



**EU ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION  
TO SRI LANKA**

**Final Report of the European Union's Observation  
Mission to Sri Lanka's  
December 5, 2001  
Parliamentary Election**

# **FINAL REPORT**

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### **Section 1**

## **1. Executive Summary**

The October 2000 parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka, which the EU observed, resulted in a hung parliament. The governing People's Alliance (PA) coalition obtained 107 seats of the 225 and was able to stay in power with the support of two small Tamil and Muslim parties, Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) and National Unity alliance which had four seats each. Following frictions and tensions within the government six MPs defected to the opposition. Further political instability ensued and President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga dissolved the Sri Lankan Parliament on 10 October 2001, exactly one year after the previous election and called new elections for 5 December 2001.

The Sri Lanka's Commissioner of Elections, Mr. Dayananda Dissanayake once again invited the EU to send an Election Observation Mission. His invitation was accepted and a 55 strong team led by the same Chief Observer and deputy were deployed during the election campaign. Their experiences differed little from the 2000 election campaign and in some cases the situation was considerably worse. A significant contributory factor was the fact that the recommendations of the previous Election Observation Mission had not been acted upon.

At the end of the election campaign 43 people had been murdered as a result of political motivated violence according to official police statistics. Seventeen of these occurred on election day itself. Many more were injured in the 2000 plus incidents that had been reported. The primary source of the violence were the country's two largest parties who abysmally failed to give the necessary leadership to ensure that the campaign was conducted in an atmosphere free of violence and intimidation. In fact several leading figures made inflammatory and irresponsible speeches during the campaign which contributed to the violent atmosphere. This self inflicted damage to the democratic process was compounded by abuse of state resources, unequal access to the media, the political misuse of the police and the army and the existence of private armed groups.

On the positive side the Election Commissioner and his staff were well prepared and acted at all times in a thoroughly professional manner. The 17th Amendment to the Constitution which was passed on 24th September 2001 by 208 votes (the Tamil Parties did not participate in the vote) had strengthened the role of the Election Commissioner. This initiative arose out of an agreement between PA and the JVP outlined in a Memorandum of Understanding. The JVP agreed to support the government as long as it implemented the MOU particularly this proposed Constitutional Amendment to establish an independent Election Commission.

However, although the amendment was passed, the bodies envisaged under it were not set up. Encouragingly the Attorney General confirmed that the Commissioner of Elections could not only continue to exercise and perform the powers and functions vested in him immediately prior to the commencement of the Act but also that of the newly proposed Election Commission until that body was so constituted. Regrettably however the Election Commissioner's attempt to enforce provisions of the Act were thwarted during the election campaign.

Additionally during the penultimate week of the campaign a crude attempt was made by 8 government ministers to put pressure on the Election Commissioner alleging his unsuitability for office and accusing him of bias. Despite this and other pressures that were attempted to be exerted upon him, he exercised his mandate independently of pressure from the government and opposition and at all times acted with the utmost integrity.

## **Conclusions**

In delivering an overall verdict on the election two fundamental issues need to be addressed.

Firstly did the violence, abuses and attempted malpractice prevent the people of Sri Lanka from exercising their democratic rights?

Secondly, did these and other factors distort the election result?

The answer to the first question is no. This conclusion in no way excuses the unacceptable decision to close army checkpoints at Vavuniya and Batticaloa disenfranchising many thousands of voters. Nor does it ignore the thuggery, intimidation and attempted electoral malpractice which did take place. However despite the murders, the intimidation and the abuses, almost 80% of the voters of Sri Lanka turned out to exercise their right to vote. This is great testimony to their commitment to the democratic process - something which their elected representatives would do well to respect.

As regards the second question, although the EUEOM would have preferred that the Election Commissioner should have been supported by all the political parties in his desire to repoll affected districts, we recognise that any repoll would not have significantly affected the overall outcome which in our view did reflect the will of the electorate.

Again, like last year, we make similar recommendations (see Section 9) as to what measures should be taken to prevent the continued reoccurrence of the problems that were witnessed and reported to two EU missions.

Once again, we have to say that no matter how far reaching these recommendations are, no matter how many of them are implemented, unless all the political parties (and especially the incoming government) assume their collective responsibility and give moral leadership respecting the clear wishes of their people for free and fair elections, the fundamental principles of democracy will be destroyed.

We hope it is not yet too late.

## Section 2

## **2. Introduction and Acknowledgements**

On 18 October the COASI Council Working Group discussed the possibility of deploying an EU Election Observation Mission to Sri Lanka as was sent in 2000. All EU Heads of Mission represented in Colombo had previously expressed their support for such a Mission. The Commission informed the Presidency and the Member States that, in principle, such a mission would be politically advisable and useful provided essential components of the mission were in country at least three weeks prior to Election Day. Due to the short timeframe it was not possible to field an exploratory mission and, therefore, the European Commission Delegation to Colombo provided the background situation report for the mission.

The six member Core Team arrived in Sri Lanka between 10-16 November. Twelve Long Term Observers arrived on 19 November and 30 Short Term Observers arrived on Tuesday 27 November. (All members of the team left by December 10).

Following its arrival the Mission adopted a two-pronged strategy to create awareness of its presence and its role - use of the local media and undertaking a wide ranging series of meetings with relevant political parties, bodies and individuals. On all occasions great emphasis was placed on the independence and objectivity of the Mission and its strict policy of avoiding any involvement or appearance of involvement in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka.

The Mission through the person of the Chief Observer held three meetings with the Heads of Mission of the embassies of the Member States who are represented in Sri Lanka. These contacts were extremely useful and ensured regular contact and exchange of information.

The assistance of the EC Delegation office and all its staff particularly the Head of Delegation Ambassador Ilkka Uusitalo was invaluable to the Mission and was sincerely appreciated.

We also wish to express our appreciation to the election officials, representatives of political parties and members of the security forces who helped us in many different ways and who made our work here more efficient.

The EU Election Observation Mission has been fortunate to have the assistance of GTZ in Sri Lanka who provided logistical and back up support to the team.

Furthermore we would like to acknowledge the advice and assistance of the many NGOs we met but particular mention should be made of CMEV and PAFFREL. Their willingness to share information and to provide in-depth knowledge from their own observations was most useful.

Finally and most important of all we would like to take this opportunity to thank the people of Sri Lanka for their hospitality and the generosity shown to all the members of our team during our time here.

## **Section 3**

### 3. Background of the Mission

President Kumaratunga dissolved the Sri Lankan Parliament on October 10, 2001, exactly one year after the previous election, and announced new elections for 5 December 2001.

On 15 October, the Election Commissioner sent a standard invitation letter to foreign observers to the EU (through the Commission Delegation), the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Asia Association of Election Authorities, the International Foundation for Election Assistance, the Indian Election Commission and the UN Election Assistance Office in New York. . On 18 October the COASI Council Working Group agreed that the deployment of an EU Election Observation Mission to Sri Lanka would again be politically advisable and useful. All EU Heads of Mission represented in Colombo had earlier expressed their support for the Mission. The Election Commissioner confirmed that he would fully agree with the EU guidelines and terms of reference for an independent, self-standing EU Observation Mission, along the same lines as was done last year.

The guidelines are:

- It should comprise impartial election observers, selected in accordance with the 1999 EU Guidelines on Selection of Election Observers and abiding by the EU Code of Conduct for Election Observers;
- It should be self-standing and independent of the Elections Commissioner, the Government of Sri Lanka, and any other group or organisation, and responsible only to the European Union;
- All costs associated with the mission should be funded entirely by the European Community budget, both as concerns international travel, and in-country costs;
- The mission should have logistical and administrative support provided by an international agency with an office in Sri Lanka;
- All members of the mission would need to be officially accredited as observers by the Elections Commissioner, and would need to have independent access to polling stations and counting centres, as well as be permitted to make contact with government officials and have access to all information relevant to their election observation activities;
- The mission and its observers would need to have complete freedom of movement within the country, subject to limits imposed by genuine security concerns;
- The EU mission would co-ordinate with Sri Lankan observer groups and any other international observers, while establishing reports which are separate from and independent from those groups.

Initially the PA had managed to maintain its slim parliamentary majority despite the defection of elements of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) to the opposition United National Party (UNP). However, despite the support of the Marxist People's Liberation Front (JVP), the PA-led coalition's majority was undermined by the later defection of leading members of the ruling party.

The President could have decided to offer the UNP, which held the parliamentary majority, the opportunity to form the government. Instead, she used her constitutional powers to dissolve the parliament on its first anniversary, which is indicative of the fierce rivalry and sometimes overt animosity between the two main Sinhalese parties.

Elections were set to be held on 5 December between 7 a.m. and 4 p.m. covering all 22 electoral districts throughout the country.

The Indian Election Commission received an invitation and sent seven observers. In addition PAFFREL and CMEV invited a number of foreign observers to work in their teams but they were not officially invited or accredited by the Election Commissioner.

The Election Commissioner has usually invited Commonwealth Secretariat and the Asian Association of Election Authorities (representing mainly SAARC countries) to send observation teams. In 2000 for the first time the EU was invited.

There are three main local observation and monitoring groups in Sri Lanka; The People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL), the Movement for Free and Fair Elections (MFFE) and the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV). PAFFREL and MFFE work closely together and produce joint reports. CMEV concentrates on monitoring and reporting election related violence. The weakness of the local monitoring is that though the Election Commissioner accredits these organisations, they do not have official access to the inside of polling stations or counting centres. However in practice locally local polling officials often grant access to well respected individuals.

Apart from the EUEOM there were no other international observations teams present for the 2001 election.

**Section 4**

**4. Political Background**

**a. The 2000 Parliamentary Elections**

The 2000 elections resulted in a hung parliament. Whilst the PA won with a reduced majority, securing 107 of the 225 seats (from 113 in 1994), it was only able to form a governing coalition and stay in power with the support of the small mainly Muslim NUA and the Tamil EPDP.

**2000 Election Results**

<i>People’s Alliance (PA)</i>	<i>107 seats</i>	<i>(45% of national vote)</i>
<i>United National Party (UNP)</i>	<i>89 seats</i>	<i>(40%)</i>
<i>People’s Liberation Front (JVP)</i>	<i>10 seats</i>	<i>(6%)</i>
<i>Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)</i>	<i>5 seats</i>	<i>(1.23%)</i>
<i>National Unity Alliance (NUA)</i>	<i>4 seats</i>	<i>(2.29%)</i>
<i>Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP)</i>	<i>4 seats</i>	<i>(0.6%)</i>
<i>Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO)</i>	<i>3 seats</i>	<i>(0.3%)</i>
<i>Sihala Urumaya (SU)</i>	<i>1 seat</i>	
<i>All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC)</i>	<i>1 seat</i>	
<i>Independent Group</i>	<i>1 seat</i>	

With regards the conduct of the elections the main issues were:

A high level of campaign violence and LTTE terrorist attacks. The total was 73 murders. A local monitoring group reported 1,726 election-related incidents, including murder, violence, and assault. The EU concluded that both the campaign and election day were indeed marred by violence.

There was clear evidence that the government mis-used state resources for its campaign, including government vehicles, employees and funds.

The EU EOM was impressed by the work of the Commissioner of Elections, who undertook his task well in the face of many serious difficulties.

State media gave clear bias in coverage to the government.

**b. The Recommendations of the 2000 Parliamentary Elections**

In the final report from the EU Election Observation Mission for the 2000 Parliamentary Election many recommendations regarding the election process were presented, some more vital than others. It is regrettable that these recommendations were not acted upon.

If the code of conduct (Recommendation 4) for election campaigning (providing for sanctions for breach of it) had been established it could have had a significant impact on the reduction of violence in the 2001 elections.

Similarly if the suggestion for the use of voter identification (Recommendation 9) had been addressed it could have minimised attempted electoral malpractice in this election campaign.

Furthermore the inability to prevent the misuse of state resources (Recommendation 5) ensured that it continued in this campaign.

Our proposal regarding the establishment of an Independent Election Commission was to some extent addressed with the passage of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution adopted in September 2001. Although we welcome this, this was a consequence of the agreement reached in a Memorandum of Understanding between the PA and the JVP and was not in response to our recommendations. It did nonetheless give the Election Commissioner wider powers than before and strengthened the election administration in Sri Lanka. However the Act was not fully implemented as a result of which many reservations were expressed about the Election Commissioner's powers of enforcement.

The EOM hopes that its recommendations regarding the 2001 elections (see section 9) will not suffer a similar fate, leading to a repeat - or even a worsening - in future elections of the violence and intimidation which marred the elections in 2000 and 2001.

### **c. The Context of the 2001 Parliamentary Elections**

Following the loss of a parliamentary majority for the ruling People's Alliance (PA) and an impending vote of no-confidence organised by the opposition, the President dissolved the parliament and called for new parliamentary elections on 5 December.

The PA lost its slim parliamentary majority after the defection of elements of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) to the opposition United National Party (UNP). In response the President prorogued the parliament for two months until 7 September. The PA signed an MoU with the People's Liberation Front (JVP) at around the same time. The terms of the MoU demanded by the JVP were strong, including: The reduction in the number of ministers from 45 to 20; the cancellation of the proposed referendum on Constitutional change; and the approval of a 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution to establish a Constitutional Council and independent commissions. However, a few weeks later the PA suffered further defections, partly as a result of the decrease in the number of ministers, resulting in the loss of its majority once more.

The President could have decided to offer the UNP, which held the parliamentary majority, the opportunity to form the government. Instead she chose to dissolve the parliament on its first anniversary 1, which is indicative of the fierce rivalry and sometimes overt animosity between the two main Sinhalese parties and particularly the leaders of the parties.

## **Section 5**

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<sup>1</sup> The Constitution prevents the dissolution of the parliament in its first year.



## **5. Legal Framework**

### **a. General Outline**

The main legislation governing the conduct of the 2001 parliamentary elections are the Parliamentary Electoral Act (1981) and the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (1978, amended 17 times between 1978 and 2001).

In addition to these laws, the Election Commissioner issues a series of guidelines establishing procedures for the administration of the election. For example, the rights and entitlements of observers are included in these guidelines.

In addition to these administrative guidelines the Election Commissioner also issued some guidelines and instructions under the powers afforded him by the newly-passed 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution (see below). These guidelines addressed coverage of the campaign by the state media, an instruction to ministries not to allow the use of public property, public funds and public employees for the campaigns of ministers, and an instruction to the police not to transfer police units after the election had been called. See below for an analysis of these issues.

### **b. Electoral System**

The system for the election of the 225-seat parliament is a mixed proportional system with preference voting. 196 Seats are elected from 22 multi-member districts. Each district is apportioned a number of seats according to the number of registered voters in the district, with a four seat minimum for any one district. The numbers range from five seats for Batticaloa in the east to 20 seats for the capital Colombo.

In each district parties must pass a 5% threshold in order to qualify for a share of the seats. In addition to voting for the party of their choice voters also cast up to three preference votes for the candidates from the party they have selected. These preferences are added up and the leading candidates take appropriate number of party seats at the district level.

A further 29-seats are elected from National Party Lists. All the party votes from across the country are added together, and the 29-seats are distributed on a proportional basis. Parties are required to put up a list of candidates at the time of nomination and these are listed in order, and the members are selected according to the number of seats won by each party. In effect, these national top-up seats represent a bonus for the strongest parties.

Given the existing delimitation of district boundaries and the existence of fairly strong parties, minority communities in Sri Lanka, such as Tamils and Muslims, secure participation in the parliament.

The number of registered voters per seat is roughly equal, with the exception of Jaffna and Vavuniya, where the number of votes per seat is noticeably lower than elsewhere. If one considers the cost per seat in relation to the voter turnout, then the same two districts have a markedly lower voter/seat ratio than elsewhere. During the campaign the Sinhalese nationalist Suhala Urumaya party included these facts as part of their campaign, claiming that the system results in the over-representation of Tamils in the parliament.

There is discussion in the country on prospective changes to the electoral system, with most people favouring a change to a different kind of mixed system, akin to the system used in Germany. It seems that most people agree on the concept of having directly-elected constituency representatives and a proportional top-up which truly takes account of the proportionality of the overall seat distribution in accordance with the proportion of the vote won,. However, there will likely be much debate and

argument regarding the balance between the number of seats to be distributed at the district level and the number of seats to be distributed through the national top-up.

### **c. Election Administration**

In order to administer the conduct of the elections each of the 22 electoral districts is sub-divided into a number of polling divisions, of which there are 160 in total. Each polling division then has a number of polling stations for the conduct of the poll. There are 9,981 polling stations in total. In addition, each division also has a number of counting centres responsible for groups of polling stations. There are 810 counting centres in total.

There are also specially designated polling stations for voters from un-cleared areas. These are known as cluster polling stations, and voters are supposed to be transported to these from the un-cleared areas in order to vote for the representatives from their place of residence. There is also a provision for voters displaced due to the conflict.

The election is administered by:

An Election Commissioner at the national level;

A Returning Officer and Assistant Commissioner in each of the 22 Electoral Districts;

A Senior Presiding Officer (SPO) for each of the polling stations;

A Senior Counting Officer for each of the counting centres;

At the polling station and counting centre level there is also a provision for Polling Agents from each registered political party.

Domestic monitors are not formally provided with access to polling stations or counting centres.

The current Election Commissioner is appointed by the President. But under the newly-passed 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment, an Election Commission and its Chairperson will be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Constitutional Council. Returning Officers are appointed by the Election Commissioner. Senior Presiding Officers are appointed by Returning Officers. Election Officials tend to be drawn from the ranks of local government and from among teachers

Observation of the preparations for the election has shown that election officials around country seem to be well prepared, well trained and generally have confidence of stakeholders. The Election Commissioner has sought to ensure a regular election even under difficult conditions and under personal pressure.

The People's Alliance (PA), wrote to the President complaining about the Election Commissioner and sought his removal in the penultimate week of the campaign, claiming he was unsuitable for office and showed bias towards the opposition. The EOM would disagree with this assertion, and the Commissioner was easily able to refute the allegations against him of personal impropriety and bias. He pointed out that a similar such complaint was made by the PA last year and had already been refuted by the Attorney General in regard to the allegations of financial impropriety.

### **d. 17th Amendment of the Constitution**

There was a lot of discussion regarding the powers afforded to the Election Commissioner for this election, in light of the passing of the 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the Constitution in October 2001. According to the 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment there will be a new independent Election Commission, to consist of 5 members appointed by the President upon recommendation of a Constitutional Council.

The Chairman of the Commission shall also be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Council. Members shall hold office for 5 years. No court shall have the power or jurisdiction to question

any decision, direction or act of the Commission, made under the Constitution or under any law relating to the holding of an election.

The Commission shall enforce laws relating to the election and state authorities shall secure such enforcement. The Commission can prohibit a party or candidate from using state/public property in the campaign . The Commission can issue media guidelines to ensure balanced and fair coverage. It shall be the duty of the state media to ensure compliance with the guidelines.

According to the 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment, if state media contravenes the guidelines the Commission may appoint a competent authority (with powers and functions to be provided by Parliament) to take over the management of the bodies for all broadcasts, which in the opinion of the Commission impinge on the election.

The Commission may deploy police officers made available to the Commission and such officers shall be under the direction and control of the Commission during the period of the election. The Commission may also make recommendations to the President regarding the deployment of the armed forces for the prevention of any actions which may be prejudicial to the holding of the election.

In order to ensure the implementation of the 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment, the envisaged Constitutional Council must be formed to recommend the appointment of the various independent commissions. However, the parliament must first recommend the membership of the 6-person Council and of course the parliament had been prorogued and then dissolved by the president. It is hoped that once the Constitutional Council is established by the new parliament, then the new Election Commission will be free and independent to administer and regulate the election accordingly.

The powers outlined above are clearly far-reaching and go beyond the powers usually attributed to an election commission. However, political parties and civil society are fully supportive of such a role, stressing that only if the commission is truly independent and able to exert such a controlling influence can the integrity of the process be assured. To illustrate this point, the Amendment was passed by 208 votes in the 225-seat parliament and also enjoys the support of civil society.

During this election, it is clear that the Commissioner initially tried to exert some of the powers apparently afforded him by the Amendment. For example, he issued an instruction to the police trying to stop transfers of police. To justify this, he cited to the EOM a transitional provision (27.2) of the Amendment, which states that “the person holding office as the Commissioner of Elections on the day immediately preceding the date of the Commencement of [the Amendment], shall continue to exercise and perform the powers and functions of the office of the Commissioner of Elections as were vested in him ... until an Election Commission is constituted ...”.

However, these powers were not always respected, as was seen with the Guidelines for Media, police transfers and mis-use of public property, funds and employees. The Commissioner was not prepared to force the issue of enforcement. The local NGO, Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) took a case to the Supreme Court in an attempt to get a court ruling forcing the Commissioner to enforce adherence by the state media. However, the court did not issue such a ruling and the case dissipated as the campaign finished.

#### **e. Rule of Law**

There is concern that incidents reported during the election were not fully followed up on by complainants or police, and resulted in few actual prosecutions, mirroring the pattern after the 2000 elections.

The police issued a detailed breakdown of their follow-up to complaints at the end of November, which they did not do last year. At that time, while they had received some 1,700 reports of incidents, 29

people had been remanded into custody and 296 taken into custody then given bail. Arrested persons included bodyguards of candidates. Police blamed candidates for encouraging supporters into violence. Riot squads and special police units had been deployed to combat the problems. In some areas it was planned to deploy the army in support of police. Police said that a large number of suspects remained at large, but, "They are with various candidates".

There were consistent complaints from parties, and EOM observations concurred, that the police were too inactive. However, the police bemoaned the fact that there was little they could do in most instances and again the EOM would concur that the police were often caught in between the "warring parties".

## **Section 6**

### **6. Pre-Election Phase**

#### **a. Voter Registration**

To qualify to vote, a person must be 18 years of age, a citizen and resident in the district.

Voter registration is updated annually and there are some 300,000 more voters in 2001 than there were for the 2000 elections. The total number of registered voters for the elections was 12,428,762.

Voter registers are updated each year, ensuring adequate voter registration. In addition, the 10-yearly census was carried out in June 2001, further strengthening the registration process. Displaced voters in the country are provided with specially designated polling stations enabling them to vote for their "regular election district" even while temporarily resident elsewhere in the country.

#### **a1. Voter Registration in Jaffna**

Concerns were raised that in Jaffna there are 633,457 registered voters, but only some 500,000 people are actually resident at present on the peninsula due to the conflict. This raises concerns since voters cards and ballots are produced according to the registration figures, which means there is effectively a large surplus of voter cards and ballots in the peninsula. This opens the process to potential abuse, particularly given the presence of armed EPDP activists and their virtual monopoly of control over the islands off Jaffna.

#### **b. Registration of Candidates**

Political parties and candidates are afforded full right to participate in the election. A small number of candidates were denied registration in specific districts, but no complaints were raised in this regard and the denial was due to a legal shortcoming in the party's nomination papers.

All registered political parties are recognised for the purpose of the election. After the proclamation requiring the holding of the election, the secretary of a recognised party must submit within seven days a written application to the Election Commissioner.

The nomination period for candidates commences on the tenth day after the date of publication in the *Gazette* of the Proclamation of the election date. The nomination period expires at twelve noon on the seventeenth day after the Proclamation.

Any person qualified to be a voter qualifies as a candidate. However, candidates are not permitted to stand on more than one list for a party or on the lists of more than one party. In addition, candidacy is not permitted if a person holds particular public offices, such as the presidency, auditor-general or more minor positions such as an officer in a public corporation or public officer of certain grades.

#### **c. Election Environment and Campaign**

The election took place against the backdrop of a worsening national economy and continuing war and conflict between the Sri Lankan security forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as well as the increasing hostility and violence between the competing parties in the election. As a consequence of the conflict prevalent in the country, there has been a concurrent militarisation of society. All ministers and VIPs have heavily armed security guards, many other candidates have armed guards and a number of parties, such as the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), which is strong in Jaffna, has an armed militia under its control.

In this respect the 2001 election exhibited the same paradoxical qualities of the 2000 parliamentary elections. There is a credible electoral administration and legislative framework and a long tradition of holding elections<sup>2</sup>. However, this is contrasted by dramatic levels of violence between the competing political parties and allegations of election day irregularities in particular areas. The problems are compounded by the fact that large parts of the country are no-go areas for the Sri Lankan security forces, electoral administration, political parties and observers, as they are controlled by the LTTE and classified as "un-cleared areas". Thus there is not nation-wide freedom of movement or freedom of assembly. Furthermore, it is clear that parties or particular candidates have their own 'strongholds', and when other parties or candidates are active there, there is an increase in tension.

In the Jaffna peninsula there has been active campaigning, unlike last year. However, problems exist in the peninsula as some minority parties, like EPDP, have been authorized by the government to carry arms for their own protection. This impacts on the freedom of other parties to be active or free to campaign without intimidation, particularly on the islands which are the stronghold of the armed EPDP.

There were reports of a couple of small campaign meetings held by the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in the un-cleared areas in the east of the country, which was not the case last year. However, such areas are not served with an election administration or any other aspects of the process. Voting will not take place there and there has only been the aforementioned limited campaigning. Cluster polling stations have been set up in government controlled areas so that voters from un-cleared areas could go and vote there.

The political campaign was generally very active, with parties and candidates holding a large number of rallies, posting the towns with their flyers and posters (technically illegal unless on official campaign office) and advertising in the media. The newspapers and TV also of course gave extensive news coverage to the campaign.

The campaign was marred by violence. The number of reported incidents surpassing 2,000, including many allegations of the use of firearms and at least 26 deaths by the eve of the poll. The political parties all blame each other for the inter-party violence, and it is clear that they are all culpable to varying degrees. The climate of violence has not been helped by an apparent reluctance of the major parties to explicitly address the issue with its supporters.

According to police reports the number of election-related incidents as of 5 December 2001 was 2,065. The seriousness of the incidents is not in the number of complaints, as parties do have a tendency to file some spurious complaints. Rather, the seriousness of the issue is contained in the detail of the complaints. For examples, of the complaints lodged up to 5 December 2001, there are reports of:

26 murders  
46 attempted murders by shooting

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<sup>2</sup> Sri Lanka is a fairly established democracy, in the sense that it has been holding elections since 1931, with governments regularly changed through the ballot box.

34 attempted murders by throwing a bomb  
54 acts of intimidation by throwing a bomb  
213 threats with fire-arms

The following examples serve to highlight the nature of the figures further:

In Puttalam in the west of the country, there was a high number of reported incidents (185). Both the United National Party (UNP) and PA candidates were implicated in this respect. Violence was particularly pronounced in Anamaduwa, where the candidates of the two main parties, DM Dasanayake (PA) and Range Bandara (UNP) were fiercely competitive.. Local reports put the number of deaths at six, and the District Medical Officer told LTOs that he treated up to 30 people who had been seriously wounded. In Chillaw, there were six murders identified by the police as election-related and many other acts of campaign violence between the two parties. In response to the widespread violence in the area, the police deployed special units and provided local officers with increased powers to try to maintain order.

In the northern peninsula of Jaffna, candidates and speakers for the TNA were attacked by EPDP activists with knives and swords, resulting in two deaths and numerous injuries. The Chief Observer, the Head of the EU Delegation, the Media Officer of the EUEOM and the LTOs visited the area within a few hours of the incident taking place. The team met with the local Police Chief, the Minister for Rural Development and visited the injured in hospital. The Chief Observer issued a strong statement condemning the attack. Subsequently LTOs spoke with the police and were informed that EPDP activists and EPDP local leaders were being questioned about the attack.

In Anuradhapura in the north of the country, observers arrived at an incident just after it had occurred, and confirmed that supporters of the two main parties had fought a gun battle. Two PA supporters who had confronted a UNP supporter in his house were hospitalised with bullet wounds. Observers found ammunition, empty bullet cartridges and pieces of human flesh at the scene. In the same district there was also a clash between PA and UNP supporters resulting in 11 persons being hospitalised.

In Kurunegala, a clash between PA and UNP activists and candidates at a UNP rally resulted in one death, the son of the PA candidate, and serious injuries to others. In another incident the police shot dead a PA supporter during a disturbance. Tensions in the area were rising markedly as election day approached, with local fears for clashes on or after the day of the election.

In Pannala, close to Kandy, one PA supporter died and another four were injured in fighting between PA and UNP supporters.

In Batticaloa and Ampara in the east of the country the level of violence was not as high as had been feared in the run-up to the election. However, the fierce rivalry between candidates from the SLMC and Muslim candidates within the PA resulted in numerous reports of alleged attacks on vehicles, property and persons. Reported incidents also involved other parties. For example, a bomb blast at the EPDP office in Batticaloa injured 20 persons. During the campaign there have been three murders in the Batticaloa area and a total of 230 reported incidents in Ampara and Batticaloa.

The likelihood for violence was increased due to the tendency for the bodyguards of candidates and even party activists to be heavily armed. One incident in Kandy exemplifies this fact, when 14 people were injured after a PA activist apparently accidentally dropped a hand-grenade which he was carrying in his pocket.

It can also be noted that local monitoring groups claim that many other incidents are not included by the police in the list because the police did not define them as election-related. The local groups believe many of the other incidents were in fact election-related. For example, a CMEV report of 3 December cited 1,216 major incidents, including 38 killings, 50 attempted murders, 392 assaults and 112 cases of arson.

## Party Campaign Strategies

### **Main Political Parties**

**People's Alliance (PA).** Party of the President, comprising the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP), which governed the country between 1956-65, 1970-77, and range of leftist and minority parties. Came to power again in 1994, ending 17 years of UNP rule. Governed in coalition with NUA (Muslim) and EPDP (Tamil). Strong in most provinces except in north. Had recent MoU with JVP and parties talk of co-operation after the election.

**United National Party (UNP).** UNP is the main parliamentary opposition and is a centre-right party. Has formed government for 30 of the 50 years of independence. In conflict with PA over constitutional reforms and the shape of any peace agreement. Led by Ranil Wickramasinghe, who enjoys confidence of business community. During campaign called itself United National Front (UNF), which includes former PA members on its National List and some SLMC members.

**People's Liberation Front (JVP).** Marxist-oriented party, which grew out of disaffected educated Sinhalese youth and led insurrections against governments in 70's and 80's, destabilising the south and assassinating ministers. The party leader returned from exile in UK during the campaign.

**Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).** Emerged in 1976, formed around the Federal party led by the "father of Tamil nationalism" S. Chelvanayakam. Initially advocated a separate state of Tamil Eelam, but 1994 party Constitution advocates a federal solution. Strong in Tamil areas in the North and East. Has formed Tamil National Alliance for the election (includes TULF, TELO, ACTC and EPRLF).

**Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP).** Since 1990 has fought against the LTTE, and dominated politics in Jaffna. Generally supportive of PA on war. EPDP activists retain reputation for human rights abuses and have strong control of the islands of Jaffna peninsula.

**Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) & National Unity Alliance (NUA).** Two parties representing the minority Muslim community, which is largely based in the east, Kandy and central Colombo. SLMC is aligned with the UNP, with some members, in central areas, standing as UNF. The NUA is competing as part of the PA for this election, and its membership encompasses the Muslim, Tamil and Sinhalese communities.

There was a lack of any real policy debate during the campaign, either in meetings or rallies. Most parties and candidates focused more on a negative characterisation of their opponents.

The PA sought to stress what it characterised as the positive advancements made under its tenure in office, and the President threw her full political weight behind her party, appearing at rallies, on TV and in newspapers constantly. The PA also gave high prominence to what it claimed was evidence of a UNP-LTTE "Pact" for peace on terms sympathetic to the LTTE. Designed of course to discredit the UNP, the claim was strenuously denied by the party and Tamil parties outside of the government. The PA also stressed that the 1994 elections, held under a UNP government, were in fact more violent than the 2001 election.

The UNP sought to highlight what it characterised as the impoverishment of the country in terms of economic development and a lack of movement on a solution to the conflict with the LTTE. For the purpose of this election, the UNP co-ordinated its efforts with PA and SLMC members who left the coalition earlier in the year. This ad hoc grouping called itself the United National Front (UNF). The UNP also reported widely on allegations of campaign violence and abuse of state resources.

Many of the Tamil parties, including the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) joined together as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), in an attempt to consolidate the Tamil vote. The EPDP, however, remained close to the PA outside of the Alliance.

The Muslim parties were split prior to the election, with the SLMC, which left the PA coalition, joining forces with the UNF in central districts and contesting as the SLMC in the east. NUA members competed under the PA symbol.

The JVP portrayed itself as the likely “king-maker” in any post-election coalition, and remained close to the PA.

#### **d. Media and the Elections**

##### **Introduction**

The 17th Amendment to the Constitution gives the Commissioner for Elections new powers to control the State media during the campaign period. Guidelines were published and circulated to both state and private media by the Commissioner for Elections on 19<sup>th</sup> October 2001. Private media were requested to abide by the guidelines but the Election Commissioner has no powers of enforcement here. He has the power to enforce regulations in the State media but apart from issuing regular warnings to the state controlled media and receiving little or no response in return, he did not pursue the issue. The Supreme Court was asked to consider two challenges to the Election Commissioner on this matter.

While there have been some complaints that the guidelines issued are too vague, they provided a framework for the broadcast media to ensure balanced, fair and impartial coverage during the campaign. Article 126 (1) of the Parliamentary Elections Act No. 1 of 1981 states that both chairmen of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation and the Chairman of the Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation are responsible for allocating broadcasting facilities and time to recognised political party or independent groups. As these are State broadcasters and therefore not independent it would be useful to look at how international standards are applied in this area.

The Sri Lankan media can be divided into two categories: Government owned and controlled media, and privately owned media. Both are highly partisan. Independent objective reporting is hard to find. The state controlled media supported and promoted the PA while the private media was frequently fiercely anti-PA. Some private media clearly support the main opposition party UNP, some take a more neutral line. Both electronic and printed media are available in English, Sinhala and Tamil. The local Media Monitoring organisation confirmed this bias in reporting.

The Government controls the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd. The Lake House Group, which publishes the Daily News, Sunday Observer, Dinamina (in Sinhala) and Thinakaran (in Tamil) along with many other dailies, weeklies and magazines. The Government also controls the Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation (state tv) and the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC) which have the best and widest coverage all over the country including the Northern part of the country. The state controlled electronic media have some regional centres which broadcast special regional services.

There are several privately owned media groups including commercial radio and TV-stations. Their coverage of the country is limited. There are no regional or locally based tv stations. The main publishers of national newspapers are as follows: Wijaya Newspapers publishes the Sunday Times, Lankadeepa (largest circulation weekend Sinhala paper), Daily Mirror and Midweek Mirror. Upali Newspapers Ltd. Publishes the Island and Sunday Island newspapers, Divaina (in Sinhala). Leader Publications publishes the Sunday Leader. There are many local language and tabloid newspapers which take a critical stance of the ruling party, e.g. Lakbima, Ravaya.

##### **Allocation of campaign time in the Government broadcast media**

A specific amount of time in the Government broadcast media is allocated to each party by the Commissioner for Elections. The time is based on the number of districts and the number of candidates a party fields. Parties are free to use the time allocated to present their political programme as they wished. In practice this seems to consist of a candidate sitting in front of a camera reading a prepared script. Time slots are allocated on a lottery basis. There were no complaints by the parties on the system



of allocation although there was dissatisfaction that certain slots were at times where viewership would be almost non-existent, i.e. early morning.

The problem arose with other programmes in the broadcast media i.e. news, talk shows and documentaries, which in the Government controlled broadcast media may be used to promote the ruling PA. News of the opposition was often communicated in a negative context mainly showing opposition parties attacking each other's campaign manifestos, personalities and tactics. The state broadcaster regularly showed lengthy interviews with the President and the main news bulletins seem to consist of the President and members of the Government making barely disguised election statements with little time given to coverage of the opposition. Such excerpts as were shown were frequently edited to give a less than accurate account of what was said. Several private media channels gave coverage in similar programmes to the opposition parties.

During the 48 hour moratorium before Election Day state media broadcast tv interviews with the Prime Minister and others including the JVP leader for clear electoral purposes. Privately owned electronic media, particularly TNL also broke the moratorium broadcasting interviews with the main opposition party.

### **Campaign in the Media**

The use of inflammatory language by politicians of the main parties, from the President down during party rallies, speeches and in the media has helped to inflame the political campaign leading to more violence particularly as the campaign drew to a close. At a party rally the President said... "We have given freedom even to kill our own people. But this time we will not allow that to happen. We will murder the murderer. I say that clearly. We will not harass innocent people. Friends, it is alright to kill a murderer". When a UNP candidate, Naveen Dissanayake, was asked how UNP will face the challenge of election violence, he said "By hitting back. There's no point in resorting to Gandhian principles because the ones who unleash violence have no moral scruples and do not have the brains to understand the whole idea behind peaceful protests. ....In order to ensure a victory for the people, there's no other option than an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth". The media was dominated by reports of violence and intimidation particularly between the main political parties and between EPDP and TNA in the North.

The Government run newspaper, the Daily News was completely partisan in its approach to reporting the news. Its news coverage was almost entirely devoted to what the Government and PA candidates were doing.

The State run TV gave widespread coverage to anything the President was involved in and made a cursory attempt at covering what opposition parties were doing, often in a negative fashion. The President was frequently interviewed or shown making political speeches. There was practically no attempt to cover the opposition in a similar fashion. It must be remembered that the President is Leader of the PA and not just President of the country as some would argue. Furthermore the State run TV Rupavahini is the only television station which has widespread reach around the country.

A strike at Lake House in the penultimate week of the election campaign said to be called by the pro-UNP Trade Union, the Jatihika Sevaka Sangamaya, resulted in a limited edition of The Daily News being published for one day. The strike was supposedly in support of a demand for the payment of the special allowance of Rs.1200 which was given to all public servants. Some claimed the unions were demanding that Lake House should stop or tone down the propaganda war against the opposition. Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation's transmission bus was taken to the compound of President's House following suggestions that another strike could take place which would cripple state television. The navy were called in to provide security at Lake House.

Independent media were by and large pro-opposition or anti-government and also did not respect the guidelines as issued by the Election Commissioner. He appealed to the media to voluntarily observe a

code of conduct designed by themselves in order to promote unbiased and impartial reporting of news and views during the election campaign. The media failed to implement such a code.

It was a source of great encouragement to the mission that the Chief Observer's speech to national editors on 29 November was widely reported in both editorials and news pages of the independent media right up to polling day. By contrast it received little direct coverage in the state media. Nonetheless it was significant that the tone of editorials and political commentary in the state media (as well as party leaders' statements) reflected his comments during the last week of the campaign.

#### **Criminal defamation**

Under the Criminal Defamation law a journalist or editor can be charged and sentenced with the crime of defamation of character. Many journalists have been indicted over the years under this law. This law should be repealed as soon as possible.

#### **Self Censorship**

Many regional correspondents indicated they imposed a self-censorship when filing stories. Regional journalists, unlike staff reporters in the capital, are frequently state employees working as freelancers. Some regional journalists said they had received threats from politicians. The editor of a paper in Jaffna had to employ security such was the threat to him during the election.

#### **International Media**

International news channels, BBC, CNN, Sky News are broadcast on private television channels and Colombo has a cable television system. BBC can be viewed 24 hours but CNN and Sky News are generally available at certain times each day. Many hotels as well as private individuals have satellite receivers.

BBC World Service Radio is transmitted mostly without censorship by the Government controlled SLBC. However after the fall of Elephant Pass in 2001, the Government banned the transmission of the Sinhala and Tamil service which had been relayed through the SLBC. This service should be restored immediately by the Government.

There are several international news agencies, including BBC, Reuters, Voice of America, AFP and AP represented in Colombo. Some have local correspondents. Journalists working for the international news agencies are sometimes subjected to subtle and not so subtle obstruction and intimidation from government authorities.

Internet news websites are popular and improving rapidly.

#### **Post Election**

A curfew was in place for a number of days after Election Day to try and prevent sporadic violence by party supporters. The media continued to work during curfew despite potential problems moving around the country.

Given the lack of independence demonstrated by the state media, there may well be serious problems over media balance at the next election if the present situation continues.

#### **e. Use of State Resources**

The PA and associated parties, such as the EPDP, mis-used public and state resources to a high and visible degree. This included using state vehicles, state buildings, state personnel and state funds to support their campaign efforts. Notably individual ministers used the resources of their ministries to further their candidacies.

To a lesser degree the UNP was also reported to have mis-used local government resources in areas, such as Colombo, in which they hold power.

These abuses were professionally documented by various watchdog organisations, such as the Commission to Monitor Mis-Use of State Resources and particularly the Institute of Human Rights' Programme for Protection of Public Property. The Institute of Human Rights reported the following examples to the EOM:

Ministries taking out advertisements praising the achievements of the department in general and the Minister, when he or she was a candidate in the election. The IHR claim that the advertisements were paid for by the ministry with public funds, and that such full-page colour advertisements cost approximately 280,000 Rupees (\$3,100). The EOM noticed many of these advertisements in the state-owned *Daily News*, including the Ministry of Education effectively publicising the candidature of the Minister of Education, who was standing in Kandy, in an advertisement, which was a joint publication with the newspaper.

Vehicles with state license plates or state emblems were often used for campaigning purposes. The IHR published long lists of such vehicles identified as having been released for such duties.

Public employees were released with pay to work on the campaigns of PA candidates. Examples include 15 employees from the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation released to work on PA campaign. A second example includes public employees released with pay to work on campaign of the Minister of Petroleum General Anurudha Ratwatte, a candidate in Kandy.

State buildings were used for the campaign. Examples include the *Visumpaya* building in Colombo, being used by Arjuna Ranatunge, a PA candidate. The building is a state building used to host visiting Heads of States and is under the authority of the Urban Development Authority. The *Mahavali Centre* was used as a distribution centre for the PA campaign; with state vehicles observed by the IHR also being used for the campaign activities from the building. IHR also reported that UNP used local government buildings in Colombo.

There were also verified reports of a total of 110,000 PA campaign leaflets being distributed by the armed forces in Jaffna.

The IHR also pointed out that it is difficult to address many of the issues as in their opinion the government is not committed to enforcing the regulations, and the political parties tend not to pursue cases after the election. It is also a problem that the 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment was not fully implemented and the Election Commissioner had no effective powers of enforcement.

All LTO reports from the field indicated concern at the miss-use of public property during the election.

## Section 7

### 7. Election Day

#### a. Postal Vote

Postal voting took place on 20 and 21 November. The Observation Mission did not observe the process and hasn't received any comments or complaints from parties or Domestic observer groups. The mission noted that the postal votes are reported separately, and not added to the ordinary ballots before the result is presented and could suggest voting patterns particularly by public employees which could in some instances cause problems of the secrecy of the ballot.

#### **b. Polling Day, 5 December**

The polling procedure in Sri Lanka is straightforward and uncomplicated. Polling cards were sent to the voters prior to Election Day informing the voter about time and location for the poll. The polling card is not a compulsory document and it is possible for the voter to cast his/her vote without the card, and even without any identity card. Polling Agents are allowed to monitor the process and it is possible for a Polling Agent to challenge the identity of the voter. If the voter identity is challenged the voter must fill in a declaration of identity. To avoid proxy voting (impersonation) the voters little finger is marked with indelible ink. The voters' number is indicated on the ballot paper counterfoil, which in theory makes it possible to trace a single ballot paper back to a specific voter. After receiving the ballot paper the voter mark with an X for the party of his/her choice and in addition to that he/she can mark up to three candidates (preferential vote). There is no internal rank between the candidates.

There are 9981 polling stations in Sri Lanka, in 22 Election Districts. There are also cluster polling stations established south of the confrontation line and in the east. The Commissioner has also set up polling stations for displaced persons.

Polling Stations should open at 7.00 a.m. In 27 Polling Stations observers followed the opening of the poll. The opening of the Polling Stations was reported to have been on time, which indicates that the administrative preparations had been successful.

From all regions and polling divisions, observers reported that the Presiding Officer and the staff were committed to perform a good job and the level of co-operation with the observers was high. The Presiding Officer provided the information asked for.

Observers reported that the voters in general were aware of the voting procedures, which made the voting procedure smooth and efficient.

The 27 observer teams, including the Core Team, submitted a total number 284 reports on the polling procedures. The reports were processed on Polling Day and the day after at Headquarters in Colombo. The number of reports per region (LTO deployment area) and per election district is shown in the diagrams below.

According to their reports, the polling was carried out smoothly and with only minor irregularities. Observers reported that parties/candidates were campaigning close to polling stations on Election Day in 2.4 % of the visited polling stations. The campaign was concluded Sunday 2 December and no one was allowed to carry out campaigning activity after that. Despite the regulations in the Electoral Act observers reported that campaigning was carried out during the two days prior to Election Day (3 and 4 December). Furthermore, several teams reported campaign activities on polling day, convoys of party supporters were intimidating voters and polling officials in several cases.

In 3% of the polling station visited observers noted that unauthorised persons were inside the polling station. Any interference and presence by unauthorised persons in polling stations can have a direct impact on the voters present in- and outside the polling station.

Observers reported in one out of five polling stations that the secrecy of the vote was not secured. The layout of the polling station was mainly the reason, and in most cases it was possible for the Senior Presiding Officer and/or his deputy to look straight into the polling booth. In the instructions to the

Senior Presiding Officer it is stated that he/she "is able to see every function within the polling station clearly, especially the tables of clerks, representatives and the voting cubicles". These instructions could in some instances have been interpreted too literally. The problem with the secrecy of the vote must be addressed by the Commissioner in the future and more detailed instructions to the Polling Officials must be issued.

The quality of the ink was questioned in reports from the observers and the application procedure was reported to be inadequate in some polling stations. The ink plays an important role in an election process where the voters can vote without registration and identity card, and is the instrument used by the officials to avoid proxy voting (impersonation).

Intimidation of voters close to polling stations was reported in several instances. Party activists were driving around in cars close to polling stations and threatened people on their way to the polling stations. Teams reported thugs hanging around polling stations intimidating voters, officials and party representatives.

The observers were asked to give an overall assessment of the process in the polling stations they visited in a 4-grade scale from Very Bad to Very Good. In 1% of the visited polling stations the judgement made by the observers were Very Bad, and in 6.2% the rate was Bad, see table. These figures are slightly higher than for the 2000 Parliamentary elections, but the number of reports is too small to draw any further conclusions.

Year	Very Bad	Bad	Good	Very Good
2000	-	3.2%	58.1%	38.7%
2001	1.0%	6.3%	52.6%	40.1%

**c. Counting Process**

After the close of the poll at 16.00hrs the observers were instructed to follow the ballot boxes to the counting centres. The observers reported that the boxes were secured and that the transportation of the boxes to the counting centres was carried out in a secure way. To enhance the security of the counting process the Commissioner issued additional procedures to be followed before the count could start at the centres. In addition to the protocol from the Senior Presiding Officer also the Zonal Officer, Police officer on duty, Party Agents and Candidates should send in their comments before the count could start at the centre. These procedures are new and were introduced this year, and in general they delayed the start of the counting process.

The number of counting centres visited by the teams is not possible to give due to the fact that several centres were situated at the same premises.

According to reports from the observers the counting process was time consuming and started late in several places. Despite that the counting was carried out in a professional way and the people involved did a very good job. The number of counting centres was increased compared to the 2000 Elections. A general comment from some observer teams were that the counting centres were responsible for too many polling stations, which of course have an impact on the process and delayed the results. The number of reports from the counting process is too small to make any statistical analysis.

**d. Aggregation of Results**

In 29 polling stations in Kandy the Commissioner annulled the election due to irregularities that occurred during the voting process on polling day. The number of affected voters in the annulled polling stations

is 33.421. EU observer teams observed and reported irregularities in the area during the poll. The Commissioner is according to the Electoral Act obliged to hear the opinion of the political parties in this matter. All parties agreed to annul the polling stations and not ask for a re-run. In addition to the districts in Kandy eight polling stations were annulled in other polling districts, see table below. The number of voters in each district was too low to have any impact on the final result in the districts, but still a number of voters were disfranchised by the decision taken by the Commissioner.

District no.	Electoral District	No. of Polling Stations
2	Gampaha	2
5	Matale	2
15	Kurunegala	2
16	Puttalam	1
18	Polonnaruva	1

The Election Commissioner reported an overall turn out of 76%, which is in accordance to the figures reported by the observers on polling day. The low turn out figures for Vanni and Jaffna districts are also in line with the results reported.

The Commissioner announced the official results, distribution of seats, on 7 December, and the following day the results of the preferential vote.

## **Section 8**

### **8. Complaints and Appeals**

All complaints on the process of voting and counting must be submitted to the Returning Officer who then forwards them to the Election Commissioner. The Election Commissioner makes a final ruling on the complaints and is obligated by law to report on his findings after the election to a meeting of representatives of political parties.

The Commissioner may decide either to reject the complaint, or to accept it. If it is accepted, the decision is either to annul the poll, or to annul and order a re-run. Re-runs are only ordered where the number of annulled votes would make a difference to the result in the district.

As a result of a Supreme Court ruling the Election Commissioner is now able to receive a wider variety of reports on the conduct of polling and counting in his consideration of whether or not to annul the results from polling stations.

Under the new regulations, the Election Commissioner can consider reports from:

- Senior Presiding Officer
- Area Returning Officer
- Senior On-Duty Police Officer
- Polling Agents
- Candidates

The Election Commissioner only considers possible annulments based on these reports, and he requires corroborative reports in order to substantiate any allegations.

The Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) submitted a report to the Commissioner requesting him to re-run the poll in a number of polling stations across 15 of the 160 polling divisions. CMEV also raised questions regarding the failure to provide the electoral franchise to voters from the un-cleared areas in Batticaloa and Vanni.

Based on the submitted reports from the above mentioned persons, the Election Commissioner annulled the following polling stations:

Kandy	29	(affecting 33,421 votes) <sup>3</sup>
Gampaha	2	
Matale	2	
Kurunegala	2	
Puttalam	1	
Polonnaruwa	1	

The reasons for the annulments included:

- Ballot box burned
- Gang removed ballot box
- Polling station closed early because of threats
- Ballot box destroyed by thugs
- Stuffing of ballot boxes
- Ballots stolen
- Ballot box lost in between polling station and counting centre

The Commissioner wanted to re-run the process in Kandy, but political parties reached a consensus on not re-running the poll. According to the Commissioner all the parties felt that a re-run might in some way result in fewer seats for them.

The other major problem reported to the Commissioner was the closure of check-points preventing voters from un-cleared areas from reaching polling places in Batticaloa and Vavuniya districts. The Commissioner estimated that up to 25,000 voters in Batticaloa and 25,000 voters in Vanni could have been affected. Again, annulled the results in these polling stations but in accordance with security advice from the army, no re-runs are scheduled. The army could not confirm that they would allow such numbers of persons to pass through their checkpoints, and as a consequence the right to vote is in effect no longer afforded to persons from these areas.

## Section 9

### 9. Conclusions and Recommendations

It is our conclusion that, despite the problems all the voters faced, whether they were denied the right to vote because the army closed checkpoints or their votes were stolen or they were denied access to the

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<sup>3</sup> The problems in the Kandy District were mostly in Pataha Dumbara and Hewaheta divisions.

polling station because of the existence of armed thugs, the results of the 2001 parliamentary elections did reflect the political will of the people who clearly wanted change.

The incoming government has an enormous task ahead of it particularly to ensure that future elections strengthen the democratic process. This process has been under great stress and strain because of the actions of successive governments. This must never happen again. Action must be taken to prevent the fairness of any future elections being undermined by politically motivated violence, abuse of state resources, unequal access to the media, the politicisation of the police and army and the existence of private armies.

Following are our recommendations:

1. Full and early implementation of Amendment 17 to the Constitution.
2. Review of the Parliamentary Elections Act.
3. A Code of conduct for political campaigning should be established for all political parties, candidates and their supporters. Sanctions should be established for breach of it. Such a Code of Conduct could be included in the Electoral Act.
4. Voter identification should be required for voting.
5. A more reliable indelible ink should be used so as to prevent multiple voting.
6. Voter secrecy must be protected. Senior Presiding Officers must be given clear instructions as to how to arrange their polling booths. These should be designed and laid out properly to guarantee the secrecy of voting.
7. Given the significant number of rejected ballot papers it would be appropriate to introduce a number of initiatives regarding voter education prior to polling day.
8. Arrangements should be made by law to allow domestic observers to be present in polling stations and at the count.
9. Complaints to the Police arising out of the election should automatically be referred to prosecution service after investigation. Complaints not so referred should be recorded giving the reason for non referral and these records should be available to the Election Commission. The possibility of producing a report on them so as to demonstrate impartial enforcement of the rule of law should be considered.
10. Postal ballots should not be counted separately. They should be mixed with ordinary ballot papers to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
11. The feasibility of starting the count when the first box arrives rather than waiting for all boxes to come in should be examined.

## **Annex 1. Press Releases**

### **EU Election Observation Mission**

Sri Lanka Parliamentary Elections 2001

*Room 481, Hotel Lanka Oberoi, 77 Steuart Place, Colombo 3  
Tel. (01) 437 437 ext. 2610 / Fax: (01) 452 156 or 452 155*



Monday 19<sup>th</sup> November 2001

**STATEMENT BY JOHN CUSHNAHAN MEP  
CHIEF OBSERVER  
EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION  
TO SRI LANKA 2001**

In our report on last year's general election our team expressed major concerns. While we stressed that it would be difficult to conclude that the election was "free and fair" in all districts we did acknowledge that the overall result did to a reasonable degree reflect the political will of the electorate.

Conscious of the level of violence that occurred during last year's campaign it is a matter of the utmost concern that in the discussions we have had with the political parties since we arrived, real fears have been expressed that the level of violence in this campaign could in fact be higher.

In response to this it has to be said that the political parties themselves have the most influence to prevent this happening and would have the most to gain if they succeed. Nothing undermines the democratic process more than democratic parties themselves either resorting to violence, condoning it or being ambivalent about its use. I would appeal to the leaders of all the Island's political parties to agree on a **Code of Conduct** for their candidates and supporters for the remainder of this election which should not only give a commitment to non-violence but which would also state that their respective party would take disciplinary action against any of their candidates or activists who engage in unacceptable and undemocratic behaviour.

Another issue I would like to refer to regarding last year's report is that the many recommendations we proposed were not acted upon. However we do welcome the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution. While we welcome the fact that the Attorney General has confirmed that the Commissioner of Elections shall not only continue to exercise and perform the powers and functions vested in him immediately prior to the commencement of this Act but also those of the Election Commission until that body is so constituted, we do note that reservations have been expressed that his ability to act will be curtailed because he does not have the powers of enforcement. Because of this I would call on all political parties and all the relevant government, state and security bodies to cooperate fully with the Election Commissioner to ensure that the 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment is therefore fully implemented both in the spirit and letter of the law.

With regard to electoral malpractice I would like to emphasize that the Supreme Court has now clarified the regulations concerning repolling. The Commissioner of Elections has very clear instructions that where he considers fraudulent practice has occurred repolling will take place within 7 days. This sends a clear and emphatic message to anyone who might intend to stuff the ballot boxes or abuse the ballot in any way. We therefore would strongly recommend that he use this power if he has evidence of electoral abuse.

Although I didn't expect to be back so quickly, I am looking forward to working with the political parties and all the relevant authorities who believe the best way to strengthen the democratic process is by ensuring that this election is free and fair and that the voters are able to exercise their democratic rights without fear of threats, intimidation or violence.

ENDS

**Annex 1a:**

**EU Election Observation Mission**  
Sri Lanka Parliamentary Elections 2001  
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Thursday 29<sup>th</sup> November 2001

**STATEMENT BY JOHN CUSHNAHAN MEP  
CHIEF OBSERVER  
EU ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION**

**VIOLENCE IS MURDERING DEMOCRACY IN SRI LANKA  
Rule of law must be impartially enforced**

Party Leaders must act to stop the violence to ensure free and fair elections

What I experienced on my recent visit to Jaffna underlines the fundamental challenge our mission faces in coming to an assessment of the integrity of the electoral process in Sri Lanka. (Parliamentary Elections Wednesday 5<sup>th</sup> December 2001).

Firstly, the heartfelt sympathy of our delegation to them and everyone who has suffered from any violent incident. I witnessed at first hand the tragic consequences of the use of violence in the electoral contest in this country. After the incident in Kayts one person is dead, the life of another hangs in the balance, and many others were injured including two candidates who, as part of the democratic process, presented themselves before the electorate.

Those who carried out this murder and similar attacks elsewhere are murdering democracy itself. Since this election was called there have been over 1,400 incidents of election related violence reported resulting in a number of deaths and serious injury.

The statistics that are available point the finger at the country's two main parties. Whatever the truth of these allegations I accept that there are many people of goodwill in these parties who want nothing more than a free and fair election. However their leaders must bear a major responsibility for the actions of their candidates and supporters. As we move into the final days of this election they must pull this country back from the brink, or they will have allowed a situation to continue where their general election will be perceived to be tainted and tarnished.

It must also be stated unequivocally that the Government in power has a particular responsibility in this matter. It has a political and moral obligation to ensure that the entire security forces of this State are mobilized to eliminate violence from the political process. Furthermore the police also have a particular responsibility to ensure that the rule of law is impartially enforced.

I have to say that it was a source of great disappointment that following the high level of violence in last year's contest so few prosecutions were made. How is this possible? Our team will be anxious to monitor the progress of investigations not only during our stay here but following our return to Europe. The reason for doing this is quite clear – impartial enforcement of the rule of law is an important cornerstone of democracy.

The second issue I want to address is our assessment of the current election. My experience in Jaffna and the experience of other members of my team elsewhere has highlighted the widespread concern that many things have already happened in this campaign so far which raise serious question marks about the integrity of this electoral contest. I have passed on a number of suggestions to the Commissioner for Elections which I hope he will act upon to protect this.

I would appeal to all the political parties to assume their collective responsibility and to give moral leadership to take whatever action is necessary that this election upholds the fundamental principles of democracy.

Throughout our mission we have been warmly received by the people of Sri Lanka who have made it absolutely clear to us that all they want is a free and fair election. We owe it to them to ensure that this happens. I hope the leaders of the political parties listen to their people. ENDS

**Annex 1b: Statement introducing Preliminary Report**

**EU Election Observation Mission  
Sri Lanka Parliamentary Elections 2001**  
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Friday 7<sup>th</sup> December 2001

**STATEMENT BY JOHN CUSHNAHAN MEP  
CHIEF OBSERVER  
EUROPEAN ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION, SRI LANKA**

I would like to praise the people of Sri Lanka who turned out in such huge numbers to exercise their right to vote despite the murders, intimidation and violence experienced in some parts of the country. Unfortunately some people were denied the right to vote either because the army closed checkpoints or their votes were stolen or they were denied access to the polling station because of the existence of armed thugs.

According to official police sources 43 people were murdered during this campaign (17 on Election Day itself). Many more were injured. This is unacceptable. It has to be said that once again the primary source of this violence were the country's largest parties who failed to give the necessary leadership and take the necessary course of action to ensure that this election would be conducted in an atmosphere of non-violence. Party leaders now have a duty to ensure that those who were elected to parliament on the back of violence are not rewarded either by being given a place in the government or high office in their respective party. Such people whether candidates or activists should be properly disciplined. Furthermore the full rigours of the law should be applied to those who engaged in violence irrespective of their party allegiance.

Despite the problems that voters faced it would seem that the result reflects the political will of the people who clearly wanted change. The next government of Sri Lanka must be appointed in accord with the democratically expressed wishes of the voters. To ignore this principle would be to undermine democracy itself.

The incoming government has an enormous task ahead of it particularly to ensure that future elections strengthen the democratic process. This process has been under great stress and strain because of the actions of successive governments. This must never happen again. Action must be taken to prevent the fairness of any future elections being undermined by politically motivated violence, abuse of state resources, unequal access to the media, the politicisation of the police and army and the existence of private armies.

We will complete our report within the next couple of weeks and this will be presented to the European Commission and Member States governments. It will be up to them to decide if any future action should be taken. In the preliminary report presented to this press conference I have provided the initial observations of our mission in a number of categories as set out by our mandate.

*I would like to thank the Election Commissioner and his staff, government officials, political parties, local monitoring organizations, civil society, media and the security forces for their cooperation with our mission which they extended to us during our stay in Sri Lanka.*

**Annex 1c: Preliminary Report**

**EU Election Observation Mission  
Sri Lanka Parliamentary Elections 2001**  
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## PRELIMINARY REPORT

### **Introduction**

The European Union's Election Observation Mission to Sri Lanka's Parliamentary Elections on December 5 issues this statement of preliminary findings.

The EU mission was convened following an invitation by Sri Lanka's Commissioner of Elections, Mr. Dayananda Dissanyake. The Election Commissioner confirmed that he would fully agree with the EU guidelines and terms of reference for an independent, self-standing EU Observation Mission.

### **Statistical Representation of Teams and Coverage**

This report is based on the observations of election preparations and the campaign by 6 Core Team members for 4 weeks, 12 long-term observers deployed throughout the country for three weeks and 37 short-term observers deployed for ten days. These observers have come from 13 of the member states of the European Union. Observers reported back from 20 of the 22 districts, including Jaffna. The EU also observed the counting process in centres throughout Sri Lanka.

Our approach in reaching conclusions on the election process is based on seven criteria. The following are our initial observations under each of these criteria:

#### **The degree of impartiality shown by the election management body.**

Observation of the preparations for the election has shown that election officials around the country were well prepared, well trained and generally had the confidence of stakeholders. The Election Commissioner has sought to ensure a regular election even under difficult conditions and under personal pressure.

The People's Alliance lodged a complaint against the Election Commissioner and sought his removal in the penultimate week of the campaign. The EU EOM would disagree with the complaint. Further, the Commissioner was easily able to refute the allegations made against him.

The 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the Constitution potentially afforded the Election Commissioner increased powers to ensure a regular election. It is clear that he initially tried to exert some of these powers. However, his instructions and requests were not always respected, such as with the Guidelines for Media and the transfer of police units.

#### **The degree of freedom of political parties, alliances and candidates to organize, move, assemble and express their views publicly.**

Serious incidences of violence prevented this happening in a number of areas and the primary source of violence were the country's largest parties who failed to give the necessary leadership and to take the necessary action against their respective candidates and supporters who were responsible.

Furthermore statements made by the President, a leading UNP candidate and the exiled <sup>1</sup>JVP leader among others, were highly irresponsible and could have been construed as an incitement to commit acts of violence.

Additionally it is totally unacceptable that private armed groups are allowed to exist unimpeded and that such groups are under the control of certain politicians. Their use and the misuse of the Presidential Security Division undermined normal political activity in certain areas.

#### **The fairness of access to state resources made available for the election.**

The PA and associated parties, such as the EPDP, have mis-used public and state resources to a high and visible degree. This has included using state vehicles, state buildings, state personnel and state funds to support their campaign efforts. Notably, individual ministers have used the resources of their ministries to further their candidacies.

These abuses have been documented by various watchdog organisations, such as the Institute of Human Rights' Programme for Protection of Public Property. Examples cited by the IHR include expensive full-page colour advertisements from Ministries, effectively promoting the candidacy of Ministers and their parties; the use of public vehicles for campaigning purposes; the use of public employees and State buildings for the PA campaign. There were also reports of PA campaign leaflets being distributed by the armed forces in Jaffna.

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<sup>1</sup> In subsequent correspondence to the Chief Observer, the JVP claimed this was a misquote of what was said.

EU EOM reports from the field corroborate these conclusions. It is also noted that despite requests from the Election Commissioner to cease such practices, they continued throughout the campaign.

**The fairness of access for political parties, alliances and candidates to the media, in particular the state media.**

State broadcaster Rupavahini seriously breached this principle as did the state controlled newspapers. The government controlled media did not give equal access to all the parties during the course of the election campaign. The state media did not respect the moratorium on campaigning during the final days of the campaign. We have similar concerns in relation to the independent media.

**Registration of voters without discrimination of the basis of gender, racial or ethnic origin.**

Voter registration across the country is well conducted, ensuring voters are properly registered. Further, special provision is, in principle, provided for displaced voters and voters from the “un-cleared” areas.

The main concern is in Jaffna, where the registered electorate is some 633,000, but the number of persons actually resident is only about 500,000. This raises concerns as the voter cards and ballots are produced according to the registration figures, which means there is effectively a large “surplus” of voter cards and ballots in the peninsula.

**Any other issue that concerns the essential freedom and fairness of the election.**

The government in power had a special responsibility to ensure that the election was conducted in an atmosphere of non-violence. It had a political and moral obligation to ensure that the entire security forces of the state were mobilized to eliminate violence from the political process. This it failed to do.

The decision of the army to close checkpoints at Vavuniya and Batticaloa prevented many thousands of people from exercising their right to vote. It would seem that there is no justification for this action and serious questions have to be raised about the political motivation behind it.

The rule of law should have been impartially enforced. However widespread concern was expressed to the Mission that there was political interference with the police. Those who abuse the police in this way do them a great disservice and undermine public confidence in them. It should also be stated that many members of the police did in fact discharge their responsibilities honourably.

We intend to monitor the progress of investigations into the many incidents of violence that occurred. The public deserve reassurance that those guilty of acts of violence irrespective of their party allegiance or the office they hold, will be subject to the full rigours of the law. The impartial enforcement of the rule of law is also an important cornerstone of democracy.

**The conduct of polling and counting of votes described in the electoral law.**

On election day, observer reports indicated a strong technical organisation of the voting and counting by election officials, with a generally good presence of party agents in the polling stations.

Although our observers expressed some concerns about the layout of the polling booths in polling stations and the quality of ink that was used to prevent multiple voting, it was a well organised poll. However, in contrast there were alarming reports of violence in certain areas, such as Kandy, Matale, Kurunegala, Puttalam and Anuradhapura. This violence, which included bomb attacks, shootings, intimidation and clashes between activists, mirrored the campaign violence in the same areas.

While the Commissioner of Elections was in favour of repolling in Kandy where the number of annulled votes could have affected the result the political parties were in consensus that repolling should not take place.

A second major concern is the report of the lack of access to polling areas for voters from the “un-cleared” areas in Batticaloa and Vanni. The failure to ensure checkpoints were open and that transportation for these persons was allowed to pass represents a major infringement of their right to vote and has serious implications for the integrity of the process in the affected areas. However repolling will not take place in the cluster polling stations in the uncleared areas despite the fact that large numbers of voters were prevented from taking part.

There is also concern at the dominant role played by EPDP in the process in Jaffna, with reports that some areas, and notably the islands, were closed to polling agents from other parties.

**ENDS**

**John Cushnahan MEP**

## Annex 2: Election Day Surveys

### Voting Process

During Polling Day 27 teams submitted reports to the Observation Mission HQs in Colombo, see deployment plan for further details. In total, 300 polling day report forms were processed at HQs during Polling Day and the following day. Most of them were sent by fax from the six regions. A minor part of the reports, Colombo region, were delivered by hand. 15 forms were excluded due to transmission errors. In addition to the polling report forms, 25 counting forms were submitted to the HQs in Colombo.

Sri Lanka is divided into twenty-two Election Districts, and the 22 districts are divided into 160 Polling Divisions. The EU Election Observation Mission deployed observers into seven main regions covering 21 Election Districts, see table below. Polling district no. 18 and 21, (Polonnaruwa and Ratnapura) were not covered on Election Day.

LTO Area	Election Districts	No. of Teams	No. of Reports	Per cent
Colombo	1,2,3	7	65	21.7 %
Anuradhapura	11,14,17,(18)	4	52	17.4 %
Kurunegala	15,16	4	43	14.4 %
Kandy	4,5,6,22	4	50	16.7 %
Ampara (Digamadula)	12,13,19,20	4	48	15.8 %
Matara	7,8,9	3	33	11.0 %
Jaffna	10	1	9	3.0 %
<b>Total:</b>	<b>20 (21)</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>100%</b>

On Election Day observer teams visited 285 polling stations, 15 were visited twice. The actual number of visited polling stations is higher due to the fact that some reports were excluded from the data processing.

The observer teams spent in average 29 minutes in the polling station, see diagram

The number of reports from each of the 20 Electoral Districts is shown in the table below. Out of the 160 Polling Divisions observer teams reported from 107.

	Electoral District	No. of Reports	Per cent
1	Colombo	43	14.4 %
2	Gampaha	13	4.3 %
3	Kalutara	9	3.0 %
4	Mahanuwara	18	6.0 %
5	Matale	10	3.3 %
6	Nuwara-Eliya	11	3.7 %
7	Galle	8	2.7 %
8	Matara	15	5.0 %
9	Hambantota	10	3.3 %
10	Jaffna	9	3.0 %
11	Vanni	14	4.7 %

12	Batticaloa	5	1.7 %
13	Digamadulla	17	5.4 %
14	Trincomalee	16	5.4 %
15	Kurunegala	31	10.4 %
16	Puttalam	12	4.0 %
17	Anauradhapura	22	7.4 %
18	Polonnaruwa	0	0 %
19	Badulla	11	3.7 %
20	Moneragala	15	5.0 %
21	Ratnapura	0	0 %
22	Kegalle	11	3.7 %
		300	

### Counting Process

After the close of the poll at 16.00hrs observers were instructed to follow the ballot boxes to the counting centres. The observers reported that the boxes were secured and that the transportation of the boxes to the counting centres was carried out in a secure way.

The number of counting centres visited by the teams is not possible to give due to the fact that several centres were situated in the same building.

The counting process was time consuming and started late in several places according to reports from the observers. Despite that the counting was carried out in a professional way and the people involved did a very good job. A general comment from some observer teams were that the counting centres were responsible for too many polling stations, which of course have an impact on the process and delayed the results.

The count of the preferential votes was time consuming and the results were reported late. Teams in Colombo followed this process on the 6 December, but not to the final results were presented.

### Election Day Reports - Comparison 2000 and 2001

No.	Question	Yes - %		No - %		Comment
		2000	2001	2000	2001	
1	Did you witness any active campaigning on polling day?	14.6	2.4	85.4	97.6	
1b	Did you witness any incidents on election day?	N/A	6.0	N/A	94.0	New question
2	Was the ballot box verified to be empty before voting began and then properly sealed?	94.5	96.6	5.5	3.4	One box
3	Were any complaints noted regarding the opening procedures?	5.3	0	94.7	100	
4/5	Turn out	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
6	Did the officials check the fingers for indelible ink before issuing ballot papers?	95.6	99.3	4.4	0.7	
7	Did the officials call out name and number of the voter?	99.0	100	1.0	0	
8	Was the voter register marked?	99.8	100	0.2	0	

9	Was the number of the voter noted on the counterfoil and the ballot stamped with the official mark?	98.8	99.3	1.2	0.7	
10	Did the voter mark the ballot paper in secrecy?	88.8	77.9	11.2	22.1	
11	Did you observe people voting on behalf of others?	1.0	0	99.0	100	
12	Were voters requiring assistance aided in a proper manner?	78.3	85.4	21.7	14.6	
13	Were voters refused the right to vote for inappropriate reasons?	2.3	2.5	97.7	97.5	
14	Did you observe any intimidation of voters?	4.4	1.4	95.6	98.6	
15	Did the polling station receive all necessary material from the Commission?	99.0	98.0	1.0	2.0	
16	Was the ballot box located in full view of the election officials?	99.0	100	1.0	0	
17	Were other observers present outside the polling station?	14.2	22.4	85.8	77.6	
18	Were party agents present inside the polling station?	98.3	99.3	1.7	0.7	
19	Were any unauthorised persons inside the polling station?	6.2	3.0	93.8	97.0	
20	Did other observers report any problems to you?	N/A	3.9	N/A	96.0	New question
21	What is your overall assessment of the process in this polling station?	Very bad	2.0		1.0	
		Bad	8.3		6.3	
		Good	55.2		52.6	
		Very good	34.5		40.1	
	Number of forms	<b>429</b>			<b>300</b>	

### Annex 3: Election Results – Sri Lanka Parliamentary Elections 2001

Colombo	UNP 12 PA 7 JVP 2	Digamadulla	SLMC 3 PA 2 UNP 1 TULF 1
Gampaha	UNP 5 PA 4 JVP 1	Trincomalee	UNP 2 TULF 1 PA 1
Kalutara	UNP 5 PA 4 JVP 1	Kurunegala	UNP 8 PA 6 JVP 1



Kandy	UNP 7 PA 4 JVP 1	Puttalam	UNP 4 PA 3
Matale	UNP 3 PA 2	Anuradhapura	UNP 4 PA 3 JVP 1
Nuwara Eliya	UNP 5 PA 3	Polonnaruwa	UNP 3 PA 2
Galle	UNP 5 PA 4 JVP 1	Badulla	UNP 5 PA 3
Matara	UNP 4 PA 3 JVP 1	Moneragala	PA 3 UNP 2
Hambantota	UNP 4 PA 2 JVP 1	Ratnapura	UNP 5 PA 4 JVP 1
Jaffna	TULF 6 EPDP 2 UNP 1	Kegalle	UNP 5 PA 3 JVP 1
Vanni	TULF 3 UNP 2 DPLF 1		
Batticaloa	TULF 3 SLMC 1 PA 1		

### National List Seats 2001

UNP	4,086,026	13 seats
PA	3,330,815	11 seats
JVP	815,353	3 seats
TULF	348,164	1 seat
SLMC	105,346	1 seat

### Overall Results 2001 (2000)

UNP	109 (89)
PA	77 (107)
JVP	16 (10)
TULF	15 (5)
SLMC	5 --
EPDP	2 (4)
DPLF	1 --

### Annex Deployment Plan

#### ***Jaffna***

Robert Berneheim	S	LTO
Gerard Le Marec	F	LTO

#### ***Kandy***

Svante Renström	S	LTO
Renata Tardioli		IT LTO
Victor Madeira dos Santos	P	AIDCO
Alain du Boispean	F	STO
Tilia Herold		A STO
Fotini Pantelidou		G STO
Cesira Damiani		IT STO
Thomas Prinz		D STO
Diederik Hindriks	NL	STO

### ***Matara***

Soraya Usmani Martinez	UK	LTO	
Xavier Noc		F	LTO
Mario Caivano Garcia		SP	STO
Anne Genoud		F	STO
Anita Nyberg		S	STO
Walter Torres Hernandez		B	STO

### ***Kurunegala***

Kirsten Westphal	D	LTO	
Sonia Franco Alonso		SP	LTO
Carl Grasveld		NL	STO
Claudia Cristina Soares Gomez Diaz	P	STO	
Liam Kilgallen		IR	STO
Fransico Manuel Cunha de Mendonca Prata	P	STO	
Kati Maria Jäaskelainen		FI	STO
Pilar House		IT	STO

### ***Anuradhapura***

Theo Schoemaker	NL	LTO	
Eva Vissers		B	LTO
Isabelle Hènoque	B	STO	
Paul Horsting		NL	STO
Asunta Vivo Cavaller		SP	STO
José Antonio de Gabriel Perez		SP	STO
Timothy Joyce		IR	STO
Nora Kankashian	A	STO	

### ***Digamadula***

Margarida Alves		P	LTO
Björn Birkoff		S	LTO
N T Wesselingh		NL	STO
Renate Holzapfel	D	STO	
Lars Björklund		S	STO
Maria Chalatsi		G	STO
Jeff Alderson		UK	STO
Taina Dahlgren		FI	STO

### ***Colombo***

John Cushnahan	IR	Core	
James Gilbert		UK	RELEX
Carole Coscino		F	Core
Anders Eriksson		S	Core
Mary Cummins		IR	Core
Mark Stevens		UK	Core
Mark Starmanns		G	In-Country
Roger Daenekindt	B	STO	
Nathalie Renaud		F	Core
Leopold de Beer		NL	STO
Joseph Nitti		IT	STO
Monica Reintjes		NL	STO
Terry Duffy		UK	STO