



PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : UGANDA

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PROFILE SUMMARY

Summary

Summary of the profile

Internal displacement in Uganda has been caused by separate armed conflicts in northern and western areas as well as violent looting and cattle raids in the East since the mid-1990s. Conflict has affected about one quarter of the country's 45 districts, and about 550,000 people remained internally displaced by February 2002 (OCHA, March 2002).

Historical background

Violent attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), starting in the mid-1990s forced about three-quarters of the ethnic Acholi population to flee their homes in the Gulu and Kitgum/Pader districts of the North. The LRA soon gained a reputation for abducting children in order to forcibly conscript them, to force them to carry looted supplies, and to sexually exploit them. A relative calm in the area during 1999 allowed for some return of displaced populations, but escalated LRA attacks since the beginning of 2000 have forced an increasing number of people to seek refuge in the so-called 'protected villages' or, alternatively, in the towns of Gulu and Kitgum. After a period of some stability, the LRA intensified its raids during the first months of 2002. With the consent of the Sudanese government, the Ugandan army launched an offensive operation against the LRA inside Sudan starting in March 2002 (IRIN, 5 April 2002).

The other main area of displacement in Uganda is in the Rwenzori mountains on Uganda's western border with Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This region has been an arena for violent attacks by the rebel group Allied Democratic Front (ADF) since November 1996. The ADF violence intensified between 1998 and 2000 and included the abduction of school children as well as the attack of IDP camps. Bundibugyo, Kasese and Kabarole were the worst affected districts, but the violence also spread to the Bushenyi, Mbarara, Hoima and Kibaale districts. Since the beginning of 2001, the situation improved as a result of a weakening of the ADF by Ugandan security forces. District authorities were by March 2002 actively planning return of the displaced populations in all affected areas (OCHA, March 2002).

In eastern Uganda, internal displacement has been caused by the violent raiding of villages by Karamojong pastoralists in search of local goods and cattle. The situation in eastern Uganda, most notably in the districts of Katakwi, Soroti, Kumi, Kitgum and Lira, was particularly bad during the first months of 2000. Although the situation normalized to some extent by end 2000, about one third of the population in the Katakwi district remained two years later displaced and housed in poorly equipped IDP camps (OCHA, 28 February 2002, p34). In December 2001, the government finally initiated a disarming exercise of the Karamojong. However, as voluntary disarmament was met with only limited success, the Ugandan army began forcibly disarming the Karamojong in February 2002.

Displacement patterns and protection concerns

Over the last several years, civilians in conflict areas have been fleeing their homes and returning according to the changing intensity of the conflict. Urban centers have often been used as refuge. During periods when the security situation has been relatively tolerable, the displaced have often continued to farm their lands during the day and have returned to safe areas during the night. IDP settlements in all conflict areas have been exposed to armed attacks, abductions and looting of food aid. Government response to chronic insecurity in the North has been to gather large numbers of the population in 'protected villages'. This has been a controversial policy, and some have argued that these villages have been established primarily as a military tactic. The 'protected villages' have not provided adequate physical protection to internally

displaced people and have, in fact, been regular targets for LRA attacks. Displaced adolescent girls have been particularly vulnerable to abduction and sexual violence (WCRWC, July 2001).

Subsistence needs

Food security has been seriously undermined by ongoing conflicts – even in areas with high potential for agricultural production like the North. In the Karamoja area the increasingly violent cattle raids have depleted a major source of income and food and WFP has found it necessary to target more than 500,000 IDPs for food aid in 2002 (WFP 27 December 2001, p10). Overall, nutrition surveys indicate that malnutrition is more prevalent among displaced children than the population at large, but there have been signs of improved nutrition levels since the late 1990s (UN, November 2001, p43). Poor health among the displaced population has also been linked to congested camps with inadequate water and sanitation facilities as well as a breakdown of social structures (Oxfam, 8 February 2002). As of 2002, the living conditions and health situation in Katakwi IDP camps were among the worst in the country. On the whole, conflict and displacement in Uganda have undermined community support systems, and there has been an increase in crime, alcohol and drug abuse since the 1990s.

Although there have been positive developments with regard to access to primary education – especially in the North – high drop out rates among girls have remained, and there has been limited capacity to offer traumatized children special care (Weeks, March 2002, p27; WCRWC, July 2001, p25).

Improved opportunities for return during 2002

Since the beginning of 2002 most insurgent groups have been weakened and opportunities for return have opened up in many areas of the country. Often, the displaced have preferred a gradual return by which they first take advantage of improved security to recommence agricultural activities in their home areas and subsequently move back to their homes. However, physical security has not been the only factor determining the pace of the return process. Many displaced have been discouraged to return because of the lack of public services and education facilities in home areas. Others have faced problems of destroyed properties and loss of land rights. The conflict has led to an increased number of female-headed households who have a limited capacity to manage the return process (World Vision, December 2001).

Humanitarian access and response

The delivery of emergency assistance have been constrained by lack of security during the whole of the conflict in Uganda. There have been several instances of attack on aid vehicles and the killing of Ugandan humanitarian staff. In many cases, it has been necessary to use military escorts when transporting and distributing food aid. Still, the access situation has in general been better than in other African countries experiencing armed conflict, and substantial humanitarian assistance has reached displaced populations. In addition to food aid, projects in the areas of food production and education have been successfully implemented. The government has since 2001 launched several offensive operations to combat the rebel groups. It also developed a 'National Policy on Internal Displacement' in 2002.

(Updated April 2002)

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

Access to monthly "Humanitarian Update"

Humanitarian Update by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (January 2001 - March 2002)

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) based in Kampala publishes a monthly update that provides the latest information about protection issues and subsistence needs of the internally displaced in Uganda, as well as updated figures on IDP populations. This information is being incorporated in the Global IDP Database when the Uganda profile is updated – normally every 3-4 months. The Monthly Update may thus contain more recent information than this country profile. If you want to access the complete reports, you may download these in PDF format below. On request we can also make available Updates for 1999 and 2000.

Causes of displacement

Rebel attacks on civilians a main cause of displacement (1986-2001)

- Displacement in Uganda caused by rebel attacks on civilians, armed conflicts between rebels and government forces, as well as tribal clashes
- Factors that induce displacement include abductions, threats, mutilations, rape, landmines, theft and destruction of property
- Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) active in northern districts of Gulu and Kitgum since late 1980s
- Intensified armed activity by the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) in the western districts since June 1997
- Displacement of civilians between 1995 and 1997 in the north-west because of attacks on by the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)
- Improvement in security situation in all areas during 2001 enabled some return
- Speculations that 200,000 IDPs likely to return if Governments armed campaign against LRA succeeded (March 2002)

"Three major subcontexts of internal displacement exist in Uganda, each of them with its own characteristics. [...]

[...]

The Ruwenzori range in the southwest has been historically plagued by uncontrolled armed elements. Insecurity has been a "way of life" in this border zone with Zaire/DRC. The situation has, however, deteriorated since 1996, due to cross-border attacks by a new armed group, the "Alliance of Democratic Forces" (ADF). [...].As long as there are no significant improvements with regard to security and territorial control on the Congolese side of the border, internal displacement will continue to plague the population of this region.

For generations, the people of the northern region bordering the Sudan, notably the Acholi of the two largest districts Gulu and Kitgum, have had an adversarial relationship with the central powers in Uganda.

[...] Since 1986, the area has been the theatre of armed rebellion by the "Holy Spirit Movement" and its successor, the "Lord's Resistance Army" (LRA), against the government of Yoweri Museveni. In 1996, governmental forces embarked on a strategy of relocating the local population into 'protected villages'. [...]

The northeastern Karamoja area bordering the Sudan and Kenya has been a traditional theatre of raids by cattle rustling tribes (Karamajong, Turkana, Pokot). It is not unusual that Karamajong carry their raids westwards into the centre of the country, particularly during dry times when pasture in Karamoja becomes scarce and cross border movements from Kenya are frequent. With the arrival of the rainy season, the situation usually improves. The year 2000 saw particularly violent raids leading to the temporary displacement of some 140'000 persons. The raiding has taken on the character of military confrontations, with destabilising effects beyond the border districts and the displacement of increasing numbers of persons." (OCHA 7 October 2000)

"The two most brutal rebel groups [during 1999] were the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), operating in the north, and the Alliance for Democratic Forces (ADF) in the west. The political goals of each group were unclear. ADF forces reportedly consisted of extremist Muslims and former Ugandan soldiers from earlier regimes. The LRA appeared to have roots in extremist Christian and local traditional religions. The Ugandan government has long accused the Sudan government of providing military aid to many of Uganda's insurgencies.

[...]

The majority of families displaced in the north were uprooted prior to 1999 and have been unable to return home for fear of renewed attacks by the LRA and other guerrillas. Up to 80 percent of the population in Gulu District remained displaced.

Since 1996, the government has moved tens of thousands of northern families into about 30 so-called "protected villages." Some residents moved into the camps voluntarily, while others resisted and were forced into the sites by government security personnel.

[...]

In southwest Uganda, security and humanitarian conditions deteriorated during 1999 as ADF rebels mounted several offensives and government troops intensified counterinsurgency efforts.

Rebel attacks "caused rapid and massive displacement and re-displacement of the majority of the residents" in some southwestern areas, UN aid workers reported. Rebel raids uprooted 50,000 to 70,000 people during March-April and pushed an additional 10,000 persons from their homes later in the year.

[...]

The displaced population in southwestern Uganda was "scared, traumatized, and paranoid" after years of rebel atrocities, aid workers reported. Rebels targeted civilians, particularly residents of displacement camps. ADF guerrillas killed five displaced persons in March and abducted 15 uprooted people in June. Many other incidents were likely unreported." (USCR 2000)

The situation worsened during 2000:

"The humanitarian context in Uganda has degraded considerably since the 2000 Consolidated Appeal was made in November 1999. There have been three developments since the formulation of the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) that affected its applicability. First, the relative calm that held through most of 1999 in the northern districts was shattered near the end of the last year in the days immediately following the Nairobi Agreement between Uganda and Sudan. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has increased both the intensity and duration of their attacks. Second, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) campaign changed from a desultory low level insurgency to a much more vigorous rebellion. Finally, Karamajong raids into Kumi, Katakwi, Soroti and Kitgum were more determined than in previous years due to the drought in 1999 in Karamoja. Thus, the CHAP's worst case scenarios regarding the need for continuation of relief in the Rwenzori region, in Gulu and Kitgum, and in Karamoja came to pass." (UN July 2000, p.1)

Signs of improvements during 2001?

"The Ugandan military applied increased pressure on both the LRA and Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) as external support for both rebel groups dwindled [during 2000]. While rebel forces continue to attack civilian targets in Bundibugyo, Kasese and Kabarole districts in the west and in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts in the north, the frequency and severity of attacks have decreased. The majority of displaced still fear the rebels, preferring to remain in protected villages by night. The construction of security/access roads and the increased mobility and presence of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) is encouraging increasing numbers of IDPs to return home. During the past year, the number of displaced in need of assistance decreased by 151,062 or 20.5 percent. The number remaining in protected villages however, remains significant." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Present Situation")

"In 2001, the people in need of humanitarian assistance declined by 35% from 1.1 million to 717,532. The decrease was attributed to several factors including:

- a) withdrawal of UPDF troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and their redeployment to peripheral crisis districts;
- b) resumption of diplomatic relations with Sudan;
- c) discontinuation of external military support to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF),
- d) peace initiatives by community leaders,
- e) mediation by the Carter Centre and donors,
- f) the GoU's declaration of an Amnesty; and
- g) census-taking in refugee settlements and protected villages for the displaced.

Although there has been a lull in rebel movement and activity since June 2001, the situation remains unstable. It is too early to determine whether the relative calm will continue and we stand cautioned by experience." (UN November 2001, p.3)

See pp. 19-20 of the UN Consolidated Appeal for 2001 for scenarios on how the situation may develop during 2002

Displacement related to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the North (1998-2001)

- Escalated LRA violence against civilians started in 1995
- Reports of continued abduction of children. and young adults by LRA
- Nearly one year of calm disrupted by new LRA attacks by the end of December 1999
- Reported in 1999 that the LRA appeared to have split into smaller bands operating throughout Gulu/Kitgum
- LRA pursued an even more violent tactic towards civilians during 2000
- Kitgum in particular affected LRA attacks during first half of 2001
- LRA attacks reported to be less sporadic by end-2001
- Reported in March 2002 that Sudan was permitting Ugandan forces to pursue the LRA within South Sudan

"[I]t was from 1995 onwards that the scale of violence, displacement and child abductions by the LRA increased dramatically.

[...]

A common theme throughout this devastating period of Acholi history has been the strategic use of civilians by both sides, including the calculated enforcement of displacement. In February 1996 the LRA issued an edict banning settlement within four kilometres of roads and prohibiting the use of bicycles. Their intention was the tight control of a population inaccessible to government troops which would provide

cover and supplies for the rebels. To enforce the edict, hundreds of people were killed, villages and food stocks were burned and thousands drifted towards the relative safety of Gulu town. By September 1996 the Gulu District Council announced that 100,000 people in the district were now displaced.

Meanwhile, the government's Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) shelled villages they suspected of containing LRA units, discouraged the return of IDPs from the towns and conducted a number of 'clearances', particularly from Aswa and Kilak counties in northern Gulu District. By November 1996, the Gulu District Council estimated that IDP figures had doubled to 200,000. Three months later, the figure was again upwardly revised to 270,000 as the policy of creating camps (introduced in October 1996) intensified. Tens of thousands of people had swelled the towns (particularly Gulu), trading centres and areas around army barracks. By mid-1998 the majority of IDPs were in 20 official camps." (WFP September 1999, pp.6-7)

"[In 1998 the] LRA abducted young girls as sex slaves and labor slaves. Other children, mainly girls, were reported to have been sold, traded or given as gifts by the LRA to arms dealers in Sudan [...]. While some later escaped or were rescued, the whereabouts of many children remain unknown.

[...]

The LRA continues to maim and rape civilians, and loot and burn private homes, as does the ADF. The LRA also abducted children to be guerillas and tortured them by beating them, raping them, forcing them to march until collapse, and denying them adequate food, water, or shelter." (US DOS March 1999, sect. 1b)

Relative calm in Gulu/Kitgum during 1999:

"The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) returned to Uganda from inside the Sudanese border in December 1998 and January 1999 and carried out numerous attacks and abductions in Gulu and Kitgum. However, since that time, there have been very few serious incursions or attacks by the LRA. Generally, Gulu and Kitgum are more peaceful than any time since 1995. It appears that IDPs are moving back and forth between the camps and their homes, often leaving children and other more vulnerable groups in the camps for security and possibly access to education and health services. With the relative quiet, many of the IDPs have been able to cultivate larger areas of land than in past years, either by returning to their own fields or simply by being able to move further afield from the IDP camps. UN Agencies are able to move without military escorts." (UN November 1999, p.3)

By the end of December 1999, a deteriorating situation was reported:

"Shattering nearly one year of quiet and calm in Gulu and Kitgum, the Lord's Resistance Army crossed back into northern Uganda just days before Christmas on 22 December and have been attacking military and civilian targets, IDP camps, and vehicles throughout Gulu and Kitgum for the past month, including Gulu and Kitgum towns. Though the number of rebels is unknown, the LRA appear to have split into a multitude of small bands throughout the two districts. Unlike in January 1999, there have been no child escapees from the LRA thus far perhaps because there have been few major engagements between the UPDF [Government forces] and LRA. The UPDF has captured 23 child soldiers. The military is now providing a military escort for vehicle travel on the Lira-Kitgum and Gulu-Kampala road. There have already been reports of a number of landmine incidents. The LRA have abducted numerous people—some of whom have been released after acting as porters.

Hundreds of thousands of displaced persons that had only just recently ventured away from the IDP camps to reclaim their homes, have now returned to the IDP camps in both Districts. Actual verification of numbers by relief agencies is impossible due to insecurity. Thousands of area residents are also spending each night in Gulu and Kitgum Towns in hospital grounds, bus parks, schools etc. The numbers fluctuate depending on the daily security situation. Water and sanitation in these locations is not adequate for the new arrivals." (UNHCU 24 January 2000)

"There seems to be a sense of fear that the pattern of rebels approach and attacks have changed. Unlike in the past, where they would loot and abduct civilians for carrying looted properties, they seem to kill more of people abducted. It's also believed that the rebels have resorted to burning IDP settlements and even

killing quite a number, in a bid to discourage them staying in the camps. As a result, IDPs have been made to move back and forth their original homes (for those who have ventured back) and the camp." (UNHCU 25 September 2000)

Less sporadic LRA attacks by end-2001

"Though insecurity remains the major inhibiting factor to movement and access in north (Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts and north-western regions (Arua, Yumbe, Moyo and Adjumani districts), LRA attacks have been sporadic and less intense. Stakeholders hope the prevailing calm in the region is a result of various peace initiatives, and that it will last. Events that have contributed to the comparative quiet include:

The ongoing Amnesty;

A number of community based peace initiatives such as the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI);

Government's efforts to dialogue with the LRA rebels, spearheaded by the Gulu LCV Chairperson's meeting with several LRA Commanders on June 4th; and

Improved relations between the governments of Sudan and Uganda, which led to Sudan Government's formal decision to cut support to the LRA on August 20th.

Further, as part of the peace overtures to restore diplomatic relations (broken in 1995), Sudan reopened its embassy in Kampala August 2001, with Uganda doing the same in Khartoum a month later. These political changes may result in the resolution of the long-running LRA rebellion. Gulu district officials are already reviewing the possibility of resettling IDPs in camps nearer to their homes." (UN November 2001, p.6)

"During the reporting period (July/August) the security situation in Gulu and Kitgum has been relatively calm. This is partly attributed to ongoing peace negotiations and the heavy deployment of soldiers of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) at the border, which hampered the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels' movement to the area. There are still reports of large rebel groups sighted in various areas, but most incidents are linked to the looting of food. Incidents of torching houses by rebels have also decreased considerably. The short road between Gulu and Kitgum is being used again, though the Gulu-Lira is reportedly now safer than the Gulu-Kitgum road.

Most humanitarian workers and residents hope this is not just a lull in insecurity but a result of the ongoing peace negotiations between government and LRA." (OCHA August 2001)

"Gulu District has seen some very encouraging developments over the last two months. More than 50 LRA rebels are said to have reported ("come out") and information about the Amnesty Act seems to reach more and more people throughout the District. The number of rebels who have returned to their villages is said to be high because many go straight back to the community and do not report to the authorities. However security is still very fluid in some areas. NRC for example reports that 8 sites selected in their school rehabilitation programme in Gulu District do not yet have the necessary security for construction to start.

The UPDF now estimates LRA numbers still in Uganda to have reduced considerably (estimated at 100), though an estimated 300 are said to be in Southern Sudan (according UPDF - during a security meeting in Gulu 14th December), where they are increasingly affected by international developments. The remnants in Uganda have split into much smaller groups, which engage in banditry, though the scale has also decreased. Hence in December, the security situation in Gulu has seen only a few isolated incidents in the Bibia - Atiak and Pabo areas. These incidences have involved hut burning (42 huts burnt in Atiak on 29th November, 3 huts burnt in Paloro - Rajab on 16th December) and looting of food and money. Abductions have lessened significantly and a few people, not necessarily children, are often abducted to carry the loot. Pabbo IDP Camp, which has been the worst affected by banditry and looting has had two weeks' period of calm as of 17 December. This is attributed largely to the UPDF Commander, who is said to have "taken appropriate action". One grave incident during the reporting period was when alleged LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle on the Bibia-Atiak Road, killing three people." (OCHA December 2001)

"The security situation in the three districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader remained relatively calm, with one or two isolated incidents. An estimated 300 LRA rebels attacked and overran a local defence unit in Agoro

Market, Lamwo county, Kitgum District on 23rd February. Two civilians were killed in the incident, which disrupted the relative peace and security that had prevailed in the region for the past year. The UPDF are reported to have pursued the rebels, who were fleeing back to Sudan and killed at least two along the Sudan-Uganda border." (OCHA February 2002)

Continued LRA attacks by beginning of 2002, but offensive operation started by government's security forces:

"A recent agreement signed by the Ugandan and Sudanese governments has given the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) authorisation to sweep through broad swathes of Sudanese territory in pursuit of the LRA.

[...]

During the operation, which began on 28 March, the UPDF overran five LRA base camps in (Eastern Equatoria) southern Sudan, and by 29 March had captured a cache of arms worth just over US \$2 million, according to Bantariza." (IRIN 5 April 2002)

"The attack by the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda on the Agoro IDP settlement in Kitgum District on 23 February [2002] has been followed by continuing rebel attacks in Gulu District. The international declaration of the LRA as a terrorist organization in late 2001 and improvements in diplomatic relations between the Government of Uganda (GOU) and the Government of Sudan (GOS) have led to an agreement between the GOU and GOS to permit Ugandan forces to pursue the LRA within South Sudan.

The possibility of intensified civil unrest in Eastern Equatoria region of Southern Sudan has a number of humanitarian implications within northern Uganda. This includes the return of 3,000 to 5,000 LRA abducted children to northern Uganda, the internal displacement of Sudanese civilians in the Eastern Equatoria region and a consequent influx of 60,000 Sudanese refugees to the northwestern region of Uganda. In addition, 200,000 IDPs are likely to return from protected camps in northern Uganda if the threat of the LRA is eliminated." (WFP 28 March 2002)

"Although outright victory is unlikely, expectations that the LRA will have less territory in which to manoeuvre, coupled with hopes that the Government's amnesty for former rebels will coax increasing numbers of fighters away, has created anticipation that the long-term security situation will eventually improve.

[...]

According to unverified reports from civilian authorities in the north there has already been an observable return home from some camps by those residents who came from parishes where security incidents have not occurred in over the last 12 months." (OCHA/IDP Unit 3 April 2002, p.2)

"However, with the deployment of large numbers of troops of UPDF in Southern Sudan, and the consequent thinning of army presence in Gulu District, the security situation is reported to have deteriorated sharply during the month of March. Once again there has been observed movement of large rebel groups. Groups of 40-50 heavily armed men have been sighted moving throughout the District as opposed to the small pockets of rebels from Kilak hills that were, over the last months, engaged in looting mostly. There have been rumours that the rebel groups have been reinforced through new influxes from Sudan, but these have been difficult to confirm. It has to be noted that rumours – especially of sightings of LRA – are running wild and aggravating the existing tension in the area. With the incidents having taken place to the Northeast, Northwest, Southeast and Southwest of Gulu town there can no longer be talk about safe areas where people are likely to start moving out of the camps in the near future. Residents of Pagak camp in Lamogi Sub-County for example, said they have now changed their mind about planning for return following the latest developments and the attacks in Amuru. As a consequence of Joseph Kony's LRA renewed activities, talk of resettlement has drastically reduced and many NGOs are restricting field activities to a minimum." (OCHA March 2002)

For the historical background of LRA see:

Civilians in the north moved by Government into "protected villages" (1996-1999)

- Government forces (UPDF) started in 1996 to move civilians in the North from strategically important areas into "protected villages"
- 23 officially designated sites in Gulu with 270,000 IDP in 1998
- Five official camps in Kitgum with an IDP population of about 80,000 in 1998
- Estimated that 75 percent of Kitgum and Gulu civilians were resident in camps by January 2001
- People in Gulu forced to move into "protected villages" while displacement in Kitgum was more spontaneous

GULU

"In response to the evolution in LRA tactics, UPDF tactics in Gulu included, by September 1996, the creation of camps and the removal of people from strategically important areas or places where the army was unable to prevent LRA activity. The decision to create camps was taken at the highest level. On 27 September 1996 President Yoweri Museveni informed members of the Parliamentary Committee on the Offices of the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs that the authorities were going to establish "protected villages". However, from interviews with villagers and others, it appears to Amnesty International that some UPDF units were already moving people out of their homes a number of weeks before the top-level decision to create camps was communicated to the Parliamentary Committee." (AI 17 March 1999, para.2.1)

"Initially, in 1997, there were about 50 settlements where IDPs were grouped either spontaneously or under army supervision. The district authorities could not manage such a widely dispersed group of people. Following a needs assessment undertaken by WFP, the camps in Gulu District were merged into 23 officially designated sites where 270,000 people would be provided with continuing assistance. In October 1998, three of these camps were found to have sufficient access to land for cultivation (though they were still served through food-for-work (FFW) projects by WFP). This effectively brought the camp total in Gulu to 20 where humanitarian assistance was (and still is) given. In Kitgum the IDP population was about 80,000 in five official camps." (WFP September 1999, p.8)

"Many people have moved to camps "spontaneously", fleeing from the LRA. Others feel that the authorities gave them no choice about leaving their farms and livelihoods. Yet others were physically forced by government soldiers. Few people are happy to be in camps, which appear to have become semi-permanent, regarding them as punitive. However, the extreme violence of the LRA poses a real dilemma. Returning to the countryside may provide more opportunities (for example, for education) but may increase the risk of being killed, either by the LRA or by patrolling government soldiers." (AI 17 March 1999, "Introduction")

"Although fighting between government forces and the LRA continued, there were no reports during the year that government forces used threats to compel citizens to leave their homes because of the conflict." (US DOS February 2001, sect.1f)

"As a counter measure to the insurgency, IDPs have been moved into military protected camps and it was estimated [by WFP] that 75 % of both Kitgum and Gulu was resident in camps in January considerably with people being able to get back to normal activities with access to gardens and less fear of insecurity" (RNIS April 2001, p.41).

"Under the Geneva Convention, the GoU has the right to move or contain people if, for reasons of insecurity, such relocation is in the people's best interest. In the majority of cases, it would appear as if

displaced Ugandans have been able to exercise their right to residence and movement and that their choice of location/abode has generally been voluntary." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Lessons learned")

"It is well known that the LRA recruits from the IDP camps and fear of continued LRA attacks keeps the IDPs trapped in the protected villages against a widely voiced will to return home. Linked to this, the Ugandan army (UPDF) is reported, on occasions, to forcibly prevent departure of IDPs from the camps, despite the official government policy of voluntary resettlement. It has been reported that the prolonged internment of the Acholi has deepened ethnic divisions and widened regional disparities in terms of education, income levels and poverty, breeding mistrust and resentment." (OCHA 31 September 2001, p.26)

KITGUM

"If we compare Gulu and Kitgum (which includes Pader), the circumstances which explain the origin of displaced camps in Acholi are slightly different. This is why we shall deal with both parts separately.

[...]

Camps in Kitgum came into existence at three different points in time: in January 1997 (Lukung, Padibe, Palabek Gem and Palabek Kal), in October-November 1997 (Pajule, Lacekocot, Acholibur) and in March 1999 (Potika and Agoro). The circumstances which gave origin to these camps were different from the ones in Gulu, and the percentages of the population which is displaced is also different: 80 % in Gulu and 20 % in Kitgum (which also includes Pader district). On at least two different occasions the Government has attempted to create more displacement in Kitgum: in September 1997 and in September 2000 (in Pajule), although in both cases the population and some of their leaders openly resisted the move.

Between the nights of 7th January and 12th January 1997, LRA rebels systematically swept through villages of the Lamwo sub-counties of Lukung and Palabek, in northwest Kitgum. These units methodically hacked and clubbed to death a total of 412 men, women and children. Thousands of homes were looted and burned. The remaining population fled in sheer terror. This was the largest single massacre of the war in Acholi.

[...]

Potika and Agoro camps are the most recently created ones, having started in March 1999. At that time rebels had come down over the mountain of Lamwaka, heading for Madi-Opei. The UPDF pushed them back and forced people to leave those areas." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, pp. 5, 8)

People in Gulu forced to move into "protected villages" while displacement in Kitgum was more spontaneous:

"In Gulu district, the establishment of the villages followed a decision by the military authorities in 1996; most of the villages appear to have been established between August and October of that year. The population was ordered into the villages on short notice; those who remained outside them were subject to army attack. In Kitgum/Pader, the villages were more often established as a result of the flight by rural residents following LRA attacks in 1995-97; these villages evolved more spontaneously, with people moving near trading centres and military cantonments in search of security; there has been more movement back and forth from people's original homes than is the case in Gulu." (Weeks March 2002, p.2)

For further information, see:

[Mixed opinions about the physical protection offered by the "protected villages" in Northern Uganda \(1996-2001\)](#)

[Background of the "Protected villages" strategy \(1996-2002\)](#)

Displacements related to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the west and southwest (1998-2002)

- Heightened activities by ADF in 1998 and 1999 including abduction of school children and students
- Continued attacks by ADF during 2000, including attacks on IDP camps
- ADF activities spread to neighbouring districts of Bushenyi, Mbarara, Hoima and Kibaale during 2000
- Claims by Government that army campaign had reduced the strength of ADF by mid-2001
- Reported in February 2002 that daily life was being normalized and free from insecurity incidents in the districts of Kamwenge, Kabarole, Bundibugyo, Kyenjojo and Kasese

"[During 2000] The ADF have continued attacks in Bundibugyo, Kabarole and Kasese since 1997, with Bundibugyo being the worst hit. Currently Bundibugyo has about 114,000 IDPs (about 80% of population), Kabarole has 11,161 and Kasese 20,000. Security has improved and military escorts are only occasionally required. However, the ADF activities have worryingly spread to neighbouring districts of Bushenyi, Mbarara, Hoima and Kibaale. It is unlikely that the ADF problem will cease in 2001. Though the current slow trickle of IDPs to their homes in all three districts is encouraging, a single attack would send all IDPs returning to the camps, as occurred previously." (UN November 2000, p.17)

"The ADF have attacked civilian and military targets in and around the Rwenzori Mountains since 1997. The most affected District is Bundibugyo where nearly two-thirds of the population is internally displaced. ADF attacks continue in Bundibugyo, and parts of Kasese and Kabarole and more recently Kibaale. The displaced "caseload" ebbs and flows according to the ADF attacks. In 1998, a peak of Bundibugyo IDPs of around 90,000 dropped to around 20,000 at the end of 1998 only to shoot up dramatically in the first five months of 1999 to 90,000 again. In Kasese, some 30,000 IDPs have remained at the foot of the mountains since 1997. In Kabarole, the displacement has been more temporary, fluid and perhaps hidden as people stayed with neighbours, and scattered among community institutions." (UN November 1999, p.14)

One report gives the following outline of the ADF atrocities in 1998:

"In the west and southwest, the rebel Allied Democratic Forces significantly heightened their activities [in 1998], which included repeated attacks on civilian targets, trading centers, and private homes, resulting in hundreds of deaths and abductions. The ADF continued to plant land mines extensively and increased its attacks on both rural and urban civilian targets, police outposts, and UPDF encampments. In February 30 students were abducted by ADF rebels from Mitandi Seventh Day Adventist College in Kasese. In April rebels attacked a woman in Bundibugyo district and cut off her ears and nose. The ADF forces hacked two civilian women to death in Kasese district in May. The ADF's deadliest attack of the year occurred on June 8, when rebels killed 80 students of Kichwamba Technical College in Kabarole district by setting locked dormitories on fire. An additional 80 students were abducted in the raid. Also in June, ADF rebels abducted over 100 school children from a school in Hoima district. ADF conducted dozens of small-scale raids that resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths. An ADF-affiliated group, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda claimed responsibility for three bus bomb attacks in August that killed 30 persons. (US DOS March 1999, sect. 1c)

Further escalation of ADF activities occurred during the second half of 1999:

" The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) substantially increased attacks in mid-December 1999 and these attacks have continued without abatement for the past two months in Bundibugyo and Kabarole Districts. President Museveni is currently in the Rwenzori Region leading operations against the rebels. Even with the President in the area, the ADF continues to attack IDP camps. There have been daily attacks, gun battles and/or ambushes occurring in parts of the District during the day and at night. Since the start of the year, there have been 28 separate ADF attacks and ambushes reported in the Monitor and New Vision newspapers. These attacks have left several dozen civilians dead. During his visit, the President is reported to have encouraged people to return to their homes and leave the IDP camps." (UNHCU 18 February 2000)

Continued attacks during first half of 2001

"In the Southwest, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) activity continues unabated. Although the Kasese attack on 17 March was not linked to the ADF, on March 28 heavily armed ADF rebels attacked Hamukungu fishing village – about 30km southwest of Kasese town – reportedly killing three and abducting four. In early April, the UPDF claimed, however, to have reduced the force to 'less than 100' and to have overrun a local commander's headquarters. President Museveni has also declared a departure from the 'softer approach' implied in the initial amnesty offer and decreed decisive action to bring the terrorist threat to an end through strengthened UPDF measures against them. IDPs in the Southwest remain hesitant about returning to the homes, due to continuing fear of attack by remnant rebels, although Kasese district is advocating for their resettlement." (OCHA 30 April 2001, p.31)

But signs of a safer situation by end-2001

"ADF attacks have decreased in number and magnitude since the year began. Save for the March 17th attack on Kasese, where unknown terrorists were involved, calm has reigned in the region, with very few Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks reported. With hope that this quiet is more than a lull in the storm, IDPs in Bundibugyo now have access to more garden areas during the day while still seeking the safety of camps at night. Approximately 20% have boldly resettled in four new camps nearer to their homes with the aim of increasing their food production. Consequently, the district is providing security to the new camps and humanitarian agencies are exploring ways of aiding IDPs resettlement in both Bundibugyo and Kabarole." (UN November 2001, p.6)

"We are sleeping calmly these days", these were the words of several district representatives in the third Regional District Coordination Meeting, held in Bundibugyo on 28th February. There are promising reports coming from the districts of Kamwenge, Kabarole, Bundibugyo, Kyenjojo and Kasese on daily life being normalized and free from insecurity incidents. The IDPs, in all the six districts, who have been displaced for the last four to five years, are looking at a brighter future, but there is still work to be done before everybody who wishes, could go home." (OCHA February 2002)

For historical background of ADF see:

[Background of the Alliance for Democratic Forces \(1996-1999\)](#)

Displacement caused by violent Karamojong pastoralists in eastern Uganda (1999-2001)

- Widespread availability of small arms amongst the Karamojong pastoralists and cattle raiding a tradition in the area
- Museveni allowed the Karamojong to retain their arms in order to protect themselves from external raids by the Turkana and Pokot in neighbouring Kenya.
- Drought ignited raiding by the Karimojong and displacement in the districts of Katakwi, Lira, Kitgum, Soroti and Kumi during first half of 2000
- Normalised security situation facilitated return by mid-2000
- During 2001 there were reports of over 55 recorded violent attacks by Karamojong cattle raiders/rustlers on neighbouring Katakwi District – causing new displacement

"The north-east of the country is inhabited by the Karamojong pastoralists, a marginalised minority of about 100,000 people. Since the Karamojong acquired automatic weapons the region has become a virtual no-go area. The area is suffering from environmental degradation and is periodically struck by famine. The military has been involved in regular punishment expeditions in the fight against cattle-raiding. Vigilantes have taken the law into their own hands, resulting in a breakdown of law and order. Guns are plentiful and gangs have terrorised the local population. An estimated 30,000 illegal weapons are in circulation which are used to rustle cattle and ambush and raid vehicles. These raids extend across the borders into Kenya and

Sudan and on numerous occasions have provoked serious incidents with neighbouring countries." (EPCPT December 2000)



"The issue of the Karamojong warriors has been a thorn in the side of all Ugandan governments since independence. The current government of President Yoweri Museveni allowed the Karamojong to retain their arms in order to protect themselves from external raids by the Turkana and Pokot in neighbouring Kenya.

[...]

The Karamojong have maintained their armouries by buying guns cheaply from the SPLA [Sudan People's Liberation Army], and other sources in Somalia and northwestern Kenya," Wairagala Wakabi, a journalist with 'The EastAfrican' who specialises in the movement of small arms in the region told IRIN. "They have the option of barter trade where they exchange animals for guns."(IRIN 22 March 2000)

"Currently [April 2000], as the drought in Karamoja begins to bite, the Karimojong are violently raiding neighbouring districts of Katakwi, Lira, Kitgum, Soroti and Kumi and causing a lot of displacement.

From a rapid assessment carried out by a WFP-led joint agency team and discussions with district leaders of the area (March 28-30), Karimojong rustlers and tribesmen have for the past month been terrorising the neighbouring districts of Katakwi, Soroti, Kumi, Kitgum and Lira, causing displacement as they loot food and other items and destroy property. This is partly because Karamoja experienced an unusual level of drought in 1999 (Karamoja experiences persistent drought and with at least six-seven months of dry spell each year. In 1999 the rains came late and were not consistent or adequate. As in the past, the Karimojong moved into neighbouring districts for water and pasture. As they were retreating back, the old pattern of looting with violence surfaced. This year, however, the looting was reportedly combined with raping, killings and violent beatings of a previously unknown dimension. Pick-ups and lorries are also reported to have ferried food and household items of ransacked villages. Frequent mention of disarmament of the Karimojong may have triggered this year's extreme violence in the raids according to some district leaders and displaced people during the fact finding mission.

The affected districts were Katakwi with an estimated number of 35,000 displaced. Kumi (2500), Soroti (2500), Kitgum (80,000) and Lira (15,000). The attacks are still ongoing and there is urgent need for security in the region or the situation of IDPs will deteriorate." (UNHCU 12 April 2000)

"[Reported in June 2000 that] The security situation in the districts of Lira, Soroti and Kumi and to an extent Katakwi, seem to have normalised. The exception are the border areas of Katakwi where attacks still occur and people seem to have moved their households inward, away from the border areas. The temporary measure of arming the Local Defence Units (LDUs) seems to have worked, as the attacks have almost stopped. " (UNHCU 6 June 2000)

"[Reported in April 2001 that] Karamojong cattle raiders/rustlers have launched a series of attacks on neighbouring Katakwi District, just as the rainy season gets underway - a time when the Karamojong are going back home if they migrated to neighbouring districts. The attacks, which began in early April [2001],

are reported to have displaced yet unknown numbers of people. Katakwi residents have also lost cattle, goats, chicken and crops like cassava from gardens to the rustlers. The worst hit areas are those sub-counties bordering with Moroto, including Ngariam, Magoro and Usuk in Usuk County and sub-counties in Kapelebyong County. The numbers in the remnant IDP camps from last year's violent raids in March-April are now swelling as more families return. The attacks are reportedly not by large groups but most likely by small groups of cattle thieves from Karamoja. The LDUs recruited last year to guard Katakwi residents from Karamojong raiders have allegedly been absorbed into the barracks, hence leaving gaps for the cattle rustlers.

[...]

The security situation in Karamoja is still very fluid, with a significant increase in the number of ambushes and armed robberies on the road especially between Kotido-Moroto and Moroto-Namalu, over the last four weeks or so. On the other hand, inter-tribal clashes have somewhat subdued and some attribute this to the increased presence of UPDF officers deployed to facilitate the disarmament programme." (OCHA April 2001)

"The annual migration of Karamojong in search of pasture took place in mid-January, with approximately 200 herders, mainly Jie from Kotido district, crossing into East Kitgum and Pader districts. However, significant migration into neighbouring Teso districts, the site of serious clashes over resources in 2000, was not apparent. A number of factors appear to have contributed to the maintenance of relative calm during 2001, albeit with some clashes during return migrations from mid-April. Such factors include food distribution within Karamoja itself by international aid agencies, the availability of some pasture within Moroto and Kotido districts, some limited disarmament of herders crossing district borders and increased dialogue on peace and reconciliation between the various groups. While emergency interventions appear to have eased immediate tensions, only long-term development to improve not only the access to water but also to basic social amenities can address their underlying causes. The considerable reduction in the total number of IDPs for Uganda is due primarily to the return of the Karamojong to Karamoja, which has allowed the majority of displaced in Katakwi, Soroti, Lira and Eastern Kitgum to return home." (OCHA 30 April 2001, pp.30-31)

"[S]ecurity continues to elude Karamoja as inter-group clashes and ambushes continue. Even more worrying is the export of this violence into neighbouring districts, particularly Katakwi, where there were over 55 recorded violent attacks by Karamojong in 2001, resulting in the displacement of a third of the population (88,500 people). Government responded with renewed commitment towards disarming the Karamojong, alongside various proposed development projects in Karamoja, resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and security enhancements to prevent migrations into Katakwi, east Kitgum, Kumi, Soroti and Lira.

[...]

Improved security will be the key to recovery. In 2001, traditional Karamojong raids became more violent than in the past and included death, rape and malicious destruction of property such as uprooting of crops. Katakwi's 320 km border with Moroto makes it difficult to maintain a 24-hour security net and the Karamojong warriors continue their relentless attacks through numerous entry points. The result has been a displacement of 88,500 people (30% of the Katakwi population)." (UN November 2001, pp.5, 17)

"The security situation in Katakwi remains calm, despite the influx of Karamojong into the district to find pasture and water for their cattle. According to the RDC of Katakwi, the last raid was on 6th January 2002, and there have been a couple of cattle thefts in some areas. He reports that the Karamojong who have entered Katakwi, with an estimated 30,000-40,000 heads of cattle, are peaceful and not provocative. However, it has not yet been established whether they are carrying arms or not. Fear is high among the Katakwi residents, for past experience has shown them that peace as the Karamojong graze their animals does not guarantee security when they head back home with the onset of the rains. Hence those still in camps are staying in camps and those who had returned home are reported to have returned to the camps." (OCHA February 2002)

See also:

Historical background of the rebel movements

The Acholi people and the Lord's Resistance Army (1987-2002)

- Killing of Acholis loyal to President Obote by Idi Amin in the 1970s
- Acholis mobilised for the overthrow of Amin in the late 1970s
- The "Obote II" Ugandan army (UNLA) included a predominant Acholi element until Museveni (NRA) gained power in 1986
- Acholi contingent of the UNLA continued to engage the NRA forces in 1986 while fleeing to Sudan and creating rebel group Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA)
- Holy Spirit Movement Front (HSMF) led by Alice Auma "Lakwena" fighting NRA during the 1986-87 period
- Joseph Kony fighting with UPDA but "inspired" by HSMF
- Peace accord between UPDA and NRA in 1988, but Kony leaving and creating LRA
- Breakdown of peace talks between LRA and Museveni in 1994 marks end of support for LRA by Acholi people
- First round of major LRA attacks during 1996 forced approximately 110,000 Acholi people to seek refuge in trading centres in Gulu district
- Reported in March 2002 that between 2,000 –3,000 LRA fighters remained encamped within Sudan between 65 and 100 km. from the border
- LRA actively pursued by Ugandan army during first of 2002 after being considered a "terrorist group" by the US

"From the beginning, the LRA's principal tactic has been to target the civilian population of Acholiland, terrorizing the community and creating paralyzing despondency. In its attacks, it characteristically kills, maims, rapes, loots, burns homes, destroys crops, and – most traumatically – abducts civilians, especially children. Kony is said to believe (or to have been told by his spirits) that the Acholi are to be punished for their lack of support to his cause.

Beyond this vague objective, its own survival and a vaguely-stated goal of "overthrowing the Museveni government", the LRA seems to have no coherent political programme. As a channel for spirits, Kony has created an aura for himself and his organisation of deliberate irrationality and obscurantism. As a practical matter, the LRA exists as an end in itself, serving to prey upon the civilian population, keeping it in a state of terror and turmoil and preventing any meaningful economic reconstruction of the region. (Weeks March 2002, p.9)

Historical background:

"During the first post-Independence government of President Milton Obote (referred to as "Obote I"), the Ugandan army was still derived primarily from the north. The Acholi, while not the majority, comprised its predominant ethnic group. Soldiers from the West Nile region were prominent as well. (GerSONY, Section 1, 1997,"Background")

"Amin's persecution of Acholis: Army Commander Col. Idi Amin - an ethnic Kakwa and a Muslim who claimed to be from Koboko County in the West Nile's Arua District - overthrew Obote in January 1971. Fearing the army's Acholi and Langi elements, he ordered them to the barracks, and early in his regime had

many hundreds of their officers and enlisted men killed. The Amin regime was characterized by the elimination of many prominent, educated or prosperous Acholi in Kampala as well as in the north, including in 1977 the Anglican Archbishop of Uganda. Some Acholi assert that an entire generation of Acholi leaders was eliminated or forced into exile during these years.

Amin replaced the Acholi in the army with West Nilers, especially Kakwa and Aringa people from northern Arua and with a group many Ugandans refer to as "Sudanese." The term "Sudanese" apparently refers to Sudanese migrant laborers long settled in Uganda and their descendants, who resided around the Jinja area near Kampala; or their relatives from southern Sudan (and some from northeastern Zaire) who were invited to join the Amin forces.

As national and international disaffection with Amin increased, anti-Government elements (including the current president, Yoweri Museveni) coalesced in Tanzania during the late 1970s, and organized to overthrow him. According to some northerners, Ugandan Acholis residing as refugees in Sudan as well as Acholi in Gulu and Kitgum living in their home areas were recruited for this purpose. In Tanzania, they organized and trained to participate in the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA). The Tanzanian Army and the UNLA invaded Uganda and in April 1979 overthrew the Amin forces, many of whom retreated to Sudan.

Following three brief interim presidencies (Lule, Binaisa and Muwanga), and an election whose integrity was widely questioned, President Obote was returned to power in 1980. The "Obote II" Ugandan army, now the UNLA, again included a predominant Acholi element. Its proportion was estimated by some Acholi sources as about 30% to 40% of the approximately 35,000-person force. A larger proportion of officers than enlisted men may have been Acholis. The army, often perceived by the public as largely of Acholi origin, was used by the government for the unenviable job of settling power disputes and carrying out unpopular government orders, gaining for it the enmity of many Ugandans. " (Gersony, Section 1, 1997,"Amin's persecution of Acholis")

"In 1981, the National Resistance Army (NRA) under Yoweri Museveni began an armed insurgency. The NRA was comprised primarily of Banyankole, Baganda and Banyarwanda combatants from southern and central Uganda, including Luwero District where in 1984, Obote forces carried out extensive reprisals against unarmed Baganda civilians. UNLA forces in Luwero were often referred to as "the Acholis" and were and blamed for the deaths of 100,000 civilians.

In 1985, Acholi elements in the UNLA overthrew the Obote government, expelled other ethnic groups from the military, and put a predominately Acholi government in power under General Tito Okello Lutwa. This was followed by authoritative and well documented reports of looting throughout the country by primarily Acholi officers and enlisted men. Following a short-lived power-sharing treaty between the UNLA and NRA, the NRA overthrew the government and took power. Fearing revenge, the ex-UNLA Acholi forces fled to Sudan where they organised themselves into an armed insurgency against the NRA." (UN November 2001, p.13)

"As the Acholi UNLA forces crossed Acholiland, they warned Acholi civilians that the NRA would exact revenge - and in fact kill many of them - when it arrived in Gulu and Kitgum. They urged civilians to follow them across the border to Sudan, and many did. The rest remained at home and held their breath, awaiting developments." (Gersony, Section 1, 1997,"Advent of the NRA")

"Most of the former Acholi UNLA soldiers who retreated from Kampala (fighting the NRA as they withdrew) continued north during March 1986 and finally crossed the international border into Sudan. Sudan provided refuge and a base from which to re-organize but, according to most reports, did not provide military assistance. Several Acholi asserted that, in fact, Sudanese authorities confiscated their weapons when they entered Sudan and returned them when they crossed back into Uganda.

According to some reports, senior Acholi officers began actively planning their military campaign against the NRA almost immediately. A Makerere University study [...] asserts that the anti-government Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) was established in Juba in March 1986. One knowledgeable interviewee asserted that in May 1986 key Acholi military leaders, at a meeting in Sudan, identified locations throughout Gulu and Kitgum which the UPDA would attack in mid-August. If these reports are generally accurate, it appears that the UPDA was organized just as the NRA arrived in Gulu, and that its battle strategy was determined during a period in which almost all of the assessment's interviewees characterized the NRA's conduct as exemplary." (GerSONY 1997, Section 1, "Phase I UPDA")

The present leader of LRA, Joseph Kony, came to the forefront during the second half of the 1980s:

"In late 1986, a temporary but significant figure emerged on this conflict scene in the form of Alice Auma "Lakwena." Lakwena is significant for several reasons: her movement, the Holy Spirit Movement Front (HSMF), came the closest to succeeding in overthrowing the NRM of any movement to date; Lakwena, through the HSMF, was the only early resistance to the NRA/M to claim moral and religious grounds to attempt to influence the conflict; and it seems that Lakwena, rather than the UPDA, provided the greatest inspiration for Joseph Kony, though he fought with the UPDA. Auma claimed to be possessed by the spirit of a dead Italian soldier named Lakwena. To a people who felt they were being punished for atrocities committed by Acholi soldiers fighting the NRA under Obote II and Lutwa, the HSMF promised redemption. In order to join HSMF, one had to undergo ritual purification to cleanse themselves of past sins. According to HSMF doctrine, only an impure soldier could die in battle. There can be little doubt that the success of the HSMF was due, in part, to the beliefs in magic and spirit powers that are a part of the Acholi culture and, in part, due to the early successes of the HSMF.

In October of 1987, a mere 80 km from Kampala, the NRA finally and resolutely defeated the HSMF. Lakwena is said to have escaped to Nairobi, but she has not made an overt gesture toward overthrowing the NRM since.

The UPDA, meanwhile, continued their struggle as a separate movement, which even on occasion clashed with the HSMF forces. In 1988, however, the UPDA signed a peace accord with the NRM. Many of those in the UPDA leadership were given positions in the government. It is said by some that those with the most to gain by coming back into the country mainstream and, thus, the most to lose by staying in the bush were the people who accepted the peace accord. Those who had little education, stood little chance of significant gain, and had already committed atrocities remained in the bush. According to Charles Alai, a founding member of the UPDA, who was, in 1996, Uganda's Minister of State for Public Services, "...by 1988 when we negotiated with the NRM government, Kony had already broken away from UPDA. When we came out, we had already disagreed with Kony and he took the most deadly and primitive officers with him." Thus, at the conclusion of the 1988 peace accords, a rather large contingent of the disenfranchised stayed in the bush.

Though Kony adopted many of the methods of his supposed cousin Lakwena he never gleaned the popular support she had. His movement, known in 1988 as the Uganda Peoples Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA) and later as the LRA, has had something more of a schizophrenic or disjointed nature about it. Kony has vacillated from near full adoption of Lakwena's beliefs, including the Christian components denouncing witch doctors and diviners, to denying any links with Christian doctrine to incorporating many Muslim rituals and beliefs.

[...]

By 1994, things had once again reached a state where the government felt it needed to attempt to bring peace to the north. Thus, in 1994, peace talks were held between Kony and the NRM. These talks were facilitated by Betty Bigombe. Bigombe, herself an Acholi, was then the Minister for Pacification of the North. Bigombe's efforts very nearly came to fruition. It is said that, at the time, LRA soldiers were staying freely in the trading centers and that a cease-fire existed. These talks ended badly when President Museveni suddenly announced that he was giving the LRA seven days to put down their weapons and turn themselves over to the government. Within three days of this announcement, the LRA had once again begun attacking.

After the breakdown of the 1994 talks, any support that the LRA had enjoyed from the Acholi people dried up. Thus, the mass abduction of children began in early 1995.

[...]

Clearly, the people of Acholi-land have little stomach for a movement that has inflicted so much harm and contributed so greatly to the destruction of their culture and people. Whatever support the LRA has enjoyed in the past in Acholi-land has long since dissipated." (Westbrook June 2000, , sects. III, VI)

"The Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) deployed in all main trading centres throughout Gulu, Kitgum and Padar Districts and continued to engage in low-intensity battles with the LRA until February 1996, when the later, buttressed by alleged arms and logistical from Khartoum, escalated its attacks against Acholi communities. By July 1996, the LRA had attacked numerous locations throughout Gulu in what appeared to be a campaign to breed fear amongst the population and to force the UPDF to respond in a more forceful and imprecise manner. There followed numerous incidents of Acholi citizens being caught up in "friendly fire" or of being brutally interrogated and accused of being LRA collaborators.

[...]

Initial attacks February – September 1996, resulted in approximately 110,000 Acholi people fleeing voluntarily to trading centres in Gulu district where UPDF detachments offered a degree of protection. In late October, UPDF tactics changed. Officers began *encouraging* and *persuading* the Acholi to seek the refuge of "protected villages." In some cases, the Acholi were given the option of displacing themselves or remaining in their homes and being mistaken for LRA. In January 1997, neighbouring Kitgum district was attacked, with 81,000 Acholi fleeing to protected villages, reportedly in a voluntarily manner. Those who had been hesitant to move to the protected villages in Gulu, were now given further encouragement. By end 1997, a total of 400,000 Acholi had been displaced - some by force, some by persuasion and some voluntarily – although the exact proportion has never been ascertained." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Historical Backdrop")

"Current estimates [April 2001] put the strengths of the LRA at around 200 to 300 operating within Uganda and about 800 operating in southern Sudan. The vast majority of LRA fighters and camp followers are either children or were children at the time of their abduction into the movement." (UN CHR 19 April 2001)

"With the development of the Uganda-Sudan relationship [by beginning of 2002], Kony has become increasingly isolated from external support and funding; especially as the UK has frozen bank accounts of known LRA and ADF collaborators as part of the crackdown on terrorism. At the same time, a significant number of his soldiers are taking advantage of the amnesty on offer. In December [2001], the UPDF reported that 82 rebels, including commanders, had surrendered to the government in less than two months and more may have returned directly to their villages. It is alleged, however that Kony has tasked commanders loyal to him to arrest and retrieve the deserters. A demobilisation process has been launched by the Office of the Prime Minister under the Amnesty Law – which applies both to the ADF and LRA – but there needs to be improved promotion and information on the law, and an increase of funding for the process if it is to be truly effective and confidence in it is to be maintained. At the end of December, the Amnesty Commission reported that it was unable to demobilize, reintegrate and resettle over 2,000 ex-rebels due to financial constraints." (OCHA 28 February 2002, pp.31-32)

Research undertaken between November 2001 and January 2002 shed more light on LRA at present

"Ugandan and foreign military and diplomatic sources were broadly consistent in their assessment that the LRA main force, in the Sudan, consists a well-armed and trained body of perhaps 2,000 –3,000 fighters, located in an encampment that is also crowded with those fighters' wives and consorts, and with their children as well as young children who have been recently abducted from Acholiland and are undergoing training as fighters – the total population of the main encampment is perhaps 5,000 people. According to international military observers, this encampment is over 100 km. from the border (others in the military place it closer in, at 65 km. from the border), in territory nominally under Sudanese government control, and it is shifted periodically for security reasons."

(Weeks March 2002, p.8)

During first half of 2002 an operation began to pursue the LRA:

"After the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, the US State Department declared the LRA, among others, a terrorist group. With the global scene largely dominated by the anti-terrorist campaign in the last months of 2001, prospects for a peaceful resolution to the conflict appeared to recede. The Ugandan government publicly demanded a military solution to the LRA problem. Museveni visited Sudan in January 2002 for the IGAD meeting, and at a pre-summit meeting with Bashir both presidents pledged support for the war on terrorism. This visit, like the earlier visits of President Bashir to Kampala in 2001, signal a marked improvement in bi-lateral relations. Towards the end of January 2002 there were reports of a significant UPDF military build-up in northern Uganda and speculation grew that a move to attack the LRA inside Sudan was imminent." (ACCORD 2002, "Implementing the 1999 Nairobi Agreement")

"A recent agreement signed by the Ugandan and Sudanese governments has given the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) authorisation to sweep through broad swathes of Sudanese territory in pursuit of the LRA.

[...]

Bantariza [Director for Information and Public Relations with the UPDF] told IRIN on Wednesday [3 April 2002] that the Ugandan army's military offensive against the LRA and its bases in southern Sudan - was "proceeding smoothly".

'Either way we are happy,' he said. 'In case LRA runs to other areas, we will go there and get them. The protocol permits that. They [the Sudanese government] gave us no objections to going into areas they control.

[...]

During the operation, which began on 28 March, the UPDF overran five LRA base camps in (Eastern Equatoria) southern Sudan, and by 29 March had captured a cache of arms worth just over US \$2 million, according to Bantariza. He said there had been no casualties reported since the operation began.

[...]

According to, a private international organisation promoting peace and human rights in Africa, the process leading to improved relations evolved at the regional level under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) but was also boosted by the US-led war on terror launched after the 11 September events - in which it has secured Khartoum's assistance against terrorism and listed the LRA as a terrorist organisation.

[...]

[T]he London-based organisation [Justice Africa] also suggested that the Sudanese military could have warned the LRA of the impending Ugandan offensive, enabling it to evacuate its bases before the arrival of the UPDF.

According to Justice Africa, the LRA's main military bases were within the security perimeter of the Sudanese army's southern command in Juba - its major garrison in southern Sudan, from where it could easily have dealt with the LRA itself." (IRIN 5 April 2002)

See also Weeks (March 2002, pp 5-14) for a good historical overview of the Acholi and LRA

For information about displacement related to LRA see:

[Displacement related to the Lord's Resistance Army \(LRA\) in the North \(1998-2000\)](#)

Background of the Alliance for Democratic Forces (1996-1999)

- The ADF emerged in western Uganda late 1996
- ADF has few links with western Uganda - its leaders come from areas in central Uganda with strong Islamic ties

- Because of the war in DRC borders with Sudan and DRC have been secured thus depriving the ADF of its supplies (November 1999)

"A new rebel insurgency emerged in western Uganda in late 1996. The Alliance for Democratic Forces (ADF), using bases in Zaire, attacked in November and abducted 300 civilians. Tens of thousands of persons - some suffering severe wounds - fled heavy fighting between the rebels and Ugandan troops. They sought refuge on church properties, in school buildings, and in private residences of friends. (USCR 1997, p. 102)

"A 'rebellion without a cause'. This is the description most often attributed to rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) who have been sowing terror and destruction in western Uganda for the last three years.

[...]

The ADF, which decided to adopt Islam as its ideology, was born from a core group of puritanical Moslems from the Tabliq sect whose members portray themselves as "Moslem evangelists". In Uganda, the Tabliqs claimed Moslems were being marginalised by the government.

Together with the obscure and largely defunct National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), the Tabliqs moved to western Uganda to start the rebellion under the ADF umbrella. They set up rear bases in neighbouring Congo where they began recruiting and training fighters with the promise of money and education. It was easier to recruit in Congo where the people were not hostile to the ADF.

The ADF has few links with western Uganda - its leaders come from areas in central Uganda with strong Islamic ties such as Iganga, Masaka and Kampala itself. A former Catholic, Jamil Mukulu, is said to be the driving force of the ADF. The group also includes some ex-commanders of former president Idi Amin's army.

Military sources told IRIN there were three main reasons why the rebels adopted western Uganda as their theatre of operations: the mountainous terrain, the proximity to Congo and the ability to exploit an existing ethnic conflict in the area. They coerced some local people to help them, especially the Bakonjo people with their extensive knowledge of the mountains.

Using leaflets and a mobile radio in Congo (now dismantled), they tried to turn the population against the government by propaganda attacks against its policies. One such statement in 1998, signed by the ADF "chairman" Frank Kithasamba, warned that the group would "crack down" on those responsible for the deaths of its members and urged local people "to be on the lookout for politicians who kill and intimidate opponents and voters for their own interests".

There is little evidence of the ADF's Islamic claims. 'They attack indiscriminately, just to kill,' said David Magado Katesigwa, the assistant Resident District Commissioner (RDC) for Bundibugyo district. 'They hit soft targets, such as the IDPs [internally displaced people]'.

Government workers and humanitarian officials alike are unable to explain the ADF's continued senseless killing, other than that the rebels are now on the run with nowhere to go. 'They carry out revenge attacks because the local people refuse to support them,' Katesigwa told IRIN.

The ADF problem exploded in 1997. Prior to that there had been sporadic attacks which did not appear to concern the government too much. President Yoweri Museveni, in his book 'Sowing the Mustard Seed' published in 1996, makes no mention of the insurgency in the west. But in 1997, the ADF launched a surprise attack on Ugandan soldiers at Mpondwe on the border with Congo in Kasese district. Attacks and atrocities escalated the following year with the army apparently unable to contain them, one of its problems being the lack of an adequate alpine force.

[...]

Sources say that due to the war in DRC and Uganda's collaboration with Congolese rebel groups in northwest and northeast DRC, the borders with Sudan and DRC have been secured, thus depriving the ADF of its supplies. Other measures, such as posting soldiers at intervals along the Fort Portal-Bundibugyo road, have also been taken and there is a noticeable military presence in the whole area." (IRIN 8 December 1999)

For information about displacement caused by ADF see:

[Displacements related to the Allied Democratic Forces \(ADF\) in the west and southwest \(1998-2000\)](#)

Background of the conflict in the West Nile and the WNBF (1971-1998)

- Conflict in the West Nile distinct from the war in Gulu/Kitgum
- West Nilers in the Idi Amin Army are believed to have participated in massacres of Acholi and Langi officers
- West Nile pacified by Tanzanian army forces mid-1979
- The Museveni force NRA reached the West Nile in March 1986 and relative peace followed
- Disruption of nine years of peace by the emergence of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) in 1995
- WNBF's military strength diminished during 1997 following demobilization of the rebels
- Most displaced people from the north-west returned to their homes during 1999

" The conflict in the West Nile has been strikingly distinct from the war in Gulu/Kitgum in most essential respects. These include its duration, the level of motivation of rebel combatants, its intensity and degree of brutality, the magnitude of casualties and civilian displacement, and its economic impact.

[...]

Unlike the ethnically homogeneous area of Gulu and Kitgum, the West Nile is home to a number of distinct groups, including the Kakwa and the Aringa (mainly Lugbara-speaking Muslim) people of northern Arua's Koboko and Aringa counties. The overwhelming majority of Moyo District residents - except in its western Obongi County - are of the predominantly Christian Madi group, which has participated in neither the West Nile conflict nor in the war in Acholi, with which it also shares a border.

[...]

Like the Acholi people but in reduced proportion, West Nilers were prominently represented in the Obote I army. Muslims in northern Arua were considered to be strong supporters of President Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC) party. When Army Commander Idi Amin - an ethnic Kakwa (who was also a Muslim) and who claimed Koboko County as his birthplace - overthrew the Obote Government in January 1971, the prominence of West Nilers in the Ugandan army increased. It is believed that West Nile soldiers participated in the large-scale massacres of Acholi and Langi officers [...]." (Gersony 1997, Section 2, "Background" & "The Amin regime")

"Tanzanian army forces were responsible for pacification of the West Nile, which they achieved in mid-1979. According to all accounts, their conduct towards West Nile civilians was restrained and correct. In this environment, West Nilers began to trickle back from southern Sudan. Once the invading coalition had consolidated its control of Uganda, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) was reconstituted, with prominent participation of Acholi and Lango elements.

When during 1980 the UNLA replaced Tanzanian occupying forces in the West Nile, it engaged in brutal reprisals against the local civilian population. In late 1980, ex-Amin forces invaded from southern Sudan and forced some UNLA units out of the West Nile region. They were organized into two main groups:

- the Uganda National Rescue Front (**UNRF**), based principally among the Aringa people of northeast Arua; and

- the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) forces, based mainly among the Kakwa people of northwest Arua.

After it regained control of the area from the ex-Amin forces, the UNLA engaged in further reprisals and large-scale destruction of property in both Arua and Moyo. One UNLA massacre on 19 June 1981 gained international prominence: hundreds of displaced civilians had taken refuge in the Comboni (Verona) Fathers Catholic Mission, over which the flag of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was flying. UNLA soldiers entered the mission, located at Ombachi just outside Arua town, searching for ex-Amin guerrillas and in the process killed more than fifty of the civilians, many of them children. As a result of such incidents, as many as 500,000 West Nile civilians fled to Sudan for refuge." (Gersony 1997, Section 2 "Amin overthrown - 1979")

Period of relative calm between 1986 and 1994 interrupted in 1995 by the emergence of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF):

"In late-March 1986, the NRA [Museveni's National Resistance Army] reached the West Nile, meeting no resistance within the region. The conduct of NRA forces was generally reported as positive. President Museveni visited Arua during the following month and consulted with the elders on his plans. The UNRF forces, led by Brigadier Moses Ali, joined the Museveni government. For almost a decade thereafter, the West Nile enjoyed relative peace. " (Gersony, Section 2, 1997, "Advent of NRA")

"A turning point in the West Nile occurred in 1994, when Sudanese Government forces recaptured from the SPLA the strategic town of Kajo Keji in southern Sudan, and consolidated their control of the Sudan/Uganda border west of the Nile. [This was the same year in which Sudan's assistance to Joseph Kony's LRA began.] With Sudan's assistance, former Amin Foreign Minister, Juma Oris, a Muslim and, at that time, resident of Juba, organized what became known as the West Nile Bank Front. Interviews in the West Nile suggest that WNBF officials offered the equivalent of a US\$300 recruitment bonus to former soldiers and young men to join the rebel organization. Recruiters reportedly predicted a rapid defeat of the Museveni government and attractive employment in a future government in which the WNBF would be a powerful force. It appears that some recruiters appealed to the Muslim religious background common to the WNBF's Sudanese sponsors and residents of northern Arua.

WNBF activities began to affect the West Nile in 1995 and intensified in 1996. In 1995, the WNBF (and Kony's LRA) began to use land mines apparently provided by Sudan. In September 1996, Moyo town was bombed by aircraft, which appeared to originate in Sudan. WNBF activities were based along the Uganda/Sudan border as well as in the towns of Aru and Mahagi in northeastern Zaire, from which it pursued its insurgency.

However, in comparison with the eleven years of Acholi insurgency, WNBF attacks were intermittent, uneven and less effective. Although their activities ranged from time to time throughout Arua and western Moyo - and even marginally in eastern Nebbi - to an outside observer, it appeared that the motivation of WNBF forces was lower than their LRA counterparts, even in some respects half-hearted.

During 1997, the WNBF's strategic capabilities were critically diminished. Banyamulenge operations in northeastern Zaire deprived the WNBF of its refuge along the Zaire/Uganda border. Military operations led by the SPLA recaptured control of most of the Sudan/Uganda border. Both military offensives were reportedly supported directly by UPDF forces. Significant numbers of WNBF leaders and combatants were captured and returned to Uganda. WNBF activity diminished considerably." (Gersony, Section 2, 1997, "The Sudan factor")

"The defeat and demobilization of the West-Nile Bank Front (WNBF) rebels in 1997 have brought increased security to Nebbi and parts of Arua. However, there are now concerns that some of the demobilized WNBF soldiers are returning to their arms after their hopes for a better life remains unfulfilled

– this, despite distributions of seeds and tools by UNHCR and FAO aimed specifically at ensuring their successful reintegration." (UN December 1998, p.8)

"WNBF attacks resumed during the year [1998] in northwestern region bordering Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and more than 100 abductions in Arua district. The majority of those taken in subsequent raids over a week-long period later escaped and returned to their homes. In November WNBF rebels killed and decapitated a Muslim religious leader in Arua, reportedly in retaliation for his son's defection from the WNBF ranks. The Uganda Salvation Front/Army carried out an attack on a police station and prison facility near Tororo in the east in August in which it abducted 110 prisoners. Members of the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF--II) also carried out a number of abductions and killings in the northwest. The UNRF-- II attacked a WFP vehicle in Moyo and killed a WFP driver in September." (US DOS March 1999, sect.1g)

"The plight of Ugandans living in the West Nile region improved in 1999 as a result of peace negotiations between the government and the UNRF II. Most displaced people from the north-west were able to return to their homes and take steps towards resuming a normal life." (ICRC 31 August 2000)

Potential solutions and future perspectives

Peace accord commits Sudan to halt support for rebel groups operating in Uganda (December 1999-2002)

- Support for LRA by Sudan government since mid-1990s
- December 1999 agreement obliges both Sudan and Uganda to disarm and disband "terrorist" groups operating on their soil
- International concern by July 2000 about slow implementation of agreement
- Agreement reiterated in September 2000
- Improvement of in Sudan-Uganda relations reported by beginning of 2002

"It is widely acknowledged that the war in Sudan between the National Islamic Front (NIF) government, and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) rebel group has played a role in the continuation of the war in northern Uganda. In the first place, the NIF supports the LRA. This seems to have begun sometime in 1993 and 1994. According to Father Carlos Rodriguez of the Catholic Mission in Kitgum, there are two reasons for this support: "the LRA provides cannon fodder in the form of Acholi children to fight the SPLA"; and they support the goal of destabilizing the NRM government due to its support of the SPLA. The LRA managed to fight the NRM for years without the help of Sudan, but the conflict has taken on a much more deadly nature since the entrance of the Sudanese." (Westport June 2000, sect. V)

"Among Acholi at all levels with whom the consultant spoke, it was accepted as an article of faith that Sudanese support to the LRA has been provided in direct retaliation for Ugandan support to the SPLA. Over and over, villagers, politicians and civil-society leaders expressed dismay at this state of affairs and expressed the feeling that there could only be an end to the LRA threat if the Ugandan side cut off assistance to the SPLA. It is generally accepted that the Sudanese authorities have used the LRA as anti-SPLA proxies within the Sudan itself, as well as in Northern Uganda. The LRA and SPLA are understood to have clashed frequently, and LRA returnees interviewed by the consultant spoke vividly of major engagements in which the LRA was able to seize substantial weaponry." (Weeks March 2002, p.13)

"Khartoum's support for violent opposition groups in neighboring countries has been most overt in Uganda. The Sudanese military has trained members of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group

that espouses its own form of alternative Christianity. Sudanese soldiers have joined Ugandan LRA rebels in attacks on villages in northern Uganda, including an attack in early 1995 that left 250 Ugandan villagers dead. Following that attack, the Ugandan government also broke diplomatic relations with the Sudan. By mid-1996, the LRA had fundamentally changed. With support from the government of the Sudan, it was openly able to attack major targets, presenting a serious threat to the Ugandan People's Defense Forces. In July 1996 the LRA massacred Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda" (Ruiz 1998, p.160)

Uganda and Sudan agreed in December 1999 to cease support for rebel groups:

"Uganda and Sudan moved closer to normalising their relations when they pledged to undertake to stop supporting each other's rebel groups in an agreement signed on December 8. In the accord reached during talks in Nairobi, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Sudanese President Omar el-Beshir agreed to take steps to re-establish diplomatic relations and to promote peace in the region. Points of the agreement included pledges "to renounce use of force to resolve their differences, to stop support for each other's rebel groups, to disband and disarm the terrorist groups and to respect each country's territorial integrity." The Carter Center, which oversaw the talks, issued a statement saying: "This agreement complements the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process in Sudan, chaired by Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi." The 11-point agreement also includes clauses on the return of prisoners of war (POWs), locating and returning abductees to their families and an amnesty for returnees who renounce use of force. The accord called for the formation of a joint ministerial committee and technical teams to establish a timetable of specific steps for implementation. [...]" (UN EUE 31 January 2000, "Uganda")

Concerns were expressed in July 2000 that the agreement had not led to any improvements:

"whereas a Peace Accord between Uganda and Sudan was signed in Nairobi on 8 December 1999 which included a commitment by the Sudanese Government to stop its support for the LRA and guarantee the safe return of the abducted Ugandan children held in rebel camps in Sudan, [...] whereas the political will to implement the Peace Accord has been lacking on both sides, both countries have continued to support each other's armed rebels, and very few abducted children have been returned by Sudan," (European Parliament 6 July 2000, paras. H-I)

Uganda and Sudan again agreed during a meeting in September 2000 to disarm the rebels:

"Despite these overtures [the agreement], the LRA returned to northern Uganda with more frequent and severe forays than ever before. The group [LRA] remains based in Sudan, operating in northern Uganda, preventing regular access by humanitarian convoys. On 29 September, Kampala and Khartoum again sat to reiterate the same agreement with the brokerage of Egypt and Libya." (UN November 2000, p.13)

"Uganda and its neighbor Sudan resolved last week to normalise bilateral relations, 'The New Vision' newspaper reported. The two countries agreed in principle to disarm and relocate the rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) at least 1,000 km deep into Sudan from the border. The talks, attended by the foreign ministers of Uganda, Libya, Egypt and Sudan, agreed that Egyptian and Libyan observers would be placed on the Sudan-Uganda border to focus on removing the security threat caused by the LRA to Uganda. They also agreed that to exchange foreign service officials to look into the affairs of each other's country. Two Ugandan diplomats will reportedly be stationed at the Kenyan embassy in Khartoum and two Sudanese diplomats in the Libyan embassy in Kampala." (IRIN 6 October 2000)

New context for Sudan-Uganda relations after 11 September terrorist attacks in the USA

"After the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, the US State Department declared the LRA, among others, a terrorist group. With the global scene largely dominated by the anti-terrorist campaign in the last months of 2001, prospects for a peaceful resolution to the conflict appeared to recede. The Ugandan government publicly demanded a military solution to the LRA problem. Museveni visited Sudan in January 2002 for the IGAD meeting, and at a pre-summit meeting with Bashir both presidents pledged support for the war on terrorism." (ACCORD 2002, "Implementing the 1999 Nairobi Agreement")

"The establishment of diplomatic relations between Sudan and Uganda, the release of prisoners of war, the exchange of envoys by Kampala and Khartoum, the cessation of support by Sudan for the LRA and an

expressed willingness to use military action against them, as well as increased control of the Sudan-Uganda border, have all impacted on and curtailed rebel activity and movement. The improvement of in Sudan-Uganda relations was further developed during the January 2002 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit in Khartoum, where, in a meeting between the two leaders, both pledged to cease support for rebel groups. Sudan's President Bashir had already announced his Government's withdrawal of support to the LRA in August 2001, and President Museveni, in his first visit to Sudan since 1995, countered this with an announcement of Uganda's suspension of assistance to the SPLM/A in southern Sudan, claiming this had initially been in self-defence against the Sudan-supported Kony rebels, and had taken the form of 'moral support' and humanitarian assistance in the past rather than military aid. With the approach of the traditional season for SPLM/A attacks approaching, it remains to be seen whether the positive trend in Uganda-Sudan relations will continue." (OCHA 28 February 2002, p.31)

POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

Figures

Reported that 552,000 people were internally displaced by end January 2002

- UN positive about return during 2002
- Camps in Kasese getting smaller as many people have either returned home or are staying with host communities
- Exact number IDPs in each of the districts remains an approximation as there is continuous movement of displaced persons from one camp to another

Geographical distribution of IDPs by end-January 2002

	End-2001	End-January 2002
Bundibugyo	63,000	63,000
Gulu	292,160	315,882
Kabarole	15,416	960
Kasese	18,000	1,600
Katakwi	88,500	88,500
Kitgum	82,645	82,645
TOTAL	559,721	552,587

Source: OCHA January & February 2002

"The three districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader [The former district of Kitgum was divided by administrative reform in January 2001 into two districts, Kitgum and Pader] are home to most of the Acholi people of Uganda. Recent, accurate figures are not available, but by general consensus the combined population of these districts in 2000 was on the order of 700,000-750,000. Of this population, at least 450,000 have been living for varying periods in a state of chronic internal displacement, clustered in what are known as "protected vil-lag-es" [...]

[...]

In Gulu district, the most populous of the three, the pro-ected-village population exceeds 320,000 out of a total of some 420,000; most of the remaining population of the district lives in Gulu town, where many families have settled after fleeing the insecurity of the countryside and should also be counted among the displaced.

Kitgum and Pader districts are less populated in absolute terms and in terms of overall density. Of a combined population of approximately 265,000, at least 135,500 (90,200 in Kitgum and 45,300 in Pader) live in protected villages for at least part of the year. " (Weeks March 2002, p.1)

"It is anticipated that the year 2002 will see some tendencies for the displaced to return back home to their homesteads and villages. The southwest (Bundibugyo, Kabarole and Kasese) and northeast (Katakwi) are the two locations from which we could see a gradual return of IDPs to their homes during 2001.

The possibilities for return will be more difficult in the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, where continued displacement of IDPs is foreseen. The situation in Sudan is likely to remain unchanged resulting in occasional influxes of refugees. Western DRC is unstable and while most of the affected remain IDPs, Uganda will need to prepare for a possible influx of refugees from its neighbours.
(UN November 2001, p. 19)

"[In the west]Bundibugyo District has the biggest problem of internal displacement where a large proportion of its total population (174,800 people) in the district are estimated to be staying in camps, most of the displaced people (52%) having been in camps for more than three years.

About 14,116 people were displaced by insecurity in Kasese, but about 1,616 were staying in camps and the remaining 12,500 were staying with host families. Camps in Kasese are getting smaller, currently only 960 IDPs are estimated to be staying in camps as many people have either returned home or are staying with host communities. In Kabarole district, at the height of the insurgency, more than 22,000 persons were reportedly staying in camps but towards the end of 2001 the number had reduced to 15,416 IDPs. Several camps such as Bukiika, Bukuku, Bwanika, Kigote and Iruhura have closed down as people returned to their homes.

Although Kamwenge and Kyenjojo districts suffered the effects of the insurgency, there are no existing IDP camps.

[...]

Availability of accurate data is vital if the process for resettlement is to be well planned and later implemented. However the current available data on internally displaced persons is insufficient in the region. The exact number of displaced people in each of the districts still remains an approximation. The principle causes for the inaccuracy of this data include continuous movement of displaced persons from one camp to another, inflation of numbers of people displaced in anticipation of receiving more quantities of relief and lack of adequate resources for district/agencies to conduct thorough registration of IDPs. Several NGOs have attempted collect information regarding IDPs, however on review of data from different agencies, the assessment team realized a discrepancy of the statistics from each agency. This is as a result of different interests and reasons of collecting this data as well as different approaches and definitions. For instance, some agencies only consider adults in their data collection while others consider only those who are in camps and not in host families or do not consider those in trading centers where camps were established although they were also affected by displacement. Due to influx of displaced people occupying land of host communities, they themselves therefore become displaced, as their economic base has been reduced or inaccessible. Some data regarding the magnitude and categories of affected people due to insurgency are either not recorded or missing in the region." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, pp.v -22)

Reported that 560,000 people were internally displaced by end- 2001

- Verification of IDP populations in Gulu camps revealed irregularities in registration
- Reduced number of IDPs since mid-2000 among others related to return of people displaced by the Karamajong in early 2000
- Reported in April that Karamojong raids in the Katakwi District had caused increased displacement

Geographical distribution of IDPs by end-January 2001 and end-December 2001

	January	December
Bundibugyo	120,000	63,000
Gulu	370,000	292,160
Kabarole	20,000	15,416

Kasese	16,000	18,000
Katakwi	15,000	88,500
Kitgum	82,645	82,645
TOTAL	623,645	559,721

Source: OCHA February 2001 and January 2002

"The verification exercise [by WFP of Gulu IDP camps] took off well in March 2001. During the month 8 out of the 33 IDP camps were verified. To date the exercise has continued well except a few instances where transport constraint causes some shortfalls. The purpose was to ascertain an accurate number of displaced persons living in camps that require support. Against this background the exercise has registered several findings: –

- 'ghosts' names registered (including people who are long-dead)
- local leaders registering more than two households for themselves;
- students, who are studying out of the camp, were also registered."

(OCHA April 2001)

Major changes during the year:

"The Ugandan military applied increased pressure on both the LRA and Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) as external support for both rebel groups dwindled [during 2000]. The majority of displaced still fear the rebels, preferring to remain in protected villages by night." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Present Situation")

"In an unusual pattern, Karamojong cattle raiders/rustlers have launched a series of attacks on neighbouring Katakwi District, just as the rainy season gets underway - a time when the Karamojong are going back home if they migrated to neighbouring districts. The attacks, which began in early April, are reported to have displaced yet unknown numbers of people. [...] The numbers in the remnant IDP camps from last year's violent raids in March-April are now swelling as more families return. The attacks are reportedly not by large groups but most likely by small groups of cattle thieves from Karamoja. The LDUs recruited last year to guard Katakwi residents from Karamojong raiders have allegedly been absorbed into the barracks, hence leaving gaps for the cattle rustlers." (OCHA April 2001)

"The considerable reduction in the total number of IDPs for Uganda is due primarily to the return of the Karamojong to Karamoja, which has allowed the majority of displaced in Katakwi, Soroti, Lira and Eastern Kitgum to return home." (OCHA 30 April 2001, pp.30-31)

Number of IDPs increased from 560,000 to more than 700,000 by mid-2000

Area	December 1999	June 2000	November 2000
Adjumani	10,000	10,000	2,000
Bundibugyo	101,000	120,000	105,000
Gulu	237,710	370,000	370,000
Kibaale	12,000	12,000	-
Kabarole	20,000	20,000	14,595
Kapchorwa	5,000	5,000	-
Katakwi	-	15,000	15,000
Kasese	35,000	35,000	16,000
Kitgum	93,000	90,000	82,645

Masindi	46,958	47,000	5,000
Total	560,668	724,000	610,240

Source: UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit (UNHCU) 24 January 2002, 14 July 2000 & 20 December 2000

Major changes during 2000:

Gulu/Kitgum areas

"Hundreds of thousands of displaced persons that had only just recently ventured away from the IDP camps to reclaim their homes, have now [January 2000] returned to the IDP camps in both Districts [Gulu and Kitgum]. Actual verification of numbers by relief agencies is impossible due to insecurity. Thousands of area residents are also spending each night in Gulu and Kitgum Towns in hospital grounds, bus parks, schools etc. The numbers fluctuate depending on the daily security situation." (UNHCU 24 January 2000)

"Security remains [by July 2000] very poor in large parts of Gulu and Kitgum. The LRA continues to regularly attack camps and trading centres, ambush vehicles and engage in battles with the UPDF.

[...]

Nearly the entire rural population of Gulu is now in IDP camps or in Gulu Town -- estimated displaced population is now 370,000. In Kitgum there are 82,000 IDPs in the official camps but perhaps another 10-20,000 in transient or unofficial camps. IDPs have little access to their homes or to land for cultivation." (UNHCU 14 July 2000)

Rwenzori areas:

"The ADF continues to make its presence felt through several attacks in Bundibugyo, Kasese, Kibaale and Hoima over the past month. The attacks thus far have not resulted in serious displacement except in the Rwenzori region where over 80 percent of the population of Bundibugyo District are displaced - 120,000 displaced in 51 camps - and in Kabarole and Kasese where some 43,000 persons remain displaced." (UNHCU 18 August 2000)

"In Kasese, security is reported to have improved tremendously though some IDPs still fear returning to their homes in the hills, as ADF activities have not ceased entirely. These IDPs, totaling 16,000 - in camps or living with relatives still need assistance in health, food, water and sanitation, etc. One particular case is that of 16 families camping in Rugendabara Y.M.C.A. whose children of secondary school-going age are not attending school because parents cannot pay fees. They also lack plastic sheeting for shelter as the recent storms destroyed those they had." (UNHCU 30 October 2000)

"The issue of inflated IDP numbers remains unresolved with plans to tackle the problem early 2001. Humanitarian agencies (ACF/USA, MSF/F, ICRC, Oxfam, WFP, UNICEF, CRS, ActionAid and local organisations like Church of Uganda) nevertheless continue humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable in the area, based upon population figures that have been reduced arbitrarily." (UNHCU 20 December 2000)

Karamoja area:

"Currently [April 2000], as the drought in Karamoja begins to bite, the Karimojong are violently raiding neighbouring districts of Katakwi, Lira, Kitgum, Soroti and Kumi and causing a lot of displacement.

[...]

As in the past, the Karimojong moved into neighbouring districts for water and pasture. As they were retreating back, the old pattern of looting with violence surfaced. This year, however, the looting was reportedly combined with raping, killings and violent beatings of a previously unknown dimension. Pick-ups and lorries are also reported to have ferried food and household items of ransacked villages. Frequent mention of disarmament of the Karimojong may have triggered this year's extreme violence in the raids according to some district leaders and displaced people during the fact finding mission. " (UNHCU 12 April 2000)

Major changes during 1999:

"Recent [February 1999] heightened activity by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has forced the displacement of several thousands of Bundibugyo residents. District and NGO estimates place the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently at about 40,000 living in 24 IDP camps and settlements.

The majority of IDPs appear to have been in their current displaced camp since mid 1997 when the war started. However, new displacement continues daily both of IDPs and of residents. IDPs are moving from more scattered IDP camps into Bundibugyo Town, and more generally from one IDP camp to another in search of a more secure location. Thus far Nyahuka Town has not witnessed an increase in displacement. No district plans have yet been drawn up for possible influxes of additional IDPs into the two urban areas [...]

In early February, an estimated 6,038 persons were displaced by the UPDF in Agoro Sub-County in the mountain range of Lomwaka in northern Kitgum. The displacement was ordered due to security reasons. Local authorities put the number at 6,038 people. The displaced have been directed to Paluga and Patika in Agoro, northern Kitgum. WFP has provided food rations to the 6,038 persons. No shelter nor water and sanitation facilities have yet been provided." (UN HCU 16 March 1999, pp. 1 & 6)

" A new emergency appears [by April 1999] to be developing in the western district of Bundibugyo where large numbers of Ugandans are again becoming displaced due to rebel activities. Local authorities and aid agencies operating in the area estimate that between 50-70,000 persons are now displaced in the district. WFP is sending an initial food shipment of 200 tons of food and will closely monitor the situation. Insecurity is a major constraint and the last WFP food convoy had to turn back just before reaching Bundibugyo." (WFP 9 April 1999)

"Following a spate of rebel attacks on their homes and communities in September and October [1999], approximately 9,000 residents of Purongo Sub-county in Gulu have moved to five camps close to army detachments for protection. The area is west of Gulu town in Nwoya County. Sources speculate that attacks are being carried out by a few LRA rebels who have remained in Gulu throughout the year." (UNHCU 19 November 1999)

400,000 IDPs reported to receive humanitarian assistance by December 1998

- Peak of displacement in the Gulu District in June 1998 with 320 000 IDPs
- New displacements during 1998 offset by return of IDPs to their former homes

Major changes during the year

"New internal displacement continues [in 1998] throughout conflicted areas in the northern and western parts of Uganda, especially in Kitgum, Gulu, Kasese, Bundibugyo, and Kabarole; entire communities continue to be affected by ongoing insecurity in these areas as well as in Arua, Adjumani, Moyo, Lira and Apac and to a lesser extent a few other districts. The new displacement is offset by the return of IDPs to their former homes or the absorption of these IDPs into homes of relatives or movement to other locations. There are approximately 400 000 IDPs receiving assistance from the UN and other International Organisations (IOs) and NGOs." (UN December 1998, p. 9)

"Displacement in Uganda has traditionally related to refugees, both in terms of exodus and influx. In recent years, however, internal displacement has grown enormously, and IDPs are currently double the number of refugees in the country. The latest available figure for internally displaced people was estimated at 400,000 in March 1998. Recent events indicate that the number of IDPs in Uganda may continue to rise as hostilities escalate." (Mooney and Mugumya 1998, p. 73)

"One of the most contentious issues in northern Uganda is that of forced displacement. From the perspective of local people, being displaced from their homes is one of the most important facts in their

current struggle for survival. Since 1996 the number of displaced persons has quadrupled. According to the World Food Program, at the most recent peak of displacement, in June 1998, over 320,000 persons were displaced in Gulu District, the majority in 20 official camps, one containing over 30,000 people. There are at least seven other camps in Kitgum District, where by June 1998 nearly 80,000 people had fled their homes. Displaced people have also sought refuge in Gulu and Kitgum towns and in other parts of Uganda. (AI March 17 March 1999, "Introduction")

Geographical distribution of IDPs reported by October 1998:

Area	Number of IDPs
Gulu	261,206
Kitgum	63,121
Lira District	13,000 (Displaced population by flooding receiving monthly food ration from WFP)
Bundibugyo	11,000 (Estimated number of people assisted by WFP)
Kitgum District	59,000 (Estimated drought affected population being assisted by WFP)
Karamoja Region	67,000 (Estimated drought affected population being assisted by WFP in Kotido and Moroto districts)
Total	474,327

Source: UN OCHA 23 October 1998

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Patterns of displacement in the Rwenzori Region (2002)

- People either return or move from one IDP camp to another to get closer to their homes
- 60% of IDPs in camps in Kasese district are staying more than 10 Km away from their original homes

"Several displaced people from Bundibugyo ran to neighboring districts such as Kasese and Kabarole District, while others were reported to have crossed to the districts of Kibaale and Mubende. The number of people staying in camps in Bundibugyo District is growing as many people are returning from neighboring districts to settle in camps nearer to their homesteads. Apparently there are no people from Kabarole or Kasese districts staying in camps in Bundibugyo, although there are Congolese refugees staying in IDPs camps in the district. For example Butogo camp has about 530 refugees of Congolese origin, residing in defined parts within the camp.

[...]

About 14,116 people were displaced by insecurity in Kasese at the height of the ADF insurgency. Camps in Kasese are getting smaller, currently only 960 IDPs are estimated to be staying in camps as many people have either returned home or are staying with host communities. Some of the displaced persons found in Kasese camps came from the neighboring districts like Kabarole and Bundibugyo. Household data revealed that IDPs (60%) in camps in Kasese district are staying more than 10 Km away from their original homes. Many of them come from Bundibugyo District (7 hours walk over mountainous terrain) and Kabarole District (4 hours walk).

[...]

At the height of the insurgency, more than 22,000 persons were reportedly staying in camps [in the Kabarole district] but towards the end of 2001 the number had reduced to 15,416 [...]. Several camps such as Bukiika, Bukuku, Bwanika, Kigote and Iruhura have closed down as people returned to their homes. Although other camps still exist, the population is getting smaller each day as people return home. For example, in Kyamukube camp 63% of the displaced have returned, 83% from Kibota camp have returned and 53% from Mitandi camp have gone back" (Oxfam 8 February 2002, pp. 4-5)

Fluctuating security situation reflected by fluid movement pattern (1998-2001)

- IDPs seek protection in camps and towns as security situation deteriorates
- Some people farm by day but seek refuge during the night in camps, churches, caves, in the bush or in local trading centres
- Reported by end-2000 that IDPs in Bundibugyo have not returned to respective homes but were moving between camps in the district

"The largest relief operation is for IDPs in the north. There are 33 IDP camps in Gulu district and 8 in Kitgum/Pader districts. The general trend is towards more people accessing their land; their spending time in their original homes; and their leaving children, the disabled and the elderly in the camps. These people return to the camps to receive their food rations and/or for safety, when the security situation is unfavourable."(WFP 27 December 2001, p. 13)

" Bundibugyo overall security has improved, though there are still some very vulnerable areas where unpredictable attacks occur. Three attacks have happened since beginning of September [2000]. But the district is not complacent and is weary of the upcoming festive season. Though IDPs are now moving more to their gardens during the day, they have not returned to respective homes. The movement is rather between camps in the district.

[...]

Reports of Lords Resistance Army Rebels (LRA) movement in Gulu and Kitgum continued throughout the reporting period. The LRA movement as coupled with their usual attacks, killings and abductions.

[...]

Early October many people were coming into Kitgum Town at night from areas around. Pajule trading centre is also full of people forced to move from villages. [...]

[...]

There were numerous reports of movement of the rebels through both districts. In Kitgum, Achol-pii area for example, they have persistently been causing panic in the camp. Rebels have even crossed the road very near to Kitgum town on several occasions." (UNHCU 30 October 2000)

"Large population movements have been reported as rebel attacks force residents of the three districts [Bundibugyo, Kitgum and Gulu] to seek security and protection in camps and towns. In Bundibugyo, the displaced are reportedly moving to different camps and seeking protection in the two main towns of Bundibugyo and Nyahuka. Some Bundibugyo residents are leaving the District for Kabarole and Kasese although the numbers do not appear significant at this time. In Gulu, the IDP camps are now full once again as most of the population moved back to the IDP camps with the encouragement of the District officials. In Kitgum, the affected population is sleeping in the IDP camps and in certain locations around Kitgum town but people are still moving outside of town and the camps during the day attempting to bring in the last of the harvest and bring their food stores to a more secure location." (UNHCU 24 January 2000)

"Since the war began the number of internally displaced persons has risen and fallen according to events. There is no single or simple pattern to displacement. In some areas during the 1997 and 1998 planting and cultivation seasons some villagers returned to their fields. In some places people sleep in the camps but spend the daylight hours at their nearby homes. The times when most people have moved are when one side or another have put civilians in the countryside at the centre of their military tactics" (AI March 1999a, sect.2)

"There is no single or simple pattern to internal displacement in the north. In some areas during the 1997 and 1998 planting and cultivation seasons, many villagers returned to their fields. Some were 'night commuters', usually men who returned to the safety of towns or camps at night. Others stayed away longer, creating divided families where women and children remained in camps. By mid-1999 an intensified counter-insurgency campaign by the government had created much improved security conditions and a further IDP category emerged - those who followed the army back to the bush, but preferred to build temporary shelters around army camps while tending their fields during the day. These 'half-way houses' often sheltered whole families.

The year 1999 marked a potential turning point in the cycle of displacement. The LRA had not been active since August of the previous year. An amnesty was declared for all rebels and peace efforts on several fronts were underway, including discussions with the Government of Sudan which, if successful, would cut the rear bases and supply lines of the LRA. Despite the optimism of the government, however, most IDPs remained in camps for several reasons:

Most people were ignorant of the security situation in their home areas.

They received no clear indication that lasting protection would be offered by the army. Although army contingents accompanied some returnees, this was ad hoc, with no firm commitment to stay near the villages.

In the absence of any central government directives, IDPs were receiving contradictory advice from the army and civil authorities, aid organizations and camp leaders.

Some politicians were anxious not to lose the political advantages of population concentrations in the camps. Semi-urban and urban settings potentially provided better security, employment, transport, schooling and medical assistance promised by the government.

Vulnerable groups - particularly widows, the old and infirm - did not have support for reconstructing houses in their home areas.

In some areas, IDPs were offered land for resettlement near the camps.

The return of IDPs to their homes depended on the seasonal supply of harvested food and shelter materials (especially grasses for houses). The first season in which any substantial cultivation was possible was in 1999. A successful August/September harvest may provide an additional incentive for a return to the villages." (WFP September 1999, p.7)

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Security threats to the displaced

Displaced children and adolescent victims of abduction by LRA (1997-2002)

- 13,611 persons recorded as “not returned from captivity” by November 2001
- Major fear among adolescents in “protected villages” for IDPs in Gulu to become abducted
- Abducted girls reported being raped, sexually enslaved and forced into domestic servitude

“The registration of abducted persons in Uganda started in 1997.

[...]

An ‘abducted person’ as defined for this registration exercise, is a person who has been forcibly taken away by armed persons operating in northern and southwestern Uganda. Even people who were in captivity for a short time (a day) have been registered.

[...]

A total of 30,839 children and adults are registered as having been abducted between 1986 [sic!] and 2001. Of these, 28,903 abductees were from northern Uganda, while 2,036 were from south-western Uganda. Kitgum/Pader and Gulu Districts account for 41 and 38 percent of the total number of abductees respectively. These are the districts where the LRA has been most active over the past ten years

Most abductions took place in the rural areas where people are most exposed to rebel attacks. The most vulnerable persons are in rural homes where the rebels often strike at night. The majority of the people (73.1 percent) were abducted from homes, while 9 percent were abducted from roads. Other places of abductions include: the field (5.3 percent), school (3.6 percent), market (1.2 percent) and other (i.e. water sources and IDP camps). There was no indication of place of abduction for 2.6 percent of the abductees.

[...]

A total of 17,228 persons are recorded as “returned from captivity”. Of these, 303 people (149 of them children) returned through Entebbe airport with the help of the Government of the Sudan, IOM, UNICEF and other international agencies. The rest, 13,611 persons, are recorded as “not returned from captivity”. Of these, 5,923 were abducted as children and 7,327 were adults. The age for 361 abductees could not be deducted.” (UNICEF November 2001)

“While adolescents [in “protected villages” for IDPs in Gulu] said that the security situation has somewhat improved during the past year, many revealed that they continue to sleep in the bush for fear of abduction.

[...]

Adolescents who have managed to escape their captors depicted compelling scenarios of their abduction – some lasting six to 10 years. These mostly involve raids by small LRA bands, where children are rounded up in schools, at home or elsewhere and forced to carry heavy loads between 50 and 100 miles to southern Sudan, receiving little food along the way. En route to Sudan, many are forced to commit acts of violence and thievery, including against other children. They are warned that refusal to obey will result in their own deaths. Once in Sudan, they are trained as fighters in LRA encampments and, after training and indoctrination, they are often forced to return to Uganda to commit atrocities against their own communities and the UPDF. Some young people are even forced to kill members of their own families and communities. As a result, many believe they can never return home because of the terrible acts they have committed. The leaders of the LRA have created a virtual human shield in the form of a young army of forced recruits. Anyone seeking to fight back against the LRA does so knowing that they are fighting against a troop of abducted adolescents.

Abducted girls reported being raped, sexually enslaved and forced into domestic servitude, as described further below, while smaller numbers are forced into armed combat. While most victims are Ugandan, Sudanese refugee adolescents living in settlements in northern Uganda have not been spared LRA attack and abduction.

[...]

While recorded numbers of abducted children and adolescents are estimated at over 11,000, actual numbers may be much higher, as many young people were abducted for shorter periods of a few weeks and made it home without further report. In a group interview with 21 randomly identified adolescent orphaned girls in the Padibe IDP camp in Kitgum, the Women's Commission asked for a show of hands of those who had been abducted. Every hand but one went up.

The principal characteristic of these short-term abductions is forced labor. The girls in Padibe, for example, told stories of being forced to carry loads and do other chores for the rebels before being let go. This labor, along with money and supplies looted by the LRA, help to sustain the LRA's survival and campaign of terror." (WCRWC July 2001, pp.12, 14, 17)

"Consideration is overdue to the fact that the focus on LRA abductees and returnees has, for some time, diverted attention from the extreme needs of the children who live in the affected districts of northern Uganda as a whole. The 99.8% of the child population left behind experience a daily catalogue of major forms of abuse. Most are in constant fear of abduction due to a lack of adequate protection from the government. A majority of them live in 'protected villages' where parenting and socialisation practices are severely disrupted. From there some are forcibly recruited into the government's own Home Guard - the Local Defence Units (LDUs) deployed to other conflict zones such as the DRC." (ACCORD 2002, "Which children count?")

"After about 12 months of relative calm in war-torn Acholiland, a group of LRA rebels launched an armed attack on Agoro IDP camp on 23rd February 2002. Three LDUs and two civilians were reported killed by the rebels in the attack and a large number of IDPs abducted." (OCHA March 2002)

Physical safety of war affected populations undermined by multiple threats (2001)

- Children targeted directly by the rebel groups
- Health services are seldom prepared to offer counseling to survivors of sexual abuse or violence
- In 1999, Gulu Hospital carried out 191 amputations due to landmine injuries

"Most of the services available to displaced persons look at the issues related to trauma, physical ill-health and violations of rights in a non-integrated manner. Legal aid clinics are very few and legal information is mainly available in urban areas. Health services are seldom prepared to offer counseling to survivors of sexual abuse or violence, Probation and Welfare Departments are severely under-resourced and the Local Councils (LCs) have little knowledge or training in child- and gender-sensitive handling of cases. Finally, emergency psycho-social care and mental health care in areas of armed conflict is rarely available. A number of international conventions specifically refer to the rights of children in armed conflict.

Conflicts and displacement bring disruption to normal life, endanger people's livelihoods and threaten children's rights to protection, education, health, nutrition, and family care. Children are extremely vulnerable in areas of armed conflict, especially in Uganda where they are targeted directly by the rebel groups. These groups use all kinds of horror techniques in their attacks on the local village and population, with the aim of undermining the population's opportunity to make a living and live peacefully in the affected areas, including:
abduction;

ambush;
burning of villages and camps; and
placing landmines.

The current conflict in the north is characterised by extreme forms of brutality and terror. Terror campaigns against the population in local communities are among the worst of its kind: children are abducted, separated from their families and kept in captivity where they are taught to terrorise and kill other children and adults. 8,866 children, some of them as young as six years old, have been abducted by LRA in Apac, Gulu, Kitgum and Lira districts in the north. They were forcefully brought to camps in Sudan where they were trained as soldiers and sent to the battlefields in Sudan and Uganda. Girls are often used as sex slaves and are "married" off to senior adult rebels.

The LRA has planted landmines near homes, along pathways and near water points. The use of the landmines is a very powerful terror tactic. There are no figures available; indeed, there is probably no way of knowing exactly how many landmines have been planted. Landmines have also been laid by the UPDF along the Kitgum-Sudan border. In 1999, Gulu Hospital carried out 191 amputations due to landmine injuries. Given the isolation of many homes, the difficulties of transport and the insecurity, these figures must represent only a small fraction of the real number of landmine casualties.

The conflict in the western part is of a more traditional character where political opposition to the present Government seems to be the main reason for its origin and continuation. Here, too, the conflict is characterised by its terror and brutality. The number of child abductions seems to be on the increase, and has reached around 1,000. However, children as young as 12 have been found to be enrolled in the Government's armed forces (UPDF) and in local resistance groups in this area, which is a major concern in respect to children's rights. The ADF is thought to comprise people from a wide range of backgrounds. The commanders are military men from the former regimes in Burundi, Rwanda and DRC. All bear a grudge on the Ugandan leadership for their current fall from power.

There are no figures on the incidents of sexual and physical abuse. However, it can be assumed that the incidence is much higher than in a normal situation. 41% of women are vulnerable to domestic violence in Uganda. In non-conflict areas, research has shown a high level of defilement. In a study of press reports of abuse cases from 1986 to 1996, physical and sexual abuses of children are the most common cases reported. In addition, defilement is widespread: in one study, 13% of primary school students and 24% of secondary school pupils had been defiled. Of these, 26% of the primary school students had been defiled by a boyfriend and 25% by a brother or cousin." (UN November 2001, pp. 47-48)

Worsened security situation for IDPs in the North (2000- 2001)

- IDPs in Gulu fear to move far from the IDP camps because of rebel movements
- Several LRA attacks on IDPs in "protected villages" during 2000
- Reports of rebels looting IDP camps for food aid
- Claimed that IDPs in some areas have left their camps for fear of their lives

"The security has remained fluid throughout the month [April 2001]. The security situation has been unpredictable and the intentions of the rebels have remained enigmatic in the face of election results. There have been reports of rampant rebel movements in the west, northwestern, northeastern and southwestern parts of the Gulu district. In early April, rebels are reported to have ambushed a passenger vehicle and killed a driver, turn-boy and a passenger and set ablaze a tipper lorry on Gulu-Alero road. The rest were set free after being looted of all their belongings.

The most affected IDP camps include Awach, Palaro, Oroko and Anaka. Because of this security situation IDPs in the affected camps fear to move far from the camp for fear of their lives. This has affected their cultivation." (OCHA April 2001)

"Generally, the security situation has been very fluid over the past two months. More rebels are reportedly out of their hideouts, looking for food and money. In some camps, the rebels looted whatever food was distributed." (OCHA May 2001)

"Attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Adjumani and Gulu districts in northern Uganda are terrorising the local and refugee populations, reports JRS Uganda. A spate of attacks in March and April [2001] attributed to the rebels have claimed the lives of at least 25 people.

[...]

'The security situation has been unpredictable for the last few months, as the intentions of the rebels remain enigmatic. There have been reports of rampant rebel movements in different parts of Gulu district,' [...]. "This state of affairs has caused internally displaced Ugandans in affected areas to leave their camps for fear of their lives. There has also been a marked increase in night robberies with guns." (JRS 25 May 2001)

Summary of the security situation during 2000

"Reports of violations of humanitarian law increased in the north, and remained a problem in the west. While the number of reported violations by the Government decreased during the year, such violations by the LRA increased. In the north, government forces continued their policy of maintaining so-called protected villages with UPDF detachments nearby as a means of protecting civilians and denying support to the LRA. Although substantial NGO and donor community assistance has improved the overall conditions in the villages, conditions still remain poor. The Government failed to provide adequate security to the villages, which were the targets of rebel attacks.

[...]

LRA attacks increased during the year, and there were numerous incidents of attacks on villages and displaced camps in which villagers were killed, injured, raped, or abducted [...]. In the north, forces of the LRA, led by Joseph Kony, continued to attack civilian targets, as well as refugee camps. During the year, attacks by the LRA resulted in approximately 175 deaths and numerous injuries and the destruction of homes and property. On March 5, LRA rebels attacked Padibe displaced camp in Kitgum, killing 12 persons, wounding 30, and burning 800 huts. On March 12, LRA rebels attacked Cwero protected village in Gulu and abducted 10 persons. On August 16, LRA rebels again attacked Cwero protected village, abducting one person. No new incidents of mutilation were reported." (US DOS February 2001, sect.1g)

Insufficient physical protection offered by the "protected villages" in Northern Uganda (1996-2002)

- Claimed that creation of camps has extended violence to other communities not under army protection
- At least 21 cases of rebel attacks on "protected villages" documented for the period 1997-2001
- Residents of the protected villages subject to attacks, looting, abductions and sexual assaults by LRA, indisciplined elements of the UPDF, by free-lance armed bandits and, in some cases, by elements of the SPLA

"In response to the evolution in LRA tactics, UPDF tactics in Gulu included, by September 1996, the creation of camps and the removal of people from strategically important areas or places where the army was unable to prevent LRA activity." (AI 17 March 1999 "Breaking the Circle", para.2.1)

"When the protected villages were established, a debate ensued among some elements of the humanitarian assistance community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerning the appropriateness of

assisting their involuntarily displaced residents. Some organizations, such as the World Food Program and World Vision, did respond promptly to requests for assistance.

Some opponents of the protected villages withheld their assistance. They argued that these villages were established as a military tactic, and were not a spontaneous civilian response to conflict. To assist the protected villages would therefore violate the neutrality of NGOs. They also questioned the military effectiveness of the strategy and whether civilians were better protected in them. A few, including some who had not visited any such places, asserted that they were all similar to the site at Pabo (i.e., they were all co-located with the military detachments), which was inaccurate. Referring to cases like Pabo, they characterized all the centers as "protected villages" or "protected barracks," alleging that the civilians were used as a first-line of alert against rebel attacks against the military. Advocates of the "protected villages" argued that the UPDF was in the process of an aggressive operation against the LRA. To the degree that the LRA could replenish its losses by abducting more youngsters - which in the highly dispersed rural areas the army could not effectively prevent - its effort and sacrifice seemed futile. By eliminating the LRA's ability to loot food and abduct youngsters - frequent complaints of the rural population - rebel forces would be weakened. Able to concentrate its stationary units in a limited number of locations, the remainder of the army would be freer to pursue the rebels. The Geneva Convention, it was argued, permits the Government to displace populations for their protection [although it also requires that adequate arrangements for their material well-being be provided]. As long as the LRA continues its attacks and executions on undefended civilians, advocates argue, it is impossible for the UPDF to protect so many potential targets in such a vast area. The army is criticized for not effectively protecting the civilian population from LRA assaults, yet it is also criticized for attempting to concentrate the population so that it can address the problem more effectively. " (Gersony ,Section 1, 1997, "The Protected Villages debate")

"In human rights terms the movement of people into camps in Gulu and Kitgum Districts presents a series of dilemmas. Villagers are being attacked with extreme violence by the LRA, in breach of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The authorities have an obligation to protect people from violence perpetrated by the LRA and, of course, by UPDF soldiers and other government agents. The authorities argue that providing protection from the LRA is not possible if people remain dispersed throughout the countryside." (AI 17 March 1999 "Breaking the Circle", para.2)

"The authorities have only partially lived up to their obligations under international law to provide for basic physical need. Food security in camps remains poor. Since camps ('the protected villages') were first created local people have consistently complained that the army has failed to protect them from assault by the LRA seeking to abduct children and loot food. Further, in many cases cited in this report UPDF soldiers have themselves been directly responsible for human rights violations against people in camps. " (AI March 17 March 1999 "Breaking th Circle", "Introduction")

"One of the unforeseen effects of the creation of camps has been the extension of violence to other communities not under army protection. Neighbouring areas such as Lira and Apac districts where people have remained in their home villages and cultivated have seen increased incidence of violence and looting by the LRA. Conventional standing army approaches to security, even with resources that the UPDF can ill-afford, cannot be effective against highly mobile LRA units travelling usually by foot in areas with no roads or communications." (WFP September 1999, p.8)

"Under the Geneva Convention, the GoU has the right to move or contain people if, for reasons of insecurity, such relocation is in the people's best interest. In the majority of cases, it would appear as if displaced Ugandans have been able to exercise their right to residence and movement and that their choice of location/abode has generally been voluntary. Due consideration must be given to the fact that rebel movements have not only failed to establish a basis of civilian support but have continuously launched campaigns of terror against the civilian population. Rarely do they engage in combat with the UPDF." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Lessons learned")

"The official position of the Government of Uganda is that people are in the displaced camps for their own security. This is why from the beginning it gave them the name of "protected villages". Indeed, most people we talked to told us that despite all the hardships of life they felt more secure than when they were at their original homes. This was one of the few positive aspects they normally saw about life in the camps, since in case of attack they had a greater chances of preserving their lives (this feeling was stronger in the camps of Lamwo, in Kitgum, than in Gulu).

However, many people who once advocated in favour of the camps are now wondering if protection is really being offered and at what cost to the people.

In fact, the LRA's deadly attacks in the displaced camps have taken place from the beginning. In Opit, for instance, people told us that in the past five years the camp has been attacked eighteen times. From the outset, the Government was under no illusion about the likely response of the LRA concerning the creation of these settlements. In November 1996, Major Kakooza Mutale had this to say to the press:

"The depopulation of villages removes the soft targets and logistics for the survival of the rebels. They will lack food, information, youth to abduct and people to kill. Desperation will drive them to attack the army and the camps. That will be their end."

Many of the attacks have taken place a few days after distribution of relief food aid, which in the view of many of the people we talked to, means that rebels come "to get their share". [We have documented] twenty one recorded cases of major attacks in camps since 1997, which represents only part of what has taken place. In this section we shall only highlight two incidents which gained some attention when they happened.

On the 23rd of March 1997, LRA rebels entered the trading centre at Pabbo, looted shops, abducted an unspecified number of children, fired some shots and departed. As they withdrew, the UPDF fired several mortar rounds at them. But being within a populated area, eight civilians were killed.

On the 5th of March 2000, a group of rebels were sighted coming from Palabek going towards Padibe. Some local leaders from the camp moved quickly to Kitgum to inform the District Internal Security Officer (DISO), who promptly sent word to Pajimu barracks to ask for more soldiers to protect Padibe camp. The reinforcements never came and at around midnight the rebels carried out a murderous attack in which they killed twelve people, injured twenty and burned eight hundred huts. At the moment of the attack there were only a dozen members of the Local Defence Unit (LDU) and most of them were at a drinking party dancing. In fact most of the people killed were shot dead at the disco.

Location of military barracks in the displaced camps has long been a very controversial issue. Some Acholi MPs have referred to IDP camps as "protected barracks" or "protecting villages", alleging that civilians were being used as a first line of alert against rebel attacks against the military. During our visits to the camps, we were able to see for ourselves that in the cases of Pabbo, Alero, Cwero and Awach, the location of the military detachment in the middle of the camp exposed the civilian population to real danger. "We are the ones protecting the soldiers" or "we are tired of protecting the Army" were bitter complaints we often heard in those (and other) camps. However, most camps we visited consisted of widely dispersed huts within a kilometre or two of the village centre, not immediately near military detachments." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, pp.14-15)

"Despite this mass movement, with all the disruption and destitution that have accompanied it, the residents of these "protected villages" do not in fact feel protected. Attacks have continued on a regular basis, and the small, poorly armed and trained units that are assigned to each village, usually without communications or access to mobile reinforcements, find themselves helpless to respond. In all too many cases, the military are themselves the source of insecurity, committing acts of brutality and lawlessness against civilians that rival those of the LRA.

[...]

Today, while there continue to be regular low-level attacks on communities and on vehicles traveling along the roads in the area, the levels of LRA violence have been substantially reduced.

In addition to attacks that they attribute to the LRA, however, residents of the protected villages complain that they are subject to attacks, looting, abductions and sexual assaults by indisciplined elements of the UPDF, by free-lance armed bandits (known locally in Luwo as *Boo Kech*), and, in some cases, by elements of the SPLA present in parts of Kitgum [...].

Residents consistently complain that when they are under attack, the military detachments in the adjacent barracks fail to respond effectively or in a timely manner, and that these units (many of which are in fact under-paid and under-trained Local Defence Units, not regular UPDF troops) are in fact themselves often the source of violence and criminality.

Rape is a particular concern in this respect – residents in a number of villages stated categorically that women are regularly raped by members of the military detachments and that complaints have gone unheeded. Other complaints involve looting or assaults that occur in the open fields, in which village residents are set upon for being outside their village “without authorization”. (Weeks March 2002, pp.2, 21)

" A common observation of the adolescent researchers when they visited the protected villages in Gulu District with Women’s Commission researchers was “Where’s the protection?” Indeed, there was little vigilant or even visible presence of the UPDF around the periphery of the camps. Young people reported concerns that soldiers guarding camps often pitched barracks in the center of camps, effectively protected by the people around them instead of the other way around. While adolescents said that the security situation has somewhat improved during the past year, many revealed that they continue to sleep in the bush for fear of abduction." (WCRWC July 2001, p.12)

For further information, see:

[Civilians moved by Government into "protected villages" \(1996-1999\)](#)
[Background of the "Protected villages" strategy \(1996-2000\)](#)

Women and girls continued to be targets of abuse and rape in IDP camps and refugee settlements (2000-2001)

- Girls surveyed in Gulu named “rape and defilement” as their third most important concern
- UPDF Soldiers reported to be perpetrators of sexual violence in IDP camps

"Adolescent girls have been and are prime targets for rape, sexual assault and sexual exploitation, including sexual slavery and prostitution. In nearly every interview, adolescent girls described personal knowledge of “rape and defilement” either against themselves or their peers. Adolescent girls and boys told researchers that girls are raped, or “defiled,” in IDP camps, the Achol Pii refugee settlement and in noncamp settings. The perpetrators and their tactics vary by location and include the LRA, UPDF soldiers, Ugandan nationals, IDP camp and refugee settlement residents, neighbors, family members and adolescent males.

Girls surveyed in Gulu, including those living in six IDP protected villages, named “rape and defilement” as their third most important concern behind “insecurity, abduction and murder” and “displacement,” and both boys and girls in the village of Omiya Anyima ranked “rape and defilement” as among their top five concerns. This unrelenting violence causes girls to endure terrible psychological and physical harm, including increased teen pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and other health concerns. Girls who have not been raped also suffer the constant fear that it will happen to them. [...]

IN THE IDP CAMPS: UPDF SOLDIERS ARE THE MAIN PERPETRATORS

Internally displaced Ugandan girls and young women living in camps said that they, too, live in fear of rape, but in their case it is committed mostly by UPDF soldiers, who are supposed to be responsible for providing security. Girls stated that sometimes the UPDF will lie in wait for them along roads at night, ambush them and rape them, or even go straight to their huts and rape them. They also explained that girls who refuse sex in exchange for gifts or other goods or services are often forced to comply. Rose, 14, who lives in Awer IDP camp in Gulu, told researchers: "The soldiers ask girls to spend time with them, and they give them gifts. They expect them to have sex with them, and if they don't, they just defile them anyway. Sometimes they don't even ask about anything, they just ambush you and attack you while you are in your hut or while you are walking in the bush." (WCRWC July 2001, p.19)

"[T]he distinctive needs of young girls, elderly women, widows, victims of violence and rape, and female heads of households in Uganda's crisis areas are particularly alarming and deserve added attention. Roughly 60% of the population in the war torn districts of Gulu and Kitgum are women and as many as one-third are widows in the four main crises areas. Many women lost their husbands to conflict. HIV/AIDS is also causing many deaths among men, thus affecting women and their children. Many lost members of their family along with their belongings and homes, the latter often being legally inherited by the husband's surviving male relatives. Lacking physical and legally enforced protection, they continue to be targets of abuse and rape in IDP camps and refugee settlements where leadership is male-dominated. Lack of employment in protected areas also forces women and girls into socially unacceptable forms of wage labour to support their families. Many have the added burden of caring for dead relative's children in addition to their own." (UN November 2000, p.27)

"There are reports of women being raped in and around IDP settlements. The local press also have reported incidents of women being attacked, often by other women, at water points on the suspicion that they are collaborators with the rebel forces. To address these and other protection concerns of internally displaced women, attention needs to be paid to practical preventive measures such as adequate lighting near latrines and escorts for women when they fetch water or firewood. Such measures as set forth in detail in UNHCR's Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women provide a useful reference for the government, UN and NGOs involved in the management of IDP camps. There are also reports of women having to exchange sexual favours to obtain food rations and supplies. In order to avoid such problems, WFP has wisely taken the decision to distribute food only through women. This practice should be adopted by other relief efforts and extended to non-food items as well." (Mooney and Mugumya 1998, p.74)

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)

Food and nutrition

Reports indicate general improvements in the nutritional situation amongst IDPs in Gulu and Kitgum (1999-2001)

- Level of global acute malnutrition in the Kitgum IDP camps only marginally improved during 1999
- But severe and global malnutrition found to have decreased in 1999 surveys of IDP camps in Gulu

"Preliminary results of an ACF nutritional survey in October [1999] in Gulu IDP camps has found a significant improvement in the nutritional situation amongst IDPs. Both severe and global malnutrition has decreased in the population surveyed. It appears that many of the remaining cases of severe malnutrition reflect either a particularly vulnerable social situation or a temporary lack of adequate food and water for children perhaps due to intense efforts at cultivation away from camps over the past months. A similar assessment in Kitgum is now underway and results should be available in December." (UNHCU 19 November 1999)

"An ACF-USA nutritional survey in Kitgum in December 1999 found that global malnutrition of children aged 6-59 months, living in non-displaced areas has decreased dramatically since the March 1999 survey, from 6.7% to 3.5%. The rates for children living outside of camps are much lower than the percentage found in the IDP camps. ACF notes that this relatively low level of global acute malnutrition can be expected to increase if insecurity continues in Kitgum.

The level of global acute malnutrition in the IDP camps, now 6.6%, has only marginally improved since March when it was 7.0%. The percentage of severe malnutrition for the 6-59 month age group is also higher in IDP camps than in villages. The high percentage of global acute malnutrition in the IDP camps for the 6 – 29 month age group, at 10.2 %, is of concern, since they appear more at risk of malnourishment than 30-59 month age group." (UNHCU 24 January 2000)

"Nutritional measures are reasonable in some areas. Surveys in Gulu and Kitgum in April and October 1999, and again in March 2001 indicated levels below 7% global acute malnutrition. In Bundibugyo, MSF/F found only 2.6% global acute malnutrition in October 1999. No significant increases in feeding programmes admissions suggests that malnutrition levels have remained reasonable."(UN November 2001, p. 43)

"Conditions vary from camp to camp. Those close to Gulu town are better off than those located in more outlying areas. Koc Goma, Awer and Unyama had some reasonable space between huts, fairly adequate water supply and people seemed to be better fed. However, in most camps we visited one of the most depressing sights is the many children showing signs of malnutrition, such as reddish hair and swollen bellies. In August 1997 the Gulu District Medical Officer estimated that 50% of the children living in displaced camps were malnourished. Although these days the figure is surely lower than that, it is evident that poor nutrition leave many children at the mercy of fatal diseases. We were told that last year 52 children died of smallpox in Alero." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, p.11)

Kitgum/Paeder surveys revealed increase in global acute malnutrition for children between 1999 and 2001

- Children 6-29 months are at a higher risk of becoming malnourished compared to children 30-59 months
- Indicated that the primary cause of malnutrition is not directly related to food supply and calorie intake but relates to other factors (illnesses, social settings, etc.)

"The last year was relatively calm as far as rebel movements, allowing many of the families living in the IDP camps to return to their villages of origin on a periodic basis to begin re-cultivating their fields.

Despite this increased freedom, the displaced population has limited access to their fields and is still receiving food assistance from WFP through NRC, their implementing partner. Until October 98, the displaced population of all existing camps received 100% of the daily food ration from the WFP. This ration is: 320 gr of cereals/person/day, 60 gr of pulses/person/day, and 20 gr of oil/person/day. This ration gives approximately 1517 Kcal/ person/day with 18.6% lipids and 11.4% proteins.

From October to December 98, the ration was reduced in 4 of the camps (Palabek Kal, Lokung, Padibe, and Palabek Gem). These camps currently receive a ration of 200 gr of cereals/person/day, 30 gr of pulses/person/day, and 10 gr of oil/person/day. The remaining camps (Potika A, Potika B and Agoro) receive 400 gr of cereals/person/day, 60 gr of pulses/person/day, and 20 gr of oil/person/day.

Action Against Hunger (ACF-USA) responded to the situation in 1997 by starting a nutritional program in the region (Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts) that were later turned over to the Districts when ACF-USA closed their program in Kitgum District in 2000. At this time malnutrition level were reduced from their high of 15% global acute malnutrition to <5% global acute malnutrition. Currently, one Therapeutic Feeding Center (TFC) in Kitgum Municipality (St Joseph Hospital) for the treatment of the severe malnutrition cases and three Supplementary Feeding Centers (SFC) for the treatment of moderate malnutrition cases are operational.

ACF-USA was requested by UNICEF and WFP to conduct a nutritional survey among the children aged 6-59 months in the IDP camps in the two newly created districts of Kitgum and Pader. This report discusses the results obtained in Kitgum District. The results of the survey performed in Pader District are discussed in a separate report. ACF- USA conducted the last nutritional survey in the IDP camps in March 1999 when the two districts were still considered one. A comparison between this survey and the actual one carried out in the displaced camps is possible because the same methodology was used in both, but caution must be taken considering that the period when the surveys have been carried out differ and the statistics include the camps which are now considered a part of Pader District.

[...]

The prevalence of global acute malnutrition for children between 6 and 59 months has increased by almost two percentage points since the last survey conducted by ACF-USA in March 1999.

Table 11
Comparison of Acute Malnutrition Rates in Z-Scores

	ACF-USA Survey Nov. 01	ACF-USA Survey March 99
	6-59 months (n = 925)	6-59 months (n = 954)
Global acute malnutrition	8.9% [CI 95%: 7.1% ↔ 10.9%]	7.0% [CI 95%: 4.9% ↔ 9.9%]
Severe acute malnutrition	0.4% [CI 95%: 0.1% ↔ 1.2%]	0.3% [CI 95%: 0.0% ↔ 1.5%]

Children 6-29 months are at a higher risk of becoming malnourished compared to children 30-59 months. The difference between age groups might be explained in that generally mothers tend to abruptly stop breast-feeding and start giving a normal diet to their children as soon as they conceive another child. Sudden weaning could induce malnutrition. Weaning usually occurs before the age of 30 months.

Given that the general food distribution in Kitgum District continues under the mandate of WFP and that the families have improved food security through increased access to land allowed by the improved general security in the District, it seems that the primary cause of malnutrition is not directly related to food supply and calorie intake. A relationship between malnutrition and other factors (illnesses, social settings, etc.) may exist. To show cause and effect, a case control study and nutritional causal survey would be needed.

The chronic malnutrition rate remains fairly constant at 37.4%, which is comparable to the global Ugandan rate of 33%. The high level of chronic malnutrition reflects the effects of poor long-term nutrition in this population. Early detection and prevention is the only curative approach. Multi-sectorial activities that impact the health and nutrition at the community, family, and individual levels are necessary to alleviate chronic malnutrition, as well as improvement of general and individual economic resources.

" (ACF December 2001, pp. 5-6

"In March 2000, the Kitgum District was subdivided into two distinct districts, thus forming Kitgum and Pader Districts. The two districts share a common history, but the actual management and conditions of the two districts differ substantially. Given that the Pader District Government has only been established since March of last year, the management is still strongly dependent upon the infrastructure and experience of Kitgum District. This dependence has caused some obstacles in administration within the district and logistical delays. Atanga is the only official IDP camp in Pader District.

[...]

The prolonged civil unrest in Pader has had a severe impact on agricultural production and reduced the self-sufficiency of the subsistence farming community. Agriculture has always been the largest source of household income and many farmers now suffer from extreme poverty as a consequence of the unrest and the loss of their cattle. This in turn led to growing concern about the nutritional status of the most vulnerable groups within the community.

[...]

The prevalence of global acute malnutrition for children between 6 and 59 months has increased slightly (0.2%) since the last survey conducted by ACF-USA in March 1999, but the incidence of severe acute malnutrition has increased by almost 1 percentage point.

Table 11
Comparison of Acute Malnutrition Rates in Z-Scores

	ACF-USA Survey Nov. 01	ACF-USA Survey March 99
	6-59 months (n = 803)	6-59 months (n = 954)
Global acute malnutrition	7.2% [CI 95%: 4.9% ↔ 10.4%]	7.0% [CI 95%: 4.9% ↔ 9.9%]
Severe acute malnutrition	1.1% [CI 95%: 0.4% ↔ 2.9%]	0.3% [CI 95%: 0.0% ↔ 1.5%]

Children 6-29 months are at a significantly higher risk of becoming malnourished compared to children 30-59 months. The difference between age groups might be explained in that generally mothers tend to abruptly stop breast-feeding and start giving a normal diet to their children as soon as they conceive another child. Sudden weaning could induce malnutrition. Weaning usually occurs before the age of 30 months.

The severe acute malnutrition is significant and much higher than that of the March 1999 survey. One principal factor causing this increment could be the fact that the SFC is no longer functioning in the IDP camp. The SFC stopped receiving the supplementary food supply in August of this year and consequently

was forced to stop all operations. The district and WFP had made arrangements to continue the SFC in Atanga, WFP would supply the supplementary food and the district was responsible for the transport from Kitgum to Atanga. Unfortunately the district has not been able to fulfill its obligation and as a consequence, the SFC is no longer functioning. Additionally, the closest health center to the camp, Atanga Health Center, is frequently without the necessary medical supplies and medicines. The IDP are then forced to go to the health centers or hospital in Kitgum. This is a large distance and many IDP may opt not to make the journey. This tendency may result in undertreatment of illnesses and injury with possible subsequent increased malnutrition especially among the vulnerable 6-59 months population.

Given that the general food distribution in Pader District continues under the mandate of WFP and that the families have improved food security through increased access to land allowed by the improved general security in the District, it seems that the primary cause of malnutrition is not directly related to food supply and calorie intake. A relationship between malnutrition and other factors (illnesses, social settings, etc.) may exist. To show cause and effect, a case control study and nutritional causal survey would be needed.

The chronic malnutrition rate remains fairly constant at 36.0%, which is comparable to the global Ugandan rate of 33%. The high level of chronic malnutrition reflects the effects of poor long-term nutrition in this population. Early detection and prevention is the only curative approach. Multi-sectorial activities that impact the health and nutrition at the community, family, and individual levels are necessary to alleviate chronic malnutrition, as well as improvement of general and individual economic resources. (ACF December 2001, pp. 5, 14-15)

Chronic malnutrition rate remains high among IDPs in Bundibugyo (November 2001)

- Chronic malnutrition rate estimated at 61.3% compared to global Ugandan rate at 33%
- An estimated 63,000 IDP receive food during a distribution cycle

"The World Food Program (WFP) is responsible for food distribution. General food distribution is done on a six weekly cycle. All IDP camps receive food except for the Bundibugyo Town Council camps and Nyahuka camp. An estimated 63,000 IDP receive food during a distribution cycle. WFP provides a 50% ration and the IDP cater for 50%. One ration per person represents 180 grams of cornmeal and 30 grams of beans.

MSF runs a Therapeutic Feeding Centre (TFC) located at Bundibugyo Hospital.

[...]

The survey was conducted from October 22 to November 1, 2001; this period corresponds to the beginning of the bean harvest.

[...]

The prevalence of acute malnutrition remains low. The nutritional survey carried out by MSF in November 1999 showed similar results.

Table 10
Comparison of Acute Malnutrition Rates in Z-Scores

	ACF Survey Nov. 01	MSF Survey Nov. 99
	6-59 months (n = 900)	6-59 months (n = 627)
Global acute malnutrition	1.6% [CI 95%: 0.7% ↔ 3.3%]	2.6% [CI 95%: 1.5% ↔ 4.2%]
Severe acute malnutrition	0.2% [CI 95%: -0.0% ↔ 1.4%]	0.6% [CI 95%: 0.2% ↔ 1.7%]

Children 6-29 months are at a higher risk of becoming malnourished compared to children 30-59 months (RR 11.98). The difference between age groups might be explained in that generally mothers tend to abruptly stop breast-feeding and start giving a normal diet to their children as soon as they conceive another child. Sudden weaning could induce malnutrition. Weaning occurs mostly before the age of 30 months.

A relationship between malnutrition and other factors (illness, social setting) may exist. To show cause and effect, a case control study would be needed.

The general food distribution in Bundibugyo District is under the mandate of WFP. The food distribution is covering the IDP needs. The harvesting of beans had begun at the time of the survey.

The chronic malnutrition rate remains high (61.3%). The global Ugandan rate is 33%. The high level of chronic malnutrition reflects the effects of poor long-term nutrition in this population. Early detection and prevention is the only approach. Multi-sectorial activities that impact the health and nutrition at the community, family, and individual levels are necessary to alleviate chronic malnutrition, as well as improvement of general and individual economic resources." (ACF November 2001, pp. 5, 13-14)

Access to food considered the main problem by 25 percent of IDPs interviewed in the Rwenzori region (2002)

- 43 percent of IDPs perceived poor access to land as the main problem

"As a result of displacement, internally displaced people are faced with problems of access to cultivable land, health plus economic and social problems in their settlements. While most of these problems existed before, living in camps has aggravated them.

[...]

Majority (43%) of IDPs perceived poor access to land as the main problem they face during displacement. One in four IDPs (26%) regarded food as the main problem, while access to income and health ranked priority problem by 12% and 10% respectively. When asked about the second priority problem, 38% of respondents considered health; water and sanitation did not emerge as a problem in IDP camps during household interviews, although among the diseases mentioned several were water and sanitation related. Internally displaced persons were concerned with the increased morbidity and mortality due to displacement. Diseases prevalent in the camps are malaria, respiratory tract infections (RTI), cholera outbreaks and diarrhea plus sexually transmitted infection (STIs), including HIV/AIDS.

Most of these problems are not new among the people of the three districts; however living in camps has aggravated them. More than half (54%) for example, were concerned that staying in camps has made access to income more difficult." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, p.7)

Remaining IDPs in the Katakwi district face food shortages (2001-2002)

- Over 80,000 IDPs in Usuk and Kapelebyong Counties have limited access to both food and clean drinking water and depend on wild foods

"According to ActionAid, one of the humanitarian organizations active in Katakwi District, households in more civil secure areas of the district have adequate food stocks and enjoy sufficient access to food with no observable stress. The main concern continues to be the IDPs in Usuk and Kapelebyong Counties -- estimated at over 80,000 -- who face limited access to both food and clean drinking water. These households mainly depend on wild foods with a few getting assistance from relatives living in other parts of the district outside the camps. Further, only a few are able to access food from the fields and markets

because of limited access to land and cultivation in the past seasons and a general lack of income generating activities, respectively. With the ongoing disarmament of the Karimojong in neighboring Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit Districts, Katakwi District officials and humanitarian organizations hope that the civil security situation will improve. This would increase the IDPs access land to cultivate this season, which is expected to start later this month.

Sanitation and health conditions in the IDPs settlements in Katakwi District remain poor although no significant outbreak of diseases has been reported over the past three months. Malaria, upper thoracic infections and diarrhea are the main diseases affecting the IDPs, especially as the wet season begins in the district." (FEWSNET 19 March 2002)

"A December 2000 report from a follow-up monitoring assessment of Karamojong affected district of Katakwi, indicates that large numbers of people are still temporarily displaced in camps in sub-counties bordering with Moroto.

In summary, households in the most affected sub-counties have limited food stocks and are likely to experience shortages in February 2001. This is attributed to;

- a) a late start to the first season of 2000 that had poorly distributed rainfall leading to late planting, poor germination and low yields.
- b) displacement due to civil insecurity caused by Karamojong warriors' violent raids during the first quarter of 2000, which reduced people's access to land, resulting in low cultivation and crop production.
- c) poorly distributed rainfall in the second season did not help improve conditions.

The report by Concern Worldwide, recommends food aid assistance starting in February 2001, with emphasis on households in the most affected sub-counties of Kapelebyong , Usuk and Ngariam, which border with Moroto district. Special consideration to Okoboi and Lamaratoit in terms of relief food was also recommended."(OCHA January 2001)

Health

Congestion, poor hygiene and changed sexual behavioral practices have worsened the health situation in Rwenzori IDP camps (2002)

- Prevalent diseases in the camps includemalaria, respiratory tract infections (RTI), outbreaks of cholera, diarrhea, sexually transmitted infections, (STIs)

"Internally displaced persons were concerned with the increased morbidity and mortality due to displacement. While the study did not collect statistical mortality and morbidity figures, the diseases mentioned to be prevalent in the camps are: malaria, respiratory tract infections (RTI), outbreaks of cholera, diarrhea, sexually transmitted infections, (STIs), including HIV/AIDS. By the time of study, (December 2001), 12 cases of cholera were admitted at Bundibugyo hospital.

The principal causes of increased disease prevalence among people living in camps are congestion, poor hygiene and changed sexual behavioral practices among the displaced persons.

Congestion in the camps was observable during the assessment and many people do the cooking within their small shelters thus exposing themselves particularly children to domestic smoke. Though no statistics were compiled, many of the children were observed to be with cough and running noses during data collection.

On the other hand, respondents attributed the increased prevalence of STIs to increased involvement in sex after displacement. This was attributed to poverty and increased interactions with outsiders as a result of displacement. Displaced people singled out soldiers and teachers as leading catalysts for the spread of STIs for they have a regular source of income thus able to seduce more girls and women." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, p. 11)

Poor health services available for the displaced population (2001)

- Health care services and infrastructure in the chronically conflict-affected districts have experienced tremendous stress
- Six of 32 IDP villages in Gulu have no health facility
- under five mortality rates in affected districts such as Bundibugyo are unacceptably high
- HIV infection rates as high as 12.5% in camps compared with the national average of 10.5%

"[T]he continuing insurgency and political instability in some districts in southwestern (Bundibugyo, Kasese Kabarole and Ntungamo) and northern (Gulu, Kitgum, Katakwi) Uganda has contributed significantly to further violations to the rights of children and women to survival, optimal growth, development, and reproductive health. Health care services and infrastructure in the chronically conflict-affected districts have experienced tremendous stress. Access to, and utilisation of services has decreased due to the fluctuating insecurity, lack of staff and essential supplies and drugs. The pattern is very dynamic as units close during period of insecurity and may later re-open when threats have subsided. Consequently, a large segment of the populations in the affected districts has [sic!] access to health services. In Gulu district, none of the approximately 32 IDPs villages in Gulu district, with a total estimated population of 250,000, has acceptable access to health services. Of the 32 IDP villages, six have no health facility. In Pabbo IDP, with a current population of over 30,000 people, there is only one health facility. Furthermore, chronic insecurity, exacerbated by poor living conditions and irregular and low salaries, makes it extremely difficult to attract and retain qualified health personnel. In many IDP villages, nursing aides are the only staff available to provide health-care services.

It is not surprising, therefore, that under five mortality rates in affected districts such as Bundibugyo are unacceptably high at 3.1/10,000 children per day. In some of the affected districts, there are reports of significant increases in maternal mortality ratios compared with the national average. Social conditions in the crowded camps are horrendous, especially for women and children who suffer rape and abductions. Sexually transmitted infections have surged and continue to increase. HIV infection rates are as high as 12.5% in camps compared with the national average of 10.5%. Malaria prevalence in under-fives is a staggering 76.9% compared to 40% countrywide. Immunisation trails the national average considerably with a fully immunised coverage of 25% compared to 44.3% nationally. Maternal mortality is high at 1,200/100,000 live births, and more than twice the national average of 506/100,000 live births. The lack of psychosocial support has left the population severely traumatised." (UN November 2001, p.46)

Poor health conditions reported in Katakwi IDP camps (2001)

- IDPs have to travel an average of 15 km on foot to reach a health center
- Closely spaced and overcrowded huts common in most camps
- IDPs commonly wear very minimal/unclean clothes
- Lack of drainage, poor access to water and sanitation facilities has an adverse impact on the hygiene and sanitation behaviors

"Displaced people in the camps in Katakwi are reported to be suffering from unusually high rates of malaria, diarrhoea, intestinal worms, upper respiratory tract infections and pneumonia. Many of the camps are isolated and IDPs have to travel an average of 15 km on foot to reach a health centre. OCHA described the sanitation situation within the camps as "a time bomb just waiting to explode". Similar to the situation in north western Uganda, the camps have existed for many years and have been paid very little attention by both the Ugandan government and international aid agencies." (OCHA 31 September 2001, pp.27-28)

"As the morbidity and mortality indicators disclose and for a multitude of reasons, health has been a major concern in the camps. Closely spaced and overcrowded huts were common in most camps. IDPs commonly wore very minimal/unclean clothes, particularly most children were topless. Children were unclean, not bathed and dressed properly. IDPs lacked proper bedding and mattresses as warriors have looted them and, households mainly use the local mats to sleep with/with out covers. Open air cooking with out lids was widespread due to overcrowded and grass-thatched huts. Families usually throw their wastewater and kitchen waste into unprotected open composts in the vicinity/around their huts. Lack of drainage, poor access to water and sanitation facilities has an adverse impact on the hygiene and sanitation behaviors of the IDPs. Swampy surroundings and stagnant water bodies have been further aggravating the environmental cleanliness while also serving as breeding grounds for vectors. Livestock were tethered inside the camps to further contaminate the camp environment.

Morbidity and Mortality

Consequently, mortality and morbidity rates have been alarmingly high. Crude and Under-5 mortality prevails at >3deaths/10,000/day and the incidence of diarrhoea, malaria, ARI and worm infestation was rampant in most camps at >40% prevalence.

[...]

Malaria, measles and diarrhoea have claimed more deaths either individually or in combination with other complications. At the time of this survey, MOH and UNICEF launched immunization campaign and have covered almost the entire under-5 population with measles vaccination and vitamin-A drops.

Generally, skin sepsis, lice infestation, suffering from Jiggers (*Tunga Penetrans*) and fungal infections were widespread among children and adults. In most cases children and adults were found not bathed and in unclean clothes (many wore minimal clothes and particularly most children were topless) despite plenty of water sources in the nearby swamps. During informal discussions, many IDPs mentioned health facility, clothing and bedding as their first requirements.

Cooking and eating-places were dirty attracting flies to further contaminate the surroundings. These deficiencies could eventually prove to be the potential ground for the outbreaks of epidemics. In terms of morbidity, the survey noted that 96% of the households reported having at least one sick member in the last 30 days prior to survey although everyone sought treatment.

[...]

Seeking post-natal services was found to be very poor among the IDPs either due to their ignorance/weak household economy/due to the non-availability of services. Of the total deliveries, only 32% mothers received Vitamin-A capsules after delivery. And 48% sought post-natal services from the health posts. These deficiencies in health seeking behaviors could be the leading causes for around 47% of the mortality before their first birthday i.e. 47% of the mortality has taken place among infants." (Oxfam 28 November 2001, pp.21-22)

The psychological trauma suffered by abducted children makes their reintegration difficult (1998)

- Many health workers have fled from conflict areas and serious problems remain in the areas to which the abducted children are returning

"Moreover, the psychological trauma suffered by abducted children makes their reintegration difficult, UNICEF and several NGOs provide much-needed reintegration and psychosocial support to these children who manage to escape. Among returning girls, the problem of sexually transmitted diseases is widespread. The World Health Organization (WHO) is assisting the Ministry of Health in ensuring the availability of medication for those affected, but these efforts are hampered by a lack of health workers. That many health workers themselves have fled from conflict areas suggests that serious problems remain in the areas to which the abducted children are returning. Although some positive preventive work has been done, abductions persist in some areas. Human rights monitoring and advocacy, such as the work of Amnesty International and UNICEF, could be expanded." (Mooney and Mugumya 1998, p.75)

Water and Sanitation

Water and sanitation situation remains poor in conflict areas (2001)

- Only about the half population have adequate latrine coverage and access to safe water in Gulu and Kitgum
- Water and sanitation sector in all conflict districts has suffered from a lack of donor interest
- Few schools access to clean and safe drinking water

"Service delivery in these [conflict affected] districts has been made more difficult this year by a serious increase in the number of security incidents. Local governments have struggled to deal with the effects of conflict due to low institutional capacity caused by the displacement of district staff. According to current statistics (September 2000) from the Directorate of Water Development (DWD), latrine coverage in Gulu and Kitgum is 48% and 48.8%, respectively while access to safe water is 53% (47% in 1996) and 37%. Figures for Bundibugyo are similar. However in the IDP camps the situation is much worse. Further, the water and sanitation sector in all conflict districts has suffered from a lack of donor interest probably caused by the prolonged conflict. NGOs and local government have both been challenged to find sufficient resources to make a significant impact and have struggled to make a marginal improvement over the course of the last year.

The problem is particularly acute at schools. In displaced areas, many children continue to study under trees and use bushes for sanitation. Many other children study in temporary or makeshift schools where adequate sanitation facilities have not been provided. They also study in a very unhygienic and polluted environment. The problem is further compounded as children lack supporting materials to support practicing sanitary and hygienic behavior. Few schools in these areas have access to clean and safe drinking water during the school day." (UN November 2001, pp. 53-54)

"Besides the issue of poor feeding, in most of the camps water supply is also a big problem. A good number of boreholes have been put in place in recent years by some Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), but when they break down the cost of repair is beyond the means of the community. In Alero, with a population of 15,000, we found six boreholes, three of them broken. In Cwero we found that all three boreholes were broken and women had to walk a distance of three miles to fetch some water from a well. This was also the situation we found in Amuru, where women told us bitterly that in these forages for water a good number of them have been raped by rebels or by government soldiers. Little wonder that in many camps a jerrycan of water is a highly treasured commodity which is sold at 500 shillings.

Inadequate sanitation is another big concern. In most camps we visited the latrines are located between the houses, at very close distance, and are often overflowing. In some latrines the pits are left open, and we have heard of a good number of cases of small children dying after they fell into them. In overcrowded camps, like Padibe, Pabbo, Lukung, Anaka and Amuru, the stench is unbearable and flies are everywhere,

making it easy for an outbreak of infectious disease to spread quickly." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, p.11)

"Although 75% of the households in Katakwi have some level of access to safe water mainly from handpumps, the number of water systems in the camps is far less than the required capacity. In some cases, 7000-8000 IDPs share one handpump and a lot of time is wasted in queuing up to fetch water. Imposition of user fee further restricts IDPs' use of water from these sources. 25% population fetch water from unprotected sources.

There has been a complete failure in the hygiene and sanitation measures in the camps. 98% households reported disposing their household wastes into open composts/around their huts. 78% lack access to adequate water for bathing and hygiene practices. Open defecation has been one of their rampant behaviors responsible for environmental pollution. 56% reported using open places for defecating." (Oxfam 28 November 2001, p. 6)

WatSan facilities in camps not constructed for long term use (2000)

- Children attending primary school, are facing great difficulties keeping themselves clean and healthy
- Study found that poor sanitation was one of the major factors contributing to the high drop out rate of girls
- Over-crowding, low water supply and sanitation coverage and a failure to ensure safe disposal of human excreta and refuse has led to disease outbreaks like cholera in some camps
- Latrines in IDP camps not maintained properly

"In Uganda, accesses to safe drinking water, presently at 47%, and to a clean healthy environment remain two of the most commonly unfulfilled human rights. The situation is made even worse and more life-threatening for people who have been displaced by conflict especially for those living in the IDP camps of Bundibugyo, Kasese, Gulu and Kitgum districts. The camps and temporary shelters that were earlier set up at the onset of displacement were not intended for long term use. Many are starting to exhibit problems similar to that of small cities but without the resources needed to deal with them. Some camps, such as Pabbo (pop 30,000) and Bundibugyo Town (pop 45,000) are highly congested. In these camps, over-crowding, low water supply and sanitation coverage and a failure to ensure safe disposal of human excreta and refuse has led to disease outbreaks like cholera leading to increased morbidity and mortality.

The situation described above, disproportionately affects children and women. School-going children, particularly children attending primary school, are facing great difficulties keeping themselves clean and healthy. Even in the best of times, the water and sanitation situation in Uganda's primary schools calls for serious attention. For example, a study of schools by the Uganda National Examination Board [UNEB] in 1996 in several sample districts found the coverage of water facilities to be 66.7% while only 8% had access to adequate number of latrines. Another study done by UNICEF in 1999 in 90 primary schools showed that only 2% of the surveyed schools had adequate latrine facilities, only 37% of the teachers had received sanitation related training and only 25% of schools had sanitation educational materials. When an outbreak of cholera struck the country in February 1998, at least 560 primary schools were closed due to lack of adequate sanitation facilities. As indicated in the UNEB study, school sanitation also has a significant gender implication. The study found that one of the major factors contributing to the high drop out rate of girls was poor sanitation.

Conditions of displacement are much worse. At the majority of displaced primary schools, pupils spend 8 hours a day 8 months a year in makeshift schools where there is little access to safe water, appallingly poor

sanitation facilities and a generally very unhygienic environment. Water, Sanitation and hygiene related diseases like diarrhoea, cholera, dysentery are now endemic in the affected zones.

[...]

A survey by AMREF [African Medical And Research Foundation] indicates that over 50% of households in these camps live in chronic ill health characterised by overcrowding, shortage of water and the lack of adequate sanitary facilities. The latrine coverage ranges from 14% in rural areas where most IDP camps are found, to 50% in the urban area. Those who have latrines in the displaced camps do not maintain them properly. Low literacy rates, coupled with entrenched cultural beliefs and practices, make the change of behaviour to proper hygiene practices difficult. A survey conducted in June 1998 reveals the safe water coverage stands at 53%, but the service level is based on a minimum of 10 litres per person per day (cf. 15 litres minimum per day). Due to prolonged insecurity, many protected water sources continue to be abandoned as people flee to safety while those within the IDP camps constantly break down due to heavy use. Many of the water sources are eventually abandoned due to lack of spares or inadequacy thus encouraging the use of alternative unsafe sources. The institutional mechanism for water source management continuously breaks down due to loss or displacement of members on committees, none practice of skills acquired resulting into attrition of knowledge and loss of technical community persons. Maintenance tools are inadequate. Poor logistics and lack of resources in the water development department can not enable the staff to cope with the ever-worsening conditions of the IDP camps. Displaced primary schools have even worse water and sanitation conditions as they struggle to implement the UPE programme, and reliable water and sanitation surveillance system for schools is yet to be established." (UN November 2000, pp. 89-90, 96-97)

Shelter

Landowners in the Rwenzori region charging IDPs for land to establish shelters (2002)

"Associated with economic problems is the difficulty to access their original land. Land emerged among the perceived main problems faced by IDPs (43%). Both displaced persons and landowners on whose land camps were established face this problem. Landowners where camps were established have had their crops destroyed by people putting up temporary shelter.

Land in camps

The demand for land has increased in areas where camps were established, making it more marketable. Many landowners, where camps were established have sold parts of their land either to the displaced people or other interested persons. This has led to constant displacement of some IDPs from one place or camp to another. Some landowners chased displaced persons from their land, while others are charging IDPs a fee for establishing a shelter or constructing a latrine. This was mainly observed in camps near trading centers e.g., Nyahuka, Union IDP camps in Bundibugyo district.

In Kasese district, Ibanda Primary IDP camp, displaced people were reportedly chased from the land and only 6 households remained after pleading to the owner. In Nyahuka IDP camp, Bundibugyo district, respondents reported being charged between 10,000 Ush and 50,000 Ush. per year for constructing a shelter and 5,000 Ush - 10,000 Ush. per year for a latrine." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, p.8)

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

Education and psycho-social support needs

Positive assessments about access to primary education in northern Uganda despite high drop out rates of girls (2002)

- Reported that most of school-age children in IDP camps were attending schools
- Only 7% of the households reported having children not in schools due to lack of fees or scholastic materials
- Girls often don't get beyond the early years of primary school
- Dropouts occur mostly in the later years of primary school when young people are entering adolescence
- Success related to combined efforts by authorities, donors and the communities themselves
- Education at secondary level remain inadequate

"The assessment team had anticipated education as one of the services that Internally displaced persons have problems to access. However it did not emerge as a major problem. During a ranking exercise, it always came fourth or beyond. Most of the school going age children in the camps especially at primary level were in schools may be because many camps are closer to schools and the UPE program. Some key informants noted that some children were abducted and or lost their parents and are no longer in schools. However only 7% of the households reported having children not in schools due to lack of fees or scholastic materials and 2% due to distance to schools. Some households had children above 6 years and not in schools but perceived them still young to go to school." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, p. 12)

"Access to universal free primary education has been one of the brightest successes of this period of displacement among the Acholi.

[...]

Thanks to the combined efforts of the authorities (through the national programme of universal, free education), the donors and the communities themselves, these goals have broadly been achieved, though too many children still fail to take advantage of the education on offer for lack of funds to cover the remaining, modest expenditures required, or because their support is required for other family activities.

The lack of a similar programme for secondary studies is a serious problem, as the destitution caused by more than 15 years of conflict and displacement prevents all but a few families from otherwise providing for their children's education. The sale of livestock was the principal source of cash to cover post-primary school fees; few, if any, families have any saleable assets remaining. Means need to be found to ensure that the emerging generation will have an adequate skills base to meet the economic challenges of the future, and to reduce the number of young people left entirely idle and marginalized."

(Weeks March 2002, p. 27)

"A system of Universal Primary Education (UPE) instituted by the Ugandan government in 1996 has created great opportunities for Uganda's children to attend primary school by offering free, although not compulsory, education for up to two girls and two boys in each family. UPE has given many young people in northern Uganda the opportunity to attend primary school. But this opportunity is short-lived for most, especially for girls, as they don't get beyond the early years of primary school. The insecurity of the war has hindered the full implementation of UPE, and has created enormous barriers for young people to gain access to and complete quality primary education.

At least half of the Ugandan population in the conflict areas of northern Uganda are internally displaced. According to the World Food Program (WFP), 26.4 percent of the IDPs living in camps are children aged 5 to 14 years old. The majority of these children have been out of school since the conflict escalated in July 1996, ironically just as UPE was instituted. Currently, less than 30 percent of school-age children in IDP camps are enrolled on a full-time basis, with young girls affected disproportionately. 68 According to the UPDF Fourth Division Commander in Gulu, over 300,000 children in northern Uganda are unable to go to school because of LRA activity.

[...]

In the districts covered by this research, a number of barriers have made sporadic attendance, late arrival and dropouts in primary school seem the norm. Primary school levels run from P1 through P7, beginning usually at age five. Dropouts occur mostly in the later years of primary school when young people are entering adolescence. Adolescents and school officials report that many young children are starting P1 at seven, eight or even nine years old, and others try to complete their primary studies when they are older and have missed some years. Huge numbers of young people are unable to attend school at all because of other responsibilities and barriers. These include child-care, long travel distances, security problems and an inability to pay school fees. Many adolescents told the Women's Commission that they had completed a number of primary school years but simply could not continue. Gender discrimination, which will be discussed later, is also a huge factor in the lower enrollment and higher dropout rate of girls."(WCRWC July 2001, p.25)

Education system does not address the needs of traumatised displaced children and adolescents (1998)

- The conflict in the north and south-western districts threatens children's physical well-being and psycho-social development
- The conflict has left significant numbers of children either unaccompanied or orphaned

"The conflict in the north and south-western districts of the country disrupts the education of children and adolescents and threatens their physical well-being and psycho-social development. For the large number of child and adolescent Sudanese and other refugees seeking sanctuary in Uganda the trauma of their displacement is similarly threatening to their well-being. Populations in conflict-affected areas and refugees have been exposed to ruthless killings and systematic abductions, and face displacement due to unstable and volatile security. In addition, conflict has left significant numbers of children either unaccompanied or orphaned.

Although a concerted effort has been made over the past two years to increase school attendance through the provision of Universal Primary Education (UPE), UPE in its present form does not yet practically address the needs of children and adolescents who are displaced and who are traumatised. Furthermore, up to now, refugee children do not have access to the UPE system. Education has been severely affected in many places due to displacement or through the destruction of school buildings or the targeted killings of teachers. There is a strong commitment to education in the affected communities and education is often the top priority identified by communities immediately following an attack or displacement. While the educational needs of refugees are relatively well-catered for due to their strong interest and support from donors, UNHCR and partners, efforts to integrate refugee education within the government structures will be made in the future. " (UN December 1998, p. 21)

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Food security

Rwenzori report shows that displacement has changed traditional livelihood patterns (2002)

- Subsistence agriculture as the main source of livelihood declined from 81% to 56% after displacement
- More people getting engaged in casual labor

"Lack of access to income and potential sources of income is a significant problem faced by IDPs. Most people used to depend on selling crops as a source of income, but this was disrupted by displacement.

[...]

Subsistence agriculture was and still remains the main source of livelihood, however, tremendously declined from 81% to 56% after displacement. People's ability to sell crops as a source of livelihood has fallen 10 times after displacement. More people (23%) are currently engaged in casual labor as a form of survival during displacement compared to only 1% before. Others or nothing include those who depended on remittances from families and relatives before displacement and now depend on donations from humanitarian agencies after displacement. Those who entirely depend on others for survival have increased from 3% to 11% after displacement.

[...]

Despite the disruptions in livelihood and income sources, demands for money have increased due to displacement. Many people for example need cash to pay for food items they never paid for before, such as renting land where they have their shelters or for cultivation.

[...]

A change in perceived good living standards has led to an increase in demand for cash. This was reported to be due to mixing with well off families. Men were of the view that their wives have adopted new demands and need more cash than before, seeking to join the well off class." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, pp. 9-10)

Signs by end-2001 that the IDPs were becoming less dependent on humanitarian assistance (2001)

- Conflict hinders employment opportunities and discouraged internal and external investment
- 20 percent of Uganda's arable land excluded from production
- Deteriorated infrastructure in the west, north and northeast has made marketing of surplus commodities unprofitable
- Relative calm in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts enhanced conditions for favorable crop cultivation and production during 2001
- South-western region has benefited from sufficient rains during second half of 2001

"Northern Region: The overall food security situation in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader is also chronic due to civil insecurity, affecting both access and availability of food. The primary cause of food insecurity in this region is the activities of the LRA (threats of looting, murder, rape, and abduction). As a consequence, normal social/cultural structures are breaking down and leading to high abandonment rates (i.e. men

leaving their families), frequent teenage pregnancies, and lack of care for vulnerable groups and high risk of AIDS.

The "protected village" life has dramatically altered the livelihoods of people in this region, resulting in various coping strategies. One significant change is the reliance on food aid, with many people reporting that on average food aid supplies between 20 and 30% of their food needs, though this varies by camp. Searching for labour opportunities is increasingly a coping strategy in the camps, although due to the concentrated and saturated labour market, daily wages are experiencing diminishing returns. Other strategies include increased reliance on gifts from relatives or outright begging, selling of household property and stealing of food. Young girls are susceptible to acquiring money through prostitution."(UN November 2001, pp. 43-44)

"The major source of income for the IDPs is casual labour, and money is spent mainly on food and medical care. Food prices in Kitgum and Pader have generally shown a downward trend during the reporting period. Millet for example decreased from Ush. 400 in July, to Ush. 275 in August and September. Sorghum is also down from Ush.230 to Ush.180. Commodities supplied by WFP such as beans vary per month and the observation is that the variation is closely linked to the WFP distribution pattern - in the months where beans constitute the IDP food basket, the bean prices are lower.

Reports show that most IDPs in Kitgum, Pader can now access their land due to the long lull in the rebel activities. Consequently, they now produce crops to supplement WFP relief food. About 60 percent of the IDPs reportedly spend their days in their gardens, away from the camps, leaving behind children, the elderly." (OCHA October 2001)

"IDPs are taking advantage of the improved security situation to work in their gardens outside the camps. There is increased movement along the roads and people are traveling deeper into the villages where they have not been able to go for so long. Though this trend has been observed in Kitgum increasingly over the last six months, it is encouraging to see that Gulu is also perceived to be safer - 25 percent of IDP population in Gulu are estimated to be accessing their gardens. Although District authorities have not directed "decongestion" per se, there are numerous reports of people responding to new deployments by UPDF and creating settlements close to these. New smaller camps have been set up (from large camps) throughout the sub-county, especially around larger camps like Pabbo." (OCHA December 2001)

"Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts, Northern Uganda: Relative calm in these three districts enhanced conditions for favorable crop cultivation and production during 2001, although land acreage cleared and harvested remain below normal levels compared with early 1980s' levels (before populations were displaced). Nonetheless, the improved food production realized has enhanced households' access to food, along with the ongoing food aid distribution by the World Food Programme (WFP), whose Protracted Relief and Recovery Program is well supplied and runs until March 2002. The agency is working on extending it from April 2002 through March 2005, providing food through general distribution for people who cannot leave the protected settlements, school feeding for primary schools, food for work, and assistance to vocational training. Food will continue to be provided as supplemental and therapeutic feeding in health centers for malnourished children as well as to orphans and formerly abducted children who have been returning from captivity in Sudan since pacts were reached in 2001. The combination of relatively improved household food stocks, limited remittances, and food assistance augur well for food security in the three districts over the next four months." (FEWS NET 26 February 2002)

"Given the great hardships involved in getting access to their original land, those who can afford it have tried at times to rent a plot of land from camp residents whose fields are within reasonable distance. We were told in some camps that the usual yearly rent for an acre of land is between 30,000 and 40,000 shillings. Landlords can evict their tenants at any time and, understandably, this is one of the main sources of local conflict among camp residents." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, p.12)

South-western region

"It has been raining steadily throughout April and with increased access to gardens, a modest harvest is expected. Unfortunately, the road conditions are also deteriorating in Bundibugyo and Fort Portal and this has hindered food distribution operations and accessibility to a number of camps. WFP will however have distributed Cermeal and beans on half ration per IDP beneficiary to 57 (all) IDP camps in Bundibugyo by end of April.

[...]

An assessment of six IDP camps in Kabarole District, early April, revealed that most camps were located in cultivated areas of Kisomoro, Buhesi and Mugusu sub-county and there were no obvious signs of malnutrition. There was however, a need for medical supplies. Additionally, with improvement of security in some areas, provision of seeds wood improve their food security.

Three of the IDP camps receive WFP food relief, but an SFI program would target the children and be a better form of assistance to the displaced in this area. More assessments are planned." (OCHA April 2001)

"On a more positive note, the south-western region has benefited from sufficient rains and a good harvest is expected; although on occasions the rain has fallen so heavily it has even destroyed crops and buildings/IDP shelters. IDPs continue to have access to gardens near the camps for minimal cultivation and the harvest will supplement WFP relief food (WFP continues to provide food aid, at half ration, to IDPs in camps). A lack of seeds has also posed a problem and will be sorely needed for the next planting season. IDP returnees frequently ask humanitarian agencies for support in the form of seeds and tools rather than relief food. Fortunately, the security situation has continued to improve over recent months, enabling IDPs, in particular, to carry out farming activities in relative security which bodes well for the future." (OCHA 31 September 2001, p.28)

Food security situation in Karamoja characterised as a chronic problem (2001)

- Each Katakwi household attacked several times resulting in loss of livestock and household assets
- 50% of Katakwi households have lost access to their lands and 90% owners have completely lost their cattle

"Northeastern Region: The overall food security situation in Karamoja can be characterised as a chronic problem due to drought and civil insecurity, affecting both access to and availability of food. Other contributing factors to food insecurity include: (1) periodic drought and erratic rainfall which affects both crop and livestock in the Northeastern arid pastoral and middle transitional; (2) international migration during period of stress in neighbouring Kenya; (3) Gun culture and cattle raiding which results in depletion of assets and affects inter-regional trade; (4) pest, disease and shortage of agricultural inputs and services and (5) environmental degradation.

Coping mechanism of food insecure households include provision of labour, collecting firewood, gathering wild fruits and vegetables, collecting white ants, collecting and selling stones, hunting for wild animals, borrowing using kinship ties, migration in search of food and selling livestock. "(UN November 2001, pp. 43-44)

"Rampant warrior raids have displaced 1/3 of Katakwi population and have completely devastated their household economy. Each household has been attacked at least 5 times in the last 5 year. Losses of human lives, livestock and household assets have been the common consequences of these raids. In all, warriors have killed 5.4% of the IDPs, injured 6.2% and have abducted 3.6% during their chronic and/or intermittent raids. 75% of the households have lost an average of 10 cattle, 9 goats/sheep and 15 poultry birds to warriors. Losses of agricultural implements, kitchen utensils, stored food items, clothes, bedding and

mattresses have been common among the IDPs. 83% households have lost their cassava in the last season as warriors uprooted them.

Household food security

Food security was severely tied to traditional agriculture and animal husbandry before displacement. Due to raids and prevailing insecurity, 50% households have lost access to their lands and 90% owners have completely lost their cattle. The area offers restricted coping to include wage labor on local farms (mainly weeding) and small businesses, dominated mainly by brewing (p14-17). In total household food security of most IDPs is highly compromised in quality, quantity and diversity." (Oxfam 28 November 2001)

Dramatic diminishing of cattle herds due to cattle raids and increased demand for meat by army (1985-1997)

- Gulu and Kitgum cattle herds reduced from about 285,000 to an estimated 5,000 head between 1985 and 1997 because of cattle raids
- Almost all the area's livestock was removed as Karamajong cattle raiders continued to harass livestock owners on Kitgum's far eastern border, with a peak of intensity in 1987

"Cattle has long been the main repository of Acholi wealth. By 1985, their nearly 300,000 cattle (and even more numerous goats, sheep and other livestock), represented not only their savings, but also their contingency reserve for sickness, drought, retirement, education and marriage dowry. In 1986 and much of 1987, farmers provided livestock to the UPDA, sometimes against promissory notes payable after the victory they expected. The UPDA used most of this livestock for food, but some might have been traded in Sudan for arms and ammunition, which were in short supply.

The NRA confiscated cattle as needed to support its operations. Fearing such confiscations, some Acholi preemptively liquidated parts of their herds. Local veterinary experts report that a small part of the herd was also lost to diseases like rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia which they believe originated in southern Sudan. Karamajong cattle raiders continued, as they had throughout history, to harass livestock owners on Kitgum's far eastern border.

However, beginning in about August 1987, during the Alice Lakwena period, an event unique in Acholi history occurred: an overwhelming number of Karamajong cattle raiders swept through Kitgum and eastern Gulu and removed almost all the area's livestock. Those who resisted the rustlers were brutally attacked. In areas where both Karamajong and NRA soldiers were present, some farmers reported that the latter colluded in these activities, but in general Karamajong raiders were observed to be operating on their own. In western Gulu, it appears that at about the same time, a similar large-scale removal of livestock was conducted by NRA forces.

Data provided by veterinary officers indicated that the cattle population of Gulu and Kitgum in 1985 was about 285,000. The cattle raids removed almost the entire herd. In 1997 - ten years after the raids - the combined herd for both districts is estimated at 5,000 head, less than 2% the earlier number. Goats and other livestock have been similarly affected. The replacement cost of the plundered cattle herd alone is estimated at close to US\$25 million.

To put this loss in perspective, the Gulu branch of the Cooperative Bank - which serves principally a rural clientele and is one of only two banks in Gulu - observed that in times of insecurity, savings deposits tend to increase. Yet, on average for the years 1991 through 1996, it estimated its total deposits at about US\$1.5 million.

In an instant, the Acholi farmers were deprived of the milk their cows provided; the additional acreage and higher yields which their oxen permitted them; their fallback for marriage dowries and education; and the

savings which carried them through drought, hard time, sickness and old age. The self-respect which attached to cattle ownership and the cultural functions upon which exchange of cattle had relied were disrupted. It was one of the greatest economic and moral blows of the war. It also deprived the insurgents of livestock upon which they relied for food and which they might have used to trade for the arms and ammunition upon which their viability increasingly depended.

The attitudes which had motivated the Acholi to launch or continue the armed anti-NRA struggle - pride, military humiliation, sense of betrayal and alien rule, loss of government power and its economic impact - were compounded by the loss of their livestock and the apparent loss of control over their environment, as well as the defeat of the Lakwena forces at the end of 1987. Six months later, the UPDA signed its peace agreement with the NRA. But perhaps in part because of bitterness over the cattle raids, not all the rebel forces abandoned the armed struggle.

The disappearance of the police Tracking Force which in the past had restricted Karamojong raiders to sporadic incidents along the eastern Kitgum border contributed to the lawless environment in which these raids occurred. The Acholi people, except its active insurgents, were disarmed. That there was no reported confrontation in Acholi between the cattle raiders and the police, military or other Government authorities led the local population to believe that they were tolerating the plundering, which later occurred in the same magnitude in other districts. The attitude of most Acholis ranges from deep suspicion to absolute conviction that lawlessness of this magnitude could not have occurred if it had not been instigated - or at least approved - at the highest level of government.

Authoritative government sources acknowledge some of the NRA raids in western Gulu, which they attribute to corrupt elements in the military at that time. Efforts at restitution by the government have been made for a fraction of these thefts. Government sources also concede that the Karamojong raids were carried out with little armed Government opposition. They argue, however, that in 1987 the NRA's armed forces were relatively small and not yet consolidated. Nonetheless, in Acholi they were forced to confront both the UPDA and Lakwena forces at the same time. This allowed the NRA few resources to spare to combat the cattle raiders and hesitant to risk opening another major armed front against Karamoja.

The enduring political fact, nonetheless, is the widespread belief in Acholi that the Government instigated or at least approved the raids, a source of irreconcilable and continuing bitterness against the present administration."(Gersony, 1997, Section 1, "The cattle factor")

Public Participation

Only limited participation by women in camp management (2001)

- "Fair" female representation on the camp committees not reflected by participation in the day-today decision making forums
- Women only holding junior positions in the administrative hierarchy of camps

"At the local level, it was discovered that female participation is very limited in camp management and that the situation was not different before displacement. While all the three camps covered by the study had a fair female representation on the camp committees, it was evident that this was only by record in the books, and not by actual participation in the day-today decision making forums.

Where women were active, they still occupied junior positions in the administrative hierarchy of the camp, thus did not participate in actual decision-making. While meetings with camp committees had been scheduled for days that rebels forbid people from going to their gardens (Tuesdays and Fridays), there was

still limited female participation in the meetings. In one camp, only one female leader attended a series of meetings [...], while in another; two educated female leaders attended all the meetings. In the later case, it was obvious that the two were very vocal and represented women views extremely well.

The study learnt that male dominance and high illiteracy rates among the female population were responsible for blocking women from effectively participating in decision making forums." . (World Vision/Cranfield University December 2001 p. 37)

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

Community support systems

Displacement has led to changes in gender roles (2002)

"Meanwhile the changes in the household economy have also led to changes in economic and domestic roles. More than ¼ (54/190) of the women interviewed are now heads of household due death of husbands or separation, while many men reported to be now responsible for child care than before after losing or separating with their wives.

"It is us the men who are mostly affected because for example when your wife is taken, it is us men who will look after the children by feeding them and doing domestic work" (FGD, BUN; Men).

Women on other hand reported taking over men's roles, as many men have resorted to drinking thereby shunning work. Some men were reported to avoid going to the gardens under the pretext that rebels will abduct them. This has resulted in increased workload for the women." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, p.10)

Conflict affected areas in Northern Uganda experience problems of social and cultural breakdown (1999-2001)

- Conflict has destroyed or undermined community support systems that once assisted and protected affected children
- Problems include increased crime rate, consumption of alcohol and drug abuse, loss of respect and values, as well as breakdown of family structure
- Anecdotal evidence suggests an increasing trend in child abuse
- Camp regulations undermining traditional gatherings

"Whereas the Acholi are accustomed to living in widely dispersed settlements, the populations of the "protected" villages are tightly packed together, often with only an arm's length between houses.

Sanitation is inevitably poor, and exposure to communicable diseases high. Social conditions are a matter of universal concern: parents feel, in particular, that they are losing control over their children's behavior. Sexual promiscuity is perceived to be unacceptably high, with correspondingly high rates of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV. Girls and women turn to prostitution in the absence of other economic outlets, boys to brawling, to petty crime, to rape, and in some cases to armed banditry." (Weeks March 2002, p.3)

"The ongoing conflicts have also caused loss of life and major disruptions to the communities. Many children have witnessed violence and atrocities; lost family members to the war; been separated from their families, and undergone severe physical and mental hardships in fleeing the conflict. In addition, there have been massive abductions of children being trained as fighters or forced into slave labour. The conflict has destroyed or undermined the community support systems that once assisted and protected these affected children and reintegrated them in the community.

With the full consensus of the members of the Psycho-social Core Team composed of NGOs working with affected communities in northern Uganda, national technical experts, line ministries and UN Agencies, an in-depth Northern Uganda Psycho-Social Needs Assessment (NUPSNA) was carried out in 1998. The final report highlighted negative social trends of magnitudes previously unknown to the affected areas. These problems include social and cultural breakdown e.g. increased crime rate, consumption of alcohol and drug abuse, loss of respect and values, as well as breakdown of family structure e.g. separation, orphan hood and increased domestic violence." (UN November 1999, p.21)

"Anecdotal evidence points to an increasing trend in child abuse, especially sexual abuse. One problem is that there is little knowledge of legal protection and how to obtain justice. To respond to this need, Child Rights Advocates are being trained. These advocates have basic training on the legal aspects of child protection and child abuse. In cases of child abuse, the advocates can give advice as to how to pursue the case and to ensure that justice is obtained. So far, 30 Advocates have been trained in Nwoya County, Gulu district." (UN July 2000, p.8)

"Social Costs: Over 800,000 IDPs have been traumatized by terrorist attacks and have remained physically and mentally idle in camps for over five years. Nearly all traditional community and family mechanisms for ensuring cohesiveness and stability in society have broken down. Children have lost years of schooling, preventing them equal access to employment and future opportunities for participating in the national political system and economy." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Lessons learned")

"As one moves through any of the displaced camps, one of the most depressing sights is to see scores of unattended children everywhere, idle youth loitering about and men drinking alcohol. This is just the surface of a deeper problem that most people, especially elders, feel as something very painful: the collapse of the good cultural values that people used to feel proud of. A whole generation is growing up in a moral and cultural vacuum, and considering that children under the age of 15 account for more than 55% of the total population in the IDP camps in Acholi this is a very serious situation.

The main means of transmitting the Acholi traditional culture to the younger generations is the evening family gathering at the fireplace, referred to in the Acholi language as *Wang oo*. Army-enforced regulations in most camps state that everybody is expected to be indoors or at least next to their huts by 7:30 p.m. Those who break this rule are routinely beaten. The consequence is that since there is no more *wang oo*, children - adults often complain - are not taught good cultural values.

Cramming together people in a small space is seen in all camps as another main reason for the lack of respect that children show towards their parents, since both parents share the same hut with the children without any privacy and at times children make fun of their parents when they see them sleeping together at night.

As a result, very early pregnancies (at the age of thirteen or fourteen), children becoming thieves, and alcoholism among adolescents who have dropped out of school, are worrying features of life in the displaced camps. People resent very bitterly the fact that in recent years no pupil from a school in the camps got a first grade. Little wonder when one considers that in Acholibur there are only four classrooms for 1050 pupils (only 17% of their students pass exams to continue to secondary school after P7). Palabek Gem Displaced Schools had 20 teachers for the 1060 enrolled pupils, and only 13% were able to pass exams to continue to secondary school. Pajule Displaced Primary School has an average of 300 pupils in the P1 classes, and in Pabbo the average size of a P1 class is about 500 pupils. Given these circumstances for most young people going to Secondary School is just a dream beyond all possibility." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, p.13)

"Displaced persons were concerned with the degeneration of social values and order, as a result of displacement and staying in camps. Respondents noted that displacement has led to moral degeneration as reflected in behavior changes, neglect of responsibilities and disrespect.

[...]

Change in sexual behavior is among the areas that have significantly deteriorated. Many people confessed engaging in multiple and casual sexual relationships than before displacement. While the team did not collect any statistical data on this issue, female youth were reportedly most affected by the problem although adult and married people too are involved.

[...]

Alcoholism and drug abuses have been on the increase among IDPs staying in camps in particular those located in towns. The assessment observed several people chewing *mairungi/khati* in union camp located near Bundibugyo town. The youth were reported to be mainly engaged in drugs, while all categories (youth, men and women) locally brewed alcohol.

[...]

Respondents noted that the rate of domestic violence had increased with staying in camps. Wife battering and sexual harassment were reported as the most common forms of domestic violence. Women were particularly affected most by domestic violence. Idleness, poverty and increased alcohol use has aggravated the problem of domestic violence. Women reported being sexually harassed and or battered after their husbands were drunk." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, pp. 13-14)

PROPERTY ISSUES

General

People not given sufficient time to collect their belongings when forced to move to "protected villages" (1997)

- Claimed that property left behind was looted by both rebels and soldiers
- Foodstuff and crops left behind
- Claimed that the Army has planted landmines in villages soon after being deserted

"While it is true that some people moved voluntarily closer to Army units before August 1996 seeking protection, most people were indeed forced to move by Army personnel, who often used rather drastic methods. In every camp we visited in Gulu, people told us invariably that they were forced. In some cases people remember that soldiers gave them a seven-day deadline (Opit) or only three days (Awac), threatening to treat those who resisted as rebels. In most cases, however, it would appear that soldiers just stormed villages - often at dawn - without any previous warning. They told people to move immediately without giving them much time to collect their belonging. People were often beaten to force them out of their compounds.

Much of the property left behind was looted by both rebels and soldiers. A number of people who ventured to go back to their former homes soon after found them burnt down.

[...]

In Pabbo, Opit, Anaka, Cwero and Unyama we met a good number of people who had direct experience of having had their villages shelled. We were told that big guns of the BM21 6 barrel type were used to fire at villages where people refused to move. The Army has consistently refuted these allegations and stated that it only fired at or shelled rural areas where it suspected that the LRA was present. Aerial bombardments were used - we were told - in places like Kaloguro village, in Pabbo, Awach, KocGoma, Amuru and Anaka. This first wave of forced displacement occurred at a time of the year which normally marks the beginning of the harvesting season. Given the fact that in most cases people were not given time to collect any foodstuff, their crops remained in the fields or in the granaries. In Pabbo and Opit people told us that there were cases of Army helicopters being used to collect foodstuff from abandoned villages.

[...]

According to the camp-dwellers we interviewed, the UPDF planted landmines all around the mountainous villages soon after they were evicted: at the riverside, in doorways to huts, by granaries, and any other place they thought the rebels would go. As a result, a number of people were injured or killed when they went back to collect their belongings. This information is consistent with records from the office of the Catholic Justice and Peace Committee in Kitgum, who in April that year met a number of people who had been hit by landmines near Potika and had been sent to Kitgum Hospital. Moreover, during our visits to Agoro and Potika we met people with missing limbs who told us how they were hit by landmines. We also heard sad personal experiences from women who told us how their children were killed by landmines when they tried to reach their villages looking for food. People in Potika and Agoro told us that they would like to go back home, but the Army does not allow them." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, pp. 5, 8)

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General

Positive signals of improved opportunities for return in most areas during first half of 2002

- Government expect weakened LRA would facilitate return in the north
- Original IDP camps in Bundibugyo being decongested allowing IDPs to cultivate new gardens
- Indicated at the end of November 2001 that the President had directed that IDPs in Bundibugyo could resettle back to their traditional homes
- Reported in March 2002 that the security situation in Bundibugyo, Kabarole, Kasese, Kyenjojo and Kamwenge continued to improve

"The security in the southwestern region and more so in Bundibugyo has been rather calm over the past few months. Bundibugyo has one reported incident on 25th August, where suspected ADF rebels attacked Kikyo IDP camp.

The sense of more security has more and more people moving out of camps in certain areas and back nearer to their homes in Bundibugyo, mainly to be able to access their gardens. Majority are still coming back to the IDP camps at night, but some small groups have been settling in smaller camps closer to their homes and gardens. Some have moved where there are no UPDF detachments and the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) says it is a challenge that people are moving before security has been provided.

UPDF and District Status: It has to be noted that there has been no formal guarantee of security from the District or UPDF that declares "safe for IDPs to go home". However, they are not discouraging this voluntary movement to open up new camps, where sanctioned by UPDF because they may lose all hope of returning home and become dependent on aid. There was a particular case where IDPs returned to a parish higher on the lowland plateau of the Rwenzoris, but the UPDF went and ordered them lower down again. Likewise, the district cannot encourage IDPs to return because they cannot guarantee security. Currently, the RDC is providing security to "new" camps like Mirambi (with an unverified 2200 people already settled), where people have moved without informing district authorities" (OCHA August 2001)

"Improvements in security in the north and increasing isolation of the LRA in recent months had facilitated the spontaneous return of several thousand IDPs to their home areas, humanitarian sources told IRIN on Thursday, 10 January 2002.

'It is happening in a fairly ad hoc manner. It is pretty slow but it is going in the right direction,' they said.

The population of one of the largest camps at Pabbo, Gulu District, had fallen by around 5,000 and was now estimated at 41,000 people, sources added.

[...]

Humanitarian sources confirmed that there were good prospects for large-scale IDP returns in the west.

'The war in the west is pretty much won,' sources told IRIN. 'The number of ADF [fighters] is very, very small. Almost everyone that wants to go home should be able to do so.'

[...]

Although the Ugandan government has no clear policy on tackling internal displacement, Museveni said in his end of year address that the security status of the northern and western Uganda would improve enough to allow the IDP camps to be dismantled.

"I would like to assure those Ugandans that are still in those camps that they will be able to go back to their homes this year," he said on Radio Uganda on 31 December." (IRIN 11 January 2002)

"As Kony's position is weakened and the UPDF estimates LRA numbers in Uganda at only 100 with a further 300 in southern Sudan, Museveni appears confident that there will be a direct, and positive, impact on the situation for IDPs in the north and he has expressed a hope that IDPs will be able to return to their homes by early April. While there continue to be a small number of attacks and ambushes on roads, these are often attributable to banditry and incidences of abduction have decreased. In response, IDPs have begun to venture out of the camps to work in their gardens and travel to their villages, a trend that had already been noticed in Kitgum over the last six months, and is now apparent in Gulu where 25% of the IDP population are estimated to be accessing their gardens. While this is encouraging, IDPs continue to be cautious, leaving children in the camps for example, and it is likely to take a sustained period of peace before camps can be dismantled prior to return, or suitable settlements created and existing ones improved to house those IDPs who do not wish to return to their villages of origin and prefer to benefit from trading centres and infrastructure developed during the period of insecurity.

[...]

All IDPs expressed in the most emphatic terms their desire to see the villages dismantled and for conditions to change to allow a quick return to their place of permanent residence. Some just needed Government or UPDF to declare they wouldn't oppose a return to their villages, others needed a guarantee of security from Government, and a package to help them resettle back to their homes, while yet others felt that no return would be conceivable as long as Joseph Kony and the LRA remained in Southern Sudan, even if their level of activity were to continue to be substantially reduced.

[...]

The Rwenzori region, comprising Kasese, Kabarole, Bundibugyo, Kyenjojo and Kamwenge (the two later being formally part of Kabarole) has also seen an improvement in security and there appears to be a growing desire on the part of IDPs to return to their homes. The western area of Uganda has been subjected to attack and destruction by the ADF over the last five years, leading to the displacement of over 100,000 and, as insecurity barred their access to land or livelihood, their subsistence upon humanitarian assistance. UPDF action against the rebels, combined with increased promotion of amnesty (an Amnesty Office was opened in Kasese in August 2001), and work with the organisation Give Me A Chance to demobilise and reintegrate captured or surrendered rebels, finally appears to be bringing some result. IDPs in Bundibugyo have started to cultivate new gardens, four settlements have been established closer to these, decongesting original IDP camps, and three further locations for possible new villages have also been identified, pending further improvements in security. At the end of November, it was indicated that the President had directed that IDPs could resettle back to their traditional homes as the security situation in the area has 'normalised' and district authorities have been urged to encourage this movement before the next planting season." (OCHA 28 February 2002, pp.31-33)

"There is a pervasive sense of despondency, bitterness, and alienation that is palpable in every interaction with protected-village communities. *Every group and individual with whom the consultant spoke expressed in the most emphatic terms their desire to see the protected villages dismantled and for conditions to change to allow a quick return to their place of permanent residence.*

When asked what would be required for this to happen, however, groups differed considerably in their responses. For some, it would be enough for the GOU and/or the UPDF to declare that they would not oppose such a return. For others, such a return would need to be preceded by a "guarantee of security" from attack on the part of the authorities. Others still would require such guarantees and would also require a "package" of material assistance to make the transition. Meanwhile, some groups (though by no means all) felt that no return would be conceivable as long as Joseph Kony and the LRA remained in Southern

Sudan, even if their level of activity were to continue to be substantially reduced." (Weeks March 2002, p.22)

"Although outright victory is unlikely, expectations that the LRA will have less territory in which to manoeuvre, coupled with hopes that the Government's amnesty for former rebels will coax increasing numbers of fighters away, has created anticipation that the long-term security situation will eventually improve.

[...]

According to unverified reports from civilian authorities in the north there has already been an observable return home from some camps by those residents who came from parishes where security incidents have not occurred in over the last 12 months." (OCHA/IDP Unit 3 April 2002, p.2)

"The security situation in Bundibugyo, Kabarole, Kasese, Kyenjojo and Kamwenge continues to improve and the general trend indicates that the Rwenzori region is peaceful. Voluntary return of IDPs continues to increase. However, despite this positive trend, there are still insecurity incidents along the border with the DRC. The incidents are minor and do not pose a threat to the District's overall improved security situation. The few incidents of cholera outbreak over the last months, are under control and the curative and preventive measures in fighting the epidemic have yielded tangible results.

Efforts are underway between the Districts of Bundibugyo, Kasese and Kabarole to organize the transportation of IDPs back to their respective homesteads. This commendable effort is done on the initiative from the Districts themselves. District officials in Bundibugyo are actively encouraging IDPs to return home and so far the process is going on gradually. It is very satisfying to see more concrete examples of IDPs returning home and organizations concentrating their efforts in the areas of return, rather than cementing efforts in the camps." (OCHA March 2002)

Several challenges must be addressed to facilitate return in the North (February 2002)

- Public services poor in areas of return
- Some forced to sell their land when displaced
- All secondary school facilities are located in the larger trading centers
- Analyst warns that single-stage return process in the north would likely fail (2002)

"Although most of the 508,400 presently residing in protected villages have *expressed a desire* to return, it is estimated that only 365,150 or 72 percent will actually opt to return under any security conditions and that only 200,000 or 40 percent will return in the first year. Assuming decongestion of protected villages and return/resettlement is not forced upon them, it is estimated approximately 143,250 or 28 percent will remain in/around the protected villages or in main trading centres indefinitely for the following reasons:

Many IDPs frequented the centres in the pre-crisis period because of the education, health, religious, entertainment and market facilities/services that they provided. They have grown accustomed to these facilities, which have led to irrevocable social change and made life at the village/parish level less attractive.

Children and the elderly are particularly dependent upon education and health care services that are unavailable at parish/village level. All secondary school facilities are located in the larger trading centres. Many have resided in trading centres for six years and have adopted new skills or occupations that are more lucrative than agriculture.

Many had previously been involved in non-agricultural sectors and formed a transient population that had resided but not been registered in the trading centres and municipalities.

Some were forced to sell their land and no longer have a home to which they can return.

Women heads of households lost access to land upon becoming widowed or separated

While over 365,000 are likely to eventually return, the majority will remain in the protected villages a while longer until several confidence-building measures are taken and conditions in their places of origin are conducive to their return on a full time basis. Such determining factors or pre-requisites include the following:- reduced threat of rebel attacks at the Parish/village level; a declaration by Government on the rights and entitlements of IDPs (or a national policy on IDPs); on the areas to which they will be allowed to return, and the circumstances under which they can return; extension of basic services and physical/social infrastructure to Sub-county and Parish levels. Other Practical Concerns/Constraints will include resolving land disputes and identification/distribution of additional land; Provision of shelter and timing return to coincide with availability of elephant grass (specifically for northern Uganda); Food/Subsistence - (distribution at Parish level is likely to be particularly problematic); essential/Non-Food Items, including utensils, blankets, hoes, pangas, pick-axes; water and sanitation issue, employment/income generating activities, etc.

All stakeholders need to be engaged in the preparation of a phased policy implementation plan, identifying needs and existing resources, including those which could be made available through re-orientation of the existing Country Programmes of each agency. Resources potentially available under the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal and through other programmes should be considered, along with possible delays in the funding and implementation of these programmes." (OCHA February 2002)

"Though all of the interviewees with whom the consultant spoke expressed a passionate desire to return home as soon as feasible, many recognized that the circumstances now were not right, and that as long as insecurity continued to prevail they would choose to remain in the camps until (for example) "guarantees of security" could be given by the authorities. Many of these would doubtless choose to remain in the villages even if a blanket green light for a return home were given.

But many others feel passionately that the time to return is now.

[...]

It will be important to see outward movement as a gradual and, at least initially, tentative process. Individual family members may at first move out of their villages for brief periods and then return, then larger family units may do so, while more cautious individuals will remain behind and observe the process. Others still will have grown accustomed to their surroundings and to living in a larger community and will choose to remain where they are permanently. Thus, for reasons both of principle (i.e., that one's place of residence must, as affirmed in the Guiding Principles, always be freely chosen) and of efficacy (people forced to make a definitive choice before they feel ready to do so will likely opt for caution), any process that presents outward movement as a single-stage, single-choice large-scale "event" (as seems to be the case for the concept of "decongestion" as it has been discussed) is likely to fail. The fundamental wrong of the present system is that it has deprived individuals of choice and initiative in the ordering of their own lives. No solution that perpetuates this defect can be an effective remedy." (Weeks March 2002, p. 27)


Survey found that education and orphans support were in general considered the highest resettlement priority by IDPs in the north (December 2001)

"In this section, the study presents findings about both FHH and MHH perceived resettlement priorities.

[...]

Under free listing, a standard question was posed to the people, "If government were planning resettlement programmes, what programmes would do you think would help/ benefit your household most?"

[...]



The results of **Figure 4.8** (above) indicate that ‘education and orphans support’ were ranked as the people’s highest resettlement priority, while ‘latrine slabs’ is the least on their list of twelve most important resettlement priorities. However, when results are disaggregated, some differences emerge.

[...]

The results [...] indicate that MHH ranked ‘food relief’ as their highest resettlement priority, and ‘latrine slabs’ their least on the list of twelve most important priorities. Thus while MHH and FHH were agreed on their ‘least’ priority (latrine slabs), they had a slight difference over their highest priority.

[...] FHH ranked ‘education and orphans support as their highest resettlement priority, with ‘latrine slabs’ as the least on the list of twelve.

[...]

Data [...] indicate that MHH below 30 years ranked ‘education and orphans support’ as their highest resettlement priority, and ‘security’ as least on the list of the twelve most important resettlement priorities.

In the same figure, MHH above 30 years ranked ‘food’ as their highest resettlement priority, with ‘tents’ and ‘latrine slabs’ tying as the least. It is evident, therefore, that differences emerge when results are disaggregated by age (<30 yrs and >30 yrs>).

[...]

The results of **Figure 4.11** (above) indicate that FHH below 30 years ranked ‘education and orphans support’ as their highest resettlement priority, and ‘latrine slabs’ being the least on the list of twelve.

In the same figure, FHH above 30 years ranked ‘building support’ as their highest resettlement priority; with ‘latrine slabs’ being the least among the twelve. These findings are as expected: older women would be engrossed in problems of construction, whilst the younger are pre-occupied with securing a future for their children (education).

[...]

Summary[...], the people’s highest resettlement priority is ‘education and orphans support’ with the lowest on the priority list being ‘latrine slabs’. It also emerges that priorities differ with age and gender." (World Vision/Cranfield University December 2001, pp. 41-45)

Female-headed households disadvantaged during resettlement (2002)

- Survey found that Female-headed households (FHH) were extremely disadvantaged and vulnerable compared to male-headed households (MHH)
- FHHs will have limited capacity to grow and access enough food upon resettlement
- FHH have limited sources of income and thus limited access to required farm inputs
- The number of MHHs that acquired new life sustaining skill during displacement found to be almost double that of FHH
- Only 7 percent of FHHs endowed with house construction skills

"Meanwhile the changes in the household economy have also led to changes in economic and domestic roles. More than ¼ (54/190) of the women interviewed are now heads of household due death of husbands or separation, while many men reported to be now responsible for child care than before after losing or separating with their wives." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, p.10)

"The purpose behind this inquiry was to understand the required support priorities of both displaced male and female-headed households [MHH/FHH in the Gulu district] which would in turn enhance strategic and effective targeting of donor, government and aid agency resettlement programmes.

[...]

Key findings include a deprivation trap [...], in which most female-headed households are entrapped making them extremely disadvantaged and vulnerable compared to male-headed households.

[...]

The project also discovered that resettlement priorities differ according to the age and gender of the household head. It was further discovered that though there may not appear to be a big divide between female and male-headed household resettlement priorities, the two groups emerge as two worlds apart when viewed from the vantage point of how their assessed capacities and vulnerabilities will impact on the identified resettlement priorities.

[...]

the FHH phenomenon has been exacerbated by the now 15 year-old civil conflict. An article by Onyango-Obbo (1996) observed that, "*in Acholiland, there is virtually no generation of elders. Most people are widows or orphans. In some families, the grandmother was a young widow, the mother a widow, and the grandchildren too are widows or orphans.*" The same article reports that by 1991, women were heading about 60% of the homes, while a survey report by ICRC (2001) indicated that on average, widows head about 20.4% of the households in Acholiland.

[Food Production]

When it comes to crop production, a typical Acholi household practices gender division of labour. Opening virgin land and digging is traditionally a male occupation, while planting and weeding is a female occupation.

[...]

For those that mentioned inability to grow enough food upon resettlement, a number of reasons were given to explain their responses and included the following. "*The land is fertile, but being a woman with young children, it will be very difficult at the beginning...I don't have enough working tools, and there will be no man around to help me. We will try, but I don't even know where to begin,*" said Lucia, a 43 year-old widow and mother of eight.

[...]

A comparison of findings between FHH and MHH reveals that upon resettlement, FHH will have limited capacity to grow and keep enough food. This is explained by a number of factors. Firstly, FHH have weak labour compared to MHH and will comparatively not be able to open up enough land. This is coupled by the fact that digging is traditionally a male activity thus women don't have enough digging skills. Thirdly, compared to MHH, FHH have limited sources of income, thus limited access to required farm inputs, e.g. farm tools, animal traction technologies, and improved seeds.

Again, compared to MHH, FHH do not have the skills to make granaries nor the funds to have one made for them. They will therefore experience more post-harvest losses than MHH, and may continue to be lured into selling their produce during the immediate harvest period. There is therefore ample evidence for this study to conclude that compared to MHH, FHH will be more vulnerable to food insecurity during the reconstruction period." (World Vision/Cranfield University December 2001, pp. 1, 6, 24, 52)

[Means of production]

"All respondents confirmed having had some form of life supporting skill before displacement. For the FHH, new and old life supporting skills include embroidery, brewing, pottery, modern agronomic practices, knitting, baking and cookery, livestock keeping, fish farming, bee keeping, TBA skills, tailoring, handcrafts and witchcraft. For the MHH new and old life supporting skills include modern agronomic practices, bicycle repair, tailoring, building huts and thatching skills, pitsawing, carpentry, brick making, brick laying, and making and weaving local crafts.

All interviewed MHH confirmed ability to continue using all their new and old skills, but mentioned problems associated with lack of investment capital. On the other hand, only 75% of the FHH confirmed ability to continue using all their life supporting skills amidst grinding constraints.

[...]

In their long lists of constraints, both FHH and MHH emphasised lack of capital as one of the leading constraints that continues limiting their production potential. "*I learnt carpentry and tailoring while undergoing rehabilitation with agency X, and am still taking tailoring classes for returned abducted children in the camp...If I had a sewing machine, I would be able to make dresses for sale,*" says Vincent, a 17 year ex-child soldier (formerly abducted). Vincent was abducted for two years, is still single but heads a household of eight, including his very weak mother.

[...]

Traditionally, the Acholi would keep livestock, especially cattle, as their main form of wealth. The study discovered that the number of IDP MHH keeping some form of livestock is more than double that of FHH, and the number of MHH that acquired new life sustaining skill during displacement is also almost double that of FHH. It would therefore follow that in times of severe stress; more MHH would have some form of fall back, which their FHH counterparts would not have.

Arguably, most of the MHH skills especially building, carpentry, opening up new land etc, will be more marketable during the reconstruction period, while for the FHH, their non-agricultural skills will have lost much of the market to the scattering effect caused by resettlement. It would therefore appear that during resettlement, more FHH will be more economically disadvantaged than MHH.." (World Vision/Cranfield University December 2001, pp.27, 28, 54)

[Housing]

"House construction is a male domain activity, and as a result, only 7% FHH acknowledged to be endowed with house construction skills, and can construct their own huts without seeking for male participation. Male participation is usually paid for in cash or in-kind, and the study discovered that some women have had to trade unwanted sex in exchange for the required male construction skills.

[...]

The study also found out that while in displacement, a number of FHH had acquired some of the required hut construction skills in order to reduce expenditure on house construction. Some of the skills include brick making, and the meticulous work of constructing the roof frame from the ground [...], instead of doing it from the housetop as usually done by men. Once the bricks are ready and the roof frame is in place, they then hire men to erect the wall and thatch the roof using the finished roofing frame." (World Vision/Cranfield University December 2001, pp. 30)

Several factors may discourage return in the Rwenzori region even if security improves (2002)

- Survey shows that 90 percent of IDPs in the Rwenzori region have a desire to return to their villages (2002)
- By the beginning of 2002 the majority of the IDPs went back to their homes during day to carry out cultivation, but stayed in camps during the evening
- Majority expect that problems like inadequate food supply, congestion and better access to income sources can improve after return
- IDPs mentally preparing for return to their homes following Government statement that all IDPs should be resettled by March 2002
- Sustainable security a condition for return
- Some IDPs may not wish to return home after losing their economic bases in the original villages or improving their livelihoods and social life while in camps

"Security is a key concern for people to resettle in their communities, this was reported by 52% of the respondents. When some IDPs were asked why they have not yet returned to their homes, the general feeling is that security has improved in the region, there is still uncertainty about the sustainability of relative security that they are enjoying. Most respondents (82%) want government to make a statement guarantying that their villages are secure before they can go back.

Many people may not wish to return home after losing their economic bases in the original villages. During the war many cocoa and coffee plantations were destroyed. While majority of the household (94%) had land before displacement, some people have sold it out during the period of displacement. Several internally displaced people lost their houses and household property during the insurgency.

Meanwhile, data obtained from focus group discussions and key informant interviews indicates that some people may be reluctant to go back to their original villages, due to better life experienced while in camps or changes that have occurred in their social life. The youth were particularly singled out as a category that may be reluctant to return to villages.

Other challenges for resettlement include:

Breakdown of social infrastructure in the original communities where IDPs came from

Lack of accurate data on the magnitude of displacement in the region

Local leaders who are allegedly using the insurgency for their own selfish political gains

Inadequate districts' capacities to handle the resettlement process

High expectations by IDPs from government and other agencies before returning home

[...]

"Internally displaced persons look forward to leaving camps and go back to their villages.

During household interviews 90% of the respondents noted the desire to return home but only constrained by issues such as security in their original villages (52%), lack of shelter (25% - lack roofing materials such as grass or iron sheets) or waiting for others to return to their original villages (6%). Only 7% would opt to stay in camps and the remaining 3% undecided. [...].

The internally displaced people talked to believe that their current problems such as inadequate food supply, congestion and better access to income sources can be solved if they return to their villages. Some IDPs look forward for the possible economic opportunities during resettlement such as brick making, labor during construction of houses, crop production and trade in agricultural commodities when most people are able to return home. The general feeling by respondents was that restoration of social and cultural values would only be possible by leaving the camps.

[...]

Meanwhile most IDPs are willing to cooperate amongst themselves, with government and other agencies to participate in the resettlement process such as opening up of roads and re-digging water sources.

[...]

The existing perceived and real security is paramount if people are to return to communities. Apparently, most people acknowledge that security has improved in all the three districts although Kasese and Kabarole are relatively better than Bundibugyo.

People use the last time they heard of rebel attacks, gun shots 'rebels' sighted in the area as the main indicators of security.

[...]

Existing efforts towards resettlement

Internally displaced people, central government and districts have begun some activities that are directed towards resettlement. Majority of the displaced people in the three districts go back to their homes during day to carry out cultivation and later return to camps in the evening. In Kasese and Kabarole, many camps are getting smaller as most people are beginning to return to their homes voluntarily. For example, in Kyamukube camp, the camp size has reduced from 956 households to 496 (reduced by 63%), and in Mitandi camp, 53% of the households have returned

During focus group discussions many of those still in camps in the Kasese and Kabarole districts, noted that they were still constructing their houses to allow them to return home. In some household, the parents have gone back home leaving only children in camps as a process of returning. Some key informants discussed with in Bundibugyo reported to be preparing to return home, but waiting to end the Christmas season, which in the past is known to be an insecure season when rebels increase their activities.

People from Bundibugyo who had camped in Kasese and Kabarole, Mubende, Masindi or other districts are already joining camps in Bundibugyo that are closer to their homes as a process of returning home.

[...]

The statement from central government on its intention to have all IDPs resettled by March 2002, as well as the visit of the second deputy prime minister in the region was a good signal, many people seem to be mentally preparing for return to their homes. However even before this statement, district authorities in the region had begun some efforts toward resettlement. In Bundibugyo for example, the RDC encouraged IDPs to go to camps that are closer to their homes so that they can access their gardens. Other IDPs have applied to the security authorities for setting up decongestion camps. In Kasese there is a draft document towards displaced persons although the focus was more on providing services to people who are still in camps. Security Personnel in the districts indicated their desire to see people going back to their original communities. All these are indicators of the political will for solving the problems of displaced persons, which is important if resettlement is to be done."(Oxfam 8 February 2002, pp. vi-vii, 15-16)

Displacement and ongoing conflict have eroded resources needed for successful return (2001)

- Estimated that as many as 25% of the displaced will prefer not to return even if security situation improves
- Opportunities for reconstruction and rehabilitation of northeastern Uganda hampered by cattle rustling effects, food shortages, pests and diseases

"It needs to be emphasised however that many of the displaced may not opt to return home under any conditions. Considerable social change has occurred since their displacement and a generation of children have been born and raised in trading centres/protected villages." It is estimated that as many as 25% of the displaced will remain in these centres once they are decongested allowing for improved basic services and overall living conditions. Those resettling to parishes near the trading centres will continue to benefit from

the services and facilities they provide. Thus, physical and social infrastructure at the level of trading centres/protected villages and at the parish level should both be considered, with priority given to the latter and to the road network that connects both types of population centres.

[...]

The districts affected by Karamojong attacks in northeastern Uganda include Lira, Soroti, Kaberamaido, Katakwi and Kumi. These districts have a combined estimated population of 1.7 million people. More than 85% of the population are peasants and depend on agriculture for their livelihood. At present, there are 88,000 IDPs living in 46 camps in the Katakwi district as a result of Karamojong attacks. During 2000, over 70,000 persons in Lira and over 5,000 in both Soroti and Kumi districts were internally displaced. Although they have all returned to their homes, they remain disadvantaged due to property losses to Karamojong cattle rustlers.

As a result of cattle rustling, livestock numbers have been reduced from 507,000 to 33,000. The lack of draught power, traditionally provided by oxen, has led to a marked reduction in the land area under crop production. In the Katakwi district, for example, only about 100,000 hectares of the 425,000 hectares of arable land are cultivated. According to the Farm System Analysis in the Magoro and Ngariam sub-counties of the Katakwi district, 70% of the farmers prepare land-using hoes and the average family prepares up to 1-2 acres per cropping season. This requires a lot of labour, limits the acreages for production and delays planting, leading to reduced crop yields and consequent food insecurity.

The reconstruction and rehabilitation of the region has been hampered by cattle rustling effects, food shortages, pests and diseases, inadequate knowledge and skills of good farming practices, limited access to and inadequate purchasing power for basic production inputs, poor market channels/infrastructure, lack of electricity and poor market prices.

Northern Region: Sixteen years of insecurity in this region have had a profound effect on the food security and agricultural production of the Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts. Most of the population has been unable to access their land for cultivation for the past few years. The resulting food insecurity has been further exacerbated by the destruction of large areas under cassava production (second crop of the country after banana) by the African Cassava Mosaic Disease (ACMD). Without significant and immediate support, the war-affected populations will remain food insecure. The population needs assistance in agricultural inputs and capacity development in order to regain their livelihoods. In cases when people are able to access land, the critical support mechanisms are often inadequate for them to achieve self-sufficiency.

Farmers face difficulties in obtaining sufficient, good quality and affordable agricultural inputs at appropriate times for planting. Given the meagre income and savings of IDPs and returnees, micro-credit is essential but scarce. When farmers or IDPs are able to produce a surplus crop, they are faced with the problem of few viable markets and low sales prices. Farmers tend to lose a significant portion of their crop to poor post-harvest handling and storage. They also lack the technology or financial capacity to add value to their products. The crisis-affected districts, particularly eastern Kitgum and Pader, will remain vulnerable to drought for the foreseeable future. It must be noted that the eastern parts of Kitgum and Pader districts are also prone to insecurity and population displacements, in addition to LRA threats, due to Karamojong cattle rustling. Both opportunities and capacities for income generating activities for food security are seriously limited in the whole region at present.

Over the last two decades, the region has lost almost its entire livestock (cattle and small ruminants). This has a negative impact on food security as the lack of animal traction reduces capacity for land preparation and in turn reduces food production, the lack of milk and animal products leads to a decline in nutritional levels for the population, the lack of animal manure reduces soil fertility; and theft of the cattle is a huge loss of capital and income."(UN November 2001, pp. 36, 38

IDPs have responded positively to opportunities for return in the past (1998)

- By the end of 1999, deteriorating security forced displaced persons that had only just recently ventured away from the IDP camps to reclaim their homes returned to the IDP camps in Gulu and Kitgum
- Majority of displaced by the Karamajong during first half of 2000 in Katakwi, Soroti, Lira and Eastern Kitgum returned home
- Reported in May 2001 that construction of security/access roads and the increased presence of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) were encouraging increasing numbers of IDPs to return home

"There are limited LRA attacks [by November 1999] although the threat of an extreme escalation remains since the LRA are undefeated and have not signed a peace agreement. Nevertheless, the gradual return and reintegration of IDPs continue. Formerly abducted children continue to slowly return through escape and capture." (UN November 1999, p.17)

Positive trend turned by the end of December 1999 as LRA crossed back into northern Uganda:

" Shattering nearly one year of quiet and calm in Gulu and Kitgum, the Lord's Resistance Army crossed back into northern Uganda just days before Christmas on 22 December and have been attacking military and civilian targets, IDP camps, and vehicles throughout Gulu and Kitgum for the past month, including Gulu and Kitgum towns.

[...]

Hundreds of thousands of displaced persons that had only just recently ventured away from the IDP camps to reclaim their homes, have now returned to the IDP camps in both Districts. Actual verification of numbers by relief agencies is impossible due to insecurity. Thousands of area residents are also spending each night in Gulu and Kitgum Towns in hospital grounds, bus parks, schools etc. The numbers fluctuate depending on the daily security situation. Water and sanitation in these locations is not adequate for the new arrivals.

In Gulu, reportedly most of the former IDP population is back in the camps and not moving outside of the camps much during the day. There is concern that many of the IDPs were not able to bring their harvest and other goods with them to the camp." (UNHCU 24 January 2000)

Continued rebel attacks in all areas continued to discourage return by mid-2001

"While rebel forces [by mid-2001] continue to attack civilian targets in Bundibugyo, Kasese and Kabarole districts in the west and in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts in the north, the frequency and severity of attacks have decreased. The majority of displaced still fear the rebels, preferring to remain in protected villages by night. The construction of security/access roads and the increased mobility and presence of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) is encouraging increasing numbers of IDPs to return home. During the past year, the number of displaced in need of assistance decreased by 151,062 or 20.5 percent. The number remaining in protected villages however, remains significant." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Present Situation")

"while some Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have returned on a semi-permanent basis, insecurity still prevails. The majority of IDPs will be discouraged from returning until the rebel threat has been fully eradicated." (OCHA 21 May 2001, "Scenarios")

"Meanwhile in Bundibugyo, IDPs who fled to Congo, Kasese and Kabarole are reportedly coming back and new female food committees started to register them. During April, over five new camps have been created to enable IDPs to get closer to their original homes and lands." (WFP 25 May 2001)

"The considerable reduction in the total number of IDPs for Uganda is due primarily to the return of the Karamajong to Karamoja, which has allowed the majority of displaced in Katakwi, Soroti, Lira and Eastern Kitgum to return home." (OCHA 30 April 2001, p.31)

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

Overview of the access situation by end-2001

- Reports of regular armed attacks on WFP and NGO vehicles in the North Eastern region
- Reduced rebel activity the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader by end-2001
- Rwenzori National Park (South-western Region) re-opened in July 2001

"North Eastern region

Banditry and inter-ethnic clashes are frequent as are armed attacks on vehicles, including those operated by WFP and NGOs. The UPDF have provided escorts but these are irregular. Local police are not visibly present and there is a general lack of law and order in the north-eastern districts of Nakapiripirit, Moroto and Kotido. The GoU's disarmament programme is on hold due to funding and other constraints and is unlikely to be effective due to the region's lucrative trade in small arms.

South-western region

ADF and NALU rebels are less active in the south-western region but have previously been responsible for fatal attacks against tourists and the local population. The Rwenzori National Park (South-western Region) was re-opened by Ugandan authorities in July 2001 and there has been relative calm following a resumption of ties with Sudan. However, trends over the past five years reveal a pattern: attacks, followed by deployment of defence forces, followed by over-confidence and withdrawal, followed by renewed attacks.

[Northern Region]

Although the humanitarian community is witnessing another period of reduced rebel activity and tension in the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader, there are no guarantees that this positive trend can be maintained in future. Having lost their previous source of arms and logistical support, it is very likely that the LRA will attempt to find other sources in their attempt to instil fear amongst the population and undermine the authority of the Government. Meanwhile, it is conceivable that GoU may be forced to maintain links with the SPLA, which could encourage renewed Sudanese support for the LRA." (UN November 2001, pp. 50-51)

Reports of worsened access situation in Gulu/Kitgum during first half of 2001

"Generally, the security situation has been very fluid over the past two months. More rebels are reportedly out of their hideouts, looking for food and money. In some camps, the rebels looted whatever food was distributed. The security situation has impeded agencies from conducting their normal activities in Gulu and Kitgum. If the current situation prevails, armed escorts may be inevitable for most or all project site visits. In Pader, LRA seem to have concentrated their activities mostly in the Atanga and Pajule sub-counties. Road travel on Gulu/Lira-Kitgum roads can only be undertaken after security clearance and not earlier than 10:00 am." (OCHA May 2001)

The UN Appeal document (pp. 51-52) includes a list of security incidents during 2001

Lawlessness in the Karamoja region limits access (2000)

"Neglect by successive governments resulted in a high degree of lawlessness, made worse by a flooding of weapons into the [Karamoja] region for more than two decades. Now traditional cattle raids have evolved into daily clashes, violent highway ambushes, and general lawlessness, often resulting in numerous deaths.

The insecurity limits development and relief agencies from getting relief or services to the most vulnerable: under five-year-olds; lactating and pregnant mothers; disabled, elderly; widows/widowers; orphans and child headed households. Karamoja has the lowest population growth rate of 1.8%, which is significantly below the average national growth rate of 2.8%. There is also a need to increase training and capacity-building for technical staff in health, water and sanitation, education and other sectors." (UN November 2000, p.16)

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

Government response

Return of IDPs entering the Government agenda (2001-2002)

- reported in April 2002 that the Government was formulating a national IDP policy
- Government signaled by mid-2001 that they would pursue a strategy of decongesting camps
- Strategy of phased return of about 200,000 IDPs from districts of Kitgum, Gulu and Pader (north) being developed by beginning of 2002

"The last positive element is that the Office of the Prime Minister and the Department of Disaster Management, nominally responsible for the internally displaced have, with the encouragement of the OCHA office and the country team, embarked on formulating a national policy on IDPs. The National Policy and Institutional Framework on Internal Displacement (hereby called the policy) moves away from the controversial 'protected villages' to a more dignified approach based on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal displacement. The policy also puts large emphasis on finding durable solutions to the plight of the displaced." (OCHA/IDP Unit 3 April 2002, p.2)

"Ojwok [Minister for the North] told IRIN the government was pursuing a policy of "decongestion" under which the more heavily populated camps would be gradually moved out. If the favourable security situation continued and a programme of phased resettlement could be agreed upon, "we would have cleared the camps in three to five years," he added.

It is as yet unclear where exactly IDPs would be resettled under the decongestion plans. The Resident District Commissioner in Gulu, Musa Ecweru, said there were plans to resettle displaced people around schools nearer to their home villages, where they would have some access to land, and would live in temporary structures for a limited period.

However, ARLPI [Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative] said there appears to be little enthusiasm for the decongestion among IDPs, as it could simply mean they were moved to a smaller version of their present camps, and would still not be able to return home." (IRIN 24 July 2001)

"The Government of Uganda (GOU) has publicly declared its intention of seeing IDPs return home as early as March 2002. While this is a very encouraging sign, it is imperative that any return or resettlement of IDPs should conform to the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Uganda and basic guiding principles on internal displacement. It is in this regard that the Department of Disaster Preparedness in the Office of the Prime Minister with the assistance of the United Nations is drafting a national Policy to make provision for the protection and assistance of IDPs and facilitate their integration, return, resettlement and recovery." (OCHA February 2002)

"The UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) met 18 January 2002 to discuss the return of 374,000 IDPs from their respective "protected villages". Participants were drawn from the UN Agencies, the World Bank, IOM and the Office of the Prime Minister. It was agreed that various actors will assist the GoU to work out a policy and strategy for a phased return of about 200,000 IDPs from districts of Kitgum, Gulu and Pader (north), during a period of 6-8 months. The Agencies will relocate resources within their existing country programmes, where possible. However, a flash appeal may be required. It is expected that the

President will call for a meeting within the coming two weeks to further discuss the UN's contribution to the return.

[...]

On 22nd January the DDMC endorsed the plan for a resettlement survey produced by the Sub-Committee on Peace, Justice and Resettlement. While the UNDMT & OPM are preparing a policy and plan for return, agencies in Gulu District join forces to map the current geographical pattern of resettlement. The survey will identify major resource gaps at the Parish level as well as IDPs plans and capacity for leaving the camps. The District has set aside funds for the survey, but there is still need for some external assistance. So far the following contributions have been identified: IOM and OCHA contributes with technical advice and some logistical support, URC contributes with personnel trained in PRA techniques, CRS, NRC and ACF contribute with transport. There is still need for some additional funding and a budget will be circulated to agencies in the District. The District Planning Unit is responsible for administering the survey and if all agencies respond quickly to appeals for contribution, the assessment should be ready by mid-February.

The UNDMT agreed that sector plans should include updated information on agencies' activities and planned programmes, preferably with information at Parish level." (OCHA January 2002)

"The Government of Uganda introduced an Amnesty Law in 2000 intended to lure back ADF and LRA forces. Unfortunately, the terms of the law are not well understood, if even known, by those it is intended for. Although a demobilisation process has been launched by the Office of the Prime Minister, implementation is constrained by inadequate funding and the lack of proper long-term planning. The process has yet to be successful, and the numbers reintegrated remain relatively insignificant. The slow mobilisation risks provoking a loss of confidence in the process.

Government plans to decongest camps have their merits but as yet do not include sufficient input from the greater aid community. To gain support, they need to include sufficient safe-guards for IDPs and to place emphasis on return/resettlement rather than decongestion. Any initiatives to enable the population to re-settle should be coordinated and planned between all stakeholders, particularly the IDPs, *so that the unfortunate outcomes of their displacement are not repeated in reverse*. Items to be included in resettlement packages need to be identified and stock-piled prior to any planned movements. If revised, the Government initiative could reorient existing humanitarian assistance towards establishment of physical and social infrastructure at the parish level. Concerns that decongestion would simply replace large camps with smaller ones and that infrastructural development would create a pull factor towards the parishes and away from home villages, are unwarranted. Under pre-conflict conditions, displaced persons did not live in villages but in small concentrations of the extended family consisting of 2-3 huts. The local parish was frequented daily for religious services, education and marketing. Decongestion and development of the parishes would greatly facilitate resettlement to areas within easy walking distance of farms, enabling the IDPs to be self-sufficient and that, least we forget, is a primary objective." (OCHA October 2001)

Ministry of Health planning an emergency one-year health programme for IDPs in Katakwi (September 2001)

- Sanitation and nutrition interventions planned for over 88,000 IDPs living in displacement camps
- Ugandan Office of the Prime Minister has a budget of 560 million shillings (US \$318,000) for Katakwi's water supply problem

"Uganda's Ministry of Health is planning an emergency one-year health programme at a cost of 1.6 billion Uganda shillings (about US \$909,000) for internally displaced people (IDPs) in the troubled northeastern district of Katakwi.

The coordinator of the Katakwi Health Emergency Plan, Sam Engenyu, told IRIN that the plan, provisionally approved in mid-August, was expected to provide for sanitation and nutrition interventions for over 88,000 IDPs living in displacement camps as a result of raids by neighbouring Karamojong warriors.

The Karamojong raids on Katakwi, which intensified in March last year and prompted Katakwi District Council into declaring a state of emergency last month, have systematically driven residents from their homes and forced them to build camps in which they live, sometimes without water and health services [...]

The Ugandan Office of the Prime Minister, which has primary responsibility for coordinating assistance to Katakwi, also has a budget of 560 million shillings (US \$318,000) to tackle Katakwi's poor water supply problem by drilling 40 boreholes in and around the IDP camps, humanitarian sources told IRIN on Wednesday. It has also proposed that UNICEF contribute 50 million shillings (US \$28,000) to deal with HIV/AIDS, malaria, sanitation, and social mobilisation, sources said." (IRIN 13 September 2001)

Absence of an official GoU policy on displacement and protected villages (May 2001)

- Army maintains that only through relocation and concentration of the population in secured villages can the Acholi be protected
- Budget of the Ministry of Disaster Preparedness decreased since 1996

"No government policy exists to address the plight of IDPs. 70% of IDPs are women and children, many of whom have been displaced since 1996. Attempts are underway to work with the Government to address their suffering; for the first time government representatives expressed interest in playing an active part in the CAP 2002 exercise. To this end, OCHA, in collaboration with the GoU and the Makerere University, UN agencies, NGOs and community and religious leaders, will commission a comprehensive and authoritative IDP study. Emphasis will be put on identifying specific steps/measures that can be taken by all parties to make immediate/simultaneous progress in the following areas:

Amnesty/Disarmament/Demobilisation

Re-integration

Resettlement/Recovery/Sustained Security.

[...]

In the absence of the Disaster Management and Preparedness Bill, there appears to be no official GoU policy on displacement, protected villages or the forced confinement of IDPs within these villages. The 'protected villages' have raised a number of controversial issues: the perceived endorsement by the international community of a policy of forced relocation, the coherence of this policy with humanitarian principles and human rights law, the advisability of investing resources into temporary IDP settlements, the ambivalence towards funding or working in these settlements, the creation of aid-dependency amongst a population no longer able to work in its fields, the security threats posed to IDPs, etc." (UN November 2001, pp.3, 9)

"Presently, in the absence of the Disaster Management and Preparedness Bill, there appears to be no official GoU policy on displacement, protected villages or forced confinement of IDPs within these villages. The 'protected villages' have raised a number of controversial issues: the perceived endorsement on the part of the international community to a policy of forced relocation, the coherence of this policy with humanitarian principles and HR law, the advisability of investing resources into temporary IDP settlements, the ambivalence about funding or working in these settlements, the creation of an aid-dependency amongst the population who is no longer able to attend their fields, the security threats these areas pose to IDPs.

Militarily, the UPDF maintain that the wide, geographical dispersion of Acholi households makes the protection of each household impossible and that only through relocation and concentration of the

population in secured villages can the Acholi be protected. An opposing view is that increased defence spending in recent years, if appropriately targeted, would provide for adequate security of the Acholi and that displacement of Ugandans is largely attributable to UPDF misplacement in neighbouring countries, namely Ituri Province, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Southern Sudan. In May, the Ugandan Government announced plans to withdraw entirely from the DRC. Other critics consider the protected villages to be a deliberate attempt by the Government to ethnically marginalize, weaken and otherwise prevent the Acholi from posing a political or military threat. There is no known evidence to support such conspiratorial hypotheses which have only succeeded in discouraging joint attempts to find solutions." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Lessons learned")

"UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (1992) stipulates *"the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organisation, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory."* Yet, as humanitarian assistance has increased, particularly since July 1996, the budget of the Ministry of Disaster Preparedness (formerly the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare) has proportionately decreased, resulting in emergency aid flows "substituting" rather than complementing the Government's own resources. In their rush to assist people in need, well-intentioned aid agencies have frequently overlooked the GoU's coordination role and the importance of building its response capacity." (UN November 2000, p.15)

Operation to disarm the Karamojong initiated by end-2001

- Parliament approval of law in March 2000 instructing the government to disarm the Karamojong
- District political leaders in Karamoja sensitising the people in July 2000 about the forthcoming campaign
- Disarming exercise officially initiated in January 2001
- Reported in December 2001 that some 7,000 illegal weapons had been handed over out of a targeted 40,000
- Reported in February 2002 that the army would forcibly disarm the Karamojong because they had largely ignored the call to surrender their guns under the voluntary disarmament programme
- Concern among local population that warriors will hide illegal weapons that the raiding will continue once the defense is pulled out

"Tension has been mounting in the [Karamoja] district, compounded by parliament's approval of the law last week [March 2000]. The law requires the government to disarm the Karamojong and remove them from neighbouring districts within six to 12 months. It also calls for deploying the army at strategic points along Karamoja's border with neighbouring districts. Observers warn that the stage is set for a confrontation between the army and the heavily-armed warriors. (IRIN 22 March 2000)

"There are contradictory reports on the disarmament process. The UPDF spokesman reports that the Vice President officially launched the Disarmament process in Karamoja on February 10, 2001. The political head of the process is Hon. Ruhakana Rugunda, Minister in charge of the Presidency, to be assisted by Hon Peter Lokeris, Minister in Charge of Karamoja Affairs. Col Taban, 3rd Division Commander is in charge of the UPDF troop deployment in the region.

[...]

Some agencies on the ground report an increase in building of security roads and military presence/army detaches. Others say that the process seems to be on hold." (OCHA February 2001)

"The security situation in Karamoja is still very fluid, with a significant increase in the number of ambushes and armed robberies on the road especially between Kotido-Moroto and Moroto-Namalu, over the last four

weeks or so. On the other hand, inter-tribal clashes have somewhat subdued and some attribute this to the increased presence of UPDF officers deployed to facilitate the disarmament programme.

To some though, the disarmament programme is still not very evident on the ground, save for the increased UPDF presence. The sensitization of the community in particular and other related activities have apparently not happened obviously, and many people are still waiting to see more on disarmament." (OCHA April 2001)

"The highlights of incidents in November and December [2001] , show the violent effects of the gun and underscore the importance of the ongoing disarmament program. The disarmament process began in earnest, with the President himself spearheading the process. The programme is ongoing and reports indicate that upwards of 10,000 guns have been voluntarily handed in. Government is also appealing for funds to aid the programme and for parallel development projects in Karamoja. With Karamoja in the spotlight, and the President himself meeting with donors and international agencies to appeal for funds for the region, the hope is that Karamoja is finally on the path to meaningful recovery and development." (OCHA December 2001)

"In Karamoja, Eastern Uganda, violent skirmishes have continued even as the disarmament programme is being implemented, with, on one occasion, the presidential guard being attacked. 88,500 remain displaced – over 38% of the local population - in Katakwi, sub-counties of which have been persistently attacked by Karamajong pastoralists, resulting in substantial population movement, food insecurity as crops cannot be planted or are abandoned, and limited access to basic services. The UPDF has been heavily deployed to help restore order and implement the ambitious disarmament of the Karamajong. Initially under the personal supervision of President Museveni, the programme began on 2 December and, by 7 December it was reported that some 7,000 illegal weapons had been handed over out of a targeted 40,000. The first phase of the disarmament process (voluntary handing over of the guns) ended on 15 February. The second phase began immediately after this – disarmament by force undertaken by the UPDF – and is currently ongoing." (OCHA 28 February 2002, p.34)

"The Ugandan army at the weekend announced the launch of a forcible disarmament operation in the insecurity-prone Karamoja subregion of northeastern Uganda, following the expiry of a month's grace period which the government extended to the Karamojong community to voluntarily surrender their arms.

Maj Shaban Bantariza, the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) spokesman, told IRIN from Kampala on Monday [25 February 2002] that the army had decided to move in and forcibly disarm the Karamojong because they had largely ignored the call to surrender their guns under the voluntary disarmament programme launched by President Yoweri Museveni.

In December, Museveni travelled to the Morulinga area of Karamoja's Moroto District, where he spearheaded the voluntary disarmament exercise. He gave a deadline of 15 February, after which, he said, those found in possession of illegal firearms would be arrested.

By the expiry of the deadline, only 7,676 guns - less than a quarter of the an expected 40,000 - had been handed in by the community, according to Bantariza." (IRIN 25 February 2002)

"We had given the Karamojong up to 15 February to hand in their guns. As far as 'voluntarily' is concerned, we think they are not doing well," he said. "It is not working. Some of them want to keep their arms so they can rustle their neighbours' cattle."

"[...], the President of Uganda has launched a disarmament campaign from December 2001 to retrieve the weapons from the warriors in order to ensure security and peace in the region so that the IDPs would return and settle back in their villages by March 2002.

[...]

But, as is said elsewhere and according to local understanding, warriors have possessed weapons both through legal and illegal means. They acquired legally on the pretext of guarding their livestock while they smuggled more as their raiding interest grew commercially. The public interpretation is that “even if the campaign is successful in retrieving all the legal weapons, the illegal weapons would still stay with the warriors and the raiding spree continues once the defense is pulled out”. (Oxfam 28 November 2001, p.24)

Background of the "Protected villages" strategy (1996-2001)

- Government started in 1996 to move rural families in conflict areas into "protected villages"
- The "protected villages" are located near UPDF detachments as means of protection , but also to deny support to the LRA
- Calls by politicians in 1999 for Government to terminate the "protected villages" strategy
- Larger camps were during 2001 being re-grouped into smaller settlements

"In response to the evolution in LRA tactics, UPDF tactics in Gulu included, by September 1996, the creation of camps and the removal of people from strategically important areas or places where the army was unable to prevent LRA activity. The decision to create camps was taken at the highest level. On 27 September 1996 President Yoweri Museveni informed members of the Parliamentary Committee on the Offices of the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs that the authorities were going to establish "protected villages". However, from interviews with villagers and others, it appears to Amnesty International that some UPDF units were already moving people out of their homes a number of weeks before the top-level decision to create camps was communicated to the Parliamentary Committee. " (AI 17 March 1999, para.2.1)

"The decision to create camps was officially announced by President Yoweri Museveni on the 27th September 1996 to members of the Parliamentary Committee of the Office of the President and Foreign Affairs. However, in at least in two of the camps surveyed (Pabbo and Ajulu) people told us that they remember that as early as August that year Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) soldiers were already moving in villages and ordering people to move to the trading centres.

[...]

While it is true that some people moved voluntarily closer to Army units before August 1996 seeking protection, most people were indeed forced to move by Army personnel, who often used rather drastic methods. In every camp we visited in Gulu, people told us invariably that they were forced." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, p. 5)

"In the north, government forces continued their policy of concentrating inhabitants in so-called "protected villages" with UPDF detachments nearby as a means of protecting them and denying support to the LRA" (US DOS March 1999, sect. 1g)

"A Ugandan government plan to scale down "protected villages" in the rebel-hit north, while basically welcomed, has also attracted criticism that it is no solution to the army's protracted war against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

'It is not a question of scaling down,' Gulu area MP Norbert Mao told IRIN on Monday. 'The villages should be dismantled and the government come up with a firm policy to step up security.'

As strategy to curb insurgency, the protected villages had failed, Mao said. "We have never supported these camps. Our people will not miss them.'

'The camps were not for the protection of civilians, but to control their movement,' Mao added, saying they were 'major arenas for human rights abuses.'

'People become totally dependent on the military and are highly vulnerable to acts of rape and illegal arrests,' he noted. He argued there was no provision for humanitarian assistance such as health facilities, and the people were simply rounded up and forced into the villages.

The protected village policy was mooted [sic!] by the government of Uganda and supported by some villagers who thought it would ensure protection from the LRA, as well as denying the rebels logistical support, food and new recruits. However, the policy later became unpopular with allegations of gross human rights violations in the camps.

Press reports recently quoted Gulu commander Briagdiier Wamala Katumba as saying the armed forces intended to establish more detachments 'so we can decongest protected villages.'

The deputy editor of the independent daily "The Monitor", David Ouma Balikowa, said the concept of protected villages had failed and local communities blamed them for the destruction of family units.

'Girl children are victims of early pregnancies, abductions (by rebels) still go on and there are many other acts of human rights violations,' he told IRIN.

The human rights group Amnesty International cautiously welcomed the government's plans.

'In principle it could be a good idea if well applied to guarantee respect for human rights", African regional office director Patrice Vahard told IRIN. "It could allow people to go back and till their lands, but they must be assured of protection against attacks. They must feel secure.' (IRIN-CEA 19 April 1999a)

"In the north, government forces continued [in 1999] their policy of maintaining so-called protected villages with UPDF detachments nearby as a means of protecting civilians and denying support to the LRA. Although substantial NGO and donor community assistance has improved the overall conditions in the villages, conditions still remain poor. This policy of maintaining protected villages continues to be attacked by parliamentarians from the area, although less vehemently than before since many persons have returned to their home villages; however, while the UPDF did not coerce persons to remain in most protected villages, in February [1999] two new protected villages, Patika A and Patika B, were created near the Sudanese border and villagers in the surrounding area were forced to evacuate their homes and move to these villages." (US DOS 25 February 2000, p.8)

"The GoU has a relatively good humanitarian rights record, but there are documented cases where Ugandans have been displaced either by force or 'creative persuasion.' The GoU claims that the wide, geographical dispersion of Acholi farms makes it virtually impossible to protect every household and that only through concentration of the population in 'protected villages' can Uganda's Defence Forces (UPDF) defend Ugandans, particularly given present austerity measures restraining defence spending. Local Defence Units (LDU's) have been deployed but lack the training and resources to effectively combat rebel forces that are evasive, mobile and widespread. Many IDPs claim that their displacement is largely due to UPDF misplacement." (UN November 2000, p.15)

"President Museveni recently commented that the north has, in general, missed out on the positive macro-economic outlook that prevails across the rest of the country and that poverty levels in the north are actually increasing; nevertheless the government has yet to formulate a clear policy on displacement. That said, with the current, promising security environment and increasing pressure from international aid agencies, the government has begun to look at plans for dismantling the IDP camps. These would, at best, entail decongestion measures aimed at the most over-crowded camps, although it is, as yet, unclear where exactly the IDPs would move to under these plans. The Resident District Commissioner in Gulu recently announced tentative plans to resettle displaced people around schools nearer to their home villages, where they would have some access to land, and would live in temporary structures for a limited period. However, ARLPI, a Religious Leaders Peace Initiative group working to facilitate peace negotiations in the north,

said that there appears to be little enthusiasm for the decongestion plans among IDPs themselves, who fear simply being moved on to smaller versions of their present camps." (OCHA 31 September 2001, p.26)

"During 2001, there was a concerted effort by Government and community leaders to facilitate the movement of IDPs back to their homes. Larger camps are now being re-grouped into smaller settlements. Officials have designated certain areas, which have been provided with military protection, as being 'safe' from the rebels, for people to move back home; and some people are temporarily re-settling behind military detachments as security roads are being constructed to link remote areas.

At present, IDP movements have become less restricted as a result of the increased security situation and/or political climate. This, in turn, has increased their household well-being. It is important to stress here that any initiatives to enable the population to re-settle should be coordinated and planned between different actors, particularly the IDPs, so that the unfortunate outcomes of their displacement are not repeated in reverse. Indeed, the proposal for decongestion was more a statement of intent than a feasible plan of action.

Concerns that decongestion would simply replace large camps with smaller ones and that infrastructural development would create a pull factor towards the parishes and away from home villages, are unwarranted. The GoU, is to be commended for the initiative, which if refined, would reorient existing humanitarian assistance towards establishment of physical and social infrastructure at the parish level.

Decongestion and development of the parishes would greatly facilitate resettlement to areas within easy walking distance of land, enabling the IDPs to be self-sufficient. Agencies participating in CAP 2002, support the GoU initiative and are working closely with district officials to transform the existing concept paper into a practical plan."(UN November 2001, p. 36)

For further information, see:

[Civilians moved by Government into "protected villages" \(1996-1999\)](#)

[Mixed opinions about the physical protection offered by the "protected villages" in Northern Uganda \(1996-2000\)](#)

Ministry for Disaster Preparedness and Refugees main coordinating body for IDP assistance since 1998


- MDP/R act as focal point for Government on disasters and humanitarian affairs and has the responsibility to coordinate and monitor assistance and protection of IDPs
- District Disaster Management Committees are charged with coordination and facilitating the response to disasters at the district level
- Reported by end-2000 that DDMCs lack the organisation, expertise and resources to be effective
- Inadequate funding limited capacity for emergency response of the Government's Department of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees in 1999
- District authorities are generally lacking coordination capacity

"The Ministry of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees acts as the main coordinating body for IDP relief and rehabilitation in Uganda. The Ministry is supported with financial and technical assistance from UNDP, WFP and other agencies comprising the United Nations Disaster Management Team (UNDMT). UNDP is to contribute 500,000 US dollars to establish an inter-ministerial Disaster Management Unit and a national policy for disaster relief and mitigation.


The Uganda Constitution calls for a Disaster Management Commission, which is currently being formed, but generally government coordination and assessment of needs has been poor. In Gulu and Kitgum the District Disaster Management Committees (DDMCs), organized under the Chief Administrative Officer (see box), have been assisted by UNICEF in updating their population censuses and District Emergency Plans of Action. However, the DDMCs have depended too much on information gathering without putting enough effort into proactive coordination and have yet to provide effective direction." (WFP September 1999, p.28)

"Over-all coordination is the responsibility of the OPM. However, limited resources and capacity have severely hampered OPM's efforts. Monthly donor meetings provide a forum for updating the donor community on the overall humanitarian situation but provide no scope for detailed discussion, joint analysis or planning. Sectoral coordination meetings are held regularly in Kampala and in crisis areas to collect and compare data gathered either informally or through agency-sponsored assessments. These parallel meetings of District Disaster Management Committees (DDMC) meetings, comprised of GoU, NGO and UN field staff. The DDMCs are held irregularly and lack the organisation, expertise and resources to be effective." (UN November 2000, p.36)

**Government Structures and Liaison with the International Aid Community
(as it related to IDPs)**



**Government Structures and Liaison with the International Aid Community
(as it related to IDPs)**



(WFP September 1999, p.29)

"The Government's ability to detect, respond to, or facilitate response to an emergency in a timely manner is limited due to a woefully inadequate annual budget at the Government's Department of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees (DDPR). In addition to this is the budget cut at the units responsible for monitoring early warning indicators. Increasing the financial and human resources provided to DDPR could assist the GoU in monitoring, coordinating and intervening effectively during crises." (UN November 1999, p.12)

"In the decentralised administrative structure of Uganda, the main responsibility for governmental humanitarian coordination lies with district authorities. District authorities are generally lacking coordination capacity, in particular because the function of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) who is normally in charge of humanitarian coordination is overstretched. While capacity building to support CAOs and their Disaster Management Commissions is important, there is general consensus that district authorities at present cannot provide for dynamic inter-agency coordination. However, unlike in other countries where local authorities often try to curtail humanitarian actors, authorities in Uganda accept self-driven inter-agency coordination. In Kitgum, such internal mechanisms for inter-agency coordination – undertaken in all transparency and with a systematic link to the district administration – have proven successful." (OCHA 7 October 2000, para.16)

Army receives training by the Uganda Human Rights Commission (1997)

- Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) published its own report on the human rights situation in Uganda during 1997

"In conjunction with the Government-sponsored Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), the police force commenced a training program for police officials to foster respect for internationally recognized human rights standards. The UHRC conducted a similar program with UPDF officials throughout the year." (US DOS March 1999, sect. 1c)

"Some governments have raised the issue of how to prevent human rights violations in the north with the Uganda Government. At various stages in the past three years concern has been expressed about the situation in the camps and countryside of Gulu and Kitgum. Assistance to those in camps has been provided in the form of humanitarian relief. The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) appears to be on the verge of receiving donor government support to expand its work in rural parts of Uganda. In August 1998 it published a high quality annual report on the human rights situation in Uganda during 1997." (AI 17 March 1999, para. 6.8)

UN coordination mechanism

Efforts to strengthen the UN capacity for coordination (2000-2001)

- The UN Humanitarian Coordinator (same person as UN Resident Coordinator) for Uganda is responsible for coordinating United Nations humanitarian relief and rehabilitation assistance to the country
- OCHA serves as the secretariat for the Humanitarian Coordinator
- OCHA enlarged its office from one to six professional staff during 2000
- OCHA field office established in Gulu and western region (Bundibugyo) during first half of 2001, and attempt will be made to establish similar in the northeast (Karimoja)
- Improved information systems established during 2001

"Overall responsibility within the UN system for coordination rests with the newly appointed UN Humanitarian Coordinator. The Coordinator is responsible for ensuring that assistance is provided on the basis of assessed needs and in accordance with humanitarian principles. OCHA will serve as the secretariat for the Humanitarian Coordinator, working closely with the Office of the Prime Minister, (OPM), within the Government of Uganda. The OPM is the line ministry responsible for natural disasters, IDPs and refugees in Uganda.

The main goal is to support coordination mechanisms within the Government of Uganda in order to maintain an integrated approach to policy and programming issues by strengthening existing coordination structure. To reach this goal, the humanitarian partners in Uganda aim to:

Introduce extensive use of the Disaster Management Team (DMT) coordination mechanism including NGOs, GOU and other relief actors. The DMT would serve as the main forum for discussion and planning of the overall direction of the humanitarian and transitional interventions in Uganda.

Strengthen and support the District Authorities and civil society focused initiatives in the districts of Uganda dealing with humanitarian issues.

Through capacity-building support the OPM to take the lead role on coordination of humanitarian assistance, emergency preparedness on natural disasters and complex emergencies.

[...]

To ensure the fullest possible integration of emergency relief activities under the CAP with reconstruction and development activities under the Framework, the position of UN Humanitarian Coordinator has been combined with that of the UN Resident Coordinator." (UN November 2001, pp. 32, 36)

"In 2000, OCHA hired a Senior Humanitarian Adviser/Chief of Unit supported by two international officers and five national staff, including three National Officers." (UN November 2000, p.119)

"Lead agencies will be elected to coordinate activities within their sector of expertise. These will include both NGO and UN Agencies, depending on their competencies and capacities. UNDP and the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) will provide security services for the humanitarian community through field based Area Security Coordinators. UNICEF will continue to play a lead role in most social sectors, particularly human rights and education. WFP will be responsible for coordinating telecommunications and advising on logistics and UNHCR will remain the logical focal point for refugee assistance and protection. AVSI, MSF, ACF, IFRC, OXFAM and other agencies will continue to facilitate coordination in other sectors."(UN November 2000, pp. 36-37)

"In May [2001], OCHA established a field office in Gulu, co-located with WFP, International Organization for Migration (IOM), and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) with staff seconded from the NRC and funded by the Norwegian Government. The Field Coordination Support Unit will establish District Disaster Committees, undertake inventories of on-going and planned projects, identify resource gaps by area, affected group and sector and establish inter-agency monitoring mechanisms in Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Adjumani districts. OCHA established similar coordination structures in the western region (Bundibugyo) late April and an attempt will be made to do the same in the northeast (Karimoja) in June 2001." (OCHA 21 May 2001, "Monitoring")

"Needs assessment and planning of humanitarian assistance were vastly improved in 2001 with the establishment of supportive information systems. The World Food Programme's (WFP) Vulnerability and Mapping Unit worked to strengthen existing inter-agency data collection efforts and refine methodologies and instrumentation, culminating in a comprehensive Emergency Food Needs Assessment (EFNA) that provided valuable information on the needs, capacities and vulnerabilities of groups throughout the country.

With assistance from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Norwegian Government, OCHA posted staff up-country to establish sector groups, support disaster planning at district level and establish, for the first time, a database covering all UN and NGO agencies involved in humanitarian assistance including inventories of on-going and planned activities by crisis area, sector and beneficiary group. The UN is now working with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to amalgamate data on humanitarian and development interventions. This data, along with inter-alia situation reports, sectoral assessments, maps, vulnerability analyses and early warning information is contained in the UgandAid.Net Humanitarian Information Network website launched in conjunction with the CHAP/CAP 2002 (October/November 2001). The site includes forums and discussion groups for each crisis area, sector and beneficiary group enabling agencies to share lessons-learned and maintain a general dialogue on humanitarian issues of mutual concern." (UN November 2001, p.5)

Response by the UN towards the IDP situation in 2001

Major imbalances in funding of 2001 Appeal

- Humanitarian activities in Uganda are critically under-funded compared to development projects
- Protection and Human Rights received no funding under the CAP 2001
- Assistance skewed towards the northern Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Padar, while the southwest and northeast regions are nearly excluded

"Strategy Imbalance: economic recovery in Uganda since the mid-eighties has led donor government to pursue a split assistance strategy. Large funds are disbursed for development assistance in more stable areas, whereas the UN Consolidated Interagency Appeal (CA) for humanitarian activities is critically under-funded. The poverty and instability in western northern and northeastern Uganda are largely attributable to economic, political and ethnic marginalisation. Donors have a tendency to consider the humanitarian crises in Uganda as isolated situations of socio-political instability and are reluctant to acknowledge their regional interdependence and chronic character. This makes it difficult for the UN to establish and maintain a strategic orientation of humanitarian programmes, beyond ad-hoc relief interventions."

(OCHA 21 May 2001, "Scenarios")

"OCHA Uganda has recently drawn much attention to the plight of the IDPs, reporting that general living conditions in the camps (health, water and sanitation) are rapidly deteriorating. At the same time sexual violence and the spread of HIV/AIDS are endemic. Furthermore, a stark contrast can be observed between the funds available for IDP assistance and the large scale donor programmes in more stable areas of the country. Solutions to the problem are not forthcoming although many contend that investment in security, infrastructure and job creation would help restore both personal dignity among the IDP communities whilst strengthening confidence in the government. Others, including major donors, argue that insecurity prevents them from investing in social and physical security structures. Whatever the solution, it is clear that urgent measures are desperately needed to improve living conditions for the IDPs and, in purely pragmatic terms, to alleviate the pressure on the camps which are becoming increasingly financially unsustainable." (OCHA 31 September 2001, p.26)

"During 2001, there were sizeable disparities between the level of funding received by agency, sector, target group and geographical region. Only 6 of the 19 appealing agencies received funding. None of the NGOs, many of which have important comparative advantages, received support for their proposed interventions. Three key sectors, Recovery and Infrastructure, Protection and Human Rights, and Security and Staff Safety received no funding under the CAP 2001, while 51% of total funding was in support of food aid, albeit multi-sectoral in its orientation.

Imbalanced Funding

As assistance in 2001 tended to be driven by supply rather than demand, the spread of assistance by target group was also uneven. While refugees represented 19% of the affected population, multi-sectoral refugee programmes received 64% of overall assistance. Geographically, assistance was skewed towards the northern Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Padar to the near exclusion of the southwest and northeast regions (together representing six of the twelve districts cover in CAP 2001) Such imbalances had a negative impact on CHAP implementation which called for an integrated programme addressing multi-sectoral needs and focusing on capacity building.

[...]

Funding shortfalls for FAO resulted in inadequate agricultural seeds and tools in Karamoja and neighbouring districts, thus undermining recovery of food security efforts in northeast Uganda. Only one FAO project from CAP 2001 has been funded for northeast Uganda.

In addition to the funding received in 2001, UNFPA maintains its assistance programme through support from the Bill Gates Foundation and other sources.

WFP received only 50.81% of its requirements under CAP 2001, forcing it to reduce food rations. This will inevitably result in a higher incidence of malnutrition and nutrition-related diseases. Food-for-work (FFW)

programmes aimed at establishing reservoirs, small dams, fishponds and other infrastructure for enhanced food security were reduced.

UNICEF lacked sufficient funds to engage in humanitarian assistance outside of its on-going 5-year country programme." (UN November 2001, pp. 1-2)

"While the cost of maintaining the camps and of providing for basic needs is increasing, support for such activities are steadily decreasing, rendering the camps unsustainable on purely financial grounds. Donor fatigue is becoming increasingly apparent and is particularly noticeable in food aid assistance which has rapidly declined. Freedom of movement and access to land has been limited, preventing the IDPs from compensating for the loss of external assistance. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR's) Self Reliance Strategy had to be discontinued due to lack of support. Trends in malnutrition and nutrition-related diseases and the status of IDPs in general, has worsened. Improved security, combined with asset and job creation, remain the only means of overcoming the problem." (OCHA 21 May 2001, "Vulnerability")

"As of 8 April 2001, five months after the CHAP/CA was launched, some US\$ 13,211,391 or 17.21% had been provided for the provision of humanitarian assistance.

[...]

Funding shortfalls for FAO has caused a lack of adequate agricultural seeds and tools in Karamoja and neighbouring districts (Karimojong-affected areas), thus undermining recovery of food security efforts for the adversely affected in northeastern Uganda. Only one project from the FAO's CA has been funded for northeastern Uganda. Its implementation and impact will not be seen until the second half of 2001. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has received no funding from CA 2000 or CA 2001. It maintains its assistance programme through funding from the Bill Gates Foundation. WFP has inadequate funding under CA 2001 for its Protracted Relief and Recovery Programme (PRRO 6176) and Emergency Operation (EMOP 6235) and has been forced to reduce food rations drastically. Food stocks under PRRO 6176 (UGA-01-1/N01) are expected to be depleted mid-August 2001 which will have a severe impact on the nutritional status of over 730,000 displaced persons and refugees. Highly successful food-for-work programmes aimed at establishing reservoirs, small dams, fish ponds and other infrastructure for enhanced food security have been reduced due to lack of funding. UNICEF lacks sufficient funds to engage in humanitarian assistance outside of its on-going 5-year country programme. Lack of funding has forced the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to reduce staff and activities by 30% in 2001."(OCHA 21 May 2001, "Funding")

See OCHA's [Financial Tracking Database for Complex Emergencies](#) for information about funding of the 2001 Appeal.

IDP related food aid during 2001

- General food distributions for IDPs being phased out gradually in the Gulu and Kitgum districts
- Recovery objectives of food aid not successful as IDPs remained in camps
- Survey found that members of Female Headed Households had problems registering for food aid
- Food aid programme originally planned for 411,500 people, but intensified rebel activity during 2000 increased the number of people receiving WFP food to some 673,000

"This Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) [by WFP] is a two year project, which commenced 1 April 2000. In 2001, the PRRO will continuously provide: a) emergency food assistance to refugees and displaced persons where needed; b) a food safety net during resettlement, while general food distributions are being phased out in favour of targeted rehabilitation initiatives; and c) food for work and food for training to provide human and physical assets and to improve household food security. Around

half of the households targeted under the PRRO are headed by women. Approximately two-thirds of the resources under the recovery component will be targeted at women and girls. Moreover, women will be fully involved in food for work or food for training project identification, planning, and implementation.

[...]

In Acholi land (Gulu and Kitgum districts), general food distributions for the displaced people are being phased out gradually, while food for work, food for training, school feeding, and targeted interventions for vulnerable groups are being scaled up. Women, being the household food providers, have been severely affected by the insecurity denying them access to their fields and gardens. By creating assets in the communities, women will be facilitated to gain access to food both in the short and long-term. The PRRO will also support former child soldiers, abductees, and returnees, who have suffered traumatically from their guerrilla war experiences, by providing them food through CBOs and local NGOs. In the areas where the rebel activities are still preventing the displaced people from returning to their homes, emergency food assistance will continue to be provided.

In the Rwenzori (Bundibugyo, Kasese, and Kabarole districts), the rebel insurgency has displaced the entire rural population of Bundibugyo district into 51 IDP camps. Few areas have been secured by the strong presence of the Ugandan army allowing the displaced people to farm their lands. Rehabilitation and recovery activities are being planned and subject to the security situation, will be launched, mainly targeting women. In the insecure areas, WFP will continue to provide emergency food assistance in order to maintain nutritional levels of the population." UN November 2000, pp.49-50)

"In Bundibugyo, WFP has been providing regular food assistance to approximately 100,000 IDPs who fled from rebel attacks in their home villages. These IDPs are accommodated in 53 camps throughout the district but move to their homes and fields as security permits. As security conditions improve, WFP plans to gradually phase out the general food distributions. Food-for-work activities are being initiated in the district and WFP further plans to introduce a school feeding programme." (WFP 26 January 2001)

"The United Nations World Food Programme today [12 March 2001] appealed to donors to fully fund its emergency operation in Uganda so the agency can continue feeding nearly 700,000 internally displaced people and refugees in the country.

The food aid agency urgently needs 45,000 tonnes - worth \$27 million - in order to maintain food distributions over the next several months.

The WFP operation, which was launched in April 2000 and remains almost sixty percent underfunded, had originally planned to feed 411,500 people. But intensified rebel activity in Uganda last year sent tens of thousands more fleeing from their homes in search of food and shelter. Coupled with increasing influxes of new refugees from Sudan, the number of people receiving WFP food in Uganda has skyrocketed to some 673,000 in Northern and Western Uganda." (WFP 12 March 2001)

Main findings from evaluation of the programme by end-2001:

"In its first year of implementation, protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 6176.00 performed well in meeting its protracted relief objective, feeding unexpectedly large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in an unstable, unpredictable environment, but less well in meeting its recovery objectives, due largely to the continued encampment of IDPs. While relief activities have dominated PRRO 6176.00, attention has tended to focus on instituting recovery activities. However, more attention should be paid to strengthening core relief functions, such as verifying refugee and IDP numbers, and improving final distribution mechanisms and post-distribution monitoring.

[...]

Two of the biggest future challenges for this operation concern the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) for refugees and the resettlement of IDPs. Although WFP activities in refugee-hosting areas are explicitly linked to the SRS, this linkage needs to be strengthened. A related weakness of the SRS is the lack of clarity about the conditions for self-reliance. In relation to the resettlement of IDPs, WFP needs to be proactive at both the district and national levels, setting its sights on an agreed framework for resettlement.

While it may be difficult to determine exactly what approach (and what risks) WFP should take, it is clear that the status quo is unsatisfactory. Strong leadership is required from within the United Nations system in Uganda, both to advocate for more urgent consideration of resettlement and to coordinate the funding and allocation of material inputs.

[...]

Projections for recovery activities were for assistance to a total 178,000 beneficiaries (11,259 tons) in the first year. By the end of the year, 209,714 beneficiaries had received assistance (118 percent compared with target), but only 3,123 tons had been utilized (28 percent compared with target). This reflects a slow start to school feeding: participating students rose to 73 percent of projections by the end of the first year, but only 27 percent of projected commodities were utilized. The planned expansion of the school feeding programme needs to take into account the capacity of the district and of WFP staff.

Similarly, although the number of FFA [Food for Assets] beneficiaries in the first year exceeded the initial projection (137 percent), the quantity of food utilized was well under target (28 percent). Field staff have found it difficult to generate FFA activities for encamped populations of IDPs or refugees, and so have mainly supported projects put forward for or by non-IDP and non-refugee populations—a concentration that is questionable, given the stated objectives of the PRRO. In refugee-hosting areas it is appropriate to integrate the host population in FFA activities, but not to concentrate on this population. [...]

The PRRO sets out to target women, but the analysis of disadvantage and vulnerability is not specific to the camp/settlement context, and no qualitative, gender-sensitive indicators are suggested for evaluating performance beyond numerical achievements.

The country office and IPs have encouraged a greater number of women to collect rations on behalf of their families, although outcomes are uncertain. Efforts have also been made to assist women to exercise more authority, stipulating participation in distribution committees (90 percent in Bundibugyo district). As of yet, no leadership training has been provided.

The PRRO set as a target the allocation to women of 65 to 70 percent of recovery resources and at least 30 percent of project outputs/assets created through FFA, but it is not clear if these targets have been met. Few FFA interventions have adequately considered gender issues in their selection and management. The country office is aware of this shortcoming and plans to provide training to IPs. Attempts have been made to use FFT to empower women.

Although the country office collects a considerable amount of disaggregated data and requires IPs to do so as well, qualitative monitoring of progress in relation to WFP's Commitments to Women is missing.

[...]

The PRRO was under-resourced at its commencement, and no commodities arrived until the third month. By the end of 2000, pledges amounted only to 37 percent of what was requested and receipts to only 10 percent. Most of the resources used by the PRRO until the end of 2000 (over 33,000 tons) came from carryovers from the preceding emergency operation and protracted emergency operations for refugees and displaced persons. If these stocks had not been available, the PRRO would have been starved of commodities. As of June 2001, there was a large shortfall in commodities for the remaining year of the PRRO. When the PRRO programme category was introduced, it was hoped that it would lead to longer-term funding commitments. This has not been the case with PRRO 6176.00." (WFP 21 December 2001 pp.3, 10,12, 14

Some views on food aid as seen from the recipient side:

"In most camps we were told that food relief distribution usually takes place these days every two months. In other camps like Awac people say that although some food used to be provided when the camp was first established nothing is being distributed these days. It seems that the average distribution is five mugs of posho and three kilos of beans for a household of eight for a month, plus a tin of cooking oil which is to be shared between two families. Most people told us that these food rations usually do not last more than two weeks. In Opit people told us that in 1998 they went for more than four months without any food relief

being distributed. People in most camps seem to remember 1998 as the year in which hunger was most unbearable. The office of the Justice and Peace Committee in Kitgum has documented a number of cases in which people in displaced camps resorted to eating seeds treated with chemicals, which caused an unspecified number of deaths. A lot of complaints about the quality of the food were also brought out during our interviews, including many cases of rotten beans and flour with worms. In Anaka and Alero people mentioned cases when in 1998 pieces of broken glass were found mixed with maize for distribution." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, p.11)

"While women have been designated as the initial point of control for relief food distribution, 40% and 13% of FHH [Female Headed Households] and MHH respectively felt that the two groups (FHH and MHH) did not have equal registration opportunities. It was further discovered that almost twice as many FHH compared to MHH had all their resident members not registered. From these statistics, it is evident that within the current registration system, FHH compared to MHH have limited capacity to ensure that they are registered for relief distribution, thus should be considered as disadvantaged.

A number of reasons appear to be responsible for this trend of events. Male hegemony in the Acholi society coupled with high illiteracy rates among the female population gives the FHH a low status thus limiting their chances of making themselves heard. As argued by Britt (1993), implementing resettlement programmes through the existing power structures may not benefit the entire community especially the FHH. This calls for alternative mechanisms to be explored on a case-by-case basis. As observed by Mooney (1998), it would be appropriate to include active female leaders in the registration process, as this would especially deter women from having to trade sexual favours to have their names registered for relief supplies." (World Vision/Cranfield University December 2001, p. 51)

Assistance in the area of psychosocial and social resilience of communities (2001)

"A range of activities will be carried out to support the psychological and social resilience of communities in times of armed conflict. To guide the development of a psychosocial approach to psychological stress and to ensure that interventions are well coordinated, UNICEF will continue supporting the development of guidelines and principles for psychosocial programmes. Gulu District has been supported to coordinate psychosocial programmes in Gulu district. Registration, psycho-social treatment and advocacy activities related to LRA atrocities continue. GUSCO, WV, Kitwa, AVSI and IRC will continue activities aimed at the return, rehabilitation and reintegration of children abducted by the LRA. UNICEF provides support to GUSCO and WV, and is active in working with the UPDF to ensure humane reception and speedy processing of former abductees.

To strengthen community capacity to withstand the psychological and social stress of the conflict, UNICEF will support programmes that build community capacity. Community volunteer counsellors (CVCs) will continue to be trained in Gulu and Kitgum district by NGOs and district programmes. In December 1999, UNICEF completed an assessment of ADF effects on children, with specific emphasis on the scale of abduction. UNICEF is now developing a set of psycho-social interventions in cooperation with SCF/UK and district level authorities in the three affected districts of Bundibugyo, Kasese and Kabarole and is extending the abduction registration system to these districts.

Anecdotal evidence points to an increasing trend in child abuse, especially sexual abuse. One problem is that there is little knowledge of legal protection and how to obtain justice. To respond to this need, Child Rights Advocates are being trained. These advocates have basic training on the legal aspects of child protection and child abuse. In cases of child abuse the advocates can give advice as to how to pursue the case and to ensure that justice is obtained. So far, 30 have been trained in Nwoya County, Gulu district. As follow-up to the Amnesty Bill, a number of NGOs and donors have been active in support of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative and other local initiatives to promote dialogue in Gulu and Kitgum and to ensure that the Amnesty Bill was disseminated widely throughout the conflict affected areas.

Objectives: a) Promote and strengthen community based psycho-social support system; b) increase displaced children's access to basic education by improving school facilities and quality of teaching and increase retention especially of the girl child; c) promote peace education for children in and out of school; d) sustain and accelerate monitoring and information systems for abducted children; e) reinforce advocacy campaign to secure release of children abducted by LRA rebels; f) support integration of returned abducted children in their communities." (UN November 2000, p.33)

OCHA appeals for the creation of an Emergency Response Fund (2000)

- Hit-and-run tactics of rebel groups often result in displacement in several different locations simultaneously
- Traditional funding mechanisms often not rapidly accessible
- Emergency Fund to fund activities up to US\$ 30,000 aimed at fulfilling the immediate, life-saving needs of the most vulnerable affected groups

"Trends in Uganda reveal a series of rapid-onset, low to medium intensity conflicts resulting in spontaneous displacement of civilian populations. The evasive, hit-and-run tactics of rebel groups often result in displacement in several different locations simultaneously. Early warning systems have focused primarily on slow evolving natural calamities and have failed to systematically monitor and warn agencies of impending man-made disasters. Even under the best circumstances, it is not always possible to forecast or to pinpoint specific outcomes of complex social conflict. Traditional funding mechanisms are often not rapidly accessible with agency response generally lagging behind need, resulting in undue human suffering.

While early warning, contingency planning, stockpiling and other disaster preparedness measures are being improved, there is a need to establish an Emergency Response Fund (ERF) or quick dispensing facility that will enable NGOs and UN Agencies to respond to unforeseen crises in a more timely, effective and humane manner.

Proposals for funding will normally be limited to US\$ 30,000, depending upon assessed need and agency capacity. The interventions must aim to fulfil the immediate, life-saving needs of the most vulnerable affected groups and must pass stringent project selection criteria. Implementing agencies must also demonstrate that they have adequate capacity and that their interventions are technically feasible and socio-economically sound. OCHA will administer the ERF and will account and report on fund utilisation through the Humanitarian Evaluation and Advisory Team (HEAT), which will be responsible for approving individual project proposals and for monitoring progress and impact." (UN November 2000, p.121)

IDP related UN response during 2002

Increased international attention about the plight of IDPs in Uganda (2002)

"The challenge remains for the government, with the support of the international and humanitarian community, to prepare a comprehensive and efficient strategy to decongest the camps, assist and protect the IDPs and create an environment in which peace and development can flourish. Humanitarian concern for the region is now increasingly matched by government and international interest. 2001 has seen a number of humanitarian assessments, surveys and participatory studies of the northern districts – by IOM, ICRC, the EU and Government of Uganda, the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, the Justice and Peace Commission of Gulu Archdiocese, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative - many of which have concentrated upon current living conditions in the camps, conditions for return and have

sought to identify short-term, 'transitional' and longer-term needs. The preliminary findings and recommendations of the OCHA-initiated study of IDPs in the north were presented on 7 January and indicate that the situation in the three northern districts represents a catastrophe for the people of the region and for the nation of Uganda as a whole." (OCHA 28 February 2002, p.34)

UN envisages reorientation of emergency interventions towards recovery and resettlement should the situation improve during 2002

"Based on survey responses, the forecast is for a slight improvement of the situation for many of the IDPs in the country, erring on the side of optimism, with a likely return of IDPs in the south western districts of Uganda.

The affected population will remain weakened, particularly as the need for support during the return and resettlement phase is equally crucial as during the time of plight. Should the overall situation improve, access to populations outside the present operational area will be gained, but this will also increase the numbers of people to be assisted. Should the possibilities for a solution to the displacement become a reality for the areas mentioned, the emergency interventions presented under CAP 2002 will be reoriented towards recovery and resettlement pending donor concurrence.

Lack of funding remains the major obstacle for effective assistance to the vulnerable population, but there is hope that donors would favour funding initiatives that support the generation of infrastructure, incomes and other forms of social security conducive to an early return of the IDPs. The Government of Uganda is responsible for protection of the IDPs, but lacks the finances and capacity to do this effectively." (UN November 2001)

IDP related activities in the 2002 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Uganda

The table below only includes planned activities in the 2002 Appeal that may have a direct impact on IDP. Several activities in the Appeal that are not included below are likely to benefit IDPs indirectly, and it is recommended to consult the 2002 Appeal document if more detailed information is needed.

Pages 29-31 give an analysis of the capacities available among the humanitarian agencies according to sector.

Pages 63-75 gives details about several agricultural projects of high importance if the return process should gain momentum

Pages 154-169 presents ongoing and planned humanitarian activities according to sector and geographical areas

OCHA's [Financial Tracking Database for Complex Emergencies](#) provides information about funding of the 2002 Appeal.

See also separate information envelope titled: [IDP related NGO activities included in the 2002 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Uganda](#).

Sector/Activity	Requirements (US\$)
FAO: Improvement of food security for vulnerable households in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts of Northern Uganda; UGA-02/A01 "Community mobilisation and beneficiary selection; procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs; training (including orientation workshops for extension workers, basic leadership skills for organising food security committee groups and managing beneficiary	US\$ 537,850

groups, draught animal power utilisation, simple agronomy of groundnuts, soybeans, cassava and other major crops, post-harvest handling techniques and marketing), monitoring and evaluation."	
FAO: Food security for Rwenzori region through emergency relief and rehabilitation in the agricultural sector (UGA-02/A02) "Procurement of agricultural inputs (seeds, tools, livestock - including goats); mobilisation and sensitisation/training of beneficiaries; distribution of agricultural inputs to beneficiaries; training Community Health Workers in HIV/AIDS prevention and care; coordination and collaboration meetings with stakeholders and humanitarian actors; monitoring of crop performance in the field; report writing; and evaluation of project performance and impact."	US\$ 802,500
UNICEF: Education (UGA-02/E01) "To promote and fulfil the rights to education and psycho-social recovery, of children and adolescents affected by conflict."	US\$ 1,000,000
WFP: Targeted Food Assistance for Relief and Recovery of Refugees, Displaced Persons and Vulnerable Groups in Uganda (PRRO 6176) /1012.00 (UGA-02/F01): see separate info. Envelope below: Maintenance of minimum acceptable nutritional and dietary standards of IDPs and refugees; Self-reliance through the creation of assets in settlements or in the early stages of resettlement; Enhanced attendance and learning capacity of children, especially girls, in re-established pre-primary and primary schools; Enhanced social support systems for extremely vulnerable and disadvantaged groups	US\$ 35,265,184
UNICEF: School and community sanitation, hygiene and water for IDP camps in Bundibugyo, Kasese, Kitgum and Gulu (UGA-02/WS01) To fulfil the rights of women and men in IDP camps and displaced Primary School (boys and girls) pupils to safe water to at least 15 litres per capita per day in 2002. Ensure special needs for girls and women on sanitation and hygiene facilities. To fulfil the rights of women and men in IDP camps and displaced Primary School (boys and girls) to safe disposal of excreta, solid and liquid waste, safe handling and use of water, and hygienic household environment in 90% IDP camps in 2002. To put in place systems to sustain operation and maintenance of interventions.	US\$ 846,000

IDP related food aid during 2002

- WFP expect the IDP beneficiary numbers to decrease from 542,000 during 2002 to 115,000 by the beginning of 2005
- Returning IDPs to be offered a three-month resettlement food package
- Recovery activities to comprise Food For Assets; educational support (school feeding); and support for social care structures.
- FFA to support the re-establishing income-generation and subsistence farming activities in resettled communities

"The protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) expansion envisages an increase in the self-sufficiency of substantial numbers of IDPs over a three-year period. Relief interventions (including supplementary feeding) and/or as a return/reintegration package, will continue to constitute the majority of food aid inputs. IDP beneficiary numbers are expected to reduce significantly to 115,000 by the beginning of the third year. By contrast, the refugee caseload will remain above 100,000, though at reduced ration levels as government land allocation enhances livelihoods.

Some 292,000 primary schoolchildren in refugee, IDP and host population areas will receive a cooked breakfast or lunch as part of an expanding programme aimed at enhancing attendance and learning. This will be linked with current government priorities under the Universal Primary Education scheme.

Opportunities to increase assets through food-based activities will be extended to some 48,000 beneficiaries in the first year of the PRRO, with a further 23,000 beneficiaries added in each subsequent year. In addition, the PRRO will assist some 11,300 individuals who are being provided with residential and/or rehabilitative care through partners, including former abductees and those assisted through AIDS service organizations.

[...]

IDP beneficiary numbers are expected to decrease significantly, from 542,000 during the first year to 115,000 by the beginning of third year. Relief needs during the initial resettlement phase will remain high as people return to face overgrown land, poorly maintained infrastructure and additional expenditure on household reconstruction. Included in the relief needs is a three-month resettlement food package for IDPs. In IDP and refugee settlements receiving WFP assistance, WFP will provide 100 percent of food needs for extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs), i.e. those without family or community support, including the disabled, orphans and the lone elderly. These persons are estimated at 19,900 in the first two years and 11,150 in the third year. The community and/or partner organizations will select EVIs, and food will be provided for them through existing distribution structures. WFP will help communities refine their targeting criteria and will provide suggestions on how those communities can further support vulnerable persons living among them. To date, between 60 and 95 percent of IDP and refugee recipients at distributions have been women.

WFP will continue to provide food commodities to supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres (SFCs and TFCs) in IDP and refugee situations when the prevalence level of global acute malnutrition indicates a need for selective nutritional intervention.

[...]

Recovery/School Feeding

Baseline surveys for the UPE scheme have recognized an urgent need to bolster attendance in previously run-down or abandoned schools. In the northern region, a further 126,000 children in IDP camps and native homestead areas will be included in the programme. In West Nile refugee catchment areas, school feeding will assist both refugee and national primary-school students in refugee-hosting sub-counties, 106,000 students in 191 schools will be assisted by year three. In Bundibugyo, the PRRO will support an estimated 60,000 schoolchildren by the second year. HIV/AIDS education will be introduced in the school curriculum through WFP partners. WFP will also advocate for HIV/AIDS education through participation within the Ministry of Education/Donor Group on Education.

Food-for-assets

The PRRO will support 48,000 persons with food for assets (FFA) in the refugee, IDP and Karamoja regions, during the first year. As resettled populations stabilize and general distribution drops, more diverse and numerous FFA projects (including food for training [FFT]) will be encouraged, with an additional 23,000 beneficiaries in the second and third years. In line with WFP's Commitments to Women, efforts will be made to ensure that at least 50 percent of FFA direct beneficiaries and owners of assets created are women. Food for work (FFW) will benefit former IDPs after resettlement in home villages and refugees phased out of general food distributions. FFT will facilitate resettlement and self-reliance through training for refugees and IDPs in skills that support sustainable livelihoods.

[...]

The largest relief operation is for IDPs in the north. There are 33 IDP camps in Gulu district and 8 in Kitgum/Pader districts. The general trend is towards more people accessing their land; their spending time in their original homes; and their leaving children, the disabled and the elderly in the camps. These people return to the camps to receive their food rations and/or for safety, when the security situation is unfavourable. The PRRO 14 WFP/EB.1/2002/8/2 projects general food distribution needs for 462,000 people in the first year, dropping to 115,000 by the third year. The figure includes resettlement food packages and continuing support to specific vulnerable individuals.

In western Uganda, WFP supports IDPs in some 46 camps in Bundibugyo. The actual total IDP figure, including those spontaneously settled in Nyahuka and Bundibugyo towns, is about 120,000. In the first year of the PRRO expansion, a working relief figure of 80,000 is envisaged, dropping to zero in the second year as home areas are fertile and anticipated rates of resettlement are high. [...] The school feeding programme locates the PRRO within a wider developmental framework for Uganda, assisting disrupted schools in re-opening and ensuring that children have at least one nutritious meal a day. The number of pupils benefiting from school feeding will increase from 258,000 in the first year of the PRRO to 292,000 in the second year, as a greater number of schools come on-line. The school feeding programme will introduce activities related to the conservation and rehabilitation of natural resources, including the introduction of fuel-saving stoves, tree nurseries and vegetable gardens.

Recovery activities for both refugees and IDPs comprise FFA (including training); educational support (school feeding); and support for social care structures. FFA is vital for re-establishing income-generation and subsistence farming activities in resettled communities. Appropriate FFW infrastructure projects will be complemented by skills training, particularly for women, in efforts to stimulate diverse means of support for the women's families. Participatory planning is central to the strategy; likewise, projects will for the most part be linked with complementary inputs from donors and the Government. Notable among such projects is the FAO-supported Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA)." (WFP 27 December 2001, pp, 3, 10-11, 13-14)

"The World Food Programme (WFP) continues to feed the displaced and refugees under the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO 6176) that ends in March 2002 with a planned extension from April 2002 – March 2005. The activities under the current PRRO and the new one range from general food distribution; school feeding of primary level pupils; food for work/assets and food for training projects; supplementary and therapeutic feeding of moderately and severely malnourished children respectively; and provision of food to orphans and formerly abducted children. Women continue to be earmarked as a priority target group in WFP operations because of their special vulnerabilities to food insecurity and offer an opportunity for using WFP assistance to build long-term food security." (OCHA January 2002)

"Re-registration of IDPs in Bundibugyo is currently going on as a joint District and WFP enterprise and it was announced that general food distribution will be discontinued as of July this year. Food distribution will only continue through school feeding and reaching especially the vulnerable part of the population for another couple of years. Active promotion for return is being done in close cooperation with the grassroot level of the community.

[...]

World Food Programme (WFP) continues to feed the displaced and refugees under the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO 6176). During the reporting period WFP distributed food to 146,197 IDPs in Gulu out of 315,966; 82,645 IDPs in Kitgum and 23,000 refugees in Achol-pii. Gulu beneficiaries get a 45-day cycle food distribution, whereas Kitgum's food distribution is monthly. Implementation of all WFP operations is done in close collaboration with government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Implementing Partners (IPs). Norwegian Refugee Council is the implementing partner for general food distribution to IDPs, whilst International Rescue Committee (IRC) is the IP for refugees in Achol-pii. WFP also provides food aid to support activities of other partners working in areas parallel to its own operations in northern Uganda, such as the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) on Food for Assets (FFA); Gulu Save the

Children Organization (GUSCO), World Vision and KICWA on feeding returned/formerly abducted children in psychosocial support centers; and others on a demand driven basis." (OCHA February 2002)

See also: IDP related food aid during 2001

Implementation of UN operations to adhere to "guiding principles" introduced in 2001

- Guiding principles "written such that the majority of agencies can agree upon them"
- Principles to be translated into "round rules"
- "Principles" reflect existing global principles for humanitarian action but are adjusted to the Uganda context

"CHAP in 2002 will [...] be guided by a set of basic and commonly agreed upon principles or standards of behaviour.

[...]

During 2002, the principles will be translated into a clear policy or set of ground rules governing:

- a) the basis upon which the humanitarian community engages with authorities; and
- b) the ground rules by which assistance will/will not be provided.." (UN November 2001, pp. 32-33)

Background:

"A voluntary set of 'guiding principles' has been included in CA 2001 to rationalise the provision of humanitarian assistance and to define minimal, universal standards of behaviour tailored to specific operating conditions in Uganda. The guiding principles are written such that the majority of agencies can agree upon them. The principles will later be incorporated in ground rules to be agreed upon with "local authorities."

[...]

With a view to rationalising the provision of humanitarian assistance and defining standards of behaviour, organisations such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement together with NGOs have elaborated several documents (Code of Conduct, Principles for Humanitarian Action) spelling out basic humanitarian principles to be abided by humanitarian actors. Because of their agency-specific content, none of these documents can be endorsed by the entire humanitarian community (UN Agencies, NGOs, IGOs). Similarly, some country-specific particularities rendered inapplicable such documents, obliging humanitarian agencies in Uganda and other countries to tailor their own Code of Conduct to ad-hoc constraints or country specific aspects. Obtaining the adherence and endorsement of all humanitarian actors can be a long process, hence the idea to define a set of most basic and commonly agreed upon principles that could be applied by a majority of agencies operating in Uganda." (UN November 2000 p.8)

Content:

"The Guiding Principles is a voluntary code, enforced by the will of international aid agencies who agree to maintain the standards set forth. The basic elements of these principles are drawn from recognised legal instruments and international law, including the 1945 UN Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims of war; the two additional protocols to the 1949 Conventions dealing with the protection of victims of international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts, the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. The other texts of reference for humanitarian assistance are the UN Security Council Resolution 1265 (17/07/99) concerning the protection

of civilians in armed conflicts, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998 and the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (the Sphere Project).

Those agencies participating in the CA for Uganda, will be guided by the following basic principles of conduct:

Humanity: Based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all individuals - without any distinction - have the right to food, health, shelter, education, and protection. Should the enjoyment of these rights be limited or impeded by a disaster, the right to receive humanitarian assistance is hence a fundamental humanitarian principle that should be enjoyed by all citizens. International aid agencies recognise their obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed, and to address human suffering wherever it is found. The prime motivation of humanitarian response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected. Further, in the pursuit of ensuring the protection of civilian populations, international aid agencies shall impartially endeavour to promote and protect human rights.

Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance shall be provided solely upon the basis of objectively ascertained needs of the disaster victims (individuals, families and communities), without discrimination as to nationality, ethnic origin, gender, race, religion, class or political opinion. Notwithstanding the right of international aid agencies to espouse particular political or religious opinions, humanitarian assistance shall not be dependent on the adherence of the recipients to those opinions. The promise, delivery or distribution of assistance shall not be tied to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.

Neutrality: Humanitarian assistance shall be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature. Humanitarian aid is not a partisan or political act and shall not be viewed as such. It has an independent status beyond political or military considerations. International aid agencies shall ensure that no warring party is able to use the agency or its assistance for its own advantage and that the provision of assistance will not be influenced by political, economic or military considerations. International aid agencies shall deal with the warring parties on equal terms and deliver assistance according to assessments based upon objective criteria.

Armed escorts will only be used as a last resort for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas of serious insecurity, e.g. where a) an interruption in humanitarian assistance is likely to cause human suffering; b) an analysis of trends in security incidents or of the motives and intentions of warring parties indicates high risk; and c) the terms of insurers of personnel and property in Uganda stipulate armed escorts as a necessary precondition for accepting liability. For UN Agencies, the Field Security Officer, in consultation with UNSECOORD, will determine the need for armed escorts on a case-by-case basis. Agencies whose policies prohibit movement with armed escorts under any circumstances will coordinate their movements with escorted agencies to avoid being in the same area simultaneously.

Independence: International aid agencies shall act independently from governments, and shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy. International aid agencies shall therefore formulate their own policies and implementation strategies and shall not seek to implement the policy of any government, except insofar as it coincides with their own independent policy. International aid agencies shall never knowingly - or through negligence - allow themselves, or their employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian. Assistance shall not be driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses, or by the political interest of any particular donor.

Participation: Humanitarian assistance shall never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme. International aid agencies shall strive to achieve full community participation in their relief and rehabilitation programmes. Wherever possible, the provision of relief aid shall be based upon the local capacities already in place to meet those needs, and

international aid agencies shall recognise that local communities have their own resources and capacities, which must be integrated into relief intervention and further strengthened.

Accountability: It is recognised that there are four stakeholders in the provision of aid assistance: the beneficiary community; the local authority; the donor and the international aid agency. Within this relationship, the international aid agencies shall hold themselves accountable to both the beneficiary communities (that their needs are met) and the donors (that assistance is provided for the proposed purpose). Local authorities, on their part, shall hold themselves accountable for the protection, safety and well being of populations living in areas over which they claim control.

Transparency: All dealings with donors and beneficiaries shall reflect an attitude of openness and transparency. International aid agencies recognise the need to report on their activities, both from a financial perspective and the perspective of effectiveness (impact of their work, and factors limiting or enhancing that impact). International aid agencies recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid distributions and to carry out regular assessments of the impact of disaster assistance. All endeavours shall be made to inform local authorities and local communities about international aid agency activities. In return, it is expected that local authorities will report honestly and fairly with regards to needs identified and populations requiring assistance. Where appropriate, separate agency arrangements shall be formulated for local authorities and international aid agencies to collaborate in the delivery of assistance. This principle shall be applied without prejudice for the security of the beneficiaries.

Coordination: International aid agencies shall ensure that their programmes are guided by strategies established through inter-agency cooperation, and shall work within the framework and mechanisms already established in the country of intervention. New international aid agencies to a region shall respect existing designated operational areas and sectors. Consultation through established coordination mechanisms shall occur before any programmed planning and intervention in an area takes place, with a view to achieving better coordination, coherence, and cost-effectiveness. Reciprocal support shall be sought through coordination mechanisms. Wherever appropriate and consistent with individual agency mandates, international aid agencies shall seek to use common area based plans for intervention, in conjunction with local authorities and communities. Inter-agency structures shall act as a self-regulatory mechanism to ensure adherence to the Principles of Conduct. Compliance with the Principles shall be achieved through transparency and consensus building.

Supporting Local Capacities: International aid agencies shall attempt to build the disaster response capacity of the local population, and, all humanitarian actions should be tailored to local circumstances and aim to enhance, not supplant, locally available resources and mechanisms. Where possible, international aid agencies will attempt to strengthen local capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible, international aid agencies will work through local authorities and aid agencies as partners in planning and implementation, and cooperate with local government structures where appropriate. Strengthening local capacity with a view to preventing future crises and emergencies is an integral part of the humanitarian mandate. International aid agencies shall therefore strive to reduce future vulnerability to disasters. Where possible, international aid agencies shall provide training and other support to build up the capacity of local authorities to administer its affairs, raise revenue, administer justice, provide law and order and welfare services, and above all to abide by international standards of human rights and good governance.

Cultural Sensitivity: Insofar as it does not contradict the principles hereby stated nor violate any human rights, international aid agencies shall respect the local culture, religion, traditions, structures and customs of the communities and shall refrain from any offensive behaviour or action in the performance of their duties.

Additionality: The GoU has the responsibility for initiating, coordinating and sustaining assistance to people in need. Aid agencies will accordingly consider official requests once needs have been objectively assessed as being in excess of government resources and response capacities. Before requesting assistance

from aid agencies, the OPM and other responsible Government departments will endeavour through parliamentary discourse to solicit extra-budgetary funding in response to man-made and natural calamities. External humanitarian assistance will in all cases be provided as an addition to, versus a substitute for, action by Government, local authorities and communities.

Commitment: The Government is expected to participate in joint assessments, programming missions and meetings; to ensure that their staff is provided remunerative salaries and allowances and that they are self-supportive and sufficiently motivated to fulfil their responsibilities. Accordingly and in order to avoid dependency and corruption, aid agencies will avoid paying daily subsistence allowances, travel allowances, sitting allowances, and otherwise covering the financial obligations of Government staff. In the same vein, relief assistance will not be bartered for access to communities, to pass through checkpoints, or to ameliorate working arrangements with local administration.

Do no harm: All relief actions affect the prospects for long-term development, either in a positive or a negative fashion. Recognising this, international aid agencies shall pay particular attention to environmental concerns in the design and management of relief programmes, and shall endeavour to minimise the negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long-term beneficiary dependence upon external aid.

Proportionality: Considerations of proportionality shall be reflected in all international aid programmes. Where resources are not sufficient, priority shall always be given to the most vulnerable communities, and to the most vulnerable individuals within communities, such as women, children, elderly, disabled, minorities and displaced. Vulnerability, as far as possible, shall be identified, defined and determined by international aid agencies working in conjunction with beneficiaries.

Professionalism and Cost-Effectiveness: International aid agencies' programmes shall be based on high standards of professionalism and expertise in order to minimise waste of valuable resources. In general, by undertaking aid operations, international aid agencies shall hold themselves accountable to the highest international standards such as those embodied in the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. While international aid agencies will cooperate with the media in order to enhance public response, they shall not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of maximising overall relief assistance. International aid agencies shall avoid competing among each other for media coverage in situations where such coverage may be to the detriment of the service provided to the beneficiaries or to the security of humanitarian staff or the beneficiaries. They will conserve funds by co-location or sharing common premises, telecommunications, vehicles, staff and other resources. Where possible, they will seek to pool, compliment and focus their resources for maximum impact and cost-effectiveness." (UN November 2001, pp. 179- 181)

IDP related response by NGOs

IDP related NGO activities included in the 2002 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Uganda

The table below only includes planned activities by international NGOs that have been included in the 2002 Appeal, and that may have a direct impact on IDPs. Several Some NGO activities in the Appeal that are not included below are likely to benefit IDPs indirectly, and it is recommended to consult the 2002 Appeal document if more detailed information is needed. See OCHA's [Financial Tracking Database for Complex Emergencies](#) for information about funding of the 2002 Appeal.

Activity	Requirement
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	s (US\$)
AFRICA 2000 NETWORK-UGANDA: Sustainable agriculture for improved land production in Bundibugyo and Kasese Districts (UGA-02/A08) "To enable households to improve nutrition and income through skills development, provision of farm inputs and information dissemination."	US\$ 291,500
HUNGER ALERT: Fish Farming Project for Internally Displaced Persons in Gulu district UGA-02/A10 The proposed project aims to introduce fish farming by establishing a fish-breeding centre that will supply fish fry commercially to the 240 beneficiaries. The fish-breeding centre will be established and managed by Hunger Alert at Bungatira village, about six kilometers from Gulu town.	US\$ 159,070
HUNGER ALERT: Rice production initiatives project for the rehabilitation of war-affected people in Gulu District, Northern Uganda (UGA-02/A11) "To generate income from rice growing in order to facilitate re-settlement of war-affected people and reduce poverty"	US\$ 201,000
NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL: Support to return, resettlement and reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts, Uganda (UGA-02/ER/I02) "Increase the number of returnees to the villages and strengthen the sustainability of the local communities: (1) support the IDPs' efforts to rehabilitate communal structures like schools, access roads, smaller bridges/culverts and shallow wells, by providing necessary materials for rehabilitation; (2) provide grass for thatching until the long grass is available; (3) provide individual assistance for vulnerable groups such as orphans, child-headed households, elderly, disabled, etc.; (4) enable children to attend schools in the villages by giving them assistance; (5) stimulate and facilitate former and current IDP food production activities in the return and resettlement phase..."	US\$ 401,000
ACTIONAID-UGANDA: Education emergency response (Rwenzori, Kitgum and Katakwi Projects (UGA-02/E02) "To increase displaced children's access to basic education, to train school financial management committees, to promote peace education and to establish adult literacy programmes."	US\$ 1,000,800
OCKENDEN INTERNATIONAL: Education support to traumatised Internally Displaced Persons and refugees in Northern Uganda (West Nile and Gulu) (UGA-02/E03) "Counselling; Pyscho-Socio Training; Life Skills Training of the traumatised women, men and youths in IDP camps"	US\$ 350,000
SAVE THE CHILDREN NORWAY : Education Support to Internally Displaced Children in Katakwi district (UGA-02/E04) "Enable displaced children in camps to access basic education through provision of temporary classrooms, classroom furniture and equipment, teaching/learning materials, training of teachers in appropriate teaching methodologies and sensitisation of community members on child rights and the value of education in difficult circumstances."	US\$ 374,000
OXFAM GB: Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity Building (UGA-02/P/HR/RL01) "(1) To enhance the preparedness capacity and humanitarian response of government and local NGOs. (2) To advocate for IDP rights and provisions, ensuring that there is more sensitivity and responsiveness by government and key donors."	
ACTIONAID-UGANDA : Protection and Human Rights (UGA-02/P/HR/RL04)	US\$ 191,200

Strengthen the capacity and raise awareness of local NGOs, CBOs, and other civil society institutions on human rights issues Alleviate human suffering by the most vulnerable Promote and protection of human rights especially for women in situations of armed conflict	
CANADIAN PHYSICIANS FOR AID AND RELIEF: Safe Water and Sanitation Project for Internally Displaced Persons in Gulu District (UGA-02/WS03)	US\$ 136,834
"To improve the health status of IDPs living in 10 protected camps in Gulu through the development of safe water facilities."	

NGO initiatives to promote IDP rights (2002)

- Oxfam GB project to promoting awareness and recognition of IDPs rights
- ActionAid to work in partnership with grass-roots organisations and government line departments in the districts

"Oxfam GB regional programme plan prioritises capacity-building as one of the areas to focus on in the humanitarian crisis areas. This programme seeks to enhance the capacity and preparedness of key stakeholders (government and non- government) in ensuring effective and coherent response in the country. The programme is designed along the themes of preparedness, protection and quality response, and focuses on five areas: (1) promoting development of early warning systems and policies for perennially drought affected areas; (2) promoting awareness and application of alternatives when free food is not appropriate; (3) promoting awareness and recognition of IDPs rights and situations; (4) supporting the development of disaster preparedness plans for two-piloted conflict affected districts of Kitgum and Katakwi (plans for western Uganda conflict affected areas were already developed by OCHA); and (5) promoting awareness and application of international humanitarian principles and provisions by humanitarian agencies, including national and local NGOs.

Oxfam GB in Uganda will lead the implementation process. However, the project is to be based in the Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugees to maximise collaboration, learning and capacity-building. This will involve recruiting a Programme Officer to be based in the Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugees. Oxfam will maintain a line management responsibility for guidance and support. The Officer will also maintain a matrix management responsibility with the Ministry, and joint planning will be enhanced between Oxfam, the Ministry and selected joint implementing partners (for example, OCHA, WFP, Etc). The details of this model will further be discussed with the Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugees. Oxfam GB in Uganda has a similar model with the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP), which is in the Ministry of Planning and Finance." (UN November 2001, p. 113)

"The main focus of the ActionAid programme is to build peace and mitigate the effects of conflicts that have rocked the Rwenzori region, Kitgum and Katakwi districts for the many years. ActionAid has responded by supporting education of the displaced children in camps, improving health services through raising awareness on sexual rights and health rights (SRHR), providing care and support for HIV/AIDS and supporting the search for peaceful solutions through peace-building initiatives at community, district and national levels.

ActionAid worked with local partners and CSO to promote peaceful means as a response to ending the rebellion and cattle rustling in northern, western and north-eastern Uganda. The insurgency has resulted in heavy losses in civilian lives and disruption of socio-economic developments in Bundibugyo, Kitgum, and

Katakwi, which caused extensive psycho-social trauma and stress and leading to breakdowns in the community coping mechanisms.

ActionAid will work in partnership with grass-roots organisations and government line departments in the districts in order to raise the voices of the voiceless and implement the humanitarian, human rights, protection and integration programmes. These are local council structures (i.e. local policy making government structure in the community), Peace building Initiatives, DDMCs at all levels, women groups, theatre clubs, elders councils, school management committees. In addition, the media, government troops (UPDF) and other peace-building-related networks will be engaged to support processes leading to conflict resolution and sustainable peace." (UN November 2001, p. 118)

WFP to strengthen partnerships with NGOs (2002)

"WFP will seek and strengthen partnerships with NGOs. Tripartite agreements will be signed with UNHCR and NGO implementing partners in the five refugee hosting districts. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) will be negotiated with AAH (Bundibugyo/Moyo districts), Lutheran World Federation (Adjumani), Norwegian Refugee Council (Gulu/Kitgum), Gulu Support the Children Organization (Gulu), International Rescue Committee (Acholi Pii refugee settlement) and German Development Service (Arua).

Other NGO partners include *Médecins sans Frontières* (MSF)/France (Therapeutic Feeding and Food for Work in Bundibugyo; Sleeping Sickness in Arua), *Action contre la faim/USA* (nutritional surveys), World Vision International (WVI) (former abductees rehabilitation centre; HIV/AIDS support programme; and support to farmers' groups in Gulu), Maltheser (TB project in Arua), Gulu Women's Empowerment Network (TB project in Gulu) and Kitgum Concerned Women's Association (formerly abducted children). Cooperazione Internazionale/Italy will provide seeds to IDPs in Bundibugyo. *Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst* (German Development Service) (in Arua) and the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (in Adjumani and Moyo) will undertake agricultural production and environmental protection initiatives with refugee populations. The country office is in the process of identifying appropriate partners in Karamoja. The country office will explore the possibility of a joint performance review for partners and incorporate this into the MOU. Greater emphasis will be given to strengthening the capacity of community distribution committees, including through ensuring female participation and leadership. (WFP 27 December 2001, p. 17)

Kacoke Madit (KM) – an organisation of the Acholi community in exile working for peace (1996-2000)

- KM was established in 1996 by Acholi people living in the 'Diaspora'
- Peace initiative dedicated to the restoration of peace to Northern Uganda by peaceful means

"Kacoke Madit (KM) was established in 1996 by Acholi people living in the 'Diaspora' in response to the escalation of the N. Uganda conflict. It is a peace initiative dedicated to the restoration of peace to Northern Uganda by peaceful means. It has now grown into a world-wide network of community groups, organisations and peace initiatives working together to end the conflict and to promote reconciliation. The initiative has helped to establish and to build the consensus among Acholi people, other Ugandans and the international community at large, for the conflict to be resolved by peaceful means.

In addition to its peace-making role, KM provides a forum for the development of post war plans and strategies to meet the socioeconomic and development needs of the war-ravaged districts and the rehabilitation of education, health care, communication and other infrastructure.

'Kacoke Madit' is an Acholi phrase, which means "Big Meeting or Big Conference". The name was originally coined in reference to the first conference organised by KM in 1997.

The Origin of KM

In 1995, Acholi community in North America unsuccessfully lobbied the Uganda North America Association (UNAA) to include the conflict in Northern Uganda on the agenda of their 1995 Convention in Chicago. They therefore held a separate meeting during the Convention at which they agreed to call a meeting involving all members of the Acholi community of North America to discuss the conflict between LRA and the Uganda Government.

The meeting took place the following year during the UNAA convention in Toronto Canada, (August 30 - September 2 1996), under the chairmanship of Dr. Ben Ochora Latigo. It was attended by Dr. Martin Alier, who was then the Uganda Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Regional Cooperation). The meeting produced a 9-point resolution, which was delivered to President Yoweri Museveni by Dr. Alier. President Museveni did not respond to this initiative, and attempts to get a response were unsuccessful.

It was also proposed in Toronto that an all-Acholi Meeting should be organised in London, United Kingdom. In late 1996, following circulation of the proposal, and widespread consultation, a team of volunteers from the Acholi community in the United Kingdom formed the London Organising Committee. They elected Dr Patrick Oguru Otto as Coordinator, and embarked on the task of organising the first Kacoke Madit (KM).

The first Kacoke Madit (KM97)

The first Kacoke Madit took place in London, United Kingdom on the 5th and 6th April 1997. It was attended by more than 300 delegates from Uganda, the USA, Canada, the UK, Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Kenya. The main objectives of the conference were to raise awareness of the conflict in N. Uganda, to exchange views on the causes and consequences of the conflict and to determine the most viable and practical means of bringing the conflict in Northern Uganda to a speedy end. The Uganda government was represented by the Ministers for State for Foreign Affairs, Dr Martin Alier and for Northern Uganda, Mr Alphonse Owiny Dollo, while the LRA sent their Secretary for External Affairs and Mobilisation, Dr James Obita and 2 other members of the LRA/M High Command.

The conference produced an eleven-point resolution, which principally called on the Government and the LRA to cease hostilities and to embark upon a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

The Second Kacoke Madit (KM98)

KM98 built on the achievements of KM97. It was held between the 17th and 19th July 1998 in London, UK again. In view of the setbacks experienced in implementing the 1997 resolutions, and unsuccessful attempt by the government and the LRA to establish a viable negotiation process in 1997 and 1998, the theme, '*Removing the Obstacles to Peace*' was adopted for the conference. The conference was attended by more than 300 delegates from all sectors of the Acholi communities, as well as many non-Ugandan individuals and representatives of Governments and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

KM98 identified the main obstacles to peace and proposals to overcome them, which were encapsulated in the 11-point conference resolution. The conference also re-affirmed the delegates' commitment to pursuing a peaceful resolution as stipulated at KM97." (KM 2000)

Several local NGOs undertaking peace building activities at the community level (2000)

"The Church of Uganda conducts a Peace and Human Rights Programme, which started in the north and north-east but has been extended to west-Uganda. Several peace and human rights training sessions to raise

the consciousness of civil society have been conducted. The Planning, Development and Rehabilitation Department of the CoU is associated with Responding To Conflict, based in Birmingham, UK, and works closely with Action by Churches Together (ACT) in Geneva.

A community peace-building programme in the Gulu district in northern Uganda is run by the NGO People's Voice for Peace. Here, trainers in conflict resolution help victims to cope with conflict and to build peace. Support for income-generating activities is part of the programme. The coordination of the community peace-building activities is being done through its Peace and Oral Research and Testimony Documentation Centre. Networking and collaboration with other peace actors within the civil society (local groups, churches, social movements, and traditional institutions) is seen by PVP as essential. Presently the Gulu-based organisation is expanding its activities to neighbouring districts, due to the high demand especially in the area of support to women victims of war.

Under its Popular Human Rights Education project, the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) has made several interventions aimed at the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the country. In July 1997 it organised a three-day conference at the Gulu District Council Hall on the conflict in northern Uganda.

Yamii Ya Kupatanisha (JYAK) is the Ugandan branch of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR). It has set up the Gulu Vocational Community Centre for boys and girls. Many of the pupils are returnees from Sudan who had been abducted by LRA rebels. At the Gulu Centre, they are offered vocational training and peace education is also part of the programme. JYAK is also preparing trainers for peace initiatives at the individual and community level. The organisation emphasises the role of youth and women as peacekeepers.

A number of NGOs have begun trauma counselling programmes for the children caught up in the conflict. The Concerned Parents of Abducted Children (CPAC), for example, have worked with UNICEF and the church in Uganda to get their children back. The CPAC campaigns nationally and internationally for the release of the children and draws attention to the plight of all children in Uganda caught up in war. In December 1998 Angelina Acheng Atyem, a member of the organisation, won the UN Prize in the Field of Human Rights.

The Centre for Conflict Prevention is an Uganda-based NGO seeking alternative and creative means of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. The Centre trains key figures and professionals in conflict prevention and resolution skills, besides other skills like community development, office management and decision-making. The trainees are encouraged to transmit the same skills to people in the community and workplace in turn. Many of the trainers are women who held influential positions in society. The Centre also provides counselling services to traumatised children and young people

ACORD Uganda has been running extensive programs in the north for at least a decade. In March 1997 it organised a two-day conference in Kampala on conflict resolution in the north, with a host of national and regional invitees.

Uganda has a wide variety of NGOs operating in the country. They are obliged to register with the Nongovernmental Organisations Board. NGOs thought to be opposed to the government have sometimes had difficulties in obtaining their registration." (EPCPT December 2000)

Improves food security for Gulu/Kitgum IDPs related to seed and tool distribution programme by ICRC (1999-2001)

- Seed distributed to 63,422 families in March 1999
- Programme has facilitated a partial phase-down of general food distribution
- Reports of active farming activity in Kitgum during first half of 2001

"In Acholiland, where the ICRC maintains a permanent presence of four expatriates and 30 national staff, activities concentrate on 320,000 displaced people, the majority of whom have been displaced since the end of 1996/beginning of 1997. The main focus is on agricultural assistance for the population in Gulu (19 camps) and in Kitgum districts (9 camps) helping people to achieve economic security.

To this end, a seed distribution for 63,422 families was carried out in March. In conjunction with the Ugandan Red Cross Society (URCS) a total of 760 tons of seeds (maize, beans, sorghum, ground nuts), 62,000 vegetable seed kits and 68,000 hoes were distributed together with soap. The seed package aims to provide 2,182 kilocalories and 81 grammes of protein per person per day for a period of six months. At the end of May the first technical assessment was carried out by the ICRC to study germination rates and seed quality and the second focused on food security and access to agricultural land. It appears that land access in both Gulu and Kitgum has improved in comparison with recent years and there have been sufficient quantities of rain, therefore the harvest at the end of June is expected to be very good. If the security situation does not deteriorate, the displaced peoples' food security should be guaranteed for the next six months. " (ICRC 29 June 1999)

"ICRC's successful seed and tool distribution programme, along with repatriation and resettlement in northern Uganda, and NGO-supported income-generating activities, have permitted a partial phase-down of general food distribution in favour of recovery activities. This has conserved food resources, allowing current WFP operations to be extended until the proposed PRRO commences on 1 April 2000. WFP's ability to phase down food assistance was largely attributable to the timing and impact of ICRC's agricultural inputs." (WFP 6 January 2000, p.8)

"It is reported that in Kitgum, most IDPs and refugees are busy clearing land and others opening land for the first season of the year. The area has started receiving rains. The few who managed to embark on vegetable productions along the stream are now busy harvesting tomatoes, Irish potatoes, cabbage, eggplants, and okra seeds distributed by ICRC. The main sources of income in the camps are from sale of their own farm produce and since its dry season they are busy making bricks either through paid labour or selling the bricks to get some money. Other coping mechanisms are small-scale fishing, hunting and gathering wild green vegetables. However, there is a serious land shortage for the IDPs, as most of them cannot own land because of insecurity and the host community is unwillingness to give them bigger plots." (OCHA April 2001)

"Seed Distribution Programme:

Following an assessment carried out by the ICRC agronomist in the beginning of 1999, the ICRC conducted a major seeds and tools distribution for displaced people in Acholiland. With the help of the Uganda Red Cross Society volunteers, food crop seeds, hoes, vegetable kits and soap were distributed to more than 308,000 people. In addition, in Kitgum district, 8,820 newly displaced people in two villages were assisted with seeds, hoes, blankets, jerry cans and soap.

Assistance in the South-western Region:

After having received the necessary security guarantees, in June the ICRC carried out an assessment in 20 of the 46 camps for displaced people in Bundibugyo district. Many of them lack adequate shelter facilities and are facing clean water supply problems. Hygiene standards have been affected and the dangers of cholera epidemics have increased.

Following this assessment, the ICRC decided to provide emergency assistance covering the most urgent shelter and hygiene needs. The health delegate in Bundibugyo carries out weekly checks on infectious diseases, and provides ad hoc assistance in the Bundibugyo district hospital. The water and sanitation engineer will also evaluate the appropriate response to the problem of access to clean water.

Support to Health Facilities:

The ICRC supplies surgical kits and medicine to government and private hospitals in the Kitgum and Gulu districts and in Kasese when these facilities lack sufficient stocks to treat influxes of war-wounded." (ICRC 26 January 2000)

International Rescue Committee assisting IDPs in Kitgum since 1998

"The IRC [International Rescue Committee] began working in Kitgum District of Northern Uganda in 1998 in response to the immense needs of children who had escaped from the rebel army. The IRC has also been working to address the critical need for sanitation services and clean water for the estimated 130,000 displaced people in Kitgum District. In January 2000, the IRC expanded the scope and nature of its assistance program by taking over management of a large refugee camp in Kitgum.

IRC activities range from emergency relief, to rehabilitation, to development and are based on an integrated, district-wide strategic plan to restore and rebuild the lives of displaced and refugee communities.

[...]

Since August 1998, the IRC has worked with displaced communities in Kitgum District to construct more than 4,000 family latrines, greatly improving sanitary conditions in crowded IDP camps. We are also constructing latrines in schools that are hosting thousands of displaced pupils. Health and hygiene education, especially directed at children, is a strong component of the sanitation program. The IRC is also repairing dozens of water wells around Kitgum district and training local committees to better manage their water resources." (IRC 2000)

Efforts by Oxfam to improve conditions in "protected villages" (1997-99)

" During 1997 Oxfam accomplished the provision of water and sanitation facilities to all camps and the distribution of knitted tops and tents. Water was installed in two of the camps using motorized bore-holes. To improve sanitation Oxfam facilitated the construction of community pit latrines, waste pits and hygiene education, and trained 75 Community Health Workers to monitor sanitation work and water sources. Oxfam's work in Kitgum was based on the premise that security would improve to a degree that Oxfam could work in an operational capacity within the district and that the displaced would be able to return to their home villages.

Insecurity has not waned. Consequently, Oxfam has renewed its intervention in Kitgum. The cost of the motorised pumps has proved to be expensive, effected by the continued insecurity, and is beyond the means of the community. Oxfam will now construct ten hand Augured Shallow wells and six motor drilled deep wells fitted with hand pumps, and until complete will continue to finance costs of the motorised pumps. Oxfam will also provide water equipment to local water sanitation committees in order to improve access and amount of water for the displaced and neighbouring local community. Provision of tools also aims to increase the construction of more pit latrines per household as opposed to communal latrines. The replacement of motorised pumps will mean that the poorest have access to water even when Oxfam phases out its emergency work. Moreover, these extra water sources will increase the accessible amount of water per person per day to ten litres.

Oxfam identified a new need in Kitgum town to cater for people who are displaced at night from feeling unsafe in the suburbs. Five VIP latrines will be constructed in two local hospitals." (Oxfam 05 February 1999, pp. 2-3)

Reference to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Analysis of the "Protected Villages" with the Guiding Principles as reference (March 2002)

- Prolongation of forced encampment seem arbitrary
- Lack of clarity if IDPs may or may not leave the "protected villages" seem to contradict a number of core personal freedoms
- Complaints about lack of reaction or preventive measures against destruction and looting of property and possessions
- Reason for concern but no direct evidence of punitive treatment of the Acholi on ethnic grounds

Only extracts from the analysis included here. It's recommended to read the complete chapter in Weeks' report (March 2002, pp. 26-35)

" Finding 1:

While the establishment of the "Protected Villages" may have been justifiable on grounds of military exigency in 1996, their prolongation into 2002 would seem to be inconsistent with international humanitarian principles.

In the UN "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement", Principle 6 states as follows: "(1) Every human being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence. (2) The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement...(b) In situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand; ...(3) Displacement shall last no longer than required by circumstances". [Emphasis added.]

While the LRA is still an active menace to civilians, it seems to have been sub-stancially weakened in recent years. The "imperative military reasons" that presumably led to the establishment of the villages would thus seem to have re-ceded accordingly, while the situation with regard to the security of civilians would appear to vary considerably from one area to the next, making the blanket prolongation of forced encampment to seem arbitrary and to reflect a failure to fully examine possible alternatives.

[...]

Finding 2:

The arbitrary nature of the forced encampment of the majority of the people of Acholiland, and the lack of clarity as to the circumstances under which they may or may not leave the "protected villages", for example to pursue agricultural activities in their home areas, would seem to stand in contradiction of a number of core personal freedoms.

Though all of the interviewees with whom the consultant spoke expressed a passionate desire to return home as soon as feasible, many recognized that the circumstances now were not right, and that as long as insecurity continued to prevail they would choose to remain in the camps until (for example) "guarantees of security" could be given by the authorities. Many of these would doubtless choose to remain in the villages even if a blanket green light for a return home were given.

But many others feel passionately that the time to return is now. Guiding Principles 14 states: "(1) Every internally displaced person has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to chose his or her residence. (2) In particular, internally displaced persons have the right to move freely in and out of camps or other settlements."

[...]

Finding 3:

Most or all property and possessions of the internally displaced, including houses, have been destroyed or looted. Personal security in the “protected villages” is often poor, with attacks, abductions, rapes, lootings and other violent acts being committed variously by LRA assailants, by UPDF elements, by free-lance bandits, and by other village residents. While there is no evidence of a deliberate official policy to incite or encourage such acts, residents complain that too little is done to prevent them or to hold perpetrators accountable.

Guiding principle 11 (2) holds that “internally displaced persons, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, shall be protected in particular against: (a) rape, mutilation, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, another outrages upon personal dignity, such as acts of gender-specific violence, forced prostitution or any form of indecent assault.’

Guiding Principle 21 (2) states: ‘The property and possessions of internally displaced persons shall in all circumstances be protected, in particular, against the following acts: (a) Pillage; (b) Direct or indiscriminate attacks or other acts of violence....’

[...]

Finding 4:

Prolonged, enforced encampment of the Acholi threatens the basis of their economic system.

According to Principle 9, “States are under a particular obligation to protect against the displacement of indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other groups with special dependency on and attachment to their land.”

As a long-established agro-pastoral society, the Acholi have such a dependency, and their displacement is consequently far more destructive, socially and economically, than might be the case for, say, a more urbanized population.

Finding 5:

There is no direct evidence that the Acholi displaced are being targeted for punitive treatment on ethnic grounds.

Principle 6, (2) (a) and (e), is relevant here: “The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement: (a) when based on policies of apartheid, “ethnic cleansing” or similar practices and at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious, or racial composition of the affected population...(e) When it is used as collective punishment.”

When combined with the history of tension and mutual suspicion between the Acholi and the central government mentioned previously in this report, the very fact that Acholiland is ethnically so homogeneous (virtually all the displaced are presumed to be of Acholi origin and ethnicity) and so distinct from the rest of the country must raise some concerns. Loose talk noted among government officials in Kampala adds to the concern: at a super-ficial level, remarks are often made that, taken out of context, could be interpreted as laying collective blame on the Acholi for, for example, the actions of the LRA. If this came to reflect a clear pattern of thought, as opposed to being mere passing expressions of frustration, it would raise the matter of enforced encampment in Acholiland to the very highest level of international concern and invite a level of scrutiny that the circumstances do not at present appear to warrant.” (Weeks March 2002, pp. 26, 27, 28)

Workshop on "The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" organised in March 1999

- The workshop called for strengthening Government assistance to and protection of IDPs and for greater coordination between government and relief organizations.

- A core conclusion from the workshop was that as human beings, IDPs have human rights that include rights to greater protection and involvement in decisions affecting their lives

"At a workshop examining the application in Uganda of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, participants called for greater attention by the national and international community to the needs of IDPs in Uganda, including those not living in IDP camps.

The Office of the Prime Minister - Minister for Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, and the Norwegian Refugee Council hosted a 3 day workshop, 29-31 March, which brought together District officials from Gulu, Kitgum, Kasese and Kabarole, IDPs from Gulu, Kitgum and Masindi and a number of NGOs, UN agencies and the ICRC.

The workshop called for strengthening Government assistance to and protection of IDPs and for greater coordination between government and relief organizations. A core conclusion from the workshop was that as human beings, IDPs have human rights that include rights to greater protection and involvement in decisions affecting their lives. Participants also concluded that strategies aimed at long term self-reliance for IDPs should be sought.

Regarding the military, there was a call for greater discipline, and training and sensitization in international human rights and humanitarian law. Participants also recommended the dissemination of the Guiding Principles more broadly to affected communities. The workshop appealed to the international community to increase attention to the conflicts presently affecting Uganda and to provide greater resources to IDPs both during their displacement as well as during resettlement." (UNHCU 17 April 1999, p. 5)

See also the final report from the workshop (NRC April 1999)

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADF	The Alliance for Democratic Forces
DMI	Directorate of Military Intelligence
DDMC	District Disaster Management Committee
DHT	District Health Team
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FFA	Food for Assets
FHH	Female Headed Household
FUNA	Former Uganda National Army
FCU	Field Coordination Unit
HACU	The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit
ISO	Internal Security Organization
LDU	Local Defense Unit
LRA	The Lord's Resistance Army
MDP/R	Ministry of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees
MHH	Male Headed Household
MoH	Ministry of Health
NALU	National Army of the Liberation of Uganda
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UHRC	Uganda Human Rights Commission
UNDMT	United Nations Disaster Management Team
UNLA	Ugandan National Liberation Army
UPDA	Uganda People's Defense Army
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Forces
UPC	Uganda People's Congress Party
UPE	Universal Primary Education
UNRF	Uganda National Rescue Front
WNBF	The West Nile Bank Front

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