Karativu
34. Special Task Force Camp	Kaluwanchchikudy
35. Special Task Force Camp	Thirukkivil
36. Prison Camp	Batticaloa
37. Security Co-ordinating Unit Office	Vavuniya
38. Batticaloa Police Station	Batticaloa
39. Aralaganwila Police Station	Aralaganwila
40. Welikanda Police Station	Welikanda
41. Vavuniya Police Station	Vavuniya
42. Mannar Police Station	Mannar
43. Kantale Police Station	Kantale
44. Kayts Police Station	Kayts
45. K.K.S. Police Station	K.K.S.
46. Trincomalee Police Station	Trincomalee
47. Uppuweli Police Station	Uppuweli
48. Chinabay Police Station	Chinabay
49. Trinco Harbour Police Station	Trincomalee
50. Mutur Police Station	Mutur
51. Kuchchiweli Police Station	Kuchchiweli
52. Ampara Police Station	Ampara

53. Inginiyagala Police Station	Inginiyagala
54. Damana Police Station	Damana
55. Uhana Police Station	Uhana
56. Bakkiella Police Station	Bakkiella
57. Central Camp Police Station	Ampara
58. Mahaoya Police Station	Mahaoya
59. Dehiattakandiya Police Station	Dehiattakandiya
60. Kalmunai Police Station	Kalmunai
61. Sammanthurai Police Station	Sammanthurai
62. Akkaraipattu Police Station	Akkaraipattu
63. Pottuvil Police Station	Pottuvil
64. Nochchiyagama Police Station	Nochchiyagama
65. Medawachchiya Police Station	Medawachchiya
66. Vilachchiya Police Station	Vilachchiya
67. Kebithigollewa Police Station	Kebithigollewa
68. Padaviya Police Station	Padaviya
69. Pulmuddai Police Station	Pulmuddai
70. Wanathavilluwa Police Station	Wanathavilluwa
71. Kalpitiya Police Station	Kalpitiya
72. Dehiwala Police Station	Dehiwala
73. Mt. Lavinia Police Station	Mt. Lavinia
74. Kohuwala Police Station	Kohuwala
75. Police Post	Sri Saranankara Road, Dehiwala
76. Army Detention Camp	Thalladi, Mannar
77. Army Detention Camp	Thandikum, Vavuniya
78. Army Detention Camp	Palaly, Vasavilan
79. Army Detention Camp	Weli-Oya
80. Hardy Detention Camp	Ampara
81. Poonani Army Detention Camp	Poonani

Source: The Nadesan Centre. September 1995. *Arrest and Detention Under the Current Emergency Regulations*. 3rd ed. "Appendix 3." Colombo: The Nadesan Centre.

APPENDIX II: NOTES ON SELECTED SOURCES

Canadian High Commission in Colombo (External Affairs):

Reports by the Canadian High Commission in Colombo are based on field officers' personal observations and discussions with Sri Lankan government officials, NGO representatives and representatives of the UNHCR. For further information on the purpose of these reports and the sources on which they are based, please consult each report individually.

Matthews, Bruce:

Bruce Matthews is a professor of Comparative Religion at Acadia University in Wolfville, Nova Scotia. He has published several essays on Sri Lanka. On 19 January 1995 Professor Matthews gave a presentation to the IRB in Toronto, a transcript of which is available at IRB regional documentation centres. In June 1995 he visited Sri Lanka to study the circumstances of the reengagement of the civil war, particularly government counterinsurgency operations. His findings have not been published.

Sri Lanka Information Monitor (INFORM):

INFORM is a Colombo-based human rights organization founded in 1988 that monitors and documents human rights violations in Sri Lanka. It monitors the Sri Lankan daily press in all information related to human rights, and occasionally commissions independent reports on

particular cases. It produces the monthly *Situation Report*, which is widely distributed in Sri Lanka and abroad. INFORM also organizes training programmes for local human rights groups on techniques for cataloguing, storing and retrieving information as well as on human rights network building.

Tamil Information:

Tamil Information is a monthly bulletin produced by the Tamil Information Centre (TIC), a London-based human rights organization founded in July 1993. The bulletin provides information on human rights violations and the situation of Tamils in Sri Lanka, focusing particularly on arrests, torture, killings and disappearances. The organization's sources of information include Sri Lankan NGOs and newspapers as well as contacts in Sri Lanka and abroad.

Tamil Times:

Tamil Times is an independent monthly review of Sri Lankan current affairs founded in Surrey, UK in 1981.

University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) (UTHR(J)):

The University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), established in mid-1988, is a Sri Lankan human rights organization originally based in Jaffna but now in Colombo. A network with a membership composed of teachers from all Sri Lankan universities, the UTHR(J) is affiliated to the Federation of University Teachers' Associations (FUTA). The UTHR(J) seeks to promote debate on, and respect for, human rights in Jaffna and Sri Lanka, mainly through grassroots mobilization. It has produced a number of reports on human rights issues in Sri Lanka.

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