



# **PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP  
Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council

(as of 26 March, 2002)

Also available at <http://www.idpproject.org>

Users of this document are welcome to credit the Global IDP Database for the collection of information.

The opinions expressed here are those of the sources and are not necessarily shared by the Global IDP  
Project or NRC

Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project  
Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59  
1209 Geneva - Switzerland  
Tel: + 41 22 799 07 00  
Fax: + 41 22 799 07 01  
E-mail : [idpsurvey@nrc.ch](mailto:idpsurvey@nrc.ch)

## CONTENTS

<b>CONTENTS</b>	<b>1</b>
-----------------	----------

<b>PROFILE SUMMARY</b>	<b>7</b>
------------------------	----------

SUMMARY	7
---------	---

<b>CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT</b>	<b>10</b>
--	-----------

<b>BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT</b>	<b>10</b>
-----------------------------------	-----------

THE BUILD-UP TO THE 1996-1998 CIVIL WAR	10
---	----

MOBUTU DEFEATED AND KABILA EMERGES TO POWER (MAY 1997)	12
--	----

RECOVERY FROM THE 1996-1997 CIVIL WAR INTERRUPTED BY REBELLION AGAINST KABILA (1998-1999)	12
---	----

OVERVIEW OF THE VARIOUS ARMED CONFLICTS ONGOING IN DRC (2001-2002)	14
--	----

WARRING PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE POST-AUGUST 1998 CONFLICT: AN OVERVIEW	16
--	----

PROTRACTED LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE WITHIN THE RCD/ML CAUSES TOTAL COLLAPSE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY IN THE NORTH-EAST (2000-2002)	21
--	----

LUSAKA CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AND NEW PRESIDENT FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF KABILA IN JANUARY 2001 (1999-2001)	24
---	----

ONE OF THE DRIVING FORCES BEHIND THE CONFLICT IS CONTROL OVER DRC'S NATURAL RESOURCES (2001-2002)	26
---	----

SOME PROGRESS IN THE DISARMING OF THE MILITIA AND WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES (SEPT 2001-FEB 2002)	28
---	----

INTER CONGOLESE DIALOGUE BETWEEN CONGOLESE ARMED REBEL MOVEMENTS, CIVILIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND ORGANIZED CIVIL SOCIETY BUT STILL NO PEACE (2001-2002)	29
---	----

<b>MAIN CAUSES FOR DISPLACEMENT</b>	<b>30</b>
-------------------------------------	-----------

MAJOR DISPLACEMENTS DURING 1997 CIVIL WAR AND DURING ARMED REBELLION IN THE EAST AGAINST KABILA (1997-2001)	30
---	----

FIGHTING BETWEEN VARIOUS ARMED GROUPS CAUSES DESPERATE DISPLACEMENT SITUATION IN THE KIVUS ( 2000-2002)	32
---	----

IN THE KIVUS RCD-GOMA TROOPS AND HUTU ARMED GROUPS CAUSE MASSIVE DISPLACEMENT TO EXPLOIT RESOURCES MORE EASILY (2001)	34
---	----

IN MANIEMA PEOPLE FLEE VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN MAYI MAYI AND RCD FORCES (2001-2002)	34
---	----

VIOLENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE HEMA AND LENDU PEOPLE IN THE ORIENTALE PROVINCE HAS CAUSED MAJOR DISPLACEMENTS SINCE JUNE 1999 (1999-2002)	35
---	----

FIGHTING BETWEEN UGANDAN AND RWANDAN TROOPS IN KISANGANI CAUSED SUBSTANTIAL DISPLACEMENT IN JUNE 2000 (2000-2002)	37
---	----

PEOPLE FLEE FIGHTING AT THE FRONTLINE IN THE EQUATEUR PROVINCE (2000)	38
---	----

PEOPLE FLEE FIGHTING AT THE FRONTLINE IN THE KATANGA PROVINCE (1998-2001)	39
---	----

MANY DISPLACED WHO HAD FOUND REFUGE IN GOMA HAD TO FLEE AGAIN WHEN THE NYIRAGONGO VOLCANO ERUPTED (FEB 02)	40
--	----

## **POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES** **42**

<b>TOTAL NATIONAL FIGURES</b>	<b>42</b>
2,275,111 IDPS AS OF FEBRUARY 2002	42
OTHER VULNERABLE GROUPS INCLUDE ABOUT 200,000 PEOPLE WHO LIVE HIDDEN AND ARE TOTALLY DESTITUTE (FEB 2002)	42
OVER 2 MILLION IDPS IN DRC BY END OF SEPTEMBER 2001	42
960,000 IDPS IN DRC BY END OF 1999	43
500,000 IDPS IN DRC BY END OF 1998	44
100,000 BELIEVED TO BE DISPLACED BY THE END OF 1997	44
400,000 BELIEVED TO BE DISPLACED BY THE END OF 1996	45
UN OCHA'S RENEWED EFFORTS TO GATHER PRECISE DATA ON THE NUMBER OF IDPS DESPITE DIFFICULTIES (2001)	45
<b>DISAGGREGATED FIGURES</b>	<b>46</b>
DISTRIBUTION OF IDPS BY PROVINCE (JULY 99-FEB 2002)	46
DISPLACEMENT IN THE MANIEMA PROVINCE (2001-2002)	47
DISPLACEMENT IN THE KATANGA PROVINCE (2000-2001)	47
DISPLACEMENT IN THE ORIENTALE PROVINCE (2001-2002)	48
DISPLACEMENT IN THE NORTH KIVU PROVINCE (2001-2002)	49
DISPLACEMENT IN THE SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE (2001-2002)	49
DISPLACEMENT IN THE EQUATEUR PROVINCE (2001-2002)	50
DISPLACEMENT IN THE EASTERN KASAI PROVINCE (2000-2002)	51
DISPLACEMENT IN THE WESTERN KASAI PROVINCE (2001-2002)	52
DISPLACEMENT IN KINSHASA PROVINCE (2001-2002)	52
THE CIVIL WAR HAS CAUSED A LARGE NUMBER OF DISPLACED AND UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN (1999-2000)	52

## **PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT** **54**

<b>GENERAL</b>	<b>54</b>
IN NORTH KIVU, LARGE-SCALE DISPLACEMENT FROM AREAS RICH IN MINERAL WEALTH (2001)	54
CHANGED FRONTLINE AND STRATEGY BY ARMED GROUPS IN SOUTH KIVU MAKE THE DISPLACED FLEE GREATER DISTANCES (2000-2001)	54
IDPS REMAIN CLOSE TO THEIR PLACES OF ORIGIN (1999-2000)	55

## **PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT** **57**

<b>GENERAL</b>	<b>57</b>
RAPE OF GIRLS AND WOMEN OF ALL AGES HAS BEEN EXTENSIVELY USED BY ALL FORCES (2000-2002)	57
ATTACKS ON ORGANISED IDP CAMPS IN NORTH KIVU IN 2000	58
DISPLACED CHILDREN NEED PROTECTION FROM RECRUITMENT BY ARMED GROUPS (2001)	59
REBEL AUTHORITIES AND ARMED GROUPED FIGHTING ON THE SIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT ALL COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES (2000-2002)	61

THE BANYAMULENGE (TUTSI) COMMUNITY IN THE KIVUS IS THREATENED BUT RECEIVES LITTLE PROTECTION FROM RCD-GOMA (2001)	62
SEVERAL IDP GROUPS SUBJECTED TO FORCED LABOUR (2000)	63

## **SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)** **64**

### **GENERAL** **64**

INDICATORS SHOW MORE PRESSING SUBSISTENCE NEEDS IN 2001 THAN IN 2000 (2001-2002)	64
CIVIL WAR INFLECTS UNBEARABLE HARDSHIP ON WOMEN (2000-2001)	65
IDPS SEEKING SHELTER IN THE FOREST CONSTITUTE BE THE MOST VULNERABLE IDP GROUP (2000)	66

### **HEALTH** **67**

OUTBREAK OF CHOLERA IN KATANGA PROVINCE (2001-2002)	67
COPING CAPACITIES OF HEALTH AUTHORITIES GREATLY REDUCED FOLLOWING VOLCANO ERUPTION NEAR GOMA (2002)	67
IDPS ARE MORE EXPOSED TO HIV/AIDS INFECTION AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT (2001-2002)	67

WHO SAYS CLEAR SHIFT TO PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH NEEDED TO FOCUS ON THE MAIN KILLER CONDITIONS (2000-2001) 68

CONFLICT CAUSES DEGRADATION OF THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (1999-2001) 69

APPALLING HEALTH CONDITIONS AMONG IDPS IN SOUTH KIVU (2000-2002) 71

VIOLENCE IS MAKING FAMILIES MORE VULNERABLE TO DISEASES SAY SURVEYS IN EQUATEUR AND KATANGA PROVINCES (2001) 72

IDPS OFTEN LIVED IN PARTICULARLY INSANITARY CONDITIONS (2001) 74

### **NUTRITION AND FOOD** **74**

MALNUTRITION ON THE INCREASE AMONG IDPS (2000-2002) 74

MALNUTRITION OF SMALL CHILDREN IN BARAKA (TERRITORY OF FIZI, SOUTH KIVU) (FEB 2002) 76

IN THE KIVUS NUTRITIONAL ASSESSMENT SHOWED THAT HOST FAMILIES AND IDPS ARE MALNOURISHED (OCT 2001) 76

UN AGENCIES ASSESS FOOD NEEDS IN CITY OF NORTH KIVU (2001) 76

IN KATANGA PROVINCE, WIDESPREAD MALNUTRITION REPORTED AMONG IDPS AND THE POPULATION IN GENERAL (2001) 77

CRITICAL FOOD SITUATION IN KINSHASA DUE TO THE WAR AND INFLUX OF IDPS (2001) 78

IN MANIEMA PROVINCE, IDPS HIDING IN THE FOREST ARE DYING OF DISEASE AND MALNUTRITION (JULY 2001) 80

EVIDENT SIGNS OF MALNUTRITION AMONG IDPS IN ITURI (MARCH 2000) 80

ALARMING HIGH MALNUTRITION RATES AMONG DISPLACED AND OTHER CHILDREN (2001-2002) 81

### **SHELTER** **82**

IDPS IN EASTERN DRC SEEK SHELTER IN TOWNS (2000) 82

MAJORITY OF IDPS ARE NOT HOUSED IN CAMPS BUT HAVE MERGED INTO HOST COMMUNITIES (1999-2000) 83

## **ACCESS TO EDUCATION** **84**

### **GENERAL** **84**

FOLLOWING VOLCANO IRRUPTION 45 SCHOOLS DESTROYED IN GOMA LEFT TEMPORARILY SOME 24,000 CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL (FEB 2002) 84

400,000 DISPLACED CHILDREN OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE HAVE NO ACCESS TO BASIC EDUCATION  
(2001) 84

**ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION** 86

**GENERAL** 86

DETERIORATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION DUE TO THE WAR (2001-2002) 86

MANY DISPLACED WOMEN HAVE BECOME THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD (2001) 87

ORPHANED AND SEPARATED CHILDREN, ESPECIALLY YOUNG GIRLS, ARE EXPOSED TO NEGLECT  
AND ABUSE (DECEMBER 2000) 88

**DISRUPTION OF FOOD PRODUCTION AND COPING MECHANISMS** 88

KISANGANI POPULATION, INCLUDING IDPs, IS STILL COPING WITH TRAUMA OF JUNE 2000 WAR  
(2001) 88

DISPLACEMENT ADDS ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON MECHANISMS FOR SELF-RELIANCE OF HOST  
FAMILIES (1997-2001) 89

COPING AND SURVIVAL MECHANISMS OF IDPs IN SOUTH KIVU (2000) 91

MILITARY OPERATIONS CAUSE GENERAL DETERIORATING FOOD SECURITY (1999-2000) 92

**DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP** 93

**GENERAL** 93

62% OF WOMEN IN DRC MARRY UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW AND CANNOT GET INHERITANCE  
PRIORITY (OCT 2001) 93

**PROPERTY ISSUES** 94

**GENERAL** 94

IDPs FROM BUNIA AREA (ORIENTALE PROVINCE) MAY LOSE THEIR LAND IF DO NOT RETURN  
HOME WITHIN A MONTH (2001) 94

**PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT** 95

**GENERAL** 95

IRC SURVEY SAYS THAT 43% OF DISPLACED PERSONS WHO FLED MT NYIRAGONGO ERUPTION DO  
NOT WANT TO RELOCATE WEST OF GOMA (2001) 95

WITH THE CEASEFIRE HOLDING, IDPs ARE STARTING TO GO HOME (2001) 95

**HUMANITARIAN ACCESS** 97

**LIMITATION OF ACCESS CAUSED BY THE CONFLICT** 97

IMPROVED ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED-AREAS BUT DECREASED ACCESS IN REBEL-  
HELD AREAS (2001-2002) 97

INCREASED DIFFICULTY TO REACH VULNERABLE POPULATIONS IN MANIEMA PROVINCE (FEB  
2002) 98

FREQUENT ATTACKS ON RELIEF WORKERS HINDERS THE DELIVERING OF ASSISTANCE TO THE  
DISPLACED (2000-2002) 99

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS REDUCED DURING 2000	100
---	-----

<b><u>NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES</u></b>	<b>102</b>
--	------------

<b>NATIONAL RESPONSE</b>	<b>102</b>
--------------------------	------------

GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO ALLOW FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AIMS TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THE DISPLACED (2001)	102
--	-----

RCD-GOMA AUTHORITIES START TAXING HUMANITARIAN DONATIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (SEPTEMBER 2001)	102
--	-----

<b>INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS</b>	<b>103</b>
--	------------

UN MECHANISMS FOR COORDINATION (1999-2001)	103
--	-----

DEPLOYMENT OF UN MISSION, MONUC, TO HELP IMPLEMENTING LUSAKA AGREEMENT AND MONITOR SECURITY CONDITIONS (1999-2002)	104
--	-----

UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEFINES NEW APPROACH TO BE TAKEN BY MONUC (FEBRUARY 2001)	107
---	-----

UN AND NGO SUB-OFFICES TO GET CLOSER TO ISOLATED IDP COMMUNITIES AND OTHER VULNERABLE POPULATIONS (2000-2001)	108
---	-----

PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN THE DRC (NOVEMBER 1998)	109
---	-----

<b>UN RESPONSE</b>	<b>112</b>
--------------------	------------

2002 UNITED NATIONS CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY APPEAL: PROJECT REQUIREMENTS AND STRATEGY	112
---	-----

REVISION OF 2002 CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FOLLOWING ERUPTION OF NYIRAGONGO VOLCANO (FEBRUARY 2002)	116
---	-----

RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN NEEDS FOLLOWING ERUPTION OF NYIRAGONGO VOLCANO (FEB 2002)	117
--	-----

THE AMERICAN REFUGEE COMMITTEE HAS PROGRAMS BENEFITING IDPS IN THE MASISI REGION (NORTH KIVU) (Nov 2001)	118
--	-----

UN 2001 APPEAL FOR DRC FUNDED AT 64.18% (2002)	119
--	-----

FAO & WFP WILL SUPPORT THE REINTEGRATION OF IDPS AND THE RECOVERY OF THEIR HOST COMMUNITIES' FOOD SECURITY (2002)	120
---	-----

MORE THAN 4,440,000 WAR-AFFECTED PEOPLE BENEFITED FROM HEALTH PROJECTS IN 2001 (Nov 2001)	120
---	-----

OVERVIEW OF FOOD & HEALTH ASSISTANCE TO THE DISPLACED POPULATION PER PROVINCE (2000-2001)	121
---	-----

WFP & FAO INCREASED THE AMOUNT OF FOOD DISTRIBUTED IN 2001 (Nov 2001)	124
---	-----

WFP'S ASSISTANCE TO IDPS BASED ON EMERGENCY REPORTS (AUG 2001- FEB 2002)	125
--	-----

UNICEF DISTRIBUTES NON-FOOD ASSISTANCE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL NGOs TO IDPS (2001-2002)	128
---	-----

UNICEF LAUNCHED EDUCATION INITIATIVE IN FAVOR OF IDPS (2002)	129
--	-----

UNICEF, INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL NGOs IN THE AREA OF CHILD PROTECTION (2001-2002)	130
--	-----

UN AGENCIES ANSWER SOME OF THE ACUTE EDUCATION NEEDS OF DISPLACED AND OTHER VULNERABLE CHILDREN (Nov 2001)	131
--	-----

EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS (EHI) AND QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS BENEFIT IDPS (2000-2001)	132
---	-----

UNDP'S ACTIVITIES INCLUDE THE REINTEGRATION AND LIVELIHOODS SUPPORT OF IDPS (2002)	133
--	-----

UNDP TO CREATE A SECURITY NETWORK (2001)	134
--	-----

JOSEPH KABILA ASKS UNHCR TO ASSIST THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED THE AGENCY DOES NOT TARGET IDPs (2001-2002)	135
FOOD AID REACHED 840,000 DISPLACED PERSONS DURING 2000	135
RELATIVE INCREASE IN ASSISTANCE DURING 2000 BUT LEVEL STILL MODEST COMPARED TO NEEDS (NOVEMBER 2000)	136
SWIFT RESPONSE TO MAJOR NEW DISPLACEMENTS FROM KISANGANI (2000-2002)	137
<b>RESPONSE BY NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS</b>	<b>139</b>
OXFAM GB, SCF-UK AND CHRISTIAN AID ADVOCATE FOR BETTER IDP PROTECTION (2001-2002)	139
INTERNATIONAL NGOs EXPAND THEIR ACTIVITIES TO AREAS FORMERLY INACCESSIBLE (AUGUST 2001)	139
SCF: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE AND FOOD SECURITY OF DISPLACED WOMEN AND CHILDREN (2000-2001)	140
IDP RELATED ACTIVITIES BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (2000-2002)	141
WORLD VISION RUNS SEVERAL PROGRAMS BENEFITING THE DISPLACED IN THE EAST (2001)	142
CHURCHES TOGETHER (ACT) AIMS TO ANSWER URGENT FOOD, MEDICINES, SHELTER AND CLOTHING NEEDS (2001)	143
MERLIN AND CARITAS ALSO ASSIST THE DISPLACED (2001)	144
MSF HAS HEALTH AND NUTRITION PROJECTS ON BOTH SIDE OF THE FRONT LINE (2001)	144
STUDY BY LIFE AND PEACE INSTITUTE SHOWS DIVERSITY BUT LACK OF UNITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE KIVU PROVINCES (2001)	145
LOCAL NGOs AND CHURCH NETWORKS MAY BE THE BEST CHANNELS TO REACH DISPLACED POPULATIONS (DECEMBER 2000)	146
NGO ACTIVITY BY SECTOR/AREA (2000)	146
ACTION AGAINST HUNGER: ASSISTANCE TO DISPLACED FAMILIES (MARCH 2000)	148
<b>DONORS RESPONSE</b>	<b>149</b>
EU ADOPTS EURO 32 MILLION HUMANITARIAN PACKAGE (JAN 2002)	149
THE U.S. TRIPLED ITS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO DR CONGO IN 2001	150
DONORS PLEDGED TO PROVIDE MORE FUNDING TO DRC WITH RENEWAL OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (2001)	150
<b>ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS</b>	<b>152</b>
<b><u>LIST OF SOURCES USED</u></b>	<b>155</b>

## PROFILE SUMMARY

### Summary

Despite the cease-fire between the primary armed groups in DR Congo (DRC) since January 2001, fighting is still ongoing in the North and North-East of the country where most of the 2.2 million internally displaced persons are located (as of February 2002). The humanitarian situation remains desperate, and due to insecurity and lack of funding, the international response is far from sufficient to cover the needs of the displaced. It is estimated that over 2.5 million people have died in DRC since 1998 in the context the war, the majority due to disease and malnutrition.

The dramatic situation of internal displacement in DRC is a result of confrontations between various groups -both external and internal- to accede to power, accompanied by inter-ethnic rivalry in the central and eastern regions. The present conflict started in October 1996 when a rebel army, supported by Rwandan and Ugandan troops, launched an attack against the Mobutu regime. It resulted in the fall of Mobutu and in the coming to power of Laurent Kabila. By mid-1997, about 150,000 people were displaced in the country (USCR 1998, p.61). In 1998, a major rebellion against the new regime, supported by Kabila's former allies, Rwanda and Uganda, started in the East and developed into a new civil war. Continued hostilities between Kabila's forces, armed contingents from several African nations, and three rebel factions, as well as conflicts between rebel groups, resulted in large-scale massacres and massive displacement. Competition for control of DRC's rich natural resources, including diamonds, gold and precious metals such as coltan have sustained the war (see the 2001 UN report on exploitation of natural resources and its addendum, May and 13 November 2001).

Under the auspices of the Government of Zambia, President Kabila's government, with its allies Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, signed a cease-fire agreement on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka with Rwanda and Uganda. The major rebel groups also became parties to the agreement. The Security Council then authorized in November 1999 the deployment of a UN Mission (MONUC) to support the Lusaka Accord. However, the cease-fire was not respected. In January 2001, the assassination of Laurent Kabila and the rise to power of his son, Joseph Kabila, led to a new momentum in the peace process. The cease-fire finally took hold, and the disengagement of forces from the front lines is now largely complete (UNDP 28 Nov 2001). The Lusaka agreement also foresaw an "Inter Congolese dialogue" to discuss the establishment of a transitional government. Meetings between Congolese armed rebel movements, civilian political parties and organized civil society have taken place but have so far not brought any result (as of mid-March 2002). In June 2001, UN Security Council Resolution 1355 extended the mandate of MONUC for another year and strengthened it to include a civilian police force component (UN SC 30 August 2001). Its phase III will concentrate on the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process and up to 2,500 troops will be deployed in 2002 (UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002).

Today, the country remains de facto divided into three main parts: first, the government of Kinshasa controls the western part, supported by Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia; second, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), which controls much of the Equateur Province and parts of Orientale in the north, with support from Uganda; third, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma) in the east and southeast, i.e. in North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, Orientale, and Katanga provinces, supported by Rwanda (UN OCHA 28 February 2002). Also, each party has to contend with opposition groups, such as the Mai Mai and the Rwandan and Burundian Hutu groups in the East. The situation in the Kivus and in Maniema continues to be highly unstable, with significant operations by RCD/the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and armed group activity (UN SC 15 Feb 2002). In the Orientale Province (North-East), fighting between the MLC and another group, RCD-Kinsangani, has intensified over the last few months. At the

same time, ethnic clashes in the Province have caused hundreds of killings and twenty thousands displaced in February 2002 (UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002).

The majority of the over 2.2 million internally displaced are in the East, particularly in North and South Kivu, Province Orientale and Northern Katanga, the areas most affected by the war:

North Kivu	South Kivu	Orientale	Katanga	Equateur	Maniema	Eastern & Western Kasai	Kinshasa
760,000	435,111	250,000	415,000	85,000	160,000	130,000	40,000

(UN OCHA 28 February 2002)

These numbers probably underestimate the true extent of displacement since IDPs in DRC are difficult to count due to a high degree of dispersion and limited access (UN OCHA 7 June 2001). The number of IDPs has remained stable since mid-last year in most provinces, but the United Nations have registered an increase of 210,000 IDPs in South Kivu and of 20,000 in Orientale Province since September 2001 (UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002 & 30 Sept 2001). This increase can be explained by the fact that displacement movements continue in the east and in the north-east despite the cease-fire. These estimates do not take into account the latest displacements, such as the 20,000 additional IDPs in Maniema Province following clashes between rebels and the Mai Mai (UN OCHA 20 Feb 2002). They do not reflect either the fact that people who fled their villages may have had to flee again to escape violence or natural disasters. In January 2001, many people who had been displaced by conflict and who had found refuge in Goma had to flee again when the Nyiragongo volcano erupted. The eruption caused the destruction of around 15 percent of Goma town, and approximately 120,000 people have been made homeless (UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002).

***Humanitarian situation:***

The civilian population continues to suffer tremendously, especially in the central and eastern regions. According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), an estimated 2.5 million people have died in the context of the war since August 1998, the majority due to disease and malnutrition (IRC April 2001).

Several reports suggest that the displaced and the general war-affected population share the same needs. The health care system, already in a weak state when the present conflict started in August 1998, has degraded further due to looting, fleeing staff and lack of resources. Up to 70 percent of the population is now excluded from accessing basic health services (WHO 9 August 2001). The system has been unable to cope with the sharp increase of diseases, such as malaria, cholera and meningitis (WHO 9 Aug 2001 & 5 March 2002, UN SC 15 Feb 2002). The situation is particularly worrying in Goma, where the volcano eruption caused the destruction of five health facilities and further reduced the coping capacities of health authorities (UNICEF 19 Feb 2002). IDPs suffer great exposure to HIV/AIDS infection as a result of the conflict, since they have no means to protect themselves from this infection and do not have access to information about its transmission (Oxfam August 2001). Most IDPs have not sought shelter in camps but have integrated into host communities. Coping mechanisms of communities hosting the displaced are seriously over-stretched (ACT 10 August 2001 & WVI 30 July 2001).

Sixteen million people (33 percent of the population) have critical food needs as a result of prolonged displacement and other factors (UN SC 8 June 2001). It has been reported that approximately 64 percent of people in Eastern DRC are undernourished. This is the highest figure in the world (Oxfam 6 Feb 2002). Malnutrition rates among the displaced – particularly children - are very high in the Kivus (ACT 13 July

2001 & WVI 15 March 2002), Equateur (UN SC 15 Feb 2002), Kinshasa (UN OCHA Sept 2001), Maniema (ACT 13 July 2001) and Katanga (PANA 30 July 2001 & WVI 27 Sept 2001).

### **Human Rights Situation**

The human rights situation is very critical. UN agencies as well as NGOs regularly report widespread killings, torture and other human rights abuses against civilians by armed groups on all side (HRW 2002 & US DOS 4 March 2002). According to Amnesty International, rape of women and girls has been used extensively by all armed groups (IRIN-CEA 27 June 2001). In October 2001, the UN Secretary General said that internally displaced women are often preyed upon by armed elements and have been the victims of torture, sexual and other abuses and ethnically motivated killings (UN SC 16 Oct 2001). Displaced children are easy targets for forced recruitment into the armed forces. More than 10,000 children remain under arms in the DRC, recruited by all parties to the conflict (Oxfam August 2001, p.14). Girls are recruited as well, often falling victim to forced labor and sexual abuse (AI 19 June 2001). Both the DRC government and the RCD-Goma have committed to cease recruitment and to demobilize child soldiers but this promise has been slow to materialize. In December 2001, President Kabila finally demobilized a first group of 300 child soldiers enlisted in the government army (AFP 19 Dec 2001).

The conflict has also had a terrible impact on the education system. According to a report by Oxfam GB, SCF-UK and Christian Aid, displaced children have little or no chance to continue with their education (Oxfam August 2001).

### ***Humanitarian response:***

Access to government-controlled regions has improved as a result of the simplification of procedures for international humanitarian agencies (UN OCHA 31 March 2001). Humanitarian agencies have frequently been forced to suspend operations in rebel-held territory because of insecurity and localized violence in certain parts of the Kivus, Maniema, northern Katanga and Ituri (UN SC 15 Feb 2002). Refugee International reported that RCD-Goma authorities, in search of new sources of revenues following the drop in the price of coltan, have started to tax humanitarian supplies, jeopardizing the humanitarian effort (RI 4 September 2001).

Many UN agencies and international NGOs assist IDPs in government and in rebel-held territories in many crucial areas. They provide food and non-food items to the displaced, health care, emergency education, support child protection and reintegration activities (see for example WFP emergency reports, UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001, ICRC 7 March 2002, SCF-UK 10 July 2001). Several humanitarian agencies have recently opened sub-offices in the field to get closer to displaced communities living in isolated locations (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001 & WHO 9 Aug 2001). The UN 2002 Appeal amounts to over US\$ 194 million (UN 26 Nov 2001). An additional 21,6 million was requested in February 2002 following the eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano (UN OCHA 19 Feb 2002). This is significantly more than last year's appeal which asked for 123 million, and was funded at 64% (UN OCHA 2002 "Financial tracking" & UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001).

(Updated March 2002)

# CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

## Background of the conflict

---

### The build-up to the 1996-1998 civil war

- Substantial displacements while Mobutu still in power during the early 1990s
- Civil war ignited in October 1996 in the South Kivu region as Mobutu's government attempted to expel some 400,000 local ethnic Tutsi
- By the end of 1996 rebel troops (ADFL) fighting Mobutu had captured territory along Zaire's border with Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi causing Rwandan refugees (Hutu) to flee from their camps in the conflict zone

"In 1965, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu intervened in a power struggle following elections, seizing power and proclaiming himself head of the republic of Congo [...]. He headed an authoritarian regime for 32 years up to 17 May 1997 [...]. In 1971, Congo was renamed the Republic of Zaïre. The organization of opposition demonstrations in the 1980s prompted changes towards a multi-party political system in April 1990 [...], which marked the beginning of the transition to democracy.

[...]

The first major development in the political reform process was the establishment in 1991 of a Sovereign National Conference. The objective of the Conference was to inter alia draft a new constitution. From the start, the Conference was in conflict with the President, whose supporters in the Conference were in the minority [...].

A succession of short-lived governments was appointed, with alternates being simultaneously appointed either by the Conference or by the President. This resulted on many occasions in organs of the state being at odds with each other, and a demonstrated lack of any coordinated policy [...].

[...]

After 1992, President Mobutu's powers started to be eroded and the stability of the country deteriorated, as opposition forces gained popular support in politics during the transition process [...]. The maintenance of a repressive system amid political liberalisation measures opened the door to an era of chaos and civil strife [...]" (UNHCR-CDR April 1998, sect.2.3)

**In 1995, USCR reported that:** "Zaire's unstable situation [had] produced a state of a state of anarchy in many regions. The country's economy was in ruins after years of neglect and official corruption. Unemployment was estimated to be as high as 80 percent. Zaire's historically undisciplined police and soldiers rioted and looted with impunity.

At the root of Zaire's crisis was President Mobutu Sese Seko's refusal to accede to democratic reforms. Mobutu's ability to stir division among his opponents and manipulate ethnic violence forced an estimated 700,000 persons from their homes in two regions of the country and left some 6,000 dead. The worst violence erupted in the southern region of Shaba and in the eastern regions of North Kivu.

In the Shaba region – formerly called Katanga – repeated violence occurred during 1992-93 between Katangans and persons of Kasai ancestry who had lived peacefully in Shaba for generations. Some 400,000 persons were forced to flee from Shaba to their ancestral homeland in the Kasai area in central Zaire.

Thousands fled to neighbouring countries. Tens of thousands more remained in Shaba but sought refuge in camps administered by relief workers.

In North Kivu, some 270,000 were internally displaced by violence during 1992-93. The violence flared to disputes over land and the denial of Zairean citizenship to ethnic Banyarwanda." (USCR 1995, p.82)

**Three years later the conflict had further deteriorated:** "[In the Masisi zone of North Kivu] violence escalated in 1996, driven by several factors: long-standing inter-ethnic rivalries over economic and political power; efforts by Rwandan Hutu refugee leaders to force local populations out of the Masisi zone in order to resettle themselves in the area; and efforts by Zairian government officials to inflame tensions in order to expel political opponents.

[...]

"The presence of some 600,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the [Masisi] region...has greatly exacerbated the situation," USCR stated in a mid-1996 report, Masisi, Down the Road from Goma: Ethnic Cleansing and Displacement in Eastern Zaire. USCR's site visit to the conflict area found 'strong indications' that militia and former Rwandan soldiers operating out of the nearby refugee camps 'have access to sophisticated new weapons, are participating directly in the fighting, and are facilitating the ethnic cleansing of the area.' Zairian troops also participated in the violence, USCR and other investigators concluded.

The upheaval affected members of six ethnic groups. The conflict virtually destroyed the region's network of health clinics and schools. More than 80 percent of the area's economically important cattle herds were lost. Farming in the Masisi area one of Zaire's most productive agricultural zones was decimated. One relief agency reported child malnutrition rates near 40 percent in the worst affected areas.

Attackers routinely burned homes, making return by the owners difficult even when tensions eased in August. Zairian troops reportedly extorted money before allowing families to reclaim their properties.

[...]

Full-scale civil war erupted in eastern Zaire in October [1996]. By year's end, rebel troops captured a 400-mile long swath of territory along Zaire's border with Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.

The war originated in the South Kivu region of eastern Zaire when government authorities attempted to expel some 400,000 local ethnic Tutsi, known as Banyamulenge, who had been in Zaire for generations. Authorities formally nullified the Zairian citizenship of Banyamulenge in 1981. In 1996, officials intensified their claims that the Banyamulenge were not legitimate citizens. A local official warned that all Banyamulenge must leave the country within a week and threatened to confiscate their property. Violence gradually increased throughout September, as Zairian troops and civilian mobs attacked the homes and businesses of the Banyamulenge community.

The Banyamulenge armed themselves and counterattacked. By mid-October, Zairian troops were in retreat and large areas rapidly fell into rebel hands. The rebels stated that their movement, known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), included Banyamulenge as well as members of other political and ethnic groups opposed to the decades of corrupt and abusive mismanagement by Zaire's government and army.

The quick advance of ADFL troops, initially estimated to number 3,000 to 10,000 combatants, caused Rwandan refugees to flee from their camps in the conflict zone. ADFL rebels regarded soldiers and militia of the former Rwandan government in the camps as enemies, and attacked the camps as military bases. "Combatants should stop attacking refugees," UNHCR stated. Virtually all refugee camps in the Uvira area reportedly emptied by October 21. Most camps in the Bukavu area were vacated two weeks later.

[...]

Numerous NGO workers on the ground and international diplomats charged that Rwandan and Ugandan government troops crossed into Zaire and participated in the rebels' military offensive, contributing mightily to its rapid success. Rwandan and Ugandan officials acknowledged sending troops into Zaire on a limited basis." (USCR 1997, pp. 105-106)

## **Mobutu defeated and Kabila emerges to power (May 1997)**

- Pockets of violence continued in eastern Congo/Zaire during the last half of 1997

"The civil war continued unabated in early 1997. UN efforts to mediate a peace agreement failed, despite a UN Security Council resolution urging "protection and security for all refugees and displaced persons, and facilitation of access to humanitarian assistance." Mobutu's military offered little or no resistance against the advancing ADFL troops. The major city of Kisangani, in north-central Congo/Zaire, fell to ADFL forces in March. The key southeastern city of Lubumbashi was captured in April. Rebel troops and their allies seized Kinshasa, the capital, in May.

A majority of citizens appeared to welcome the defeat of Mobutu and his troops, who had continued to terrorize the population even during their retreat across the country. The victorious ADFL immediately installed its leader, Laurent Kabila, as president.

[...]

Pockets of violence continued in eastern Congo/Zaire during the last half of 1997, provoked by long-simmering ethnic tensions and the continued presence of Rwandan soldiers and militia members linked to the extremist former government of Rwanda. Shadowy insurgent groups sprang up to challenge ADFL control in some eastern areas." (USCR 1998, p.60)

## **Recovery from the 1996-1997 civil war interrupted by rebellion against Kabila (1998-1999)**

- Rebellion against President Kabila emerged after Kabila issued a decree expelling Rwandan members of the armed forces from the DRC in July 1998
- Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) captured the eastern border towns of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira in 1998
- In August 1998, during a meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Zimbabwe and Namibia pledged to assist Kabila
- In 1999 the RCD splitted in different movements
- In July 1999 the MLC, a new rebel group in Equateur Province, captured Gbadolite

"In late July 1998, Congolese President Laurent Kabila sent home all Rwandan soldiers, thus officially breaking ties with the allies who, together with Ugandan forces, had helped sweep him into power fourteen months before. Rwanda and Uganda responded by invading Congo and joining forces with troops from the Congolese army (Forces Armées Congolaises, FAC) that had mutinied against the government in Goma and Bukavu. The RCD [Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie], composed of former Tutsi members of Kabila's government, former Mobutists, a number of intellectuals, and others, soon emerged as the political leadership of this coalition." (Human Rights Watch February 1999, chapt. I)

"This time Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi sent in troops to support the RCD, a conglomerate of Congolese with various motives to topple the Kabila regime. Once again, the Banyamulenge gave active support and many RCD cadres were chosen from their ethnic group. The RCD later split in two factions and another rebel group, the MLC, challenged Kabila in the Northeast. Kabila is backed by mainly Angolan and Zimbabwean troops. His "unofficial" allies include directly and indirectly, the Mai Mai, and some of the rebels groups against the current Rwandan (Interahamwe, ex-FAR), Ugandan (ADF, NALU) and Burundian governments (FDD, Palipehutu). The Banyamulenge are currently in an isolated position. Although well represented in the ranks of the RCD, they have a separate militia for self-protection. Having immigrated to the DRC over the centuries, they want to integrate in Congolese society but their support to the consecutive Rwandan interventions makes them seen as "collaborators" with what is perceived as an

occupation force. Aside from a tense relationship with Rwanda and the Congolese RCD, they are also being targeted by the Mai Mai, FDD, ex-FAR and Interahamwe." (AAH August 2000, sect. 2)

"According to the Europa World Year Book 2001, Ugandan and Rwandan involvement in the DRC became quite clear in early October 1996 when in response to the persecution of the ethnic Tutsi Banyamulenge resident in South Kivu, eastern DRC, by the Rwandan Hutu militias with the support of members of the Zairean armed forces (FAZ), Rwanda's Tutsi-dominated government and its close regional ally, Uganda, made rapid advances against the combined forces of the Hutus and the poorly trained and ill-disciplined FAZ.

What had initially appeared to be a regional movement seeking to defend the Tutsi population and to disempower Rwandan extremist Hutus, soon gathered momentum and emerged as a national rebellion aiming to overthrow the Mobutu regime. Tutsi rebels were joined by dissidents of diverse ethnic origins to form the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), led by Laurent-Desire Kabila. AFDL entered the then Zairean capital, Kinshasa, on 17 May 1997.

However, on 28 July 1998, Kabila, then DRC president, issued a decree expelling Rwandan members of the armed forces from the DRC. In early August, a rebellion, reportedly receiving aid from both France and Rwanda, was launched in the east of the DRC. The Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) swiftly captured the eastern border towns of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira. This was condemned by Kabila as a Rwandan invasion. Rwanda at first denied the accusation, but on 6 November conceded that its troops were fighting alongside the RCD.

Meanwhile, on 19 August 1998, during a meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Zimbabwe and Namibia pledged to assist Kabila. Later that month, Angola also sent troops to support Kabila.

Signs of tension within the RCD surfaced in January 1999 when the movement was restructured against the wishes of some of its prominent members, including Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, and some members began to question publicly the alleged dominance of the Banyamulenge within the RCD.

In mid-May, in an action supported by Rwanda, but condemned by Uganda, the RCD deposed Wamba dia Wamba as its chairman, and replaced him with Emile Ilunga. Wamba moved to Kisangani, and subsequently to Bunia, and formed the RCD-Mouvement de libération.

Starting sometime in October 2000, Wamba's deputies, Mbusa Nyamwisi and John Tibasiima Atenyi, staged a coup in a bid to oust him. However, the wrangles continued, and in an effort to save the situation, Uganda tried to bring together all the rebel factions receiving its support, including the RCD-N, to form the Forces pour la libération du Congo (FLC) under Jean-Pierre Bemba, but Wamba did not sign the agreement.

The MLC was formed in November 1998 as a new rebel group in Equateur Province in northwestern DRC. In July 1999, the MLC captured Gbadolite, where it established its headquarters." (UN OCHA 19 Feb 2002)

"Starting from August 1998 major changes in the humanitarian situation occurred in the DRC as a result of military confrontation simultaneously taking place in the eastern provinces of the country and in Bas Congo province, as well as in Kinshasa. The first three months of the military conflict put an end to one year-long progress of the relief community in rehabilitating destroyed infrastructure and reintegrating returnees. The war equally undermined the positive trends towards national reconciliation that had started to emerge in the Congolese society. It also became an impetus for a new wave of hostilities and flagrant violations of human rights. The immediate impact of this war was undoubtedly devastating for the population. However, in the longer run, it is fraught with even more serious consequences, as it has affected the fragile social tissue of the Congolese society as a whole. For the first time since the complex humanitarian emergency of 1994/95, the struggle in the east of the country echoed in the traditionally peaceful west, South and Upper Northern

parts of the country. In contrast to the civil war of 1996, the area of military clashes significantly expanded in August-September 1998 and directly affected the civilian population of Bas Congo, Orientale and Kinshasa provinces."(UN December 1998, pp. 1-2)

### **Overview of the various armed conflicts ongoing in DRC (2001-2002)**

- De facto partition of the country despite January 2001 cease-fire
- Conflict between the government in Kinshasa and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and Rwanda
- Conflict between Government and FLC and Uganda, which has reinforced its military presence in Orientale province following fighting between RCD-Kisangani and MLC (Mouvement de liberation du Congo)
- Tribal conflict between the Balendu and the Bahema in Ituri

"Stalemate in the war and lack of progress in the peace process led to a de facto partition of the country under four regimes, each depending on foreign troops for its survival. The government is entrenched in the western half of the country, although its longstanding reliance on foreign allies became pronounced following the assassination in mid- January 2001 of President Laurent Kabila and his replacement by his son Joseph Kabila. One rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo, MLC), headed by Jean-Pierre Bemba, controls much of Equateur province in the north. By early 2001, it had established its sway over another, less well organized rebel group, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), which claimed to control parts of North Kivu, and Orientale provinces in eastern Congo. This merger brought together several of the RCD-ML leaders and created the Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front pour la Libération du Congo (FLC). Wamba dia Wamba, however, one of the first leaders of the rebel movement and founder of the RCD-ML, continued to oppose this merger, but with little apparent success. A third rebel group, the main part of the RCD, now known as RCD-Goma, controls parts of North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, Orientale, and Katanga provinces in the east and southeast.

[...]

In addition to the virtual partition of the country, the war has produced further divisions within the zones dominated by Uganda and Rwanda. Local leaders, seeking gain for their political parties or for themselves personally, have manipulated ethnic loyalties and have exploited external support to carve out their own areas of influence. The interaction between local leaders and actors in the broader war has exacerbated local ethnic tensions and created a volatile mix of inter-ethnic conflict that continues to have devastating consequences both in terms of violations of human rights and general suffering for the civilian population." (HRW March 2001, sect. I)

*As of Feb 2002*, "The DRC still remains split into three main zones of control with the MLC (Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo) backed by the Ugandans in charge of the northern part (parts of Orientale and Equateur). North and south Kivu and parts of Orientale and Northern Katanga are controlled by the Rwandan supported RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie) and are still torn by ethnic conflict. The western and southern parts of the country are under government control with military support from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola.

Moreover, there are still some peace spoilers who have no interest for peace in the DRC: for example, the leaders of the Ex FAR and Interahamwe who were involved in the genocide and have all reasons to fear the ICTR or the Rwandan Justice; those who are engaged in the illegal exploitation of the DRC's resources and those who have committed gross violations of human rights and are afraid to be submitted to justice one day." (UN OCHA 28 February 2002, p.16)

"Nine major armed conflicts are taking place in the Democratic Republic of Congo [...]. The main ones are:

#### **A. Conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and RCD and Rwanda**

11. This is the most serious conflict, involving, on the Government side, the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) and the armies of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, with formal and informal support from the irregular group known as the Mai-Mai (see A/55/403) and, on the Rwanda and RCD side, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR), the RCD/Goma army, the Local Defence Unit (a paramilitary guerrilla group), former Interahamwe and former Hutu prisoners in the service of APR and troops of the Burundian army, especially in the Uvira area.

12. Other groups opposed to the Governments of neighbouring countries involved in the Congolese war are active in this conflict and commit crimes against Congolese civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They are responsible for considerable violence and, on the pretext of fighting the armies of Rwanda and Burundi, massacre innocent Congolese citizens. These groups are the Interahamwe, the former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) and the Burundian *Forces pour la défense de la démocratie* (FDD), all of which have committed violations of international humanitarian law.

13. For the Congolese population, the term "rebels" does not exist: all Congolese in all three parts into which the country is divided speak only of "aggressors". The discourteous reception given by former President Laurent Kabila to MONUC was explained by the Security Council's references to Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda as "uninvited" countries, while the new relationship with MONUC since late 2000 is explained by the Security Council's reference to countries "which have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo" (see Security Council resolution 1304 (2000)).

14. Terror reigns in the area occupied by RCD and Rwanda. As in previous years, violence by members of the Mai-Mai, Interahamwe, ex-FAR and FDD, who attack RCD, APR and Burundian soldiers, triggers acts of revenge and massacres. Although on his visits to Goma in 2001 the Special Rapporteur found that there was less tension than in 2000 (see E/CN.4/2001/40/Add.1, paras. 27 and 28), the same is not true of other cities such as Kisangani. The Special Rapporteur has not received any information on massacres of the Banyamulenge population referred to in paragraph 59 of the Secretary-General's sixth report on MONUC activities (S/2001/128).

#### **B. Conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and FLC and Uganda**

15. In the north-east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Government forces, along with the country's Angolan and Zimbabwean allies and the Mai-Mai militias, are fighting the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) and FLC. Ugandan troops act with complete contempt for the Congolese population and their presence is devastating.

16. The violence of the Ugandan rebels of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is creating considerable insecurity because of bloody attacks on the civilian population; in pursuing these guerrilla fighters, UPDF simply attacks the defenceless population all over again.

17. The inability of the Ugandans and FLC to put a stop to the violence was reflected in the mass murder in late June at Aru, Ituri, of between 250 and 843 people accused of witchcraft. This case is unconnected to the Bahemu-Balendu conflict. Various sources blame the Ugandans, not just for their inability to control the region but for directly carrying out the murders.

#### **C. Internal armed conflict between the Bahema and the Balendu in Ituri**

18. It was the seriousness of this conflict unfolding in territory controlled by Uganda and FLC, especially the 19 January massacres, that led to the Special Rapporteur's mission in March, undertaken at the request of members of the Security Council (see E/CN.4/2001/40/Add.1, paras. 39 to 54). Tensions eased after the Protocol of Agreement skilfully secured by the FLC Chairman, Jean-Pierre Bemba, on 17 February (para.

53), but the success of the Protocol depended both on the willingness of the parties and on Mr. Bemba's skill and interest in imposing his authority on the Ugandans, which did not happen. Although initially the violence abated, the Ugandans continued to favour the Bahema and there has been a resumption of terrible incidents, such as the cold-blooded, premeditated murder of six International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) humanitarian workers on 26 April. Only days before the murder, the Bahema had launched a smear campaign against humanitarian and human rights personnel: the MONUC human rights officer, the Special Rapporteur and ICRC, whose personnel had been threatened for the past year. The crime occurred in an area where there are large numbers of Ugandan soldiers who, together with the Bahema, constitute the real "State" in the region. The Secretary-General drew attention to this situation in June, in his eighth report on MONUC, when, referring to the incident, he noted that "during past months, many international workers in Bunia have received threatening letters from one of the ethnic groups in the area" (S/2001/572, para. 54). Clashes in Picho, Kalo, Drodro, Nizi and elsewhere have also resulted in some 100 deaths since March. The FLC Chairman's pledge to the Special Rapporteur that there would be an end to impunity has not been fulfilled." (UN GA 31 August 2001, para.11-18)

As of February 2002, "The situation in Orientale Province (where the total number of troops is thought to be between 2500 and 3000) has however raised concerns that UPDF may further reinforce their presence in the Aru, Mahagi and Kyavinyonge sectors in order to protect their security interests. In addition, UPDF have reinforced their position in Beni by reportedly deploying a new battalion there. These areas are not only threatened by the upsurge in fighting between the RCD-K forces and the Mouvement de liberation du Congo (MLC) led by Jean-Pierre Bemba but are also at the heart of an ethnic feud between the Lendu, Hema and Ngiti. [...]

Once again in Ituri, in February 2002 bloody ethnic clashes have caused hundreds of killings and twenty thousands displaced, seriously jeopardizing the peace process. MONUC's Representative has expressed grave concern about the deterioration of the situation and has stressed the responsibility of the administration in place (Ugandan army) to ensure the security of the population there. Impunity and insecurity have translated into downward spiral of violence and hatred in a number of areas such as Uvira, Fizi, Baraka, Hauts Plateaux, Kalima, Kindu, Ituri, Mwenga, Beni and Butembo and as a consequence have significantly reduced access and assistance to the most vulnerable." (UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002, p.15)

### **Warring parties involved in the post-August 1998 conflict: an overview**

*The table below presents briefly the major armed groups involved in the DRC conflict since August 1998. The information should be considered indicative only, and excludes numerous smaller armed groups and factions within and outside the main armed groups involved in the conflict. The table may not be updated with regard to recent changes in alliances. More detailed information is included below the table, but readers seeking further information may consider a review of the source documents.*

"The number of non-state actors, often referred to as armed opposition, uncontrolled military groups, insurgents, etc. is continuously on the rise. In addition to domestic non-state armed groups, the DRC hosts a significant number of foreign rebel or insurgent groups, which consider the DRC as a rear base for launching raids on their respective countries. With the exception of Tanzania, Zambia and CAR, all other DRC neighbour countries attempt to neutralise their domestic armed opposition on the DRC soil. In simple terms, the internal struggles of Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and to a much lesser extent (in the past) Republic of the Congo have been spilling over into the DRC. In eastern province of the Kivu, there is a noticeable amalgamation of foreign and local insurgent groups that are not believed to be entirely under the control of any state-parties to the conflict, although they regard Rwandan and Burundian armies as their main target. Security-related problems encountered by relief personnel because of widespread insurrection have been regular and frequent and are expected to increase." (UN November 2000, p.21)

<b>PRO GOVERNMENT FORCES</b>	
Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)	Remaining part of the national army loyal to President Kabila. Comprised of soldiers from Mobutu's Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ), as well as Kabila's own core force of Banyamulenge and Katangan gendarmes
Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia	National armies
Mai-Mai (also Mayi-Mayi)	Indigenous militia involved in a number of uprisings in the Great Lakes Region since the colonial era, today encompassing many of the groups of indigenous militia of different ethnic origins in eastern Congo opposed to the RCD and its allies
Interahamwe militia & Ex-FAR	Interahamwe initially organized as a political party in Rwanda, major actor in genocide against the Tutsis, after fleeing to eastern Congo Interahamwe has become a term covering any ethnic Hutu combatant in Congo. Ex-FAR (i.e. members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces)
Forces pour la défense de la démocratie -FDD (Burundian rebel group)	The armed wing of a major Burundian opposition force (CNDD-FDD)
Alliance of Democratic Forces - ADF (Ugandan rebel group)	Ugandan rebel group traditionally fighting the Government of Uganda
<b>MAJOR ARMED GROUPS FIGHTING KABILA'S GOVERNMENT</b>	
RCD-Goma (Congolese Rally for Democracy/Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD)	Composed of former Tutsi members of Kabila's government, former Mobutists, a number of intellectuals, and others. RCD was initially one group, but split into two factions during second half of 1999, i.e. RCD-Goma and RCD-ML. Backed by Rwanda.
RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) – armed wing known as Armée Populaire Congolaise (APC)	Headed by Wamba-dia-Wamba and based in Bunia, Orientale province. Backed by Uganda
The Mouvement national de libération congolais (MNLC also MLC)	Anti-Kabila group led by businessman Jean-Pierre Bemba, with support from Uganda
Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC)	Emerged in January 2001 as a unification in of the armies of MLC, RCD-ML, and RCD-National. Wamba's support and role uncertain.
Defectors from the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)	Among others, the 10th Battalion (25,000 soldiers) which launched the rebellion on 2 August 1998 from Goma
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA/APR)	National Rwandan army

## **PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES (information about selected groups):**

### **Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)**

"When Kabila came to power, he decided to reform the army. This was to become an integrated force comprised of soldiers of Mobutu's Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ), and Kabila's own core force of Banyamulenge and Katangan gendarmes. However, neither of the latter elements was sufficiently well equipped or adequately trained to take command of the new FAC army. This explains the emergence of officers from the ranks of ex-FAZ troops, such as Jean-Pierre Ondekane, who is now leading the rebel movement. It also partly explains why Joseph Kabila, the president's son, was appointed FAC chief of staff. His initial military training was under the Tanzanians during the 1996 war, and he was receiving further training in China when the rebellion broke out in August 1998. Kabila has never won the loyalty of the ex-FAZ. They have not forgotten their humiliating defeat by the AFDL in 1996 and soon defected to the rebel side soon after this latest conflict began.

Most of the better-trained FAC troops belonged to the elite unit of the 10th Battalion stationed in Goma. It was this unit, numbering 25,000 men, which launched the rebellion on 2 August 1998 from FAC headquarters in Kivu. An official announcement that the FAC had started a war to liberate their country was broadcast over Radio Goma by one of their officers, Sylvain Mbuki. Kabila denounced them as traitors and puppets of Rwanda and Uganda. Their defection led directly to the loss of Kivu. They immediately started marching north towards Oriental and Equateur provinces, south to Northern Katanga and also towards the centre of the country; the FAC troops stationed in those provinces all defected to the rebel movement.

In response, Kabila has embarked on a massive recruitment exercise to plug the gap in the FAC's ranks. However, the deserters included the more experienced FAC soldiers and the new and obviously inexperienced recruits have not proved up to the job. Kabila has therefore had to co-opt more seasoned fighters from among the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias, soldiers who formerly fought for Idi Amin, and the Burundian FDD in order to beef up his war machine." (ICG 21 May 1999, "The Congolese parties to the Conflict")

### **Mai-Mai**

"The Mai Mai are the most important group of armed, Congolese, fighters who are neither signatories of the Lusaka Agreement nor mentioned by name in the text. Yet, in eastern Congo, they have become a force of such power that any attempt to conclude a peaceful solution to the current war will likely fail if they are not taken into account. Although there are many Mai Mai groups with different interests and goals, they do appear to have one common denominator which is the expulsion of foreign "occupiers" which translates into the Rwandan armed forces, their Congolese allies, the RCD and frequently appears to extend to all Tutsi.[...]

The Mai Mai have been given both moral and material support by the DRC Government approximately from the start of the second Congo War in the summer of 1998 up to the present. Indeed, in military terms, the alliance between Kinshasa and the Mai Mai has produced important victories for Kinshasa because it has pinned down Rwandan forces and undermined the RCD/Goma. No similar violent challenges to Kinshasa's authority has developed in the areas that it controls. In sum, the Mai Mai and the Hutu guerrillas in eastern Congo (both Rwandan and Burundian) had together become the greatest threat to the RCD/Goma and the RPA.

The Mai Mai are viewed by large segments of the population in Eastern Congo as patriotic fighters against the occupation of the Kivus by the Rwandans and "their puppets", the RCD/Goma. And, the alliance between the Mai Mai and the Hutu forces (ex-FAR, Interahamwe, newly recruited Hutu and FDD) gave the latter the protection and cover among the civilian population that was needed to operate effectively against the "occupiers." Although the exact amount of control or influence which Kinshasa exerted and continues to exert over the Mai Mai is unclear, the Government has on occasion claimed that the Mai Mai are an

integral part of the FAC and some of their leaders have been given important roles as generals in the FAC. If the Mai Mai are indeed part of the FAC then the ongoing attacks against the RPA and the RCD/Goma can clearly be viewed as breaches of the cease-fire agreement. This would obviously be an undesirable development from Kinshasa's point of view - and indeed, neither MONUC nor the Joint Military Commission has formally declared such a breach - and, this may be the reason why in recent months the Mai Mai forces have been designated the Force d'Autodéfense Populaire, FAP, especially by spokesmen of the Kinshasa authorities." (UNDP 28 Nov 2001)

#### **Rwandan Hutu armed forces (ex-FAR/Interahamwe)**

"Of all the armed groups in the DRC named in the Lusaka Agreement for disarming and repatriation, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, currently known as 'Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda' (FDLR), are by far the largest, most significant, and most difficult to deal with both politically and militarily. Leaders of the FAR and the Interahamwe, while still in power, organised and executed the genocide of 1994, and it was these same 'genocidaires' who fled into the DRC (then Zaire) in the summer of that year that have continued to lead the war against the present Rwanda government from Congolese territory. Indeed, the conflict between the force led by this group and the RPF led Rwandan government constitutes the spark that ignited the war which escalated to engulf the entire Central Africa region." (UNDP 28 Nov 2001, part 2)

#### **Burundian Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD)**

"The Burundian Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) forms the second largest of the armed groups, estimated at roughly 10,000 militia. They are also integrated in the FAC and are moving between the DRC, Burundi and Tanzania. They have shown consistent resistance in joining the Burundi peace process. Both the Rwandan and the Burundians Hutus fight alongside each other and with various Congolese resistance groups, collectively known as Mai Mai, composed of many different groups and a few thousands fighters." (ICG 12 June 2001)

"When Laurent Kabila annulled his alliance with Rwanda and war broke out between them, he sought the alliance of FDD rebels and began to give them support. Burundi had sent some of its troops to the Fizi-Uvira areas to attack FDD rebels there, and this occupation of parts of the DRC became an added reason for Kabila's alliance with the FDD. [...]

The FDD's links with Kabila left it with control of a swath of the territory in eastern Congo far larger than Burundi itself; this has given some of its leaders immense control and power and made them millionaires.[...]

It is widely suspected, if not known, that the FDD is currently headquartered in the Katangan capital of Lubumbashi and is said to be continuing to recruit and train troops from the Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania.[...]

The recent progress made in the peace talks in the DRC has meant that increasing numbers of FDD rebels have crossed back into Burundi particularly in the northwest Kibira forest area, thus destabilizing the country. It is also said that at a recent FDD congress in Lubumbashi, the FDD teamed up with the FNL, which it had invited to its congress. Its alliance with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe has also been strengthened [...]" (UNDP 28 Nov 2001, part 2)

#### **Front de Libération Nationale (FLN or FROLINA)**

"The FLN [a Burundi military splinter group] is not mentioned in the Lusaka Agreement directly as an organization that has to be disarmed and demobilized. But it is a significant militia organization that has maintained bases and troops, though limited in number, in eastern DRC." (UNDP 28 Nov 2001, part 2)

#### **ARMED GROUPS FIGHTING KABILA'S GOVERNMENT (information about selected groups):**

#### **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)**

"The RCD [Congolese Rally for Democracy/Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie], composed of former Tutsi members of Kabila's government, former Mobutists, a number of intellectuals, and others, soon emerged as the political leadership of this coalition. The conflict in Congo grew during August and September [1998], eventually drawing in other states from the region, including Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad on the government side, and with Burundi apparently joining the Rwandans and Ugandans to support the RCD and the FAC defectors. Rwanda and Uganda claimed they had sent forces across the border to protect themselves against various armed groups which had been attacking them from bases in the eastern Congo, operating without hindrance from the Congolese government. Burundi continued to deny its involvement in the conflict despite regular sightings of their troops in South Kivu. The RCD proclaimed its goal to be the ouster of Kabila, while his backers stated they were protecting a legitimate government from foreign aggression. Outside observers suspected that the prospect of exploiting Congo's vast mineral wealth had attracted many of the warring parties. A number of other militia and rebel groups from the region joined the fray, while alliances between them and the warring parties were often unclear.

[...]

Victims and witnesses of abuses in eastern Congo frequently described perpetrators as "Rwandan," "Banyamulenge," or "Tutsi" military allied with the RCD, but were often unable to conclusively identify them as belonging to a particular army. Establishing the national identity of perpetrators was complicated by the fact that some Tutsi military among the Rwandan and Ugandan forces were born in Congo but have lived in all three countries; Kinyarwanda and Swahili are spoken in all three countries; and the use of uniforms by RCD forces was often haphazard. Commanders fighting on behalf of the RCD frequently wore civilian clothes and, in an apparent attempt to further hide their identity, often used their first names or pseudonyms only. Many residents of the east claimed that the RCD military was dominated by Tutsi from the Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundian or Congolese armies, increasing resentment among other Congolese ethnic groups vis-à-vis Tutsi in general." (HRW February 1999, chaps. I, IV)

"The founder members of the RCD are a heterogeneous coalition whose opposition to Kabila is the only common denominator. They come from diverse political backgrounds and only joined together in August 1998 to launch the rebellion against Kabila. The first three months of the conflict were spent attempting to co-ordinate the different interests of the various political factions within the rebel movement.

[...]

Most RCD officials interviewed by an ICG field researcher conceded that the multiplicity of political interests, including those of their major political backers, Uganda and Rwanda, are leading to a lack of cohesion in the movement. But these political differences are officially played down. In an interview with Reuters in Goma, RCD Vice-President Moise Nyarugabo said: "This is normal and it can happen that any movement may contain some differences. But the differences we are facing we are facing as a team." (ICG 21 May 1999, "The Congolese parties to the Conflict")

#### **RCD split into RCD-Goma and RCD-ML during 1999**

"The rebel Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD) on Wednesday [19 May 1999] named medical doctor Emile Ilunga as its new leader after Ernest Wamba dia Wamba was ousted on Sunday [16 May 1999] in an internal power struggle. The movement retained military commander Jean-Pierre Ondekane and Moise Nyarugabo as first and second vice-presidents respectively. Wamba said he was a victim of a "coup", unilaterally ousted by his opponents within RCD." (IRIN-CEA 21 May 1999)

"The Ugandan army's sector commanders in fact exercised ultimate authority over all military and security matters in each district. Some RCD-ML units and cadres operated directly under their command." (HRW March 2001, sect.III)

#### **Banyamulenge forces**

"Motivated by a sense of desperation linked to the fear of being exterminated, the Banyamulenge forces are among the most violent in the Congo. The fact that the Banyamulenge community has lost so many of its youth in the war has contributed to the creation of a sense of great vulnerability within the community. It is said that Banyamulenge community leaders are attempting to distance themselves from Rwandan

authorities, realizing that their association with Rwandan forces has resulted in a greater rejection of the community by other Congolese." (UNDP 28 Nov 2001, part 2)

### **Local Defense Forces**

"The local defense forces were initially set up by RCD-Goma to enable local communities to fend off isolated groups of armed bands. The concept only really took hold in North Kivu. Given finite military resources of rebel forces and the propensity of Interahamwe and ex-FAR to attack local communities, the local defense forces quickly became the vanguard of all confrontations with the armed non-state actors. These forces are to a large part constituted of individuals from the Congolese Hutu community. This reality is an outcome of the fact that this community constitutes the majority of the population in the Masisi, Rutshuru and Walikale territories, and that individuals of this community are more inclined to join the local defense forces in an effort to clearly distance themselves from the Interahamwe and ex-FAR in order to distance themselves from RPA attacks.[...]

Today, many of these forces are said to be undisciplined, and thus utilizing their authority to further individual gains. As a consequence, members of the North Kivu Congolese Tutsi community are apprehensive that large numbers of these undisciplined forces could join the Interahamwe movement." (UNDP 28 Nov 2001, part 2)

### **The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)**

"A handful of Congolese exiles led by Jean-Pierre Bemba told the Ugandan president in October 1998 that they wanted to change their government at home, but did not want to join the RCD. Ugandan authorities sent the group to a crash military and ideological training course and weeks later flew them to Equateur to launch what would become the MLC. Less than two years later, "Bemba commended Ugandan soldiers for training 20,000 soldiers" for the MLC. Reporting on the September 2000 press conference at Gebadolite during which Bemba acknowledged the UPDF's assistance, the *New Vision* quoted him as urging the UPDF to continue withdrawing troops from the DRC: "We are proud of the Ugandans. But why should they die for us when we (Congolese soldiers) are doing quite well at frontline positions?" Unlike the RCD-ML, the MLC was fighting an active war directly against the government alliance. With crucial battlefront support from the UPDF, the MLC was able to roll back a major government offensive in the second half of 2000. In contrast with the other two major rebel groups, the MLC was also reported to be financially self-sufficient, mainly from taxes levied on local produce" (HRW March 2001, sect.III)

### **Protracted leadership struggle within the RCD/ML causes total collapse of public authority in the north-east (2000-2002)**

- Constant leadership disputes within RCD-ML during 2000
- Agreement behind the creation of FLC in January 2001 provided for the unification of the armies of MLC, RCD-ML, and RCD-National, but the three partners will remain separate for the purposes of the inter-Congolese dialogue mandated by the Lusaka accord
- As of Feb 2002, the umbrella of the FLC has proven ineffective to maintain cohesion between various political factions

"Constant leadership disputes produced political and administrative confusion in the year 2000 in areas of northeastern Congo, which the RCD-ML claims to control. The three top officials of the RCD-ML, Wamba dia Wamba, on one side, and his two deputies Mbusa Nyamwisi and Tibasima Ateenyi developed parallel political and administrative structures in Bunia, the RCD-ML's capital, and in the town of Beni. The military wings of the RCD-ML reflected the leadership splits: most recruitment for the RCD-ML armed forces was carried out on the basis of personal and/or ethnic loyalty. The political struggle exacerbated ethnic tensions in the region and, at times, spurred widespread ethnic killings.

By the time it was de facto absorbed into a newly established rebel front in mid-January 2001, the RCD-ML had yet to adopt a basic platform as a political movement, to define its internal structures and their respective attributions, or to choose a leader acceptable to the various factions. Apart from a broad non-militaristic philosophy voiced by Wamba and a rhetorical commitment to the peaceful resolution of the war in Congo, the goals of the movement in the national war and its position on the war's complex regional dimensions were far from clear. The wrangling among the movement's top leaders often focused on mutual accusations of political ineptitude, misuse of funds, and the manipulation of ethnicity for narrow political ends.

Wamba's two deputies attempted at least three times to overthrow him in 2000, although he was nominally president of the movement. Uganda, which backs the rebel faction, ultimately intervened. At each upheaval, the three contenders and their top aides were summoned to Kampala for "consultations." The "foreign allies," that is, the Ugandans, in the meantime acknowledged no clear victor on the ground. This created the perception locally that they were in fact siding with both parties to the dispute at the same time. [...]

The RCD faction based in Goma and known henceforth as RCD-Goma continued [after the 1999 split] to control the Congolese military contingent of the rebellion and the Wamba-led faction, known then as RCD-Kisangani, initially had no significant military arm. Attempts by the Ugandan army, the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), to train some Congolese recruits for RCD-Kisangani angered the Rwandan commanders in Kisangani. They sought to dismantle the training camp, actually arresting dozens of recruits under the pretext that they belonged to the extremist Hutu militia that perpetrated the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Furthermore, RCD-Goma and its Rwandan backers prevented Wamba from holding public meetings to rally the support of the population. Rivalry over the enormous mineral resources commanded by Kisangani, the third largest Congolese city, as well as the political and military frictions over RCD-Kisangani contributed to the unraveling of the remaining trust between Rwanda and Uganda. This helped precipitate the first military confrontation between Rwandan and Ugandan forces for the control of Kisangani in August 1999. During the battle, which was a defeat for the Ugandans, some 200 civilians were killed in the crossfire.

The battle for Kisangani was also sparked by disputes over which RCD faction would sign the Lusaka ceasefire accord, an agreement meant to end the war in the Congo and negotiated under tremendous international pressure. During the battle, Wamba and other leaders of the RCD-Kisangani miraculously escaped death during a Rwandan assault on a hotel they used as a residence and headquarters. Because neither faction could be eliminated and because neither would acknowledge the legitimacy of the other, all fifty founding members of the RCD flew to Lusaka to sign on behalf of the "RCD." The founders affixed their names to the treaty in alphabetical order to avoid further squabbles on who should sign first. No one questioned how a movement, which could not even agree on its representatives, could carry out its obligations under the accord.

### **The Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML)**

After the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) defeated Ugandan forces in August in Kisangani, Wamba felt insecure there and relocated his office to a presidential guesthouse in Kampala. There in September 1999 he established the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), a reincarnation of RCD-Kisangani. He announced that Bunia, a small and until then quiet town in Orientale province near the border with Uganda, would be the headquarters of the movement.

Wamba appointed officials of his new government reportedly without much consultation with his aides, leading to the defection of several founding members of RCD-Kisangani in protest. While his stay in Kampala stretched into months, his two deputies took effective control on the ground. Appointed general commissar, or prime minister, of the RCD-ML, Mbusa Nyamwisi set up an RCD administration in his hometown of Beni, in the part of North Kivu province controlled by Uganda. Himself a businessman turned politician, Mbusa was a member of the economically powerful Nande business community. Tibasima Ateenyi, a former member of parliament from Bunia area and former chief executive of the Kilomoto gold mines, ran a parallel administration out of Bunia.

[...]

Neither Mbusa as general commissar nor Tibasima as minister of finance had the mandate to recruit soldiers, but both did so in early 2000, engaging in parallel and concurrent recruitment processes for the Armée Populaire Congolaise (APC), the military wing of the RCD-ML. They raised the army largely along ethnic lines, with Mbusa initially recruiting heavily among the Nande people and Tibasima enlisting mostly youngsters of his own Hema group. The two processes had one thing in common, though: the Ugandan army provided the instructors who trained and armed successive classes of hundreds of recruits at Nyaleke training camp in Beni and at Rwampara training camp in Bunia.

[...]

The APC had no chief of staff and battalion commanders were supposed to report directly to Wamba, who named himself defense commissar as well as president of the movement. Wamba reportedly suspected the loyalty of commanders identified with his deputies and so in early 2000 recruited his own Presidential Protection Unit (PPU). Elements were handpicked for the small PPU corps from experienced soldiers from the demobilized army of former President Mobutu or from deserters of President Kabila's Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC).

[...]

The Ugandan army's sector commanders in fact exercised ultimate authority over all military and security matters in each district. Some RCD-ML units and cadres operated directly under their command. Even in Beni, Bunia, and Butembo, towns where RCD-ML administrative power was concentrated, UPDF sector commanders overshadowed the Congolese political and military leaders.

[...]

The disorganization within the RCD-ML spawned even smaller splinter groups with limited personal or local agendas. Roger Lumbala, the founder of RCD-National and its only prominent member, originally belonged to the mainstream RCD-Goma and defected in February 2000 to Kampala. There he reportedly joined the RCD-ML and was deployed as mobilization officer to Bafwasende, northeast of Kisangani. Lumbala later told Human Rights Watch that the RCD-ML military unit that Wamba had placed in Bafwasende felt that it had been neglected for too long. [...]

[...]

The disorganization within the RCD-ML spawned even smaller splinter groups with limited personal or local agendas. Roger Lumbala, the founder of RCD-National and its only prominent member, originally belonged to the mainstream RCD-Goma and defected in February 2000 to Kampala.

[...]

### **The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)**

As the RCD-ML stood on the verge of collapse at the end of 2000, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) appeared to offer all that its Ugandan backers had hoped for and failed to get in their alliance with the RCD-ML. Under the firm grip of its leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, the MLC had a unified political and military command with none of the internal dissensions and spectacular defections that regularly rocked both the RCD-Goma and RCD-ML. According to reports by journalists and other visitors to its home area, the MLC enjoyed a measure of popularity in the northwestern province of Equateur that none of the other rebel movements could claim in the territories they controlled.

[...]

### **The Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC): A Merger or Takeover?**

#### **Kampala Negotiations**

As a way out of the RCD-ML crisis, Uganda in late November [2000] proposed a merger of all the Congolese rebel groups under its patronage: the MLC, RCD-ML, and RCD-N. Col. Kahinda Otafiire, UPDF chief of staff and advisor on the DRC to President Museveni, justified the proposed merger by arguing that "[i]t makes it easier for us and easier for the rebellion and that way the Congolese people can take care of their own matters," and adding "[w]e are tired of running the show for them. Let them assume their own responsibility entirely."

[...]

The Ugandans were determined to create the unified front, to be named the Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC), because a hotly contested presidential election campaign was propelling all aspects of

Uganda's involvement in the Congo war to center stage. In addition, the conduct of Ugandan troops in the Congo had drawn closer and more critical international scrutiny following the third battle for the control of Kisangani in June 2000.

[...]

The merger agreement in late 2000 appeared to vindicate Bemba. In fact it hardly masked a move to what could have been an MLC take-over of the RCD-ML, which was sorely weakened by political divisions, a splintered military, and disorganized finances. It provided for the establishment of a joint executive committee for the three movements, with an annually rotating presidency that Bemba assumed for the first year. The agreement provided for the unification of the armies of the three movements, but guaranteed that each of the MLC, RCD-ML, and RCD-National parties would preserve its autonomy for the purposes of the inter-Congolese dialogue mandated by the Lusaka accord. The MLC is said to be readying to launch itself as a national political party in the post-war era." (HRW March 2001, sect.III)

### **Fighting between opposing factions of the FLC**

"Mbusa Nyamwisi, an influential figure in the Congolese rebel movement in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, has had leadership wrangles with the heads of both the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie-Mouvement de liberation (RCD-ML) and of the Front pour la libération du Congo (FLC), and yet remains a key ally of Uganda, which backs both rebel groups. On 4 June, a section of former RCD-ML/Kisangani forces, who were guarding his residence in Beni, fought running battles with FLC forces - though the RCD-ML is supposedly a constituent element of the FLC since the January 2001 merger of the RCD-ML/Kisangani and Jean-Pierre Bemba's Mouvement de liberation du Congo (MLC). [...]

In essence, Nyamwisi no longer recognises the existence of the FLC, according to Ugandan sources. At the same time, Wamba dia Wamba (now based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) still claims he is president of the RCD-ML/Kisangani, and is unwilling to work with either Bemba or Nyamwisi unless certain of his demands are met in the RCD-ML/MLC merger. This has left Uganda with a dilemma in regard to its relations with the rebel forces it backs in the Congo." (IRIN-CEA 3 August 2001)

"The northeastern part of Congo is experiencing a total collapse of public authority mainly because of the protracted leadership struggle within the RCD/ML. The formation of an alliance with the Movement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba was designed to put an end to the quarrels between Wamba dia Wamba, Ayenyi Tibasima and Mbusa Nyamwisi, but the umbrella of the Front de Libération du Congo (FLC) has proven ineffective. The result of this lack of authority is a complete disintegration of the rule of law [...]." (UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002, p.16)

"The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo confirmed on Monday [7 Jan 01] that fighting has taken place between rival armed opposition groups in and around Isiro and Buta, in the northeast of the country.

The clashes have involved the Mouvement de liberation du Congo (MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba and the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie - Mouvement de liberation - Kisangani (RCD-ML-K) faction of Mbusa Nyamwisi. Both groups are backed by Uganda.

It is believed that the fighting erupted over territorial disputes between the MLC and the RCD-ML-K. A regional analyst told IRIN that hostilities were aggravated by MLC concern that Nyamwisi was colluding with the Congolese government of President Joseph Kabila." (IRIN 8 Jan 2002)

### **Lusaka cease-fire agreement and new President following assassination of Kabila in January 2001 (1999-2001)**

- President Kabila, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia signing cease-fire agreement on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka

- Major rebel forces signing agreement on 31 August 1999
- Continued stalemate means absence of solutions to the problem of massive displacement
- Assassination of President Kabila on 16 January 2001 moved the peace process in a new direction (2001)

"The seven month long peace talks under auspices of Zambia between the parties to the DRC conflict concluded a first significant step- signature of a cease-fire agreement by the Heads of DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia on 10 July [1999] in Lusaka. Unable to overcome persisting internal divergences, the two factions of the RCD and the MLC abstained from signing the Lusaka agreement" UN OCHA 15 July 1999, "Context")

"Following intense diplomatic activity, especially by President Chiluba of Zambia and his Government and the Government of South Africa and others, representatives of the remaining rebel movement, RCD, signed the Ceasefire Agreement in Lusaka on 31 August [1999]. " (UN SC 1 November 1999)

"The signing of a cease-fire agreement in the summer of 1999, constituted a real prospect for bringing an end to the violent conflict in Congo DR. The agreement included the establishment of a joint military commission made up of African countries to monitor the implementation of the agreement and disarmament of the Interahamwe militia, another major goal included in the accord. The agreement also included the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC and opening a national debate among all domestic factions and civil society on the future of the DRC [the "Inter-Congolese dialogue]." (EPCPT October 2000, "prospects")

***By November 2000 the implementation of the Lusaka agreement remained uncertain:***

"As a witness signatory to the Lusaka Agreement (Accord), the United Nations have been mandated by the parties to help implement the cease-fire provision of the agreement. The presence of MONUC [the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo] in the DRC has contributed to diplomatic exchanges between the warring parties, preservation of the status quo, reaffirmation of the territorial integrity of the DRC, and partial implementation of the Lusaka Accord, despite continued fighting and obstacles placed in the deployment of peacekeeping troops.

Although regularly violates, the Lusaka Agreement coincided with the end of the prospect of full scale war." (UN November 2000, p. 5)

"Eighteen months of deadlock in efforts to end the war in the Congo came to a sudden end with the assassination of President Laurent Désiré Kabila on 16 January 2001. [...] His replacement by his 29-year old son Joseph consequently gave new hope to the peace process.

The international community seized the opportunity afforded by the late president's murder and re-engaged in the DRC. Leaders in the U.S., Europe, and the United Nations immediately recognised the new president in order to give him the confidence to break from the policies of his father and implement the terms of the Lusaka cease-fire. In return, Joseph Kabila agreed to join an Inter-Congolese Dialogue facilitated by the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, and welcomed a quick deployment of MONUC, the UN military observer mission for the Congo.." (ICG 16 March 2001, sect. I)

"Since the change of power in Kinshasa in January 2001, the peace process in the DRC has gained new momentum. The ceasefire formally concluded in mid-1999 by the main belligerents has by and large been respected; the parties to the inter-Congolese dialogue have had a conclusive preparatory meeting in Gaborone and agreed to convene for substantive negotiations on 15 October; President Joseph Kabila has expressed his readiness to distance himself from the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, providing an opportunity to find a solution to the problem that has been at the heart of the regional conflict. The new government of the DRC has also taken a number of steps to stabilize the economy, ease restrictions on political activities and

adopted a cooperative approach to the international community thus allowing the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUC) to deploy in all provinces of the country.

Rwanda and Uganda have withdrawn their troops from the frontline in accordance with the provisions of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Uganda has also pledged to withdraw its troops from the DRC, with the exception of a few positions close to its border where they will pursue a limited objective of dismantling residual ADF forces. Rwanda has started to encourage the rank-and-file Hutu rebels in the DRC, notably in North Kivu, to desert and return home. Kigali has also offered a *de facto* amnesty to all rebels who were not involved in the 1994 genocide, in line with the formal amnesty in place in Uganda which has contributed to the dismantling or weakening of the Ugandan rebel groups.

Furthermore, the Rwandan authorities and the leadership of the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie – Goma* (RCD-G) have established contacts with some Mai Mai groups in South Kivu with a view to establishing local ceasefires. The *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie – Mouvement de Liberation* (RCD/ML) is continuing negotiation with Mai Mai groups in the portions of North Kivu under their control and their integration into the RCD-ML armed forces is now a likely perspective." (UNDP 28 Nov 2001)

### **One of the driving forces behind the conflict is control over DRC's natural resources (2001-2002)**

- In May 2001, UN report on exploitation of natural resources accused foreign armed forces and Congolese fighters of using DRC's natural resources to fuel the conflict
- In Nov 2001, the Addendum to the May report explored further the link between the exploitation of resources and the continuation of the conflict in DRC

" While different actors have justified their involvement in the war on the basis of security, it is clear that one of the driving forces behind the conflict is a desire by the warring parties to have access to, and control over, the DRC's vast natural resources. This wealth is not being used to reduce poverty, either in the DRC or in other countries involved in the war. In fact, wealth from natural resources is sustaining the war and bad governance. Such military activity has been described as 'military commercialism'. Natural resource exploitation has become a key factor in determining military deployment, perpetuating the cycle of violence. Against a backdrop of deteriorating governance, this is very worrying. [...]

Although troop numbers may have reduced in some areas, deployment is increasingly concentrated in mineral-rich areas. Zimbabwean troops are located in diamond, copper, cobalt, and timber-rich areas of the Kasais and Katanga. Rwandan troops have concentrated in coltan, gold, timber, and diamond-rich areas in the Kivus and Maniema. Ugandan troops, though reduced in number, are located near gold, timber, diamond, and, until recently, coltan-rich areas in Ituri and N. Kivu." (Oxfam 18 Jan 2002)

"The Panel's first report, issued on 12 April 2001 (document S/2001/357), states that illegal exploitation of the mineral and forest resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was in the form of mass-scale looting, as well as systematic and systemic exploitation which required planning and organization. Key individual actors, on the one hand, including top army commanders and businessmen, and government structures, on the other, have been the engines of that systematic and systemic exploitation. The report names functionaries, companies, banks and individuals involved in the exploitation." (UN SC 14 Dec 2001)

*To see the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/357), 12 April 2001, [[External Link](#)]*

**According to November 2001 Addendum to the report on exploitation of natural resources:**

"There are indications that clashes during the past seven months in the Oriental and Kivu regions between the Mayi-Mayi, who appear to be better equipped and coordinated than before, and UPDF and the MLC rebel group have been directly related to control of coltan and gold. Similar short-lived battles have been fought by the Mayi-Mayi with RPA over access to coltan throughout the Kivus. The Panel also believes that the infighting among the Congolese rebel groups in recent months, which has caused them to splinter and led to occasional violence, has been related to control over coltan, gold and diamonds in the Beni and Bafwasende areas.

The Panel received credible information, corroborating reports from independent sources, that Zimbabwe is supporting the Burundian FDD rebel forces by supplying them with weapons and expertise. Many reliable sources have informed the Panel in this regard that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces are training FDD in Lubumbashi, where the FDD leadership is based and where Zimbabwean copper and cobalt investments are located. Another sign of their loosely structured coordination with the Burundian rebels is that the ALIR II forces are based near FDD in South Kivu and also have a command and liaison presence in Lubumbashi. The Panel concluded that the arming of these irregular groups is contributing to sustaining what could be viewed as a war by proxy in the east. It allows the ceasefire to remain intact, while creating a "controllable" conflict in the occupied zone that satisfies the interests of many parties. With this sporadic, low-intensity conflict dragging on, a certain status quo is being maintained in this region where many precious resources are extracted, traded and routed for export. Zimbabwe and Rwanda have the most important commercial presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a result of their involvement in the war. The role that Zimbabwe plays in regard to continuing the conflict may well be shared with the Government of the Democratic of the Republic of the Congo, or at least some elements in it, as well as others. This armed activity can continue to feed Rwandan and Burundian security concerns, becoming an added justification for those two countries to maintain their military positions. In the case of Rwanda, control can then be legitimately deepened over a considerable expanse of territory, as well as its population and resources. As Zimbabwe's joint ventures in mining and timber begin to mature and become profitable, it may be tempted to retain a sizeable military presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The profiteering of private businesses of all kinds in illicit and criminal activities gives them vested interests in seeing the conflict continuing, in particular businesses in South Africa, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania." (UN SC 13 Nov 2001, para.57-8)

***Study by Pole Institute (North Kivu)***

"[...] the intercultural research institute "Pole Institute" in North Kivu together with the 'Comité de Réflexion sur le Développement Agro Pastoral en Province du Nord Kivu" (CREDAP), a platform of NGO activists and technicians working in rural areas in the province, decided to look into the issue of coltan mining. [...]

The study found that:

as crisis and war in North Kivu have severely hampered industrial mining, existing industrial mining concessions have been turned over to informal or artisanal mining, mainly of coltan. This phenomenon has led to a population exodus of all age groups with the aim of finding coltan;

as a result, agricultural and pastoral activities are being abandoned in favor of coltan. There is a real danger of food insecurity in North Kivu if the agricultural populations continue to leave their fields in order to mine coltan or turn their fields into mines;

young people, easily attracted by easy money, abandon school in favour of coltan mining. [...]

unplanned coltan mining and export in a context of State collapse and prolonged crisis has been a source of wealth for a handful of businessmen working with old and new mineral trading networks in Eastern Congo, but has also meant the emergence of a mafia economy organized around the rebel armies and their allies and the armed Mai-Mai groups. [...]

The coltan trade is closely intertwined with the activities of all armed groups present in the area. No demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programme can succeed without taking economic security into account. Proper regulation of mining and other trade is essential for disengagement and reconciliation programmes. [...]

Coltan is an abbreviation for colombite-tantalite, a mineral from which the precious metals Tantalum (Ta) and Columbium (Cb), also known as Niobium (Nb) are extracted. [...] According to mining specialists, 80% of known tantalite reserves are found in the Democratic Republic of Congo, almost entirely in the Eastern part controlled by rebel movements allied to Rwanda and Uganda." (Pole Institute Jan 2002)

*For more information on the coltan trade and the role of European companies, please see "Supporting the War Economy in the DRC: European Companies and the Coltan Trade" by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS), January 2002 [[External Link](#)]*

### **Some progress in the disarming of the militia and withdrawal of foreign forces (Sept 2001-Feb 2002)**

- One of the most problematic elements of the Lusaka Accord is the disarming and demobilization of the militia including the Interahamwe (Sept 2001)
- In Sept 2001, DRC official announced that Mai Mai militias would be included in the peace process; Mai Mai militia forces said that they held most of eastern DRC outside big towns in the hands of rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda
- The same month, 3000 Hutu Rwandan rebels were handed over by Kinshasa to UN peacekeepers and 6,000 more should follow
- Increased rebel presence and activity in Eastern DRC following cease-fire
- UNDP mission says that localized violence in many areas of the Kivus and Ituri that has ethnic, sectarian and/or economic roots should not be underestimated (Nov 2001)
- As of Feb 2002 the ceasefire along the confrontation line between the signatories to the Lusaka Agreement has now held for one year
- Some progress has also been achieved in the withdrawal of foreign forces

"The Lusaka peace process is back on track but it has left Kivu provinces at the mercy of all the key players in the region. It is generally agreed that peace in DRC poses a considerable threat to both Burundi and Rwanda as Hutu rebels, threatened with the loss of their Congolese safe haven, look for a place to run. The Arusha and Lusaka processes have put pressure on the Burundian rebels, pushing them back into Burundi and causing increased insecurity in the country. Meanwhile the withdrawal of troops and the threat of disarmament has put pressure on the Interhamwe, a force that Rwanda will do anything to keep out of its borders.

One of the most problematic elements of the Lusaka Accord is the disarming and demobilization of the militia including the Interahamwe. The UN has committed to observing this process but it is the warring countries themselves who will carry the disarmament out." (SCF 10 July 2001)

"Under the [Lusaka] accord, Kinshasa should disarm and demobilize Hutu extremists, who are held responsible for the massacre in 1994 of up to 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutus before the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Paul Kagame seized power in Kigali." (AFP 16 September 2001)

In September 2001, "[...] DRC Security Minister Mwenze Kongolo said 3,000 Rwandan Hutu fighters had been disarmed and turned in to MONUC [...]." (AFP 16 September 2001)

"The Democratic Republic of the Congo (RDC) is ready to hand over 6,000 EX-FAR and Interahamwe militia who have for the last six years been fighting Rwandan government forces, the Rwandan News Agency (RNA) reported [...]" (Xinhua 18 September 2001)

In September 2001, "Mai-Mai ethnic militias allied to government troops in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are to be included in the peace process currently under way in the vast central African country, an official [DRC Foreign Minister Leonard She Okitundu] said [...]." (AFP 18 September 2001)

*In September 2001, "[...] military activity has continued in eastern DRC. RCD-Goma has reported the capture of Fizi by Rwandan and Burundian rebels, allegedly assisted by FAC [Congolese Army], following the withdrawal of the Burundian army. The reported capture of Fizi substantiate reports of increased rebel presence and activity in southern Kivu. There is speculation of the current role of the Mai Mai, who are strong in this area."* (UN OCHA 26 September 2001)

"The existence of localized violence especially in many areas of the Kivus and Ituri that is unrelated to broader conflict and has ethnic, sectarian and/or economic roots should not be underestimated or disregarded, even though these conflicts are not addressed in the Lusaka context. If ignored, these underlying tensions could pose a serious threat to any future stability and sense of unity, well after the withdrawal of foreign forces." (UNDP 28 Nov 2001)

*As of February 2002, " The ceasefire along the confrontation line between the signatories to the Lusaka Agreement has now held for one year. Some further progress has also been achieved in the withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Allegedly, the Angolan military authorities have withdrawn two Angolan police units from Lubumbashi and Kinshasa, and are willing to withdraw others, depending upon progress in the peace process. As for Uganda, according to the UPDF on 26 December 2001, a total of 6,655 Ugandan troops have been withdrawn from the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 29 July 2000 and UPDF is also expected to withdraw contingents from Gbadolite in the near future. However, Uganda still has three UPDF battalions in the eastern DRC."* (UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002, pp.14-15)

***For more information on the process of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR) of the armed rebel groups, please see*** International Crisis Group (ICG), 14 December 2001, Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR to Prevent Further War [[External Link](#)]

### **Inter Congolese dialogue between Congolese armed rebel movements, civilian political parties and organized civil society but still no peace (2001-2002)**

- Dialogue aims to establish transitional government
- Inter Congolese meeting in Addis Ababa in October 2001 did not bring expected results
- Inter Congolese meeting in Sun City, South Africa, in Feb-March 2002

"As for the Inter Congolese Dialogue sanctioned by the Lusaka Peace Accord of 1999, it is aimed at establishing a transitional government and was designed to bring together representatives from the government, the political opposition, armed opposition groups and civil society to map out a future for the DRC." (UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002, p.15)

#### ***October 2001: inter Congolese meeting in Addis Ababa***

"An attempt to meet in Addis Ababa was made in October 2001 but the talks broke up over disagreement about the selection process and did not authorize any significant progress. Therefore, the issue of participation is still not solved. The Banyamulengue (Congolese Tutsis) believe that the talks would be strengthened by the presence of representatives from the DRC's Kivu provinces, where the Banyamulenge reside but strongly opposes the presence of foreign forces in the DRC and the inclusion of the Congolese

Mayi-Mayi militia at the talks because of their alleged responsibility in "crimes against humanity" against Congolese Tutsis of the Kivus. However, the government in Kinshasa has backed the demand by the Mayi-Mayi, based in the Kivus to take part in the talks. Moreover, disagreement over the timing of troop withdrawal creates further obstacles for the dialogue. The meeting was then postponed due to lack of funding and was re-scheduled for February 25 in South Africa. However, the political dialogue, if given a chance and supported by the international community, could permit a renaissance of legitimate Congolese political institutions.

Yet, after four years of endemic violence and tremendous suffering of the civilian population, it seems that the different parties are willing to stop the war as the cost of sustaining its political and economic consequences is becoming prohibitive. If this constructive dynamic is fully supported in a pragmatic and creative approach through the intercongolese dialogue, and if the "negative forces" at the origin of the conflict are contained, peace in DRC will not be seen any more as an unachievable dream but as a possible and realistic scenario. Nevertheless, despite these notes of hope and these significant positive developments, the war is entering in its fourth year and peace is not achieved yet. " (UN OCHA 28 February 2002, pp.15-16)

### ***Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City, South Africa, in Feb-March 2002***

"President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and his opponents in the country's complex conflict began talks here Monday [25 Feb 02] aimed at crafting an interim government to run the violence-wracked central African state. [...]

The negotiations are due to last 45 days and bring together some 300 DRC government representatives, rebels, opposition parties, militia, and members of civil society." (AFP 25 Feb 2002)

"On Thursday, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's (DRC) delegation walked out of inter-Congolese dialogue (ICD) talks being held in Sun City, South Africa, claiming that Rwanda and the Rwandan-backed rebel movement, Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD-Goma), had violated the cease-fire in the DRC.

Since Thursday afternoon, forces of the Rwandan army and RCD had been attacking government positions at the port of Moliro on Lake Tanganyika, said the national security minister, Mwenze Kongolo. 'The government has decided to suspend its participation in the inter-Congolese dialogue,' he said, 'until Rwanda and the RCD order their troops to withdraw from Moliro.'

This is the second time during the talks that the government has accused its opponents of attacking Moliro. On 28 February, the DRC government declared a unilateral cease-fire around the town after fighting there threatened to derail the ICD, which had opened only three days earlier.

Moliro in eastern DRC is one of the few ports that the DRC government still controls on Lake Tanganyika. Rwanda and Burundi have in the past both accused the government of using the port to supply rebel groups fighting against their governments." (UN OCHA 15 March 2002)

## **Main causes for displacement**

---

### **Major displacements during 1997 civil war and during armed rebellion in the East against Kabila (1997-2001)**

- During the 1997 civil war which led to the ousting of Mobutu, many fled to escape generalized warfare and the violence of retreating soldiers of various armed groups

- Beginning of second wave of major displacement during armed rebellion against Kabila (August 1998)
- Reports in early 1999 of major internal displacement in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Katanga as civilians were directly targeted by a growing number of armed groups in the east
- Exposure to tribal clashes causing considerable numbers of displacement (August 1999)
- Major displacement continued in eastern DRC as violent conflict escalated during 2000
- Reported in February 2001 that nine armed internal, international and internationalized internal conflicts were ongoing in DRC

***First wave of internal displacement caused by the October 1996 -May 1997 war against Mobutu***

"USCR site visits to eastern Congo/Zaire during 1997 concluded that up to half the population in some areas of the east were at least temporarily displaced during the war [that started in October 1996 against Mobutu]. Many were able to return home after several weeks, but thousands of families endured long-term displacement caused by lingering insecurity in their home areas. USCR estimated that up to 150,000 people remained internally displaced at mid-year, but a majority were "invisible to outsiders" because they are dispersed," USCR's report noted.

[...]

In interviews with USCR and other agencies, displaced persons indicated [in 1997] that they fled during the civil war for various reasons: to escape generalized warfare, fear of Mobutu's retreating soldiers or the ADFL [Kabila's Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaire], fear of armed Rwandan exiles, and fear of Rwandan government soldiers. Some displaced persons said they were compelled to flee their homes by extremist Rwandan leaders who took them as virtual hostages." (USCR 1998, p.61)

***During the rebellion led by RCD [Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie] against Kabila, which started in August 1998, a dynamic of displacement similar to the 1996-97 civil war continued:***

"While the current level of human rights abuses against civilians in eastern Congo is already [by February 1999] cause for serious concern, the situation risks further deterioration and even more egregious abuses. The growing number of armed groups in the east—both militia and national armies, often with tensions among alleged allies—constitute a real threat to the civilian population. A primary concern is the large number of abuses committed against civilians in areas of combat between Interahamwe and Mai-Mai militia and their adversaries from the RCD [Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie] and its allies [...]. The militia groups use guerrilla warfare tactics against the RCD forces, which is often followed by heavy-handed reprisals against civilians by the RCD military. This has led to the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Katanga. Militia in North Kivu attack civilian vehicles, strangling local economies and making travel dangerous outside of urban centers. All sides act in an atmosphere of effective impunity with little or no regard for the protection of civilians, which fuels the cycles of attacks and counter-attacks." (HRW February 1999, chapt. IV)

"The tactics of guerrilla attacks and retreats displayed by so-called Mayi-Mayi groups, longing for warlord-type of supremacy and considering themselves not bound by traditional rules, have ruthless effects on the local population currently fleeing the now virtually indiscriminate violence of both the Rwandan troops and these warlords. As a result, areas between Uvira and Fizi or close to mining concessions (Kamituga) are highly exposed to sporadic insecurity and massive displacements."(UN OCHA 15 July 1999, "Access to War-Affected Populations")

***Major displacement continued in eastern DRC as violent conflict escalated during 2000***

"In the complex conflict in eastern Congo, all the many combatant forces have attacked civilians, killing, injuring and raping thousands of persons and causing more than half a million others to flee their homes. During investigations carried out in March 2000 in areas controlled by the Goma-based Congolese Rally

for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD) and its allies, Human Rights Watch researchers documented cases of murder, rape, and pillage carried out by all of the armed groups now fighting in the region.

[...]

The repeated attacks on the civilian population of eastern Congo have caused more than half a million persons to flee their homes and created a growing humanitarian crisis in the region. According to the director of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Eastern Congo, Charles Petrie, the crisis has grown substantially in recent months with about half the more than 500,000 persons displaced having taken flight since the first of the year. After Hutu combatants increased attacks on Kalonge in January, for example, some 10,000 took flight in the first week of February." (HRW May 2000, chapt. I, III)

### ***In 2001, further displacement of populations***

"In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, nine armed internal, international and internationalized internal conflicts are going on with the participation of 6 national armies and 21 irregular groups. The most serious conflict is the one which pits Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, together with the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), against the Kinshasa Government. RCD has split many times and the pro-Uganda and pro-Rwanda factions have fought on Congolese soil, causing death and destruction in a foreign country. In another conflict, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) is fighting the Government of President Kabila. Another conflict, started by Ugandan soldiers, opposes the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. The victims of all these conflicts are always Congolese." (UN CHR 1 February 2001, "Summary")

"Conflict in the eastern part of DRC has been concentrated consistently around the larger towns within the two Kivu and Maniema provinces, in particular Uvira, Bukavu, Goma, Kisangani, Kindu, Punia, Kampene, and Kalima. The populations in these areas of DRC have been the most affected by both of these wars." (MERLIN 20 August 2001)

"While the general security situation has remained stable in Goma (North Kivu province), movements of the Interhamwe forces continued in Bwito (Rutshuru territory) resulting in new displacements of populations and restricted access for humanitarian agencies. Confrontation between armed groups in South Kivu province forcing populations to flee their homes and sporadic attacks in Northern Katanga have reportedly hampered humanitarian activities." (WFP 27 July 2001)

### **Fighting between various armed groups causes desperate displacement situation in the Kivus ( 2000-2002)**

- Villagers seek refuge in the forests at night
- Situation particularly bad in areas close to Goma
- Reports in early 2000 of Rwandan troops moving civilians within North Kivu in order to create a security zone to control infiltration into Rwanda
- Evacuation of civilians undertaken without civilian authorities' consent or involvement
- Escalated conflict between Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge) and Mayi Mayi militias behind increased displacements in South Kivu (2000)
- In July 2001, movements of Interahamwe forces in North Kivu and fighting in South Kivu caused further internal displacement
- As of Feb 2002, the situation in the Kivus continues to be highly unstable, with significant operations by RCD/the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and armed group activity

"The North and South Kivu provinces are the epicenter of this disaster. Base of the biggest rebel faction (RCD Goma), disputed home of the Banyamulenge and other Tutsi in Congo, the provinces are the point of

convergence of armed groups (Maï Maï, Interahamwe, Burundian rebels, Banyamulenge militias, RCD soldiers, Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian soldiers). In South-Kivu, the Maï Maï, Interahamwe and FDD [Burundian rebel group] form a variety of alliances de facto supporting Kabila, fighting the Tutsi ethnic group, furthering their own cause against the regional regimes or committing acts of banditism. The lives of the Banyamulenge are being threatened or they risk to be expelled from the Congolese community. The RCD rebels have not been able to gain the acceptance of the population. The sheer number of actors and complex motivations, the barbarism and multitude of human rights violations and the constant exaction on the civilians by all sides have made this area a true mosaic of misery. (AAH August 2000, sects. 1, 3.3)

"While the situation in the eastern Congolese town of Goma appears calm and relatively stable, the story in the surrounding forests and remote villages is completely different with people literally running for their lives.

According to humanitarian workers who recently visited these areas and spoke to local residents, the Rwandan Interahamwe militia is carrying out a "massive campaign of intimidation". Villagers said they were so afraid that they went to sleep in the forests at night when most of the attacks usually take place. [...] Villagers, victims of both sides in the DRC conflict, also spoke of reprisal attacks carried out by soldiers of the governing Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD-Goma)." (IRIN 16 November 2000)

"There have been concerted efforts by Rwandan troops to move large groups of civilians out of Rutshuru territory deep into the interior of North Kivu. Available reports indicate that the entire commune of Bwito (300,000 persons) has been already "evacuated" in order that a security zone be created to control infiltrations into Rwanda. Arbitrary displacements in North Kivu/Rwanda bordering areas have been known since 1997, however the ongoing one is being implemented by Rwandan military without civilian authorities' consent or involvement." (OCHA 15 February 2000)

"All sides continue to accuse one another of violating the Lusaka cease-fire agreement signed in July-August 1999, and the situation in the eastern provinces remains precarious [...]. The U.N. World Food Program (WFP) reported at the end of July that movements of Interahamwe forces in North Kivu (Rushuru territory) and fighting in South Kivu province have prompted internal displacement and restricted humanitarian access." (USAID 20 August 2001)

"The Kivus remain extremely insecure and areas of intense humanitarian need. Their position on the border with Burundi and Rwanda make them important bases for rebel groups from the two countries. One of the chief concerns is that the rebel groups have never entered into any peace negotiations or signed any cease-fire." (ACC/SCN 31 July 2001, p.30)

"Hate speech and communal violence have increased alarmingly in the provinces of North and South Kivu, located in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The violence is directed at Congolese Tutsis (known as the Banyamulenge). An estimated 150,000 Banyamulenge are now at imminent risk of violent attack by Mayi Mayi militias. Despite having made Congo their home for two hundred years, Congolese authorities have questioned the Banyamulenge's right to citizenship. The Banyamulenge citizenship question was a key issue in the 1996 war which brought Laurent Kabila to power. Now, Kabila's promotion of ethnic tension threatens to bring down the Lusaka Accords and to plunge Congo back into full-scale war. [...]

Feelings are running at fever pitch since rebel authorities, the Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie (RCD), refused to permit the Archbishop of Bukavu, Monsignor Kataliko, to return to his diocese. Public reaction to the RCD action has been immediate. Strikes and public demonstrations shut down Bukavu for several days. Public sentiment against the Banyamulenge has turned ugly. Recently, a dog was killed and dragged through Bukavu behind a car with crowds shouting, "This is how you treat Tutsis!" There are rumors that the local Mayi Mayi militias, who enjoy broad public support, are reportedly planning pogroms against the Banyamulenge. The Banyamulenge have reportedly armed themselves, determined not to suffer the same fate as Rwandan Tutsis in 1994[...]" (RI 30 March 2000)

"The situation in the Kivus continues to be highly unstable, with significant operations by RCD/the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and armed group activity reported over the past four months." (UN SC 15 Feb 2002)

### **In the Kivus RCD-Goma troops and Hutu armed groups cause massive displacement to exploit resources more easily (2001)**

- Extraction of mineral wealth made easier when local population has been killed or has fled

"Amnesty International is [...] concerned at reports of human rights abuses such as killings, torture, use of forced labour, including by children and prisoners, and displacement of population that have taken place in the context of the exploitation of the resources. For example, Amnesty International has received reports of unarmed civilians being killed during fighting between the RCD-Goma troops and Hutu armed groups over mining areas; of villages being burned down; or people attacked and forced to flee the area. An independent observer told Amnesty International delegates that 'when a new RCD-Goma or RPA commander is nominated in the mining area of Walikale, Masisi, or Shabunda, the insecurity in the region decreases. However, once a commander is in a region for a while, he understands that insecurity has an advantage. His troops start shooting, killing and provoking massive displacement of the population, in order to make access to the extraction of the mineral wealth easier because the population is dead or has fled.'" (AI 19 June 2001)

### **In Maniema people flee violent clashes between Mayi Mayi and RCD forces (2001-2002)**

- Violent clashes between Mayi Mayi and RCD forces and their allied forced the 13,000 inhabitants of Lokandu to flee towards Kindu in August 2001
- Mayi Mayi – RCD clashes in Punia also, which exposes the pygmy population to atrocities
- Other inter-ethnic clashes in the south-east of the province erupted over the exploitation of natural resources (fish, game and minerals), causing many displacements
- Mayi Mayi incursions around Kindu cause major displacement in Feb 2002

"De violents affrontements entre Maï- Maï et les forces du RCD et leurs alliés ont eu lieu depuis le 25 août à Lokandu, 50 Km au nord de Kindu, obligeant les quelques 13.000 habitants de la ville à fuir en direction de Kindu ou vers l'ouest. Jusqu'au 31 août, la situation demeurait confuse sur l'issue des combats.

- Insécurité persistante à Punia où des affrontements entre maï- maï et les forces du RCD ont été signalés à 12 km de la cité de Punia, près de l'aérodrome de Kalombenyama. Selon les autorités locales, les maï- maï viendraient de la grande forêt de Kitamona qui se prolonge jusqu'à Ikela. Il y a crainte d'une jonction avec les forces basées dans cette localité. Ces opérations qui se déroulent en pleine forêt exposent les pygmées à des atrocités.

- D'autres affrontements inter-ethniques sont signalés dans le sud-est de la province entre les Babembe appuyés par les maï- maï et les Babuyu appuyés par les forces du RCD et leurs alliés. Le conflit aurait fait plus de 26.000 déplacés dans la région de Kabambare. [...]

Les enjeux de ce conflit sont multiples mais les plus cités sont entre autres l'exploitation des ressources naturelles (poissons, gibier et minerais) par les deux communautés et leurs alliés qui se battent dans cette partie de la province. " (UN OCHA 12 September 2001)

"Clashes between rebels and traditional warriors who back the Kinshasa government resumed at the weekend in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a rebel source said.

Officials of the Rwandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) said fighting between Mai-Mai warriors and RCD rebels broke out Saturday in Maniema and South Kivu provinces." (AFP 19 Dec 2001)

"Suite aux récentes incursions des mayi mayi à la périphérie de Kindu, l'estimation des ONG locales est présentement entre 35 000 et 40 000 déplacés." (UN OCHA 15 Feb 2002)

### **Violent conflict between the Hema and Lendu people in the Orientale province has caused major displacements since June 1999 (1999-2002)**

- Conflict between the Hema and Lendu has previously occurred in 1972, 1985 and 1996
- Escalated conflict since mid-December 1999
- Reports of major destruction of villages and attacks on civilians having caused an estimated 150,000 displaced by end of January 2000
- Several interethnic clashes occurred in the region of Bunia during mid-August 2000
- Lendu launched a major attack on Hema villages in the region of Bunia in mid-December 2000
- Reprisal attacks on Lendu residents by Hema militiamen and soldiers of the APC (RCD-ML)
- FLC (new rebel coalition since Jan 01) managed to broker a peace agreement between representatives of the Hema and the Lendu peoples in mid-February 2001
- Renewed fighting and killing of 6 ICRC workers in April 2001
- 200 people dead and 15,000 displaced following attack by Lendu militiamen on the Hema village north of Bunia town (Feb 2002)

" The clashes between the pastoralist Hema and agriculturalist Lendu ethnic groups in the Djugu area of Ituri began in mid-June [1999], essentially over long-standing local land disputes. But the presence of various Congolese and foreign armed groups, the easy availability of weapons, the war-ravaged economy, and a rise in "ethnic ideology" in the area have provided dangerous fodder for the conflict's rapid extension and ferocity, analysts told IRIN.

[...]

Conflict between the Hema and Lendu has occurred several times in recent decades, including in 1972, 1985 and 1996. A local NGO involved in human rights and reconciliation issues told IRIN that the country's 1973 land law was an important source of the problem because, under the law, people can purchase already-inhabited property and then present title to the land two years later when it becomes incontestable in court. This practice has resulted in families being driven off their fields and out of their homes, the NGO said.

The latest violence started after members of the Hema group reportedly tried to extend their land holdings onto Lendu property, allegedly with land title documents falsified in collaboration with local authorities, sources told IRIN.

Djugu, with an estimated population of one million, is part of the "province" of Kibali-Ituri, created earlier this year by the Ugandan-backed Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Mouvement de libération (RCD-ML), led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba. Reports indicate that Ugandan soldiers had fought in the conflict on the side of the Hema, in exchange for cash payments.

[...]

Wamba said the conflict was linked to long-term disparities in wealth and access to education, which had favoured the Hema. "Those inequalities, which are a colonial legacy, are now being exploited," he told IRIN." (IRIN 15 November 1999)

"[In December 1999 it was reported that] Ethnic clashes between the Lendu and Hema people in Ituri district of eastern DRC have broken out again in the past fortnight, displacing tens of thousands of civilians and greatly increasing humanitarian needs in an already difficult situation, the regional head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Philip Spoerri told IRIN on Tuesday.

[...]

The current clashes were at their most intense around Djugu, and had sent 20,000 to 30,000 displaced people towards nearby towns, particularly Bunia, for shelter, he said. In light of the renewed clashes, the ICRC hoped to reach 85,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in 10-15 sites in and around Bunia and Djugu by the end of January, Spoerri told IRIN." (IRIN 21 December 1999)

"The conflict in the district has cost the lives of thousands and caused over 150,000 people to be displaced within the region. Many villages have been razed to the ground; the fields that were used for crop cultivation are totally deserted. The conflict has led to the collapse of the already fragile healthcare system. In the past six months, the area has been ravaged by various epidemics including measles, the plague, and cholera." (MSF 2 February 2000)

"Lendu and associated militia of Ngiti people together with less organized bands of villagers, most of them armed with traditional weapons, launched a major attack on Hema villages in the region of Bunia in mid-December [2000]. According to some survivors, some Lendu also had automatic rifles. The fighters brought the violence into Bunia on January 19 when they attacked UPDF headquarters at the airport. They apparently wanted to disable a helicopter gunship that the UPDF had used against them in earlier attacks. They also wanted to occupy the airport to prevent the triumphal return of local Hema leaders, who were increasingly appearing as the winners in the negotiations going on in Kampala.

Some eighty attackers were slain by UPDF fire, including gunfire from the armed helicopter. Retreating Lendu militia ruthlessly massacred some sixty Hema residents in outlying residential areas and the villages of Soleniema and Mwanga north of Bunia. In the hours after the attack was repulsed, Bunia residents reported seeing UPDF officers encouraging Hema youth in several quarters of the town to arm themselves and to identify and kill Lendu infiltrators. This call apparently set the stage for reprisal attacks on Lendu residents by Hema militiamen and soldiers of the APC loyal to Mbusa. According to some witnesses, at least 150 to 250 Lendu were slaughtered, many of them Lendu intellectuals and community leaders.

[...]

Some 20,000 people fled in all directions inside Ituri as an estimated 10,000 others, mostly Hema, sought refuge in Uganda in the first week of January. This latest fighting made Ituri the scene of one of the bloodiest conflicts fought in the shadow of the Congo's broader war. The resulting displacement and movement of refugees to Uganda is one of the largest humanitarian emergencies in Congo today.

### **Mediation Efforts and Reconciliation**

By mid-February, the Front for the Liberation of Congo appeared to be reestablishing control in the area. Violence diminished and hopes for peace increased. Following a three-day conference attended by some 160 traditional chiefs and notables of Ituri province, the FLC managed to broker a peace agreement between representatives of the Hema and the Lendu peoples. Signed on February 17, the agreement called among other things for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of all militia groups. Olivier Kamitatu, national secretary of the FLC, told Human Rights Watch that the new front, "as public authority," undertook to implement these and other provisions of the agreement, including to dismantle training centers for militia, control movements of soldiers, secure border crossings, and guarantee the free movement of goods and people along roads." (HRW March 2001, sect. IV)

"The killings of the six ICRC personnel in the vicinity of Bunia in April comes against a backdrop of ethnic massacres between the Lendu and Hema [...]. Following these killings, fresh fighting broke out between the Hema-Bagerere and the Lendu, around the Fataki and Djugu areas." (UN SC 8 June 2001, para.66)

"Inter-community fighting, between Bira and Ngety tribes, has been reported in Ituri, with 44 dead and 48 wounded in the Nyakunde area (near Bunia). The situation has been calmed by the Ituri governor through negotiation with the communities." (UN OCHA 26 September 2001)

***Renewed fighting in Feb 2002 causes displacement of 15,000 around Bunia***

"An attack by Lendu militiamen last Friday [15 Feb 2002] morning on the Hema village of Kparnganza, north of Bunia town in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which, according to news organisations, left 200 people dead, constitutes yet another urgent warning that the security situation is deteriorating in the area and could get worse if something is not done to abate it.[...]

Humanitarian agencies in Bunia, northeastern DRC, have estimated that more than 15,000 people had been displaced in the surrounding area in the past few weeks by ethnic conflict involving the Lendu, Hema and Alur tribes, and among the political factions of several rebel groups.

Fingers are pointing at Uganda, which has maintained a military presence in northeastern DRC ever since 1998, when it sent forces into the DRC to support rebel movements. Uganda is now being blamed for failing to resolve the deteriorating state of affairs in the region. Various sources are even suggesting that Uganda prefers to uphold the status quo to enable it to continue "plundering" the DRC's natural resources.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) last week said Uganda should be held responsible for grave human rights violations and massive human suffering taking place in the territories it was occupying in the DRC." (IRIN 19 Feb 2002)

***It is recommended to read the comprehensive report issued by Human Rights Watch in March 2001 for further details about the linkages between rebel forces, the Uganda army and the Lendu-Hema conflict- as well as information about the Front for the Liberation of Congo (created in January 2001).***

***For other background information about this conflict and the dynamics of the violence and displacements it created in early 2000, see IRIN 3 March 2000 "Special Report on the Ituri clashes" [Part One](#) and [Part Two](#).***

***Also, see the recent HRW report, 13 Feb 2002, "Attacks on Civilians in Ugandan Occupied Areas in Northeastern Congo" [\[External Link\]](#)***

**Fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani caused substantial displacement in June 2000 (2000-2002)**

- Violent clashes emerged in August 1999
- Clashes in June 2000 lasted for six days, killing and wounding numbers of civilians in the indiscriminate bombing by both sides
- Some 65,000 residents sought refuge in the nearby forests
- Reported in February 2001 that Rwanda and Uganda had withdrawn their forces at a distance of some 100 kilometres from Kisangani
- Destruction still evident as of early 2002 and no progress on the demilitarization of Kisangani

"The city of Kisangani, located in the north-east of the country and at the geographical centre of the African continent, has been the scene of five conflicts in the last four years. The third largest city of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a commercial centre on the Congo River, Kisangani has effectively been cut off from the rest of the country.

[...]

Kisangani has been the theatre of several clashes between rebel and government troops and between erstwhile allies according to some observers. The most recent of these occurred from 5 to 11 June 2000, when the city was the scene of fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan troops which included widespread indiscriminate shelling by both sides.

[...]

Persisting tension between Ugandan and Rwandan troops degenerated into open and violent clashes for the first time in August 1999, the fighting spreading from garrisons and military camps into residential areas of the city. Another round of clashes was prevented from becoming outright war in mid-May 2000 when members of the Security Council's mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUC brokered a ceasefire agreement, including a disengagement plan. However, despite acceptance of the agreement by both the Rwandan Patriotic Army and the Uganda People's Defence Forces and the deployment of additional United Nations military observers, the situation remained highly volatile throughout May, and continued to disrupt economic trade and traditional food supply lines. By the end of the month the humanitarian community negotiated a resumption of air traffic with the belligerents to allow supplies to be flown in, as the city is not accessible by inland transport, thus preventing further deterioration of the population's health and nutritional status.

Hostilities once again broke out on 5 June and lasted for six days, killing and wounding numbers of civilians in the indiscriminate bombing by both sides. Losses among the civilian population were high and damage to the city's infrastructure and housing was widespread. Over 760 civilians were killed and an estimated 1,700 wounded. Over 4,000 dwellings were damaged, destroyed or made uninhabitable [...]. Sixty-nine schools were partially destroyed or damaged [...], and other public buildings were badly affected. Power stations and the water-supply systems were severely disrupted. The fighting forced some 65,000 residents to flee Kisangani and seek refuge in the nearby forests. Around 3,000 internally displaced people were housed in a camp at Katele." (UN SC 4 December 2000, paras. 46, 54, 56, 57)

"Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), Rwanda and Uganda have continued to keep their forces at a distance of some 100 kilometres from Kisangani. However, RCD military elements have remained in the city, with its leaders maintaining that security concerns do not allow them to withdraw their forces before the arrival of United Nations troops. The area around Kisangani has been de facto divided into quadrants: RCD occupies the south and west; MLC and UPDF the north-west and the north; and UPDF solely the east. This dispersal is generally respected, except for isolated skirmishes usually between RCD and MLC/RCD-N in the diamond mining area to the north of the city." (UN SC 12 February 2001, para. 29)

*See also "Swift response to major new displacements from Kisangani (June 2000)" [Internal link]*

"In follow-up missions in 2001, LWF/DWS [Lutheran World Federation Department for World Service, Rwanda Programme] was able to see improvements in terms of security. The humanitarian agencies are now able to locate themselves in Kisangani and implement programmes to assist the population. The destruction is still evident. Little has been done on the physical rehabilitation of damaged structures and homes due to the huge cost of building materials caused by high transport costs." (ACT 5 March 2002, p.5)

"Nor has much progress been made on the demilitarisation of Kisangani, despite the public commitment made by the RCD leadership at the meeting of the Political Committee with the Security Council on 9 November [2001]." (UN SC 15 Feb 2002, para.95)

### **People flee fighting at the frontline in the Equateur Province (2000)**

- Fighting in May 2000 between MLC and DRC/Zimbabwean troops on the Mobenzene axis
- Civilians fleeing indiscriminate bombings and pillaging by soldiers towards Congo-Brazzaville

"[By July 2000] Equateur remained the most active part of the frontline. In early May, combats pitted MLC and DRC/Zimbabwean troops on the Mobenzene axis and within a few days, MLC progressed more than 100 km in the direction of Mbandaka and captured Mobenzene, Maita, Buburu and Wenze settlements. Civilians have reportedly fled the areas of intensive combats and a few of them have arrived to Mbandaka, bringing the total number of IDPs to 14,000. Local sources in Kinshasa reported that at the end of May, the Government troops repulsed MLC positions in the course of fierce fighting at Buburu and Moboza, 250 km north of Mbandaka. End June-early July was the hottest period since January 1999, as an ultimatum sent by Kinshasa to MLC troops has been followed by fighting in the Basankusu area and increasing pressure on Mbandaka, from the other side of the river." (OCHA 11 July 2000)

"In this region, the conflict intensifies in Libenge, Basankusu, and Bolomba between government forces (FAC) and the troops of the MLC rebel movement, supported by the Ugandan army (UPDF). The civilian population, subject to indiscriminate bombings and pillaging by soldiers, flee toward the CAR or Congo-Brazzaville. According to some sources, the distances walked by this population has been up to 300 km. Such movements of population, notably toward lands that are as inhospitable as the marshes of Congo-Brazzaville, make plausible the testimonies of humanitarian sources, according to which there have soldiers have pillaged and harmed civilians in villages situated along the stream as well as in Dongo." (OCHA September 2000, p.9)

"In mid-December, MLC began a military offensive across a broad front in northern Equateur, capturing Imese and Befale. Government and allied forces reinforced their positions around Mbandaka. In mid-January, MLC forces attacking Bolomba were repulsed after heavy fighting. Since 18 January, the military situation has become static, with no reports of significant fighting." (UN SC 12 February 2001, para.24)

### **People flee fighting at the frontline in the Katanga Province (1998-2001)**

- Majority of IDPs fled during the August-November 1998 fighting in northern Katanga
- Reported in 1999 that the IDPs are reluctant to return in fear of being considered rebel collaborators if Government regain control of return areas
- Major fighting around Pweto in December 2000 forcing civilians to flee towards Zambia
- In Sept 2001, further attacks in N. Katanga have led to additional displacement

"Along with the first-wave displaced of the Kivus, the IDP caseload in Katanga is the oldest as it was mainly generated during the August-November 1998 fighting in northern Katanga. All major IDP categories (according to their mode of settlement) known in the DRC are represented in this province: there are IDP camps in Lubumbashi, IDP resettlement sites south of the provincial capital, IDPs hosted in local communities and finally those dispersed in an area as large as 50,000 km<sup>2</sup>. In total, there are some 250,000 displaced persons scattered in Katanga on both sides of the frontline." (OCHA 11 July 2000)

"An OCHA led inter-agency mission in Northern Katanga (4-8 October [1999]) completed the initial assessment of displacement in this province, which was started in August 99. The mission visited Kalemie, Moba as well as a number of villages 12 Km. south of Moba. According to findings of the mission, only a part of Kalemie (80 percent) and Moba (30 percent) residents have returned after having fled their communities in November-December 98. Assessment mission witnessed a large-scale devastation of areas affected by combats. The situation of returnees and those who are still living in the bush (over 120,000 persons) was described as pre-catastrophic with wide-spread starvation. In spite of serious hardships, the displaced are reluctant to return partially as a result of radio messages emanating from Lubumashi warning the population that in case of their return to rebel-occupied towns they will be considered collaborators when DRC Government regains the control of Northern Katanga." (UN OCHA 15 November 1999, "Humanitarian Action")

"In late November [2000], following attacks by government forces (FAC) in Katanga, RCD and the Rwandan People's Army (RPA) launched a counter-attack which culminated in their capture of Pweto on 6 December. Thousands of combatants and refugees fled into Zambia to escape the fighting.

[...]

Owing to the continuing fighting in the Equateur region, North and South Kivu, Katanga and Province Orientale, the latest estimate concerning the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 2 million, and this figure is expected to rise further.

[...]

As a result of recent fighting in the Pweto region (Katanga), a considerable number of people have sought refuge in neighbouring Zambia; about 9,000 of them are hosted in a refugee camp near Kala in Zambia's northern province, and a further 15,000 have settled in villages in the same area." (UN SC 12 February 2001, paras. 20, 45, 47)

"Further attacks in N. Katanga have led to additional displacement. The Pepa-Pweto axis is not secure. Fighting also reported between Babuyo and Babembe, the former allegedly supported by the RPA [Rwandese Army]. Babembe have previously been in conflict with the Banyamulenge, also supported by the RPA. Competition for natural resources in the area also exacerbates tension." (UN OCHA 26 September 2001)

### **Many displaced who had found refuge in Goma had to flee again when the Nyiragongo volcano erupted (Feb 02)**

- Eruption of Mount Nyiragongo near Goma in Jan 2002
- As a result of the disaster, assessments indicate that around 15 per cent of Goma town has been destroyed, 120,000 people have been made homeless and 147 have died
- With their property destroyed and their livelihoods wiped away, the entire Goma population is affected

"Perhaps among the most unlucky are those who fled violence only to be forced to flee again from Goma as the Nyiragongo erupted: chased away one more time but by natural disaster. [...]"

The eruption of Mount Nyiragongo near Goma, on January 17 [2002], has caused a severe natural disaster in an area that has already suffered from years of conflict and distress. The lava flowed into the city and nearby Lake Kivu, causing fires, devastating the area, and generated an estimated 350,000 people to flee towards neighboring Rwanda. The vast majority of those who fled the town on January 17 returned home as early as Sunday 20 January and decided to stay in Goma despite fear due to a number of heavy earthquakes, continued eruptions, opening of fissures by earth tremors and serious risks of lethal gasses emission.

As a result of the disaster, assessments indicate that around 15 per cent of Goma town has been destroyed, 120,000 people have been made homeless and 147 have died.

With their property destroyed and their livelihoods wiped away, the entire Goma population is affected. Relief agencies and local authorities continue to debate options for the support of affected families. Possible options include moving to sites near Goma, resettling in neighboring towns, or returning previously displaced people to their areas of origin. The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), which controls the area, has banned any reconstruction on top of the recent lava flows and has announced that two sites outside of Goma (Lac Vert and Mugunga) would be available for resettlement.

However, a survey of homeless Goma residents by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) revealed strong resistance to settling in the outside of Goma or in other towns.

The specificity of this natural disaster is that it has happened in a stateless area, ravaged by war and this situation has further complicated the response by the humanitarian actors. For example, the extent of the distrust between the two populations has been a factor leading to a much earlier return of the population to Goma and the suspicion of "hidden motives" about declaration and advice from RCD have also created a specific dynamic to the crisis. " (UN OCHA 28 Feb 02, pp.4 & 14)

## POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

### Total national figures

---

#### 2,275,111 IDPs as of February 2002

"...the reported total number of IDPs (which shows an increase of 11% or 230,000 persons over the period [since September 2001]) reflects only a fraction of what is actually happening on the ground. In practice, a displaced person cannot be accounted for more than once and in today's Congo, the population who fled their villages and found asylum in another area have had, in many cases, to flee again and once again as frontlines move, violence erupts and their temporary refuges are no longer safe. Perhaps among the most unlucky are those who fled violence only to be forced to flee again from Goma as the Nyiragongo erupted; chased away one more time but by natural disaster.[...]

*This number also does not take into account the latest displacement due to interethnic clashes in Ituri (Orientale Province). (UN OCHA 28 Feb 02, p.14)*

**Other vulnerable groups include about 200,000 people who live hidden and are totally destitute (Feb 2002)**

OTHER VULNERABLE GROUPS IN THE DRC	
Estimated child soldiers	6,000
Widows	15,000
Handicapped including war wounded	25,000
Urban vulnerable	+/- 3,500,000
Hidden population/ total destitution	200,000
Food insecure	16,000,000
Host families (estimate)	87,500 (households) x 5 (individuals) = 437,500
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>20,987,500*</b>

**\*It is recognised that several of these groups will, naturally, overlap, possibly rendering this figure slightly exaggerated.**

(UN OCHA 28 Feb 02, p.14)


#### Over 2 million IDPs in DRC by end of September 2001

*According to UN estimates, there were about 2,045,000 IDPs in DRC as of the end of September 2001 (UN OCHA 30 September 2001).*

*There were about 2,002,500 IDPs in DRC by the end of December 2000. (OCHA 31 December 2000, p.3)  
This represents a significant increase during the last of part 2000, since there were 1,4 million IDPs by*

June 2000 and 1,8 million by September 2000. (UN November 2000, p.15). This is despite the fact that an estimated 810,000 former IDPs have returned to their habitual place of residence. (OCHA 31 December 2000, p.6).

**IDP growth since 1998**




(OCHA 17 April 2000)

According to the United Nations, "The vast majority of the 2 million people displaced by war are children and women." (United Nations 7 June 2001)

**960,000 IDPs in DRC by end of 1999**

"[By January 2000 there were] some 960,000 internally displaced persons in eight of the 11 provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and over 300,000 refugees from six of its nine neighbouring countries. Recent humanitarian Assessments reveal that over 2.1 million people (internally displaced persons, refugees, urban vulnerable) or 4.3 per cent of the population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo face critical food insecurity. Another 8.4 million (mostly urban populations and farmers in the proximity of the front line), or 17 Per cent of the population, face moderate but rapidly growing food insecurity." (UN SC 17 January 2000, para. 24)

"The reporting period [1 October - 15 November 1999] saw new population displacements (Kibali-Ituri, Orientale; Walikale, North Kivu, and Mongala, Equateur) but also return of entire communities in South Kivu. Nevertheless, the overall number of IDPs grew from 830,000 to 916,000 (increase by 75,000), as illustrated on the accompanying graph. This considerable increment is attributable to continued hostilities between Hema and Lemu ethnicities and volatile security in Haut Uele districts of Orientale province." (UN OCHA 15 November 1999, "Humanitarian Action")



## **500,000 IDPs in DRC by end of 1998**

"The number of IDPs is believed to have almost tripled since the outbreak of hostilities in the DRC and is estimated to have reached the level of 500,000 persons scattered in North and South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema, Kasai, Equateur and Katanga provinces. In rebel-held areas, the current conflict is marked by patterns some of which are similar to those that affected humanitarian action during the 1996-1997 war in former Zaire, i.e. all communities of Northern and Southern Kivu are considered - and consider themselves as - collective targets for military attacks. Massive, durable displacements are expected to have been amplified during the last three months. The situation is usually different in other parts of the DRC, where the populations are only afraid of looting and side-effects of military confrontations. Thus, they only leave their houses for as long as fighting, looting or take-over of a town will last at local level." (UN December 1998, p.14)

*It should be noted that USCR apparently subscribed to a more careful estimate of IDPs by the end of 1998:*

"The outbreak of renewed war in Congo-Kinshasa in August uprooted hundreds of thousands of people, some for a few days, others for the rest of the year. At year's end, displacement persisted primarily in the eastern one-third of the country.

Although an estimated 300,000 persons were internally displaced at year's end and some 130,000 were refugees in neighboring countries, some aid workers estimated that 80 percent of the population in some eastern regions (a million or more people) might have fled their homes temporarily for several days at different times during the year. Such estimates were impossible to confirm because much of the country remained inaccessible to local and international aid workers." (USCR 1999, p.59)

## **100,000 believed to be displaced by the end of 1997**

- After the main civil war ended (May 1997), eruptions of violence in eastern Congo/Zaire pushed additional tens of thousands from their homes
- About 40,000 Congolese fled early in 1997 hundreds of kilometres westward with Rwandan refugees to the city of Kisangani

"The number of residents who became internally displaced during the civil war remains uncertain. More than 100,000 were already uprooted in eastern Zaire prior to the civil war due to ethnic conflicts. Poor roads, impenetrable forests, and pockets of insecurity impeded full assessments of humanitarian needs in the country's vast isolated areas throughout 1997.

A UN funding appeal in March estimated that nearly a half-million Congolese/Zairians were displaced. U.S. aid officials estimated in August that some 230,000 probably were uprooted within the country. A UN human rights official reported in mid-year that 250,000 to 400,000 were displaced. An international NGO put the number at 190,000. All sources agreed that the most pervasive displacement was in the chronically unstable Masisi zone of eastern Congo/Zaire, near the town of Goma.

USCR site visits to eastern Congo/Zaire during 1997 concluded that up to half the population in some areas of the east were at least temporarily displaced during the war. Many were able to return home after several weeks, but thousands of families endured long-term displacement caused by lingering insecurity in their home areas. USCR estimated that up to 150,000 people remained internally displaced at mid-year, but a majority were "invisible to outsiders because they are dispersed," USCR's report noted.

About 40,000 Congolese fled hundreds of kilometers westward with Rwandan refugees to the city of Kisangani early in the year. More than 70,000 fled to Tanzania. Smaller numbers entered Uganda, Burundi, Sudan, Zambia, and other countries as refugees. As many as 10,000 former Zairian soldiers and their families reportedly fled to Central African Republic.

[...]

In the second half of 1997, after the main civil war ended, eruptions of violence in eastern Congo/Zaire pushed additional tens of thousands from their homes. Some 8,000 people converged on the town of Goma in late April. At least 15,000 fled to Rwanda. Entire areas of Masisi zone, in the east, lay deserted, with 15,000 homes burned and 1,000 people dead." (USCR 1998, pp. 60-61)

### **400,000 believed to be displaced by the end of 1996**

"Uprooted Zairians were the virtually forgotten victims of their country's widening civil war [after October 1996].

An estimated three million Zairians lived in the conflict zones. An estimated 400,000 became internally displaced, and approximately 50,000 others became new refugees in Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda. An additional 1,000 or more Zairian or Rwandan Tutsi fled to neighboring Congo to escape anti-Tutsi violence in the Zairian capital, Kinshasa.

In addition to the new Zairian refugees created during 1996, tens of thousands of Zairians remained refugees from previous years." (USCR 1997, p.107)

### **UN OCHA's renewed efforts to gather precise data on the number of IDPs despite difficulties (2001)**

- IDPs in DRC are difficult to count due to a high degree of dispersion
- OCHA looks at the number of displaced per health zones
- It established an information network to compare data from different sources
- Its offices collect data in a continuous way and inter-agency mission also assess IDP numbers
- Dissemination of standardized evaluation forms

"La collecte d'information en matière de personnes déplacées est un exercice extrêmement ardu en République Démocratique du Congo, ne serait-ce que par un degré de dispersion spatiale probablement le plus élevé au monde. Depuis plus de deux ans, OCHA s'efforce de regrouper les informations et de dénombrer les déplacés selon une combinaison cohérente de démarches :

- Approche par zones de santé et, le cas échéant (Masisi, Rutshuru) par territoires;
- Utilisation contradictoire de données démographiques mises à jour avant le second conflit (études Ministère de la Santé/OMS, ISA, Sisan);
- Prise en compte des mouvements de réfugiés congolais en dehors des frontières;
- Constitution d'un réseau d'information maillé de nature à permettre recoupements et études contradictoires;
- Travail continu de collecte des bureaux OCHA;
- Missions inter-agences ; missions spécifiques par les assistants humanitaires;
- Etudes spécifiques de villes ou de territoires (Kabinda, Masisi, Mwenga) par différents organismes;

- Dissémination de formulaires d'évaluation standardisés et élaborés en concertation avec les toutes les agences et ONG à Kinshasa;
- Report cartographique des données.

OCHA souhaite procéder à une actualisation détaillée des chiffres de personnes déplacées à travers le territoire national. Pour cela, les outils précités existent déjà ainsi que les résultats de missions spécifiques.

L'exercice est devenu tellement fastidieux (du fait de l'absence prolongée de la pratique de collecte systématique) qu'OCHA envisage de se donner la fin juin comme date butoir pour la publication d'un chiffre qui constituera le produit de nos efforts communs. A compter du mercredi 6 juin, tous les bureaux OCHA à travers le pays solliciteront de chacun des organismes partenaires des informations à la fois simples et précises (la fiche de données sur les personnes déplacées est disponible dans tous les bureaux).

Les bureaux OCHA à Goma et Kinshasa procéderont à la consolidation de ces chiffres, et si les données le permettent, à une tentative de catégorisation des populations déplacées selon des critères similaires à ceux présentés dans l'Appel Consolidé 2001. Bien entendu, les mouvements de retour et de réintégration feront également l'objet d'une attention particulière." (UN OCHA 7 June 2001)

## **Disaggregated figures**

---

### **Distribution of IDPs by province (July 99-Feb 2002)**

- The majority of displaced persons were found in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, Katanga, Orientale and South Kivu, (Feb 2002)
- Almost 1.2 million IDPs in the Kivus as of Feb 2002
- The number of IDPs in Equateur decreased greatly from Dec 2000 to Sept 2001
- The number of IDPs in Orientale increased greatly from Dec 2000 to Sept 2001 and then increased again in Feb 2002
- The number of IDPs in Katanga increased by 100,000 IDPs between Dec 00 and Sept 01

<b>Area</b>	<b>July 1999</b>	<b>June 2000</b>	<b>Dec 2000</b>	<b>Sept 2001</b>	<b>Feb 2002</b>
<b>Equateur</b>	100,000	250,000	300,000	85,000	85,000
<b>Orientale</b>	70,000	215,000	160,000	230,000	250,000
<b>North Kivu</b>	160,000	287,000	640,000	760,000	760,000
<b>South Kivu</b>	195,000	220,000	350,500	225,000	435,111
<b>Katanga</b>	150,000	250,000	305,000	415,000	415,000
<b>Maniema</b>	20,000	110,000	137,000	160,000	160,000
<b>Eastern Kasai</b>	60,000	30,000	30,000	130,000	130,000
<b>Western Kasai</b>	N/A	140,000	80,000	Included with Western Kasai)	
<b>Kinshasa</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	40,000	40,000
<b>Total</b>	775,000	1,502,000	2,002,500	2,045,000	2,275,111

Source: UN OCHA 15 July 1999, 11 July 2000, 31 December 2000 (p.11), 30 September 2001; 28 February 2002, p.13

## **Displacement in the Maniema province (2001-2002)**

- The 1998 war created in Maniema a climate of permanent insecurity, destroyed infrastructure and caused massive displacements of population to the forest
- Report in March 2001 that the majority of the displaced in Maniema Province, about 100,000 persons, were in Nyembo
- Report in February 2001 that 68% of population in Maniema has been displaced
- The UN recorded 160,000 IDPs in Maniema as of Feb 2002
- Following recent Mayi Mayi incursions around Kindu, the number of displaced in Kindu is estimated between 35,000 and 40,000

"Le Maniema, jeune province issue de l'éclatement en trois de la grande province du Kivu en 1988, a dès le début connu des événements qui ont inexorablement conduit cette province dans une situation préoccupante. [...]"

La première guerre de 1996 a eu un impact modéré comparativement à la seconde guerre en cours depuis 1998 qui a achevé définitivement la dégradation générale de la province. Le front de cette guerre a créé un climat d'insécurité permanente, des déplacements massifs de la population vers les forêts, des destructions et pillages de toutes les infrastructures [...].

Le déplacement de plus de 100,000 personnes a paralysé matériellement et financièrement le maintien des infrastructures menant le Maniema à l'enclavement total et au chaos sur le plan socio-économique. [About 100,000 of them were in Nyembo as of March 2001]" (UN OCHA September 2001)

"The province of Maniema is one of the most isolated in the county. Its 132 square kilometres contain agriculturally rich land and formerly supplied Katanga and Kivu provinces with food. However, due to the extreme degradation of the provincial road and railway networks due to neglect, particularly since the outbreak of two wars, the province has experienced an economic decline, and suffers from a severe lack of information and technological expertise. Situated in a densely forested equatorial region, the only access currently to Kindu, the capital of Maniema, is by air." (ACT 5 March 2002, p.22)

### ***UN (CHR) reported in February 2001 that:***

"In Maniema, over 68 per cent of the population has been displaced. Humanitarian relief is able to reach only 50 per cent of the displaced persons." (CHR 1 February 2001, para.42)  
*Between Sept 01 and Feb 02, the number of IDPs remained stable at 160,000 IDPs* (UN OCHA 30 Sept 01; 28 Feb 02).

" Les acteurs humanitaires opérant au Maniema ont contredit l'information passée sur les ondes de la RFI, selon laquelle il y aurait 13 000 déplacés à Kindu. Ils ont réaffirmé que ce chiffre est de loin dépassé, surtout qu'une opération concertée avait été menée en décembre 2001 pour dénombrer tous les déplacés de Kindu dont le nombre s'élevait à 24 216, soit 5847 familles. Suite aux récentes incursions des mayi mayi à la périphérie de Kindu, l'estimation des ONG locales est présentement entre 35 000 et 40 000 déplacés." (UN OCHA 15 Feb 2002)

## **Displacement in the Katanga province (2000-2001)**

- Katanga province is divided between the northern part under RCD-Goma control, and the south, under the control of the government of Kinshasa
- 415,000 IDPs in Katanga as of Feb 02

"La province du Katanga est aujourd'hui divisée en deux parties par la ligne de front: la partie Nord tombée sous le contrôle du RCD Goma et la partie Sud, sous celui du gouvernement de Kinshasa.

La situation humanitaire y est très préoccupante. Elle est caractérisée par des extorsions quotidiennes de la population et l'insécurité liée aux intenses activités militaires dans la partie agro- pastorale et piscicole du Nord- Katanga, l'enclavement et la rupture d'approvisionnement dû à la réduction du trafic commercial; les déplacements des populations et de la recrudescence de différentes épidémies, la spirale de la malnutrition." (UN OCHA September 2001)

***UN (OCHA) reported in July 2000 that:***

"Along with the first-wave displaced of the Kivus, the IDP caseload in Katanga is the oldest as it was mainly generated during the August-November 1998 fighting in northern Katanga. All major IDP categories (according to their mode of settlement) known in the DRC are represented in this province: there are IDP camps in Lubumbashi, IDP resettlement sites south of the provincial capital, IDPs hosted in local communities and finally those dispersed in an area as large as 50,000 km<sup>2</sup>. In total, there are some 250,000 displaced persons scattered in Katanga on both sides of the frontline." (OCHA 11 July 2000)

*The number of IDPs in the Province remained stable between Sept 01 and Feb 02. There were 415,000 IDPs in Katanga as of Feb 02 (UN OCHA 30 Sept 01; 28 Feb 02).*

### **Displacement in the Orientale province (2001-2002)**

- Kisangani has been one of the stakes of both latest wars
- Orientale province is under rebel occupation, split between factions supported by Rwanda and Uganda
- The ethnic conflict between Hema and Lendu has plagued Ituri and caused 10,000 dead and 170,000 IDPs
- The highest number of displaced in the province as of June 01 were in Bunia (40,000 IDPs)
- As of Feb 02, increase of IDPs in Bunia by 20,000, not including the displacements due to the most recent interethnic clashes
- Many Hemas and Lendu do not spend the night in their homes (Feb 2002)

"Oriental Province is the largest province in DRC, with an area of over 503,282 sq. km. and a population of approximately 8 million. The province is situated in the Northeast most part of the country and is divided into 5 districts (Kisangani, Low Uele, High Uele, Ituri and Tshopo). Kisangani, located on the Congo River and the third largest city in DRC, is 400 km. from the Rwanda border to the east, and 1,000 km. from the capital, Kinshasa, to the Southwest." (ACT 5 March 2002, p.4)

"La Province Orientale a été souvent qualifiée de «province martyre», se distingue sur le plan humanitaire par la singularité des événements vécus. Les points névralgiques ont été la Ville de Kisangani et le district de l'Ituri.

Pendant les deux guerres de 1996-1997 et 1998- 2001 Kisangani a été la ville de tous les enjeux pour les belligérants représentant ipso facto l'une des concentrations militaires les plus importantes du pays. Le dérapage a été consacré par les affrontements de mai et juin 2000 entre les armées rwandaises et ougandaises causant environ 1000 morts, 2000 blessés, la destruction des infrastructures socio-économiques, le traumatisme et la frustration au sein de la population.

La province Orientale, totalement sous occupation des rebelles est partagée entre les différentes factions soutenues par le Rwanda et l'Ouganda.

Quant à la situation en Ituri, elle a été marquée par le conflit ethnique entre les Hema et les Lendu. Cette guerre intercommunautaire la plus meurtrière connue ces dernières a causé environ 10.000 morts et 170.000 déplacés sans oublier ses retombées négatives sur le secteur de la santé, de la sécurité alimentaire, de l'éducation...Le degré de haine communautaire et d'atrocité a été tel que beaucoup de survivants surtout des femmes et des enfants resteront longtemps traumatisés par des scènes d'horreur vécues." (UN OCHA September 2001)

As of Feb 02, IDPs "increased by 20,000 in Bunia. This figure does not include thousands of new IDPs scattered in Ituri following the recent ethnic clashes." (UN OCHA 28 Feb 02).

"La situation sécuritaire reste préoccupante, en particulier avec la recrudescence de la violence et le flottement politique. Tous les axes à partir de Bunia sont redevenus précaires. La population de Bunia vit dans une psychose d'attaques de la part des uns et des autres. De nombreux Lendus comme Hemas ne passent plus la nuit dans leurs maisons depuis un certain temps." (UN OCHA 15 Feb 02)

### **Displacement in the North Kivu province (2001-2002)**

- North Kivu is the province with the highest number of displaced in DRC with 760,000 IDPs as of Feb 02
- 120,000 people have been made homeless following the eruption of Mount Nyiragongo near Goma in Jan 2002

"La province du Nord- Kivu a été confrontée au cours de la décennie 1990- 2000 à une série de crises humanitaires aiguës dont les plus importantes sont la guerre intercommunautaire dans le Masisi (1993 et 1996); la présence massive et prolongée des réfugiés rwandais (1994- 1996); la guerre de 1996- 1997 et la guerre en cours depuis août 1998.

La province du Nord Kivu est totalement sous occupation des rebelles du RCD Goma. Les retombées négatives de ces crises ont affecté tous les secteurs de la vie, notamment le déplacement massif des populations et l'abandon des villages; les extorsions quotidiennes et l'insécurité généralisée consécutive à la multiplicité de bandes armées et à la prolifération des armes de guerre; la dégradation écologique; la destruction des infrastructures de base, l'enclavement des localités agricoles; le ralentissement des activités économiques et l'interruption du processus de développement." (UN OCHA September 2001)

"Recent confrontations in Nzulo and Mugunga entailed the displacement of more than 2000 IDPs families to Sake and Bugulube. It was noted at the 31st August 2001 meeting of the Commission for Population movements headed by SCF that the number of IDPs in the area was estimated at 796,000 in August 2001 compared with 640,000 IDPs in December 2000. This increase in the number of IDPs is due to continuous attacks registered in the rural areas of North Kivu." (WFP 13 September 2001)

*The number of IDPs remained stable from Sept 01 to Feb 02 at 760,000 IDPs (UN OCHA 30 Sept 01; 28 Feb 02)*

*As a result of the disaster, assessments indicate that around 15 per cent of Goma town has been destroyed, 120,000 people have been made homeless and 147 have died. (UN OCHA 28 Feb 02)*

### **Displacement in the South Kivu province (2001-2002)**

- South Kivu is controlled by RCD-Goma

- The western part is characterized by intense military activity and massive displacement
- The health zones with the highest number of displaced as of March 2001 were Walungu (almost 62,000) and Bukavu (54,000)
- Number of IDPs in South Kivu province almost doubled from 225,000 in Sept 01 to 435,111 as of Feb 02
- Following fighting in Jan 2002 south of Bukavu, 1500 families were displaced to towns nearby
- In the Fizi-Baraka region, approximately 20,000 IDPs went around Baraka to flee Mayi Mayi and Interahamwe militia which head towards Fizi

"La situation humanitaire du Sud- Kivu est presque identique à celle du Nord- Kivu. Elle est marquée par la présence massive et prolongée des réfugiés rwandais et burundais (1994- 1996) ainsi que les conflits communautaires à l'origine de la guerre de 1996, et la guerre en cours depuis août 1998. La province du Sud Kivu est totalement sous occupation des rebelles du RCD Goma.

Le Sud- Kivu connaît une forte densité de la population dans la partie Est l'exposant, de ce fait, à la carence de terre pour les activités agro- pastorales.

En revanche, la partie Ouest plutôt moins peuplée et à haute productivité agricole sert actuellement de zone opérationnelle avec d'intenses activités militaires entraînant les extorsions quotidiennes de la population ; l'insécurité ; l'enrôlement de la main d'œuvre masculine dans l'armée et les milices ; la déperdition scolaire ; l'abandon des champs et les déplacements massifs des populations. Les femmes et les enfants du Sud- Kivu sont les plus affectés par les effets de la guerre. [...]

Avec 353944 déplacés, le Sud- Kivu vient en deuxième position après le Nord- Kivu en nombre de personnes déplacées. Les deux provinces constituent ainsi la moitié des déplacés de la RDC."

*As of March 01, the health zones with the highest number of displaced were Walungu (almost 62,000) and Bukavu (54,000) (UN OCHA September 2001)*

*The number of IDPs in South Kivu province almost doubled from 225,000 in Sept 01 to 435,111 as of Feb 02 (UN OCHA 30 Sept 01; 28 Feb 02)*

"Les affrontements survenus le 20 janvier à Luhwindja, collectivité située en territoire de Mwenga à 65 km au sud de Bukavu, entre les groupes mayi mayi « Mudundu 40» alliés aux Interahamwe et les forces du RCD épaulées par l'APR auraient causé un déplacement d'environ 1500 familles qui se seraient dirigées vers les localités environnantes. Notons que Luhwindja avait accueilli récemment environ 700 familles en provenance de Burhinyi ayant fui d'autres attaques des milices interahamwe. [...]

Dans la région de Fizi-Baraka, environ 20 000 déplacés seraient regroupés autour de Baraka fuyant, selon les ONG locales du milieu, la progression des mayi mayi et Interahamwe qui chercheraient à reprendre le contrôle de Fizi." (UN OCHA 15 Feb 2002)

### **Displacement in the Equateur province (2001-2002)**

- Massive displacement of population, as the province is divided in two, the North and the East, under MLC and RCD-K/ML rebel occupation, and the South under the control of the government of Kinshasa
- The number of IDPs decreased from 300,000 in Dec 2000 to 85,000 in Sept 01 to remain stable since then (as of Feb 02)

"L'Equateur est l'une des provinces les plus durement touchées par la guerre en cours depuis 1998. Elle est coupée en deux, le Nord et l'Est sous occupation des rebelles du FLC [now split again in MLC and RCD-K/ML, as of March 2002], l'Ouest et le Sud sous le contrôle du Gouvernement de Kinshasa. Les activités militaires intenses dans cette province ont pour conséquences les extorsions quotidiennes de la population, l'insécurité généralisée, la destruction des récoltes, le vol de bétail et les déplacements massifs de la population." (UN-OCHA September 2001)

*The number of IDPs decreased from 300,000 in Dec 2000 to 85,000 in Sept 01 to remain stable since then (UN OCHA 31 Dec 00; 30 Sept 01; 28 Feb 02)*

### **Displacement in the Eastern Kasai province (2000-2002)**

- Many displaced who found refuge in Eastern Kasai come from Katanga Province
- Kasai is a strategic place for military and economic reasons and is split between RCD-Goma and the government of Kinshasa
- Majority of the displaced are in the health zone of Sankuru
- The number of IDPs in Eastern and Western Kasai remained stable from Sept 01 to Feb 02 at 130,000
- Bulk of the displaced said to be hiding in the forest not far from their homes

"Le contexte humanitaire au Kasai Oriental a été marqué au cours de la décennie 1990-2000 par l'arrivée massive des populations refoulées du Katanga en 1992 (environ 800.000 personnes), la guerre de 1996-1997 et celle en cours depuis 1998. A l'instar de la Province Orientale, le Kasai présente des enjeux militaro- économiques importants pour les parties impliquées dans la guerre. Il est ainsi scindé en deux, une partie sous occupation des rebelles du RCD Goma appuyés par le Rwanda, l'autre sous le contrôle du Gouvernement de Kinshasa.

Actuellement, la situation humanitaire se caractérise par l'afflux de nombreuses familles restées dans les territoires occupés, dans la forêt et dont l'état est alarmant. Le Kabinda a vécu un drame particulier, à savoir l'encercllement par les belligérants pendant plus d'une année."

*As of March 01, the majority of IDPs were in the health zone of Sankuru (80,000 IDPs). (UN OCHA September 2001)*

*The number of IDPs in Eastern and Western Kasai remained stable from Sept 01 to Feb 02 at 130,000 (UN OCHA 30 Sept 01; 28 Feb 02)*

#### **UN (OCHA) reported in July 2000 that:**

"Newly established contacts with religious sources in Lomela and Kole health zones of Sankuru district suggest that since March-April 2000, the local communities regularly receive IDPs coming from Ikela (Equateur) and Dekese (Western Kasai) in addition to long-date local displaced. The bulk of the displaced are said to be hiding in the forest, although not far from their homes. Although the need for relief supplies (mostly medicines) is great, local church sources prioritise the protection of displaced and give an appalling account of violence (systematic rape of school age girls) civilians are subjected to by Rwandan troops. At this stage it is impossible to accurately estimate the number of all IDPs in the province, especially given the relatively new influxes from Equateur. The conservative figure of 140,000 IDPs is maintained for planning purposes, until a more comprehensive assessment on both sides of the frontline can be undertaken." (OCHA 11 July 2000)

### **Displacement in the Western Kasai province (2001-2002)**

- Part of the Western Kasai province is under rebel occupation since May 1999 and this provoked displacement
- As of March 2001, the highest number of displaced (13,000) was in the health zone of Kananga
- The number of IDPs in Eastern and Western Kasai remained stable from Sept 01 to Feb 02 at 130,000

"La situation de conflit qui affecte la RDC est durement ressentie dans la province du Kasai Occidental dont une partie est sous occupation rebelle depuis le mois de mai 1999.

Cette situation a entraîné un déplacement massif des populations, des problèmes aigus de sécurité alimentaire, de malnutrition, d'accessibilité aux soins de santé et de précarité des conditions de vie."

*As of March 2001, the highest number of displaced (13,000) was in the health zone of Kananga* (UN OCHA Sept 01; 28 Feb 02)

*The number of IDPs in Eastern and Western Kasai remained stable from Sept 01 to Feb 02 at 130,000* (UN OCHA 30 Sept 01; 28 Feb 02)

(UN OCHA September 2001)

### **Displacement in Kinshasa Province (2001-2002)**

- Kinshasa province has a population of over 6 million, among whom 40,000 are IDPs

"Sa population est estimée à 6.037.997 habitants. Kinshasa compte 24 communes urbaines et 34 de zones de santé. [...]"

Le contexte humanitaire global de la province de Kinshasa a été marqué au cours de la décennie 1990-2000 par la succession à la fois des catastrophes naturelles et celles dues à l'homme. Les événements les plus spectaculaires sont les pillages de 1991 et 1993, la série des accidents survenus entre 1996 et 2000, les inondations de 1999-2000, les érosions sur environ 400 sites et les deux guerres de 1996-1997 et de 1998-2001.

La crise économique qui frappe le pays n'a fait qu'aggraver face aux aléas la vulnérabilité d'une population Kinois déjà très pauvre et sans pouvoir d'achat. C'est dans ce contexte que le ménage kinois doit faire face aux dépenses de la nourriture, de la santé, de l'éducation et autres." (UN OCHA September 2001)

*As of the end of Feb 02, there were 40,000 IDPs in Kinshasa* (UN-OCHA 28 Feb 02)

### **The civil war has caused a large number of displaced and unaccompanied children (1999-2000)**

- 210,000 IDP children affected by the hardships accompanying internal displacement as of Nov 99
- 10,000 children in need in protection in the urban areas of the Kivu region

"[An] increased numbers of abandoned or street children in all major urban areas of the DRC prompted UNICEF to support a census of minors in Kinshasa, Goma, Lubumbashi, Mbuji-Mayi and Kisangani. The

number of street children is estimated between 12-15,000 in Kinshasa alone. According to SCF/UK, the number of children in need in protection in the urban areas of the Kivu - 10,000." (UN OCHA 15 July 1999, "Children in Need of Protection")

"Approximately 1,500 unaccompanied children remained displaced early in the year at a camp in the city of Kisangani, in north central Congo-Kinshasa. Some 360 children in the camp died of cholera and dysentery before government authorities agreed to close the camp and transfer the children to different locations in February. Government officials claimed the children were Mai-Mai combatants."(USCR 1999, "Renewed War")

"Children in the DRC are worst hit by the adversities of the political and military turmoil and the accompanied economic collapse. Negative developments in child protection in the DRC can be seen in the following appalling statistics:

- \* An estimated 10-20,000 children under 15 were recruited as soldiers by all parties to the conflict;
- \*A unprecedented increase is being observed in the numbers of abandoned and street children (estimated 50,000) in all major urban centres as well as an increase of minors (estimated 25,000) attending nutritional rehabilitation centres and child-prostitutes.
- \* 210,000 IDP children are most affected by the hardships accompanying internal displacement (i.e., epidemic diseases such as measles and food shortages)." (UN November 1999, p.15)

"Abandoned children make up a substantial proportion of the displaced. In September, in the city of Kabina alone, there were 3,000 malnourished children out of a total population of 150,000, of which 15,000 were displaced persons (Hopital Catholique Sainte-Camille). In Lubumbashi too, the number of street children is growing fast. Estimates for this relatively new phenomenon are as high as 3,000 children. Perhaps this is an indication that essential family ties are no longer able to withstand the pressure of the circumstances." (MSF 25 January 2000, "Abandoned children")

*See also: "Displaced children need protection from recruitment by armed groups (2000)"*

# PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

## General

---

### **In North Kivu, large-scale displacement from areas rich in mineral wealth (2001)**

"Large-scale population displacement is particularly prevalent in areas rich in mineral wealth. In the Masisi territory of North-Kivu, on 29 June 2000, the RCD-Goma and RPA reportedly fired continuously into the air for an hour-and-a-half, terrorizing the local population and forcing thousands of people to flee, leaving the area empty and easy accessible to troops. In another case, 34,000 were displaced during the months of July and August 2000, and a further 27,000 in September and October 2000, due to fighting around the town of Shabunda, a rich coltan mining area. [...] Most of these Internally Displaced People are receiving no humanitarian assistance." (AI 19 June 2001)

### **Changed frontline and strategy by armed groups in South Kivu make the displaced flee greater distances (2000-2001)**

- Previously IDPs used to make efforts to stay near their villages and fields
- Anticipation of an all-out war, affected communities flee on far greater distances
- New strategy of uncontrolled armed groups to destroy villages forces IDPs constantly on the move from village to village in search for protection from attacks by the numerous armed factions
- In some instances, people in South Kivu are displaced five or more times, in various directions, as fighting breaks out in their places of refuge

"For much of 1999 humanitarian agencies were able to trace and reach most of IDP communities, since their movement was generally stable once away from insecure areas, i.e. IDPs were on the move for some time and making efforts to stay near their villages and fields. The displacement patterns of South Kivu noticeably changed starting from November-December 99, but especially in January 2000 when the frontline stretched from western parts of Maniema province down to Shabunda and even Kalonge. The dramatic shift of the frontline that has also led to significant changes - the Mayi-Mayi activity is now perceived by the civilian population, especially in towns, as a resistance movement, with which it overwhelmingly sympathises. Thus a qualitative change in the patterns of displacement- in search of security and in anticipation of an all-out war, affected communities flee on far greater distances. If the current levels of tension were to be sustained for another month, the majority of rural areas of South Kivu might be deserted and a significant rise in refugee numbers in Tanzania might occur." (OCHA 15 February 2000)

" The fact that uncontrolled armed groups in the Kivus are much better armed and co-ordinated than previously results in focused fighting of longer duration. On a number of occasions during the reporting period the uncontrolled-armed groups (UAGs) have gained the upper hand over RCD forces. A distinct change in the modus operandi of these groups has been observed: it would appear they no longer fight, loot and withdraw. In many instances they fight for control of villages or territories and remain there as an occupying force. This was notably reported by recent IDPs from Masisi in North Kivu.

[...]

The most important pattern of displacement in South Kivu during the reporting period has been the change in strategies of attacks on populations and thus the change in displacement practices. Those dwelling in

forests habitually displaced from settlements to camps further into the forest in order to be out of the way of whatever insecurity arising. This would be sufficient to keep them protected until their villages were safe and they could return. This method of self-preservation is no longer adequate. It would appear that there are previously unknown UAGs operating who are clearing entire areas with the express purpose that people do not return to their villages. As a result, waves of people who had been living rough in forests are now being swept before UAGs, constantly on the move." (OCHA 17 April 2000)

"The continued fighting in North and South Kivu provinces in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has displaced nearly half a million people in recent months. Congolese have fled from village to village in an illusory search for protection from attacks by the numerous armed factions in the region. Host communities up to this point have welcomed internally displaced people (IDPs). Individual households have swollen to twenty or more people in some areas. However, African hospitality and limited international resources are reaching their limits." (RI 5 May 2000)

"This province [of South Kivu] has seen the development of a pattern of displacement in which civilians, whose villages are raided for food and livestock, have to flee either to neighbouring villages, or to large towns such as Bukavu. In some instances, people are displaced five or more times, in various directions, as fighting breaks out in their places of refuge. In other cases, people have returned to their home villages once security returned, only to be displaced by fresh fighting. For the most part, they flee without belongings and many of those who return discover that their villages and farms are burned or otherwise destroyed by armed belligerents." (ACT 13 July 2001)

### **IDPs remain close to their places of origin (1999-2000)**

- Most IDPs are not housed in camps but have merged into host communities
- Some communities already enduring the stress of the conflict has to shelter other displaced persons fleeing other more insecure areas
- People living along river and roads used by the armed forces settle in the nearby forests and hills
- Civilians flee to temporary sanctuaries in response to rumors of approaching troops
- When the relative calm during the day gives way to terror at night people seek refuge outside their villages

"In rebel-held areas, the current conflict is marked by patterns some of which are similar to those that affected humanitarian action during the 1996-1997 war in former Zaire, i.e. all communities of Northern and Southern Kivu are considered - and consider themselves as - collective targets for military attacks. Massive, durable displacements are expected to have been amplified during the last three months. The situation is usually different in other parts of the DRC, where the populations are only afraid of looting and side-effects of military confrontations. Thus, they only leave their houses for as long as fighting, looting or take-over of a town will last at local level." (UN December 1998, p.14)

"A characteristic feature of displacement in eastern DRC is the fact that IDPs are not housed in camps but have merged into host communities. Their conditions remain precarious due to lack of farming land, vital services and general insecurity. Remaining in proximity to their places of origin, the displaced are prone to be subjected to the same hazards and abuses that caused them to flee in the first place. On a number of occasions during 1998-99, the displaced and local communities were stranded in combat areas and were removed by military authorities in a bid to create security zones.

[...]

Having fled hostility, displaced communities (IDPs) live in forests in overcrowded, inadequate shelters, with insufficient food, contaminated water supplies and no sanitation. Adverse forces at times accentuated by persecutory practices and abuses perpetrate the vulnerability of this group. In most cases they have to endure the side effects of the war - looted property, destroyed infrastructure, including health facilities and

often damaged housing, when they finally return to their hometown or village. In addition, a significant number of such communities has to shelter other displaced persons fleeing other often more insecure areas." (UN July 1999, pp.8-9)

"Since the beginning of the war the roads and navigable rivers in DRC have become a source of danger for most civilians. These axes are used for movement of troops that are typically accompanied by looting and extortion. Hence, the strategy adopted by riverside and roadside populations, to settle in the nearby forests and hills where they could eventually cultivate. In case if the short-distance displacement took place within the harvest season, the prospects of losing the entire output are greater. On the other hand, in instances when the population has sufficient flexibility to prepare its displacement, certain belongings and food reserves are being spared. Because of widespread fears of the military, civilians often flee to their temporary sanctuaries in response to rumours of approaching troops. In high insecurity areas however, the population flees longer distances and for a longer time and eventually become "people in the forest" (see above). This phenomenon of proximity flight is especially noticeable on most significant axes. However, it is also the case with secondary axes overburdened with sustained presence of regular armies, passage or retreat of smaller groups of deserters or uncontrolled-armed groups." (UN November 2000, p.15)

"The number of displaced people around the Kahuzi Biega national park, near Bukavu, is increasing, independent humanitarian sources in the region told IRIN.

During the daytime, some of them work or go looking for food. At night, they seek refuge in banana plantations along the road towards Miti, Murhesa and Kafulumaye. The sources said they were fleeing attacks by Interahamwe militia, Mayi-Mayi and other armed groups hiding out in the forests. Relative calm during the day gives way to terror at night, when these militia groups carry out looting sprees, raping women and killing people who get in their way.

The forest-dwelling pygmies are not immune from attack. Aid organisations have requested them to integrate into society so that they can benefit from food distributions, as it is impossible to care for them in the forests." (IRIN 1 August 2000)

# PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

## General

---

### **Rape of girls and women of all ages has been extensively used by all forces (2000-2002)**

- Church sources in Eastern Kasai reported systematic rape of school age girls by Rwandan troops (July 2000)
- Worsened security situation for women in Kabinda (Kasai Oriental) reported in September 2000
- In September 2001, women fled to Bukavu to escape being raped
- In its Oct 01 report, the UN Secretary General said that internally displaced women are often preyed upon by armed elements and have been the victims of torture, sexual and other abuses and ethnically motivated killings
- The UN reported in January 2002 that 40 women in Shabunda (South Kivu) had been victims of sexual violence by Mai Mai elements
- Girls living on the streets due to war or poverty are extremely vulnerable to sexual predation once they reach puberty
- In Bukavu, a local NGO, PRODES, identified many sexually exploited minor girls (Feb 02)

"Nothing better defines the de-humanization process that has developed over a decade of turmoil in eastern DRC than the culture of rape of women and girls by armed groups." (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001, p.34)

According to Amnesty International, "Rape of girls and women of all ages has been extensively used by all forces. 'Many women have been subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence by members of the security forces,' the Amnesty report said. However, rape is seriously under-reported because of the social stigma that victims must endure." (IRIN-CEA 27 June 2001)

"In general, refugee and internally displaced women are often preyed upon by armed elements and have been the victims of torture, sexual and other abuses and ethnically motivated killings. Rape has been used as a weapon of war. The situation is particularly dire in the eastern provinces. The recruitment of able-bodied males into armed forces and factions have left households headed by women and girls to fend for themselves in a country whose economy and infrastructure has been decimated by years of war." (UN SC 16 Oct 2001)

***In Eastern Kasai*** "Although the need for relief supplies (mostly medicines) is great, local church sources prioritise the protection of displaced and give an appalling account of violence (systematic rape of school age girls) civilians are subjected to by Rwandan troops." (UN OCHA 11 July 2000)

"In Kabinda, the security situation for women has greatly deteriorated. Many cases of rape, occurring when women go to work in fields, have been reported. This situation has created a food shortage since women do not dare walk to the fields as well as an exodus of women toward Mbuji Mayi, the only accessible town from Kabinda." (OCHA September 2000, p.10)

***In South Kivu:*** "The fear of rape defines daily life in rural south Kivu, where rape became a privileged weapon and a normal practice in this heinous war, although much unknown due to the stigmatization of rape victims." (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001, p.34)

" There were reports that Interahamwe militia in South Kivu Province often raped women. [...]

Rwandan troops and RCD rebels also reportedly engaged in the rape of women in public and often in the presence of their families and in-laws. A woman raped in this manner generally is forced out of the village, leaving her husband and children behind. According to a number of credible human rights organizations, marauding bands of armed men in the occupied territories often put victims of rape through further abuse by inserting rocks, sharp sticks, and hot peppers into their vaginas." (US DOS 4 March 2002)

"40 femmes du territoire de Shabunda ont été victimes de violences sexuelles et dépouillées par des éléments maï-maï. Elles se sont mobilisées pour dénoncer ces pratiques dans un document adressé aux autorités locales et à diverses institutions internationales en faveur du rétablissement de la paix." (UN OCHA 2 Jan 2002)

"Girls living on the streets due to war or poverty are extremely vulnerable to sexual predation once they reach puberty. If they cannot find a home or are not taken in by a child welfare center, they are almost certain to have to sell sex to survive. They may opt to join life in the training camps, where they are used as porters, sex slaves, or spies to infiltrate enemy encampments." (RI 6 Feb 2002)

"Dans la ville de Bukavu et ses environs, une ONG locale de défense des droits de l'enfant, PRODES (Programme pour le développement social ) vient d'identifier 207 filles mineures prostituées, 376 filles-mères mineures, 67 filles violées, 57 filles mineures exploitées sexuellement et 129 filles mineures exploitées économiquement. Cette ONG vient de lancer un cri d'alarme pour attirer l'attention à la fois de la communauté internationale et des autorités." (UN OCHA 15 Feb 2002)

### **Attacks on organised IDP camps in North Kivu in 2000**

- Interahamwe and Mayi Mayi fighters reportedly attacked a camp for displaced persons at Sake, near Goma in July 2000
- RCD-Goma soldiers reportedly did not protect the displaced, even though they were posted near the camp
- Attack raised the issue of exposing the beneficiaries to predatory armed elements by providing them with humanitarian assistance
- No reports in 2001 that IDP camps were attacked by government or rebel forces

"The military and security situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in the Kivus, remained highly volatile. RCD has complained that pro-government armed groups continue to launch numerous attacks in North and South Kivu. One such attack occurred near Uvira on 9 July and resulted in the death of an international relief worker. Another serious incident took place on 10 July, when the Interahamwe and Mayi Mayi fighters reportedly attacked a camp for displaced persons at Sake, near Goma. On 26 August a grenade attack in Bukavu killed 8 and injured some 40 people. Although the armed groups responsible for these attacks are not signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, there are persistent reports that they receive arms and training from one of the parties." (UN SC 21 September 2000, para. 27)

"Security considerations affect humanitarian interventions in areas where there is military activity, or a strained military or political situation. While the security of relief personnel deployed in volatile areas is an ongoing concern, the safety of beneficiaries is increasingly a matter of a preoccupation. The decision not to intervene in a given emergency is therefore, a self-imposed policy on the part of CAP participants, whereby no risks or a minimum amount of risks to the security of the personnel and beneficiaries are taken. Recent

attacks on organised IDP camps in North Kivu raised the issue of exposing the beneficiaries to predatory armed elements by providing them with humanitarian assistance." (UN November 2000, p.20)

"[...] on 9 July 2000, Rwandese Hutu insurgents fighters attacked a camp for Internally Displaced Persons in Sake, killing 42 civilians, including women, children and the elderly. Although the attack on Sake IDP camp was committed by the Rwandese Hutu insurgents, a number of witnesses informed Amnesty International delegates that RCD-Goma Soldiers, who maintained positions very close to the camp, failed to protect the camp." (AI 19 June 2001)

"[U]nlike in previous years, there were no reports [in 2001] that IDP camps were attacked by government or rebel forces." (US DOS 4 March 2002)

### **Displaced children need protection from recruitment by armed groups (2001)**

- More than 10,000 children under arms in the DRC, recruited by all parties to the conflict
- Girls are recruited as well and are mostly used for domestic work and as sex slaves
- President Kabila demobilized a first group of 300 child soldiers enlisted in the government army (Dec 01)
- Important to understand how receptive the families and communities are to the children's return (Nov 2001)

"War and poverty have also led to the displacement of many children. Some are orphaned or unaccompanied and forced to live on the streets. Such children are at particular risk of recruitment into the armed forces. An independent observer told Amnesty International that all over the Kivus 'children have become cannon fodder and slaves: they are recruited to become soldiers. Girls and sometimes boys are forced to become domestic servants or wives of combatants, and sometimes they are also used for child labour and exploited without payment to work in the mines. [...]"

The break-down of the political, social and economic infrastructures (schools, communities, household, health facilities), as well as displacement, weaken or destroy children's immediate source of care and protection, making them an easy target for recruitment. Unable to adequately provide for their children's needs, some parents in the region believe that recruitment into the armed forces will offer their children the food, education and security they need, and encourage separated from their families, displaced or have limited access to education." (AI 19 June 2001)

"The UN estimates that 15-30% of all newly recruited combatants in the DRC are children under age eighteen, and a substantial number are under the age of twelve. Both the Congolese Armed Forces and various opposition groups forcibly recruit children." (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 12 June 2001)

"It is estimated that more than 10,000 children are under arms in the DRC, although the precise number is impossible to verify. All parties to the conflict are alleged to be making extensive use of child soldiers. Despite declarations by both the DRC government and the RCD-Goma to cease recruitment and commit to the demobilisation of child soldiers, their use and recruitment continue. The April 2001 report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council on the MONUC operations stated that MONUC confirms regular sightings of child soldiers across the country.[1] [...]"

The recruitment and use of girls by the different armed groups is difficult to assess. The presence of girls has been noted in RCD and FAC forces. Although some receive military training, it appears that few, if any, see combat. Girls are typically used for domestic work and sex, primarily by commanders, which implies that their number is relatively low compared with boy recruits. Many girls remain 'wives' of

military commanders, even returning to the countries of origin of foreign forces. Many others resort to prostitution to support themselves and their children after being abandoned or widowed by their military partners.

Despite initial encouraging signs that the demobilisation of child soldiers would proceed, the process has failed to materialise, and the authorities have not been forthcoming with the numbers or locations of the child soldiers in their forces.[2] However, influence and persuasion exerted locally on some military commanders, coupled with community-level awareness-raising, has shown some successes, particularly among the higher-ranking career officers who may be more sensitive to public opinion, and more interested in maintaining professional standards of conduct. Enforcing compliance with demobilisation orders from Chiefs of Staff among lower ranks, and influencing the irregular forces (Mayi-Mayi, FDD, Interahamwe) which fall outside the framework of the Lusaka Accord, remain important constraints.

While a small number of children have been formally released by the military, unknown (but certainly much larger) numbers have chosen to leave and returned home on their own. The government of the DRC views these children as *deserters*, placing additional protection concerns on their reintegration to community life. They have been the focus for some child-focused local organisations, and have benefited from small-scale socio-economic reintegration programmes, which assist their families in developing self-reliance, and which offer opportunities to access basic services."

[Notes: [1]: 7th Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/373) dated 17 April 2001

[2] President Joseph Kabila has ratified both the Optional Protocol to the CRC and Convention 182, relating to children in armed conflict, and issued orders to respect "conservative measures" as the first steps in the demobilisation process, mandated by *Decret-Loi N° 066 (June 2000)*. A parallel process has been developed by the RCD-Goma.] (Oxfam August 2001, p.14)

"For children who find themselves alone, joining one of the military groupings is one of the few remaining alternatives if they are to survive. There is no time to lose in setting up large-scale programmes to offer these vulnerable children an alternative option, so that they are not drawn into a violent environment and forced to contribute themselves towards the spiral of violence." (MSF 25 January 2000, "Abandoned children)

"It is argued that children in different fighting factions have distinct social backgrounds, distinct explanations of how or why they came to be with an armed group, distinct experiences within the particular armed group and distinct prospects for social and economic reintegration. Because of the variations in their backgrounds and future prospects, it is very important to seek to understand how different communities perceive the role their children have played in the conflict and how receptive these families and communities are to the children's return. Further needing to bear in mind is the fact that over the course of years of fighting many child soldiers will be demobilizing as adults, yet their experiences as child soldiers will surely have repercussions for their long-term reintegration." (UNDP 28 Nov 2001)

*In 2001* "Government security forces continued to use child soldiers but reduced the overall forcible recruitment of child soldiers during the year and cooperated with the U.N. to demobilize some child soldiers. [...]

Rebel forces reportedly continued to recruit child soldiers, particularly in the areas controlled by Rwandan and Ugandan forces, and to use child soldiers already in service." (US DOS 4 March 2001)

"President Joseph Kabila has demobilized a first group of 300 child soldiers enlisted in the government army in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), state television reported Wednesday." (AFP 19 Dec 2001)

*See also: "The civil war has caused a large number of displaced and unaccompanied children (1999-2000)"*

### **Rebel authorities and armed grouped fighting on the side of the Government all commit human rights abuses (2000-2002)**

- RCD claims to be legitimate authorities in the region
- Lack of response from RCD troops when protection is requested
- In 2001, UN Security Council said that worsening human rights situation in eastern DRC
- UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported use of torture both by government and by rebel forces in DRC (Sept 01)

*According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in DRC, Mr. Roberto Garretón, "The situation of terror, suspicion and insecurity prevailing in the territory occupied by RCD and its ally Rwanda is in itself "a situation of ongoing violation of human rights" which, quite apart from specific acts and individual violations, affects everyone. The situation in the eastern part of the country must be analysed in this context." (UN GA 31 August 2001)*

According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, "In the Government-controlled areas, the Office of the High Commissioner received reports of summary or extrajudicial executions, prolonged arbitrary detention and torture. [...]"

In the rebel-held areas, general insecurity persists and OHCHR received credible reports of arbitrary detention, systematic violations of the right to movement, free expression, association and fair trial and torture, sometimes leading to the death of the victims." (OHCHR 28 Sept 2001, para. 14-5)

"The areas of eastern DRC controlled by the RCD-Goma and Rwanda, are administrated like a state, with civil servants, tax collection, mineral concessions, and military recruitment. The RCD-Goma has its own civilian service and military wing. However, the RCD-Goma has never been able to garner popular support and legitimacy in the areas it governs, and has failed to look after the basic needs of the population, such as ensuring protection, salaries and health, while imposing high taxation." (AI 19 June 2001)

"The RCD claim to be legitimate authorities in the region. They and their RPA allies have said they are seeking to protect the local population from Mai-Mai and bands of Hutu combatants. Yet in a number of cases, local people have appealed in vain for this protection. Numerous people displaced from Bunyakiri told Human Rights Watch researchers that their repeated calls for help had gone unanswered by RCD troops. As one witness reported, "We go to tell the RCD where the Interahamwe are camped, and they tell us, 'It is your affair. They are your family.'" (HRW May 2000, chapt. III)

"In the east, security had worsened, while in the north-west the human rights situation had deteriorated. Humanitarian agencies continued to face deteriorating conditions since the killing of International Committee of the Red Cross workers in April." (UN SC 30 August 2001)

"Since Rwanda's second intervention in the DRC in 1998, Amnesty International has received consistent reports about atrocities committed against unarmed civilians from the Kivu region of eastern DRC. Tens of thousands of unarmed Congolese civilians have been unlawfully killed, subjected to torture, including rape, and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Children have also been recruited in large numbers by the various forces who claim to be fighting either for the sovereignty of the region, or the security of the Congolese or Rwandese population. Others have 'disappeared' in custody or have been

unlawfully detained for being suspected or known supporters of opposing forces. Human rights defenders have been constantly harassed." (AI 19 June 2001)

"During investigations carried out in March 2000 in areas controlled by the Goma-based Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD) and its allies, Human Rights Watch researchers documented cases of murder, rape, and pillage carried out by all of the armed groups now fighting in the region." (HRW May 2000, chapt. I)

*In March 2001, OCHA reported that "les combats ont repris en Equateur. Les escarmouches ont lieu aux environs de la localité de Bolombo, entre le Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) et les FAC [Forces Armées Congolaises]. [...] Les soldats du MLC auraient [...] pillé de la nourriture appartenant à des déplacés du camp de Bolomba." (OCHA 15 March 2001, "Equateur")*

"There were reports that nongovernmental armed groups fighting on the side of the Government, and reportedly materially supported by the Government, tortured, raped, and otherwise physically abused many persons during the year. Mai Mai guerrillas reportedly killed persons by torture, including by mutilation and crucifixion. [...]

There also were numerous reports of torture by rebel forces in the occupied territories. (US DOS 4 March 2002)

"Banyamulenge militia, Rwandan rebels, and Mai-Mai attacked persons whom they suspected of supporting their opponents, killing and maiming civilians and destroying or pillaging their property. In May, Mai-Mai abducted twenty-six foreign nationals who worked for a logging company, but later released them all. In early September Mai-Mai in the area of Butembo ambushed a vehicle carrying two local civil society leaders who sought to mediate between their group and another." (HRW 2002, "Human Rights Dev")

### **The Banyamulenge (Tutsi) community in the Kivus is threatened but receives little protection from RCD-Goma (2001)**

- The Banyamulenge community, about 150,000 in the Kivus, has been frequently attacked by Rwandese Hutu, Mayi Mayi and Burundian armed opposition groups
- Far from protecting them, the deployment of Rwandese troops and the presence of the RCD administration have increased the ethnic tensions between the Banyamulenge (Tutsi) and the rest of the population

"The Tutsi community of the Banyamulenge, (Batutsi of Rwandan origin, not recognized as having Congolese nationality) a small minority of around 150,000, is located mainly in South-Kivu, in the *Haut Plateau* and in smaller communities in Uvira, Bukavu and around Goma in North-Kivu. That the Banyamulenge community is threatened is not in doubt. In the *Haut Plateau*, they are effectively surrounded by Rwandese Hutu, mayi-mayi and CNDD-FDD armed opposition groups. Attacks on the community by the Hutu combatants fighting the Rwandese and Burundian governments are frequent, and killings of Banyamulenge civilians take place on a regular basis, and many villages have been pillaged and burned down. The roads in the area are very insecure, depriving the Banyamulenge in the *Haut Plateau* of access to the market in Uvira on which they are economically dependent. Many Banyamulenge are too afraid to travel, and can no longer cultivate their fields, or attend to their cattle without risking to be attacked. Because of the growing insecurity, since June 2000 Congolese Tutsi have increasingly been fleeing to Burundi.

The continuing attacks by Hutu and *mayi-mayi* armed groups on the Banyamulenge and Rwandese inaction demonstrate that the Rwandese occupation is failing to protect them. [...]

In addition, while tensions linked to land issues or citizenship rights for the Congolese Tutsis have long existed between the different ethnic groups in the Kivus, the deployment of RPA troops and the RCD-Goma administration since 1998 has drastically increased the ethnic tensions between the Banyamulenge and the rest of the Congolese population. A local human rights defender told Amnesty International delegates that anti-Tutsi feelings were increasing, and that in his view 'the Banyamulenge community was in danger of extermination.' The Banyamulenge are often held responsible by other Congolese ethnic groups for RCD-Goma attacks on them and are blamed for Rwanda's invasion of the DRC." (AI 19 June 2001)

### **Several IDP groups subjected to forced labour (2000)**

- IDPs forced by armed groups to undertake agricultural activities, services and transportation

"Various field observations conclude that several IDP groups are being systematically subjected to non-remunerated activities, or basically forced labour. The most unfortunate ones find themselves in the hands of military, various militia groups and warlords, held as prisoners or hostage and employed for agricultural activities, services and transportation. Most strikingly, this category is not a rare sociological phenomenon, but a common arrangement practised in many parts of the country along the roads of exile. There are other categories of displaced that are being regularly exploited, however this kind of subservient labour arrangement is of economic origin and is not coercive: extremely impoverished urban displaced, for instance, migrate into the country side in search of food for labour arrangements. Typically, displaced in this category remain in villages and are used as subservient labour force." (UN November 2000, p.15)

## SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)

### General

---

#### Indicators show more pressing subsistence needs in 2001 than in 2000 (2001-2002)

- According to the International Rescue Committee, 2.5 million died in the context of the war since August 1998, the majority due to disease and malnutrition
- DRC has been classified by FAO in its 2001 State of food insecurity in the world as the world worst performer in terms of the increase in the number of undernourished people, behind the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
- There are 150 supplementary feeding centers in the rebel controlled areas and ten in regions under government control.
- With improved access to certain areas in the East, NGOs discovered high malnutrition rates and deterioration of infrastructure
- Indicators for malnutrition, maternal mortality, and others deteriorated in 2001 compared to 2000
- According to Oxfam, Eastern DRC has the highest figure of undernourishment in the world

"A mortality study released by the International Rescue Committee on 8 May estimates that, since the outbreak of fighting in August 1998, some 2.5 million deaths have occurred in the civilian population of the area in excess of the number that could have been expected without the war. The latest survey updated and expanded a study conducted in 2000, which estimated that 1,700,000 "excess" civilian deaths had occurred in the first 22 months of conflict. Like the 2000 study, the current report indicates that the overwhelming majority of deaths were related to disease and malnutrition - by-products of a war that has ravaged the country's health-care system and economy. Persistent fighting and insecurity have driven hundreds of thousands of people into forests and jungles where they have had no access to food, medicine or shelter. War-affected areas, in turn, have been inaccessible to aid organizations because of insecurity.

Both studies found a proportionately smaller number of deaths - 350,000 in 33 months - directly attributable to violence. Even so, according to the study director, one in eight households surveyed have experienced the violent death of a family member during this period. Among the most disturbing findings is the disproportionate effect of the war on young children. The proportion of children below the age of two was shockingly lower than would have normally been expected. In two of the districts surveyed, Moba and Kalemie, an estimated 75 per cent of children born during the conflict have died or are expected to die before their second birthday. " (UN SC 8 June 2001, paras. 60-61)

"While the accuracy of data extrapolated from such a small sample is open to debate, the magnitude of the suffering caused by the conflict is clear." (Oxfam 6 August 2001, p.18)

*To view the IRC study, see [\[External Link\]](#)*

"Despite its incredible natural assets, with abundant rainfall and fertile soils and with a relatively low population density, the DRC has been classified by FAO in its "2001 State of food insecurity in the world" as the world worst performer in terms of the increase in the number of undernourished people (22% increase from 1990-92 to 1997-1999), behind the Democratic People's Republic of Korea".

The continuous displacement of farmers, the looting of harvests, transport difficulties that have disrupted the traditional supply circuit, coupled with insufficient purchasing power has created a state of endemic malnutrition for the Congolese. In some location gravely affected by the war such as Katanga, the level of severe malnutrition has reached 25%. The average calorie intake per person per day is 1800Kcal. There are 150 supplementary feeding centers in the rebel controlled areas and ten in regions under government control. It is estimated that these feeding centers cover the needs of only 25% of the population. Sixteen million people are considered to be food insecure. Finally, out of the 1\$ day that most of the population has to survive on, 90% is spent on food." (UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002, p.17)

"The deployment of military observers from the UN Observer Mission in the DRC (MONUC) has opened some previously isolated areas throughout eastern DRC to humanitarian aid. Non-governmental organizations have reported alarmingly high malnutrition rates and widespread infrastructure deterioration in some newly accessible areas, such as in northern Katanga province." (USAID 20 August 2001)

Indicator	2000	2001	Sources
Infant mortality (under five- per 1000) - eastern DRC	146	200	UNICEF
Mortality related to war (daily)	1000	2600	IRC
Maternal mortality per 100,000 births (Kivu)	1830	2250	UNFPA and UNICEF Goma
Malnutrition (in selected areas)			UNICEF, SCF, ACF, MSF, Nuova Frontiera
Global	7 - 16%	7 - 30 %	
Severe	3 - 8.5%	3 - 9.4%	
Morbidity patterns (absolute figures)			WHO DRC
Cholera		4,760	
Measles		5,776	
Inflation (western DRC)	540%	320% (YTD)	OCHA
Food deficit (western DRC)	10 - 40%	10 - 55%	OCHA
School enrolment (Kivu)	67% (base year)	36%	UNICEF Kivu
School drop-out rate	49%	75%	UNICEF DRC

(UN OCHA 21 June 2001)

"Eastern DRC suffers from regular food shortages and sixty-four per cent of the population is undernourished. That's the highest figure in the world." (Oxfam 6 Feb 2002)

### **Civil war inflicts unbearable hardship on women (2000-2001)**

- Violence perpetrated against women a feature of the war
- Absence of functional maternity wards
- Number of women dying as a result of pregnancy is three to five times higher than the African average

"Continued war in the DRC is a double-edged dilemma from a woman's perspective: an ever-present appalling violence and a blow to the most basic rights, pitted against an unprecedented opportunity to play a fairer role in the common response to the crisis. [...]"

The amazing endurance of the Congolese woman has been forged throughout the country's 30 years of social and economic decline, deadly natural and industrial disasters, and sporadic warfare since October 1996. The most striking effect of Congo's recent crises on women –small and major, natural and man-made – is reflected through the following:

The Ebola outbreak in Kikwit, Bandundu (peak in May-June 1995) showed images of Congolese and foreign nurses putting their own health at risk for their early commitment towards incurable patients with no protective equipment. The plane crash at Ndolo airport (January 1996), one of the worst aircraft accidents in history (more than 300 deaths) killed mostly female traders and buyers who were encouraged by "informal state structures" to push survival trade onto airport runways. Ever since the winds of war have swept through Congo, a country that strikes every visitor with its perpetual use of the word *maman*, violence perpetrated against women has become a morbid reflection of an increased resignation to the horrors of war. Massacres of Hutu Rwandan refugee women in Biaro or Mbandaka, massacres of mostly female and infant villagers in the Kivus (Kasika, Makobola), soldiers burying women alive in Mwenga, rumours of rape by HIV-infected soldiers in eastern DRC, forced labour of thousands of displaced communities at soldiers' disposal - these are but most visible features of woman's suffering.

A less visible mark, yet deadlier in the longer term, are problems associated with motherhood: the chances of a pregnant women finding a functional maternity ward and being able to afford to benefit from its services in today's DRC are the slimmest in four decades. Statistics of maternal mortality mentioned in the 2000 Appeal – 1,837 deaths per 100,000 births, one of the highest in the world – have been echoed by IRC findings in eastern DRC areas (3,000/100,000). Lack of hygiene and sanitary facilities coupled with massive displacements, poor nutrition and expanding spots of health deserts have produced a risky environment that is and will inevitably alter the country's demographic profile. Mothers carrying both their babies and a 20 kg load of wood in one subtly tied piece of cloth along the roads of South Kivu are more than an embodiment of women's fate in today's DRC: behind their solid gait, they remind us of how frail the whole society has become." (UN November 2000, p.15)

"The number of women dying as a result of pregnancy is three to five times higher than the African average. Under-nourishment, forced and economic prostitution, overwork for insufficient compensation, untreated ailments and the psychological strain of maintaining large families are exacting a terrible toll. Out of the 2.5 million babies born in an average year, 20% will not reach their first birthday. Infant mortality is 50% higher than the African average." (UN 26 Nov 2001, p.42)

### **IDPs seeking shelter in the forest constitute be the most vulnerable IDP group (2000)**

- Forest dwellers lack access to health care and subside on wild foods
- This IDP category estimated at 200,000

"Tragically, it is estimated that less than half the displaced communities and families are receiving humanitarian assistance. Those vulnerable and displaced populations left without assistance are hiding in the forests, inaccessible as a result of insecurity and some who emerged for their hiding places in August [2000] were disturbingly described as 'living in animal-like-conditions.'" (OCHA 31 December 2000)

"This group of displaced is legitimately believed to be the most vulnerable among all IDP communities. Most commonly, these people have been displaced several times, having left their home communities seeking security in remote and barely accessible areas. Communities then cleanse a portion of forest and start cultivating. This category of displaced has practically no access to health care and is reduced to consuming wild berries and "non-human" and raw food. Ashamed of their physical appearance and nudity, precarious health conditions (infections, dermatosis, parasitosis, etc.), "forest dwellers" avoid any contacts with the outside world and seek to further distance and alienate themselves from the neighbouring communities. The previous (1996-1998) experience with similar groups of displaced suggested that

practically every family loses on average one child under five. Because of its survival tactics, this group is the hardest to access and assist. The largest concentrations of people in the forest were observed in Shabunda (South Kivu) and Bokungu-Ikela (Equateur). The number of people in this category is estimated at 200,000." (UN November 2000, p.15)

## **Health**

---

### **Outbreak of cholera in Katanga Province (2001-2002)**

"As of 5 March the Ministry of Health, Democratic Republic of Congo has reported 5021 cases of cholera and 407 deaths in Katanga province, since the outbreak began in November 2001. A total of 8 health zones in Katanga province, including the city of Lubumbashi, have been affected, including Ankoro, Kabolo, Kongolo and Kalemie in the northern part of the province." (WHO 5 March 2002)

"Cholera outbreaks were also recorded throughout the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, from Goma in the north to Lubumbashi in the south, and it is believed that more than 100 people died from cholera, which is endemic to this region, during the reporting period [Sept-Dec 01]" (UN SC 15 Feb 2002, para.73)

"Au 14 octobre [2001], 221 cas de choléra étaient enregistrés dont 21 décès. La dernière épidémie de choléra dans cette région remonte à 1998." (UN OCHA 22 Oct 2001)

### **Coping capacities of health authorities greatly reduced following volcano eruption near Goma (2002)**

"Although the number of deaths, due to the volcanic eruptions and its affects, have been low (100-150), the crowding in shelters, poor water and sanitation conditions and inadequate health support seriously risk the lives of survivors, especially children and women, who are highly vulnerable to cholera, measles, meningitis, malaria and dysentery. With the destruction of five health facilities in Goma, the coping capacities of the health authorities have been greatly reduced.[...]

The HIV/AIDS epidemic has been prevalent in the Goma region even before the current crisis, owing to population movements and ongoing conflicts. However, the families who have been left homeless are now the most vulnerable." (UNICEF 19 Feb 2002)

"The major problems facing the people of Goma as they return are water and sanitation, shelter, food, medical care and schools." (Oxfam 23 Jan 2002)

### **IDPs are more exposed to HIV/AIDS infection as a result of the conflict (2001-2002)**

- IDPs have no means to protect themselves from HIV/AIDS infection nor access to information about its transmission
- 800,000-1 million children are orphaned because of AIDS
- Eastern provinces have the highest rates of HIV/AIDS infection

"Multiple troop movements and population displacements in the DRC, and to and from neighbouring countries with high HIV prevalence rates, have left the DRC well set for "an explosion of HIV/AIDS",

according to WHO focal point Dr Tshioko Kweteminga, cited in an agency situation report late last week. [...]

National statistics collected through the health information system suggested that there were just under 10,000 new HIV cases last year but public health authorities have estimated – based on information from five regional sites – that there were in the region of 173,000 new HIV cases each year in the DRC, and almost 1.3 million adults and children living with HIV." (IRIN-CEA 15 August 2001)

"In both government- and rebel-controlled areas, the population has suffered greater exposure to infection as a result of the conflict. People who are internally displaced, or who have lost all means of earning a livelihood, do not have the resources to protect themselves from infection, nor access to information about HIV/AIDS transmission. Health structures have limited capacity to test patients for HIV or to screen blood used in transfusions. Women living close to military camps, with no source of income, have turned to prostitution, despite the risks involved, in order to support themselves and their families.

Human rights organisations have also registered many cases of soldiers raping women. In addition to mental and physical injury and the risk of pregnancy, rape victims are particularly vulnerable to contracting HIV because body tissues are more likely to be torn. There are six foreign armies fighting on Congolese soil, and on average, soldiers' rates of infection can be up to four times higher than those of civilians.[1] [...]

Unlike most other diseases, AIDS affects adults of child-bearing age particularly, leaving the very young with no one to care for them.

[Note: [1] "No Excuses", Christian Aid, 2001" (Oxfam 6 August 2001, p.28)

"The eastern provinces have the highest rates, with the number of people infected having increased fivefold (from 4 to 22 per cent) over the past two years in towns such as Goma, Bukavu and Beni." (UN SC 8 June 2001)

"Surveys among blood donors in eastern DRC show HIV/AIDS prevalence rates around 20%, four times higher than the National AIDS Control Programme figures." (UNICEF 11 Feb 2002)

### **WHO says clear shift to public health approach needed to focus on the main killer conditions (2000-2001)**

- Malaria is the no one cause of the population of 20 million in the east and accounts for 65% of all causes of morbidity (June 2001)
- Up to 70% of the population is now excluded from accessing basic health services
- As a result of difficult living conditions and lack of access to health care, diseases which had almost been eradicated are now recorded
- As of Nov 2001, less than 25% of the population have access to basic health services according to UN estimates

"Malaria is the number one cause of mortality for the population of nearly 20 million in the east. There are big problems of security, logistics and infrastructure, low access to health services, no preventative activities and a real lack of standardization of approach to surveillance and treatment. [...]

Health care in DRC must be redirected from the current facility-based curative care to a public health approach focused on the main killer conditions if humanitarian interventions are to address the unacceptable mortality and morbidity evident in the country. This was the key message of a joint WHO-UNICEF mission which spent late July in DRC.

The mission found that, despite good intentions, up to 70% of the population is now excluded from accessing basic health services, while all forms of preventative public activities are severely curtailed, not least because salaries of health service workers are linked to curative care. This observation led to the mission's second key recommendation: that "health worker remuneration must be separated from payment by patients... and linked to performance of a package which directly targets the main killers, both in the health centre and at household level." (WHO 9 August 2001)

"As a result of difficult living conditions and lack of access to health care, diseases which had almost been eradicated, such as bubonic plague and whooping cough, are now being recorded. There have also been numerous epidemics of measles and cholera, and reported cases of haemorrhagic fever, monkey pox, and meningitis." (Oxfam 6 August 2001, p.19)

"More than half of the health zones do not receive any external support and less than 25% of the population have access to basic health services (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001, p.42)

"Malaria accounted for some 36 percent of all causes of morbidity in December 2000 and grew to 65 percent of all causes of morbidity by the end of June 2001. [...] (Department of Public Health, Ministry of Health, DRC)." (IFRC 1 Jan 2002, Sect.3)

### **Conflict causes degradation of the health care system (1999-2001)**

- Scores of health institutions were looted or severely damaged in Orientale, North and South Kivu, Maniema, Katanga and Equateur provinces in the wake of the August 1998 rebellion
- Continued looting by soldiers, rebels or armed individuals affect many centres along the frontline and in unstable regions
- Health care systems paralysed in many provinces as qualified staff have fled war-affected regions
- At least 37 per cent of the population don't have access to any formal health care
- Situation in rebel-held areas is even worse due to war damage
- Health personnel run the risk of being taken hostage or prisoner
- Vaccination statistics difficult to obtain because of the massive migrations of IDPs

"Degradation of the health care system in the DRC continued at an accelerated rate throughout 1999. In addition to the already dilapidated health infrastructure, chronic absence of investments and qualified specialists, scores of health institutions, including those rehabilitated by relief agencies in 1997/98, were looted or severely damaged in Orientale, North and South Kivu, Maniema, Katanga and Equateur provinces. The health care management system is paralysed in many provinces as a number of qualified specialists (e.g. Chief Provincial Doctors) fled war-affected regions. A sharp increase in epidemic diseases such as cholera, measles, polio, meningitis, trypanosomiasis, and onchocercosis is being observed in all provinces. These reflect poor access to potable water (average 42 percent), feeble vaccination coverage (measles- 33 percent, BCG 46 percent), and limited access to primary health services (26 percent of the population). An estimated 34 percent of the country's population suffers from moderate to severe malnutrition. This percentage is believed to be especially high amongst the displaced children and women. Maternal mortality rate has increased from 870 per 100,000 in 1995 to approximately double this year according to WHO. Finally, forced displacements have increased exposure and vulnerability to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS)." (UN July 1999, p.10)

"The health situation in DRC is marked by the continued destruction of the medical infrastructure, a rupture in essential medicines stocks due to difficulties in a lack of supply, as well as a lack of resources. The

maternal and infant mortality rates are excessively high. In 1999, maternal mortality ratio was estimated by the Ministry of Health and WHO to be 1,837 per 100,000 life births, with the infant mortality reported to be 127/1,000 life births. The average rate of HIV/AIDS infection was 4.1%: This broke down to 6.3% for Kinshasa; 8.6% for Lubumbashi; 10% for Matadi; and 16% for Goma. The epidemiological profile was dominated by infectious diseases, exacerbated by increasing malnutrition rates, growing morbidity and precarious living standards. The dramatic resurgence of previously controlled diseases such as plague, TB, trypanosomiasis and onchocerciasis has negatively impacted on the socio-economic indicators. Additionally, there have been new emerging diseases, such as Marburg haemorrhagic fever, monkey pox, spastic paralysis 'Konzo', as well as the spread of cholera epidemics, dysentery, malaria and cerebrospinal meningitis." (UN November 2000, p. 24)

"A dearth of recent statistical data from across the country makes a full assessment of the population's access to health services difficult.[1] However, conservative estimates of the coverage of health facilities show that at least 37 per cent of the population, or approximately 18.5 million people, have no access to any form of formal health care.[2]

In government-held areas, the share of central government expenditure allocated to the health sector is less than one per cent – and has been barely more than this since Independence in 1960. As a result, the health system has always been run as a 'private' service, with patients required to pay. In areas under RCD control, there is no budget for health services. Additional support to the 307 Health Zones into which the country is divided comes mainly from churches and other organisations. However, in 2000, 100 Health Zones received no external assistance, either from the government or from outside agencies. In addition, there is a severe lack of human resources. In 1998 there were only 2056 doctors for a population of 50 million people, and of these, 930 were in Kinshasa.[3] [...]

In rebel-held areas the situation is even worse, because a large number of the medical facilities in areas which were already under-resourced have also suffered war damage. In Masisi (North Kivu), 40 per cent of all health infrastructure has been destroyed, including the hospital in Mweso which was gutted and used by soldiers. In the Djugu territory in Ituri, many health centres were completely destroyed as the inter-ethnic war raged through its towns. All that now remains is rubble, medical staff having fled or been killed. In rebel-held parts of Kabinda Health Zone (Kasai Oriental), the disengagement of warring parties in March has allowed medical staff from health outposts to reach the town for the first time in more than a year. They reported that in 12 areas only one of the health centres has any medicine, and the rest are not functioning at all. Many have been looted, and have little or no essential equipment."

[Notes:

[1] Access is defined as both geographical and economic, ie being within a reasonable walking distance of a functioning health service and being able to afford to pay for the consultation and treatment.

[2] Figure published in the 8th Report of the Secretary General on the UN Organisation Mission in DRC (S/2001/572), 8th June 2001. However, OCHA estimates that the percentage could be as high as 75%, meaning that over 37 million people would be denied access to health care.

[3] Etat des Lieux du Secteur de la Santé, Avril-Juin 1998, Ministère de la Santé Publique] (Oxfam August 2001, pp.15-17)

'La santé pour tous dans l'année 2000 - Health for all in the year 2000', the slogan adopted by the World Health Organisation in order to stimulate primary health care, is just an illusion: 79 health districts are more than 100 km from their referral hospital, and only 9% of health districts have a refrigerator for storing medicines. In the provinces of Maniema and South Kivu, there are no longer any lab technicians employed. The number of working health centres fluctuated in 1996 between 30% in Eastern Kasai and 86% in Bandundu.

[...].Looting and a "first come, first served" attitude by soldiers, rebels or armed individuals affect many centres along the frontline and in unstable regions. Health personnel run the risk of being taken hostage or prisoner. Imports of medicines via the rivers have come to a standstill for logistic or military reasons. Due

to the disappearance and deterioration of equipment, the drying-up of spare parts supplies and the failure to maintain buildings, the quality of medical care provision is declining rapidly.

The life expectancy at birth of the average Congolese is decreasing. In 1996 the life expectancy for men was still 51 years and 54 for women. In 1999 it was estimated to be 47 years, partly as a result of AIDS. The number of people not living beyond the age of 40 amounted to 30% of the total population in 1995. According to WHO, the number of women dying in childbirth rose from 870/100,000 in 1995 to almost twice as much in 1999 (**OCHA 1999**). The poor quality of mother-and-child care also has consequences for infant mortality, which rose from 131/1,000 live-born children in 1972 to 111/1,000 in 1980 and to 141/1,000 in 1995 (**UNICEF**). Between 65% and 84% of deliveries take place outside health care institutions or without the help of qualified midwives.

Preventive work such as vaccination campaigns can no longer be carried out in a structured way. Overall vaccination statistics are difficult to obtain because of the inaccessibility of many areas and the massive migrations of internally displaced persons. The efficiency of one-shot actions such as national vaccination days still has to be analysed. Although these one-shot initiatives receive a massive response, the disastrous everyday reality of primary health care is pushed into the background. Epidemics are no longer detected in time, and are left to spread unchecked. In 1999 alone, a polio epidemic broke out in Equator province claiming over 200 victims." (MSF 25 January 2000, "primary health care")

"Although average figures for routine vaccination rose slightly in 1999-2000 according to figures from WHO's Expanded Programme on Immunization unit, overall the picture is grim.

The rise stems largely from intensive efforts in NGO-supported health zones and improvements in cold chain due to the expansion of the polio programme. But still fewer than one third of children routinely receive childhood vaccination and averages for some antigens fall as low as 18% while in Orientale Province, rates run at 0 to 10%." (WHO 9 August 2001)

### **Appalling health conditions among IDPs in South Kivu (2000-2002)**

- Most common diseases are malaria, respiratory infections, diarrhea, malnutrition, anemia and amoebiasis
- Reported that cholera is endemic
- In South Kivu, average crude mortality rate amongst IDPs is estimated at 6.0/1000/month, which is very high
- Significant outbreak of meningitis from Sept to Dec 2001

"Most IDPs are in Kivu province on the Rwandan border and they live in extremely poor conditions. They are able to plant crops on an irregular basis. Malnutrition rates have risen and now stand at 10% of the population. Health services and education, which operate broadly on a pay-as-you-go system, have become increasingly inaccessible to the impoverished population. There have recently been epidemics, notably haemorrhagic fever, measles and most importantly, cholera, in the region." (SCF 31 December 2000)

*In South Kivu*, "The average crude mortality rate amongst displaced populations is estimated to be 6.0/1000/month; this is very high when considered against the baseline rate of 1.2 reported by UNICEF before the war. A number of endemic diseases, and a particularly worrying epidemic of cholera, are reported in some areas in the province." (ACT 13 July 2001)

**"In the Sud Kivu :** the FAO has described the situation in Shabunda and Mwenga as « frightening », because of the flight of the population into the forests as a means of fleeing RCD Goma rebels, the Rwandan army and the militias. The author of the FAO report who met some of these people notes "":...

they don't have anything human except the shape of a body. The feet are inflated, with several wounds, an empty look... they mention a lot of cases of mortality in the forest for lack of healthcare. Their nutritional state is very disturbing." The number of these displaced in forests is estimated at more than 100,000 for the territory of Shabunda alone, out of a total population estimated at 475,000 people. " (OCHA September 2000)

"The situation in Shabunda, South Kivu, is reported as desperate. A UN mission, visiting the town in July, described the town as an "islet" controlled by RCD-Goma and surrounded by forces opposed to the RCD. About 34,000 displaced people have converged on the town itself, dislodged from their homes by fighting between the RCD and opposing forces such as the Mayi-Mayi and Interahamwe militias. These IDPs have little to eat, and no access to medical services and shelter." (UNICEF 10 October 2000)

"The most common diseases are malaria, respiratory infections, diarrhea, malnutrition, anemia and amoebiasis. Cholera is endemic. In May 2000 124 cases were reported in Uvira health zone. ACF-USA conducted 2 mortality surveys in the context of nutritional surveys in Lemera in January 2000 covering October-December 1999 and in Uvira in April, 2000, covering January March. They only include the accessible part of the health zones. Specifically the Hauts and Moyens Plateaux and the areas very close to the Burundian border are not included.

Zone de santé	Mortality rate under-fives (<5years)
Lemera	2.46 / 10,000 / day
Uvira	2.68 / 10,000 / day

For WHO, 2 deaths/10,000/day trigger a state of alert, while 4/10,000/day indicates an acute emergency (WHO under 5 mortality thresholds).

These figures are alarming but do not indicate massive mortality either. However, the studies only cover the areas that are most accessible and thus where relief has been provided. When compared with the dramatic figures of the recent IRC mortality survey in, for instance, an area such as Moba, south of Baraka, along the Lake Tanganyika in Northern Katanga, where no assistance was given in the past two years, it is clear that these alarming rates are only the top of the iceberg. Moreover, the ACF-USA surveys only cover three months. It is very likely that many deaths occurred before that period but are not included in the study. This is especially likely, given the near absence of health care, the lack of food security and the prevalence of severe malnutrition." (AAH August 2000, sect. 4.3)

"From September until December 2001, there was a significant outbreak of meningitis in South Kivu." (UN SC 15 Feb 2002, para.73)

"Plus de 300 cas de méningite ont été recensés dans la zone de santé de Katana dans le Sud-Kivu.[...] Seules 7 zones de santé sur 14 sont accessibles en raison d'une forte présence militaire." (UN OCHA 22 Oct 2001)

### **Violence is making families more vulnerable to diseases say surveys in Equateur and Katanga provinces (2001)**

- Lack of resources for IDPs in northwestern Equateur said UN-NGO June 2001 assessment mission
- MSF conducted an epidemiological survey between August and October 2001 in Basankusu and Lisala (Equateur Province) and in Kilwa (Katanga Province)
- In Basankusu (Equateur), mortality greatly exceeded the threshold of alarm and MSF estimated that around a quarter of under-fives died over a 12-month period

- In Basankusu and Lisala (Equateur) a large part of the population has no access to health care

"A recent UN-NGO assessment mission [Oxfam-GB, FAO, CARITAS, WFP, Ministry of health and OCHA] to areas of northwestern Equateur province found a dramatic lack of resources for displaced people, OCHA said. The visit took in the towns of Mbandaka, Boende and Ikela all of which are located near the frontline and which had poor access to humanitarian assistance. Most of the displaced people were living with host families. In Boende, medical facilities had been destroyed or looted, no medicines were available and the water supply had been disrupted, the report stated. It also noted that Ikela had 15,000 inhabitants before the war broke out in 1998. "Today only 1,200 persons are remaining," the report said. "The rest of them hid in the forest to escape the war. Thanks to the security resuming in the area, people are returning in their villages but they need assistance to rebuild their homes." (IRIN-CEA 1 June 2001)

## **MSF SURVEY**

"Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) conducted a retrospective epidemiological survey between August and October 2001 in five health zones", among which Basankusu and Lisala in Equateur. [...]

**Equateur** is one of the provinces most severely affected by the war that has been underway since 1998. The fighting has divided the province into two; the north and the east are occupied by the rebel FLC (Forces de Libération Congolaises); the west and the south are under government control. The two health zones surveyed, Basankusu and Lisala, lie on the rebel side. [...]

The province of **Katanga** is divided into two by the front-line: the northern part is controlled by the RCD-Goma (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie), and the southern part by the government. [...] Kilwa, the health zone surveyed by MSF, lies south of the front-line [government zone]. [...]

### ***Very disconcerting mortality rates in the zones close to the front-line***

In Basankusu (Equateur), a zone under rebel control very close to the front-line, we were able to extrapolate that around 10% of the global population had died over a 12-month period (2.7 deaths/10.000/day. In a normal situation in a developing country, an average annual rate of only 2% is expected. In Kilwa (Katanga) and Lisala (Equateur), both withdrawal zones for the military, 4% and 3% of the population died over a 12-month period (1.1 deaths/10.000/day and 1 death/10.000/day).

In the zone closest to the front-line (Basankusu), mortality greatly exceeded the threshold of alarm (2 deaths/10.000/day), a situation calling for greater humanitarian intervention. [...]

### ***Children have been particularly affected by the war***

In Basankusu, we were able to extrapolate that around a quarter of under-fives died over a 12-month period, although the mortality rate for under-fives in a normal situation would be around 3.6%. In Kilwa, the mortality rate for the under-fives was also alarming with around 12% dying over a 12-month period. In the other zones studied, the percentage of under-five deaths was higher than the threshold of alarm, but the situation was not as serious.

### ***The war has led to an increase in infectious diseases and malnutrition***

Although related to violence, the increased mortality in zones affected by war is mainly due to the increase in infectious diseases and malnutrition. Although the people are not dying from the physical violence, the indirect effects are nonetheless devastating. Violence is destroying coping strategies and makes families more vulnerable to disease.

### ***Significant levels of violence on both sides of the front-line***

In the two zones on either side of the front-line (Basankusu and Kilwa), among families having experienced violence, the looting reached dizzying rates for 2000 (77% for each zone) and remains high in 2001 (45%

et 17%). The percentage of houses and fields all or partially destroyed by fire, shelling or other means is also very high in the zone very close to the front-line (from 30% to 46%), much lower in the withdrawal zone (3% to 4%). In addition, in Basankusu and Kilwa zones, from 50% to 90% of households questioned had to flee during the war that began in August 1998.

With regard to physical violence, the same observation holds: physical assaults, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and sexual abuse show high rates in the zone very close to the front-line and less high in the withdrawal zone. For example, closest to the front, prior to 2001, 15% of households had experienced violence involving the torture of at least one family member and in 13% of such households at least one member that had been sexually abused. In the withdrawal zone, prior to 2001, 17% of households experiencing violence had seen at least one person forcibly recruited by the military from within the family. [...]

#### ***Violence and the increased number of deaths are related***

In the zones close to the front-line, households that have experienced violence also counted more deaths among members in the previous six months. For example, for the under-fives in Basankusu, the mortality rate for the under-fives living in families that had encountered violence was 7/10.000/day, while it was 4/10.000/day for children living in families not subjected to violence. Violence forced people to flee, but paralysed the transport system. Violence led to scarcities of food, other products and services, but increased the frequency of theft and the destruction of civilian property. Violence weakened the population's immunological defences, but strengthened the resistance of infectious agents through the use of fake medicines and/or incomplete treatments.

#### ***A large part of the population has no access to health care***

In the two zones close to the front-line (Basankusu and Lisala), about three to four sick people out of ten have not consulted anyone outside the family (nurse, doctor, traditional healer, first-aid worker), mainly for financial reasons (consultations and medicines are too expensive for around three-quarters of them), but also because of the lack of available medicines and, to a lesser extent, because of transport problems. In addition, between a quarter and a half of those patients seeking consultation do not obtain the medicines prescribed or make do with an incomplete treatment. This is mainly due to the lack of financial means (over 80% of them) and, to a lesser extent, because of the lack of available medicines. The results in the zones less severely affected by the conflict are no more encouraging." (MSF 19 Dec 2002)

### **IDPs often lived in particularly insanitary conditions (2001)**

"Among groups of people who are living in particularly unsanitary conditions, such as the displaced, the lack of access to sufficient water, in addition to their inability to buy soap, has led to severe outbreaks of scabies. Cholera epidemics have been notified in many parts of the country. However, Oxfam GB's activities in Kitshanga (North Kivu), an area in which 79 per cent of the population is internally displaced, show that the disease can be managed if the resources are available. Prior to the implementation of water, sanitation, and hygiene activities in June 1999, the health authorities had registered two cholera epidemics per year. Since June 1999, none has been reported [see Rapports du Centre de Santé de Kitshanga (1999-2001) et Rapport de la Mission d'Evaluation des Besoins, Oxfam, December 2000] (Oxfam 6 August 2001, p.23)

## **Nutrition and food**

---

### **Malnutrition on the increase among IDPs (2000-2002)**

- 16 million people (33 % of population) have critical food needs as a result of prolonged displacement and other factors (June 2001)
- Malnutrition amongst displaced populations in Ituri being up to 40% worse than the resident population (Feb 2000)
- Major malnutrition among displaced children arriving in Lubumbashi (Feb 2000)
- Survey of IDP children in North Kivu reveals 14,7 percent acute malnutrition (September 2000)
- Extremely high rates of malnutrition of displaced people in South Kivu who fled insecurity in Nindja and Kalonge: 34% (July 2001)
- World Vision has found a 13.9 rate of serious malnutrition among children under five northeast of Goma (North Kivu) (March 2002)
- ACF-USA says that nutritional situation of the displaced population following volcanic eruption close to Goma is correct (Feb 2002)

"Some 16 million people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are estimated to have critical food needs as a result of prolonged displacement, the rupture of traditional sources of supply due to war and the alarming increase in prices." (UN SC 8 June 2001, para.57)

"Most evidence suggests that malnutrition is on the increase, particularly amongst displaced populations in Eastern DRC. Evidence from Ituri 'province' is particularly worrying: up to 11.6% global malnutrition and 9.1% severe malnutrition with the status amongst displaced populations being up to 40% worse than the resident population. As an indicator of the severity, of the estimated population of 326,672 there are 7,578 malnourished children in Bunia Health Zone under the age of five, of whom 5,900 are candidates for therapeutic feeding. " (OCHA 15 February 2000)

"In the Eastern city of Lubumbashi (population 1 million people), the situation is worsening day by day with the massive arrival of rural populations displaced by insecurity in the war-affected zones of the republic. Approximately 20,000 displaced people live in camps or are hosted in families. A recent survey carried out by Action Against Hunger shows that over 5,000 children could be malnourished. The organization has recently opened 4 feeding centers." (AAH-USA 14 February 2000)

"A study of 971 displaced children [in north Kivu] less than 5 years of age led by the NGO Solidarité revealed that 14,7 percent suffer from acute malnutrition (with oedema) and 19,9 percent global severe malnutrition in the three localities of Kanyabayonga, Kirumbas and Kaynas. The death rate is at 2,7%/1000/day. The malnutrition rate already affecting the region, has been aggravated by the arrival of displaced individuals because the local population shares the stocks of supplies with them. The prenatal death rate is of 32/1000 (OMS norm: 20/1000) and 17,8 percent of the children are born with a weight less than 2,5 kg (WHO norm: 15 percent)." (OCHA September 2000, p.6)

"Rates of malnutrition are extremely high amongst the displaced populations of South Kivu: a recent survey carried out by an aid agency set the level as high as 34 percent, in a community of displaced people who have fled current insecurity in Nindja and Kalonge." (ACT 13 July 2001)

"An assessment of the health, nutrition and food security of people living in Rwanguba health zone, a war-affected area northeast of Goma in North Kivu province, has found a 13.9% rate of serious malnutrition among children under 5. [...]

Rwanguba is traditionally a rich, highly fertile area, however the forest near the town has facilitated numerous attacks by various rebels groups that have looted the community of all livestock and other assets. Health centres have been targeted in these attacks, with supplies looted and buildings destroyed. The community is also suffering economically from plunging world coffee prices and the impact of Mt Nyiragongo's recent eruption on Goma town." (WVI 15 March 2002)

"In the light of the mass movement of population, ACF – USA has coordinated with other agencies to conduct a rapid screening of the nutritional status of the displaced population [following the eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano just outside of Goma on 17 Jan 2002]. The aim of this screening is to confirm the status of the vulnerable group of displaced, notably children between 6 and 59 months old and pregnant women. [...]

Conclusion/recommendation: In the aftermath of the volcanic eruption, the nutritional situation of the displaced population in the sites visited seems correct. The identified cases of malnutrition did not seem a direct result of the volcanic eruption. Although the displacement may have accelerated an on going process. Providing correct quantity and access to food is essential so that the nutritional situation should not get worse."

*Localities selected: Goma, Bukavu and Kavumu. (AAH-USA 8 Feb 2002)*

### **Malnutrition of small children in Baraka (Territory of Fizi, South Kivu) (Feb 2002)**

In Baraka, "Families more recently displaced from the interior of Fizi are sheltering in some of them. In December there were estimated to be over 15,000 displaced people in the vicinity of Baraka, and there are additional smaller concentrations northwards along the lakeshore. There have been repeated outbreaks of cholera in recent months. The latest ones in Baraka have been somewhat stemmed by dispatch of serum from Uvira by ACF, but a new major outbreak has just been reported in and around Kazimia. With the rains in progress there is evidence of new planting of manioc and other food crops which is in some measure due to seed deliveries sent down, again by ACF, to local organisations that they worked with when they were here several years ago. There is no other evidence of any humanitarian supplies reaching Baraka or anywhere else in Fizi over the past couple of years. Malnutrition is evident particularly in small children. The most urgent needs are for nutrition and basic medicines, followed by non-food items, farming tools and, on the Plateau, veterinary supplies and seeds, particularly beans, maize and new banana stocks (there seems to be some sort of blight affecting the bananas). After that it is a question of rehabilitating schools and health posts, and supplying roofing sheets." (IA Feb 2002)

### **In the Kivus nutritional assessment showed that host families and IDPs are malnourished (Oct 2001)**

"A nutritional assessment last week shows that the level of severe malnutrition in the region has been contained, but that many more children show signs of 'global' (less severe) malnourishment – an indication that local populations are sharing their meagre resources with displaced people, but that there simply isn't enough to go round.

'In the first year well over 80% of the population we were helping were displaced, whereas in this second year they have fallen to 40%,' says Eleanor Monbiot, World Vision programme officer responsible for eastern DRC. 'That reinforces the conclusion that we have contained the problem among the displaced, but that the host families are in a steadily worsening position.'" (WVI 9 Oct 2001)

### **UN Agencies assess food needs in city of North Kivu (2001)**

- A joint mission of WFP, UN HCR, Caritas and the governorate assessed the needs of the people from Kibirizi, who fled attacks by Mai Mai and Interhamwe militias
- The displaced live far from their fields and suffer from malnutrition

"Une mission conjointe du PAM, du HCR, de Caritas et du gouvernorat s'est rendue à Kibirizi (ville située au sud ouest du Parc National des Virunga, dans la collectivité de Bwito, territoire de Rutshuru). Comme les autres villages lointains de la province, cette cité fut aussi le théâtre d'attaques menées par les milices Mai Mai et Interhamwe. Ces attaques récurrentes ont entraîné des déplacements massifs de population.

La majorité avait pris la direction de Kanyabayonga, Kayna, Kirumba où plus de 100,000 personnes déplacées étaient enregistrées. La minorité s'était dirigée vers Rutshuru, Kiwanja, Nyamilima. Le reste de la population de Kibirizi s'était cachée dans les collines surplombant la cité.

Le manque des vivres au site d'accueil (zone de santé de Kayna) et l'amélioration récente des conditions de sécurité à Kibirizi ont poussé les personnes déplacées à retourner chez elles. C'est dans ce cadre que le PAM et la FAO ont conçu ce projet de réinstallation des personnes déplacées. Le PAM va octroyer deux mois de ration à ces retournés et la FAO leur distribuera des semences. Caritas s'est joint à ce projet de réinstallation pour rendre disponible les non vivres (casseroles, couvertures, jerricans, assiettes et gobelets).

La malnutrition s'est développée à Kibirizi à cause du déplacement des populations vers les sites d'hébergement très éloignés de leurs champs. Pour pouvoir se réintégrer dans la vie socio-économique dans leurs milieux d'origine, les retournés ont besoin d'intrants agricoles, des vivres et de non vivres pendant les deux premiers mois.

A Kibirizi il y a un centre de santé sans médicaments essentiels et sans aucun programme de nutrition fonctionnel. Caritas Diocésaine va y ouvrir un centre nutritionnel qui prendra en charge les enfants malnourris et organisera périodiquement les enquêtes nutritionnelles." (OCHA 28 February 2001, "Nord Kivu")

### **In Katanga Province, widespread malnutrition reported among IDPs and the population in general (2001)**

- 50 % of displaced in government-held areas of Katanga province are in urgent need of food aid (Aug 2001)
- Displaced population has no access to their fields and only have manioc to eat, which lacks protein
- 32% of malnutrition rate in Kiambi and global malnutrition rate of 20% in northern Katanga (July 2001)
- 3,000 IDPs in Kasomeno, southern Katanga, face daily hunger and are in desperate need of food and agricultural tools, seeds and fertilizer (September 2001)

"Le nord de la province du Katanga, dans le sud-est de la République du Congo (RDC), qui faisait partie des régions les plus fertiles du pays, est en proie à une crise alimentaire sévère en raison de la guerre.

Sous contrôle des rebelles du Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) et de leurs alliés rwandais, les principales agglomérations du Nord-Katanga, Kabalo, Manono, Nyunzu, Kiambi et Kongolo, sont obligées de vivre en quasi-autarcie.

Les campagnes sont devenues le repaire de milices tribales Mai-Mai et les lieux de passage des rebelles extrémistes hutu rwandais et burundais. [...]

*Selon le coordinateur du Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) pour l'Est de la RDC, M. Claude Jijibar, "les habitants des villes n'ont plus accès aux champs en brousse, et les populations rurales, sous la menace de groupes armés incontrôlés, doivent se déplacer en permanence et ne se nourrissent plus que de manioc sauvage, très pauvre en protéines.*

Le taux de malnutrition globale a atteint une moyenne de 20% dans le nord du Katanga, selon une enquête récente d'une organisation humanitaire italienne 'Alisei-Nuova Frontiera.'

'La situation est particulièrement grave à Kiambi où la malnutrition est de l'ordre de 32%', souligne le coordinateur des activités d'Alisei, le Dr Achille Garavelli." (PANA 30 July 2001)

"Some 3,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in the little town of Kasomeno, in the DRC's southern Katanga province, face daily hunger and are in desperate need of food and agricultural tools, seeds and fertiliser. Short of food and facing the onset of the rainy season, administrators of the Kasomena IDP camp have appealed for help. " (WV 27 Sept 2001)

"In Katanga, massive displacement due to clashes between rebels and FACs for the control of Pweto, resulted in the displacement of more than 27,000 persons on the Kilwa-Pweto axis. According to MSF-Belgium, the health conditions are very precarious in towns located on that axis due to earlier looting of health centers. The mortality rate, particularly amongst infants, has reportedly increased among both the local population and IDPs. Around Malemba-Nkulu, the looting of harvests and seeds by FACs and Mai Mai is raising concerns of potential famine in the area." (WFP 23 Feb 2001)

"De nombreux cas de décès par anémie ont été détectés dans le camp de Kasomeno près de Kasenga. Cette situation s'explique par la fréquence de la malnutrition due à l'irrégularité de l'approvisionnement en nourriture et du paludisme." (OCHA 14 February 2001, "Katanga")

"A joint mission at the weekend by the DRC Ministry of Health, local and international NGOs, and the provincial administration of Katanga, has complemented and reinforced the prior impression of widespread malnutrition, prolonged displacement of civilians and severe economic depression, a report on Tuesday by UNOCHA, which coordinated the visit, stated. The residents of this frontline area, both host population and internally-displaced people (IDPs), were living in fear of confrontation and convinced of being unfairly forgotten by the world, it added.

Some 7,000 displaced had found refuge in Ankoro town, while 70,000 others were dispersed in an area of 20,000 square kilometres between Manono and Kabalo, the report said. The displaced emphasised their need for food and medicines, but also seeds and tools - indicating their wish to become self-reliant, it said." (IRIN 30 May 2000)

In Katanga, "'The number of men, women and children living hand to mouth, and without life's basic necessities, is overwhelming. We estimate that more than 300,000 people are displaced in government-held areas of Katanga province and more than 50 percent of them are in urgent need of food aid,' said Jose Pita-Gros, WFP Acting Country Director, DRC." (WFP 13 Aug 2001)

### **Critical food situation in Kinshasa due to the war and influx of IDPs (2001)**

- Because of destruction of infrastructures and lower food imports, only 60% of food needs in Kinshasa can be met
- The Province Equateur and the East, now occupied, cannot deliver food to Kinshasa as they used to
- Food has little nutritional value, and the calory consumption per person is 1000 kcal instead of 2200 as recommended for Sub Sahara Africa
- Half of the income per person in Kinshasa is used to buy food

- Children are the hardest hit by malnutrition: chronic malnutrition rate of 18% in the capital and 30% in its periphery

"Avant la guerre de 1998, le taux de croissance de la population de Kinshasa était estimé à 4,7 % . L'afflux des personnes déplacée est venu exacerber l'explosion démographique dans un contexte marqué par la dégradation continue de l'environnement socio- économique. Aujourd'hui, la population est estimée à plus de 6 millions d'habitants.

La sécurité alimentaire des ménages à Kinshasa est très critique. D'après l'enquête nutritionnelle réalisée en avril 1999 par le CEPLANUT, seulement 10,6 % de ménages avaient accès à trois repas par jour, 17,4 % possédaient un stock en aliment de base. Ces paramètres se sont détériorés davantage depuis 1999.

L'offre intérieure des produits alimentaires est largement insuffisante pour couvrir les besoins alimentaires de la Ville, soit 500.000 tonnes de disponibilités alimentaires contre 1.450.000 tonnes de besoins alimentaires pour l'an 2000. Cette situation s'explique par:

- L' interruption des approvisionnements à partir des provinces de: Equateur, Orientale, Nord-Kivu, Kasai...
- La baisse des importations alimentaires.
- Le piteux état des infrastructures routières. 15 % seulement de la production vivrière des localités isolées atteindraient Kinshasa.

La disponibilité d'aliments ne couvre que 60 % des besoins du point de vue quantitatif. Du point de vue qualitatif, la population est obligée de consommer une nourriture de faible valeur nutritive constituée d'un régime essentiellement végétarien. L'apport calorifique par personne à Kinshasa a été estimé selon le PNUD à 1000 kcal contre 2200 kcal recommandé pour l'Afrique subsaharienne.

Entre- temps, on assiste à la réduction drastique de revenus par tête et à la perte continue du pouvoir d'achat qui a diminué en moyenne de 45 % à cause de l'inflation galopante . 85 à 89 % des habitants dépensent plus de la moitié de leurs revenus pour la nourriture. La majorité de la population vit en dessous du seuil de pauvreté et consacre une partie importante des revenus à l'alimentation. Le déficit vivrier de Kinshasa est estimé à 1 million de tonnes en 2000.

La grande majorité de la population souffrent de graves pénuries alimentaires entraînant la malnutrition généralisée. Le taux de malnutrition est très alarmant surtout chez le couple «mère- enfant». et en particulier dans les zones périphériques. Une assez large portion d'enfants est affectée par la malnutrition chronique: 35.058 enfants (soit 33,3%) à Kimbaseke, 12.868 enfants à Selembao (soit 34,6%), 5.403 enfants à Kingabwa (soit 25,9 %) et 3.381 enfants dans la commune de Kinshasa (soit 19,9 %).

A Kimbaseke et Selembao, 13,5 % des enfants souffrent de malnutrition chronique sévère. La malnutrition chronique frappe 18% des enfants de la ville et 30% des enfants de la périphérie. Le nombre d'enfants à réhabiliter était estimé à 126.000 en avril 1999 à Kinshasa. A Kimbaseke, commune la plus peuplée de Kinshasa, 95 % des enfants mal nourris ne sont pas pris en charge." (UN OCHA September 2001)

"Children were hardest hit by malnutrition, especially in the capital, Kinshasa, and the other major urban centres." (UN SC 8 June 2001, para.57)

"L'offre des vivres à Kinshasa a baissé du fait que cette ville se trouve amputée d'une bonne partie de son bassin d'approvisionnement (Equateur et provinces de l'Est) occupée par des forces non gouvernementales. Le manioc, principale denrée alimentaire des populations est affecté par d'innombrables maladies qui en réduisent sensiblement le rendement [...]. Les difficultés d'acheminement des vivres vers Kinshasa, suite au désastreux état des routes et des véhicules constituent un autre facteur contraignant important. C'est une réelle énigme que des véhicules souvent très vétustes puissent faire parvenir jusqu'au marché de Kinshasa, des produits agricoles qui parfois ont parcouru jusqu'à 700 km." (FAO 15 Nov 2001)

### **In Maniema Province, IDPs hiding in the forest are dying of disease and malnutrition (July 2001)**

- 30% of the population in Maniema is displaced and more people have recently arrived from Katanga and Kasai
- Mai Mai and RCD troops destroyed much of the farming capacity of the province and food needs are increasing

"Some 30 percent of the population of the eastern Maniema province is still hiding out in the forests after fleeing fighting and insecurity, according to Christian Aid. The NGO, which is a member of the Action by Churches Together (ACT) umbrella group, says most of the people are concentrated in the southern part of the province. 'A significant number of deaths has been reported, due mostly to disease and malnutrition amongst the more vulnerable groups.' Christian Aid said, in a report produced by ACT. 'Land is in plentiful supply in Maniema, but the displaced lack the tools to cultivate it, and the more vulnerable amongst the displaced face a shortage of labour power for cutting down trees and cultivating land.'" (IRIN-CEA 17 July 2001)

"There are displaced people throughout this vast (132,000 sq. kms) province, and in the southernmost part in particular, the needs are increasing. This part of Maniema is closer to the war front and thus receives many new arrivals from Katanga and Kasai. In addition, the inhabitants of these areas were seriously affected by combat between Mai Mai and the RCD, who in repeated reprisal raids destroyed much of the farming capacity of the province, including houses, tools, granaries and animal stocks. On a visit to Kitimba, on the road between Kindu and Kasongo, the CA Project assistant witnessed the pathetic sight of men, women and children dressed in rags, and most barefooted. The displaced are totally lacking in financial resources." (ACT 13 July 2001)

### **Evident signs of malnutrition among IDPs in Ituri (March 2000)**

- Claims that people have died because of suspension of humanitarian aid
- Desperate humanitarian situation also expected among IDPs in hiding in the forests

"The situation of people in parts of the northeast Ituri district, which is subject to sporadic but serious clashes between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups, is "close to catastrophic", according to relief workers operating in the northeast of the country.

Aid agencies, who have been denied access to many parts of Ituri in recent months due to the Hema-Lendu conflict, found during an assessment mission from 15-19 March that "a very significant number of people" had already died, and more would die in the coming days, due to the forced suspension of humanitarian aid. The clashes themselves resulted in the deaths of some 4,000-7,000 and have displaced an estimated 150,000 people.

The situation was particularly bad in Fataki and Rethy, where the vulnerable people identified were "possibly the most at-risk group currently accessible" in eastern DRC, aid sources told IRIN. More than 3,000 displaced were located in three different sites in Fataki and signs of malnutrition were evident in almost every person, with one small pot of leaves all a family of six could hope to eat for two to three days, they said.

Malnutrition was also evident in Rethy, alongside dramatic problems of hygiene and skin disease, and a lack of drinking water. Throughout the area, there was a rising incidence of malaria, measles, respiratory

infections and the plague. Yet, it was "highly likely that other areas of equal need exist in Ituri district", particularly among those displaced people who remain in hiding in the forests. The humanitarian community is currently mobilising resources - with essential drugs, therapeutic milk, food and plastic sheeting among the priorities - and negotiating enhanced access to areas in need." (IRIN 24 March 2000)

### **Alarming high malnutrition rates among displaced and other children (2001-2002)**

- In rebel-held areas, global malnutrition rates among children under five have reached 41 % and severe malnutrition rates up to 25.79% (SCF-UK & Nueva Frontiera surveys)
- In certain parts of government-held areas, global malnutrition rates among children have reached 42% (SCF-UK survey)
- In certain areas of Katanga, there are reports of alarmingly high malnutrition rates at 28 % among young children (August 2001)
- In remote areas of Equateur Province, majority of children under 5 suffer from malnutrition and child mortality rates are reportedly unacceptably high (Dec 01 & Feb 02)

"In rebel-held areas, the rates of global malnutrition among children under five reported in the past year have reached 41 per cent,[1] with severe malnutrition rates of up to 25.79 per cent.[2] These figures were recorded at the point at which the humanitarian community gained access to previously isolated communities. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that in areas of the east which continue to be too insecure to allow any form of assistance to be delivered, the situation is at least as bad, and possibly worse. Displaced populations inaccessible in the forests are in a particularly bad nutritional state, as illustrated by WFP's figures for South Kivu, which show that 75 per cent of malnourished children currently registered in feeding centres belong to families which have just emerged from the forests. When Manono and Kiambi (northern Katanga) became accessible in January 2001, Nuova Frontiera conducted a nutritional survey which found a global malnutrition rate among under fives of 32.07 per cent and a severe malnutrition rate of 25.79 per cent. [...]

Nor have parts of the government-held territories been spared. [...] A survey conducted by Save the Children UK in the poorest parts of the Commune of Kimbanseke in April 2001 found that 42 per cent of children are chronically malnourished, and that global malnutrition rates had reached 18.3 per cent. [3] The severe malnutrition rate in these areas was also found to have tripled between September 1999 and January 2001.[4]

[Notes:

[1] Global malnutrition rate registered by SC UK during a vaccination campaign in Bunyakiri, South Kivu. The methodology used was a first screening using MUAC and oedema detection. No anthropometric measurements were taken.

[2] Rapport de l'enquête nutritionnelle dans la ville de Kiambi, Nuova Frontiera, March 2001

[3] Nutrition Survey in Tshimungu, Mapela, Kimbanseke and Lobiko Aires de Santé, Save the Children UK, 28 April 2001

[4] Kinshasa, Enquetes Nutritionnelles, Communes de Kimbanseke, Selembao, Bumbu et Kisenso ACF-USA/Ceplanut, 31 January – 23 February 2001]" (Oxfam August 2001, p. 26)

In Katanga, "A recent nutritional survey conducted in the area of Kabongo and Kitenge reports alarmingly high malnutrition rates at 28 percent among young children. Some 1,500 under five years of age are suffering from global acute malnutrition, with a high prevalence of Kwashiorkor, a life-threatening disease caused by an extreme lack of protein that turns a child's hair blonde and leaves faces and limbs swollen with fluids." (WFP 13 August 2001)

*In the Kivus*, "Children, as usual, are being disproportionately impacted by the displacement. Therapeutic and supplementary feeding centers remain full. However, a shortage of therapeutic dry milk is being felt, and many local centers which care for hundreds of children are scrambling to supply this life-giving commodity." (RI 14 September 2000)

"In Mbandaka, Gbadolite and more especially in the more remote areas of Equateur Province, MONUC has observed that the majority of children under 5 suffer from malnutrition, that child mortality rates are reportedly unacceptably high and that the expanded vaccination programme in Gbadolite has been interrupted since mid-2000." (UN SC 15 Feb 2002, para.74)

UN Mission to Befale, Equateur: "la mission organisée fin novembre 2001 par OCHA en Equateur avait pour objectif d'évaluer les possibilités d'apporter un appui à la réintégration des déplacés dans leurs localités d'origine. A l'issue de cette mission les participants ont jugé qu'une évaluation nutritionnelle des enfants de Befale s'avérait nécessaire [...]"

En définitive, sans être d'une urgence aiguë, la situation nutritionnelle dans la cité de Befale est très préoccupante." (UN OCHA 13 Dec 2001)

## **Shelter**

---

### **IDPs in eastern DRC seek shelter in towns (2000)**

- Lack of camps for IDPs from the Kivus make people move in with family and friends or squat wherever they can in the towns
- IDPs in Ituri seek shelter at trading centres, churches and schools

"The largest groups of displaced are in Goma and Bukavu. One church worker told Human Rights Watch that at least a quarter of the population of Goma is now comprised of people displaced from the interior. But even in the small community of Kavumu in South Kivu there are more than 4,000 displaced persons, some 1,200 from Bunyakiri and Walikale and nearly 3,000 from Kalonge. These are the numbers of those officially registered and the actual number may be far higher. There are no camps for the displaced so they move in with family and friends, themselves already impoverished, or they squat wherever they can in the towns. As one church worker commented, "They have no work, no home, they're not accustomed to the city. They become beggars, are exposed to illnesses. They are the most affected by cholera, AIDS, and other diseases." Recently displaced persons told Human Rights Watch researchers that many of those who remained in their communities are too afraid of attack to spend their nights at home and sleep outside the house where they are exposed to inclement weather and to illnesses such as malaria." (HRW May 2000, chapt. III)

#### ***IDPs in the Ituri district also seek shelter in towns:***

"The displaced are concentrated in isolated bush areas, major trading centres, around hospitals and in Bunia town. Bunia's population has significantly increased with villagers seeking refuge with relatives and friends. Every Friday, about 400 people are given two kg of food rations donated by MedAir, through a local women's organisation, Association des Mamans Antibwaki, in Bunia hospital grounds.

Numbers increased in February, with over 100 new cases. The organisation estimates some 75 percent come from displaced villages to collect the rations, and about 25 percent live in Bunia with relatives. Workers say resources are "very limited" and many people have to be sent away. One recipient said she moved near Bunia at the beginning of January when "Lendu fighters" attacked Ngongo village. After

reuniting her scattered family, she came to stay with a relative in a one-roomed house that now tries to support 21 adults and children.

In Djugu, the displaced have congregated around the trading centre from different affected communities - Lendu, Hema and Ndo Okebo. Many of the women interviewed said they had to resort to "stealing" from the fields, and were brewing alcohol for soldiers to earn a small amount of cash.

[...]

In Drodro, a large group of displaced people occupies two church buildings and a secondary school. Some have been there since the early months of the conflict, and are in pitiful condition - infected skin diseases, marasmic and malnourished children, chronic diarrhoeal diseases, vitamin deficiencies, as well as hepatitis and cholera cases. The displaced say there are deaths "every day". A seven month-old baby was found dead, - tinged yellow and suffering from chronic diarrhoea - the morning IRIN visited the group.

[...]

To date, many displaced Lendu and Hema co-exist successfully together in towns and trading centres. But there are rural areas where the conflict has caused extreme polarisation, especially around the Rethy area, and in previously mixed villages. Polarisation and hostilities are likely to increase if attacks continue and no settlement is reached, - escalating an already acute humanitarian crisis and further complicating humanitarian access." (IRIN 3 March 2000, "Part Two")

### **Majority of IDPs are not housed in camps but have merged into host communities (1999-2000)**

- In rural communities IDPs are often absorbed by host villages, accommodated and fed for the initial stages
- In urban areas it is not uncommon that continued stay of IDPs creates discontent

"A characteristic feature of displacement in eastern DRC is the fact that IDPs are not housed in camps but have merged into host communities. Their conditions remain precarious due to lack of farming land, vital services and general insecurity. Remaining in proximity to their places of origin, the displaced are prone to be subjected to the same hazards and abuses that caused them to flee in the first place. On a number of occasions during 1998-99, the displaced and local communities were stranded in combat areas and were removed by military authorities in a bid to create security zones." (UN July 1999, p.8)

"The great majority of displaced persons are relatively well received by foster communities thanks to the family or tribal ties. In urban areas, IDPs are sheltered and fed by their foster families thus becoming an additional burden on the already poverty-stricken urban households. It is not uncommon that the continued stay of IDPs creates discontent that eventually bursts into a conflict with the subsequent expulsion of the displaced. In rural communities on the other hand, IDPs are often absorbed by host villages, accommodated and fed for the initial stages. With the approval of traditional chiefs, the displaced subsequently receive land plots and in due course overcome their dependence on the local community. Eventually, the relations between the displaced and their hosts improve, as the former start contributing to the general well-being of the community." (UN November 2000, p.18)

## ACCESS TO EDUCATION

### General

---

#### **Following volcano irruption 45 schools destroyed in Goma left temporarily some 24,000 children out of school (Feb 2002)**

- Almost all the schools reopened end of February following the building of 200 temporary classes

"A survey conducted by the Education department in Goma points to a total of 45 schools (26 government schools, 16 private schools and three non-formal schools) destroyed by the volcano eruption out of an estimated total number of 150 schools. Many schools, secondary in particular, were near the city centre where the lava flow passed, hence the relatively high number of schools destroyed. The primary and secondary schools destroyed leave some 24,000 children out of school." (UN OCHA 19 Feb 2002)

"[A]vec l'aide des ONG qui ont construit plus de 200 classes temporaires, presque toutes les écoles ont réouvert leurs portes le 25 février. UNICEF se dit prêt à envisager de répondre à des besoins supplémentaires en fourniture scolaires et d'étudier la question de l'indemnisation des professeurs." (UN OCHA 7 March 2002)

#### **400,000 displaced children of primary school age have no access to basic education (2001)**

- UNICEF estimated for 2000/2001, 3-3.5 million children between 6-11 in DRC do not receive any formal education; 2 million are estimated to be girls
- Situation is worse in eastern part of DRC
- UN says that absolute majority of IDP children have been deprived of formal and informal schooling since 1998
- The fact that displaced children have almost no access to education make them more vulnerable to enlistment into armed forces
- In northern Katanga, local church provide classes for displaced children in the afternoon but drop out rates are high
- In eastern Katanga, parents pay double school fee to enable displaced children to also attend school

"The conflict in the DRC has had a terrible impact on an education system that was already failing. In 1998, the Ministry of Education reported that 40 per cent of children of primary school age were not attending school. The situation for girls was even worse. Nationally, half of all girls were not in school; in North Kivu, the figure was 69 per cent [1]. The investment that was made in the Congolese education system in the 1970s and 1980s has been squandered. School enrolment rates plummeted from 94 per cent in 1978 to an estimated 60 per cent in 2001. Adult literacy rates fell from 74 per cent in 1992 to 58.9 per cent in 1998. There are no reliable figures for 2000/2001, although UNICEF estimates that there are currently between 3 and 3.5 million children aged between 6 and 11 who are not receiving any formal education. This figure exceeds the total population of the neighbouring Republic of Congo. Of these children, approximately two million are girls [2].

In eastern DRC, insecurity, poverty and the frequent closure or destruction of schools will have reduced attendance to a fraction of the 1998 figures. Many parents can no longer afford to send their children to school. [...]

Displaced children in particular have little or no chance to continue with their education. Of the two million displaced people, approximately 400,000 are thought to be children of primary school age. These children have no access to any form of basic education, prejudicing their opportunities later in life, and increasing their risk of enlistment into armed forces in search of a better situation. [...]

In Kalima, the local church has set up a rotating system through which regular schools end early each day, and short classes are provided for displaced children for a few hours in the afternoon.

[Notes:

[1] Education pour tous, Bilan à l'an 2000, Ministère de l'Education Nationale, November 1999. Figures also supported by UNICEF – State of the World's Children 2001

[2] Personal reference" (Oxfam August 2001, p.29-30)

"In Eastern Katanga province, parents are actually paying double school fee to enable displaced children to also attend school, and health clinics are desperately trying to cater for the IDPs." (WV 30 July 2001)

"The absolute majority of IDP children have been deprived of proper or any schooling since 1998. In urban areas, there is a marked increase in the number of dropouts with primary school attendance declining, as many families are unable to afford exorbitant education fees. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the CHAP 2001 will attempt to revive the importance and value of the education sector, through launching a series of primary education campaigns in areas of population displacement." (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001, pp.47-48)

# ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

## General

---

### Deteriorating socio-economic situation due to the war (2001-2002)

- Rise in poverty level has dramatic impact on humanitarian situation
- Little health and education and road infrastructures existing before the two wars of 1996 and 1998 are in a state of collapse
- Devaluation of currency and cost of imported goods (kerosene, salt) has eroded people's purchasing power
- Agricultural production has dropped and in mineral-rich areas, farmers have abandoned agriculture to dig for coltan, gold or diamond
- Deprived of state support, with little access to income, and without meaningful external aid, the resources and resilience of Congolese households have simply run out
- Vast majority of Congo's 50 million people live on around 20 cents per person per day and eat less than two thirds of the calories a day needed to maintain health
- Majority of the population survives on informal economic activities, mainly carried out by women (Feb 2002)

"The war has had a devastating impact on the country's 50 million people.[1] The DRC is currently ranked 152nd on the UNDP Human Development index of 174 countries: a fall of 12 places since 1992. This is particularly shocking in a country with considerable natural resources, such as diamonds, hydro-electric power, wood, and minerals. Since the period of colonisation by King Leopold, very few Congolese citizens have ever benefited from the country's wealth. UNDP reported that the DRC's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in 1998 was US\$110, compared with US\$160 in Burundi and US\$680 in the neighbouring Republic of Congo. More than half of the five million people living in the capital city of Kinshasa are thought to live below the World Bank's poverty threshold of US\$1 per day.[2] A recent socio-economic survey in North Kivu indicated average expenditure per person per day of US\$0.41; in other places like Kayna, this figure was as low as US\$0.18.[3] The rise in poverty levels has had a dramatic impact on the humanitarian situation in the country.

The little infrastructure that existed prior to the two wars of 1996 and 1998 has crumbled. Health and education systems are in a state of collapse, continuing to rely on support from the churches, local organisations, and international agencies to provide limited services to the population. The poor state of the roads all over the country, compounded by insecurity in the east, impedes trade and makes the delivery of humanitarian assistance difficult and costly. Of the 145,000km of roads, no more than 2,500km are asphalt. Many of the remaining roads are often impassable during the rainy season. The threat of armed attack leads many business people to abandon road traffic completely. River-transport connections along the Congo River and its tributaries, once the crucial highway of the DRC, have also been severed. In many places, access is only possible by air, putting many basic necessities, including medicines, beyond people's reach. The movement of food and other supplies from rural to urban centres has completely ceased, resulting in large food deficits in towns and reduced production in the rural hinterlands.

"In eastern DRC, the war has reduced the poorest sections of the population, both displaced and host/local communities, to an extremely marginal existence. Conflict continues between the various armed groups and insecurity has worsened, particularly in rural areas. The devaluation of the currency and rise in the cost of

imported goods such as kerosene and salt has eroded people's purchasing power. In isolated areas of rebel-held territories, such as Shabunda, Kindu, and East Kasai, which can only be reached by air, the cost of items such as salt, oil, soap, and even clothes has become even more prohibitive.

Agricultural production has dropped across the east of the country, meaning that some formerly surplus producing areas no longer grow enough to feed their populations. Insecurity, limited access to markets, cassava blight [4], and difficulties in making enough money from the sale of crops, all discourage people from cultivating. [...]

In mineral-rich areas such as Walikale, Punia, and Kalima, the short-term benefits of mining have also encouraged some farmers to abandon agriculture. Instead of working in their fields, they prefer to dig for coltan, gold, or diamond. This will have long-term implications for communities' access to food."

[Notes:

[1] The population at the time of the last census (1985) was 34.7 million. Current estimates range from 49 million to 59 million.

[2] Estimates of the population of Kinshasa range from 5-10 million people.

[3] Enquête Socio-Economique, Nord Kivu, Decembre 2000, ASRAMES

[4] Cassava is the staple for 70% of the Congolese population. Over the past 7 years, cassava crops across the country have suffered from viral and bacterial diseases that have totally wiped out production in some areas such as Bandundu. The war has hindered the application of measures to control the diseases and provide healthy disease-resistant varieties to farmers] (Oxfam August 2001, pp.9,24)

"International attention has focused on those areas and populations directly affected by the war but the reality is that the vast majority of Congo's 50 million people live on around 20 cents per person per day and eat less than two thirds of the calories a day needed to maintain health. Long deprived of state support, with dramatically reduced access to income, without meaningful external aid, the resources and resilience of Congolese households have simply run out." (WHO 29 June 2001)

"In the economic front, the situation throughout the country continues to deteriorate rapidly, poverty and unemployment having reached intolerable levels. The economic purchasing power of the population is extremely weak and the majority of the population survives on informal economic activities, mainly carried out by women." ( UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002, pp.18-19)

### **Many displaced women have become the head of the household (2001)**

- In Maniema, at Kalonge, at Bunyakiri, at Shabunda, in northern Shaba, more than 60% of displaced families are headed by women
- Women, who often hold the household together, are paying an extraordinary price

"The heavy displacement of populations mostly lead to dislocation of various families. Separated, women become responsible for their children future and have the obligation to guarantee the survival of the family in such a chaotic situation. According to various sources, in Maniema, at Kalonge, at Buyakiri, at Shabunda, in northern Shaba, more than 60% of displaced populations are from families of which husbands have ran away or have been enrolled in the army or in armed militia. In Maniema, they are estimated to be 80%. The monoparental system as imposed on women is a source of permanent tension. Moreover, it is to be feared that this extended conflict will have side effects in establishing a culture of violence considered as normal lifestyle of which women are actually victims. [...]

[However] Far from being uniquely silent victims of the present conflict, women have progressively granted themselves a leadership role trying to ward off the consequences of the conflict on their families

and attempting by all means to reduce the side effects of the war on their communities." (OCHA 6 March 2001)

"Women, who often hold the household together, are paying an extraordinary price. This year over 42,000 will die in childbirth alone. Under-nourishment, forced and economic prostitution, overwork for pathetic recompense, untreated ill health and the psychological strain of maintaining large families are exacting a terrible toll." (WHO 29 June 2001)

### **Orphaned and separated children, especially young girls, are exposed to neglect and abuse (December 2000)**

- Poverty, war, HIV/AIDS, displacement, family separations and the breakdown of traditional coping mechanisms have forced growing numbers of children on to the streets

"There are large number of orphaned children in the DRC due to the high incidence of HIV/AIDS. Besides the trauma of being left without parental care, these children may be exposed to neglect, exploitation and abuse. They also lack access to education and vocational skills training and suffer immense psychological stress. [...]

Children on and of the street are criminalized and have become a soft target for round ups, recruitment and abuse by society at large; the high military presence in east and west of the country makes the situation even more acute. Issues that need to be addressed are the resettlement, care and protection of separated children, street children, child soldiers and children inappropriately placed in institutions.

Poverty, war, enlistment in the various armed forces, displacement, family separations and the breakdown of traditional coping mechanisms have forced growing numbers of children on to the streets or away from their original home environment in many foster families where they are often suffering from neglect and exploitation.

In North and South Kivu provinces, problems are concentrated in the cities and towns where a large group of vulnerable families have arrived as a result of general insecurity in the rural areas. [...] A much overlooked problem is the discrimination and abuse of women and young girls. Sexual violence against girls, adolescent pregnancies, abandoned child-mother, school drop-outs and girl sex workers are growing phenomena linked to the deterioration in work opportunities and a lack of family and community protection." (SCF 31 December 2000)

## **Disruption of food production and coping mechanisms**

---

### **Kisangani population, including IDPs, is still coping with trauma of June 2000 War (2001)**

- Despite improvement of security, people still lack of food, seeds, farm tools, medical services and shelter

"The fighting in June 2000 in and around the city affected everyone. It caused about 800 civilian deaths, much injury (physical and psychological) and a large amount of displacement. There was severe destruction and looting of property, including crops. Most infrastructure have been reduced to an even worse state than before.

Since June 2000 the security situation has been improving slowly, at least within Kisangani City, and increasingly in surrounding areas. The Lusaka agreement and its implementation is now being co-ordinated by UN troops positioned in Kisangani and there is an increasing presence on the ground of UN and humanitarian agencies. [...]

Kisangani continues to be isolated from its main supply routes – road from Goma (400 Km) and Buvira (600 Km) and the river from Kinshasa. [...] The population continues to cope with the trauma of the June war and the ongoing insecurity. Their most pressing problems are severe lack of food, seeds, farm tools, medical services (including medicines) and shelter. Farming families are anxious to normalize their lives as quickly as possible and replant. Yet seeds are scarce due to looting by soldiers and feeding of the displaced which depleted nearly all-agricultural seeds." (ACT 19 January 2001, "Kisangani")

### **Displacement adds additional pressure on mechanisms for self-reliance of host families (1997-2001)**

- Most of population in eastern DRC already destitute after decades of exploitation by the Mobutu government and isolation from the outside world (1998)
- Many IDPs, host communities and urban residents are affected by chronic food shortages and too high prices due to civil war
- When host community's resources are exhausted both the hosts and IDP further displace in search of food and shelter
- In Katanga, similar rate of malnutrition observed among the host communities than among the displaced and host families continue to care for IDPs despite meager resources (2001)
- In North & South Kivu, influx of displaced, who are bereft of any means to provide for themselves and constitute a heavy burden on the families that host them (mid-2001)
- High level of malnutrition in Shabunda (South Kivu) due to drought and presence of displaced in host families
- 200,000 displaced in South Kivu do not have access to their field, which increases the burden of host families
- In North Kivu, the number of displaced in host families is often larger than the one of the members of the host family and malnutrition is high

"Two USCR site visits to remote areas of eastern Congo/Zaire [in 1997] found that the needs of many uprooted Congolese/Zairians were the same as the needs of families who never left their homes. Decades of exploitation by the Mobutu government and isolation from the outside world had left much of the population destitute, whether at home or displaced." (USCR 1998, p.61)

"Two consecutive wars in 1996-1997 and in 1998 prompted a large number of people to flee their home communities. In most cases, the displaced have lost their belongings and survival means, such as agricultural tools and seeds. They are being hosted by other rural communities whose capacity for agricultural production is already extremely weak due to a continued economic crisis, severe shortages of agricultural inputs and ongoing hostilities. The whole agricultural production system is, therefore, on the verge of collapse as the output dramatically diminishes and the demand for basic produce is almost doubling in the host communities. The most critical issue is the availability of agricultural inputs." (UN July 1999, p.32)

"No significant positive changes in the household food security were observed during 2000. Domestic agricultural production continued to be curtailed and levels of food imports were insufficient to cover the supply-demand gap. The size of this gap varies from region to region reaching at times levels of 35-40 %.

In spite of wide spread shortages and the food market's lopsidedness, the agricultural production in many parts of the country remains considerable. The available produce, however, does not reach its traditional markets because of the prevailing military and security situation. Larger groups of IDPs and their host communities and numerous urban residents are affected by chronic food shortages and unaffordable prices." (UN November 2000, p. 26)

"

"A remarkable feature of the Congolese crisis is the degree to which it spreads from region to region in the span of a few weeks. Population movement and massive presence of troops (both foreign and Congolese) serve as a vector for the spread of various deprivations into areas otherwise untouched by the conflict. A recent study conducted by FAO in northern Katanga suggested that each newly arrived displaced person creates a perceptible pressure on the host community's limited reserves (food, medicines) and reduces food consumption of an average four hosts. The size of impact would certainly vary from one host community to another depending on IDP/host ratio. When this ratio is high enough to dry up the host community's resources, both the hosts and IDP further displace in search of food and shelter, provoking a chain reaction. Although the behaviour of IDP and host communities varies from region to region depending on the availability of resources, the multiplier effect can be legitimately applied in every IDP hosting community." (UN November 2000, pp. 13-14)

"Congolese people are known for their hospitality. In the African tradition, room must always be made for a guest or those in need. Hundreds of thousands of Congolese who have been displaced by the fighting in eastern DRC have benefited from this tradition. Room has been made at the table in the homes of countless thousands of host communities throughout this war-torn region. Thanks to the generosity of the Congolese and their tradition of helping each other, large camps - so often the mark of similar crises - are not seen.

But this generosity comes at great cost. A household of six can host at most one extra person before the family's food security is seriously impacted. In the Kivus, this number is frequently far exceeded. On a recent mission to South Kivu, Refugees International interviewed displaced and host families where. The situation has reached a point in many communities where host families have exhausted their meager reserves of food and money, placing their own children at risk. When this point is reached, those displaced by fighting must move on in search of other shelter, thus repeating the process with a new host family." (RI 14 September 2000)

#### *Katanga*

"Although displaced people are the most vulnerable, many host communities have suffered from the additional strain imposed by providing for the displaced. In Kioko (northern Katanga), Nuova Frontiera did not find that the global malnutrition rate among under fives was significantly higher in the displaced population (24.6 per cent of the sample) than in local communities." (Oxfam August 2001, p.26)

"The influx of displaced people since May 1999 has impoverished the host communities [...].

Although suffering greatly from raids by government troops and by fighting between government troops and Mai Mai rebels, these host communities have continued to use much of their meagre resources to care for the displaced people." (WV 30 July 2001)

#### *Kivus*

"La sécheresse précoce et la présence des déplacés dans des familles d'accueil renforcent le taux élevé de malnutrition. Il varie entre 4,9% et 11,3%. 15% des enfants de 5 ans meurent de malnutrition dans le territoire de Shabunda.

200.000 déplacés n'ont pas accès à leurs champs, exposant ainsi la communauté d'accueil à de lourdes charges. [...]

*In North Kivu*, "A continual influx of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing the conflict areas continue to deplete the resources of the local population. Both urban and rural areas are hosting a vast

number of displaced persons who are in dire need of life sustaining assistance. These people are bereft of any means to provide for themselves and they constitute a heavy burden on the families that host them – families already impoverished due to the political, economic and ecological degradation endemic in the DRC." (ACT 10 August 2001)

"Dans les familles, le nombre des déplacés dépasse souvent celui des membres de la famille d'accueil. En conséquence, l'état nutritionnel de la population est préoccupant surtout chez les enfants de moins de 5 ans, les femmes enceintes ou allaitantes. Le taux de malnutrition protéino- énergétique se situe entre 5 et 13 % selon la FAO. " (UN OCHA September 2001)

*In South Kivu*, "The displaced rely on the hospitality of rural communities which are themselves weakened by the war, while the effects of the underlying socio-economic crisis are all pervasive." (ACT 13 July 2001)

### **Coping and survival mechanisms of IDPs in South Kivu (2000)**

- IDPs have lost both their land, their tools and other farming inputs
- Breakdown in cash crop production cause decreased expenditure on any non-food items, such as healthcare and education
- Host families do not necessarily have a prior relationship with the IDPs
- Proximity to the village of origin of great importance for continued food production
- Income is mostly generated by selling labor

"ACF-USA undertook a nutritional survey of children aged 6-59 months and mothers in Lemera health zone, South Kivu in January 2000 [...]. Lemera is part of the Moyens Plateaux food economy zone, its altitude (which determines the vegetation and cultivation type) varies from 1,200-2,000m. Prior to the wars in 1996 and 1998, cassava, beans, rice, bananas, sweet potatoes, maize and coffee were all grown. Much of the produce was sold. The war caused displacement and a breakdown of irrigation and infrastructure systems. Much of the population have moved off their land and have lost their tools and other farming inputs. The insecurity continues together with regular displacements and systematic looting. As reported above, this has resulted in very decreased expenditure on any non-food items, such as healthcare and education. ACF-USA provided seeds and tools to 10,000 households in September 1999 and plans to do so again later this year" (ACC/SCN 31 March 2000, p.15; original source ACF-USA January 2000).

"ACF-USA held a survey in April 2000 to gauge the survival strategies of the population. Two thirds of the IDPs in the survey say they have fled their homes without taking anything. The others could take some objects (manioc, kitchen utensils, clothes), a little money (max. \$5), goats (max. 2pc) and some medicines (some paracetamol tablets). They are very dependent on the host family for cooking ware, roofing, sleeping mats, etc.

Host families do not necessarily have a prior relationship with the IDPs. Mutual help is common. Only few charge rental money (in Uvira: Kasenga) at least during the first months. In exchange, the IDPs help with the farming (and sometimes household).

The income of IDP families varies according to:

- Their proximity to the village of origin. If the fields are not too far, the women and sometimes the men take the risk of harvesting their manioc.
- Their starting capital. If they were able to take some money, they invest in a few food items they can sell with a profit. Palm oil, salt, manioc and fish, for instance, can be bought in bulk and sold in detail. Or they can be processed before sale: manioc becomes manioc flour, fish is dried, etc. The added value can be increased by selling in Burundi and make a profit on the exchange rate if the border is nearby and the road is open.

Income is mostly generated by selling labor. One day on the field earns \$0.3 or a few manioc roots. This is limited to 2-3 days per week (at the time of survey, the season was off). Harvesting and selling wood, selling some of family belongings they were able to bring (e.g. piece of cloth or pagne) add to these resources. To compare, a medical visit costs \$0.3 for a child and \$0.6 for an adult, if the reduced rates are applied. The full rate is \$0.5 for a child and \$1 for an adult.

Most of the work is done by the women, especially when their husband was not a farmer before being displaced. Men only become involved if the wife is sick or near a full term pregnancy.

Expenses are therefore very limited. Food is the main expense, followed by health care and necessities such as soap. School attendance is rare. The health of IDPs is quite bad. They are weakened by their escape and families from the Plateaux are very sensitive to the change in climate, and more vulnerable to malaria. The very low quality and quantity of their food intake makes them even more vulnerable. They eat one meal per day, often 60-70% composed of fou-fou (preparation of manioc flour). Animal proteins stay below 10% of the intake." (AAH August 2000, sect. 6.3)

### **Military operations cause general deteriorating food security (1999-2000)**

- Estimated that 10 million Congolese on both sides of the frontline face food shortages of varying degree (February 2000)
- Major food producing areas devastated by the ongoing war (i.e. the Kivus, Northern Katanga, parts of Maniema, western and eastern Orientale, central Equateur)
- Increase in the number of parents abandoning children they had no means to feed in Kasai Orientale (July 2000)

"Starting from the end of 1999, a series of attempts were made by specialised organisations to quantify food needs in the DRC and envisage humanitarian interventions in a diversified manner to meet both war-inflicted needs and consequences of an economic collapse. It is now believed that some 10 million Congolese on both sides of the frontline face food shortages of varying degree. Furthermore, the current food crisis will inevitably lead of a sustained deficit for a relatively long period since: a) the majority of food producing and processing regions of the DRC (the Kivus, Northern Katanga, parts of Maniema, western and eastern Orientale, central Equateur) are seriously affected or devastated by the ongoing war; over 800,000 farmers have been displaced and lost their production capacity in eastern DRC alone; b) food importers are disengaging from western DRC; and c) road, fluvial and railway infrastructure is crippled by insecurity and appalling dilapidation.

An EU sponsored study- "Food Economy Zones in Eastern DRC" conducted by the Food Economy Group in conjunction with SCF indicated that already now there is an obvious decline in the quality and quantity of foodstuff consumed by farmers in traditionally wealthy agricultural regions of the Kivu." (OCHA 15 February 2000)

"The civilian population of Kabinda in Kasai Orientale is reported to be facing an acute shortage of food and essential commodities, with access to agricultural land denied by the RPA and rebel Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD) that control the area, according to humanitarian sources in the DRC. A disturbing result of this situation was an increase in the past year in the number of parents abandoning children they had no means to feed, they said. The local administration was doing its best to help hundreds of deserted, homeless and orphaned children under 10 years of age, many of whom were in poor shape. Neither was there much promise of relief unless an NGO came through with assistance for the children, the sources added." (IRIN 24 July 2000)

## DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

### General

---

#### **62% of women in DRC marry under customary law and cannot get inheritance priority (Oct 2001)**

"A national campaign to inform people of the advantages to officially registering their marriages was launched last week by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Family (Ministere des Affaires sociales et Famille) of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in collaboration with UNICEF.

According to a statement from UNICEF in Kinshasa, a widow and her children are given inheritance priority under state law, as opposed to customary law, where other family members may make claims of the deceased assets. A woman is also entitled to greater protection against spousal abuse under state law. An estimated 62 percent of women in the DRC marry under customary law, while only 25 percent officially register their marriages with the state." (IRIN 1 Oct 2001)

## PROPERTY ISSUES

### General

---

#### **IDPs from Bunia area (Orientale Province) may lose their land if do not return home within a month (2001)**

"Officials of the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups in northeastern DRC have appealed to people who fled fighting in the Bunia area to return to their homes and resume their daily activities, as calm had now returned, rebel-controlled Radio Candip reported on Saturday. Officials warned that if people displaced from the Malili region did not return within one month, their land would be given away.

In February, the rival Hema and Lendu communities signed a pact aimed at resolving land disputes in the region that had left thousands of people dead during the preceding 18 months. Under the agreement, both ethnic groups were to send representatives into the rural areas to sensitise residents on peaceful co-existence and mutual tolerance, and a follow-up commission was to monitor and move the process forward." (IRIN-CEA 9 July 2001)

# PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

## General

---

### **IRC survey says that 43% of displaced persons who fled Mt Nyiragongo eruption do not want to relocate west of Goma (2001)**

"IRC conducted a cluster survey using a random spatial sampling method on Jan. 26 - 27, 2002. Two hundred forty households containing a total of 1937 displaced people were interviewed in 24 locations across the city. Major findings included:

43% of displaced said that they were not willing to relocate to Mugunga. Another 14% indicated they would go only if highly unlikely circumstances (i.e., given a prefabricated home) were realized. The majority of the remaining 43% said they would relocate only if building materials and/or support were made available.

86% of interviewees indicated that they were unwilling to relocate to Sake.

When asked what it would take to relocate to Mugunga, Sake, or "some other place," only 8% of people expressed a desire to live in "some other place."

When contemplating resettlement, people ranked having their own place as being more important than the possibility of employment, which in turn was more important than educational opportunities and/or security.

While 18% of interviewees claim to have held jobs for at least two days during most weeks in 2001, only 4% claim to be presently employed. [...]

An IRC Spatial Water Use Survey on Jan. 23, 2002 revealed that approximately 58% of households were hosting displaced and that 27% of the city's current population had lost their homes. The fate of these displaced remains undetermined. The potential options discussed by local and UN officials for resettling the displaced include encouraging people to relocate to the western edge of Goma town or the former Mugunga camp (just west of Goma), or the town of Sake, the closest major center to the west of Goma. This survey was undertaken at the request of OCHA to evaluate the attitudes and values of Goma's displaced population with regard to resettlement in a new location." (IRC 7 March 2002)

### **With the ceasefire holding, IDPs are starting to go home (2001)**

- In Maniema, returnees from the forest are without any resources (Sept 01)
- In Equateur, people are slowly returning to areas where MONUC observers are deployed (Aug 01)
- In Katanga, people leave the forest to return to destroyed villages (July 01)
- In Nov 2001, the UN said that many IDPs in Equateur and in Katanga were expected to go home
- In Shabunda (South Kivu), IDPs continue to return from the forest despite insecurity (Dec 01)

"Villagers who fled during three years of civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo have begun trickling home since a ceasefire took hold earlier this year, bringing tales of months spent living on wild plants and fowl in the bush." (Reuters 5 July 2001)

### **Maniema**

"Les familles qui ont put quitter les forêts pour rentrer aux villages se retrouvent complètement démunis et ne peuvent réintégrer le circuit agro-économique de base.

Aucun service d'encadrement rural n'étant opérationnel, on assiste à une dégénérescence des semences." (UN OCHA September 2001)

"Dans la région de Kalima, il a été dénombré, par le consortium regroupant des églises et des ONGs locales, 21.598 déplacés et 2.811 retournés qui se réinstallent petit à petit dans leurs villages sur l'axe de Lubile." (UN OCHA 12 September 2001)

### **Equateur**

"Thousands of people who had fled from Equateur Province are reported to be slowly returning to areas where the Observers of the United Nations Mission in DRC (MONUC) have been deployed." (WFP 10 August 2001)

### **Katanga**

"Tens of thousands of people displaced by war are starting to leave the forest where they were hiding and are now heading home to villages which are completely destroyed," WFP spokeswoman Christiane Berthiaume said in Geneva.

'These people have nothing left, are in a deplorable state and suffering from serious malnutrition, with children in particular suffering from severe health problems,' Berthiaume said. [...]

A ceasefire is now holding in the province and across the entire country, allowing UN peacekeepers to move in and relief agencies to get access to the sick and hungry." (AFP 19 July 2001)

In November 2001, the UN said that "it is thought most likely that the growing stability in both Equateur and north Katanga will allow considerable numbers to return to their homes and reduce the IDP figure by 500,000 to 1.5 million [...]." (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001, p.36)

### **In North Kivu insecurity maintained by troops and militia discourage the displaced to return home**

"Troops and militia maintain a continuous state of insecurity in different corners of the province namely the North West of Masisi, the South West of Lubero and the North East of Beni (in and around the Ruwenzori massif). Violence and armed clashes are a daily occurrence depending on the tendency of the political or economic interests of the armed groups. Their activities discourage the displaced persons to return to their homelands where they have their means of livelihood." (ACT 10 August 2001)

### **In Shabunda (South Kivu), IDPs continue to return from the forest despite insecurity**

"In Shabunda (South Kivu province), MSF-H reported that the food security situation was deteriorating and local markets were almost empty. While the population has been able to harvest only surrounding lands, more IDPs suffering from malnutrition and other illnesses continue to return from the forest." (WFP 28 Dec 2001)

## HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

### Limitation of access caused by the conflict

---

#### **Improved access to government controlled-areas but decreased access in rebel-held areas (2001-2002)**

- More freedom of movement in the West since March 2001 announcement by government of free movement of persons and goods
- Improved access to certain isolated areas in eastern DRC thank to deployment of UN Mission (2001)
- As of Feb 2002, lack of roads and lack of funds still prevent humanitarian actors fulfilling their role
- In eastern DRC, great insecurity limited activities of humanitarian agencies and led to an increased recourse to air interventions
- Except Kinshasa in security phase 3, the rest of the country is under security phase 4

"2001 has been characterized by an emerging contradiction: expanding humanitarian space along the formal and now quiet frontline renders ever more visible the contrast between a western DRC waiting for more signs of normalcy and economic recovery, and patterns of acute malnutrition in the zones located across "sub-frontlines", essentially in northern Katanga and southern Kivu, strongly characterized by defiance and lack of trust from respective armed forces. In these areas, humanitarian space has shrunk dramatically, raising essential questions as to how to address head-on the sources of instability: a potent mixture of a proliferation of small arms, instrumentalised hate between communities, and overwhelming exhaustion and abject poverty. At all times, the threat posed by insecurity has to be finely balanced with the absolute necessity to follow up on field assessments that attest to the gravity of the situation and to cope with the "pull factor" exerted by the assessments on the surrounding population.

At the country level, the Minister of Health's request that the humanitarian community carry out humanitarian assessments in all parts of the country and subsequent announcement by the Government on 24 March that free movement of persons and goods was restored were extremely welcome developments. They echoed a longstanding plea by OCHA and the humanitarian community in general that, rather than simply link relief efforts to the criteria of proximity, it was imperative to track and focus on the most vulnerable if the humanitarian community was to effectively combat the massive mortality in DRC. Following these moves, crossing the frontline for trade and family purposes is now taken for granted by civilians along the frontline and is not opposed by forces from any side. Some additional steps still need to be taken to fulfill the March commitments, such as the establishing practices for humanitarian actors to move to a rebel-held area without starting from Kinshasa. Expanding the use of these practices should widen the scope of opportunities within each province, facilitate the return of displaced people and simplify logistical arrangements.

Administrative obstacles also restrict movements in government-held areas, especially in the conventional disengagement "buffer-zone" near Mbandaka. However, assessments in some newly accessible areas reveal needs similar to those experienced in rebel-held areas. Surveys such as that carried out by MSF in Songwe in northern Katanga, which showed an appalling infant mortality rate of 12 per 10,000 a day, could have been found on either side of the frontline. The outbreak of cholera that affected Ankoro, northern Katanga,

in October 2001 was contained through a combined UN Emergency Humanitarian Intervention and MSF's Congo Emergency Pool (PUC), originated in the rebel-held Kabalo health zone.

In eastern DRC, the killing in April of six ICRC relief workers in Ituri and the massive influx of armed forces in May in areas of the Kivus provinces limited activities of humanitarian agencies and led to an increased recourse to air interventions. It is assumed that only some urban localities are reachable at any given time – a major hurdle being the cost of air operation - while inhabitants and displaced in rural areas are left to decide whether to remain outside the reach of assistance or to move closer to relief operations. The interventions in Kabinda and Shabunda in March highlighted this dilemma. In both locations, long-awaited decisions to airlift or truck in emergency supplies, while saving lives, exacerbated displacement patterns by drawing in local populations through the promise of manufactured goods and non food items.

Destitution is also a barrier to assistance. Large portions of conflict-prone areas such as Ituri, northern Katanga and southern South Kivu harbor thousands of families whose level of destitution – they are without any clothing at all – is so great that they are unwilling to try to return home." (UN OCHA 26 November 2001, p.16)

"Another ironic twist is the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in areas newly accessible. After months and months of crying for access, humanitarian organizations are now 'free' to operate in some provinces of DRC. Security may have improved, but the lack of roads on the one hand, and the lack of funds on the other, just as surely prevent humanitarian actors fulfilling their role. Almost the only solution lies in the potential re-opening of the commercial river and rail routes, thus enabling the Congolese to sustain themselves as they have been forced to do for decades." (UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002, p.4)

"The bulk of humanitarian challenges remain in the eastern parts of the country. Security matters and issues of access and humanitarian principles are more complex and numerous in these areas of the DRC. While all of the parties to the conflict claim to respect humanitarian principles and principles of engagement in humanitarian assistance in the DRC, they largely neglect and violate them in practice." (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001, p.53)

"Ongoing security constraints, particularly in Ituri and South Kivu, have left large numbers of people without external assistance." (UN SC 16 Oct 2001)

"The prevailing insecurity significantly restricted the ability of humanitarian agencies to assist populations in need. In some locations in North and South Kivu, Maniema and northern Katanga, agencies were forced to suspend operations because of insecurity and localized violence. In Ituri, threats and harassment forced agencies to restrict their movements to Bunia town. Insecurity often forces humanitarian agencies to rely on expensive air transport, further hampering humanitarian assistance efforts." (UN SC 15 Feb 2002, para.72)

"The region [Maniema] was only 30 percent accessible to humanitarian groups, and water supplies and sanitation in Kindu were suffering as a result, the UN said in its latest daily information bulletin." (AFP 2 Feb 2002)

"The security situation in the DRC has globally improved but remains critical in eastern and northern regions. With the exception of Kinshasa in security phase 3, the rest of the country is under security phase 4." (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001, p.53)

### **Increased difficulty to reach vulnerable populations in Maniema Province (Feb 2002)**

- Less than 30% of Maniema is now accessible to humanitarian actors
- All the villages between Nyoka and Kalima are emptied of their population

"L'accessibilité des populations vulnérables devient une préoccupation pour les acteurs humanitaires opérant dans la province du Maniema. Ainsi, suite à la multiplicité des attaques des mayi mayi dans la ville de Kindu et à sa périphérie ainsi qu'à l'insécurité qui prévaut dans les territoires administratifs de Punia et de Kailo, l'accessibilité s'avère réduite à moins de 30%. A titre d'exemple, l'ONG Merlin qui intervenait dans trois zones de santé (Kindu, Kalima et Punia) ne peut plus acheminer les médicaments et le matériel dans la zone de santé de Punia, et sur les 41 aires de santé que comptent les zones de santé de Kindu et Kalima, seules douze sont accessibles. De plus, suite à l'embuscade tendue au véhicule de Merlin, le 25 janvier sur la route Kalima-Kindu, cette ONG vient de décider de suspendre tout mouvement en dehors de la ville de Kindu.

Selon des personnes qui ont fait la route Kindu-Kalima, dont une équipe du Consortium des ONG et Eglises locales, tous les villages à partir de Nyoka, situé à 19 km à l'est de Kindu, jusqu'à Kalima sont vides de leurs populations. Une marée de personnes en provenance aussi bien de ces villages que de Kailo, se dirige vers la cité minière de Kalima. Dans cette ville, à l'instar de Kindu, il est rapporté que les paysans ne peuvent pas accéder à leurs champs. Une campagne menée par des militaires du RCD et les autorités locales met en garde toute personne qui se rendrait dans la forêt, pouvant ainsi être assimilé à un mayi mayi." (UN OCHA 15 Feb 2002)

### **Frequent attacks on relief workers hinders the delivering of assistance to the displaced (2000-2002)**

- Increase of attacks on relief workers in 2000
- In April 2001, 6 ICRC workers were killed in Ituri province
- Several attacks against MONUC in Aug-Sept 2001
- In Oct 2001, four World Vision International staff were kidnapped on the road Beni-Bunia in the north-east of the country (North Kivu-Orientale Province)
- Ambush of MERLIN vehicle in Jan 02 on the road Kalima-Kindu in Maniema Province

"Over the past months, attacks on relief workers have sharply increased. Most organizations have given up these Territories or stopped their movements and the population is abandoned. Apart regular field visits from donors (USAID, ECHO), FAO and OCHA and a recent trip by UNHCR, no UN agency has been physically present in Uvira there since August 1998. Recently, only IMC, ICRC and Action against Hunger-USA had regular international staff presence. In June, a large part of their activities were suspended due to an ambush on an IMC vehicle. ACF-USA has just initiated a major dissemination campaign to help all the armed groups understand the principles and life-saving importance of humanitarian aid. At the same time, it demands unobstructed access to all those in need. ACF-USA intends to deploy again soon.

[...]

The situation [in South Kivu] is particularly unsafe with Maï Maï, FDD and Interahamwe organizing ambushes on the road and fighting regularly against RCD soldiers. These fights are often followed by reprisals against the civilian population. As a consequence they flee from village to village and return home a few days later or not at all. Initially, the main obstacle of humanitarian work was the harassment by the RCD military. Being underpaid and underfed, relief supplies and rides in relief vehicles became attractive commodities. More recently, the attacks by the Maï Maï, FDD and Interahamwe on relief workers have multiplied. This has not only diminished humanitarian access to a population in urgent need of assistance, but also gradually eliminated the only remaining witnesses to its plight. " (AAH August 2000, sects.1, 2)

"Until a few months ago, most incidents were of the nature of harassment at checkpoints, confiscation of vehicles or looting of supplies. At times, Maï Maï/FDD/Interahamwe took over areas or made them inaccessible by cutting off the road. A few agencies could work in the Territories of Uvira and Fizi,

accepting regular interruptions, some loss of relief goods and a certain risk of being caught in one of many small attacks. But in the last six months, the presence of the underground armed groups such as the Mai Mai, Interahamwe or FDD has become widespread in the area. The increased hostilities directed against the Banyamulenge have added another explosive element. Whatever may be the reason, violent incidents, more and more involving relief workers, are clearly on the rise. (AAH August 2000, sects. 5.1, 7.2)

*On April 26, 6 ICRC workers were killed.* "The humanitarian community in Ituri province in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is gradually resuming activities that had been suspended since 27 April following the murder of six staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a humanitarian source based in Bunia confirmed to IRIN on Wednesday." (IRIN-CEA 27 June 2001)

"On 16 August, a MONUC helicopter was hit by 14 bullets, fired by unidentified armed men as it flew between Uvira and Kalemie. It was able to land safely. Later, on 3 September, a MONUC patrol was held up and robbed at Mouchouchi (6 km along the Bukavu-Walungu road) by unidentified armed men. On 27 September, a locally recruited MONUC staff member in Goma was found dead in circumstances that suggested armed robbery." (UN SC 16 Oct 2001)

"Quatre agents de l'ONG World Vision International ont été victimes d'un enlèvement dans leur véhicule le 15 octobre à Livia (40 km sur la route Beni-Bunia). Avant d'être relâchés, ils ont été dépouillés de leurs effets personnels." (UN OCHA 22 Oct 2001)

"[...] suite à l'embuscade tendue au véhicule de Merlin, le 25 janvier sur la route Kalima-Kindu, cette ONG vient de décider de suspendre tout mouvement en dehors de la ville de Kindu" (UN OCHA 15 Feb 2002)

### **Humanitarian access reduced during 2000**

- · In the east, insecurity has often prevented humanitarian access
- · In government-held territory, access depended on Kinshasa's centralised decision making procedures
- · Poor access to South Kivu due to fighting among rebel groups, reprisal on civilian population and looting of relief supplies (August 2000)
- · Major donors are based in Kinshasa and not in Eastern DRC due to travel restrictions
- · Attacks on relief workers sharply increased in 2000, particularly in the Kivus where attacks by the Maï Maï, FDD and Interahamwe on relief workers multiplied

" In rebel-held areas, the main impediment to humanitarian access has been insecurity. This has been a consistent problem since the start of the war in 1998, with threats being posed by occupying armies as well as by non-state armed groups in conflict with Rwandan troops, Ugandan troops, the RCD, and the FLC. Fighting around resource-rich areas has been most frequent, leading to a reduction in humanitarian access. It is often difficult to know who is the controlling authority for a particular area, and whether that authority can provide any guarantees of security. The situation is unpredictable and dangerous. Attacks against humanitarian workers are frequent and sometimes fatal. Even though the war along the conventional frontline has more or less ceased, eastern DRC has suffered an increase in violence. Humanitarian access is therefore often sporadic, depending on the security of particular areas." (Oxfam August 2001, p.13)

"Although the number of insecure areas where there is military activity, inter-ethnic tensions, and banditry, is much greater in eastern DRC, most security related interdictions have been imposed by the DRC

authorities on agencies operating in western provinces of the country. Legitimate concerns of authorities as far as the accredited humanitarian personnel are concerned, do often go beyond the absolute necessity to maintain minimum security standards.

[...]

Vast areas of the country are considered unsafe because of the presence of unpaid soldiers, retreating deserters, etc. Military checkpoints established on major axes (roads, river, railway) are impeding free circulation of persons and goods even within entities controlled by the same forces. Because of an inefficient chain of command, the military field officers do not often obey written authorisations and permissions issued by central authorities to travelling relief personnel." (UN November 2000)

"Whereas several international relief agencies are operational in the Kivus, working out of the relative safety of Goma and Bukavu, only very few have been deployed in the southern part of South Kivu, the "Territoires" of Uvira and Fizi. Yet more than a third of its population is displaced either internally or in refugee camps in Tanzania. Both Territories are currently suffering the third consecutive drought, destroying a large part of the crops, while an epidemic disease (foot and mouth disease) has affected the cattle. The health care system has collapsed. Thousands of severely malnourished were being assisted by Action Against Hunger in feeding centers until most of those were looted or closed because it became too dangerous for the population to get there and for the relief workers to run them." (AAH August 2000)

"Regrettably, many of the problems in delivering desperately needed aid to eastern Congo are due to the fact that all major donors as well as United Nations agencies are headquartered in Kinshasa. Most international staff have never visited the east due to travel restrictions imposed by donor governments reluctant to offend Kinshasa or give the appearance of lending support to the rebels. The lack of field experience results in a myopic view of the Congo. As a result, UN and donor government decisions about what is possible in eastern Congo are often based on conjecture and unfounded perceptions. This faulty analysis imposes undue hardship on the Congolese people." (RI 5 May 2000)

## NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

### National Response

---

#### **Government's decision to allow freedom of movement in the entire country aims to facilitate the return of the displaced (2001)**

- Following the UN's request, the government of DRC decided on March 24 to authorize freedom of movement for persons and for goods in the entire country, in compliance with the Lusaka agreement
- This measure should help to reunite families, the return of internally displaced to their homes and to improve a dire food situation

"Le gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo a décidé ce samedi 24 mars d'autoriser la libre circulation des personnes et des biens sur l'ensemble du territoire national, conformément à l'accord de Lusaka. [...]

La libre circulation concerne les voies de communication terrestre, fluviale, lacustre, aérienne et maritime. Cette mesure se justifie par le souci de réunifier les familles séparées par la guerre et de faciliter le retour des déplacés de guerre dans leur lieux de résidence. Cette décision va aider également au rétablissement des échanges commerciaux à travers toute l'étendue du territoire national afin d'enrayer la crise alimentaire qui sévit actuellement en RDC." (OCHA 31 March 2001)

"In western DRC, humanitarian space was limited by the previous government's unwillingness to grant permission to foreigners to travel outside Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. Permission was regulated by the Ministry of the Interior, and was bogged down by bureaucracy and suspicion. International NGOs were almost never granted travel authorisations or the mining permits required for travel to designated mining areas, such as most of the two Kasai provinces. Unable to start programmes, given these constraints on access, agencies could provide only limited assistance to government-held areas. Between August 1998 and March 2001, very little humanitarian aid reached populations affected by the war in Katanga, Equateur, and the two Kasai provinces, despite a growing body of information about the level of need.

In March 2001, the new government changed this policy, approving freedom of movement for international personnel. Access to many areas has now improved, although expatriate staff still find travel to designated mining areas cumbersome. Humanitarian missions are being dispatched to government-held areas cut off for almost three years, and some of these have found very serious situations." (Oxfam August 2001, pp.13-14)

#### **RCD-Goma authorities start taxing humanitarian donations from international community (September 2001)**

- In search of new sources of revenues following the drop in the price of coltan, rebel authorities in the east have started to tax humanitarian supplies, jeopardizing humanitarian effort

"The most positive development in the war-torn Congo today is the drop in the price of coltan, a mineral ore with super conductivity at high temperatures, much desired on the world market today for use in computer chips. Coltan is mined extensively in the eastern Congo and profits from the trade are a major

source of income for the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma), the rebel movement that governs much of the region with military and political support from the Rwandan government. Human rights advocates have called for an international embargo on coltan imports from the Congo on the grounds that the trade in this mineral fuels the civil war. While an embargo has not been implemented, the slump in the technology sector, which coincided with the opening of a huge new coltan mine in Australia, has led to a collapse in the price of coltan, jeopardizing the financial viability of the RCD.

While the plunge in the international price of coltan leaves the RCD-Goma with fewer resources to pursue further conflict, it forces their leadership to identify other sources of income. One obvious target is the international humanitarian community based in the eastern Congo. Humanitarian donations from the international community are generally tax-exempt. The RCD-Goma authorities recently informed one international NGO that shipments of donated medicines would henceforth be taxed at the rate of 5% of their commercial worth. Until this new tax is paid, they are holding all other cargo imported by this NGO. Another international NGO in Bukavu was just presented with a letter from the RCD-Goma demanding \$100,000 for back taxes on salaries paid to expatriates. Further harassment of this type will jeopardize the humanitarian aid effort in the eastern Congo, an effort that is already completely inadequate to meet the needs of the Congolese population cut off from basic services and unable to meet their own food needs due to the continuing conflict." (RI 4 September 2001)

## **International coordination mechanisms**

---

### **UN mechanisms for coordination (1999-2001)**

- Weekly UN Country Management Team Disaster Management Team meetings
- Creation of thematic group on humanitarian assistance to IDPs and affected populations (OCHA)
- In July 2001, international humanitarian community focused on health and food security in DRC, at a Conference in Geneva

"Coordination structures functioned in 2001 according to a two-pronged mechanism decided by the IASC: merging of Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Coordinator functions and centralized coordination functions in Kinshasa around the UN country team, while at the provincial level, particularly in rebel-held areas, coordination has been entirely delegated to local representatives of UN operational agencies (UNICEF in Northern Kivu and Province Orientale, WFP in Southern Kivu). OCHA was asked to support these provincial humanitarian coordinators.

Specific Actions included:

- The UN system, MONUC, ICRC and NGOs, regularly discussed the global strategy and common approach to the crisis in the DRC

- Emergency Humanitarian Interventions have been instrumental in responding to the most immediate needs.

-The "peace boat" operation between government and FLC held areas has been a major success in starting the process of overcoming the divisions between the government and rebel-held regions of the country. This initiative has started to open up lines of economic trade, enhanced inter-communal contacts and ameliorated the humanitarian situation.

-OCHA and MONUC Emergency Relief Funds are closely coordinated since September 2001.

-WHO and the Ministry of Health are working together to reinforce and strengthen the epidemiological surveillance.

- WHO's newly appointed Great Lakes Coordinator assumed his functions in September and began by supporting the WHO DRC office in the coordination of humanitarian health interventions
- The WHO/UNICEF meeting held in Nairobi in September brought together several provincial medecins inspecteurs as well as other humanitarian partners in a coordination meeting that embodied the principles of health as a bridge for peace.
- Food security is monitored by a thematic group chaired by FAO. This group is supported by an Emergency Agriculture Coordination structure composed of two main offices: Kinshasa and Goma, eight sub-offices and three local units which enable FAO and its NGOs and UN partners to monitor the food security situation and implement large inputs distribution campaigns.
- Emergency coordination facilitated the delivery of 300 MT of WFP food by plane to North Katanga while increasing possibilities for other types of assistance (safe motherhood, advocacy for humanitarian principles and access, revival of economic capacities).

The following reports and plans have been produced:

- National Health Sector Development Plan (UNDP/WHO)
- Reproductive Health Problem Analysis (UNFPA)
- National Strategic Plan Against AIDS (UNDP/WHO)
- Plan for the Reconstruction of the Education sector (UNDP/UNESCO)
- Community Struggle against Poverty (UNDP/DESA)
- Reports on the situation of children (UNICEF); MICS2 underway throughout the country.

Thematic groups have been created in order to re-launch durable solutions: HI/-AIDS (WHO), nutrition (WFP), humanitarian assistance to IDPs and affected populations (OCHA), human rights (OHCHR), logistics (WFP), population, women and development (UNFPA), struggle against poverty (UNDP)." (UN OCHA 26 November 2001)

"On July 9 and 10, 2001, the international humanitarian community participated in a conference in Geneva, Switzerland focusing on health and food security in the DRC. The conference participants approved of the public health approach in humanitarian assistance that supports local structures and encourages community participation. Regarding food security, UN agencies, donors, and NGO partners agreed to continue support for traditional food security interventions (seeds and tools distributions, assistance to nutrition centers) and bolster small-scale infrastructure projects (maintain feeder roads and small bridges, and introduce micro credit activities where appropriate). In addition, they reached a consensus on the need for improved coordination and information sharing, and the need to deploy a senior UN Humanitarian Coordinator to Kinshasa." (USAID 20 August 2001)

### **Deployment of UN mission, MONUC, to help implementing Lusaka agreement and monitor security conditions (1999-2002)**

- On June 15, 2001, UN SC adopted Resolution 1355, which extended the mandate of MONUC for another year and strengthened its mandate to include a civilian police force component
- UN Secretary General said in Feb 2002 that the phase II deployment of MONUC had been concluded successfully
- He also recommended that the UN Security Council increase the overall number of UN troops and police in the country
- MONUC is the most complex logistical mission ever undertaken by the United Nations (March 02)

"Efforts by the Secretary-General, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) led in July 1999 to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Signed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, along with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, it

provided for an end of hostilities and for the holding of an inter-Congolese dialogue. The "Lusaka Agreement" included provisions for the normalization of the situation along the border; the control of illicit arms trafficking and infiltration of armed groups; the holding of a national dialogue; and the establishment of a mechanism for disarming militias and armed groups. It also provided for a Joint Military Commission (JMC) composed of two representatives from each party under a neutral Chairman appointed by the OAU. The two rebel factions signed the agreement in August. To help implement the agreement, the Council authorized the deployment of 90 United Nations military liaison officers to strategic areas in the country and to the capitals of the signatory States.

To maintain liaison with the parties, assist in implementing the agreement and monitor security conditions, the Security Council in November established the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), incorporating the personnel it had authorized earlier on. In February 2000, the Council expanded the size and mandate of the mission, which was to monitor implementation of the ceasefire, support disarmament and demobilization, and provide support to the facilitator of the National Dialogue. The Council authorized the use of force by MONUC to protect United Nations personnel and civilians under imminent threat of violence, and made the deployment of the Mission to its authorized strength of 5,500 contingent on adequate access, security and cooperation. Continued fighting prevented full deployment.

In January 2001, President Laurent Kabila was killed. The Security Council met formally four times in February to discuss the changing situation in the country. Laurent Kabila's son, Joseph, assumed the Presidency and in February, at separate meetings, both he and Rwandan President Paul Kagame addressed the Council. It seemed the impasse might be broken. The Secretary-General proposed an updated concept of MONUC operations to monitor and verify ceasefire and disengagement plans, and, on 22 February, the Council adopted a resolution endorsing this new concept and calling for rapid implementation of disengagement plans. Reports in late February and early March were received of withdrawals of Ugandan and Rwandan troops from the territory of the Democratic Republic.

In June this year, the Council extended the mandate of MONUC until 15 June 2002, by adopting resolution 1355. That extension was, however, subject to a review of progress every four months. By that resolution, the Council also approved an updated concept of operations put forward by the Secretary-General in his eighth report on the Mission, which included the creation of a civilian police component and an integrated civilian/military planning section to coordinate disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration (DDRR) operations. It also includes a strengthening of MONUC's presence in Kisangani, and a strengthening of the Mission's logistic support capability to facilitate current and foreseen future deployment.

The Council also authorized MONUC to deploy military observers in locations where early withdrawal was implemented, to monitor the process and to expand the civilian component of MONUC in accordance with the recommendations in his report, in order to establish a human rights monitoring capacity, as well as civilian political affairs and humanitarian affairs offices within the Mission.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council demanded that Ugandan and Rwandan forces and all other foreign forces withdraw from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in compliance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. It demanded that the Front de Liberation du Congo (FLC) disengage and withdraw its forces, in accordance with the commitment it made to the Council mission in their meeting of 25 May 2001, and expressed its intention to monitor that process. It also demanded that RCD demilitarize Kisangani.

On 6 July 2001, in a Presidential statement, the Security Council expressed its concern about the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The statement noted that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo still maintained positions beyond the disengagement line, the FLC had not fulfilled its commitment to withdraw its forces to agreed-on positions by 1 June 2001, and that the Ralliement pour la Démocratie au Congo-Goma (RDC-Goma) had failed to disengage Kisangani and has obstructed

MONUC operations. Council members called on all forces to withdraw to the agreed-upon positions as a matter of urgency.

Council members also expressed concern about the impact on the peace process by the activities of groups such as the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, the Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) and the Force Nationale de Libération (FNL), and reminded all parties, including the Government that -- under Security Council resolution 1355 and other resolutions -- they should cease immediately all support to such groups." (UN SC 30 August 2001)

In September 2001, "The main warring parties in the DRC have asked the UN to accelerate the deployment of peacekeeping troops to help disarm militia groups in the country [...].

MONUC has already deployed hundreds of unarmed military observers, backed by around 2,000 troops, to monitor a ceasefire and withdrawal from front-line positions of the conventional armies involved in the war. Now that the withdrawal is almost complete, the UN is drawing up plans to send more troops to help in the disarmament of the militia groups involved in the war. However, the UN asserts that primary responsibility for the disarmament process lies with the countries involved in the war." (IRIN-CEA 21 September 2001)

"The UN Mission in DRC (MONUC) has been allocated US \$1 million to implement small, quick impact projects throughout the country, a MONUC statement said on Wednesday. The amount, released by the Security Council, is intended to cover areas essential to the Congolese population such as sanitation, health, basic medical supplies, water and electricity supply and the rehabilitation of schools. [...]

[...] in Kalemie MONUC funds will be used to rehabilitate a reception centre for war displaced people." (IRIN-CEA 11 July 2001)

To view UN SC Resolution 1355 extending the MONUC mandate until 15 June 2002, please see [[External Link](#)]

"The phase II deployment of MONUC has been concluded successfully. In order to facilitate the deployment of military observers teams in preparation for phase III, the establishment of the four coordination centers at Basankusu, Boende, Ilebo and Manono has further strengthened the existing mission structure. In addition, MONUC has established on February 20 [2002] a forward headquarters and a forward base in Kindu to provide the necessary access and information to start and support the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process. The initial force will consist of 200 Uruguayan infantrymen and 200 Uruguayan engineers. They will be reinforced progressively, and up to 2,500 troops will be deployed for Phase III during this year. Therefore, the Mission's DDRRR [Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration] Division has become operational and has begun working with the parties to the Lusaka Agreement, the Joint Military Commission, and the armed groups. Even though MONUC has adopted a voluntarily approach towards the DDRRR there is a need for caution in dealing with groups that are heavily armed, and engage in frequent violent clashes. The general approach is also aimed at promoting the economic and social normalization of the situation in the east and fostering a climate of confidence. The MONUC military task force stationed at the forward base in Kindu will spread out in company groups, together with military observers and DDRRR personnel, to sites where armed groups are located, in order to collect information on the groups." (UN OCHA 28 Feb 2002, p.15)

"The efforts of the MONUC administration to commence vigorous logistical preparations for the entry into phase III have been hampered by delays in securing the cooperation of the RCD authorities with regard to the access to premises required for the accommodation of military contingents, refurbishment of facilities and infrastructure repairs in Kisangani. Furthermore, RCD continued to create obstacles to the free and unimpeded operation of MONUC contractors in the Goma region by levying indirect taxes such as excise

duties, refusing to authorize the release of already delivered fuel and water and, in one instance, impounding the contractor's vehicle." (UN SC 15 Feb 2002, para.56)

"Noting difficulties in the eastward deployment of the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has recommended that the Security Council consider increasing the overall number of UN troops and police in the country." (UN News Service 19 Feb 2002)

"The United Nations operation in the Congo was the most complex logistical mission ever undertaken by the United Nations, the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) was told this morning as it concluded its consideration of the financing of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

The Assistant Secretary-General for Missions Support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Michael Sheehan, said that MONUC was a massive operation of a size and scope never before undertaken by the United Nations. Unlike all other peacekeeping operations, this "massive operation in a country broken by years of war and neglect" was also being undertaken without the participation of military units from developed countries." (UN GA 12 March 2002)

*To see the UN SC Resolution 1376 (2001) describing the requirements for Phase III implementation, [\[External Link\]](#)*

***The [home page of MONUC](#) contains links to recent UN documents on DRC***

### **UN Security Council defines new approach to be taken by MONUC (February 2001)**

- New operations plan focused on verifying and monitoring the disengagement of conventional forces
- Disarmament of armed groups and the reconstruction of the Congolese Army a secondary task
- The revised plan foresees deployment of approximately 2,500 personnel and decreases armed troops from 3,400 to 1,900

"The long stalled MONUC has started deploying following passage of Resolution 1341 [on 22 february 2001]. This hopeful development results in part from the political thaw that accompanied Joseph Kabila's rise to power. At the same time, it is the consequence of serious rethinking within the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) on how to accomplish its mission more effectively.

The Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement originally called upon the UN to deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force under a Chapter VII mandate. The force's expected role was to supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of foreign forces, to collect and account for weapons held by civilians, and to provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict. The mission also included peace enforcement. UN troops were to track down and disarm non-signatory forces, screen them for mass killers and other war criminals, and hand over suspected 'génocidaires' to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

The enormity of the task of deploying a peacekeeping force to the DRC whatever its mandate was clear from the outset. Security Council officials in New York were loath to accept responsibility for what they expected to be a disaster. The U.S. Congress, which contributes one-third of any peacekeeping operation's budget, was equally wary of what appeared to be a dangerous Congolese quagmire.

Compelled to placate these conflicting concerns, the UN Secretary General decreed that the force deployed to the Congo must be both militarily credible and cheap. Armed with this guidance DPKO planners designed a Concept of Operations for MONUC, which was adopted on 24 February 2000 by the Security

Council (Resolution 1291). In addition to 500 observers and support units, the UN would deploy four mechanised infantry battalions. This force was to establish four strong points in the DRC to which, in the event of trouble, the observers could retreat. The total mission would number 5,537 soldiers.

Over the next year the shortcomings of this plan became clear. The immediate task of the observers was to verify and monitor the disengagement of belligerents. The concept of operations implied, however, that this would have to wait for the deployment of the infantry battalions, which was expected to take at least six months. Moreover, planners could expect additional delays due to the uncertain availability and preparedness of units the member states had pledged. Finally, it was never clear what purpose these armed forces would serve once deployed. From the outset, pundits ridiculed the notion that a four-battalion strong MONUC was militarily credible or even capable of defending itself. UN officials agreed that only a massive force could realistically bring a semblance of security to the country. Anything less, they worried, would encourage false expectations among the Congolese that would probably lead to another humiliating peacekeeping failure.

While the revised Concept of Operations is a substantial improvement, it leaves some questions unanswered. Planners have once again side stepped how to disarm groups such as the Interahamwe in the hope that the belligerents reach a political consensus. UN officials now think 'the only solution to disarmament is co-operation between the government of Rwanda and the government of DRC'.

Prior to Laurent Kabila's death, DPKO began to revise its concept of operations for the Congo. Its motivation was above all the logistical difficulties involved in equipping and deploying the four infantry battalions. Planners were also afraid that the UN would be unprepared to seize the moment if the belligerents suddenly agreed to begin disengagement.<sup>15</sup> In fact, this had occurred after the signing of the 8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan, when a lack of funds for leasing aircraft prevented the immediate deployment of observers.

Under the new operations plan, the re-tooled force is tailored to accomplish the limited mission of verifying and monitoring the disengagement of conventional forces. This is an achievable objective if the belligerents co-operate. The document identifies other likely missions such as the disarmament of armed groups and the reconstruction of the Congolese Army, but delays these tasks until a later stage.

The revised plan foresees deployment of approximately 2,500 personnel and decreases armed troops from 3,400 to 1,900. Based on the understanding that the primary threat facing the UN forces is theft or sabotage rather than armed attack, planners have decided to deploy 'guard and security companies' to protect MONUC equipment and installations, instead of the logistically burdensome mechanised battalions. These armed troops will not be capable of rescuing at risk observers however, as was foreseen in the original concept of operations. Commanders must therefore remain vigilant to threats faced by the observers and be ready to withdraw them from regions where they might be at risk. The force is also to be augmented by additional command and control, aviation, logistical, and medical capabilities." (ICG 16 March 2001, sect.IIB)

### **UN and NGO sub-offices to get closer to isolated IDP communities and other vulnerable populations (2000-2001)**

- During 2000, OCHA established three new sub-offices, in Mbandaka, Bunia and Gbadolite in addition to the existing ones in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Goma and Bukavu
- WFP, FAO, Solidarités, MSF, IRC and other agencies have opened a number of sub-offices and antennae in the field in order to get closer to isolated IDP communities (2001)
- WHO strengthens the surveillance of diseases in the provinces (2001)

"The expansion of its structure through the establishment of 3 sub-offices, in Mbandaka, Bunia and Gbadolite in addition to the existing ones in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Goma and Bukavu, strengthened OCHA's information collection network, analysis and response capacities as well as sound and customised methodologies for collection and treatment of statistics on internally displaced persons (IDPs)." (UN November 2000, p. 83)

"In the past nine months, WHO has set up 11 provincial 'antennae' staffed with medical epidemiologists, logisticians and radio communications and recruited 42 epidemiologists to work at district level Both levels are funded by the Global Polio Campaign but are charged in their terms of reference with addressing the much broader brief of strengthening surveillance of all epidemic-prone diseases as well as polio." (WHO 9 August 2001)

"WFP, FAO, Solidarités, MSF, IRC and other agencies have opened a number of sub-offices and antennae in the field in order to get closer to displaced communities living in isolated locations. WFP opened new premises, including in Kamina, Zongo. Thanks to recent OFDA funding the FAO emergency coordination unit is now established in Kinshasa, Goma and in 7 antennae, thus allowing better food security and vulnerability assessment as well as the supervision of operations. OCHA's network now comprises ten offices throughout the country, thus providing NGOs and agencies with increased opportunities for information sharing and analysis, exploratory and planning missions. WHO's polio antennae in the provinces have continued working on integrated disease surveillance. Likewise, indirect interventions through local structures proved successful such as in Ituri where UNICEF relies on the local NGO SOS Grands Lacs to implement a child tracing and reintegration programme. In violence-torn Masisi, patient action and deep-rooted bonds among various interest groups enabled Agro Action Allemande to achieve a road rehabilitation programme that has prompted a significant increase in farming, trade and transport, which in turn contributed to a decrease in commodity prices in town." (UN OCHA 26 November 2001, p.15)

### **Principles of Engagement for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance in the DRC (November 1998)**

- Principles elaborated at a meeting of the humanitarian community in Nairobi on 23 November 1998
- Principles based on the ICRC's Code of Conduct
- Principles endorsed by the Government and main rebel group

"Late last year [1997] the worsening humanitarian situation in the DRC together with increased security risks to humanitarian agencies made it necessary to seek consensus on a common approach to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, based on the application of agreed principles. This set of principles – the Principles of Engagement for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo – aims at increasing the efficiency and pertinence of aid and maximising the humanitarian space for the relief community. They are based on the ICRC's Code of Conduct and were first set out at a meeting in Nairobi on 23 November 1998.

The principles are addressed to the international humanitarian community as well as to the political and military authorities in the DRC. General overarching principles are defined as impartiality; neutrality; independence (aid based solely on need); human rights; participation with local partners; coordination between agencies; transparency of humanitarian actors; and accountability. In addition, some general protocols are mentioned with regard to accessibility, security and types of intervention, and monitoring and evaluation. The principles also set out some practical means for improving coordination mechanisms and monitoring compliance to the principles." (RRN November 1998)

"Shortly after the advent of the Congolese crisis, the humanitarian community developed 'Principles of Engagement for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance in the DRC' [...] as a basis for humanitarian interventions in the DRC. The document reflects basic international norms and practices governing humanitarian action, and was endorsed by UN agencies, various NGOs and donors, notably ECHO and the US.

During a mission of the Deputy to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to the DRC in January 1999, the 'Principles of Engagement' were accepted by the DRC government and the RCD in Goma.

The document laid the groundwork for the resumption of UN humanitarian activities in the eastern provinces and emphasised the non-political character of humanitarian action. As a result and through active engagement with authorities at national, provincial and local level, the relief community increased its access to beneficiaries. Direct positive results achieved in 1999 include:

Legal and humanitarian assistance to endangered ethnic minorities;  
Access to war prisoners on both sides of the frontline;  
Safe havens for Sudanese refugees, where possible;  
Nation-wide polio immunisation campaigns on both sides of the frontline;  
Commitment from authorities to stop child recruitment and demobilise child-soldiers;  
Establishment of joint UN humanitarian offices in Goma and Bukavu"  
(UN November 1999, p.65)

---

### **Text of the principles:**

#### **"Introduction**

The worsening humanitarian situation in the democratic Republic of Congo, in particular in the Eastern part of the country, together with increased security risks both to personnel and assets of humanitarian agencies, made it necessary to seek consensus on a common approach to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, based on the application of a set of agreed principles. This set of principles aims at increasing the efficiency and the pertinence of the delivered aid and maximising the humanitarian space for the relieved community.

The set of principles is addressed to the international Humanitarian community as well as to the political and military authorities. General overarching principles are defined under 1) while some general protocols, mainly on accessibility, security and types of interventions, monitoring and evaluation are mentioned under 2)

#### **1) Overarching Principles**

The present document, together with the 'Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief', which most assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its guiding principle is... 'The right to receive humanitarian assistance and to offer it is a fundamental humanitarian principle, which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to affected populations, is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility. The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. When we give humanitarian aid, it is no a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such'... (Reference: Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster relief, 7/9/98, p.2)

#### **Impartiality:**

Aid will be delivered without discrimination as to ethnicity, religious beliefs or political opinion. Humanitarian assistance should be provided solely on the basis of needs.

#### **Neutrality-Apolitical nature of humanitarian aid:**

Aid agencies will be neutral in providing humanitarian assistance and must stress the apolitical nature of humanitarian assistance. The action of aid agencies will not imply recognition of or confer legitimacy of the authority in control of the area in which humanitarian assistance is provided.

**Independence:**

The assistance provided will be depended solely on needs, giving priority to the most urgent and stressing situations, and will not be influenced by political, economic or military considerations.

**Human Rights:**

The promotion of human rights is an essential part of humanitarian assistance and may range from passive monitoring of respect for human rights to pro-active human rights advocacy. These activities will be guided by International Human Law and by the mandates given by International Instruments to various humanitarian organisations such as UNHCHR, UNHCR, and ICRC.

**Participation:**

Beneficiaries, local partners and local structures should be involved, wherever possible, in the need assessment, provision and monitoring of humanitarian emergency assistance, so as to provide sustainability in the long term.

**Coordination:**

Participating agencies commit themselves to enhanced co-ordination and mutual support using the existing co-ordination mechanisms.

**Transparency:**

Humanitarian programmes and aid agencies operating in the country must be totally transparent in all their workings and dealings with relevant authorities. Transparency should be achieved through the regular flow of information to the relevant authorities and vice versa. This principle should be applied without prejudice to the security of the beneficiaries.

**Accountability:**

Implementing partners hold themselves accountable to both those they seek to assist and those from whom they accept resources.

**2) Protocol**

**Freedom of access:**

Parties to the conflict should ensure unimpeded access for assessment, delivery and monitoring of humanitarian aid to potential beneficiaries. The assistance to affected areas should be provided in the most efficient manner and by the most accessible routes.

**Security:**

The relevant authorities are responsible for creating conditions conducive to the implementing of humanitarian activities. This must cover the security of local and international staff as well as all assets. The restitution of requisitioned assets is an essential indication of the goodwill of the authorities. Agencies look to the local authorities to take responsibilities for ensuring the return of assets wherever possible. The security of the civil population in conflict zones is the responsibility of the relevant authorities.

**Escorts:**

Armed escorts should only be used as a last resort for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas of serious insecurity. The co-ordinating body should evaluate the need for an armed escort on a case by case basis.

**Joint assessments and types of intervention:**

Where possible basic humanitarian needs and beneficiaries will be identified through joint assessment missions, which would also define the necessary package of assistance to mitigate and prevent life threatening situations. Interventions will involve local communities, wherever possible, and be designed to strengthen existing local capacities.

**Monitoring and Evaluation:**

Monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian assistance will be jointly undertaken by aid agencies and local partners, in cooperation with donors. Mechanisms will be put in place to monitor compliance with the principles of engagement. " (OCHA 25 January 1999)

## UN Response

---

### 2002 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal: project requirements and strategy

*The table below is a summary of project requirements per agency or NGO. A note has been added in italics in the description of the project when IDPs are mentioned as target population. For more details, it is recommended to consult the [2002 Appeal document](#) if more detailed information is needed. The total appeal amounts to US\$ 194,140,365.*

2002 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Democratic Republic of the Congo List of Project Activities- By Appealing Agency / Partners <i>January-December 2002</i>		
Project Code	Appealing Agency / Activity	Requirement (US\$)
<b>Food and Agricultural Organization</b>		
DRC-02/A01	Assistance to households with malnourished children through distribution of agricultural inputs using feeding centers <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	1,111,250
DRC-02/CSS05	Support to coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance in the agricultural sector	687,000
DRC-02/A02	Provision of essential agricultural inputs to vulnerable households <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	16,855,000
DRC-02/A03	Emergency support to the rehabilitation of fisheries and fish farming activities <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	1,793,000
DRC-02/A05	Support to production of good quality seeds <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	2,040,000
DRC-02/ER/I10	Emergency assistance to rehabilitate feeder roads	2,290,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>24,776,250</b>
<b>International Organization for Migration</b>		
DRC-02/A04	Improve the food security and lower the price of the basic agricultural commodities through the enhancement of the agricultural production in the traditional regions of production and the improvement of the delivery and commercialization system. <i>Target group: most vulnerable of Western Kasai, Bandundu and Kinshasa provinces</i>	1,600,000
DRC-02/ER/I02	Provide Transport, and Reintegration assistance to the most vulnerable groups in the displaced population and assist them, the resident population and the Government of the DRC repair and maintain the social infrastructure (hospitals. schools. main	4,300,000

	and rural roads, rails and bridges) and implement income-generating community development micro-projects <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>5,900,000</b>
<b>Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs</b>		
DRC-02/CSS04	Co-ordination of humanitarian assistance; peace and confidence-building initiatives	3,724,136
DRC-02/CSS02	Emergency Humanitarian Interventions <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	6,500,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>10,224,136</b>
<b>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</b>		
DRC-02/P/ HR/RL02	Human rights monitoring and technical cooperation programmes in the DRC	1,480,807
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1,480,807</b>
<b>United Nations Children's Fund</b>		
DRC-02/S/NF01	Assistance to the most vulnerable displaced and refugee children and women <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	4,000,000
DRC-02/H04	Emergency primary health care <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	2,000,000
DRC-02/H05	Nutrition rehabilitation and promotion <i>Target group: children in areas affected by conflict/displacement</i>	2,200,000
DRC-02/H06	Emergency measles immunisation	15,000,000
DRC-02/H08	HIV/AIDS prevention in Eastern Congo <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	1,000,000
DRC-02/H10	Malaria control in The Democratic Republic of the Congo	4,500,000
DRC-02/E01	Educational response for internally displaced and war affected children <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	3,800,000
DRC-02/P/HR/RL01	Protection of Children Severely Affected by Armed Conflict <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	2,500,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>35,000,000</b>
<b>United Nations Development Programme</b>		
DRC-02/CSS03	Support to local emergency response mechanisms	790,000
DRC-02/S/NF02	Project of re-housing of vulnerable populations <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	3,752,960
DRC-02/ER/I01	Economic and social reintegration of vulnerable groups	722,500
DRC-02/ER/I03	Support to income generating activities in favor of women in Kisangani town.	570,000

DRC-02/ER/I11	Rehabilitation of basic infrastructure in Kisangani	560,000
DRC-02/ER/I12	Micro-credit/grants Programs in favor of women.	700,000
DRC-02/ER/I14	Completion of anti erosion works to protect the site of the Kinshasa University.	3,067,211
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>10,162,671</b>
<b>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</b>		
DRC-02/MS/01	Provide international protection and humanitarian assistance to refugees in DRC and assist and facilitate the safe return of refugees to and from the DRC.	23,374,392
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>23,374,392</b>
<b>World Food Programme</b>		
DRC-02/F01	Protracted relief and recovery operation for war-affected victims and vulnerable groups <i>Target population includes IDPs</i>	35,581,255
DRC-02/CSS01	Common Humanitarian Passenger Air Service	3,589,870
DRC-02/ER/I13	Rehabilitation of the rail bridge over the Niemba river	830,263
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>40,001,388</b>
<b>World Health Organization</b>		
DRC-02/H02	Reduction of pregnancy related morbidity and mortality <i>Target group: pregnant women of 30 health zones in Kisangani, Bunia, Goma, Bukavu, Uvira and Kalemie</i>	3,480,000
DRC-02/H03	Reduction of child mortality <i>Target group: 2 million children under 5</i>	4,410,000
DRC-02/H07	Strengthening the HIV/AIDS control programme in DRC; <i>target group: most vulnerable communities of 11 provinces</i>	1,860,000
DRC-02/H09	Malaria control in The Democratic Republic of the Congo	5,760,000
DRC-02/H11	Improvement of epidemiological surveillance and response systems including early warning systems, outbreak investigation and response	7,795,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>23,305,000</b>
<b>United Nations Population Fund</b>		
DRC-02/H01	Reduction of mortality rates and family planning <i>Target group: population of 30 health zones in Kisangani, Bunia, Goma, Bukavu, Uvira and Kalemie</i>	3,700,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>3,700,000</b>
<b>International Labour Organization</b>		

DRC-02/ER/108	Support to the resumption of co-operative banking and association movement activities in North and South Kivu	770,000
DRC-02/ER/109	Support to income generating activities accompanying IDPs reinstallation and reintegration <i>Target population includes IDPs in Equateur and the Kivus</i>	1,599,892
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>2,369,892</b>
<b>United Nations Security Co-ordinator</b>		
DRC-02/S01	Security of relief staff in the DRC	3,266,389
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>3,266,389</b>
<b>United Nations Development Fund for Women</b>		
DRC-02/P/HR/RL03	Gender Responsive Protection and Mainstreaming Gender in Peace-Building Efforts in DRC	594,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>594,000</b>
<b>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</b>		
DRC-02/P/HR/RL04	Concerts for Peace and National Reconciliation in the DRC	300,000
DRC-02/P/HR/RL05	Community radio for culture of peace	725,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1,025,000</b>
<b>MEMISA Belgium</b>		
DRC-02/MS02	Support to emergency intervention .	527,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>527,000</b>
<b>GRET (Groupe de Recherche et d'Echange Technologiques)</b>		
DRC-02/ER/104	Infrastructure rehabilitation (production, roads, education and health) in the devastated areas in the DRC.	1,800,000
DRC-02/ER/105	Support for saving and credit networks adjustment in the provinces under RCD control (North and South Kivu, Maniema, and Oriental province), diversification of financial services offered by these networks <i>Target group: population affected by war</i>	2,425,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>4,225,000</b>
<b>GTZ / COPEMECO</b>		
DRC-02/ER/106	Support for income Generating activities in Kisangani in DRC	692,050
DRC-02/ER/107	Support for micro finance activities	162,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>854,050</b>

<b>Handicap International</b>		
DRC-02/H11	Support the reeducation and orthopedic centers of Kinshasa and Mbuji Mayi	1,129,590
DRC-02/MA01	Mine destruction: training of a local demining team, mine clearance in Kisangani	1,254,800
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>2,384,390</b>
<b>TEARFUND</b>		
DRC-02/WS01	Operational Relief in South Kivu	970,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>970,000</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>194,140,365</b>

**"The strategy has four prongs:**

**Save lives** through a converging set of efforts towards addressing the causes of high mortality, including in those communities whose absence from any health care facilities is a primary factor of high mortality rates. This implies support to health and nutritional structures, a focus on deadliest pathologies, promotion of minimum health packages supported by appropriate furniture of supplies and materials, systematic HIV prevention and sensitization components within every relief intervention, and enhanced epidemiological surveillance. Joint rapid response under the Emergency Humanitarian Intervention (EHI) mechanism has proven to be a healthy catalyst for this integrated approach and will continue to be an effective tool for emergency action in a context still marked by scattered crises, volatile access and a transport infrastructure vacuum.

**Preserve livelihoods** of affected communities through the provision of agricultural inputs to displaced and host communities meeting basic requirements of stability, the provision of medium-term support to refugees, displaced and affected communities, the provision of return packages to different categories of target populations within an coherent reintegration framework (UN agencies, MONUC, NGO, Bretton Woods network), and support to community recovery initiatives at local level (UN, MONUC, IRC Quips and UNDP community schemes, distribution of farming inputs by FAO).

**Revive local economies** and contribute to a significant reduction of mortality and morbidity through increasing average purchasing power, rehabilitating feeder road/rail trunks through labour-intensive methods, creating credit schemes at local level, and interaction and sharing of objectives with the D-3 programme (child soldiers, demobilized nationals, and common labour-intensive projects in tense areas).

**Enhance the sense of fairness and justice** by promoting humanitarian principles among conflicting communities and armed groups and creating spaces for consultation among communities and between relief actors, local authorities and community representatives. " (UN 26 Nov 2001, pp.39-40)

**Revision of 2002 Consolidated Appeal following eruption of Nyiragongo volcano (February 2002)**

"Objectives of this update:

Ensure that the needs of the displaced, returnees and host families are met, by complementing efforts of other actors and also enhancing humanitarian actions already being carried out by relief agencies. The primary objective is to address the following needs of the affected populations and host families : food aid, shelter and relief items, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, education, HIV/AIDS, support to livelihoods of families, infrastructure, and logistics. More specifically, UNICEF, working with NGOs, will continue to address the issue of unaccompanied minors.

Sector	Agency	Amount Requested in this Donor Update (USD)
Food	WFP	11,956,224
Health and Nutrition	WHO UNICEF	2,184,000
HIV/AIDS Control and Prevention	UNICEF WHO	265,200
Water and Sanitation	UNICEF	102,000
Education	UNICEF	1,600,000
Shelter and Non-Food Items	UNICEF	2,917,000
Unaccompanied Minors	UNICEF	720,000
Support to the Livelihood of Homeless Families	FAO	1,000,000
Support to the Livelihood of Host Families	FAO	350,000
Infrastructure and Logistics	WFP	591,234
Total		21,685,658

(UN OCHA 19 Feb 2002)

### **Response to humanitarian needs following eruption of Nyiragongo volcano (Feb 2002)**

"The major threats to the lives of the most vulnerable affected, particularly children and women, include: (1) lack of shelter for the vast majority that cannot yet return to their homes; (2) the threat of disease, particularly cholera and other diarrhoeal diseases; (3) malnutrition; and (4) the potential for children to be separated from their families.

Humanitarian assistance was so far distributed in Goma and surrounding areas, Bukavu, and two refugee camps, Mudende and Nkamira in Rwanda. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees during the initial stages of the emergency situation in Gisenyi, Rwanda contributed non-food items from their stocks inside Rwanda and from the Emergency Stockpile in Tanzania worth US\$ 100,899. The items contributed include plastic sheeting, jerrycans, cooking sets, blankets. In addition to this, UNHCR is responsible for the management of the Nkamira Transit Centre which currently hosts some 6,000 persons. This Transit Centre is co-managed by UNHCR and MINALOC (the Rwanda Government). For the relief situation in Goma, UNHCR received a cash donation of US\$100,000 from the Organisation for Africa Unity (OAU) for the victims in Goma. UNHCR has procured non-food items of that value as a contribution to the UN Country Team effort. Items donated by UNHCR for Goma include therapeutic milk, medical kits, blankets, kitchen sets and plastic sheets.

Some 67,000 households received food rations, and members of the health commission conducted epidemic surveillance and health care response from the very beginning of the emergency. The Provincial Health Inspector together with the health commission and supported by WHO announced a one-month phase of free health care in the affected areas. As a result several health centres have so far received eight times their average number of patients. Host families have so far been providing temporary shelter to the homeless; and, to alleviate the situation relief agencies distributed plastic sheeting and tents to the most vulnerable homeless families.

Moreover, UN agencies have provided funds loaned from HQ and from existing country programme funds to respond to this emergency to date, including:

The non-food items Commission chaired by UNICEF distributed non-food supplies so far to 81,000 families in Goma. A more targeted distribution is programmed for an additional 14,000 households.

Mobilisation of more than 200 Mt of non-food items (14,000 jerrycans, 46,000 blankets, 13,500 plastic sheets, 25,000 packs of purification tablets, 30 Mt of soap, 200 tents, as well as 30 Mt of therapeutic food and BP5 biscuits). The items were flown from Kinshasa, Bujumbura and Copenhagen to Goma for distribution.

Six therapeutic feeding centers and health posts manned by NGOs received feeding kits and therapeutic food from UNICEF.

Chlorine to treat lake water collected by the population was provided by UNICEF.

More than 600 unaccompanied minors were identified in Rwanda, Goma and Bukavu and support was provided to implementing partners that provided care to them until the families were traced (by ICRC) and the children reunited.

A measles vaccination campaign to almost 400,000 children between ages 6 months and 15 years in the Goma area.

In Bukavu, non-food items were distributed to more than 10,000 people. 43 medical kits were distributed to health centres, and High Protein biscuits distributed to displaced children under 5 and pregnant and lactating mothers." (UN OCHA 19 Feb 2002)

*For an overview of humanitarian assistance (by OXFAM, ECHO, CARE, IRC, USAID, Save the Children, WFP, IFRC and Danish Church Aid), please see OCHA's Information Exchange Meeting, 23 January 2002, [see below]*

*For Christian Aid Response, please see Christian Aid 1 March 2002, "DR Congo: Goma emergency response update 1 March 2002" [see below]*

*For WFP EMOP 10166 Project document, "Assistance to Volcano Victims in Eastern DRC and Western Rwanda"(18 Jan-18 Apr. 2002), please see [[External Link](#)]*

### **The American Refugee Committee has programs benefiting IDPs in the Masisi Region (North Kivu) (Nov 2001)**

"ARC is targeting a population of more than 20,000 people in four localities in the Masisi Region of North Kivu. These include IDPs (internally displaced persons) along with former refugees who have recently returned from Rwanda. Both groups are exposed to numerous human rights violations including massacres, rapes and destruction of property.

ARC's program, which will also benefit affected local populations, will:

Offer primary and preventive health education.

Upgrade food security through distribution of seeds and tools and technical assistance.


Build and improve latrines.

Improve access to potable water through construction and maintenance of efficient water-flow systems.  
Provide training in areas such as agriculture, nutrition and hygiene to strengthen provision of basic services and increase community self-reliance.

With startup resources provided by a partner organization, ARC will also implement a microcredit program for those who qualify, targeting people interested in marketing agricultural surplus in the surrounding areas of Matanda, Mushaki and Sake." (ARC 7 Nov 2001)

### UN 2001 Appeal for DRC funded at 64.18% (2002)

- Emergency food aid and support to health structures attracted significant donor support

	<p><b>Table I : UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001 Summary of Requirements and Contributions - By Appealing Organization as of 07-March-2002</b></p>
---	---

Compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing organization.

Appealing Org.	Original Requirements	Revised Requirements	Contributions	Pledges	Carry over	Total resources available	Unmet Requirements	% Covered
FAO	10'655'000	10'655'000	3,842,514	0	0	3,842,514	6,812,486	36.06%
IOM	3'955'000	3'955'000	0	0	0	0	3,955,000	0.00%
OCHA	6'788'706	6'788'706	4,175,432	409,009	0	4,634,991	2,153,765	68.27%
OHCHR	1'344'941	1'344'941	1,382,830	0	0	1,382,830	(37,889)	100.00%
UNDP	1'750'000	1'750'000	0	308,182	0	308,182	1,391,818	20.47%
UNFPA	1'161'828	1'161'828	150,000	0	0	150,000	1,011,828	12.91%
UNHCR	25'303'286	25'303'286	20,962,208	0	0	20,962,208	4,341,078	82.84%
UNICEF	15'000'000	15'000'000	6,568,028	438,404	0	7,006,432	7,993,568	46.71%
UNSECOORD	2'942'896	2'942'896	629,870	467,757	0	1,097,627	1,845,269	37.30%
WFP	67'687'510	49'694'031	39,202,368	0	0	39,202,368	10,491,663	78.89%
WHO	2'875'674	4'260'352	210,000	0	0	210,000	4,050,352	4.93%
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>139'464'891</b>	<b>122'856'090</b>	<b>77'123'250</b>	<b>1,723,902</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>78,847,152</b>	<b>44,008,938</b>	<b>64.18%</b>

(UN OCHA 2002, "Financial Tracking")

"By November 2001, the Consolidated Appeal for 2001 had gathered 60% of the revised requested funds (approximately US\$ 74 million out of US\$ 123 million). Emergency food aid (76% of requirements met) and support to health structures (60% of requirements met) attracted significant donor support. "Hub mandates" such as coordination of humanitarian activities (50% of requirements met), joint response dynamics and security of operations (42% of requirements met for the latter) were also well-supported.

Food security also attracted growing interest, particularly when linked with previous sequences of nutrition and preventive food aid: WFP received 76% of requirements for emergency food assistance to IDPs, and the FAO emergency assistance through seeds and tools project received 36% of requirements (with additional pledges on the way). Three agencies received at least two thirds of their respective requirements: OCHA, HCR, WFP. However, the following sectors were woefully undersupported: economic recovery, education and maternal health. [...]

The USA was the major donor with 49% of the overall response (as of November), followed by ECHO (13%) and Japan (8%)." (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001, p.15)

### **FAO & WFP will support the reintegration of IDPs and the recovery of their host communities' food security (2002)**

"In zones crossed by front lines, where security conditions have recently improved, the return of displaced populations is hampered by their inability to resume normal activities because of lack of resources. Hence, their dependence on food aid continues. In turn those hosting returnees find themselves in a precarious condition that is at risk of further deterioration. They are unable to meet their immediate needs and are unable to overcome these obstacles on their own.

FAO intends to contribute to the reintegration of those IDPs and refugees who have expressed the wish to return to their area of origin (1.15 million persons). FAO and WFP will jointly provide assistance. Indeed, while returnees will receive seeds and tools upon arrival to immediately resume their farming activities, WFP will provide them with food rations sufficient to cover the period until the maturity of their own production. Similarly, host communities will benefit from seeds and tools distribution. [...]

Refugees and IDPs heavily rely on scarce natural resources placed at their disposal. The area of allocated land is often very limited and of poor soil quality, as observed by the joint FAO/HCR/WFP food assessment mission (JFEM) to refugee areas in Bas-Congo, Bandundu and Katanga. Not only do unsustainable agricultural practices lead to overuse, use of unsuitable land, and soil depletion of the land allocated to refugees and IDPs, but the land shortage can disturb sustainable local fallow mechanisms and reduce yields. Arable land thus often becomes a source of conflict between locals and displaced persons. Introduction of local and refugee communities to sustainable agricultural practices, such as agro-forestry, crop rotation, natural fertilization and viable alternatives, such as aquaculture and market gardening, is therefore recommended. In cooperation with humanitarian agencies and local NGOs, a capacity building programme will focus on training of trainers in sustainable cultivation techniques." (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001, p.46)

### **More than 4,440,000 war-affected people benefited from health projects in 2001 (Nov 2001)**

- Organization of national immunization days for polio and measles
- Minimum package of services designed for war conditions

"Although the number of health interventions remained small relative to the huge needs in the DRC, more than 4,440,000 people benefited from health projects. The focus during 2001 was on ensuring a minimum level of primary health care in the most affected areas of the country and reducing the impact of the failure of the public health service. [...]

Specific actions included:

*-534 health structures in 27 health zones serving an estimated 4,400,000 war-affected people are being provided with essential medicines and medical equipment. (UNICEF)*

*-Emergency measles immunization campaigns were conducted in Kabinda and North Katanga. Cholera preparedness stocks were pre-positioned in Kinshasa and Goma. Health workers in 300 centres in South Kivu were trained in cholera patient care.*

*-UNICEF supported NGO-managed nutritional feeding centres throughout the DRC. During the first semester, 23,700 severely malnourished children attended 71 therapeutic feeding centres. Attendance is expected to reach 50,000 children by the end of the year.*

*-To meet urgent needs among displaced and war-affected families, 17,700 families were provided with emergency relief kits. 21,000 additional kits will be distributed by the end of the year. Over 2,400 lactating mothers received baby kits.*

*-Surveillance activities and reporting on diseases of public health importance continued (WHO).*

*-Plans to introduce IMCI have been drafted and training of trainers has taken place (WHO).*

*-Outbreaks investigation and control activities undertaken by WHO for meningitis, plague and cholera.*

*-Defining and revising malaria national policies (WHO).*

*-In collaboration with UNFPA, training on reproductive health by WHO as well as redefining the national programme and supporting selected maternity units.*

*-A consensus and coordination meeting organized jointly by UNICEF and WHO was held in Nairobi. Participants from the health authorities in both government and rebel-held territories along with representatives from NGOs and donors discussed a minimum package of health interventions to be carried out in an emergency. [...]*

"During 2001, access to most health districts improved, although access to other areas remains limited by insecurity. "Days of tranquillity" were organised throughout the country to implement national immunisation days for polio, and included Vitamin A distribution and, in some zones, measles immunisation. As a follow-up to their joint mission, WHO and UNICEF organised a consultation in Nairobi to develop a joint strategy with the main partners to address the extreme high mortality in DRC. Health authorities from throughout the country, UN agencies, NGOs and donors developed for the first time a minimum package of services designed for war conditions and focused on immediate mortality reduction. The minimum package for health districts (Zones de Santé) in crisis proposes 30 actions directed at the seven leading causes of mortality and ill health in DRC: malaria, measles, diarrhoeal diseases, acute respiratory infections, malnutrition, pregnancy-related problems and HIV/TB. A surveillance system limited to those problems and others of epidemic potential (meningitis, cholera, hepatitis and viral haemorrhagic fevers) is proposed, along with support activities). A second package for post-acute areas is also proposed. This package comprises the minimum package for health districts in crisis and 15 additional activities, but is still more limited than the "normal" package of activities for primary care activities as developed by the Ministry of Health in DRC. (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001)

## **Overview of food & health assistance to the displaced population per province (2000-2001)**

*The following overview of IDP related humanitarian response for 2000 has been compiled from the "Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin" prepared by OCHA DRC and information from OCHA-Kinshasa for 2001:*

### **Orientale:**

"Emergency medical assistance (UNICEF, WHO and MSF/Belgium) is being provided to urban IDPs through health centres along the displacement roads and to 12,500 IDPs sheltered in several sites in Kisangani.

[...]

The humanitarian situation of IDPs in Ituri is reportedly improving as a result of a multi-sector health, nutrition, sanitation, and food security humanitarian response implemented by German Agro-Action, ICRC, UNICEF, Medair, OXFAM/UK, COOPI, FAO, and MSF/Holland. In Bunia Oxfam GB has thus far provided an appropriate water and sanitation response to 45,000 people in communities made vulnerable by displacements. By the end of June the first phase of the intervention was ended and 60,000 were getting access to safe water. The second phase of the programme envisages more durable, water and sanitation solutions to 90,000 people."(OCHA 11 July 2000)

"Most of the assistance between July and December [2000] has focused on Kisangani City because of difficulty in accessing the rural areas. With improving security ECC [Eglise du Christ au Congo] and its member churches now feel that assistance should try to target the rural population around Kisangani. There is much concern about the situation in those areas which have until now been inaccessible, as the health centers continue to see increasing cases of malnutrition among individuals arriving from rural areas. [...] The consensus among international agencies on the ground is that, with the present level of security, there is an opportunity to address the humanitarian needs of the population in and around Kisangani in an effective manner, thus allowing these communities to recover from the June war and regain their basic self-sufficiency." (ACT 19 January 2001, "Kisangani")

***Health sector:***

Certaines agences des Nations Unies et ONGs internationales interviennent dans la Province Orientale, notamment pour la prise en charge des enfants malnutris, les soins primaires, l'approvisionnement en médicaments... Il s'agit entre autres de : OMS, FNUAP, OCHA, UNICEF,MSF/Hollande, ICRC, Caritas, MEMISA, MALTEZER, IRC, Fondation Damien , MEDAIR, COOPI, Oxfam....[...]

***Food security sector:***

Les partenaires opérationnels dans le secteur de la sécurité alimentaire sont : FAO, PAM, UNICEF, HCR ,AAA...Leurs actions portent sur la distribution de nourriture, semences,..." (UN OCHA September 2001)

**North Kivu**

"Humanitarian interventions targeted at displaced populations in North Kivu are consistently improving in terms of coverage and quantity of assistance delivered. WFP for instance, recently completed the largest food distribution campaign since the beginning of the war. Some 7,250 IDP families or roughly 36,000 persons have received supplementary food rations. Non-food supplies are being provided by OXFAM/UNICEF. German Agro-Action, will be addressing some of the needs associated with this population in the coming months with USAID funding. "" (OCHA 11 July 2000)

***Health sector:***

"Au Nord- Kivu, les interventions de différents partenaires se focalisent principalement sur l'appui à certaines zones de santé (OMS,UNICEF, SANRU); l'approvisionnement en médicaments (ASRAMES); l'aménagement de 7 sites pour les IDPs (PAM avec le concours du CICR et des ONGs telles que AAA); la construction d'adduction d'eau dans le territoire de Walikale (GEA et GTZ);...[...]

***Food security sector:***

Les partenaires opérationnels dans le domaine de la sécurité alimentaire sont la FAO, le PAM, le CICR, Oxfam, Caritas, MSF, AAA, C.AID, SCF (UK). Leurs activités comprennent l'assistance à la population en vivres, semences, outils aratoires, produits phytosanitaires et zoo- sanitaires, petit bétail, outils de transformation des produits agricoles." (UN OCHA September 2001)

**South Kivu**

***Health sector:***

"Les principaux partenaires opérationnels au Sud- Kivu dans le secteur de la santé sont : OMS, UNICEF, CICR, MSF, SC, IRC, ODPI, CEMUBAC, BDOM, PSI, Die Johanniter, MEMISA,...L'APAMESK. [...]

***Food security sector:***

la FAO, le PAM, l'UNICEF, le CICR, Caritas, Christian Aid, FHI, SC, ODPI, CEMUBAC. Ils interviennent dans la distribution des vivres, semences et matériels aratoires dans les zones accessibles." (UN OCHA September 2001)

**Maniema**

***Health sector***

"La présence des agences des Nations Unies est encore très limitée au Maniema. Toutefois, les partenaires ci-après sont opérationnels:

- OMS: appui technique pour l'inspection provinciale de santé.
- OCHA: ouverture d'un bureau depuis peu.
- FOMETRO: approvisionnement en médicament dans les zones du sud de la province (Kasongo, Kibombo et Lusangi).
- MERLIN : ravitaillement en médicament dans les zones de santé de Kalima, Punia et Kindu.
- Oxfam- GB: eau et assainissement.
- CAEM, S.D.M., BDOM, FAO, CELPA: nutrition. [...]

***Food security sector:***

Les partenaires opérationnels dans le Maniema sont:

- FAO: distribution des semences maraîchères.
- PAM: distribution des vivres.
- Christian Aid: distribution des semences vivrières et outils aratoires." (OCHA September 2001)

**Katanga.**

***Health sector***

"Les partenaires ci- après interviennent au Katanga dans le secteur de la santé:

- OMS, UNICEF
- WV, MSF/Belgique, ICRC, Fondation Damien, Nuova Frontiera, SC (UK), AAH-USA, Fondation MISEREOR, CARITAS, Sœurs franciscaines des missionnaires de Marie, PAM, FAO, Vision Mondiale, CICR, OMS [...]

***Food Security sector:***

- FAO: Distribution des semences et outils agricoles aux agriculteurs.
- PAM: distribution des vivres aux- déplacés.
- HCR: distribution des vivres aux réfugiés
- AAH-USA, FHI, SCR, Nuova Frontiera, CICR." (UN OCHA September 2001)

**Eastern Kasai**

***Health sector:***

Les partenaires ci- après sont opérationnels au Kasai Oriental:

- OMS, CRS, Fondation Damien
- MDM, CRS, MEMISA. [...]

***Food security sector:***

Quelques actions sont menées dans le secteur de la sécurité alimentaire par:

- FAO: distribution des semences de maïs, de niébé, d'arachide ainsi que des outils aratoires (houes, machettes) aux ménages.
- CRS: appui aux centres nutritionnels de Kabinda." (UN OCHA September 2001)

**Western Kasai**

***Health sector:***

"Le Kasai occidental bénéficie de l'appui de l'OMS, UNICEF, CSI avec le concours du Bureau médico-social de l'Archidiocèse de Kananga. Ils interviennent dans le domaine d'appui au dépôt pharmaceutique et à 23 centres de santé et 3 hôpitaux de référence, notamment par la livraison en 2001 de 22 tonnes de matériel médical de base. [...]"

***Food Security Sector***

Les partenaires ci-après interviennent au Kasai occidental dans le secteur de sécurité alimentaire :

- FAO: distribution des semences vivrières
- PAM: distribution des vivres
- CSI: démarrage d'un programme de type «sécurité alimentaire» et «petite réhabilitation». (UN OCHA September 2001)

**Equateur:**

***Health sector:***

"Quelques agences des Nations Unies et ONGs interviennent à l'Equateur dans les domaines ci-après :

- UNICEF, CSI-B: programme d'aide d'urgence.
- MSF/B: appui aux centres de santé à Mbandaka.
- Fondation Damien: lutte contre la lèpre.
- OMS/PEV: couverture vaccinale et dépistage pour la ville et ses périphéries.
- AAA-USA, COOPI, ACF-USA, Memisa, CRS, MDM [...]"

***Food security sector***

- PAM: distribution de vivres à 3009 personnes en avril 2001 et fourniture de l'alimentation supplémentaire des groupes vulnérables avec le concours de BDOM et Caritas.
- FAO: fourniture de semences." (UN OCHA September 2001)

***Kinshasa***

***Health Sector***

Les partenaires opérationnels à Kinshasa dans le secteur de la santé sont OMS, FNUAP, CICR, CRS, IFRC, SC, MSF, WV, IRC, Fond Damien. [...]"

***Food security sector***

Le secteur de la sécurité alimentaire bénéficie de l'appui des agences des Nations Unies et OGNs ci-après: PAM, FAO, AAA- USA, SC (UK), ICRC, Caritas, BDOM, SC/UK, MSF." (UN OCHA September 2001)

**WFP & FAO increased the amount of food distributed in 2001 (Nov 2001)**

- WFP formalizes agreement with DRC Government to supply food to IDPs and other vulnerable groups (2001)

"On 6 February [2001], WFP formalized its agreement with the Government for the implementation of the first PRRO [Protracted Relief Recovery Operation] in the country. Under the agreement, WFP is hoping to provide a total of 134,565 tons of food to the most needy Congolese, over two years, at the overall operational and support cost of USD 112.3 million. However, only 13,100 tons of food have been resourced to date. [...]"

Through the PRRO, which follows several emergency operations in the region and country, WFP aims to supply food aid to 1.4 million beneficiaries this year and 1.16 million during 2002. The beneficiaries are mainly IDPs, malnourished children, vulnerable groups and refugees." (WFP 16 February 2001)

Despite the difficult conditions, WFP has considerably increased the amount of food distributed this year. FAO programmes have focused on building capacity to regain self-sufficiency by distributing seeds and tools to 380,000 households<sup>2</sup>. The survival of thousands of people is dependent on regular food distributions.

*-WFP assisted 200,000 IDPs and 150,000 members of vulnerable groups by supplying relief aid longer term for their survival and to ease their integration into host communities.*

*- FAO assisted in the integration of 180,000 refugees and IDP households within their host community by supporting agricultural activities (50,000 households in south and North Kivu; 20,000 in Kisangani; 9,000 in Equateur; 2,000 in North Katanga; 15,000 in South Katanga; 5,000 in Maniema; 15,000 in Kasai; 26,000 in Ituri and 5,000 in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo were assisted).*

*-Food assistance through Food for Work activities provided nutritional support while increasing sustainable means of subsistence.*

*- Food For Training programmes targeting women were implemented in soap making, fish conservation and market gardening.*

*- FAO supported the coping strategies of 160,000 conflict-affected households (vegetable gardening, food crop production, traditional fisheries, aquaculture, small animal breeding) mainly in rural Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Mbuyi Mayi, and Kananga.*

*- Food security programmes (promotion of vegetable gardening activities) were integrated into feeding centres to prevent the relapse of formerly malnourished children who have been discharged from the feeding centres.*

*- Paving the way for the early rehabilitation of a good quality seed production programme that benefited 40,000 farmers in the Kivu Provinces, Katanga, Bandundu, Bas Congo, and Plateau Bateke area.*

*- In response to the alarming situation of cassava production in DRC, FAO initiated projects aiming at supplying households with healthy cassava cuttings. These activities are being implemented throughout the country." (UN OCHA 26 November 2001)*

### **WFP's assistance to IDPs based on Emergency Reports (Aug 2001- Feb 2002)**

- Over the last six months WFP assisted IDPs and returnees in South Kivu, many highly food insecure
- Despite the prevailing insecurity and the limited access to beneficiaries, WFP continued to operate in the North Kivu province during that period
- WFP has been distributing food to IDPs in Katanga; in Nov 01, it completed a food for work project to resume rail traffic in North Katanga, which will enhance the resettlement of IDPs
- WFP established a first presence in the Equateur Province in 2000; it resumed food distribution for IDPs in Mbandaka in Oct. 01 and plans to provide food assistance to IDPs in the Province despite difficulty of access
- WFP distributed food to 35,500 IDPs in Kinshasa in December 01

### **South Kivu**

WFP "[...] assisted some 33,974 internally displaced persons (IDPs), malnourished children and accompanying families in Bukavu, south Kivu during the last week of July" (IRIN-CEA 6 August 2001)

"Due to insecurity in the Fizi Territory (South Kivu province), over 4,000 people fled to Baraka and Tanzania. WFP distributed 170 tons of food to 40,700 vulnerable people in South Kivu province, mainly returnees from 8 to 14 October. Returnees are still reportedly moving back to the relatively stable territories of South Kivu province. However, insecurity and the bad state of the roads remain major constraints for WFP to carry out large-scale food distributions in the province." (WFP 26 Oct 2001)

"Following confrontations between armed groups, massive displacement of population was reported in the South Kivu province. 3,500 households have fled to Kalonge on the axis North of Bukavu, while over 6,000 IDPs have gathered in Shabunda. 5,000 IDPs from Ubwari Island have also been reported in Baraka. Both local and displaced populations are highly food insecure at this time of the year, corresponding to the lean season. Access to these vulnerable groups remains problematic. As a result, WFP distributed less than 400 tons of food to 58,400 beneficiaries, mainly through nutritional programmes from 5 to 19 November [2001]." (WFP 23 Nov 2001)

"Insecurity still prevails in the South Kivu province, particularly in the Plaine de la Ruzizi, south Uvira and Kabare. Consequently, new displacements of populations were reported, in particular in Burhinyi, where over 5,000 people fled from Nirija. Some 4,600 IDPs from Kalonge have also gathered in Kabare. WFP's assistance to these needy populations is seriously hampered by insecurity on the road between Bukavu and Kabare." (WFP 28 Dec 2001)

#### **North Kivu**

"WFP in collaboration with German Agro Actin has started assisting over 150,000 IDPs in Grand Nord (North Kivu province). 50,000 IDPs have already received seeds and over 351 tons of food." (WFP 31 August 2001)

"WFP in collaboration with Save the Children Funds (SCF) assisted about 1,900 returning families in September, through seeds protection programmes in Kalembe and Mweso areas (North Kivu province). WFP and SCF have planned a post-distribution assessment mission to measure the impact of the food distributed on the socio-economic and nutritional situation in Kalembe and verify if the seeds distributed have been planted." (WFP 5 Oct 2001)

"From 1 to 21 November, WFP distributed over 350 tons of food to approximately 32,400 IDPs, returnees, malnourished children and other vulnerable groups in North Kivu province. On 21 November, WFP was completing food distribution to 4,000 returning families on the axis Kalungu-Nyamasasa-Kiniezi. However, due to persisting insecurity, displacement is still reported throughout the province. WFP is targeting 90,000 returnees and IDPs for food assistance in Mangina, Kivuye and Mihara." (WFP 23 Nov 2001)

"Despite the prevailing insecurity and the limited access to beneficiaries, WFP continued to operate in the North Kivu province. From 3 to 23 December, WFP distributed over 350 tons of food to approximately 37,800 vulnerable people. Among them, 26,300 malnourished persons benefited from WFP assistance in Butembo, Katwa, Mutwanga, Oicha, Kirotshu, Rushuru, Masisi and Kayna areas. Persisting confrontations in the North Kivu province caused the displacement of 16,250 persons from south of Lubero and Walikale towards Kikuku. Furthermore, harsh rains and hail ruined crops in Kikuku. WFP is planning to provide seeds protection packages to 5,000 returnees in partnership with World Relief in Rutshuru area." (WFP 4 Jan 2002)

"In Rutshuru, WFP is also planning to provide seed protection packages to 5,000 returnees in partnership with World Relief." (WFP 7 Jan 2002)

#### **Katanga**

"WFP expanded food assistance in the north-western part of the Katanga province, under Government control and is considering assisting people in Ankoro and Gwena areas, along the front-line. WFP completed food distribution to 14,000 IDPs in Kitenge." (WFP 31 August 2001)

"WFP is currently distributing food to IDPs in Mitwaba, Kabongo and Lubumbashi town (Katanga Province) (WFP 7 September 2001)

"WFP is also currently assisting 1000 persons, mainly IDPs involved in the drainage and clearing of Kalemie town [Northern Katanga]" (WFP 6 August 2001)

"WFP, the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and FAO carried out an assessment mission in Tundwa, northern Katanga province, where a high number of internally displaced people (IDPs) had been reported following insecurity in areas between Tundwa and Kioko. WFP reported that 1,050 IDPs have already received emergency food rations [...]." (IRIN 9 Oct 2001)

"WFP suspended its planned food distribution in Mitwaba (Katanga province) due to insecurity. WFP has established a presence in Kamina and is currently focusing its assistance on newly displaced people." (WFP 26 Oct 2001)

"Following the completion of a WFP FFW project aiming at clearing the railway line from Kalemie to the Niemba bridge (North Katanga province), rail traffic has resumed after three years of interruption. This will greatly enhance the resettlement of displaced populations and the resumption of commercial activities." (WFP 30 Nov 2001)

"In Malemba-Nkulu (Southern Katanga province), WFP in collaboration with Caritas is currently assisting IDPs in Kabala, Kabumbulu and Manono. WFP has been actively engaged in the distribution of seeds protection packages to displaced families in the suburbs of Lubumbashi and Kolwezi." (WFP 30 Nov 2001)

"Trains are once again running along the Kalemie railway in the eastern province of Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after the successful completion of a WFP food-for-work project. [...]"

Running from Kalemie, WFP's operational hub in rebel-held Katanga in eastern DRC to Niemba in the west, the railway will allow the Agency to shift urgently-needed emergency food aid to therapeutic feeding centers in isolated communities where children are dying from severe malnutrition." (WFP 11 Dec 2001)

"Following the resumption of the Special Operation 10117.0 on 21 December, WFP airlifted 136 tons of food to the Northern Katanga province. On 27 December, WFP's airlift was suspended for the second time due to a Jet A-1 fuel constraint. The balance of 78 tons will be delivered to Manono by MONUC when space will be available." (WFP 4 Jan 2002)

"A cholera epidemic has hit the province of Katanga. WFP is targeting 4,000 IDPs located in villages around Lubumbashi, where the cholera epidemic has spread out." (WFP 8 March 2002)

### **Equateur**

"Despite the recent withdrawal of armed forces to some 200 km north of Mbandaka, in Equateur Province, and the deployment of military observers by the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), the security remained precarious outside Mbandaka, WFP reported on Friday. Attempts to provide food relief for vulnerable local populations and internally displaced people (IDPs) around Mbandaka had been constrained by a volatile security situation (putting at risk WFP, partner staff and food stock), as well as by sketchy beneficiary figures, IDPs scattered over large areas, lack of partners, impassable bridges and roads, and the risk of land mines, it stated." (IRIN 18 June 2001)

"WFP established a first presence in the Equateur Province one year ago, when fierce confrontations induced massive displacements of populations towards Mbandaka. WFP currently assists 24,413 people, mainly IDPs in Mbandaka. With the ceasefire holding, the caseload of beneficiaries has been growing because of an influx of people who had been hiding in the forest, now looking for food and clothes." (WFP 5 Oct 2001)

"WFP resumed food distribution for IDPs in Mbandaka (Equateur province). Local populations in Basankusu, Befale, Makanza and Bolomba are in need of food assistance but access remains problematic. WFP took advantage of a MONUC flight to field an assessment mission in Befale, which also carried 2 tons of food. Food availability and accessibility in various areas of Equateur province has been greatly affected by looting and the presence of landmines. WFP intends to support the TFC run by MSF-B in Mbandaka and is currently looking into ways to overcome the logistical obstacles to expand food assistance in Basankusu." (WFP 26 Oct 2001)

"WFP is planning to continue to assist war-affected populations in Equateur province. This includes 29,000 IDPs in Mbandaka, many of whom have fled from the Oriental province, north Equateur and eastern provinces three years ago. In addition, WFP and FAO intend to assist 10,000 vulnerable persons in Bokungu area, providing them with seeds and food rations during the current agricultural season. Finally, more than 15,000 vulnerable families and IDPs have been registered in Basankusu.

Most of the WFP food distributions planned for December in Equateur province have been cancelled due to low food stocks. The barge, which departed for Mbandaka on 14 December with 500 tons of food, arrived in Mbandaka on 30 December. A next barge for Mbandaka should depart Kinshasa by 15 January. From 10 to 23 December, WFP distributed approximately 60 tons of food to cover the needs of 4,000 beneficiaries, including 3,100 floods-victims in Mbandaka area. 900 extremely vulnerable people received WFP assistance in Befale." (WFP 4 Jan 2002)

#### **Eastern Kasai**

"A massive influx of IDPs was reported in Kabinda (Kasai Oriental Province). IDPs were reported to be in a precarious nutritional status and medical infrastructure insufficient. For the past two years, WFP has supplied 43 tons of food on a monthly basis to around 4,000 children attending the nutritional centre run by Catholic Relief Services (CRS)" (WFP 25 May 2001)

#### **Kinshasa**

"WFP distributed 300 tons of food to 35,500 IDPs in Kinshasa on 26-29 December." (WFP 4 Jan 2002)

"In Kinshasa region, WFP plans to assist approximately 112,400 vulnerable people in March, including IDPs, malnourished people and persons involved in Food For Training (FFT) and FFW activities." (WFP 8 March 2002)

*To view the document for the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 6274.00, please see [\[External Link\]](#)*

#### **UNICEF distributes non-food assistance through international NGOs to IDPs (2001-2002)**

- In 2001, Caritas, Xavériens Brothers, World Vision and Memisa distributed UNICEF relief kits to displaced families
- In 2002, UNICEF aims to provide non-food items to 300,000 IDPs with an emphasis on children and women

"Between January and May 2001, UNICEF distributed non-food items to 18,000 displaced families. Within this distribution phases, the activities included:

In Kiribizi (North Kivu), Caritas distributed UNICEF relief kits to 1,400 families. The NGO Solidarités, with its feeding programme, is supporting 1,200 displaced families, and World Vision is currently assisting 4,000 families with non-food supplies in Bashali and Kahembe.

In South Kivu, the Xaveriens Brothers assisted additional 512 families in Kitutu and another 4,000 families in Shabunda. Also, a new partnership agreement was signed with the "Sisters of the Divine Masters in Lulingu" to assist 766 displaced families.

In Katanga, World Vision assisted 3,438 displaced families in Kamina and Malemba-Nkulu areas with emergency relief kits, blankets and plastic sheeting. MSF Belgium also distributed 1,700 emergency relief kits to ex-refugee families, returning voluntarily from the refugee camps in Kasenga and Kilwa.

In Western Kasai province, Caritas distributed family kits to 1,000 vulnerable displaced families and provided health assistance as well." (UNICEF 9 July 2001)

"During the past months, UNICEF provided emergency relief kits, purchased with funds from Belgium and US governments, to displaced communities. Through the Boboto boat (Peace Boat) initiative, Memisa distributed 500 relief kits in Northern Equateur Province. In North Kivu, Caritas and World Vision continue to distribute kits to the displaced communities in Rutshuru and Masisi to some 5,500 families." (UNICEF 23 Oct 2001)

Plan for 2002:

**"Target beneficiaries** 300,000 IDPs with an emphasis on children and women  
[...]

The need for essential non-food items remains high among the displaced population and host families. If a significant IDP return occurs in the rural areas as a result of peace, it is anticipated that a number of displaced or refugee families will return to villages which have been largely looted and devastated.

#### **Key activities**

UNICEF will provide relief kits comprising of shelter materials, blankets, impregnated mosquito nets, jerrycans, soap, cooking sets, and other essential non-food relief items to cater for the neediest displaced or returning families.

Special attention will be given to the well-being of children and women in displaced sites and refugee camps in collaboration with UNHCR. Newborn Baby Kits containing essential care and hygiene supplies (baby blanket, sheet, towel, booties, diaper, baby powder, bucket and laundry soap and cloths) for infants and mothers will be distributed." (UNICEF 11 Feb 2002)

### **UNICEF launched education initiative in favor of IDPs (2002)**

**"Target beneficiaries** 200,000 displaced and war-affected children  
4,000 teachers [...]

"The project aims to provide displaced and other war-affected children with basic literacy, numeracy and life-skills education and to promote a learning environment more favourable for children and teachers. It would specifically focus on resuming basic educational activities, particularly for internally displaced children and war-affected women and children in eastern and central DRC, in existing schools, and promote the reopening of schools in war-affected areas.[...]

Specific objectives are to educate 200,000 displaced and war-affected children by providing 4,000 educational kits specifically designed for the DRC context, together with 2,000 basic recreation kits to assist them in the psychosocial healing process. 300 schools would be targeted by this operation. In addition, 4,000 teachers would be supported with basic teaching instruments and trained in the development of peace education skills.

Strong partnerships have already been established with national counterparts, other UN agencies and local and international NGOs such as CARITAS and CRS for the implementation of these activities. In particular, the distribution of school materials and support for project monitoring has been undertaken with the Centre DON BOSCO and the CEDC (Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances) Network for technical support for implementation of non-formal education. Similar partnerships with UNESCO have been used for technical support to design the training of trainer's program, with UNDP for rehabilitation/repairing of schools, with WFP for food for undernourished children and teachers, and with the Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Professional Education, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Recreation and Youth for providing qualified human resources for the implementation of formal and non-formal education.

A coordination mechanism will be expanded and stimulated to ensure the participation of all partners, local and international agencies. UNICEF will recruit two project officers, to be based in eastern DRC and Kinshasa, to improve the monitoring and coordination of the project. They will ensure that the assistance delivered through the project is provided in a consultative process with other members of the coordination team working in the area to ensure appropriate coverage for displaced and war affected children.

All partners will participate in the process of identifying relevant indicators to assess the progress and impact of the programme. As a minimum, two assessment exercises will be undertaken to verify if the educational strategy and methodology need to be adjusted.

#### ***Key activities***

Procurement and distribution of educational and recreational kits for children.  
Procurement and distribution of educational kits for teachers.  
Procurement and distribution of school desks.  
Training of trainers and teachers.  
Rehabilitation of schools and construction of latrines." (UNICEF 11 Feb 2002)

#### **UNICEF, International and local NGOs in the area of Child Protection (2001-2002)**

- UNICEF was able to access military camps to work on demobilization of children
- UNICEF is providing protection and assistance to 20,000 children (child soldiers, unaccompanied minors and IDP/refugee adolescents)
- International NGOs such as Save the Children, and local NGOs also attempt to address the overall crisis of child protection in the eastern Congo
- Local NGOs try to prevent displacement of children but lack funding for activities

"Among the most serious issues affecting children are the lack of health care, recruitment by armed groups, food insecurity, sexual exploitation, and separation from and loss of family due to conflict, poverty and HIV/AIDS. As one of the most vulnerable categories, children are a major focus of the humanitarian community's concern. A few months ago, the operation "Kanga Vagabond" (getting rid of children wandering in the streets) initiated by the Governor of Kinshasa faced immediate objections from UN Agencies and NGOs because no proper infrastructure had been prepared to shelter the street children. This problem was eventually solved through a common approach from UNICEF, NGOs and authorities (with facilitation from OCHA) leading to proper centres where the children could also receive training.

The role of children in armed conflict has received increased attention. Demobilization of children has become a priority for the DRC authorities and rebel groups. A government decree pledges to stop enrolling children, while the two rebel movements made similar but as yet unofficial and conditional pledges. Access to military camps has been authorised in principle, enabling UNICEF to work on demobilisation activities.

Measures to stop the recruitment of children and to resettle children already linked to armed forces in their familial environment have been stepped up.

Specific actions included:

*UNICEF organised two surveys on the recruitment of child soldiers to obtain a clear picture of the situation and identify possible responses.*

*- UNICEF and MONUC's Child Protection Section have been advocating with politico-administrative and military, both in government areas, and in Eastern DRC to bring an end to the recruitment of child soldiers and have sensitized them to the need to collaborate in programs for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of child soldiers.*

*- Access to military camps in government-controlled areas and in Kisangani has been authorized and enabled UNICEF and the MONUC Child Protection Section to work on demobilization activities;*

*- MONUC through its Child Protection Section took part along with UNICEF, ILO, and BUNADER (Bureau National pour la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion) in the planning for the DDR program of vulnerable groups.*

*- 300 unaccompanied children affected by the conflict received psycho-social support and care.*

*- Within the context of tracing and family reunification activities, 165 children have been repatriated from Uganda.*

*- UNICEF is providing protection and assistance to 20,000 children (child soldiers, unaccompanied minors and IDP/refugee adolescents).*

*- In eastern DRC, a study identified 2,800 young soldiers and led to a demobilisation programme.*

*- MONUC civilian and military staff participated in the implementation of the three rounds of the National Immunization Days (NIDs) against poliomyelitis, which took place between 5 and 9 July, 9 and 13 August, and 13 and 17 September 2001." (UN OCHA 26 November 2001, pp.19-20)*

"UNICEF, international NGOs such as Save the Children, and local NGOs attempt to address the overall crisis of child protection in the eastern Congo. The problem is vast, however, and homeless children, constantly on the move outside of institutional settings, are inherently difficult to reach. *RI* was in touch with a network of Congolese NGOs and community-based organizations that are trying to establish centers to get children off the streets and provide them with basic education and vocational training. They also attempt to prevent homelessness and displacement by instilling parents with a greater sense of responsibility towards their children. These groups are effective on a small scale, but they are terribly under-funded. *RI* visited one center where 50 or 60 children ate their afternoon snack in the rain in ankle-deep mud for lack of plastic sheeting to cover the cramped dining area." (RI 6 Feb 2002)

### **UN Agencies answer some of the acute education needs of displaced and other vulnerable children (Nov 2001)**

"Specific actions in 2001 in the education sector included:

*- Over 8,000 pupils and their teachers were supplied with basic didactic equipment and two schools were rehabilitated by UNICEF in Kisangani.*

- UNDP and UNOPS collaborated in the rehabilitation of seven elementary schools in North and South Kivu

-UNESCO provided school support to 50,000 displaced children in eastern DRC. Similar activities led by NGO partners such as Caritas, Xavériens Brothers and CRS funded by UNICEF reached 80,000 pupils and their teachers throughout the country. In-service training for teachers was also organised.

- Some 20 centres of informal education are expected to be operating this academic year - six run by the government, 14 run by civil society organisations - targeting a total of 7,000 street children and children otherwise deemed to be living in "highly precarious conditions". This is part of an experimental three-year programme by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Family, the Ministry of Education and UNICEF, the latter supporting the initiative with up to US \$160,000.

- Parallel to this non-formal education programme, UNICEF will support 10 health centres for street children, doubling the number for year 2001. This project is conducted in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Family and the Ministry of Public Health to provide free healthcare to hundreds of disadvantaged children." (UN OCHA 26 Nov 2001, pp.20-21)

### **Emergency Humanitarian Interventions (EHI) and Quick Impact Projects benefit IDPs (2000-2001)**

- EHI is a UN inter-agency rapid response structure
- EHI concept is meant to operate as first aid mechanism aiming at saving lives and restoring family and communal livelihood
- As of Nov 2001 approximately 850,000 persons have been assisted by the different activities funded through the EHI frameworks

"While designed to enhance the UN's emergency preparedness capacity, the EHI concept is meant to operate as first aid mechanism aiming at saving lives and restoring family and communal livelihood . The scope of interventions under EHI will be limited to emergency food, distribution of seeds, tools, medical assistance, emergency water projects and control of epidemics.

[...]

Emergency Humanitarian Interventions (EHI) is a UN inter-agency rapid response structure which will enable the system to respond to war-inflicted and other suddenly arising emergencies on both sides of the frontline. EHI is designed to assist 300,000 war-affected persons in remote and hardly accessible areas of the DRC with no permanent presence of relief agencies. The scope of interventions under EHI will be limited to emergency food assistance and distribution of essential non-food items (WFP, UNHCR), distribution of seeds and tools for affected communities with access to land (FAO), medical assistance, emergency water projects (UNICEF and UNFPA) and control of epidemics (WFP and UNICEF). Although WFP does not appeal for funds under this sector, resources solicited for its IDP feeding projects will be made available to EHI operations, should the need arise. UNDP will contribute to EHI by strengthening the local capacities to manage and monitor the provided assistance.

EHI will be managed by the Office of the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in conjunction with the UN Country Management Team. All donor contributions for EHI are proposed to be channelled through OCHA and earmarked for a specific activity [...]" (UN November 1999, pp. 19, 57)

" EHI received considerable donor support to implement a series of activities ranging from assessment missions to facilitation of inter-agency actions. Unfortunately, the emergency response capacity of other institutions participating in the EHI initiative remained limited throughout 1999 and 2000, thus prompting modifications in the initial concept.

Modifications primarily affected operational synergies and methods of implementation while the main philosophy of EHI – immediate intervention to alleviate human suffering - remained unchanged. EHI was meant to be a “package deal” whereby each financial contribution would be distributed proportionally among various sectors and agencies. The package approach, however, was not implemented and by early 2000 the logistics, information collection and management components (OCHA/EHI) were almost fully funded while the requirements of emergency humanitarian supplies remained unmet. With the consent of donors and consultation with participating agencies, financial contributions are now channelled into an emergency fund accessible to all major humanitarian actors in response to crises. The definition of crises is relatively flexible and refers to all life-threatening situations encountered by civilians irrespective of the causes: war, natural disaster, human rights abuses, etc.

The May-June 2000 humanitarian crisis in Kisangani was a major test for EHI as an assistance concept, and as a coordination mechanism. Within days that followed the establishment of a cease-fire regime in this war-torn city, EHI consolidated resources of a large number of humanitarian actors, bilateral cooperation institutions and civil society, bringing badly needed relief to hundreds of thousands of Kisangani residents. EHI became the backbone of the international humanitarian response to the Kisangani crisis.

EHI survived chronic problems of insecurity, delayed access and prohibitions to travel often imposed by belligerents. The concept, however, needs substantial modification to address the changes in the nature of the crisis and offer a more diverse solution to emergencies that are otherwise covered by mandates of humanitarian actors currently present in the DRC. EHI and its successor are instrumental to the 2001 CAP and play a central role in linking activities at macro and micro levels to support this appeal’s strategy: bolster the coping mechanisms of war-affected populations and enhance their self-sufficiency.

[...]

Equally, EHI initiatives helped the humanitarian community to better grasp the economic dimensions of the humanitarian crisis on all sides of the frontline. Surveys have been used in humanitarian co-ordination for strong advocacy on monetary policy matters in Government-held areas, and on tax income and redistribution in rebel-held areas. Inter-agency surveys on displaced and host families (notably in Kisangani), and on mortality-related statistics (in Kinshasa to obtain a countrywide methodology) have added useful tools for decision-making." (UN November 2000, pp. 81-82, 95)

As of Nov 2001 "Approximately 850,000 persons have been assisted by the different activities funded through the Emergency Response Fund frameworks. [...]

Places long affected by fighting along “conventional lines”, like Boende, Manono, Kabinda, and Shabunda, benefited rapidly from a better organised information network and priority setting mechanisms, exemplifying the objectives of the EHI and QUIP mechanisms.

Specific actions included:

-Emergency funds were provided to support punctual and sustainable activities in the health, shelter and education sectors

-Quick Impact Projects (QUIP) were been used to support interventions in education, agriculture, non food items, and health throughout the DRC.

-Emergency Humanitarian Interventions (EHI) assisted IDPs, covered humanitarian needs in the food and health sectors, and supported the transportation of relief items." (UN OCHA 26 November 2001, p.22)

### **UNDP's activities include the reintegration and livelihoods support of IDPs (2002)**

- Assessment to identify opportunities for UNDP to engage in supporting a transition to peace and recovery

"In follow-up to the findings and recommendations of the mission led by CPR (former ERD) in August/September to review UNDP's role in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Durable Solutions (D3) process in the DRC and Great Lakes Region, a programming mission has been fielded to support the DRC country office in the elaboration of regional recovery frameworks, consultative mechanisms and the identification of key areas of activities to support socio-economic recovery and reintegration within the D3 context. This initiative will contribute to the country office effort to assist the government in the formulation of a comprehensive national recovery program.

The team is traveling from 26 November to 15 December and will visit Kisangani, Goma and Lubumbashi with a view to establishing and/or expanding program activities which will also lay the foundation for the effective management of longer-term interventions. Emphasis will be placed on programs that identify opportunities for UNDP to engage in supporting a transition to peace and recovery that incorporates participatory multi-sectoral, area-wide planning and programming, and reinforces the potential for accelerating social and economic recovery.

Specifically, activities will support local reconciliation to promote the establishment of an environment conducive to the voluntary disarming and demobilization of armed groups; incorporate programs that provide technical assistance and training as well as income-generation schemes in order to support the revival of productive activities and strengthen the capacity of local economies to absorb demobilized groups; address infrastructure rehabilitation needs and improve access to basic social services; include reintegration and livelihoods support of IDPs and other war-affected populations to consolidate peace and build confidence during the transition process; and identify areas to integrate small arms reduction activities, where/as appropriate." (UNDP 1 Jan 2002)

### **UNDP to create a security network (2001)**

- 7 Field security sub-offices planned

"The continued escalation of the conflict in the DRC curtailed UN Agencies and other humanitarian actors' activities in the field and particularly in Provinces along the front line. The proliferation of militias and armed groups and the incessant violations of the cease-fire agreement have made the security situation extremely difficult to manage.

The present project is aimed at creating a security network, which will cover the entire country through the establishment of 7 Field security sub-offices to ensure the safety of UN, NGOs' staff and infrastructures and promote a continued delivery of assistance to affected populations.

The establishment of such a security network requires considerable funds, mainly destined to the restoration of security infrastructure (most of them were looted in 1998 during the first days of the conflict).

Security-related matters will be under the overall responsibility of the UN Designated Official and the Field Security Officer based in Kinshasa and the operational coordination (in rebel held and government areas) will be handled by 7 Field Security Officers (Goma, Bukavu, Mbandaka, Kisangani, Mbuji-Mayi, Matadi and Lubumbashi) with the support of national staff.

The constraints linked to the non-existence of such network and the recent incidents occurred to the relief staff in the DRC and in the region have underlined the critical need for enhancing security measures. This project is indispensable for the fulfilment and the coordination of humanitarian assistance in the country." (UN November 2000, p.87)

## **Joseph Kabila asks UNHCR to assist the internally displaced the agency does not target IDPs (2001-2002)**

"Congolese President Jospheh Kabila on Thursday met UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers in Geneva [...]. Kabila sought help for the return home of Congolese refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). He told the High Commissioner that he was "anxious" to see the return of Congolese refugees from the Great Lakes region.

He noted that his country was now in the process of reconstruction, which would enable refugees and IDPs to return to their homes. [...] He asked UNHCR to assist IDPs in his country, estimated to number around 1.8 million, which was more than the number of refugees. The IDPs were in accessible areas but lacked basic assistance, he said." (IRIN 30 March 2001)

*In March 2002, the Global IDP Project was told by a UNHCR staff that UNHCR does not assist IDPs due to lack of funding and capacity, because peace has not been consolidated and because UNHCR is not better placed than other agencies in the field.*

## **Food aid reached 840,000 displaced persons during 2000**

- 17,000 children attended UNICEF sponsored nutritional centres
- All provinces of the country with high IDP concentration have benefited from assistance to grow their own food
- In 2000 WFP distributed two and a half times the amount of food it had distributed in 1999, the majority of which went to IDPs
- WFP reaching an average of 290,000 persons in North Kivu province of a total of 403,000 registered IDPs (October 2000)

"The impact of food and nutritional assistance is seen both on macro and micro levels: Clearly, the great majority of 17,000 children that attended UNICEF sponsored nutritional centres were saved from greater suffering and, in many cases, from death. This impact, however, is short-lived since after the recovery children return to their impoverished families where their daily meal is not always ensured. The impact of large-scale feeding project in favour of over 700,000 vulnerable, refugees, displaced, is more complex to depict: with the exception of refugees, and other non-mobile beneficiary groups (120,000 persons), the rest of beneficiaries has been attained sporadically, often just once. On the other hand, food aid and supplementary feeding saved lives in the aftermath of the Kisangani crisis or during massive influxes of displaced into Bukavu. Food injections of a total of 30,000 MTs of commodities, into various parts of the country had practically no impact on the supply side of the market, with a shortfall estimated at 1.2 million MTs in western DRC alone.

[...]

More than 17,000 children have been treated in 63 UNICEF sponsored therapeutic feeding centres: 8,750 children in North Kivu: partners- SCF-UK, World Vision and Caritas; 6,400 children in South Kivu; partners SCF-UK, Caritas, ACF-USA and Xaveriens mission. 2,000 children in Kinshasa, partner BDOM, AICF-USA; 562 children in Katanga – AICF-USA and Nova Frontiera's; 700 children in Eastern Kasai: partner CRS

[...]

An innovative logistical approach put in place by WFP is currently ensuring a simultaneous shipment of food commodities through four corridors: Goma, Lubumbashi and Matadi. Security and logistics constraints and a two-fold increase in the number of IDPs prompted WFP to review modalities of its projects: beneficiaries are currently receiving reduced monthly rations as opposed to daily supplementary feeding, to increase the number of beneficiaries and ensure the continuity of the programme.

[...]

Undoubtedly, the 2000 CAP food security initiatives made a significant impact. It can be seen in the 25% increase in market gardening produce in western DRC and in the number of uprooted farmers who resumed agricultural production in their new communities. The concept of this assistance, which is, basically, a skilful combination of economic recovery initiatives applied in an emergency, is greatly appreciated throughout the country.

[...]

130,000 refugees, displaced and host families have received agricultural inputs and resumed agricultural production. All provinces of the country with high IDP concentration have benefited from this assistance." (UN November 2000, pp.10, 11)

"In spite of the constraints, linked to insecurity, fighting an inaccessibility, WFP distributed 26,395 tons of food in DR Congo during last year [2000], which is two and a half times the amount distributed in 1999. WFP reached some 928,000 people of whom 840,000 IDPs and vulnerable groups and 88,000 refugees." (WFP 16 February 2001)

"WFP generally assists an average of 290,000 persons in North Kivu province, from the total of 403,000 registered IDPs. Current shortage of cereals has prompted WFP to significantly reduce its activities and focus on vulnerable groups in nutritional centres. There were no deliveries since mid-September and the next distribution will take place following the arrival of 448 tons of cereals in late October." (WFP 27 October 2000)

### **Relative increase in assistance during 2000 but level still modest compared to needs (November 2000)**

- Improved delivery of aid and the establishment of a wider humanitarian network throughout the DRC since March 2000
- Humanitarian response to the internally displaced persons consolidated and more systematic as opposed to sporadic interventions in 1998 and 1999
- Channelling of resources changed in favour of UN Agencies

"The Year 2000 coincided with the emergence of a second front in the Kivus, intensified fighting in all parts of the conventional frontline and a drastically curtailed accessibility to beneficiaries. Within weeks, the humanitarian situation degenerated at an unprecedented pace, while the relief community was denied access in western DRC and faced increasing insecurity in eastern DRC. Starting in March 2000, humanitarian assessment missions and active engagement initiatives with authorities at all levels opened the way for the actual delivery of aid and the establishment of a wider humanitarian network throughout the DRC. Relief operations were launched and reinforced in Orientale, North and South Kivu, Katanga, Kasai and Equateur provinces that had remained inaccessible for humanitarian aid in months. Although intermittently, due to security and access granting tardiness, the institutions participating in the CHAP, partner NGOs and the Red Cross movement delivered assistance to the largest number of beneficiaries since the beginning of the DRC conflict in 1998.

[...]

Humanitarian response to the internally displaced persons, one of the most numerous category of affected populations, has been consolidated and became more systematic as opposed to sporadic interventions in 1998 and 1999. The geographical coverage of IDP assistance projects remained patchy, and primarily included the Kivus and to a lesser extent Orientale and Katanga provinces, while displaced communities of Equateur, Maniema, and the Kasai did not receive any substantial aid." (UN July 2000, pp.3-4)

"Funding of humanitarian interventions in the DRC crisis remained relatively modest in 2000 compared with the actual size of one of the most acute humanitarian emergencies in the world. The absolute volume of humanitarian funding, however, has undergone an upsurge as have funding sources. The distribution or

channelling of resources has changed too, and most notably in favour of UN Agencies whose cumulative income reached its highest level since the beginning of the war in August 1998. The total funding for humanitarian interventions amounts (as of beginning of October 2000) to roughly US\$ 77 million. At first glance, this amount, divided among the UN Agencies, international NGOs, and bilateral programmes, is small relative to the extent of the emergency and the rapidly growing needs.

[...]

As stated above, the 2000 CA has already raised more funds than the total raised in the three similar fund-raising initiatives from 1998 to 1999. This increase in funding levels should be attributed to several "outside" factors, such as enhanced political and military settlement process and increased media interest in the DRC affairs, but also to the considerably expanded and flexible UN involvement in all aspects of the Congolese crisis. However, this relative progress should by no means lead to a conclusion that the outcomes of the 2000 CA were generally satisfactory: of 30 multi-sector projects presented in the Appeal only ten projects received partial funding; and 20 projects received no funding at all.

[...]

[T]he increased resources logically resulted in a larger programme delivery in 2000. In 1999 the UN Agencies received around 18% of the required funding and remained "stranded" in and around the three major operational bases: Kinshasa, Goma and to a lesser extent Lubumbashi. The expansion of UN humanitarian interventions should be seen in the context of a situation of dwindling accessibility. Put simply, with more funds but less access, in 2000 the UN delivered twice as much as in 1999." (UN November 2000, pp.7-8)

### **Swift response to major new displacements from Kisangani (2000-2002)**

- First emergency operation in DRC reaching IDPs while fleeing
- Pre-positioned supplies airlifted from emergency stockpiles in Kinshasa and Goma,
- UNICEF has assisted 43 health centres providing of medical services to 212,000 people in Kisangani and surrounding areas
- UN Secretary General sends inter-agency assessment mission to Kisangani in August 2000
- As of March 2002 operations of international organisations are increasing with more agencies now opening programmes in Kisangani with both national and international staff present

"Coordination mechanisms were set up in Kinshasa and Kisangani at the beginning of the crisis. In collaboration with the humanitarian agencies based in Kisangani, the UN agencies immediately responded to the most urgent needs with a few stocks already pre-positioned in town. In particular, UNICEF provided medical kits and chlorine to the Medical University of Kisangani. With fighting over, humanitarian agencies reinforced their presence in Kisangani and airlifted additional supplies from Goma. At the same time, the agencies in Kinshasa requested government authorisation to airlift emergency assistance directly from Kinshasa to Kisangani, initially with MONUC aircraft. The first flight, carried food aid to Kisangani on June 12. The heads of the humanitarian agencies, including the UNICEF representative and humanitarian co-ordinator a.i., accompanied this flight. They stayed in Kisangani for 2 days, conducting initial assessments of the damage and some interventions. Seven flights, carrying a total of 111 MTs of emergency assistance, were dispatched to Kisangani from Kinshasa on 12 - 23 June.

[...]

UNICEF sent 15.6 MTs of pre-positioned supplies from its emergency stockpile in Kinshasa, including emergency health kits (70), ORS (Oral Rehydration Salt – 7 carton of 1000), jerry-cans, plastic sheeting (626), BP5 (95) and a boat and engine. Additional supplies were also airlifted from Goma, where ICRC, some NGOs and UN agencies maintain pre-positioned emergency stocks. UNICEF sent 22.5 MTs of supplies from Goma including plastic sheeting (2,300), blankets (1,740), mosquito nets (5,000), ORS (50 cartons of 1000) and chlorine. To date, a total of 38 MTs of medical supplies and non-food items valued at US\$ 231,000 have been sent by UNICEF to Kisangani to assist health centres treating the wounded and displaced/affected population." (UNICEF 7 July 2000)

"Humanitarian response in the early aftermath of the Kisangani crisis was in many ways exemplary. This implies the quantity and quality of the assistance and most importantly its timing and co-ordination. The rescue operations carried out by MSF/Holland, MSF/Belgium and ICRC and the UN system (WHO, UNICEF, WFP, OCHA) are still underway, but the preliminary results can be identified already. This is especially important for the UN system which had insignificant capacity in Kisangani before and during hostilities but succeed in mobilising internal (EHI) and external resources (Belgian, US, and Italian Governments, MEMISA, CRS, etc.) and in providing an efficient humanitarian response.

The vital importance of humanitarian assessments was felt immediately after the cessation of hostilities. For instance, medical needs covered by ICRC and MSF in the early days of crisis were commonly considered adequate, yet the first assessments revealed that there were a number of unmet medical needs such as coverage, type of medicine, need for additional surgeons and so on. The same was applicable to other sectors of intervention.

The Kisangani operation has also valuable methodological importance for the relief community. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the phenomenon of massive population displacement was assessed while happening. In the course of relief operations targeted at Kisangani residents along their exile roads, aid workers discovered numerous groups of rural IDPs who had fled their homes during and well before the June 2000 clashes. This invisible layer of displacement – a very important factor affecting the food security, is a reaction of farmers attributable to the protracted and massive presence of military (two armies and two rebel groups).

The successful implementation of the Kisangani demilitarisation plan is likely to create a large humanitarian space in the town and its vicinity (90 km in diameter). Throughout the two-year war in the DRC, this region remained virtually isolated from the rest of the country and was weakened to a greater extent than other urban areas in eastern DRC (e.g. very high malnutrition rates and an explosive epidemiological situation). The two-year long isolation has developed the region's internal resources and its population's coping mechanisms. Although these coping mechanisms practically collapsed in the course of the May-June fighting, their restoration is believed to be attainable through well-targeted humanitarian interventions already in the short-term.

### **Beyond the Rescue Phase**

The rescue operations in Kisangani and on all major axes hosting displaced will continue as long as life saving activities are required (population movement has not entirely stabilised, there is still a number of wounded and severely malnourished, and the danger of epidemics remains serious). It may take another month before the transition to the post-conflict phase of the assistance is agreed to by all humanitarian actors." (UN July 2000, p.14)

"As part of the overall efforts of the international community to assist the population of Kisangani, badly affected by the war between the Rwandan and Ugandan troops in June 2000, UNICEF airlifted more than 38 tons of medical and essential non-food items at the onset of the crisis. With these UNICEF has assisted 43 health centres providing of medical services to 212,000 people in Kisangani and surrounding areas, emergency health and surgical kits, essential drugs, ringer lactate and Oral Re-Hydration Salt (ORS). UNICEF distributed 2 plastic sheeting and 2 mosquito nets to each of 1,258 families whose houses were seriously damaged. Relief items including plastic sheeting, blankets, mosquito nets and jerrycans were distributed to 582 families who lost most of their belongings during the battle. An additional 2,000 mosquito nets were provided to ICRC for distribution to 1,000 families." (UNICEF 10 October 2000)

[In Resolution 1304 of 16 June 2000], "the Security Council expressed the view that the Government of Uganda and Rwanda should make reparations for the loss of life and the property damage they had inflicted on the civilian population in Kisangani, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and requested me to submit an assessment of the damage. Accordingly, [...] I send a mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo from

13 to 23 August to assess the loss of life and property damage inflicted on Kisangani as a result of the fighting between Uganda and Rwanda in June 2000." (UN SC 4 December 2000)

"Two rebel factions continue to control the province but are no longer in Kisangani Town – and their restraining effect in the rural areas has also been reduced. The security situation has been improving within Kisangani City since the arrival of the UN Observation Forces and is also increasingly so in surrounding areas giving an opportunity to access populations in other districts.

Operations of international organisations are increasing with more agencies now opening programmes in Kisangani with both national and international staff present, another reflection of the increased security. The two airports continue to be active with increased numbers of commercial carriers with regular services to Goma, Kigali and Entebbe – plus UN flights to Kinshasa." (ACT 5 March 2002)

## **Response by Non Governmental Organisations**

---

### **Oxfam GB, SCF-UK and Christian Aid advocate for better IDP protection (2001-2002)**

*In an August 2001 report entitled "No End in Sight: The human tragedy of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo", Oxfam GB, SCF-UK and Christian Aid make several recommendations including the following:*

"The DRC government and the warring parties should guarantee safe access to all civilians in need and allow the free movement of humanitarian personnel and emergency relief supplies throughout the DRC. [...]

The protection of displaced people and civilians – from attack, separation from their families, malnutrition, or death from curable diseases – needs to be prioritized. All belligerents must be pressed to respect humanitarian principles and human rights, and to ensure that all humanitarian personnel have access to vulnerable groups. [...]

Donor governments should substantially increase their funding of humanitarian assistance and protection [...]" (Oxfam 6 August 2001)

"Christian Aid has been raising awareness of the humanitarian crisis in the DRC for more than two years, and with this in view its Advocacy Strategy aims to build on work with MPs and with other NGOs, both in the UK and in Europe." (Christian Aid Jan 2002)

### **International NGOs expand their activities to areas formerly inaccessible (August 2001)**

- ICRC began shipping drugs and supplies to Ikela, Province Orientale
- MSF-Holland want to open new emergency site in Yahuma health zone, north-west of Kisangani
- Merlin is extending program to Lodja, Kasai Oriental

"With the agreement of the belligerents to withdraw last July, previously inaccessible areas close to the 'old' frontline have begun to open up to those health NGOs with enough logistical flexibility to get there.

In the far west of Province Orientale, for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross recently began shipping drugs and supplies to Ikela, a health zone where the majority of the town's 50,000 population continues to be displaced into the forest onto the eastern side of the old frontline. Access to the area, 260 km as the crow flies from Kisangani, is only by boat, motorbike and bicycle. Though the initial exploration team found no major epidemics and no visible deprivation of food, they reported "zero" availability of medication and no routine immunisation for three years.

For their part MSF Holland are hoping to open up a new emergency site 300km north west of Kisangani, in Yahuma health zone where, says MSF-H Kisangani head of mission Joseph Leberer, "intervention is more or less justified across the whole area, even on emergency criteria."

'It's not that people are so sick, but that there is no recourse for any even small medical problem,' he adds. Further south, British emergency health NGO Merlin is extending its programme from the jungle province of Maniema into frontline Lodja in Kasai Oriental. and MSF Spain has reopened a health centre and three health posts in the battle-scarred health zone of Pweto in North Katanga and is exploring the possibility of expanding into other areas of opposition- controlled North Katanga. In the west, MSF Belgium are moving to re-establish activities in Equateur." (WHO 9 August 2001)

### **SCF: Improving health care and food security of displaced women and children (2000-2001)**

- SCF-UK has offices in Kishasa, as well as in Goma and Bukavu (North and South Kivus)

"Save the Children (UK) began working in what was then Zaire in August 1994, running a family tracing program for Rwandan refugees in camps around Bukavu. Having completed this work, SC UK ran down its operations in July 1996. Later that year, when civil war broke out in Zaire. SC UK was invited back as the lead NGO in the repatriation of Rwandan refugee children. In addition to family tracing in South Kivu SC UK also ran a therapeutic feeding programme for severely malnourished children, mostly IDPs and refugees.

[In addition to a country office opened in Kinshasa in January 1998] Save the Children (UK) continues to maintain field offices in Goma and Bukavu cities, Kivu province, on the Rwandan border. These areas are in rebel-held territory and work has been extremely difficult in terms of security and logistics. [...]

The overall goal of SC UK's health programme is to improve the health status of the population in conflict affected areas of East DRC, with a special focus on children and also women and other vulnerable groups.

Rehabilitation of health facilities in some areas of North and South Kivu and their provision with basic equipment have allowed the re-opening of many health centers and improved the quality of care. [...] SC UK aims to reinforce the medicine supply system in south Kivu and North Katanga to ensure better vaccination coverage and offer more prevention services to fight the spread of epidemics such as cholera." (SCF 31 December 2000)

"The fight against malnutrition, particularly amongst IDPs in North and South Kivu, has been reinforced by supporting families of malnourished children by rehabilitating feeder roads and by distributing agricultural items (hoes and seeds) in collaboration with the World Food Program (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation. SC UK has targeted all vulnerable people, including widows, heads of households, and the displaced.

SC UK aims to assist IDPs who have returned home and to restore livelihoods in the communities they come from to allow easier re-integration." (SCF 10 July 2001)

For SCF-UK country report on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for 2000, please see [\[External Link\]](#)

### **IDP related activities by the International Committee of the Red Cross (2000-2002)**

- In 2002, family parcels distributed to IDPs in isolated towns of Equateur Province
- In 2001, The US government gave that \$1.5 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross for emergency assistance programs to internally displaced persons.
- In Oct-Nov 2001, ICRC distributed non-food aid to IDPs and other vulnerable people in Northern Katanga
- In 2000, The ICRC extended its assistance to cover almost 200,000 displaced people in the eastern provinces
- In agreement with the authorities, it reduced its food distribution in camps for the displaced in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, where other sources of supply had been found.

"The ICRC delegation is located in Kinshasa with a sub-delegation in Lubumbashi, a mission in Goma and offices in Bukavu, Bunia, Kalemie, and Kisangani." (ICRC 26 January 2000)

#### **2002**

"Some 5,000 family parcels (cooking utensils, blankets, buckets, water containers, soap, spades, sugar, salt, and clothing) were distributed by the ICRC between 4 and 24 February to 4,800 families (almost 25,000 persons) in Bokungu, Mondombe and Yalusaka, either local people or people living displaced there. All three towns are in the isolated Tshuapa district of Equateur province.

The ICRC also distributed blankets, soap and condoms to local religious institutions taking care of vulnerable people in an area where four years of war have made life extremely difficult for the civilian population." (ICRC 7 March 2002)

#### **2001**

"The United States will provide \$10 million for emergency refugee assistance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) [...], U.S. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher announced February. [...] Boucher specified that \$1.5 million of the money will be going to the International Committee of the Red Cross for emergency assistance programs to internally displaced persons." (U.S. DOS 1 February 2001)

"Between 6 October and 12 November, the ICRC distributed non-food aid to 7,150 resident and displaced families (almost 40,000 persons) living in and around Malemba Nkulu, northern Katanga. Each family received four blankets, a tarpaulin, a bucket, a cooking pot, 5 kg of soap, clothes and a hoe.

The ICRC provided this assistance to help both residents of the region and those who had fled the 35 villages burned down in fighting during the first few months of the year. Large numbers had been forced to take refuge in the bush, and residents of Malemba Nkulu and the surrounding area did not return until July. Currently, the authorities in northern Katanga are making a major effort to calm the population and restore peace to the area.

There is cause for concern regarding northern Katanga, as the security situation is preventing the resumption of agricultural and commercial activity. Since August, the ICRC has been providing assistance in Kabalo, Nyunzu, Manono and Malemba Nkulu." (ICRC 22 Nov 2001)

#### **2000 Activities**

"The ICRC increased its efforts in 2000 to bring protection and assistance activities closer to the 3,000-kilometre front line. This change in strategy had three main goals: to locate internally displaced people earlier; to track down and assist the war-wounded more effectively; and to respond to the protection needs of civilians and detainees near the front line.

[...]

The ICRC extended its assistance to cover almost 200,000 displaced people in the eastern provinces during the year, and made a significant breakthrough in northern Katanga, aiding 20,000 people close to the front line in an area where no humanitarian organization had worked before. In northern Kivu, assistance was given to more than 26,000 displaced people staying with host families in Goma or in the Sake camp just outside the city. In southern Kivu 65,000 people from unsafe areas around Bukavu were given food and the ICRC resumed its agricultural programme, interrupted by the fighting, for a further 38,000 people. Further south, over 30,000 displaced people received food and other assistance in and around Uvira.

The ICRC, in agreement with the authorities, reduced its food distribution in camps for the displaced in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, where other sources of supply had been found. Medical and infrastructure support was still given to hospitals and health centers serving displaced and other vulnerable groups, and the ICRC continued to provide agricultural equipment and seed to displaced and needy resident communities which had access to land." (ICRC 6 July 2001)

For the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2002-2003 Appeal, please see [\[External Link\]](#)

### **World Vision runs several programs benefiting the displaced in the East (2001)**

- WV distributed in August 2001 non-food items to IDPs in North Katanga (adults and non accompanied children) and will provide emergency kits to 20,000 IDPs in the region in the second part of 2001
- It works with local emergency committees established by IDPs
- It runs a nutrition and health program for malnourished IDP children and others around Beni town
- It provided emergency kits to IDP families in North Kivu
- It has a nutrition program in Oicha (North Kivu)
- It has helped in the construction and rehabilitation of seven health centers in the Grand Nord

"World Vision a distribué des articles non alimentaires aux déplacés de guerre du Nord Katanga classés en deux catégories à savoir; 372 adultes avec enfants qui logent dans les locaux d'un ancien magasin et 622 enfants non accompagnés qui se retrouvent dans les installations de l'Eglise Methodiste. Ont également bénéficié de cette assistance, un autre groupe de 30 familles (soit 120 personnes), des déplacés pêcheurs de Kinkondja. Le groupe initialement planifié pour l'assistance était constitué des déplacés de guerre vivant tout aux alentours de Kamina, de Songwe et dans les villages environnants. WV continue encore à analyser la situation dans cette partie du pays, dans la mesure où l'actuelle situation de guerre n'a fait qu'empirer la misère et la souffrance déjà existantes tant chez les déplacés que les autochtones auxquels une attention particulière doit aussi être accordée. La prochaine opération prévue sera celle de faire la distribution de 2,500 kits de famille primordialement aux déplacés des villages de Malemba Nkulu et de Songwe d'ici la mi-Septembre." (UN OCHA 22 August 2001)

"World Vision emergency kits containing essential supplies such as blankets, soap, collapsible jerry cans, cooking utensils and plastic sheeting will be distributed over the next six months to 20,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) around Kamina and Malemba-N'kulu in government-controlled areas of Katanga province in southeastern DRC, World Vision announced Tuesday.

Of the estimated 180,000 IDPs (62 percent of them children) in government-held regions of Katanga province, those in Kamina are thus far not supported by international NGOs. According to World Vision, the IDPs who have fled from rebel-held areas say they are seeking food and protection and fear reprisals from retreating Rwandan and allied Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD-Goma) rebel troops. Following the distribution of essential supplies, World Vision plans to assist the IDPs to establish greater food security through fishing and agriculture, and to provide income for labor to repair schools, roads and health offices in the IDPs' host communities." (IRIN-CEA 1 August 2001)

"World Vision will continue to support and work alongside the proactive local emergency committees established by the IDPs and their hosts using representatives of local NGOs, women's groups, local authorities, and churches." (WV 30 July 2001)

"World Vision will this week begin a new nutrition and health program for malnourished children around Beni town [...]. The on-going fighting around Beni means there are at least 30,000 displaced people in the area, living in now impoverished host communities. World Vision will be assessing the opportunities for non-food distribution, and more long-term development work to improve food security and access to water." (WV 31 July 2001)

"WVI distributed 1,500 reinstallation kits (including blankets, kitchen sets and plastic sheetings) to IDPs families targeted through nutritional centers in Kirotshe health zones [North Kivu]. This distribution also encouraged the population to attend nutritional centers." (WFP 13 September 2001)

"World Vision has been responding with supplementary feeding for two years in Kirotshe, the mountainous region on the border of North and South Kivu and will continue for a third year [...]. [...]

In another vital region, the Grand Nord of North Kivu, World Vision has started one therapeutic and six supplementary feeding centers in strategic locations, working with partners at the Protestant church-run hospital in Oicha and with ECHO funding.[...]

World Vision has helped in the construction and rehabilitation of seven health centers in the Grand Nord. In every case the local community has done most of the work and provided resources, but gladly accepted World Vision's offer of help with cement, hardware and paint." (WVI 9 Oct 2001)

Oicha Zone, (the area of our [WVI] operations) is situated in Eastern Congo. The people are mainly agriculturalists and grow a variety of crops mostly bananas and palm trees. " WVI has a therapeutic feeding program and a supplementary feeding program in oicha. (WVI Dec 2001)

### **Churches Together (ACT) aims to answer urgent food, medicines, shelter and clothing needs (2001)**

- Several projects are carried out with churches and local NGOs in favor of the North Kivu displaced persons
- In March 2002, ACT plans to promote self-sufficiency for vulnerable people in Kisangani

#### **According to 5 March 2002 Appeal:**

##### ***"South Kivu and Maniema***

**Goals:** To cater for the most immediate food and non-food needs of the displaced and their host families; to improve agricultural and animal production in the medium-term through distributions, seeds, tools and animals. [...]

##### ***Oriental Province***

**Goal**

*To assist the people of the districts of Kisangani, Tshopo, and Low Uele located in Oriental Province regain basic self-sufficiency by returning to a productive, sustainable, and harmonious way of life and thus avoid the present danger of an increasing humanitarian crisis.*

*Through the exchange of expertise and services between LWF and member churches of ECC in the respective fields, a more specific but overlapping goal is to:*

*Increased Co-ordination between ECC and its member churches to strengthen its services and effectiveness in:*

*Food security*

*Health care provision*

*Nutrition services*

*Rehabilitation*

*Emergency preparedness" (ACT 5 March 2002, p.7)*

**MERLIN and CARITAS also assist the displaced (2001)*****MERLIN: (August 2001)***

Since October 1999, Merlin has supported the provision of basic and emergency health care to the most vulnerable and accessible populations in Maniema through a network of:

- 25 health centres and one hospital in Kalima health zone,
- 12 health centres in Kindu health zone, and
- 4 health centres and one hospital in Punia health zone [...]

*One of its objectives is:*

*"To maintain an emergency response capacity for epidemic outbreaks or influxes of internally displaced persons." (MERLIN 20 August 2001)*

***CARITAS (August 2001)***

*"Rehabilitation par CARITAS des sites de déplacés à Demba, Katende, Bena-Dibele, dans le Kasai Occidental. Travaux similaires à Mbandaka sur financement QUIPS par OCHA." (UN OCHA 8 August 2001)*

**MSF has health and nutrition projects on both side of the front line (2001)****According to MSF Activity Report (2000-2001)****"District health**

The cornerstone of MSF's work in Congo remains district health care in several provinces. MSF aids the health structures that make up a health zone - usually a reference hospital and the clinics and health posts that feed into it, covering about 100,000 people. Activities include supplying medicine, supervising and training health staff, ensuring vaccinations and prenatal care, carrying out epidemiological surveillance, and improving water and sanitation practices and facilities.

For the last several years, MSF has assisted nearly 30 health zones scattered in Equateur, Katanga, Bas Congo, Kisangani, Bukavu, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces. MSF began work in Bandundu province in September 2000, and at Dungu hospital in North Oriental province in March 2001.

**Nutrition**

Over the last two and half years, MSF has provided intensive (therapeutic) nutritional care in Kisangani to over 10,000 children, and supplementary care to over 17,000 children. Because the situation in that area has improved, this program will gradually be phased out. In Kitshanga, a conflict area, MSF opened a therapeutic feeding center in September 2000. In Basankusu, another scene of fighting, MSF opened a therapeutic feeding center in October 2000. As of July 2001, more than 1,500 children had been treated.

### **Fighting disease**

In its district health projects, MSF works against a variety of diseases, including measles, tuberculosis, cholera, and meningitis. In June 2000, a pilot HIV/AIDS project began in Bukavu, and MSF hopes to open an AIDS treatment center in Kinshasa in fall 2001.

Two sexually transmitted disease (STD) clinics in Kinshasa, the capital, see about 30,000 people a year, and STD work also takes place at an additional 22 health centers in Kinshasa and 15 in Lubumbashi, in Katanga province.

In South Equateur province, MSF runs a sleeping sickness screening and treatment program where 60,000 people were screened in 2000. MSF is looking at starting a similar program in Kinshasa.

MSF also responded to cholera epidemics in Pweto and in the region of Kabalo, both in Katanga province." (MSF 13 Dec 2001)

### **Study by Life and Peace Institute shows diversity but lack of unity of civil society in the Kivu Provinces (2001)**

- Lack of access of rural population but also of women and youth to structures of coordination
- Churches are the most influential component of the Civil Society and have an enormous capacity to mobilise the population both in urban and rural areas
- The area where NGOs currently have the most active programmes is in the southern part of South Kivu

"The civil society in the Kivu provinces is organised into a large number of organisations. Although there are several co-ordination structures, the CS [Civil Society] co-ordination office for the overall co-ordination and further a series of thematic platforms, one cannot claim that the CS is a well co-ordinated entity. Its diversity in technical fields, region of origin, ethnicity, religion or political alignment appears to be uncontrollable in one structure and prevents the formation of a united lobby for peace.

However, we have identified a growing group in the civil society that claims it is ready to set aside old differences and accepts to develop joint action plans for the CS contribution to the building of peace in the Congo. Proof that these claims are sincere were provided in meetings organised by COPARE for all of South Kivu, UGEAFI and SOCOODEFI for Fizi and by Campagne pour la Paix, GEAD, Pole Institute and the CRONGD-NK for North Kivu." [...]

A very important weakness we identified is the relative under-representation of the rural areas in the SC co-ordination bodies. As a consequence, the opinions from the rural masses are hardly ever echoed in the activities of the CS.

Similarly, we found that women are already very active peace workers at the grassroots level but that access to co-ordination bodies is very limited. This is not only unjust but also counterproductive. The same can be said for the youth movement.

During the fieldwork and in some meetings we were on a few occasions confronted with discrimination against Pygmies. This is not an issue directly connected to what is generally understood with the Kivu conflict but nevertheless an emergency.

The Churches are the most influential component of the CS and have an enormous capacity to mobilise the population both in urban and rural areas. Some internal conflicts and positions prevent the Churches from being effective advocates for peace. We argued however that peace work could not be effective if the Churches were not part of it: Churches need therefore to be associated and allowed to play leading roles.

In Goma, the Peace Commission and the Barza-Intercommunautaire are not recognised by everybody as civil society structures but they made positive contributions to the pacification of Masisi and Rutshuru in particular. Therefore, those structures should be collaborated with in a CS peace programme although the roles of the Commission and the Barza as well as the CS in such collaboration would need to be better defined.

Co-ordination within the Kivu, nationally and internationally is rather weak. This is explained partly by the diversity and the lack of unity of the CS in the Kivu. The result is that the CS does not have the impact it aspires and to some extent also deserves on the efforts to find an end to the war. The 'new current' in the CS has the potential to improve the co-ordination as it focuses on collaboration and joint planning.

Finally, the few links the CS has with foreign organisations provide useful advocacy channels. But the links are less when compared with the periods before and during the refugee crisis. One of the most obvious results has been that the CS in the Kivu, the associations more than the Churches, have become severely under-funded and are often unable to work effectively. [...]

The area where NGOs currently have the most active programmes is in the southern part of South Kivu, the Ruzizi Plains and especially Fizi. (Life & Peace Institute Nov 2001, pp.60-65)

### **Local NGOs and church networks may be the best channels to reach displaced populations (December 2000)**

"After four mission to the region [Eastern Congo] this year, Refugees International has concluded that it is possible to mount an effective response to mitigate the suffering of the neglected displaced populations of the Congo. The foundation of this response should be flexible funding provided to local non-governmental organizations and church networks that have the proven capability to reach communities affected by the conflict. These local NGOs have extensive networks in place, thereby allowing them to reach more people in distant communities and identify vulnerable populations. The following are examples of the types of programs that would benefit from greater support:

National Immunization Days in highly insecure areas have shown that communities can be mobilized around humanitarian initiatives.

Food security programs in Katanga province provide seeds and tools to some of the most isolated, air-only access areas where recent assessments have shown a 21% malnutrition rate.

A child soldier demobilization program in Bukavu incorporates mediation and dialogue with the local community awaiting the reintegration of the child

An AIDS education program is targeting street children living in and around Bukavu

Medical programs are exploring creative cost-recovery schemes for health care services." (RI 15 December 2000)

### **NGO activity by sector/area (2000)**

#### **"Overview of Humanitarian Interventions Outside CHAP**

**Health**

Kinshasa (ICRC, SC(UK), MSF/F, MSF/B, IFRC, IRC, CRS and WV)  
Bas-Congo (MSF/B, IRC, CRS, WV and MSF/F)  
Bandundu (MSF/F)  
Equateur (MSF/B, ACF-USA, COOPI, CARITAS and MEMISA/B)  
Eastern Kasai (MDM, CRS and MEMISA/H)  
Western Kasai ( CRS)  
Katanga (WV, MSF/B and ICRC)  
Orientale (MSF/B, MSF/H, ICRC, MEDAIR, CARITAS and MEMISA/H)  
North Kivu (ICRC, MSF/H, ASRAMES, CEMUBAC, CARITAS, SC(UK), MALTESER and FONDATION DAMIEN)  
South Kivu (ICRC, MSF/H, APAMESK, SC(UK), MALTESER, IRC and JOHANITER)

**Food Security**

Kinshasa (ACF-USA, SC(UK))  
Maniema (C.AID)  
Eastern and Western Kasai (CRS)  
Katanga (ACF-USA, FHI,)  
North Kivu ( ICRC, AAA, SC(UK), OXFAM/GB, OXFAM/QC, CARITAS and BOAD)  
South Kivu ( ICRC, CARITAS, C.AID, FHI, and SC(UK))

**Food Distribution and Nutrition**

Kinshasa ( ICRC, CARITAS, BDOM, SC(UK) and MSF/F)  
Bas-Congo (MSF/F)  
Bandundu (MSF/F and ATLAS LOGISTIQUE)  
Equateur (CARITAS and ACF-USA)  
Eastern Kasai (CRS)  
Katanga (ICRC, and ACF-USA)  
Orientale (ICRC, MSF/H, CARITAS and COOPI)  
North Kivu, WV, SC(UK), CARITAS and MSF/H)  
South Kivu ( ICRC, CARITAS, SC(UK), FHI, ACF-USA, CARITAS and JOHANITER)

**Water and Sanitation**

Kinshasa (IRC, ICRC, OXFAM/GB, MSF/B, MSF/F, ACF-USA, CRS and WV)  
Bas-Congo (IRC and MSF/F)  
Maniema (OXFAM)  
Eastern Kasai (OXFAM)  
Western Kasai (IRC)  
Katanga (ACF-USA and WV)  
Orientale ( ICRC, MSF/H, OXFAM/GB and OXFAM/QC)  
North Kivu (OXFAM/GB, ICRC and CARITAS)  
South Kivu (MSF/H, ICRC, OXFAM/GB, IRC and CARITAS)

**Rehabilitation and Environment**

Kinshasa (UNDP, IRC and CRS)  
Bas-Congo and Bandundu (MSF/F)  
Orientale (MEDAIR)  
North Kivu (CONCERN, CARITAS, SC(UK), BOAD, OXFAM/GB and AAA)  
South Kivu (UNDP, MSF, CARITAS, SC(UK) and IRC)

**Education, Child protection and Demobilisation**

Kinshasa ( IRC, WV, MDM, SC(UK) and OXFAM/GB)  
Bas-Congo (WV)  
Equateur (MEMISA/B)

Western Kasai (IRC)  
Katanga (ACF, and WV)  
North Kivu (SC(UK))  
South Kivu ( CARITAS, SC(UK))" (UN November 2000, pp. 92-93)

*For more information about activities by American NGOs, see also [InterAction \( 24 September 2001\)](#), [\[External Link\]](#)*

### **Action Against Hunger: Assistance to displaced families (March 2000)**

- 12,500 IDP families assisted in Eastern DRC
- Initiative launched in August 2000 to sensitise the local community, authorities and possibly armed groups on humanitarian principles and assistance in the Uvira area of eastern DRC

"Action Against Hunger has distributed a package of corn, maize, bean, ground-nut and sorghum seeds to 12,500 families displaced by the War in the East of DR Congo.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, hundred thousands of families have fled the on-going civil war. In South-Kivu the fighting is intensifying between the RDC rebel troops, backed by Rwanda and the local Mai-Mai militias, backed by the Kinshasa Government. As a result, most of the villagers have fled to the neighboring hillsides, setting up temporary shelter in the remote fields. Almost all commercial activity has stopped and markets are only sporadically supplied.

The first planting season is right about to start. Most of the villagers have no access to seeds and the destruction which has been in effect for the last 20 months has left them with very few agricultural implements. But the only existing road south of Uvira has been cut off by militia troops. Trucks and cars have been restricted from passage, forcing the displaced population into complete isolation from the rest of the country.

Last week, Action Against Hunger decided to distribute the seeds anyway, and bypass the closed roads, by transporting the agro-packages via Lake Tanganika. They crossed over from Burundi. Local fishing boats were used, and the farm supplies dropped off of the various pickup points along the lake shoreline. The team considered this approach to be risky, but was left without choice, other than abandoning their commitment to the expectant families. The distribution to 5,200 families was completed successfully. They join the 7,300 families who had already received seeds by road in the northern part of Uvira District, in the Rusisi plain, bordering Burundi.

This coming planting season is the first of two seasons. It is called "the small season" and most of its output is used to produce seeds for the next "main season", whose crops provide the food basket for the year to come.

Action Against Hunger is today the only international organization providing assistance to these populations in the districts of Uvira and Fizi. A Nutrition Assistance project is caring for the most severely malnourished children and the program also aims at allowing the populations to secure their self-sufficiency.

This program, funded by USAID/OFDA, is a good example of the integration of long term sustainability in an emergency situation.

Action Against Hunger is also implementing food security and nutritional programs in the government controlled areas of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. (AAH-USA 27 March 2000)

"The international NGO, Action Contre la Faim (ACF) has embarked on an initiative aimed at sensitising the local community, authorities and possibly armed groups on humanitarian principles and assistance in the Uvira area of eastern DRC. An ACF official told IRIN on Tuesday that a meeting between ACF and the authorities, traditional chiefs and elders was held last week in Uvira." (IRIN 29 August 2000)

## Donors Response

---

### EU adopts euro 32 million humanitarian package (Jan 2002)

- Main focus will be on health and nutrition/food security
- The EU had already announced the disbursement of 120 million euros for programs in DRC in June 2001

"The European Commission has adopted a Global Plan for 2002 worth €32 million in humanitarian assistance for the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The new funding decision, managed by the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), was described by Commissioner Poul Nielson, responsible for Development and Humanitarian Aid, as "a concrete example of our enduring commitment to the Congolese population." [...]

ECHO's main focus in the Global Plan, as in the previous two years, will be on health and nutrition/food security. It will continue to concentrate on the delivery of relief to the least accessible areas of the country where there are enormous unmet needs.

In the field of health, 2.7 million people are targeted to benefit directly from a range of operations carried out in almost a quarter of the DRC's health districts. Funding will be used, among other things, for drugs, medical supplies, vaccines, training and logistical support. Therapeutic and supplementary feeding, aimed at tackling or preventing malnutrition, will be provided for 75,000 beneficiaries while food security for a further 300,000 vulnerable people will be boosted through the supply of food, seeds and tools.

ECHO is also maintaining its support for the work of specialist international agencies which are involved in providing emergency assistance to conflict victims, supporting refugees and co-ordinating the efforts of the various humanitarian actors.

The projects funded under the Global Plan will be implemented by a range of ECHO partners operating in Congo including NGOs, UN agencies and Red Cross organisations. [...]

This Global Plan was adopted before the eruption of the Nyriagongo volcano and is separate from the €5 million decision announced in IP/02/94 of 20 January 2002. " (ECHO 24 Jan 2002)

#### *European Union*

In a move marking the resumption of development assistance from the European Union, on 4 May the European Commissioner for Development announced the disbursement of 120 million euros to finance poverty alleviation and the promotion of human rights." (UN SC 8 June 2001, Para.79)

#### *ECHO:*

In North Kivu "[...] ECHO is supporting – to the tune of \$100,000 a month – a central drug supply system run by local NGO ASRAMES which supplies 19 health zones via international NGOs.

Drugs are supplied free, and organizations and/or health centers decide whether or not to levy a user fee." (WHO 9 August 2001)

## **The U.S. tripled its humanitarian assistance to DR Congo in 2001**

- USAID supports emergency infrastructure programs and agricultural programs for IDPs
- The State Department's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) funded programs targeting IDPs

"In recognition of the growing misery in the DRC [...], the U.S. tripled its humanitarian assistance in 2001 to approximately U.S. \$80 million, most of it for food and other emergency supplies, immunization programs, and refugee relief. It also spent some U.S. \$5 million on judicial programs under the Great Lakes justice initiative." (HRW 2002, "United States")

"USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provided more than \$21.9 million in the DRC in FY 2001, focusing primarily on health services and food security programs. USAID/OFDA also supports emergency market infrastructure rehabilitation and agricultural programs for war-affected, vulnerable, and internally displaced persons. Programs that immediately provide assistance as well as projects that build local capacity are integrated to promote livelihoods. An important component of USAID/OFDA assistance is the funding of AirServ International to operate three humanitarian aircraft. USAID/OFDA also supports two Emergency Disaster Response Coordinators (EDRCs) in the DRC to monitor the humanitarian situation throughout the country and make programmatic recommendations to USAID/OFDA in Washington.

USAID's Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agriculture Service (USDA/FAS) have provided emergency food commodities in FY 2001. USAID/FFP has provided \$14.2 million and USDA/FAS has provided \$21.4 million in food commodities. The commodities were provided through the WFP and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) to assist war-affected and displaced vulnerable populations.

As part of USAID's Integrated Health and Humanitarian Action Plan, USAID's Africa Bureau provided approximately \$15 million in health-related support in FY 2001. Specifically, the Plan seeks to deliver high impact health services by promoting, where possible, development of the country's health zones (each consisting of a referral hospital, health centers, and community actions), and the management systems necessary to make them work. Other USG funds to support development activities are also being provided.

The State Department's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) provided \$15.9 million in direct FY 2001 assistance to programs targeting refugees and conflict victims inside the DRC. In addition to these direct contributions, PRM provided \$60 million of unearmarked funding to UNHCR in Africa, and \$45.1 million to ICRC in Africa, a portion of which is used in the DRC. PRM also provided \$17.6 million to support 330,000 DRC refugees and other refugee groups in neighboring countries." (USAID 14 Nov 2001)

## **Donors pledged to provide more funding to DRC with renewal of peace negotiations (2001)**

- A donor information meeting in Paris in July 2001 expressed support for a US\$156 million program presented by the government of DRC
- In December 2001, following up to the July meeting, the World Bank organized consultation on demobilization and reintegration program (Dec 2001)

"During his recent visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Kenzo Oshima, called for the international donor community to increase its assistance in the coming months so that relief agencies could expand their capacity on the ground and increase the resources available to tackle the country's "massive humanitarian deficit". Mr. Oshima said that with the disengagement of combatant forces and the deployment of MONUC observers in frontline areas, access to vulnerable populations was improving and some civilians, such as those in Kabinda, a former frontline town, were already feeling the effects of the peace process. Mr. Oshima identified the need for special programmes to address the specific problems of child soldiers, violence against women, issues related to displaced women and children and psychosocial problems among war-affected populations. The Under-Secretary-General also said that, whenever conditions allowed, there would be a need to develop resettlement programmes for internally displaced persons and refugees to support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process." (UN SC 8 June 2001, para.62)

"A Donor Information Meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was held in Paris on July 3, 2001. This meeting was aimed at taking stock of recent developments, and at discussing ways by which the international community could support the nascent recovery process.

At that meeting donor representatives observed that the Government had put in place a credible reform program, supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They agreed on the need to quickly address the country's debt overhang (estimated at about US\$12.9 billion), to organize an orderly demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, to develop effective mechanisms for donor coordination and implementation of assistance, to enhance transparency, in particular in the mining sector, and to support a series of urgent activities. Donors also agreed on the need to ensure that foreign assistance is equitably distributed across the country and to take a regional approach in addressing some issues.

The delegates noted that a number of donor programs worth about US\$280 million were currently underway in the country and projects amounting to some US\$240 million were planned for the coming months. The planned projects would cover a large part of those contained in a US\$156 million request by the government.

At the end of this meeting, donors asked the Bank to organize a follow-up meeting, before the end of 2001." (WB 12 Dec 2001)

***In Dec 2001***, "The World Bank concluded consultations with UN and donor partners on a planned Greater Great Lakes Regional Demobilization and Reintegration Program and Multi-Donor Trust Fund. The purpose of the meeting was to consult with partners in the international community on opportunities to support the consolidation of peace and stability in the region through a comprehensive framework for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and to lay the basis for generating the resources required for its implementation. The meeting was chaired by Emmanuel Mbi, World Bank Country Director, South Central Africa and Great Lakes Department. Representatives from 12 countries and 10 international organizations attended the meeting\*\* including General Muntaga-Diallo, Force Commander, MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). The meeting was prepared in close collaboration with UNDP. [...]

\*\* Participants included representatives from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, United States, African Development Bank, the European Commission, GCA, ILO, IMF, UN-OCHA, UNDP, UNDPKO, MONUC, and the World Bank." (WB 19 Dec 2001)

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACF	Action Against Hunger (Action contre la faim)
ACT	Action by Churches Together (ACT)
ADFL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaire)
ADF,	Alliance of Democratic Forces
ADL	Local Defense Unit
ANR	National Information Agency
APC	Popular Congolese Army (Armée Populaire Congolaise)
BOAD	Ecumenical Office for Support to Development
Coltan	Colombium Tantalum
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DDRR	disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration operations
DPKO	UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DMIAP	Détection Militaire des Activités Anti-Patriotiques
DRC (RDC)	Democratic Republic of the Congo (République Démocratique du Congo)
ECC	Congolese Church of the Christ (Eglise Congolaise du Christ)
ECHO	European Union Humanitarian Office
EHI	Emergency Humanitarian Intervention
ex-FAR	Former Rwandan Armed Forces (Ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises)
FAC	Congolese Armed Forces (Forces Armées Congolaises)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAZ	Zairian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Zaïroises)
FDD	Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie)
FLC	Front for the Liberation of Congo (Front pour la libération du Congo)
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMC	International Medical Corps
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information

	Network
JMC	Joint Military Commission
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
MONUC	United Nations Observer Mission in the DRC (Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies au Congo)
MSF-H	Médecins Sans Frontières- Holland
NGO (ONG)	Non Governmental Organization (Organisation non gouvernementale)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PALIPEHUTU	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu)
PPU	Presidential Protection Unit
PRRO	Protracted Relief Recovery Operation
RCD-Goma	Congolese Rally for Democracy – Goma (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie)
RCD-ML	Congolese Rally for Democracy-Movement of Liberation (Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Mouvement de libération)
RCD-N	Congolese Rally for Democracy-Movement of Liberation-National (Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Mouvement de libération-National)
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCF-UK	Save the Children Fund- United Kingdom
TCHA	Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance
UAGs	Uncontrolled-armed groups
UN	United Nations
UNDP (PNUD)	United Nations Development Program (Programme des Nations Unies de Développement)
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHO	United Nations Humanitarian Office
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Forces
USCR	U.S. Committee for Refugees
WFP (PAM)	World Food Program (Programme Alimentaire Mondial)
WHO (OMS)	World Health Organization (Organisation Mondiale de la Santé)
WV (WVI)	World Vision (World Vision International)

## LIST OF SOURCES USED

(alphabetical order)

**Action Against Hunger - USA (AAH-USA)**, 14 February 2000, "DRC: Tens of Thousands of Children Face Death by Starvation"

Internet : [http://www.aah-usa.org/14\\_feb\\_00.htm](http://www.aah-usa.org/14_feb_00.htm) , accessed 2 June 2000

**Action Against Hunger - USA (AAH-USA)**, 27 March 2000, "Action Against Hunger Distributes Seeds to Displaced Families in War-Torn Congo"

Internet : [http://www.aah-usa.org/27\\_3\\_00.html](http://www.aah-usa.org/27_3_00.html) , accessed 2 June 2000

**Action Against Hunger - USA (AAH-USA)**, 8 February 2002, Nutritional Screening Conducting by ACF-USA for the Volcano affected population of Goma, 30 January-8 February 2002

**Action Against Hunger - USA (AAH-USA)**, August 2000, A Mosaic of Misery: the Humanitarian Situation In The Territories Of Uvira And Fizi South Kivu, Democratic Republic Of Congo

Internet : <http://www.aah-usa.org/Kivu.htm> , accessed 17 November 2000

**Action by Churches Together (ACT)**, 10 August 2001, ACT Appeal DR Congo: Emergency Relief - AFDC11 (Rev. 1)

Internet : [http://www.act-intl.org/appeals/appeals\\_2001/AFDC11Rev1.pdf](http://www.act-intl.org/appeals/appeals_2001/AFDC11Rev1.pdf) , accessed 3 October 2001

**Action by Churches Together (ACT)**, 13 July 2001, ACT Appeal DR Congo: Eastern Congo - Relief & rehabilitation AFDC-01 (Rev. 1)

Internet : [http://www.reliefweb.int/library/ACT\\_appeals/act-drc-13jul.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/library/ACT_appeals/act-drc-13jul.pdf) , accessed 3 October 2001

**Action by Churches Together (ACT)**, 19 January 2001, ACT Appeal DR Congo: Emergency Relief - AFDC-11

Internet : [http://www.reliefweb.int/library/ACT\\_appeals/drcappeal.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/library/ACT_appeals/drcappeal.pdf) , accessed 8 April 2001

**Action by Churches Together (ACT)**, 5 March 2002, Appeal Democratic Republic of the Congo Emergency Relief & Rehabilitation for War Victims AFDC-22

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 16 September 2001, Kigali sees positive moves in DRC, but wants all Hutus disarmed

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/d2a6d31c29a18065c1256aca0042a5b7?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 18 September 2001, Mai-Mai militia to be included in DR Congo peace process

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/b675ef30a9bd60f349256acc00001099?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 19 December 2001, DR Congo government begins demobilising child soldiers

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/493d396c8ec7bd2fc1256b270063c04d?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 19 December 2001, Fighting resumes in eastern DR Congo: rebels

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/2ab2ed3227ca46b0c1256b270063a68b?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 19 June 2001, WFP begins massive airlift into ravaged southeastern DR Congo

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/d8cfa348d6656672c1256a700058637e?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 2 February 2002, Thousands flee violence in DR Congo town: UN

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/2ffdbd41323c3b5f49256b5600275f9f?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 20 September 2001, Mai-Mai militias 'control' eastern DR Congo outside big towns

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/6f61e82219190bc5c1256acd005946c8?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 24 August 2001, DRC peace dialogue to start on October 15, probably in S.Africa

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/15bb8b446484ae50c1256ab2005925b5?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 25 February 2002, DR Congo peace talks open with aim of installing new government

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/227b58aa6c4e988f85256b6b006a434c?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**American Refugee Committee**, 7 November 2001, ARC addressing humanitarian needs in Congo

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/930ed42c0b79f7c385256b350066a6b8?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Amnesty International (AI)**, 19 June 2001, Rwandese-controlled eastern DRC: Devastating human toll

Internet : [http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/amnesty\\_drc\\_19jun.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/amnesty_drc_19jun.pdf) , accessed 3 October 2001

**Amnesty International (AI)**, 31 May 2000, "DRC: Killing Human Decency - Report"

Internet : <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/2000/AFR/16200700.htm> , accessed 2 June 2000

**Christian Aid**, 2002, Christian Aid in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Internet : <http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/world/where/eagl/drcongo2.htm> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Christian Aid**, March 2002, DR Congo: Goma emergency response update 01 Mar 2002

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/765442d4bf7d232b85256b6f006dc5e2?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers** , 12 June 2001, Child Soldiers Global Report 2001

Internet : [http://www.child-soldiers.org/report2001/countries/dem\\_rep\\_congo.html](http://www.child-soldiers.org/report2001/countries/dem_rep_congo.html) , accessed 3 October 2001

**European Commission - Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)**, 24 January 2002, Commission adopts EUR 32 million humanitarian aid package for the Democratic Republic of Congo

Internet :  
[http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p\\_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/02/132|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display](http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/02/132|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display) , accessed 4 March 2002

**European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (EPCPT)**, October 2000, Congo DR: Africa's Most Worrying Battle Field

Internet : [http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/sfp/part2/237\\_.htm](http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/sfp/part2/237_.htm) , accessed 8 April 2001

**Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)**, 15 November 2001, Informations sur la sécurité alimentaire en RDC No. 22

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/f6512617037ddea985256b1e0059a833?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)**, 21 August 2000, Informations Sur La Securite Alimentaire en Rdc

**Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, 13 February 2002, Attacks on Civilians in Ugandan Occupied Areas in Northeastern Congo  
Internet : <http://www.hrw.org/background/africa/bunia0213bkg.htm> , accessed 14 February 2002

**Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, 2002, World Report 2002, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)  
Internet : <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/africa3.html> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, February 1999, Democratic Republic Of Congo, Casualties Of War: Civilians, Rule Of Law, And Democratic Freedoms  
Internet : <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/congo/Index.htm> , accessed 25 October 1999

**Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, March 2001, Uganda In Eastern DRC: Fueling Political And Ethnic Strife  
Internet : <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/drc/> , accessed 8 April 2001

**Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, May 2000, "EASTERN CONGO RAVAGED:Killing Civilians and Silencing Protest"  
Internet : <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/drc/Drc005.htm#TopOfPage> , accessed 2 June 2000

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 11 July 2001, IRIN Update 1219 for the Great Lakes  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/e598548c0cdea11a85256a86005b31ff?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 15 August 2001, DRC: Conditions ripe for HIV/AIDS explosion  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/99584414d1d1ad4d85256aa9004f8da6?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 17 July 2001, IRIN Update 1223 for the Great Lakes

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/b0beca8ff929ea5e85256a8c006eca98?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 18 June 2001, IRIN Update 1202 for the Great Lakes

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/8c076e0aa165bedd85256a6f006fa1b8?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 19 February 2002, DRC: Special report on tensions in the northeast

Internet :  
[http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=21623&SelectRegion=Great\\_Lakes&SelectCountry=DRC](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=21623&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes&SelectCountry=DRC) , accessed 19 February 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 21 May 1999, "IRIN-CEA Weekly Round-up 20 covering the period 15-21 May 1999"

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/8651f00c1d5889eac125677800460e3e?OpenDocument> , accessed 28 January 2000

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 21 September 2001, IRIN-CEA Weekly Round-up 90 covering the period 15 - 21 Sep 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/3be27c0dc873cf9a85256ace00699fc7?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 26 September 2001, IRIN Update 1274 for the Great Lakes

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/b4df96e273a618c085256ad3005d2b8c?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 27 June 2001, IRIN Update 1209 for the Great Lakes

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/f95107386bc3cd7685256a780065c30e?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 3 August 2001, DRC: IRIN Interview with RCD-ML official Mbusa Nyamwisi

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/5a6722fc99c5b58d85256a9d00521c49?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 4 July 2001, IRIN Update 1214 for the Great Lakes

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/3d12ef0579ef0b5785256a80004863ca?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 6 August 2001, IRIN Update 1237 for the Great Lakes

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/b5103fd4fb5e460d85256aa0006c7ec4?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 9 July 2001, IRIN Update 1217 for the Great Lakes

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/d22df61eb52f3a4785256a850051b530?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, 9 October 2001, IRIN Update 1283 for the Great Lakes

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/5b38a7c9b6c1c0ec85256ae0006ce6af?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, August 2001, IRIN Update 1234 for the Great Lakes

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/4bd0b5a6ef5ba8c985256a9b006a3874?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA)**, June 2001, IRIN Update 1191 for the Great Lakes

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/d3e17b93b4717efa85256a5e006a6469?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 16 November 2000, DRC: People running for their lives in the east

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/cea/countrystories/drc/20001116a.phtml> , accessed 17 November 2000

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 21 December 1999, "Democratic Republic Of Congo: Thousands displaced as tribal clashes resume in Ituri"

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/cea/countrystories/drc/19991221.htm> , accessed 14 February 2000

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 24 July 2000, Massive displacement in parts of North Kivu

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/cea/countrystories/drc/20000724.phtml> , accessed 17 November 2000

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 24 March 2000, "DRC: Desperate humanitarian conditions reported in Ituri "

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/cea/countrystories/drc/20000324.htm> , accessed 2 June 2000

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 29 August 2000, DRC: NGO launches humanitarian sensitisation campaign

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/cea/countrystories/drc/20000829a.phtml> , accessed 17 November 2000

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 3 March 2000, "IRIN Special Report on the Ituri clashes - [Part Two]"

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/cea/countrystories/drc/20000303a.htm> , accessed 2 June 2000

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 30 March 2001, President calls for assistance for IDPs

Internet : [http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=4029&SelectRegion=Great\\_Lakes&SelectCountry=DRC](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=4029&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes&SelectCountry=DRC) , accessed 9 April 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 30 May 2000, "DRC: Katanga malnutrition and suffering highlighted"

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/cea/countrystories/drc/20000530.phtml> , accessed 5 June 2000

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 8 January 2002, DRC: UN confirms MLC/RCD-ML clashes in northeast

Internet : [http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=18553&SelectRegion=Great\\_Lakes&SelectCountry=DRC](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=18553&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes&SelectCountry=DRC) , accessed 9 January 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, August 2000, DRC: South Kivu situation worsening

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/cea/countrystories/drc/20000801c.phtml> , accessed 17 November 2000

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, October 2001, IRIN Update 1277 for the Great Lakes

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/07bb3361332b393385256ad90048cdee?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Interaction**, 31 January 2001, A Guide to Humanitarian and Development Efforts of InterAction Member Agencies in DR-Congo

Internet : <http://www.interaction.org/situation/drcongo/index.html> , accessed 8 April 2001

**International Alert (IA)**, February 2002, Report on Access, Security, Peace and Humanitarian Needs in Baraka in the Territory of Fizi in South Kivu, eastern DRC

Internet : [http://www.international-alert.org/fieldwork/secrpt\\_kivu.htm](http://www.international-alert.org/fieldwork/secrpt_kivu.htm) , accessed 25 March 2002

**International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**, 22 November 2001, DR Congo: ICRC continues aid effort in northern Katanga

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/4e111782fcd37ae0c1256b0c00652dd7?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**, 26 January 2000, Fact sheet: ICRC in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Internet : <http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/Index/69CA93A89878E481412567DF004852AC?OpenDocument> , accessed 5 June 2000

**International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**, 30 March 2001, President of Democratic Republic of the Congo announces accession to Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions (ICRC News 01/10)

Internet : <http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/Index/28DB2AB2FEF0DB3AC1256A1F005225BC?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 April 2001

**International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**, 6 July 2001, ICRC presents Annual Report

Internet : [http://www.icrc.org/WEBGRAPH.NSF/Graphics/AN2000\\_africa.pdf/\\$FILE/AN2000\\_africa.pdf](http://www.icrc.org/WEBGRAPH.NSF/Graphics/AN2000_africa.pdf/$FILE/AN2000_africa.pdf) , accessed 3 October 2001

**International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**, 7 March 2002, DR Congo: Aid for isolated groups in Equateur province

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/8e9500e5fe24908f85256b7500544fa8?OpenDocument> , accessed 26 March 2002

**International Crisis Group (ICG)**, 12 June 2001, Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in conflict prevention

Internet : [http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/africa/d.r.congo/reports/A400312\\_12062001.doc](http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/africa/d.r.congo/reports/A400312_12062001.doc) , accessed 3 October 2001

**International Crisis Group (ICG)**, 14 December 2001, Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR to Prevent Further War

Internet : [http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/africa/democraticrepublicofcongo/reports/A400509\\_14122001.pdf](http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/africa/democraticrepublicofcongo/reports/A400509_14122001.pdf) , accessed 19 December 2001

**International Crisis Group (ICG)**, 16 March 2001, From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo

Internet : [http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/africa/centralafrica/reports/A400257\\_16032001.pdf](http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/africa/centralafrica/reports/A400257_16032001.pdf) , accessed 8 April 2001

**International Crisis Group (ICG)**, 20 August 1999, The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace

Internet : <http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/cafrica/reports/ca07repa.htm> , accessed 19 October 1999

**International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC)**, 2002, DR Congo/Congo appeal 2002-2003 (01.06/2002)

Internet : [http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf\\_appeals.pl?annual02/010602.pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_appeals.pl?annual02/010602.pdf) , accessed 21 March 2002

**International Peace Information Service (IPIS)**, 2002, Supporting the War Economy in the DRC: European companies and the coltan trade

Internet : <http://www.broederlijkdelen.be/publicaties/coltan14-1.doc> , accessed 21 March 2002

**International Rescue Committee (IRC)**, 7 March 2002, Displaced Persons Attitude Survey Post-Disaster Goma, DRC, Jan. 27-29, 2002

**International Rescue Committee (IRC)**, April 2001, Mortality Study, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (February-April 2001)

Internet : <http://www.theirc.org/mortality.cfm> , accessed 4 October 2001

**Mail and Guardian**, 24 August 2001, Vital breakthrough for Congo

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/9f4b626235d3ec8ac1256ab2004477ec?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)**, 13 December 2001, "Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Far-reaching programs extend basic care to millions," MSF Activity Report 2000-2001

Internet : <http://www.msf.org/content/page.cfm?articleid=1E6BFC73-4BA6-445B-9450F565312CB22D> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)**, 19 December 2001, Violence and Access to Health in the DRC, Results of five epidemiological surveys

Internet : <http://www.msf.org/source/countries/africa/drc/2001/healthreport/report.doc> , accessed 3 January 2002

**Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)**, 2 February 2000, "MSF withdraws from Bunia and Ituri district in the DRC"

Internet : <http://www.msf.org/projects/africa/drc/reports/2000/02/withdraw1.htm> , accessed 14 February 2000

**Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)**, 25 January 2000, "MSF Report January 2000: MSF in the Democratic Republic of Congo",

Internet : <http://www.msf.org/projects/africa/drc/reports/2000/01/drcreport/eng/> , accessed 2 June 2000

**Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN)**, 20 August 2001, Merlin DR Congo update Aug 2001

Internet : [http://www.merlin.org.uk/programmes/democratic\\_republic\\_of\\_congo.htm](http://www.merlin.org.uk/programmes/democratic_republic_of_congo.htm) , accessed 3 October 2001

**Oxfam**, 18 January 2002, Poverty in the Midst of Wealth

Internet : <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/drc/povertywealth.rtf> , accessed 28 January 2002

**Oxfam**, 23 January 2002, DR Congo: Humanitarian situation update 23 Jan 2002

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/304aec5eb40e2d2e85256b4a006fac61?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Oxfam**, 30 December 2000, A Forgotten War - A Forgotten Emergency: The Democratic Republic of Congo

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/f40a697911e0dbfac12569ce003638e5?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 April 2001

**Oxfam**, 6 August 2001, No End in Sight: The human tragedy of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo - Aug 2001

Internet : [http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/oxfam\\_drc\\_06aug.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/oxfam_drc_06aug.pdf) , accessed 3 October 2001

**Oxfam**, 6 February 2002, Oxfam update from the field: Goma volcano  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/1aea175cd55619f085256b58005d4b43?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**Pan African News Agency**, 30 July 2001, Famine dans le nord du Katanga  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/393894a6d7dee6a985256a9900664536?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Refugees International (RI)**, 14 September 2000, Food Pipeline Break Threatens Internally Displaced in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/c57f6e85a32f37d98525695b004c524c?OpenDocument> , accessed 17 November 2000

**Refugees International (RI)**, 15 December 2000, Congo: Catalyzing Efforts with a Regional Strategy and Grassroots Approaches  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/2c614617b8666e2d852569b60070cd33?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 April 2001

**Refugees International (RI)**, 30 March 2000, "An Urgent Call For Peaceful Dialogue in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo"  
Internet : <http://www.refintl.org/cgi-bin/docfinder.pl?file=033000ss.con.html> , accessed 2 June 2000

**Refugees International (RI)**, 4 September 2001, Notes from the field: Congo  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/ae5d49da1e6f1e3685256abd004fa4ec?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Refugees International (RI)**, 5 May 2000, "Rising Humanitarian Needs Require of Congo Strong International Presence in Eastern Democratic Republic"  
Internet : <http://www.refintl.org/cgi-bin/docfinder.pl?file=050400ss.kon.html> , accessed 2 June 2000

**Refugees International (RI)**, 6 February 2002, Children in the Eastern Congo: Adrift in a Sea of War and Poverty  
Internet : <http://www.refintl.org/cgi-bin/ri/bulletin?bc=00367> , accessed 11 February 2002

**Relief and Rehabilitation Network (RRN)**, November 1998, Newsletter No. 12: Principles of Engagement for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance in the DRC

Internet : <http://www.oneworld.org/odi/rrn/newslet/newslet13/news1b.html> , accessed 25 October 1999

**Reuters**, 5 July 2001, Congo disaster destroys decades of development

Internet

:  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/5fb8276c3a813bfbc1256a80003a0676?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Romkema, Hans** , November 2001, "An analysis of the Civil Society and Peace Building Prospects in the North and South Kivu Provinces, Democratic Republic of Congo," Life & Peace Institute

**Save the Children Fund (SCF)**, 10 July 2001, Save the Children Emergency Unit Statement: DR Congo Jul 2001

Internet

:  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/c733d0d61d3eaf7185256a850065e510?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**Save the Children Fund (SCF)**, 31 December 2000, Update December 2000

Internet

:  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/3913bb0981643f6ec12569d00040a1e6?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 April 2001

**The Pole Institute**, 2002, The coltan phenomenon, How a rare mineral has changed the life of the population of war-torn North Kivu province in the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Internet : [http://www.pole-institute.org/documents/polinst\\_coltan.rtf](http://www.pole-institute.org/documents/polinst_coltan.rtf) , accessed 21 March 2002

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 11 July 2000, DRC Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, May - June 2000

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 12 September 2001, Flash OCHA-RDC situation humanitaire au 12 sep 2001

Internet

:  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/2d1f40be04de4828c1256acb004ec52e?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 13 December 2001, Evaluation de la situation humanitaire et intervention initiale sur Befale, Province de l'Equateur

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 14 February 2001, Situation humanitaire en République Démocratique du Congo au 14 Février 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/5907f062176be76fc12569f50057ef9d?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 April 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 15 February 2000, DRC Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, January – February 2000

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/437a83f9fa966c40c12564f2004fde87/4d2aa15d738d19e885256887006b5230?OpenDocument> , accessed 26 May 2000

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 15 February 2002, Sommaire de la situation humanitaire dans l'est de la RDC pour la période du 29 janvier au 10 février 2002

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 15 July 1999, DRC Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, 15 Jun - 15 Jul 1999

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/957f4d6d242c4b83c12567b700512921?OpenDocument> , accessed 10 February 2000

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 15 March 2001, Flash OCHA-RDC Situation humanitaire du 7 au 14 Mars 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/a3aa1da09b9a496285256a1000701c6f?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 April 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 15 March 2002, DRC: Government walks out of inter-Congolese dialogue

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/10140fa6b7dece8585256b7d00746be6?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 15 November 1999, DRC Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, 1 Oct - 15 Nov 1999

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/7d6016ec5ccc11f8525682b005a6e57?OpenDocument> , accessed 18 November 1999

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 17 April 2000, DRC Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, March - April 2000

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/26b84a37d11afc7a852568c4006805b9?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 June 2000

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 19 February 2002, DRC: Special report on tensions in the northeast

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/1c02c4c0ddf68afdc1256b650051082b?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 19 February 2002, The Mount Nyiragongo Eruption in Goma Donor Update - UN Inter-Agency donor alert update

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 2 January 2002, Flash OCHA-RDC situation humanitaire au 02 jan 2002

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/6f05ba0d96dcc6e2c1256b36003f9a62?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 20 February 2002, Information Exchange Meeting Great Lakes Region

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 2001, Table 1: UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001, Summary of Requirements and Contributions- By Appealing Organization

Internet : [http://www.reliefweb.int/fts\\_dev/reports/pdf/OCHA\\_1\\_511.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/fts_dev/reports/pdf/OCHA_1_511.pdf) , accessed 4 October 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 21 June 2001, Mid-Year Review of the 2001 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/69f20fcd6327314bc1256a530036a819?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 22 August 2001, Flash OCHA-RDC situation humanitaire au 22 août 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/33da1e1329d69d8ec1256ab5002ca496?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 22 October 2001, Flash OCHA-RDC situation humanitaire au 17 Oct 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/a3407485b58c4442c1256aed0049e5bc?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 23 January 2002, Information Exchange Meeting

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 25 January 1999, Principles of engagement for emergency humanitarian assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Internet :  
<http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/files/rwdomino.nsf/4c6be8192aef259cc12564f500422b3c/cd864fbe40411a56c125670500531019?OpenDocument> , accessed 25 November 1999

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 26 November 2001, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/9ca65951ee22658ec125663300408599/9315accad57fa238c1256b100031a150?OpenDocument> , accessed 18 December 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 26 September 2001, Great Lakes Region Information Exchange Forum

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 28 February 2001, Flash OCHA RDC Situation humanitaire du 21 au 28 février 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/730c6a4b1842f5485256a020057e85d?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 April 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 28 February 2002, Affected Populations in the Great Lakes Region

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 30 September 2001, Flash OCHA RDC situation humanitaire au 30 septembre 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 31 December 2000, Affected Populations in the Great Lakes Region as of December 2000

Internet : [http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/affectpopul\\_dec2000.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/affectpopul_dec2000.pdf) , accessed 8 April 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 31 March 2001, Flash OCHA-RDC Situation humanitaire du 21 au 28 mars 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/09896f03b244d8df85256a22006f3213?OpenDocument> , accessed 9 April 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 6 March 2001, Women facing war in Congo

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/1c02b78315716fdf85256a07005733e7?OpenDocument> , accessed 9 April 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 7 June 2001, Flash OCHA-RDC situation humanitaire au 06 juin 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/70367182baaed26985256a64005ad73f?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 7 March 2002, Sommaire de la situation humanitaire dans l'Est de la RDC

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 7 March 2002, Table I : UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001 Summary of Requirements and Contributions - By Appealing Organization  
Internet : [http://www.reliefweb.int/fts\\_dev/reports/pdf/OCHA\\_1\\_511.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/fts_dev/reports/pdf/OCHA_1_511.pdf) , accessed 21 March 2002

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 8 August 2001, Flash OCHA-RDC situation humanitaire au 08 Aout 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/7fd7e47686341130c1256aa8004daf96?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, 8 March 2001, Flash OCHA-RDC Situation humanitaire du 28 février au 7 Mars 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/c79e07656fdc3d7685256a09006c1c39?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 April 2001

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, September 2000, Humanitarian Bulletin, August - September 2000

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)**, September 2001, Maniema, North & South Kivu, Orientale, Eastern & Western Kasai, Katanga, Equateur

**United Nations**, 7 June 2001, UN Special Envoy says protection, rehabilitation of children should be top priority in Congo

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/0d5a8cb6c27c2ecd85256a650043f9b8?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**United Nations**, December 1998, United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic Republic of the Congo, January -December 1999

Internet :  
<http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/websites/rwdomino.nsf/069fd6a1ac64ae63c125671c002f7289/5f0bb815701bb88fc12566d400371a86?OpenDocument> , accessed 13 October 1999

**United Nations**, July 1999, United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic Republic of the Congo, Update: July -December 1999  
Internet :

<http://www.notes.reliefweb.int/websites/rwdomino.nsf/069fd6a1ac64ae63c125671c002f7289/6d6e8d878f7b303cc12567b600481a9f?OpenDocument> , accessed 13 October 1999

**United Nations**, July 2000, 2000 Mid-Term Review of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Jan-Jun 2000)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/68f776513ba95ff1c125692200348051?OpenDocument> , accessed 26 July 2000

**United Nations**, November 1999, United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic Republic of the Congo, Update: January -December 2000

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/b6af40bb5277321cc125681f004f7232?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 February 2000

**United Nations**, November 2000, UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/9ca65951ee22658ec125663300408599/f895f02e4e866d37c1256992004c6f13?OpenDocument> , accessed 18 November 2000

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 10 October 2000, D.R.Congo: Donor Update

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 11 February 2002, UNICEF humanitarian appeal for children and women Jan - Dec 2002

Internet : [http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/unicef\\_drc\\_11feb.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/unicef_drc_11feb.pdf) , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 19 February 2002, UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Goma volcano crisis donor update 19 Feb 2002

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/47ac991a5d88204385256b660069e0df?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 2 June 2000, "UNICEF Emergency Programmes": D.R. Congo Donor Update"

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/UNID/94091393F9B7AD1C852568F2006CC744?OpenDocument> , accessed 5 June 2000

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 23 October 2001, UNICEF Humanitarian Action: D.R. Congo donor update 23 Oct 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/62200dcc891a215d85256aee0068640a?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 7 July 2000, "UNICEF Emergency Programmes": D.R. Congo Donor Update, 7 July 2000"  
Internet : <http://www.unicef.org/emerg/DRC7july.htm> , accessed 27 July 2000

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 9 July 2001, UNICEF Humanitarian Action: DR Congo Donor Update 09 Jul 2001  
Internet : <http://www.unicef.org/emerg/DRC9Jul01.PDF> , accessed 3 October 2001

**United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR)**, February 2001, Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón in accordance with Commission resolution 2000/15 (E/CN.4/2001/40)  
Internet :  
[http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/\(Symbol\)/E.CN.4.2001.40.En?OpenDocument](http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.2001.40.En?OpenDocument) , accessed 8 April 2001

**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**, 2002, DR Congo recovery programming mission  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/97d899efb52b396085256b4f006a5062?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**, 28 November 2001, UNDP/Donor mission to Great Lakes Region / Democratic Republic of Congo  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/3889a065c49149d885256b1200723694?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 12 March 2002, Fifth Committee concludes consideration of financing of UN mission in Democratic Republic of Congo  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/4a297222dc40f21985256b7a0064942d?OpenDocument> , accessed 25 March 2002

**United Nations General Assembly (UN GA)**, 31 August 2001, Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Note by the Secretary-General, A/56/327  
Internet :  
[http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/\(Symbol\)/A.56.327.En?OpenDocument](http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.56.327.En?OpenDocument) , accessed 3 October 2001

**United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN HCHR)**, 28 September 2001, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Supplement No. 36 (A/56/36)

Internet : [http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/\(Symbol\)/A.56.36.En?Opendocument](http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.56.36.En?Opendocument) , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**, April 1998, Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Internet : <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/cdr/cdrdrc.htm> , accessed 15 October 1999

**United Nations News Service**, 19 February 2002, Annan recommends increasing number of UN troops, police in DR of Congo

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/a5b072854c5bd13749256b66001ef6c6?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 12 April 2001, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/357)

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/vID/AB11819FBAC78BF985256A3000655C44?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 12 February 2001, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/128)

Internet : <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/128e.pdf> , accessed 8 April 2001

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 13 November 2001, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of DR Congo

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/5794631d1c7695dcc1256b0a004cec3d?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 14 December 2001, Democratic Republic of Congo asserts right to seek help in defence of natural wealth against outside forces, Security Council SC/7241

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/2fa8fc0d54629158c1256b260044f16f?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 15 February 2002, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/3b2931ec8b315d3885256b66006dd9bb?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 16 October 2001, Ninth report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organization Mission in DR Congo

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/702b6dc2b167815f85256ae90055f543?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 17 January 2000, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Internet : <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/30e.pdf> , accessed 14 February 2000

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 21 September 2000, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2000/888)

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 22 February 2001, Resolution 1341 (2001)

Internet : <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/res1341e.pdf> , accessed 8 April 2001

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 30 August 2001, Troops withdrawals and impending dialogue mean improvements in DR of Congo, Security Council told

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/18ad0a3c77c5599885256ab800713c36?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 4 December 2000, Report of the inter-agency assessment mission to Kisangani (S/2000/1153 )

Internet : <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/monuc/N0078063.pdf> , accessed 8 April 2001

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, 8 June 2001, Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2001/572)

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/aa30daa2342f6678c1256a6b003e83d0?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**United Nations Security Council (UN SC)**, November 1999, Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations: Preliminary Deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Internet :  
<http://www.notes.reliefweb.int/files/rwdomino.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/d1426980e4200a668525681e0075db5c?OpenDocument> , accessed 22 November 1999

**United Nations Sub-Committee on Nutrition (ACC/SCN)**, 31 July 2001, Report on the Nutrition Situation of Refugees and Displaced Populations - Issue No. 34  
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/rnis34.pdf> , accessed 3 October 2001

**United Nations Sub-Committee on Nutrition (ACC/SCN)**, 31 March 2000, Report on the Nutrition Situation of Refugees and Displaced populations, RNIS 30  
Internet : <http://www.unsystem.org/acscn/Publications/rnis30.PDF> , accessed 2 May 2000

**US Agency for International Development (USAID)**, 14 November 2001, DR Congo - Complex emergency situation report #1(FY02)  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/df5f23a3feb59b1b85256b0a0059deae?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR)**, 1997, World Refugee Survey 1997 (Washington, D.C.)

**U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR)**, 1998, World Refugee Survey 1998 (Washington, D.C.)  
Internet : <http://www.refugees.org> , accessed 28 May 2001

**U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR)**, 1999, World Refugee Survey 1999 (Washington, D.C.)  
Internet : [http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/easia\\_pacific/burma.htm](http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/easia_pacific/burma.htm) , accessed 28 May 2001

**U.S. Department of State (U.S. DOS)**, 4 March 2002, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001  
Internet : <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/af/8322.htm> , accessed 21 March 2002

**U.S. Department of State (U.S. DOS)**, February 2001, U.S. Announces Emergency Aid for Refugees in Dem. Republic of Congo  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/df6a5d0d82d6e611c12569e700381b14?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 April 2001

**World Bank (WB)**, 12 December 2001, Press Backgrounder: Donors reconvene to review progress towards economic recovery in the DR Congo since last July

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/fdb0235633fd9e2585256b27007bdde0?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**World Bank (WB)**, 19 December 2001, Greater great lakes demobilization and reintegration program and trust fund

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/4c9f7a6eca6b903a85256b27007b9d9a?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 10 August 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 32 of 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/0fa946f2e3c51ad085256aa4005b2dcf?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 11 December 2001, Food for work project gets railway back on track in DRC

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/bc760c3a6ecf571c1256b26005b2767?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 13 August 2001, WFP expands food assistance to war victims in DR Congo

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/9797e30d1a34481085256aa7005a268e?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 13 July 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 28 of 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/c88d98bde0a5b70985256a8800606b01?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 13 September 2001, Situation Report #35, from 5-13 September 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 16 February 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 7 of 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/8bf91a8e8714ed76852569f50064b559?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 April 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 23 February 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 8 of 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/45e6a6506f82f044852569fc006a41f7?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 April 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 23 November 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 47 of 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/5a7f413bc8e02df8c1256b10003e5622?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 26 October 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 43 of 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/3676b5e9af1c193985256af10064f056?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 27 July 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 30 of 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/f61f515c0edfcee485256a96005878bd?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 28 December 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 52 of 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/fa45423f29a0cc4ac1256b3500325597?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 30 November 2001, WFP Emergency Report no.48

Internet :  
[http://www.wfp.org/newsroom/emergency\\_reports/specific\\_report.asp?id=49&country=4](http://www.wfp.org/newsroom/emergency_reports/specific_report.asp?id=49&country=4)  
accessed 18 December 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 31 August 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 35 of 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/91a25aab30d5d2fa85256ab9005c768f?OpenDocument> , 9 , accessed 3 October 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 4 January 2002, Report 1: DR Congo

Internet :  
[http://www.wfp.org/newsroom/emergency\\_reports/emergencies\\_report.asp?id=54](http://www.wfp.org/newsroom/emergency_reports/emergencies_report.asp?id=54) ,  
accessed 8 January 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 5 October 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 40 of 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f92d1631f76f55abe85256adc00683acd?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 7 September 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 36 of 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/bfa9c4b03c73465485256ac000629294?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 8 March 2002, WFP Emergency Report No. 10 of 2002

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/9bda03be11c690ecc1256b76006108d8?OpenDocument> , accessed 26 March 2002

**World Health Organisation (WHO)**, 29 June 2001, WHO/UNICEF Joint Mission, Democratic Republic of the Congo (18 - 29 Jun 2001)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/0368dbf9ce71a0e1c1256a7e00500774?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**World Health Organisation (WHO)**, 5 March 2002, Disease outbreaks reported: Cholera in Democratic Republic of Congo

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/4ca9984148ca6a2bc1256b73005a9859?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**World Health Organisation (WHO)**, 9 August 2001, DR Congo Health Update July 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/d1cd868cc3d8170285256aa300580190?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**World Vision**, 15 March 2002, DR Congo: Assessment reveals serious malnutrition

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/818d9823be523dc049256b7d0017865a?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**World Vision**, 27 September 2001, Internally displaced go hungry in the DRC

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/3572bc829b8a000e85256ad4006bb356?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**World Vision**, 30 July 2001, World Vision launches new response to IDP's in government-held DRC

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/7093afb99de8b709c1256a9b0035e18d?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001

**World Vision**, 31 July 2001, World Vision launches new child health and nutrition program in eastern DRC

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/cf8467925dea3c99c1256a9c002ff447?OpenDocument> , accessed 4 October 2001

**World Vision**, 9 October 2001, World Vision programmes expanding rapidly in DRC

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/30a533f814590cb3c1256ae100562bbb?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 March 2002

**World Vision**, December 2001, World Vision Eastern Congo Oicha Nutrition Program, Nutrition Survey Report (10th-15th December 2001)

**Xinhua News Agency**, 18 September 2001, DRC to hand over 6,000 militia to Rwanda

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/005a8d484f876e6ac1256acb00503bbc?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 October 2001