



## **PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : ANGOLA**

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## **PROFILE SUMMARY**

### **Context**

The sheer magnitude of the problem of internal displacement in Angola is numbing. The figures are staggering and the conditions that surround them nearly unimaginable. At the end of 2001, the UN put the total number of persons displaced since the beginning of the decades-long conflict at 4.1 million – a third of the country's 12 million inhabitants (UN November 2001, p. 10). Working estimates in 2001 cited a figure of over three million IDPs since 1998 (UN November 2001, p. 10; UN OCHA 31 August 2001, Population movements).

The only thing more alarming than the figures themselves is the context in which they exist. The statistics are disturbing:

Angola is the most heavily mined country in the world with an estimated eight to ten million landmines (UNICEF 2001, Country background);

Nearly half of the Angolan population is under-nourished (Marc Dubois September 2001);

Infant mortality is the second highest in the world with one in three children dead before the age of five (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

Only 30% of the population has access to safe water (Oxfam September 2001)

Four-fifths of the population do not have access to essential drugs (Dubois September 2001)

Life expectancy is 44 years (Dubois September 2001)

It is in this extremely precarious environment that at least three million people – among them young families, unaccompanied children, and the elderly - are on the move.

### **Background**

Since the country's independence in 1975, Angolans have seen little peace. A protracted conflict between the Government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has ravaged the country for the better part of forty years. The worst of the fighting in Angola broke out in 1992 following the electoral victory of the government ruling party, MPLA, and its subsequent rejection by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). From 1992 to 1994, between 1.3 and 2 million persons were forced to flee their homes (Deng 10 November 2000, sect. II). By 1994, it was hoped that the Lusaka Peace Protocol might end the violence, but this did not prove to be the case. The demobilization of UNITA troops envisaged by the peace process was never completed and sporadic fighting continued throughout the country (USCR 1998). All-out war resumed by the end of 1998.

In 2000, the government succeeded in regaining control of several traditional UNITA strongholds, but these military feats failed to combat the chronic insecurity plaguing the country. In response to the strengthening government offensive, UNITA resorted more readily to guerrilla tactics in order to meet its military aims. As a result, rapid infiltration attacks as well as hit-and-run ambushes became more commonplace during 2000 and early 2001 (UN OCHA 30 April 2001; UN November 2000).

By mid-2001, UNITA seemed to have moved away from guerrilla tactics in favour of terrorist warfare, becoming increasingly involved in kidnappings and the deliberate targeting of civilians. One stark example was the UNITA attack, on 10 August 2001, on a civilian train in Cuanza Norte province resulting in the death of over 400 persons. Witnesses report that the train was derailed by an anti-tank mine, and that passengers attempting to escape the accident were killed by UNITA soldiers laying in wait (Action for Southern Africa 5 September 2001, 5 October 2001).

The death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi at the hands of government troops in February 2002 added new impetus to the peace process. (IRIN 24 & 28 February 2002). After a shaky start - with fighting ongoing as peace talks between the two sides got underway in the eastern Moxico province in March - the Angolan

government and UNITA did finally sign a ceasefire agreement in April (UN News Service 1 April 2002). At the same time, humanitarian organizations warned that even in the event of lasting peace, the humanitarian challenges facing the war-ravaged country are enormous (IRIN 1 April 2002).

### **Figures**

Given the length and pervasiveness of the conflict in Angola, there has been a near-continuous mass movement of people in the country for years (Oxfam September 2001). OCHA reports that between 1998 and 2001, approximately 3.59 million people were internally displaced. Of this number, only 1.34 million have been confirmed by humanitarian partners and are receiving assistance (UN OCHA, 31 January 2002). Approximately 320,000 IDPs continue to live in camps and sub-standard transit centres (UN OCHA 8 February 2002).

Provinces with the largest concentrations of IDPs include Bié, Huila, Malanje and Huambo - with the most significant displacements occurring in Bié province, as a result of military operations (UN OCHA 31 January 2002). At the beginning of 2002, UN OCHA reported that the total number of displaced persons in Bié province had increased to over 181,000, with a further deterioration in the humanitarian situation there (UN OCHA 24 January 2002).

### **Conditions of displacement**

The traditional movement of displaced populations has been from rural areas to state-controlled provincial capitals. In the absence of sustained and effective government services, resident populations - already impoverished by the effects of the war - have been forced to shoulder the burden caused by the massive levels of displacement (UN November 2001).

During flight, communities and families are often separated from each other. Movements of IDPs in Bié Province have revealed that many women are left to flee on their own with their children since their husbands are fighting for government or UNITA forces (WFP 12 July 2001, IRIN 23 November 2001). More than 100,000 children are estimated to be separated from their birth families throughout the country (UN OCHA 7 March 2002). As has been the case throughout the conflict in Angola, a significant number of IDPs are persons who have been forced to flee several times during the course of the conflict (Andrade 2001, MSF 2 July 2001).

Though IDPs have found some protection in provincial capitals, persons in all areas have been vulnerable to attack, rape, kidnapping and forced conscription by UNITA and government forces (UN OCHA 22 May 2001; CHR 25 January 2001). With terrorist attacks by UNITA in 2001, as well as "cleansing" exercises by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) designed to "starve out" UNITA rebels, it has been increasingly difficult to guarantee the security of civilians nearly anywhere in the country (Action for Southern Africa 5 October 2001; Mail and Guardian 20 August 2001). Women and children are naturally the most vulnerable populations. Women have been subject to sexual harassment and forced into marriage and prostitution; children - of which one million are internally displaced - have been forcibly recruited and victim of kidnappings and sexual assault (UNICEF 2001, Country background; IRIN-SA 14 June 2001; CHR 25 January 2001; NRC September 2000).

Towards the end of 2001, the UN reported that tens of thousands of newly displaced persons in interior regions were thought to be on the brink of starvation. An estimated 500,000 people in need were reportedly living in areas inaccessible to international agencies, with more than 200,000 believed to be in acute distress (UN November 2001). Acute malnutrition was reported in at least nine locations with high concentrations of IDPs (UN OCHA 7 March 2002). Vaccine-preventable diseases, as well as a sharp increase in HIV/AIDS were also contributing to the very high morbidity and mortality rates among IDPs in these locations. Some of the worst living conditions in the country were reported to be in the 22 transit centres and warehouses in seven provinces that remain open, accommodating some 17,500 IDPs (UN OCHA 8 February 2002). Agencies estimate that 90 percent of displaced communities use contaminated water sources, resulting in potentially fatal waterborne diseases (UN November 2001).

### **Return and resettlement**

Following the adoption of the Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Persons by the Government of Angola in October 2000, humanitarian agencies hoped that resettlement to safe areas would continue and even accelerate in 2001. Following the publication of the Norms, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) formed a technical working group to develop a set of legally binding operating procedures for the implementation of the Norms at the provincial level (UN OCHA 28 February 2001). However, an intensification of fighting in the central highlands in 2001 constrained return and resettlement movements, and compliance with the Norms was uneven at best (UN OCHA 22 May 2001). By the end of 2001, approximately 498,500 IDPs had been resettled in temporary areas over the previous three years. Compliance with the Norms was reported to have increased to nearly 70 percent (UN OCHA 31 December 2001, 8 February 2002). However, the continuous new displacement meant that instead of sub-standard transit centres and warehouses being closed by the end of 2001 as planned, four new centres opened in Huambo in January 2002.

### **Access**

Throughout 2001, widespread insecurity, airstrips in poor condition and dangerous roads continued to hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid to war-affected populations. The situation was further exacerbated by the deliberate targeting of aid organisations. In May 2001, sixteen World Vision staff members went missing following the UNITA attack of Golongo Alto in Kwanza Norte province (WV 21 May 2001). In June, two WFP food aid aircraft came under missile-fire attack near Kuito (WFP 15 June 2001). As a result, 60% of humanitarian relief had to be transported by air (UN OCHA 22 May 2001). However, by the time the Angolan government and UNITA signed the ceasefire agreement in April 2002, WFP reported that due to stronger army escorts and increasing prospects for peace, about 60 percent of humanitarian aid was being delivered by road and 40 percent by air - quite a dramatic change in a short space of time (IRIN 3 April 2002).

### **National and international response**

While the Government of Angola provides some minimal assistance to displaced populations, observers consider its efforts far below what they should be, its attitude as one of "neglect" (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 35). At the end of 2000, several humanitarian NGOs released reports pointing the finger at the Government of Angola, arguing that it had the resources to look after its people if only it cared to do so (The Economist 11 January 2001). In a rare briefing of the UN Security Council in March 2002, NGOs including MSF and Human Rights Watch again criticized the government (as well as UNITA) for failing to fulfil its responsibilities to populations under its control (MSF; HRW 5 March 2002). Indeed, the Government of Angola would seem to be in a much better position to aid its citizens than most other African countries. The country is extremely rich in resources: it is the second largest sub-Saharan oil producer and the fourth largest producer of diamonds in the world. However, revenues from these industries would appear to benefit only a very select few (Oxfam September 2001).

The UN appealed for US\$ 232,768,6669 for emergency programmes and humanitarian sectors in 2002 (UN November 2001). However, by April 2002, still only 50 percent of the 2001 CAP was funded. The UN linked the slow response to humanitarian appeals for Angola to the expectation by some donors that the Government of Angola would allocate additional resources from oil revenues to social sectors (UN OCHA 22 May 2001).

As of 2001, the humanitarian operation in Angola comprised 10 UN agencies, 100 international NGOs and more than 340 national NGOs. Numerous government ministries and departments were also involved in humanitarian assistance. Overall coordination of the humanitarian operation continues to be by the government Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) and by UN OCHA (UN November 2001).

*Updated April 2002*

# CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

## Background to the conflict

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### 30 years of war since independence (1963-1994)

- Independence war (1963-1974)
- Post-independence war (1974-1992)
- Post-multiparty election war (October 1992-November 1994)
- Post-multiparty election war is most devastating to Angolan people

"Angola has known little peace in the past 30 years. It has experienced three wars, the independence war (1963-1974), the post-independence war (1974-1992) and the post –multiparty election war (October 1992-November 1994) when UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebels rejected electoral defeat and returned to conflict.

[...]

The post-multiparty election war (October 1992-November 1994) was the most devastating: the UN estimates that more than 300,000 died, 3 per cent of the population. At its peak in 1993, as many as 1000 people were dying daily from conflict, starvation, and disease – more than in any other conflict in the world at that time. By September 1994, the UN Secretary General reported that there were 3,7 million Angolans, mostly displaced and conflict-affected, in need of emergency supplies, including essential medicines, vaccines and food aid. [...] Th[is] war was notable for widespread systematic violations of human rights by both the government and the UNITA rebels. In particular, indiscriminate shelling of starving, besieged cities by UNITA resulted in massive destruction of property and the loss of untold numbers of civilian lives. Indiscriminate bombing by the government also took a high civilian toll. The US deputy assistant secretary for African affairs noted at that time that: 'This type of warfare bears mainly, cruelly and disproportionately on the populace, which is caught between the warring parties.'" (Vines 1998, pp. 89-90)

*For a detailed review of the conflict in Angola see chapter III "Background" of the Human Rights Watch report "Angola Unravels - the Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process" (September 1999)*  
[\[External link\]](#)

### Signature of the 1994 Lusaka Peace Protocol fails to end violence (1994-1997)

- Persistent reports of banditry, obstruction of free movement, continuation of fighting, human rights violations, and acquisition of arms
- Government and UNITA continue to acquire new arms
- Despite monitoring by the United Nations Peacekeepers (UNAVEM III), demobilization process of UNITA troops remains incomplete
- Civil war in Zaire is significant factor in power struggles

"Following the signing on 20 November 1994 of the Lusaka ceasefire protocol between the Angolan government, led by the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the UNITA rebels, Angola has been on a tortuous path to reestablish peace and security. Although a new Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) was inaugurated on 11 April 1997, sporadic fighting continues,

including the laying of landmines by both sides. Widespread human rights abuses by the government and UNITA continue, including conscription of child soldiers and the intimidation and detention of journalists. Movement around the country is difficult. By September 1997, as confidence in the peace process deteriorated, old checkpoints had been reactivated and new ones set up on both government and UNITA areas. Acts of banditry have also escalated. The government in 1997 continued to acquire new arms in contravention of the Lusaka Protocol, the 1991 Bicesse accords and UN Security Council resolutions.

The civil war in neighbouring Zaire was a significant factor in the power struggle in Angola during 1997. UNITA had been supporting President Sese Seko Mobutu of Zaire in return for supply lines for arms and a marketing route for diamonds. In February and March the MPLA sent two battalions of Katangese Angolans (originally from Shaba province in Zaire) to help Laurent Kabila, the leader of the rebel forces in Zaire. In June 1997, Kinshasa fell to the rebel forces and Zaire became the Democratic Republic of Congo. The immediate impact on Angola was that UNITA became more vulnerable as the Kinshasa government shifted its alliance to Luanda. In May and June, Angolan government forces invaded 10 per cent of UNITA-held diamond areas in Lunda Norte in order to reduce UNITA's power base in the northeast and to expand the diamond-producing areas held by the government." (Vines 1998, p. 90)

"In 1995, a nearly 7,000-strong UN military force, known as UNAVEM III, entered Angola to monitor implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, including the disarmament and demobilization of UNITA troops. During 1996, thousands of UNITA troops assembled at UN sites throughout the country. However, many were only part-time soldiers or civilians whom UNITA forced to pose as soldiers, according to observers. Only about half of the UNITA 'troops' who arrived at assembly areas carried weapons, and tens of thousands subsequently deserted. Many observers contended that UNITA still possessed significant military capacity 'including an estimated 15,000 to 25,000 troops' in Angola's northeastern Lunda Provinces and in neighboring Zaire (later renamed Democratic Republic of Congo). . .

[...]

[International observer mission] MONUA also confirmed the existence of armed UNITA soldiers, verified forced recruitment of new UNITA troops and 'remobilization' of demobilized UNITA troops, and reported other irregularities in the demobilization process." (USCR 1998, p. 50)

*For a detailed review of the Lusaka process and its failure, see chapter IV "The Lusaka Peace Process" and chapter V "Undermining the Lusaka Peace Process" of the Human Rights Watch report "Angola Unravels - the Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process" (September 1999) [\[External link\]](#)*

### **All-out war resumes in Angola by end 1998**

- Demobilization of UNITA troops as well as civilians sympathetic to the government is unsuccessful
- Fighting intensifies in the north and east of the country
- 200,000 persons newly displaced as result of fighting at end of 1998/early 1999
- UN decides to pull out MONUA observer mission in February 1999

"During 1998 the Angolan peace process unravelled. The União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), National Union for the Total Independence of "Angola, had failed to comply with the Lusaka Protocol (1994) requirements to allow the state to extend its authority over UNITA-controlled territory and to stand down and disarm its estimated 20,000 to 30,000 troops. The government had failed to fulfill its task of disarming civilians who had been given arms during previous periods of conflict and militia groups, banned under the peace agreement, increased in numbers. From March 1998 the security situation began to deteriorate. Fighting between government and UNITA troops increased, particularly in the north and east and in the central highlands, and armed attacks on villages and ambushes occurred in many other parts of the country. In December, government aircraft attacked UNITA's strongholds of

Andulo and Bailundo in the central highlands and UNITA attacked the cities of Kuito, Huambo and Malange. As a result of the fighting in December 1998 and January 1999 hundreds of people were killed and over 200,000 displaced." (AI February 1999)

***By 1999, security situation is so unstable that UN pulls out all peacekeeping forces:***

"In a report to the Security Council on 24 February [1999], the Secretary-General stated that the humanitarian situation had 'attained the devastating proportions which could be compared to the humanitarian catastrophe in Angola during the fighting in 1993 and 1994'. He added that 'in the prevailing situation, the humanitarian principles of unrestricted access to affected populations, independent assessment and monitoring, and safety and security of humanitarian personnel, are not being met. In order to achieve these objectives, a clear and unequivocal commitment is necessary by all concerned to respect the provisions of international humanitarian law'.

On 26 February, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1229 (1999), which took note that the mandate of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Angola expired on that day. At the same time, the Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation for the liquidation of MONUA and decided that MONUA's human rights activities should continue through the liquidation period." (OCHA 4 March 1999)

***For a detailed review of the actions of the United Nations in Angola, see Chapter X "The United Nations" of the Human Rights Watch report "Angola Unravels – the Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process (September 1999) [External link].***

***Please find at UN website the full text of the 24 February 1999 report of the UN Secretary General [External link] and the UN Security Council Resolution 1229 (1999) [External link].***

### **UN Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions established to prevent violations by UNITA (2000-2001)**

- International sanctions imposed against UNITA since 1997
- UN Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions established in April 2000
- Members of Mechanism visited Angola in November 2000 and again in February 2001
- Mechanism recommended a permanent capability to ensure on-going sanctions monitoring

"The Monitoring Mechanism was established by the Security Council on 18 April [2000] to collect information on violations of the sanctions against UNITA and recommend ways to improve their implementation. Its members were Ambassador Juan Larrain of Chile (Chairman), Ambassador Lena Sundh of Sweden, Ms. Christine Gordon of the United Kingdom, Mr. James Manzou of Zimbabwe and Mr. Ismaila Seck of Senegal." (DPI 28 December 2000)

"The Mechanism was formed in July 2000, with the mandate to follow up leads initiated by the Panel of Experts, collect new information and investigate leads, and develop a mechanism to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of sanctions on UNITA.

It got off to a slow start due to wrangling over its role, but in the final months of its investigations it made considerable headway in uncovering links between UNITA and the international trade in diamonds and arms." (Action for Southern Africa 5 January 2001)

"Members of the sanctions-monitoring mechanism established under Security Council resolution 1295 (2000) visited Angola in November 2000 and again in February 2001. They met with several senior Government and State corporation officials, including some former UNITA generals, as well as members of the diplomatic community. As confirmed by the Government of Angola (S/2001/123), the sanctions seem to have contributed to efforts aimed at eroding the military capability of UNITA. However, there are worrying indications that some unidentified planes have been violating Angola's air space in the Cuando Cubango province to deliver supplies to UNITA, and that representatives of UNITA continue to raise funds through the illicit sale of diamonds." (UNSC 11 April 2001, para. 12)

"The Security Council this afternoon [19 April 2001] extended the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions until 19 October and requested it to provide a supplementary report by that date [it submitted its first report in December 2000].

[...]

As it unanimously adopted orally revised resolution 1348 (2001) today, the Council also requested the Secretary-General, acting in consultation with the Security-Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola, to appoint up to five experts to serve on the Monitoring Mechanism and to make the necessary arrangements to support its work." (UNSC April 2001)

***The Mechanism recommended the establishment of a permanent monitoring body in its supplementary report of October 2001:***

"260. The experience of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA has shown that there is a need for establishing a permanent capability of the Security Council to ensure ongoing monitoring of targeted sanctions regimes and illicit trafficking in high-value commodities in armed conflicts.

261. Such a new unified facility under the authority of the Security Council would maintain the political momentum gained in recent years on the question of sanctions enforcement and in the fight against the illicit trafficking fuelling armed conflicts. It would be cost-effective, and would avoid duplication of tasks and overlapping of investigations and ensure the preservation of a comprehensive database as well as its systematic and continuing processing. It would also perm it the establishment of permanent and fruitful working relations with technical and regional organizations such as Interpol, ICAO, SADC, ECOWAS, OAU, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the World Customs Organization, all of which are essential partners in an effective implementation of sanctions.

262. In the case of Angola, a monitoring capacity has been in place since July 2000. Any gap in the monitoring process would afford a respite to sanctions violators and would be detrimental to the effectiveness of sanctions. The monitoring of illicit trafficking in high -value commodities involved in armed conflicts of which the Security Council is seized is intrinsically related to the question of sanctions monitoring. The lack of enforcement of sanctions and embargoes and the perpetuation of illicit trafficking have the same negative impact on the perpetuation of conflicts. Experience and data accumulated by the various panels of experts appointed in the past two years have shown that sanctions violations and illicit trafficking involve the same patterns of illegal activities and similar criminal networks.

263. A permanent monitoring capability will also strengthen the enforcement of sanctions, because it will act as a deterrent to potential violations. In this regard, the Mechanism has been able to appreciate the importance of this function and its positive effect. This also sets the ground for obtaining the cooperation of States in complying with the sanctions." (UNSC October 2001)

***For more detailed information on UNITA sanctions enforcement, see the first report of the UN Monitoring Mechanism on Angolan Sanctions issued in December 2000 [\[External link\]](#) as well as UN Security Council draft resolution 1348 extending the Mechanism's mandate to October 2001 [\[External link\]](#). Refer also to the Mechanism's Supplementary Report of October 2001 for details on UNITA structures and trafficking mechanisms [\[External link\]](#).***

## **Arms to UNITA allegedly provided by Bulgaria, Ukraine and Romania via Togo and Burkino Faso (January 2001)**

- UN Monitoring Mechanism exposes arms sales to UNITA via Togo and Burkino Faso
- End-user certificates forged in many cases

*The following information comes out of the UN Sanctions Monitoring Mechanism report of December 2000:*

"The [UN] Monitoring Mechanism found that Bulgaria and the Ukraine had been major suppliers of weapons to UNITA, but appears to accept that some weapons were sold in good faith on the basis of the end-users certificates to Togo and Burkino Faso.

However, the Mechanism's report does not tackle the issue of why these countries were prepared to sell Togo and Burkina Faso such large quantities of weapons, which on the face of it do not meet their current military needs – for example, Bulgaria shipped 6,300 RPG-7 anti-tank rockets to Togo.

The mechanism points out that Bulgaria, Ukraine and Romania have wide-ranging legislation governing various aspects of the export of arms.

However, Bulgaria exported \$14 million worth of weapons between 1996 and 1998 on the basis of forged end-user certificates, with Togo as the stated destination. Forensic examinations carried out on these certificates on behalf of the Mechanism found that they were forgeries, but the Mechanism concludes that the forgeries were based on a legitimate end-user certificate issued by Togo to one of UNITA's senior arms procurers, Marcelo Moises Dachala 'Ambassador Karrica'.

Romania provided the Mechanism with evidence that it had exported \$776,000 worth of weapons to Togo and Burkino Faso between 1996 and 1999. Burkina Faso denies ever issuing the end-user certificates, but the forensic examinations found that 'the end-user certificates featuring Burkina Faso as the country of origin were authentic.'" (Action for Southern Africa, 5 January 2001)

## **UNITA forces move from guerrilla to terrorist warfare in 2000/2001**

- UNITA returns to guerrilla tactics after losing ground to government troops early in 2000
- Guerrilla warfare results in greater overall insecurity for Angolan people
- By 2001, UNITA is targeting civilians in terrorist attacks and mass kidnappings

*2000:*

"One of the most important factors affecting the humanitarian operation in 2000 was a change in military tactics, with a shift early in the year to guerrilla warfare. In 1999, shelling occurred frequently in major provincial capitals including Huambo, Malanje and Kuito. During 2000, the most common form of attack was rapid infiltration, usually involving looting, followed by immediate withdrawal. Insecurity in the countryside increased, particularly in prospective resettlement sites. In a disturbing trend, several previously secure locations, where recovery activities were either underway or scheduled, were attacked." (UN November 2000, 2000 in Review, para. 2)

"[T]he report states that 'before the Government offensive in September 1999, it was possible to talk about UNITA-controlled areas, this is less relevant today, in a situation where UNITA is operating as an

insurgent force. To speak about Government-controlled areas and areas not under Government control does not seem to give a good description of today's situation, because areas under Government control still exist where UNITA is able to operate." (Action for Southern Africa 5 January 2001)

"During the first quarter of 2000, the government appeared to be in the ascendance on the battlefield and UNITA appeared disoriented, its actions limited to sporadic guerrilla attacks. As the year progressed, this changed, with UNITA adapting back to guerrilla attacks and high-profile hit-and-run ambushes on main roads...

The level of UNITA violence against civilians increased significantly as UNITA's tactics changed during the year. In January, as the FAA approached Chinguar town, UNITA embarked upon a killing spree, aimed at ensuring that residents would not be captured by government forces. Some 140 soldiers and civilians were reportedly killed. UNITA was also reportedly responsible for extrajudicial executions in localities such as Camaxilo in Lunda Norte, Katchiungo in Huambo, and Quimbele in Uige.

Deliberate mutilations have not been commonplace in the Angolan conflict, but the number of incidents increased during the year, with UNITA forces reportedly cutting off ears and hands. The purpose appears to have been to send a warning to others not to betray UNITA, or to attempt to flee to areas controlled by government forces. It was a response to the rebels' greater isolation and battlefield losses." (HRW December 2000, Human Rights Developments)

#### **2001:**

"The number of kidnappings and murders by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement increased sharply in May [2001], drawing widespread condemnation both inside Angola and internationally. The recent attacks have indicated that the remnant of UNITA is shifting away from classic guerrilla tactics towards unashamedly terrorist warfare.

The most publicised atrocity took place on 5 May, when two hundred UNITA soliders attacked the city of Caxito, 60km north of Luanda. It is not clear how many civilians were murdered during the attack. Some reports put the number at 79, whilst the African Church Information Service puts the number at around 200. [...]

Straight after the attack on Caixito, one group of fifty soliders attacked an orphans' home run by the Danish agency Development Aid from People to People (ADPP). The rebels sacked the orphanage, and took 60 children hostage, along with a teacher. Two teachers are reported to have been killed. Also murdered during the attack was an Angolan doctor from the Italian NGO, the Committee for the Co-ordination of Volunteering Organisations.

[...]

The attacks on civilians have continued to grow, leading senior Angolan military figures to point to a change in UNITA's strategy.

The operational commander of Bie province, Brigadier Eugenio Figueiredo, told Radio Ecclesia on 23 April that the strategy was to seize weapons and food using small mobile units to attack poorly defended villages: "This is not like the old guerrillas – rather, these are ones who are trying to find means of survival and material goods to sustain themselves. The old guerrillas were more compact because they had the assistance of the people who worked on the farms. They do not have such assistance, and therefore they have to steal to survive" said Figueiredo

[...]

While terror has always been a central feature of Jonas Savimbi's approach – both for internal control and external objectives – latest events highlight that the remnants of UNITA's military units are now acting in a purely terrorist manner. This is for a combination of practical military and logistical reasons (a lack of food and diminishing local civilian support) and a desperate attempt to, paradoxically, strengthen the widely held opinion that they must be dealt with at the negotiating table.

The change in strategy is away from Jonas Savimbi's belief in the doctrine of Maoist guerrilla warfare, which puts the central emphasis on the belief that 'the revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilising the masses and relying on them.' (Action for Southern Africa 7 June 2001)

"8. UNITA has increased its terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. It has attacked schools, buses and trains. It has shot at people fleeing to escape from the flames of a burning explosion. It has shot at World Food Programme planes carrying not weapons but desperately needed food and humanitarian supplies. Sadly, such instances are far too numerous to cite here." (UNSC October 2001)

### **UNITA attack of civilian train is strongly condemned by international community (August-October 2001)**

- Civilian train derailed by anti-tank mine in Cuanza Norte province
- Over 400 persons killed, some of who were murdered by UNITA forces when jumping from the train
- U.N. has condemned the "terrorist" attack in the strongest terms

"There has been widespread condemnation of an attack by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA rebels on a civilian train on 10 August, which left over 250 [later confirmed at 422] people dead and another 160 [later confirmed at 229] injured.

The train was an ordinary scheduled service from Luanda to Dondo, consisting of four passenger carriages, two freight trucks and two oil tanks. It was derailed when it hit an anti-tank mine near Zenza do Itombe, Cuanza Norte province. Witnesses state that UNITA rebels were lying in wait, and many people were murdered as they jumped from the train." (Action for Southern Africa 5 September 2001, Revulsion over train massacre)

"The number of people murdered by UNITA during the attack on a train on 10 August is now reported to be 422 confirmed deaths, with 229 people still missing and unaccounted for.

The train had been travelling from Luanda to Dondo when it was attacked near Zenza do Itombe, Cuanza Norte province. UNITA has admitted that it attacked the train, but denies that many civilians were killed.

However, in the current climate UNITA's terrorist attacks have rebounded on themselves. A statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council on 20 September (S/PRST/2001/24) warned that 'the Security Council condemns in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks by UNITA forces on the civilian population of Angola. It stresses that such attacks are unacceptable and cannot be justified by any political goals. The Council reminds their perpetrators that such acts are in violation of international law and may have further implications'." (Action for Southern Africa 5 October 2001, Train massacre toll rises)

*For details of the U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement on Angola, please refer to original document [\[External link\]](#).*

### **Chronology of the conflict since independence (1975-2000)**

- UNITA, MPLA and FNLA already at odds at time of independence in 1975
- Country is wracked by fighting until 1994 when ceasefire accord signed
- UNITA fails to respect ceasefire; international sanctions imposed in 1997
- Continued fighting fueled by UNITA diamond revenues since 1998

"Key events of the conflict that has left at least 500,000 people dead are as follows:

### **1975**

*Nov 11:* Angola wins independence from Portugal but is already wracked by conflict between the pro-Soviet People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), both backed by the United States and Zaire.

Apartheid South Africa had in October sent troops to back UNITA against the MPLA, which had major support from Cuba.

### **1979**

*Sept 20:* Jose Eduardo dos Santos succeeds the late president Agostinho Neto.

### **1984**

*Feb 16:* Angola and South Africa sign a deal calling for a South African withdrawal to be completed in 1988.

### **1988**

*Aug 8:* South Africa, Cuba and Angola agree on ceasefires in Angola and in Namibia as part of a regional peace pact.

*Dec 22:* The largely US-brokered New York treaty among the same three parties opens the way to Namibian independence and agreement between Cubans and Angolans on the withdrawal of Cuba's 50,000 troops in Angola.

### **1989**

*July:* Fighting resumes, despite a June 22 ceasefire between the government and UNITA.

### **1991**

*March 26-30:* New laws introduce multi-party politics and guarantee civil liberties.

*May 30:* The UN Verification Mission (UNAVEM), in Angola since late 1988, is extended to monitor the ceasefire and organise general elections.

*May 31:* The government of Dos Santos and the rebels of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi sign peace accords to end the civil war.

### **1992**

*Sept 29-30:* General and presidential elections take place under UN supervision and are carried by the MPLA.

Dos Santos fails to carry the presidential poll in the first round. Savimbi refuses to admit defeat at the polls and renewed war breaks out.

### **1993**

*March 6:* UNITA takes control of Angola's second city Huambo, after battling since January in a campaign that left 12,000 dead.

*May 19:* The United States, which backed UNITA between 1975 and 1991, recognises Dos Santos' regime.

*Oct 6:* UNITA recognises the 1991 peace deal and the elections' outcome.

*Nov 15:* Direct negotiations between government and UNITA begin.

### **1994**

*March 31:* UNITA agrees to a second round of presidential elections as fighting continues.

*Nov 20:* Government and UNITA representatives in Lusaka sign another ceasefire agreement.

### **1995**

*Feb 8:* UN Security Council agrees to send a 7,000-strong peacekeeping force to Angola.

*May 6:* First summit between Dos Santos and Savimbi in Gabon.

*May 18:* Savimbi declares that he accepts the September 1992 election results and in June he announces "the end of the war in Angola."

## **1996**

*Nov 13:* Parliament abolishes the post of vice-president after Savimbi refuses to take it up.

## **1997**

*April 11:* Formation of a national unity and reconciliation government.

*Oct 30:* The UN imposes sanctions against UNITA for failing to respect the ceasefire.

## **1998**

*March 11:* UNITA is officially recognized as a political party.

*Sept 2:* Influential UNITA members split from Savimbi, prompting the government to end its dialogue with UNITA and to recognize only the splinter group.

*Late 1998:* All-out warfare resumes.

## **1999**

*Jan 29:* Dos Santos extends his presidential powers.

*Feb 26:* United Nations ends its observer mission in Angola due to resumed fighting.

## **2000**

*March 10:* A UN report accuses some African leaders of fueling the war through diamond and arms trading in violation of sanctions.

*Aug 18:* Intense fighting breaks out in eastern Angola.

*Oct 2:* MPLA calls off elections due in 2001 because of ongoing fighting, angering opposition parties." (AFP 9 November 2000)

## **Angola President dos Santos announces he will not run in next elections (August 2001)**

"Angolan President José dos Santos announced on Thursday [24 August 2001] that he would not stand as a candidate in the next presidential election. Addressing the central committee of the ruling MPLA party in Luanda, Dos Santos said the party should prepare to find a candidate for the next electoral contest, which he said could take place in 2002 or 2003. 'It is clear that the name of that candidate will not be José Eduardo dos Santos,' he said." (IRIN-SA 24 August 2001)

"In a step that could offer Jonas Savimbi an honourable exit from political life, the President of Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, has announced that he will not stand in the next presidential elections.

[...]

The government is keen to go ahead with elections in 2002, but there is growing debate over whether the conditions will exist for voters to freely express their will." (Action for Southern Africa 5 September 2001, President to step down)

## **Savimbi's death adds new impetus to peace process – leading eventually to ceasefire agreement between the warring parties (April 2002)**

- Jonas Savimbi, veteran leader of the UNITA rebel movement, is killed by Angolan government troops (FAA), in the eastern Moxico province, on 22 February 2002
- Hopes are raised for an end to the fighting - although some fear that UNITA might split into many factions and that fighting would continue

- President dos Santos calls for a ceasefire on 13 March 2002
- Peace talks between Angolan government and UNITA commanders take place in Moxico province in March, but ongoing fighting forces more civilians to flee their homes
- Aid agencies reiterate warnings that their resources are already overstretched and that they do not have the capacity to deal with further large influxes of IDPs
- Ceasefire agreement is signed by Angolan government and UNITA in April 2002

"The death of veteran Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi has added new impetus to the search for a settlement to the country's long-running civil war, analysts told IRIN over the weekend.

Savimbi was killed on Friday by Angolan government troops (FAA) after a fierce gun battle near Lucusse, about 700 km east of Luanda, the capital. His 'column', hunted by the FAA, was reportedly headed for the Zambian border. State television on Saturday showed the body of the 67-year-old guerrilla chieftain, who had led the UNITA rebel movement since 1966, sprawled on a makeshift table. The authorities said his corpse would be publically displayed in Luanda.

'I'm so optimistic. The nightmare has ended and the future has just begun,' Dinho Chingunji, spokesman for the anti-Savimbi UNITA-Renovada faction in the United States told IRIN.

There are, however, question marks over whether UNITA commanders in the bush will continue fighting, or if Savimbi's death could clear the obstacles to a peace agreement." (IRIN, 24 February 2002)

"While the international community has called for a rapid cessation of hostilities in Angola, on the ground the conflict between government forces and UNITA rebels has continued.

On Wednesday US President George Bush, after a meeting with his Angolan counterpart Jose Eduardo dos Santos in Washington, said 'we agreed that all parties have an obligation to seize this moment to end the war', and that 'Angolans deserve no less than peace'.

The European Union (EU) presidency, Spain, said in a statement this week that in light of the recent death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, 'it is the strong conviction of the EU, that the end of the Angolan conflict can only be achieved through an effective engagement of all in peace and national reconciliation, on the basis of the Lusaka protocol'. While the EU 'welcomes the positive signals from the government of Angola to date and looks forward to the early publication of the announced detailed programme leading to a definitive end of all the hostilities in Angola', some humanitarian officials on the ground believe Angola's suffering could continue for some time yet.

One aid worker told IRIN it is expected that the government, sensing it may finally have the upper hand militarily, will intensify their efforts to wipe-out UNITA. 'I expect this will lead to more IDPs (internally displaced persons) and an unpredictable response from UNITA. The worst case scenario is that we will have a Somali situation with (UNITA splitting into) many factions.'

Supporting the sentiments of the EU, the official said: 'The best move for government now is to try and pull UNITA together, though I'm not sure they'll do that. The military solution is what the military wants, the heads of FAA (Angolan Army) are saying they want a military solution, lets hope wisdom prevails.'

On Monday, dos Santos called for a ceasefire, shortly thereafter a UNITA attack killed several people and dashed hopes for an immediate peace." (IRIN 28 February 2002)

"Peace talks between the Angolan government and rebel UNITA commanders continued on Friday in the eastern province of Moxico as on-going skirmishes force people to flee their homes.

A diplomatic source told IRIN that the UNITA commanders were being kept under close watch in the city of Luena. 'They [UNITA delegation] can walk in and out of their houses but they are being closely monitored and they won't be able to just leave,' the source said.

Information on the content of the talks has thus far been slow to trickle out. 'Not even high-ranking government officials know anything about it at all, there's no information coming out about the peace talks,' said the source.

UNITA member of parliament Jaka Jamba said: 'All we can say now is that the talks are aimed at [reaching agreement] on a cessation of hostilities. UNITA has reinforced its delegation [led by General Abreu Kamorteiro] with its secretary for information, Marcial Adriano Dachala. The government delegation is headed by FAA's [Angolan Army] deputy chief of staff, General Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda.'

The World Food Programme (WFP) has meanwhile warned that the influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) into cities would further stretch aid agencies already limited resources." (IRIN, 22 March 2002)

"Welcoming the recent signing of a ceasefire agreement between the Government of Angola and the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the United Nations envoy to the country has reiterated the UN's support in helping to establish peace in the war-torn nation.

The ceasefire accord 'concludes a first phase of a process, which we all want to be irreversible and which we all want to bring peace to Angola,' Mussagy Jeichande, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Representative to the country, said in a statement to the signing ceremony on Saturday in Luena.

'Peace is a process, which requires an open and sincere dialogue,' Mr. Jeichande said. 'It is the only way to achieve the true reconciliation of the Angolan family.'

Mr. Jeichande also reiterated the UN's readiness to 'help that peace, democracy, progress and social welfare become realities available for the Angolan nationals.'

Meanwhile, Mr. Annan's Special Adviser for Africa, Ibrahim Gambari, is set to arrive tomorrow in Angola on a fact-finding mission to examine the current peace process and clarify the UN's role in it, a UN spokesman said Monday in New York.

Mr. Gambari will also seek to encourage the parties to take full advantage of the recent positive developments in Angola to move the peace process forward under the Lusaka Protocol." (UN News Service, 1 April 2002)

## **Main causes of displacement**

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### **Guerrilla ambushes and small-scale attacks have forced millions from their homes (1999-2001)**

- Both UNITA and FAA counter-insurgency measures responsible for displacement
- Indiscriminate shelling and banditry by both sides have been main causes of displacement in 1999 and 2000

#### **1999:**

"In early January 1999, between 30 and 40 people were killed in Malange when UNITA forces shelled the city in broad daylight. Observers reported that this mortar shelling, by mobile units based less than 21 kilometres away, appeared to deliberately aim at the city's heavily populated market places in an attempt to force civilians to flee. The killing and wounding of unarmed civilians through indiscriminate shelling is a breach of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions." (AI February 1999, "Human rights abuses in the context of the fighting since beginning of December 1999")

"A spokesman for the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) told IRIN that growing instability in Angola was forcing people to flee their homes creating new influxes not only in the besieged government-held provincial capitals, but in the capital Luanda, itself. He said people had been fleeing mainly to the Central Highlands cities of Huambo and Kuito, Benguela further south, Malanje east of Luanda, Cuito Carnavale in the southeast, Luena in central Angola, and the northern city of Uige.

[...]

An analyst in Luanda said people were fleeing not only from regular skirmishes between government troops and UNITA rebels, but because they knew both sides were preparing for the dry season offensive." (IRIN 14 May 1999)

"UNITA attempted to prevent civilian populations from fleeing some areas under its control while successfully forcing hundreds of thousands in other areas to flee to government-held towns. UNITA's strategy of forced population displacement seemed designed to burden the government with humanitarian responsibilities and to detract from the government's military response." (USCR 2000 Annual, p. 65)

### **2000:**

"28. ...[I]t is important to note, as did the inter-agency mission, that the responsibility for displacement falls on both the government Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) and UNITA. The Government and the FAA are reported to displace forcibly the civilian population as a counter-insurgency strategy or as a short-term security measure to protect civilians. Other reports indicate that indiscriminate shelling by the FAA and the circulation of false information have resulted in the displacement of civilians. Allegations of similar practices have been levied against UNITA. There are also reports that UNITA forcibly displaces civilians to Government-controlled areas in order to increase pressure on government resources.

[...]

82. Displacement results from civilians fleeing their villages as a result of, or in order to avoid, such practices as those above [human rights abuses, forced conscription and the like]. Often the displaced will spend several days hiding in the bush before attempting to move to safer locations such as major towns or provincial capitals. Displacement also results from civilians being deliberately forced from their homes and having to carry the very items which have been looted from them. It also results from families fleeing or sending their children to government controlled areas in an effort to protect them from forced recruitment by UNITA. The Representative was particularly alarmed by reports that children are being abducted and traded by UNITA to work as forced labour in salt mines in Malanje province. Local NGOs and church groups who may have access to salt mines are encouraged to collect additional and more detailed information which should be brought to the attention of the national authorities and the international community.

83. Displacement of the civilian population is also reported to result from the FAA 'mopping up' and counter-insurgency operations, which are expected to increase in intensity. Reports indicate that FAA troops employ many of the same tactics as UNITA, such as looting villages and forcing the inhabitants to carry the food and other possessions which have been looted from them. Accounts from internally displaced persons suggest that villagers who refuse to comply with such demands risk being beaten or killed. The Representative was informed on a number of occasions that part of the problem in this regard is that the FAA troops often receive neither their salaries nor sufficient supplies and are thus inclined to prey on the local population. A senior government official readily conceded to the Representative that this was a problem. In an effort to prevent such practices, the Government needs to ensure that its military personnel receive regular salary payments and supplies of food and basic equipment." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 28, 82, 83)

### **Floods in early 2001 have led to displacement of thousands of families (April 2001)**

- UN estimated that nearly 10,000 persons were displaced by torrential rains in southern provinces of Benguela, Namibe and Cunene
- State media puts number of those displaced by floods at 20,000
- Government later noted that as many as 38,000 persons were displaced in Benguela province

"Floods caused by torrential rains in southern Angola have forced 9,500 people from their homes, a UN report released Friday [20 April 2001] said.

State media had put the number at about 20,000. The displaced people had to flee their villages in the southwestern province of Namibe, where the Bero and Giraul rivers burst their banks and flooded several neighborhoods of Namibe town and several outlying villages.

An assessment team sent by the United Nations and aid groups said regions in Cunene, Huila and Namibe provinces could face a food crisis because floods have destroyed huge swaths of farmland, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

[...]

The floods have compounded Angola's long-standing humanitarian disaster caused by the unrelenting 25-year civil war." (AFP 20 April 2001)

"Heavy rains and flooding during April caused extensive damage in Benguela, Namibe and Cunene provinces affecting over 70,000 people. In Benguela province, the authorities reported 9,300 houses destroyed and over 38,000 people displaced." (UNICEF 21 June 2001)

### **Government development plans lead to forcible evictions from Luanda inner-city district (July 2001)**

- Forced removals from Boavista began on 1 July 2001
- Several hundred members of community now living in tents 30 km outside Luanda
- Evidence that Boavista has been earmarked for redevelopment by a subsidiary of the state oil company, Sonangol

"Forced removals from Boavista began on Sunday 1 July, in an operation accompanied by hundreds of armed police, and have continued every weekend since then. Several hundred members of the 50,000 strong community are now living in tents at Viana, 30 km outside Luanda. The government intends to continue with the removals until Boavista has been completely evacuated.

Many of those who were forced to move have had to give up their jobs in central Luanda, since their return bus fare to the city would cost 20 kwanza (about US\$1) – almost an entire day's wages for some workers. The wealthier residents had invested tens of thousands of dollars in their homes, and received no compensation when they were destroyed.

The government has promised land and building materials for the construction of new houses, but many residents are sceptical about this. The tents have been set up supposedly as a temporary measure. In the absence of any other source of income, the residents of the camp have little choice but to work on the building site where their new houses are supposedly to be constructed. They receive no payment for this, and are dependent on staple foods handed out by the authorities.

The authorities say the removals are being carried out because landslides have made the Boavista houses unsafe. Although some structures close to the cliff edge did indeed collapse during rains earlier this year, residents argue that most of the houses are safely built. There is evidence that the Boavista site, which

enjoys a central location and spectacular sea views, has been earmarked for redevelopment by a subsidiary of the state oil company, Sonagol." (IRIN-SA 24 July 2001)

"For city authorities, the standoff over Boa Vista has degenerated into a mini-conflict in this war-ravaged nation, after police tried to forcibly evict residents last week and ended up killing two people who refused to budge.

The city has tried to lure residents away, noting the squalid living conditions in Boa Vista and the environment dangers they face from the chronic mudslides caused by unusually heavy rains during the last two years.

[...]

The tent city is 45 kilometers (25 miles) outside the city center, making it closer to the town of Catete, which has suffered several UNITA attacks already this year." (AFP 6 July 2001)

### **Terrorist warfare by UNITA and "cleansing" operations by FAA forces cause fear and displacement (June-October 2001)**

- Terrorist tactics and kidnappings by UNITA puts civilian populations on alert
- Government "cleansing" operations force still inhabitants from their homes

#### ***UNITA troops:***

"The number of kidnappings and murders by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement increased sharply in May [2001], drawing widespread condemnation both inside Angola and internationally. The recent attacks have indicated that the remnant of UNITA is shifting away from classic guerrilla tactics towards unashamedly terrorist warfare." (Action for Southern Africa 7 June 2001)

"Throughout September there have been sporadic attacks by UNITA around Angola. Whilst some of these attacks were acts of banditry aimed at stealing clothes and food, other are acts of terror to deny any normality to the Angolan population." (Action for Southern Africa 5 October 2001)

***For a list of reported attacks by UNITA in the last two months, see Angola Peace Monitor Issue No. 1, Vol. VII [\[External link\]](#).***

#### ***FAA troops:***

"A human catastrophe is under way in the war-torn central highlands of Angola, amid claims that the government of Eduardo dos Santos is deliberately 'cleansing' large areas of its village population in order to starve Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels out of existence.

In recent months, tens of thousands of villagers have been displaced in Unita's heartland Bie province by the Angolan army as part of a policy of denying Unita access to the food it levies from villages under its control.

[...]

The claim by aid workers in the field and by Western diplomats in Luanda that the government is encouraging the crisis is supported by dozens of displaced villagers. It also comes as large numbers of starving villagers continue to be displaced daily by heavy fighting in Bie province and gathered into massive camps without sufficient food or shelter.

'Government troops are rounding up whole villages when they reach them and forcing the inhabitants to leave Unita areas so that they cannot feed the Unita soldiers. Then we are being expected to feed them.' Said a humanitarian official based in Kuito, Bie province's regional capital.

For its part Unita has responded to the accelerated government programme of limpeza – or 'cleansing' – by redoubling its attacks on villages and government positions, often to steal food and clothes, hampering the aid effort and sending thousands more villagers fleeing." (Mail and Guardian 20 August 2001)

### **Civilians fleeing intensifying fighting head for government-controlled towns (October 2001)**

- Major government offensives in Bie, Moxico and Cuando Cubango provinces cause civilians to flee
- Widespread insecurity causing population movements elsewhere in the country
- Increase in number of IDPs also indicated by rise in number of reported landmine accidents

"Civilians continue to seek safety in government-controlled towns across the country as they flee intensifying fighting between rebel UNITA forces and Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) troops, according to humanitarian officials.

An aid worker in Kuito, capital of the central Bie province, told IRIN on Wednesday there were large influxes of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in area where there had been attacks, but that there continued to be a 'steady movement (of IDPs) into Kuito and Camacupa', also in Bie.

Large numbers of Angolans have fled into Zambia, Namibia and Angolan towns in recent weeks to escape a major government offensive in the provinces of Bie, Moxico and Cuando Cubango. Humanitarian sources who spoke to IRIN attributed the large displacements to military activity in the region, but added that population movements elsewhere in the country indicated widespread insecurity.

World Food Programme (WFP) spokesperson in Angola, Cristina Muller, told IRIN: 'I think during this week there has been a high number of IDPs (internally displaced persons) arriving in places where WFP is present.' The number of people would be determined after everyone was registered, she said.

Muller added, however, that there was a stabilisation in the number of IDPs entering therapeutic feeding centres, especially in Bie, indicating an improvement in their nutritional status compared to about six months ago.

She said another indication that the number of IDPs was rising was an increase in the number of landmine accidents reported in the past week. The victims were usually IDPs who went in search of firewood on arrival at a new area or camp without knowing the area was mined, she said." (IRIN 31 October 2001)

### **Poverty in the midst of plenty: the case of IDPs in diamond-rich Saurimo (November 2001)**

- UNITA attacks near Saurimo, in Angola's northeast diamond zone, have forced thousands of civilians to flee to the provincial capital
- An estimated 88,000 Angolans live in six camps surrounding Saurimo
- Saurimo itself is considered safe since government garrisons are protecting one of the country's largest diamond mines nearby

"There is plenty of diamond wealth in the ground around mineral-rich Saurimo, but war-displaced Angolans living in temporary camps in the remote area don't see any of it.

'We are displaced people. We don't have enough food and we are getting thin,' said 52-year-old Alberto Tchimatulo, in the Sumulonda camp outside Saurimo city in Angola's northeast diamond zone.

The rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by the elusive Jonas Savimbi, has been fighting Luanda since independence from Portugal in 1975.

Recent UNITA attacks on Dala, 180 km (112 miles) south of Saurimo, to capture food and conscripts have forced residents to flee to the provincial capital. 'They killed a lot of people,' Tchimatulo said.

The camp has housed 7,000 people for 14 months, including Tchimatulo, his two wives and five children.

Saurimo is relatively safe and has never been attacked by UNITA despite lucrative diamond zones to its north. Some 88,000 Angolans now live in six camps surrounding Saurimo, just some of the three million people who have been forced to flee their homes to seek shelter from the war.

But while they are safe from the fighting, Saurimo citizens treat them with hostility, regarding them as lucky interlopers who get aid agency support while they have to scramble for food and medical care.

'They call the people in the camps the governor's pigs because they are accused of stealing food from local fields,' said one aid worker.

Lying on a bushy plain with hardly a tree in sight, the city is easier to protect than some others in Angola's more lush areas.

Government garrisons protecting Angola's largest diamond mine 35 km (21 miles) north, also discouraged rebel incursions, aid workers said. 'The Angolan army has good control around Saurimo,' said one.

The most recent vehicle ambushes occurred in September outside a safety perimeter that extends 20 km (12 miles) east and west of Saurimo and 17 km (10 miles) south and 50 km (31 miles) north." (Reuters 13 November 2001)

### **Both UNITA and the Government of Angola are intentionally and forcibly displacing populations, says MSF (March 2002)**

- Forced displacement of civilians by both sides to the conflict in Angola is widespread and systematic, with devastating effects on civilians' wellbeing
- UNITA has forcibly displaced civilian populations in order to get human and material support
- Government forces have moved civilians in order to isolate UNITA
- Civilian populations remain continuously displaced, often in acute distress but isolated from humanitarian aid

"The intentional and forced displacement of populations by UNITA and the Government of Angola, in furtherance of their military strategies, is taking place in many locations throughout the country.

UNITA has over the past years forced civilian populations to move with its troops in order to maintain a human and material support. This policy has been further expanded since the end of 1999, when UNITA increasingly lost control over territories and had to become more mobile, particularly in Moxico, Huambo and Bie provinces. Civilian populations remain continuously displaced under insecure conditions and with no access to healthcare or sufficient food. Gradually their health and nutritional situation deteriorates to the point where many, including adults, become severely malnourished. Patients arriving in our health centers have also reported alarming levels of mortality among the populations under UNITA control. Humanitarian organizations have absolutely no access to them.

In large parts of the country, Government forces have moved populations to isolate UNITA, cutting it off from the rural population which supplies it with food, labor, and potential recruits. In 2001, a large proportion of newly registered IDPs were displaced as a result of this increasingly widespread Government strategy, with dramatic consequences on the people's health and nutritional status.

Families are obliged to find shelter in displaced sites where overcrowding, an absence of medical care, and a lack of food has led to the outbreak of epidemics and other major health problems. Many of these IDPs are concentrated and kept in locations where international humanitarian organizations cannot be present.

In addition, Government authorities rarely provide any food assistance or health care following the displacement. Displaced populations no longer have access to their villages or fields to cultivate food. In most cases, these populations are only authorized to leave these locations once they have become seriously ill or severely malnourished, and then become dependant on international organizations.

A large proportion of the 50,000 people who arrived in Camacupa (Bie Province) last year were displaced as a direct result of the Government's strategy. Many patients recounted how villages and houses were burned by Government forces to compel them to leave. A survey conducted in Camacupa's IDP camps indicates that mortality rates have reached emergency levels. Under five and crude mortality rates were recorded at 4.8 deaths per 10,000 children per day and 2.9 deaths per 10,000 persons per day, respectively. The results of a nutrition survey conducted in the same camps indicate severe and global malnutrition rates of 1.6 and 13.3 percent, respectively. Malnutrition levels were found to be highest among IDPs who have arrived since mid December 2001.

In Huila Province, the level of displacement of populations in the north-eastern part of the province increased considerably during the second half of 2001 and continues today. According to IDP accounts, people are forced to leave their villages and are escorted on foot by Government armed forces to towns such as Caconda, Chipindo, Cuvango and Matala.

Since the second half of 2001, in Moxico and Cuando-Cubango provinces, large numbers of people have been brought by Government army helicopters and trucks to Luena and Menongue. Although some of these people are in search of security and assistance in the provincial capitals, many patients in MSF programs explained how they were forced to leave their villages. In Luena, the admissions in the therapeutic feeding centers have increased considerably during the last two months.

Forced displacement justified under international law by 'imperative military reasons' only applies to specific locations, a limited time and with the condition that assistance and security be provided to these populations by the authorities. The widespread and systematic forced displacement occurring in Angola and the failure to assure proper conditions for IDPs is responsible for devastating the health and nutritional status of large civilian populations." (MSF 5 March 2002)

# POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

## Population profile

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### Waves of displacement in Angola have resulted in categorization of "old" and "new" IDPs (2001)

- Angolan IDPs label themselves as *deslocados*, a term that implies they have been forced to leave their homes
- "Old" displaced are those who fled before 1998; "new" are those who fled from this year on
- Displaced persons indicate that, with a loss of home and land, they feel a loss of cultural identity

"In Angola, displaced persons label themselves as *deslocado* (singular). Directly translated into English, *deslocado* means 'dislocated' or 'out of place'. However, such a pure linguistic translation of the term does not necessarily capture the implicit understanding of forced relocation as is implicit in the Angolan context. In a society where movement and relocation of villages, tribes, families and individuals are normal, the term *deslocado* is used to describe an abnormal situation: a relocation that is forced, not voluntary or part of normal practice. It is therefore necessary to highlight the element of force that is implied in the term *deslocado*.

The *deslocado* identity is a social identity. Those whom we label as *deslocados* or displaced in this chapter have multiple facets of identity, such as 'woman', 'old', 'Ovimbundu' (ethnic group), 'Sambo' (tribe), 'peasant', 'head-of-family', 'Catholic', 'MPLA-supporter', etc. These facets assume different levels of importance at different times (Bordo 1990:136-145). '*Deslocado*' is only one facet of the identity of the people we interviewed.

In Angola, the displaced population is often divided into two categories: 'new' and 'old' *deslocados*. This is a classification that is commonly used by the displaced themselves, by NGOs and by government representatives. New *deslocados* are all those who have been displaced after July/August 1998, regardless of the cause of their displacement, although the war is the predominant cause. Among the new *deslocados*, some have fled from government-controlled areas, others from UNITA-controlled areas.

This division between new and old *deslocados* can be related to Susan Bordo's multiple 'axes' of identity, whereby the various axes are given varying degrees of importance by the *deslocados*, the established population, and others (1990, p. 139). Based upon the information culled from our interviews, the *deslocado* axis is more important to the new *deslocados* than to the old. This is not to suggest, however, that the old *deslocados* have stopped using that word to describe themselves. Rather, other identifying axes are more important in their daily lives.

Sørensen argues that for rural populations identity is embedded in their land and their agricultural practices (1998:82-83). Even though the displaced in Huambo province have not fled far from their homes, they often find it impossible to cultivate the land where they settle after flight. Displaced persons have described a loss of cultural identity after they leave their home villages. Our interpretation is that, with the loss of their land and normal life, an important facet of their identity is lost, too.

[...]

In all locations around Huambo that had welcomed displaced persons, both established groups and new *deslocados* struggled to survive. However, where the established groups had housing and land they could tend, the new *deslocados* often did not have access to fields. If they did, it was land that was far away and

of low fertility. The new *deslocados* pointed out that even if they could rent land from someone, they lacked other essentials, such as seeds, fertilisers and tools. Elderly *deslocados* and female-headed-households had great difficulty in constructing houses or repairing abandoned houses for shelter against rain and cold nights." (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, pp. 23-25)

## **General comments on counting**

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### **Accurate estimates of the number of displaced difficult to reach due to magnitude of problem and continued insecurity (2001)**

- Vast areas of country are inaccessible
- Sheer scope of displacement makes precise counting impossible

"Accurate assessments of new population displacement were impossible. Conflicting estimates about the total number of uprooted Angolans continued to reflect the difficulty of assessing both the needs and the size of the displaced population after three decades of war." (USCR 2001, p. 58)

"The number of internally displaced persons in Angola varies from month to month and year to year. As some displaced return home, new people become displaced. As a result, there is continual disagreement between the Angolan government, particularly the Ministry of Social Affairs (MINARS), and many international NGOs and agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), even over estimates of the number of displaced persons in the country." (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, pp. 26-27)

### **Save the Children food security assessment reveals problems with counting IDPs (July 2001)**

- Assessment notes that different agencies use different methodologies when counting IDPs
- In case of Kuito, some methods do not take into account the exit of IDPs from camps
- Furthermore, different agencies use different names for the same IDP camps

"There are different ways of recording numbers of IDPs. The official method used by the Coordination Group (comprising MINARS, WFP, OCHA and CARE International) shows only new arrivals; it does not document when IDPs leave a camp. MSF collects figures from so-called home monitors within the camps on a weekly basis. The difference between the data collected using the two different methodologies is considerable. According to the first method, the number of IDPs in Kuito has increased by about 50% since the beginning of this year; according to the second method, the numbers have stayed more or less the same over the same time period. This clearly has considerable implications for how responses are planned.

Different agencies use different names for different camps. This causes confusion when trying to compare data.

With respect to WFP pipeline food, beneficiaries are categorised differently by WFP and their implementing partner. This makes tracking food distributions difficult." (SCF 13 August 2001, Executive summary)

**Disparity in global estimates is in part a result of different methods of counting by government and UN partners (April 2000)**

- UN mission to Angola estimates total number of displaced persons at 2,299,314, of which 456,278 are said to have been displaced before 1998
- GoA estimates the total number of displaced persons at 3,697,322, of which 1,339,248 are said to be displaced before 1998
- GoA figures include dispersed populations that have been settled in and around Luanda for some time
- GoA figures include populations that moved at the very beginning of the conflict

*Following a UN inter-agency assessment mission to Angola in April 2000, UNHCR concluded the following regarding figures of displaced persons:*

	Government (1)	UCAH (2)
		Reported Confirmed
Persons displaced from 1998 or newly displaced persons	2,358,074	1,843,036 1,024,664
IDPs from the period preceding 1998 or longer-term displaced persons	1,339,248	456,278 456,278
Totals	3,697,322	2,299,314 1,480,942

<sup>1</sup> according to UCAH / report as of January 00

<sup>2</sup> according to UCAH Data base updated on 12 March 00

"Newly-displaced persons:

The figures of the Government include about 500,000 IDPs who are living dispersed in the different neighbourhoods of Luanda.

The figures of the UN **do not** include the displaced population living dispersed in Luanda.

Longer-term displaced persons:

The figures of the Government take into consideration the population that has moved since the very beginning of the conflict.

The figures of the UN takes into consideration the IDPs of the post-electoral war that were about to resettle until the country went back again to war and are therefore susceptible to be found in a vulnerable situation."

(UNHCR April 2000, pp. 5-6)

**Global figures**

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
**An estimated 3.59 million are displaced between January 1998 and January 2001 – and predictions are set for worse to come (March 2002)**

- Of the 3.59 million people displaced between 1998 and 2001, 1.34 million have been confirmed by humanitarian organisations and are receiving assistance
- Provinces with the largest concentrations of IDPs include Bie, Huila, Malanje and Huambo
- The most significant displacements continue to occur in Bie Province
- Humanitarian organisations estimate that if current trends continue, 300,000 Angolans will become newly displaced by September 2002, bringing the total number to 4.6 million and increasing the current emergency caseload by nearly 25 percent
- Agencies and NGOs warn that they are working at full capacity and do not have the resources to cope with the additional caseload

"During January 2002, more than 49,400 persons were displaced as a result of guerrilla activities and counter-insurgency operations, bringing the total number of persons reportedly displaced since the resumption of hostilities in January 1998 to approximately 3.59 million. Of this number, 1.34 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been confirmed by humanitarian partners and are receiving assistance. Provinces with the largest concentrations of displaced persons include Bié, Huíla, Malanje and Huambo.

The most significant displacements continued to occur in Bié Province, where approximately 15,400 IDPs entered Kuito, Camacupa and Cunhinga as a result of ongoing military operations in the northern areas of the province and along the borders with Huambo and Moxico Provinces. New arrivals sought shelter in over-crowded camps, reception centres, school buildings and food distribution points. In January, partners estimated that approximately 21,500 new IDPs in Kuito, Camacupa and Cunhinga remain unregistered and without assistance. Large influxes of IDPs were also registered in Lunda Sul, Moxico, Benguela and Huíla Provinces. In Moxico Province, approximately 90 percent of the new arrivals, the majority of whom are women, children and elderly, were transported to Luena by military helicopter.

In locations throughout the country, and in Kuito, Camacupa and Luena in particular, humanitarian partners are operating at full capacity and do not have sufficient resources to respond to additional influxes of IDPs." (UN OCHA 31 January 2002)



(UN OCHA 31 January 2002)

"The humanitarian situation in Angola is deteriorating sharply. Despite the recent death of the head of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, military operations are ongoing. Partners estimate that if current trends continue, approximately 300,000 Angolans will become newly displaced during the next six months, bringing the

total number of displaced in the country to 4.6 million and increasing the current emergency caseload by nearly 25 percent. The humanitarian operation is stretched to the limit. UN Agencies and NGOs are already operating at full capacity and do not have sufficient resources to address the critical needs of additional internally displaced persons. Millions of vulnerable people are living in life-threatening conditions and more will be at serious risk if action is not taken immediately." (UN OCHA 7 March 2002)

### **UN cites unprecedented figure of 4.1 million IDPs in 2002 CAP (November 2001)**

"During the period of intense fighting between 1992 and 1994, 1.3 to two million people fled their homes, primarily to provincial capitals and Luanda. In late 1997, humanitarian agencies estimated that approximately one million people were still displaced, despite the limited resettlement that had occurred following the Bicesse and Lusaka peace agreements. Since 1998, when hostilities between the parties again erupted, an additional 1.3 million persons have been forced from their homes, bringing the total number of displaced persons in Angola to an estimated 4.1 million." (UN November 2001, p. 10)

## **Geographical distribution**

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### **Every one of Angola's 18 provinces has an IDP population (February 2002)**

- Areas with the highest concentration of IDPs include Bie, Huila, Huambo and Kuanza Sul provinces
- Many of the new arrivals have been forcibly displaced by the army
- Further influxes of IDPs are expected, although there is almost no space to accommodate more people
- Some of the worst living conditions in the country are in the 22 transit centres and warehouses in seven provinces that remain open

"The total number of IDPs in the country is currently 4.1 million. Two years ago, the number was two million. Of the 4.1 million IDPs, 1.36 have been confirmed to receive international assistance.

The areas with the highest concentration of IDPs include Bié with 173,000; Huila with 174,000; Huambo with 150,000; and Kuanza Sul with 118,000. Every single one of the country's 18 provinces has an IDP population.

In Kuito and Camacupa, more than 62,000 displaced persons have poured into the area during the last five months, most, forcibly displaced by the army. An additional 12,000 entered during the first two weeks of January alone. There is almost no space to accommodate these people and resources have run out. At least 22,000 more IDPs are close by and may shortly enter Kuito and Camacupa in a desperate effort to reach life-saving assistance.

In Luena, 6,000 IDPs are arriving per month, most, forcibly displaced by the army. There is almost no space to accommodate these people and resources are about to run out. Higher levels of new arrivals are expected in coming months.

Approximately 320,000 IDPs continue to live in camps and transit centres.

During the past 20 months, 35 transit centres have been closed and 25,000 IDPs resettled to safe areas with agricultural lands. It was expected that all centres would be closed by the end of 2001. Due to the huge

level of displacement, more than 12 centres have been either established or reopened in recent months. Some of the worst living conditions in the country are in the 22 transit centres and warehouses in seven provinces that remain open. More than 17,500 IDPs are living in inhumane conditions in these centres." (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

*UN OCHA's Special Report on the Humanitarian Situation in Angola (7 March 2002) contains maps showing, among others, critical areas in the country and areas accessible to international agencies (see list of sources).*

*See also the map section of this profile containing UN OCHA map of IDP presence by province (as of February 2002), [\[External link\]](#)*

### **Humanitarian crisis in Bié province worsens as influx of IDPs continues (January 2002)**

- Between July 2001 and January 2002, approximately 64,645 persons have been displaced in Bié province - bringing the total number of IDPs there to more than 181,000
- On-going military operations are the main cause of displacement
- According to the government of Angola, more than 305,000 IDPs requiring humanitarian assistance may be in inaccessible areas of the province
- Shelter is an urgent issue, with many unregistered IDPs living in inadequate and overcrowded accommodation
- Large numbers of the newly displaced people are in an alarming health and nutritional state

*"The Problem:  
Displacement*

Since July 2001, approximately 64,645 persons have been displaced in Bié Province, bringing the total number of IDPs in the province to more than 181,000. The highest number of new arrivals occurred in October, when 16,000 persons arrived in Kuito and Camacupa. In November, 10,500 additional IDPs entered these areas. In December, 5,779 new IDPs arrived in Kuito, 7,229 in Camacupa and 4,479 in Cunhinga. During the first two weeks of January, 11,740 new IDPs were reported in the province, including 9,720 in Camacupa town. The main cause of displacement are on-going military operations in the northern areas of the province and along the borders with Huambo and Moxico Provinces.

Government sources estimate that more than 305,000 IDPs requiring humanitarian assistance may be present in inaccessible areas of the province. Approximately 83,000 are concentrated in the inaccessible areas of Muinha, Ringoma, Umpolo, Munhango, Kuanza, Gamba and Sachinemuna, where humanitarian conditions are reportedly serious. Authorities have indicated that as many as 22,000 IDPs may enter Camacupa and Kuito in coming weeks in search of humanitarian assistance.

	Total number of IDPs (as of 15 Jan)	New IDPs reported in December	New IDPs reported 1-15 January
KUITO	125,639	5,779	2,020
CAMACUPA	50,587	7,229	9,720
CUNHINGA	5,107	4,479	628

### *Registration*

An estimated 21,500 newly arrived IDPs have not yet been registered in the three locations where humanitarian operations are underway and are therefore not receiving humanitarian assistance. In Kuito, two reception centres have been transformed into transit centres due to overcrowding at existing camps and limited opportunities for resettlement on the basis of the Norms. More than 1,000 persons in these centres have not been registered. In addition, more than 1,200 families are housed in inadequate shelters in Kuito camps, including overcrowded houses, schools and food distribution points. In Camacupa, approximately 10,000 IDPs are living in the newly established Aifena camp. An additional 7,505 IDPs are living in warehouses and other locations. None of these persons has been registered. In Cunhinga, approximately 4,500 recently arrived IDPs are waiting to be registered.

### *Alarming Health and Nutritional Situation*

According to nutritional surveys conducted during December, the global malnutrition rate in Kuito IDP camps is 13 percent. In Camacupa, severe and moderate malnutrition rates among new arrivals are three percent and 28 percent, respectively. Camacupa's supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres are operating at full capacity and severely malnourished beneficiaries are now being transferred to Kuito, a 75-kilometre journey. The onset of heavy seasonal rains has aggravated the precarious water and sanitation situation in Kuito and Camacupa IDP camps, increasing the risk of water-borne diseases and malnutrition. Measles and other preventable diseases are also of concern, particularly since many IDPs arriving from inaccessible areas have not received routine vaccinations.

### *Constraints*

The security situation remains volatile in the province, limiting humanitarian access to only three of the province's nine municipalities. The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) has reconfirmed its commitment to providing assistance to populations in areas where humanitarian partners do not have access. Unless assistance is urgently received in these areas, populations are likely to move towards Camacupa and Kuito in coming weeks, putting additional pressure on already overburdened emergency response mechanisms.

The extremely poor condition of the airstrip has impeded delivery of adequate humanitarian assistance for more than 22 months. WFP is currently able to deliver less than 60 percent of relief requirements into Kuito. The poor condition of the road between Kuito and Camacupa has also prevented assistance, particularly food and non-food items, from being transported to Camacupa. Due to persistent insecurity in most municipalities, international humanitarian partners are unable to provide assistance to vulnerable populations in inaccessible areas." (UN OCHA 24 January 2002)

## **High numbers of IDPs are on the move in Moxico province (January 2002)**

- Moxico province, the birthplace of UNITA, is seen by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) as the most important remaining UNITA stronghold
- The resulting military activity continues to force thousands of civilians from their homes, and aid agencies fear many more are on their way
- Government forces are reported to be moving 100-150 people daily by helicopter to the provincial capital Luena, which remains calm
- Some IDPs testify that they have been forced to move by the government, in what NGOs are describing as a "scorched earth policy"

"A government military offensive against UNITA rebels in the eastern Moxico province and other parts of the country continues to force thousands of Angolans from their homes into camps for the displaced and aid agencies fear that many more are on their way.

Cristina Muller, spokesperson for the World Food Programme (WFP) in Angola, told IRIN on Wednesday that 2,359 new internally displaced people (IDPs) were registered in Moxico's capital, Luena, last week. This brought the total number of IDPs registered in January to 4,869, she said.

'Intense military activity has been reported throughout the province, affecting the movement of people in the region. At the moment government forces are reportedly moving 100-150 people daily by helicopter into the provincial capital Luena, where the situation remains calm. The area along the border with Zambia is reported to be highly insecure, but humanitarian agencies have no access to the region,' she said.

'Our concern is with the humanitarian situation. What we have here are extremely high numbers of IDPs moving ... WFP has increased the amount of food delivered to Luena from 800 mt to 1,200 mt a month because the number of IDPs has been so high,' she added.

According to Muller, the majority of people being flown in by the Angolan army arrived in Luena in a state of 'moderate malnutrition' - not as bad as they would be if they walked to the capital. After being registered, evaluated and given a month's ration of food, the IDPs were moved to Muachimbo, a camp about 12 km from the capital, she said. (IRIN, 30 January 2002)

Moxico was the birthplace of UNITA, and since the victories by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) on the central plateau in 1999, the government has come to regard the eastern province as the most important remaining UNITA stronghold.

Since July, the FAA have been sending more soldiers to the area, saying the intention is to destroy the last rebel bases in the province, and to capture UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. Aid workers say the resultant increase in military activity is the main reason why thousands of people are leaving their homes each month.

While people some come to the camps on foot, others arrive in military helicopters and trucks from more distant reaches of a province which extends 500 km to the Zambian border. Some of these areas are under the effective control of UNITA, whose soldiers rely on the villagers for sustenance - either in the form of willing donations of food, or wholesale looting of crops and supplies.

'Conditions were terrible - we had no food,' said another man who had been flown by helicopter and was now in the resettlement area at Muachimbo. 'We decided to put ourselves in the hands of the government.'

But other testimonies indicate that not everyone was so willing to hand themselves over to the authorities. In the Katepue camp near Luena, women who had been separated from their families have a different story to tell.

'The government forces captured me in the fields and brought me here. I came in a helicopter - I didn't want to leave my home,' she said.

Her family remained behind: 'At first they must have thought I was dead, but when they didn't find my body they must have realised I'd been captured,' she said.

Stories like this indicate that the airlift is taking place for more than simply humanitarian purposes. Since UNITA relies on peasant farmers for its livelihood, the evacuation of the rural population is helping to starve out the rebels.

Non-governmental organisation staff are almost unanimous that a scorched earth strategy is being implemented, though no one will talk openly about such a politically sensitive matter." (IRIN 10 December 2001)

## **Disaggregated figures**

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### **Many of newly displaced in Bie province are single mothers (July 2001)**

- Majority of IDPs in Kuito and Camacupa are women and children who have walked long distances to reach aid

"Abandoned by husbands either fighting for government forces or for the armed opposition movement Unitsa and left to fend for themselves, more and more female-headed households are being driven off their land by the recent intensification in fighting.

Faced with starvation, the women have little choice but to gather their belongings and move their children toward the relative safety of provincial capitals like Kuito.

[...]

In Kuito alone, it is estimated that more than 1,000 exhausted mothers, together with their severely malnourished children, are receiving medical help from aid agencies.

[...]

The situation is even worse in Camacupa, a small town some 20 kilometres northeast of Kuito and recently caught in the crossfire of the civil war.

In the past two months, thousands of mothers and children have crossed a damaged bridge on the river Cuanza to take refuge in aid camps set up in and around the town...

Suffering from severe malnutrition and war trauma, the physical and emotional well-being of many of these people is affected irreparably. The majority of the IDPs receiving food aid at Camacupa, for the most part women and children, have walked over 70 kilometres from Cuemba, to the southeast, before crossing the Cuanza." (WFP 12 July 2001)

### **Majority of internally displaced in Angola said to be women and children (1998-2001)**

- UNICEF estimates that one million children are displaced
- Over 75 percent of the displaced population are women and children
- Female-headed households make up 30 percent of persons in camps

"A recent UN inter-agency mission estimated the number of IDPs in Angola to be 2.3, out of a population of 11 million. Among these IDPs, an estimated one million are children. They are the most disadvantaged, and the ones most adversely affected by the conflict. They have little access to the poorly-run social institutions that provide health and education, as well as food, and they are the ones most at risk of disease. They are vulnerable to a number of varying forms of abuse, such as beatings and sexual abuse, and are also

under the threat of being enrolled to serve in varying functions as child soldiers." (UNICEF 2001, Country Background)

"[O]ver of 75 percent of the displaced population are children and women." (UN 30 November 1999, p. 69)

"Resumption of war in December 1998 resulted in renewed displacements of some one million people as of May 1999; this number is likely to increase in the coming months. Women and children constituted the majority of those who fled, leaving behind assets and food stocks." (WFP 9 September 1999, p. 1)

"[A]mong IDPs living in camps, more than 30 percent are female-headed households." (UN February 1998, p. 99)

# PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

## General

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### **Many IDPs have been displaced numerous times as a result of both military strategies and wilful neglect (2001)**

- Government forces remove people from rural areas in order to deprive UNITA of human and material support
- UNITA in turn punishes civilians for "choosing" the government side - attacking them and laying mines near their fields
- Once in government-controlled towns, civilians do not receive the food and medical care they require, but are inaccessible by international agencies
- Many people are forced to move again because of malnutrition and disease

"The most obvious examples of areas of concern are the towns of Cuemba, in Bie province, and Mussende, Cuanza Sul province. Both are pockets of areas under government control, while the surrounding areas remain very unstable.

People abandon their homes and fields in compliance with government counter-Unita tactics of removing people from the rural areas. Populations also flee violent oppression and destruction (or theft) of harvests, primarily but not only by Unita. Unita forces effectively prevent people from returning to their fields to gather food, attacking them – punishing them for having “chosen” the government side – or laying mines on paths to fields. Once crowded into government-controlled cities and towns that are inaccessible to aid organizations, people rely on the civil and military authorities for essential food or medical assistance. However, these are not forthcoming.

Many of the people coming from Cuemba municipality are originally from Andulo and Bailundo regions and were forced to follow Unita when those areas came under government control by late 1999. Unfortunately, when the people later (forcibly) joined areas under government control, such as Cuemba, it did not put a final end to their long journey as they had again to flee malnutrition and diseases. Basically, they have been living for years on the move, and have been displaced multiple times as a result of both military strategies and wilful neglect of the parties.

Since early April/01, over five thousand ill and malnourished people have had to make a desperate and dangerous journey from Cuemba to the town of Camacupa (also Bie province) in search of humanitarian assistance. Many arrive there in a state where they need to be urgently referred to Kuito (Bie province) for medical treatment in MSF's programmes (for figures, see below). Further North, along the border between Malange and Cuanza Sul provinces, thousands more people are making a similar journey, fleeing from emergency conditions in Mussende to Cangandala, where many need admission to MSF's therapeutic feeding centre (TFC).

[...]

In addition to these statistics, newly arrived IDPs tell consistent stories: they flee Mussende and Cuemba because the living conditions are unbearable. Put simply, there is no (or insufficient) food or medicine, and many people are dying, especially children. Their journeys are difficult and perilous, as they walk for days with no protection (Cuemba to Camacupa - 80 km., Mussende to Cangandala, 100 km.). IDPs arriving in Camacupa routinely recount that others, too weak to make it, died along the long road. These IDPs also tell us that many more people remain behind in Mussende and Cuemba.

*In Mussende, lots of people are dying of sickness, vomiting, diarrhoea, and swelling . . . I was sick and had no family. I could not go to the lavras [fields] because UNITA had laid new mines to stop the people from returning to the fields to collect food. My niece had her leg blown off from a mine . . . while trying to collect food. – 41 year old IDP from Mussende.*

MSF is worried that these cases are not isolated, but the emerging tip of a humanitarian crisis in many Angolan localities which are beyond the tight security perimeters that limit the reach of international humanitarian aid, and sometimes the civilian government itself. Cuemba, Camacupa and Mussende are seemingly just a few dramatic examples of what MSF believes is a pattern repeated throughout the war-torn provinces of Angola. Field workers hear (but are unable to verify) reports from IDPs that similar suffering exists in other areas under government control yet beyond our access (e.g., Massango, in Malange province, and Luando, in Bie)."

(MSF 2 July 2001)

***And earlier (excerpt taken from Andrade study of IDPs conducted in 1996/1997):***

"The research showed that most displaced people have moved not once, but at least twice. These movements of population were at the end of the 1970s (in Benguela), during the 1980s (Malanje), and in 1992/93 (both provinces). Before the last move, many displaced people had returned to their 'original homes' during the period of relative stability that followed the Bicesse Accord (1991). Then, after armed conflict restarted, they were forced to flee for a second time (or, in some cases, a third time), in worse conditions than before. (Andrade 2001, p. 119)

### **Initially, people flee in large groups; later, they break off into nuclear families (2001)**

- People generally fled on foot and suffered from hunger during course of journey
- Initially, people formed large groups which provided solidarity and mutual support
- Later, they split off in order to travel faster and avoid attack

***Excerpt taken from Andrade study of IDPs in Malanje and Benguela conducted in 1996-1997:***

"Only a few people fled in vehicles. Most fled on foot, carrying very little. Journeys could take several days and there were often attacks.

Hunger was frequently mentioned, as a cause of death and as creating severe difficulties when fleeing through not having enough energy to continue. Alternative foods were used, and this in turn led to unknown illnesses, which even traditional medical knowledge was unable to combat. Such events were most dramatic during the siege of Malanje. Men and women of all ages said unanimously that women were more resistant to these hardships than men. Some women ended up helping men.

While children suffered from the cold and rain, it was women of all ages who stressed the problem of partial or complete nakedness. Nudity is seen to be an exhibition of the woman's 'core' to everybody's view, and is considered a violation. It was some time into the research before we understood that women use the term 'to abuse' to mean anything from removal of clothing to rape.

Taking away young women to be the wives of soldiers is seen as improper, mutilating, and morally wrong. Older people in particular grieved because the rituals were not respected, and there was no consideration or dignity.

At a certain point the displaced people, particularly those who fled under fire, had to make difficult choices about maintaining the composition of the groups. Initially, they tended to form large groups, which

provided solidarity and mutual support to deal with the difficulties. As the walk continued the circumstances changed – big groups were more vulnerable to attack because their pace was slower. Therefore many small groups (frequently just one nuclear family) split off and travelled faster; but the potential for solidarity and mutual support was diminished." (Andrade 2001, sect. 4)

*For a comprehensive analysis of the coping strategies employed by IDPs, refer to Filomena Andrade's analysis in Construction and Reconstruction in Angola available from Development Workshop - Angola.*

### **IDPs in larger peri-urban environments do not necessarily retain ties with host communities (2001)**

- IDPs in camps and smaller neighborhoods often retain ties with resident communities
- Other IDPs, particularly those in urban centres, split away in order to survive
- Community ties often break down during period of displacement, particularly in bigger towns and cities
- Level of trust and collective action is low as a result

"In certain camps for displaced people, and perhaps in certain neighbourhoods of displaced people in inland cities, people live in 'communities' i.e. they have organised the camps so that people from the same place live together, they have maintained their old leadership (or perhaps chosen a new one from among themselves), and tend to have moved together to this new location.

But it is very rare to find anything like this in the larger towns and cities (Luanda, Benguela, Lobito, Lubango and Huambo) where the bulk of displaced people are living. There seem to be various reasons for this.

While people may move as a group on the first stage of their flight, successive stages are made in smaller groups.

In towns, people tend to seek out people from their own community to lodge them during an initial period. But they then seek their own home, and the stresses of the period when people stay together in this initial period mean that they do not necessarily want to live afterwards with the people who helped them when they arrived.

While it may have been more common in the past for people to build a house in the town alongside someone from their own community, this is now much less true: urban neighbourhoods are full and it is difficult to find space near to a previous migrant or to build in a group. There is a market in land and housing, and land prices and rents are higher in the old neighbourhoods so poorer, new migrants have to build on the edge of the towns, away from people from their own community.

It is interesting to note that in the camp of Kasseque, near to Huambo, displaced people live grouped according to their place of origin. In the poor neighbourhoods of the town of Huambo itself this is not the case.

People told us that we would find neighbourhoods of people from the same origin, and we looked very hard for this phenomenon but we did not find it.

This has certain implications for life in the towns. People rarely know their neighbours, the level of trust and collective action is low, Churches are one of the few places where people can make friends, develop trust, participate in collective action (though the number of Churches can be a divisive influence as well). Few development initiatives have taken these factors into account." (Robson 30 January 2001)

*Also refer to Construction and Reconstruction in Angola edited by Paul Robson. The book is available from Development Workshop - Angola.*

**Traditional movement of displaced has been from rural areas to provincial urban centres (1999-2001)**

- 50 to 60 percent of Angolan population concentrated in urban centres
- Civilians seek protection from attacks in government-secure zones
- Widespread looting and destruction of property makes life in rural areas difficult
- Lack of access to land makes it difficult for IDPs to gain livelihood

"In areas accessible to humanitarian agencies, IDPs have tended to collect in urban areas that are generally under government control, such as Malange, Kuito and Huambo. This is largely because many of the rural areas are heavily insecure and farming practices are frequently interrupted by security incidents...The urban areas offer some hope of security as well as access to the possibility of humanitarian assistance. However, the obvious lack of access to land in these urban locations limits their opportunities for food production resulting in affected populations becoming heavily reliant on food assistance." (ACC/SCN July 2001, p. 36)

"Large-scale displacement has resulted in rapid urbanisation throughout the country, estimated at 50 per cent (UNDP 1999:47). Cities and towns may be safer than rural areas, but livelihoods are harder to come by in urban zones. The massive migration into urban areas has not been followed by the necessary investments in infrastructure to provide basic sanitation, water, health care and schools." (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, p. 19)

"The continuous shift of populations from rural to urban areas has changed the demography of the country from one predominantly rural-based to one in which around 60 percent of the population now live in urban centres. As a result, pressure has increased on the psychosocial and physical status of these urban dwellers. They all must vie in overpopulated conditions for the same meagre resources, much of them coming from the international assistance community, itself circumscribed by a limited capacity to meet growing needs.

[...]

The majority of IDPs are concentrated in the coastal belt and in major urban centres with more than half located in Luanda, Cuando Cubango, Benguela, Huambo and Malange provinces." (UN 30 November 1999, pp. 7, 28)

# PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

## Physical security

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### **Terrorist warfare by UNITA and "cleansing" operations by FAA put civilians at risk (August-October 2001)**

- Number of kidnappings and deliberate targeting of civilians by UNITA on rise
- "Cleansing" operations of FAA in central highlands forces innocent civilians from their homes

#### *UNITA troops:*

"The number of kidnappings and murders by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement increased sharply in May [2001], drawing widespread condemnation both inside Angola and internationally. The recent attacks have indicated that the remnant of UNITA is shifting away from classic guerrilla tactics towards unashamedly terrorist warfare." (Action for Southern Africa 7 June 2001)

"Throughout September there have been sporadic attacks by UNITA around Angola. Whilst some of these attacks were acts of banditry aimed at stealing clothes and food, other are acts of terror to deny any normality to the Angolan population." (Action for Southern Africa 5 October 2001)

*For a list of reported attacks by UNITA in the last two months, see Angola Peace Monitor Issue No. 1, Vol. VII [\[External link\]](#).*

#### *FAA troops:*

"A human catastrophe is under way in the war-torn central highlands of Angola, amid claims that the government of Eduardo dos Santos is deliberately 'cleansing' large areas of its village population in order to starve Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels out of existence.

In recent months, tens of thousands of villagers have been displaced in Unita's heartland Bie province by the Angolan army as part of a policy of denying Unita access to the food it levies from villages under its control.

[...]

The claim by aid workers in the field and by Western diplomats in Luanda that the government is encouraging the crisis is supported by dozens of displaced villagers. It also comes as large numbers of starving villagers continue to be displaced daily by heavy fighting in Bie province and gathered into massive camps without sufficient food or shelter.

'Government troops are rounding up whole villages when they reach them and forcing the inhabitants to leave Unita areas so that they cannot feed the Unita soldiers. Then we are being expected to feed them.' Said a humanitarian official based in Kuito, Bie province's regional capital.

For its part Unita has responded to the accelerated government programme of limpeza – or 'cleansing' – by redoubling its attacks on villages and government positions, often to steal food and clothes, hampering the aid effort and sending thousands more villagers fleeing." (Mail and Guardian 20 August 2001)

### **Greater emphasis given to protection in 2001 than in the past (April-May 2001)**

- Greater emphasis on protection by international agencies
- Protection workshops being held in provinces to establish practical frameworks for protection at local level

"Humanitarian principles and human rights remain a major preoccupation. Evidence continues to mount that populations, including women and children, are suffering from extended periods of forced portage and other gross violations in rebel areas. An increasing number of these populations, the overwhelming majority of whom are in extreme distress, are seeking safety and assistance. Forced displacement, looting, physical assaults and forced recruitment are continuing and are concentrated in areas where armed combatants do not receive adequate logistics support." (OCHA 22 May 2001, Humanitarian context)

"The intensification of guerrilla and counter-insurgency warfare has led to a notable increase in protection violations including forced displacement, looting and physical assaults. As a result of this increase and to ensure a successful integrated approach, greater emphasis is being given to protection issues than originally indicated in the Appeal. Workshops led by joint teams of Government and UN trainers have been held in six provinces during the first three months and will be convened in all 18 provinces by the end of June. The aim of the workshops is to develop Provincial Protection Plans that establish practical frameworks for addressing protection issues at the provincial level. Partners are working closely together to develop other initiatives in information gathering, capacity-building and community mobilisation that will be implemented as a matter of priority during upcoming quarters." (OCHA 30 April 2001)

### **Physical security of internally displaced persons threatened by UNITA, government forces, and local authorities (2000-2001)**

- Theft of food and non-food items by both UNITA and government forces reportedly common
- Populations suffering from forced portage and other gross violations in UNITA-held areas
- Displaced report that UNITA murders villagers with machetes
- IDPS sometimes expected to hand over portion of assistance to local authorities
- Populations formerly under rebel-control are targeted most commonly

#### ***General:***

"Humanitarian principles and human rights remain a major preoccupation. Evidence continues to mount that populations, including women and children, are suffering from extended periods of forced portage and other gross violations in rebel areas. An increasing number of these populations, the overwhelming majority of whom are in extreme distress, are seeking safety and assistance. Forced displacement, looting, physical assaults and forced recruitment are continuing and are concentrated in areas where armed combatants do not receive adequate logistics support." (OCHA 22 May 2001, Humanitarian context)

"29. The [UN Inter-Agency] rapid assessment [of April 2000] found that the most widely observed protection problems concerned the delivery of humanitarian assistance and freedom of movement...Theft of food and non-food items by combatants was common, particularly in areas where troops were not regularly paid. Other reports suggest that extortion and theft by government troops had on occasion involved or resulted in forced displacement. Harassment by armed troops appeared to be targeted towards populations from areas formerly under UNITA control, for example Andulo, Bailundo and Malanje. There were reports that displaced persons who had ventured past the security perimeters of towns to collect food or firewood had been beaten and robbed by armed UNITA groups or bandits, or had fallen victim to landmines. There were also reports of forced recruitment of displaced persons, including of children, by both sides." (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 29)

"The UN pointed to dangers that stalked displaced families even after they reached supposed safe havens. 'Displaced populations have been prevented from entering the provincial capitals of Huambo, Malanje, and Kuito and, in several cases, have been involuntarily resettled in the outskirts of these cities,' the report stated. 'In certain areas, displaced persons are forced to pay bribes to local or traditional authorities in order to be included on distribution lists. Displaced persons are sometimes expected to hand over a portion of their assistance to local or traditional authorities...Theft by combatants is common, particularly in areas where troops are not regularly paid,' it added." (USCR August 2000)

"In certain areas, displaced persons are forced to pay bribes to local or traditional authorities in order to be included on distribution lists. Displaced persons are sometimes expected to hand-over a portion of their assistance to local or traditional authorities. The assessment confirms that misappropriation by combatants is common, particularly in areas where troops are not regularly paid. Populations formerly under rebel-control, for example in Andulo, Bailundo and Malanje, are targeted most frequently. (OCHA 15 April 2000, pp.14-15)

### **UN Senior Network mission notes that protection needs of internally displaced go largely unaddressed (March 2001)**

- More focused and active approach required to address protection needs of IDPs
- Responsibility for protection lies with GoA
- Still, mission noted progress of international humanitarian actors in appointing protection focal points at the provincial levels

"The Mission recognised that, notwithstanding the efforts of the ICRC and other actors, many protection needs of the displaced go largely unaddressed. Primary responsibility for protecting displaced civilians rests with the GoA, including through the respect of human rights and international humanitarian law. A step forward in this regard has been the promulgation of Norms on the Resettlement of displaced populations, based on the Guiding Principles, as well as the development of provincial protection plans, also based on the Guiding Principles. The GoA, in collaboration with the UN and other humanitarian agencies, is currently overseeing the elaboration of operating procedures for these Norms.

The Mission noted that, while both GoA and agencies have made some progress in implementing the recommendations stemming from the visit of the RSG on IDPs, a more focused and active approach to protection is required by the Government including with regard to the prevention of arbitrary displacement. The lack of capacity and commitment on the part of the GoA to ensure the protection of IDPs is also reflected in and compounded by the weakness of the justice system and the rule of law.

The Mission noted the attention given to and the progress made by the international humanitarian community in the development of a comprehensive protection strategy, based on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. As an exceptional and immediate measure, the HC/RC will designate a focal point in each province for protection monitoring and, as appropriate, intervention at the provincial level. An inter agency group will determine appropriate advocacy at the national level. As part of an integrated strategy, the Human Rights Division of the UN Office in Angola (HRD/UNOA) envisages expanding its presence and activities in the areas of advocacy, capacity building and community empowerment at the provincial level and should be supported to do so." (OCHA 23 March 2001, Protection)

## **Freedom of Movement**

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### **Some displaced persons involuntarily resettled in unsafe areas (2000-2001)**

- Displaced persons have been moved near military camps or to other unsafe areas
- Resettlement schemes planned against will of displaced persons and implemented without proper planning
- GoA attempted to justify moves by the need to free up facilities where displaced had settled
- Displaced populations from the central highlands often treated as "subversives"

"31. The [UN Inter-Agency] assessment [of April 2000] found that displaced populations had been prevented from entering the provincial capitals of Huambo, Malanje and Kuito and, in several cases, were involuntarily resettled in the outskirts of these cities. In Cambondo, approximately 800 displaced persons were transferred in January [2000] to a site near a local military camp and in Luena, local authorities had established a resettlement site in an area with mines. Similar concerns were noted by the inter-agency mission of March [2000], which reported that in various instances the Government had forcibly relocated displaced populations, usually to areas outside the national or provincial capital security perimeter. In most cases, such movements were implemented without planning or coordination and imposed on both the displaced and the humanitarian community, resulting in human suffering. The Government justified these moves by the need to free up the facilities where the displaced had settled, i.e., factories or military camps. However, the relocation is regarded by many as part of the Government's attempt to consolidate its presence and control in newly liberated areas. The inter-agency mission was informed of cases of forced return where the Government had 'strongly encouraged' the displaced population to regain their areas of origin, without ensuring adequate safety and living conditions. In some cases, the areas of return were attacked and the displaced forced to flee once more." (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 31)

"Authorities in certain provincial capitals fear infiltration by UNITA elements and try to concentrate the newly displaced in separate locations in order to segregate them from the general population. There is also a general perception in coastal areas and urban centers that the population from the rural hinterland are "anarchistic elements that need to be controlled"... Consequently, the displaced tend to be treated as second-class citizens.

In Huambo, provincial capital of the heartland of the conflict, IDPs arriving since a year are maintained in 'concentration centres' under unacceptable conditions. In Benguela, authorities are pursuing resettlement schemes against the resistance of the displaced and without adequate planning (no land entitlements, lack of water and health infrastructures, etc.). Such examples illustrate, again, that the protection needs of IDPs will increase as authorities make additional efforts to reaffirm governmental control in the new phase of the conflict." (OCHA January 2000)

"Some displaced populations have been resettled in the peripheries of provincial capitals such as Huambo, Malanje and Kuito and, in several cases, have been involuntarily resettled in the outskirts of these cities. In Cambondo, approximately 800 displaced persons were transferred in January to a site near a local military camp. In Luena, local authorities have established a resettlement site, Sangondo, in an unsafe area that has not been completely demined." (OCHA 15 April 2000, pp.14-15)

### **Alarming situation of landmines throughout the country threatens safety of displaced persons seeking to move about and to resettle (2000-2001)**

- Angola most mined country in the world
- Independent groups put the number of landmines between eight and 15 million, covering approximately 40 percent of the countryside
- Government of Angola says number is five to eight million

- Return, resettlement and agricultural production are obstructed by danger of landmines
- Absence of systematic approach to mine clearance in country is extremely worrying

"At least seven provinces, accounting for approximately 40 percent of the countryside, are heavily mined. In addition, active fields encircle the provincial capitals of Huambo, Bié, Luena, and Malanje and new mines continue to be laid, particularly along logistics corridors. Widespread mine infestation is a major obstacle limiting agricultural production and the free movement of people and goods. The presence of mines also impedes resettlement and return and puts thousands of Angolans at risk of grave injury or death. During the first eight months of the year, 385 mine incidents were reported in 15 provinces, up from the same period a year ago. A large percentage of landmine casualties continue to be women and children, who often fall victim while farming, searching for wood, or travelling by road." (UN November 2001)

"The [UN] Representative [on Internally Displaced Persons] was seriously concerned at the landmine situation throughout the country which, in addition to posing an obvious danger to displaced and resident populations, gives rise to problems regarding access to displaced populations by international agencies and NGOs, as well as access of the internally displaced to land for resettlement and agricultural activities.

[...]

108. As well as increasing the dangers to the displaced and the population at large and posing problems for the future development of agricultural production throughout the country, the continued use of landmines is compounded by the absence of a systematic approach to mine action which needs to be addressed urgently. Part of the problem to date has been dispute over the role of INAROE, which was established within MINARS to accommodate the preference of donors to fund civilian rather than military mine action..." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 105, 108)

"According to the Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Land mines and Unexploded Ordnance (INAROE), there are an estimated six to seven million land mines scattered throughout the country. The provincial capitals of Huambo and Bié, as well as many locations in Benguela, Malanje, Moxico and Uige have the highest levels of landmine contamination. In a sixteen-month period between mid 1998 and January 2000, 1,117 Angolans fell victim to land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The majority of incidents affect civilians, many of whom are women and children, travelling by road, farming or search for wood. Mines laid during previous wars have caused an estimated three-quarters of recent accidents." (UN November 2000, p. 16)

"Incidents of mine accidents and other war-related wounds indicate that civilian populations outside of city centers continue to be affected by the ongoing conflict. In Kuito's hospital, MSF's surgical program conducted over 23 mine-related amputations in the first three months of 2000. This number reflects an increase in such injuries. In all of 1999, the total figure of amputations at the same hospital was 35; there were only 13 in 1998." (MSF 26 July 2000)

"Agencies estimate there are seven million landmines and at least ten times this number of unexploded ordnance (UXO), causing numerous injuries and preventing access to farming and grazing land." (OCHA 17 July 2000, sect. B)

### **UNITA reportedly requires a permit for travel in all areas under its control (2000)**

"Freedom of movement continued to be denied in all areas controlled by UNITA. A permit for travel even to the next village was demanded by those in command. In the central highlands, UNITA was also responsible for forced displacement as it lost or captured territory, and its forces continued to loot and destroy private property." (HRW December 2000, Human Rights Developments)

## **Vulnerable populations**

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### **Women and children at risk of rape, sexual assault, forced prostitution and military recruitment (1999-2001)**

- Young women raped, sexually assaulted, and forced into marriages or prostitution
- Some 300,000 children are estimated to have been forced into combat by rebel and government forces
- UNICEF estimates that some 300,000 children are without parents in Angola; one million children have no access to education or health care

"While the breakdown of government infrastructure and social structures have led to millions of children suffering, it is estimated that at least 300,000 children have been forced into combat in Angola by rebel and government armed forces. Those who have survived say they are used to flight, to work in military camps, transport heavy loads on their backs as soldiers, move location and also as sex slaves.

According to UNICEF's Lidia Borba, who works in child protection services, about 1 million Angolan children have lost one parent in the war and almost 300,000 have lost both parents. In addition, more than 1 million children across the country are believed to have no access at all to education and health facilities. 'In general,' she told IRIN, 'all children are direct or indirect victims of this war. Not a single family has not been affected.' (IRIN-SA 14 June 2001, The war generation)

"30. The assessment found that internally displaced women, particularly those living near military encampments were subject to sexual harassment and some had been forced into prostitution in order to procure basic necessities. There were also reports of women and girls abducted from camps for the displaced by UNITA. In addition, there are large numbers of unaccompanied and orphaned children among the displaced. The assessment notes that although many of these children have been integrated into kinship networks or community structures, many of their needs are not met. Unaccompanied children are vulnerable to forced recruitment and abuse. Furthermore, the poverty, disease, domestic violence and child abuse associated with displacement prompt many children to leave their homes voluntarily. In so doing, they become increasingly vulnerable to disease and abuse." (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 30)

"Among these IDPs, an estimated one million are children. They are the most disadvantaged, and the ones most adversely affected by the conflict. They have little access to the poorly-run social institutions that provide health and education, as well as food, and they are the ones most at risk of disease. They are vulnerable to a number of varying forms of abuse, such as beatings and sexual abuse, and are also under the threat of being enrolled to serve in varying functions as child soldiers." (UNICEF 2001, Country Background)

### **Abductions of children occur with regularity in conflict in Angola (October 2001)**

- Most recent case involves some 16 children in Kwanza Norte province
- Over sixty children abducted in Caxito during raid on village in May 2001
- Children are abducted for recruitment in armed forces, sexual abuse and forms of forced labour

#### ***Kidnapping in May in Caxito, 60km north of Luanda:***

"Straight after the attack on Caxito, one group of fifty UNITA soldiers attacked an orphan's home run by the Danish agency Development Aid from People to People (ADPP). The rebels sacked the orphanage, and took 60 children hostage, along with a teacher. Two teachers are reported to have been killed..."

[...]

The children were freed on 25 May, but there are conflicting versions of events. UNITA issued a statement claiming that it had released over 60 orphans to a Catholic priest, Father Antonio Joaquim Ribeiro in Ambaca (over 150km from Caxito). However, the Angolan army statement claims that the children were freed after its troops surrounded the UNITA fighters at Ambaca." (Action for Southern Africa 7 June 2001)

***Abduction in October in Kwanza Norte:***

"UNICEF Angola and the United Nations Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Angola were shocked and concerned by the recent declaration from the Catholic Bishop of Kwanza Norte on the abduction of 16 children and their relatives during a religious service in the village of Kiluange in the Municipality of Golungo Alto, Kwanza Norte.

[...]

UNICEF and the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator call for their immediate release and strongly condemn all violations of children's rights in Angola. This is not the first time that children have been abducted: similar abductions have occurred throughout Angola's prolonged conflict in various parts of the country. The majority of these children have not been heard from since.

The motivation for these abductions is not always clear, but children abducted in conflict countries are often used by armed groups to carry goods and ammunition and to cook and clean. In the worst case, children, particularly young girls, may be sexually abused and both girls and boys may be used in combat or as a defensive shield." (UNICEF 16 October 2001)

## **SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)**

### **General**

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#### **Basic needs of the majority of IDP communities and resident populations are not being met (February 2002)**

"Agencies estimate that only 25 percent of the basic needs of vulnerable populations, including both resident and displaced communities, are currently being met.

Acute malnutrition exists in at least eight locations, including Caconda, Cruzeiro, Cuemba, Cusse, Lau, Luena, Mussende and Sambo Samboto, and is probably present in a further three to four.

According to the Executive Committee of the Inter-Ministerial Commission, the Angolan Armed Forces and OCHA, critical needs are suspected in 60 locations in 11 provinces. Of these, 53 cannot be reached by international agencies." (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

#### **Populations on the move in interior regions are in "appalling" condition (November 2001)**

- Tens of thousands of newly displaced persons are thought to be on the brink of starvation
- Up to 500,000 people living in areas inaccessible to international agencies are estimated to be in need - with more than 200,000 believed to be in acute distress

"Possibly the most vulnerable populations in Angola are the increasingly large numbers of families who are on the move in interior regions. Tens of thousands of newly displaced persons are estimated to be foraging for food in the bush. Credible reports indicate that the condition of these populations is appalling and that many are probably on the brink of starvation. Widows, separated children and persons with physical disabilities are highly vulnerable throughout the country, but face serious dangers during displacement. Many are unable to reach safe havens and remain abandoned in insecure areas, at constant risk of attack and abduction. In addition to these groups, about which little is known, as many as 500,000 people living in areas inaccessible to international organisations are estimated to be in need. At least 20 locations, with a combined total of more than 200,000 people, are believed to have populations in acute distress. Information on the condition of these groups is provided by newly displaced, church networks and military personnel. Reliable reports in early October indicated that populations in four to five inaccessible locations were in catastrophic condition and that at least one quarter of children in these areas were at mortal risk." (UN November 2001)

#### **Warring parties are guilty of near-total neglect of populations in need, charges MSF (July 2001)**

- Forced displacement by both parties to the conflict drives civilians to restricted areas, where the authorities then fail to provide food or health care, resulting in very high levels of malnutrition and mortality

"The warring parties to the Angolan civil war are turning blind eyes to the obvious, serious, and often acute humanitarian needs of the Angolan people. Both the Government and the UNITA rebel movement are guilty of this negligence. The medical and nutritional emergencies that MSF encounters due to its projects in the field are not just a logic consequence of the ongoing war. To a large extent they are caused by the near-total neglect towards populations, the disrespect of international humanitarian law, and the military strategies of the parties to the conflict.

The underlying causes for the emergencies include:

The near absence of governmental response to emergencies in areas under its control, resulting in very high levels of malnutrition and mortality.

Forced displacement caused by military strategies applied by both parties, which drive large populations from their land and then pin them down in restricted areas, where the authorities then fail to provide food or health care.

The inaccessibility, due to insecurity and the incapacity to negotiate, with both parties, access for humanitarian assistance, of some areas of major concern for international humanitarian organizations." (MSF 2 July 2001)

### **Statistics on the status of children**

"Thirty percent of all children die before reaching the age of five. The under-five mortality rate is the second highest in the world, with one child dying every three minutes, corresponding to 20 per hour and 480 per day.

Forty percent of the children who do survive, die before 40.

Nineteen percent of children are born with a low birth-weight, 53 percent are stunted and 42 percent are severely underweight.

An estimated 100,000 children have been separated from their families as a result of war.

Credible evidence indicates that child soldiers are being forced to fight." (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

## **Food/Nutrition**

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### **Locations with high concentrations of newly arrived IDPs show alarming levels of malnutrition (March 2002)**

- Acute malnutrition exists in at least nine locations
- Nutritional status of newly displaced people has reached emergency levels, and therapeutic feeding centres have exceeded maximum capacity
- Resident and displaced populations are at risk of increased food insecurity due to continuous arrival of new IDPs and limited access to land

"Acute malnutrition exists in at least nine locations, including Bocoio, Bunjei, Caconda, Camacupa, Cruzeiro, Cuemba, Luena, Mussende and Wako Kungo, and is probably present in a further three to four. In several locations with high concentrations of newly arrived IDPs malnutrition rates among both displaced

and resident communities have reached alarming levels. In January global and severe malnutrition rates in Caconda were recorded at 20.7 and 5.3 percent among displaced children between six and 59 months of age. Among resident children of the same age, global and severe rates were recorded at 11.2 and 2.7 percent, respectively.

In hard-hit locations including Caconda, Camacupa and Luena, therapeutic feeding centres (TFCs) have exceeded maximum capacity due to the constant influx of severely malnourished arrivals. In Luena, the TFC, which was originally designed for 60 children, is currently caring for more than 230, with an average of four to five children sharing one bed. Approximately twice as many children are being admitted on a weekly basis to the TFC than the supplementary feeding centre (SFC), indicating that the nutritional status of the new arrivals has reached emergency levels. Partners are already taking steps to expand feeding programmes at IDP camps in Luena. In Camacupa, TFCs and SFCs have also been operating at full capacity and severely malnourished beneficiaries are being transferred to Kuito, a 75 km journey. Capacity at the TFC in Camacupa will also be increased from 250 to 400 persons in coming weeks.

In Bocoio, Caconda, Camacupa, Kuito and Luena, resident and displaced populations are at-risk of increased food insecurity due to the continuous arrival of new IDPs and limited access to land and income-generating activities. In several inaccessible areas, including south-eastern Moxico, north-western Uíge, northern Kuanza Norte and border areas between provinces in central Angola, high levels of food insecurity are expected as a result of massive population movements and the destruction of agricultural fields during military operations. Although it is not yet possible to predict overall crop production for the current agricultural campaign, the late arrival of seasonal rains, insufficient quantities and delayed delivery of agricultural inputs may increase the risk of food insecurity in a number of provinces." (UN OCHA 7 March 2002)

### **Assessments of IDPs in Benguela and Bié provinces show high levels of malnutrition (March 2002)**

"Following reports by the government authorities of influx of thousands of IDPs, WFP, UNSECORD, UNICEF, OCHA, Catholic Relief Services and UTCAH undertook a joint mission in Bocoio (Benguela province). The mission estimated that at least 10,000 persons arrived in Bocoio city over the last three months and undertook a quick nutritional screening of children under five years. WFP assisted over 1,400 malnourished children admitted in Therapeutic and Supplementary Feeding Centres (TFCs and SFCs) in Benguela, Ganda and Balombo Municipalities.

On 22 February, WFP, OCHA and UNSECORD carried out a joint security and needs assessment in Cuemba (Bié province). A preliminary survey showed high levels of malnutrition amongst resident and displaced populations. As a consequence of insecurity, more than 10,000 persons arrived in the last three weeks in Kamacupa, coming from Ringoma-Umpulo areas. The high number of admission in the MSF-B nutritional centre indicates that their nutritional and health status is poor. Despite the difficulties to access the camp due to the bad condition of the road, WFP in collaboration with CARE is providing immediate food assistance to the newly displaced people once they are registered. However, IDPs are also in great need of shelter, non-food items and sanitation facilities." (WFP 1 March 2002)

### **Displacement remains one of the primary causes of food insecurity (November 2001)**

- One tenth of all Angolans rely on external food assistance
- The majority of displaced populations do not have access to sufficient quantities of quality agricultural land

"One tenth of all Angolans depend on external food assistance to survive and an estimated 30 percent of the population is expected to experience food insecurity and hunger during the coming year. Instability,

displacement, failed harvests and dysfunctional market systems remain the primary causes of food insecurity. In addition, limitations on the free movement of personnel and goods continue to raise the costs of basic commodities and reduce the amount of food available for sale. The situation is most acute in locations where persistent insecurity undermines livelihood strategies and where coping strategies are under severe stress or have collapsed.

Although efforts have been made to promote self-reliance, the majority of displaced populations still do not have access to sufficient quantities of quality agricultural land. In addition, adverse climatic conditions in 2001, including late rains and irregular or excessive rainfall, reduced overall productivity in some areas. Poor soil fertility lowered yields of key crops including maize, beans, peanuts, millet and sorghum. As a result, post-harvest food stocks are insufficient to meet requirements until the next harvest and large numbers of families in hard-hit areas have already been forced to reduce consumption to one meal per day." (UN November 2001)

### **Increasing malnutrition rates among children in Huambo province (November 2001)**

- Continuing insecurity in Huambo province has caused further movements of populations
- An unusually high percentage of the displaced children at SCF feeding centres are aged between 5 - 12

"At a time of year when attendance at supplementary feeding centres is expected to be relatively low, Save the Children has encountered an increasing number of moderately malnourished children presenting at its feeding centres in Huambo Province. In August 2000, 5,954 children were being assisted at Save the Children's feeding centres in Huambo and Caála. A year later, the same centres were attending to 9,159 children. The continuing insecurity in the province has recently caused further movements of populations from inaccessible and insecure areas into places of relative security - the municipalities around Caála, for example. The children within these populations are in a poor nutritional state.

Through Save the Children's outreach workers - whose activities reach the fringes of the accepted security perimeter - children who make it this far can be referred through outreach work to the nearest feeding centre, and there receive nutritional support. The majority of the children currently presenting at the centres are displaced from these outlying areas. They include an unusually high percentage of children between 5 and 12 years (an average of 30 per cent for all centres), and the occasional case of a malnourished teenager has emerged. This vulnerable group goes undetected by the routine nutrition surveys, which measure levels of malnutrition amongst children under five years only." (SCF November 2001)

### **Recurrent pellagra epidemic in Kuito (2001)**

- Pellagra is a disease caused by poor diet, that contributes to death from other illnesses
- The population of Kuito is in nutritional crisis, with a continued high mortality rate for over three years

"Pellagra is a disease caused by consumption of a diet of low quality. There are no other causal factors involved except dietary deficiency of niacin, pyridoxine, riboflavin and tryptophan. For the past three years, there has been an annual epidemic of pellagra in the Kuito area of Angola.

The prevalence of pellagra is about 10% in the IDP camps around Kuito and about 30% in Camacupa. There do not appear to be substantial numbers of people with niacin deficient diarrhoea or nervous system complaints without skin lesions in Kuito, although the signs are more advanced in Camacupa where diarrhoea seems to be a feature. It is unlikely that the pellagra is a dominant attributable and direct cause of mortality, although it almost certainly contributes to mortality ascribed to other illnesses.

The pellagra patients are of normal weight or are overweight. This is because the nutrients involved give rise to a type I deficiency which is not associated with loss of body weight (wasting) rather than a type II deficiency which is characterised by stunting and wasting.

The population is in nutritional crisis with a continued high mortality rate for over three years; this has recently increased to crisis proportions. Although nutritional deficiencies underlie this mortality it is not reflected in the rate of wasting (global malnutrition rate) as the dominant type of micronutrient deficiency does not directly give rise to wasting: it does, however, cause severe illness including both pellagra and kwashiorkor, immunoincompetence and death; including death, rather than recovery from, infectious disease.

A major proportion of the population is entirely dependent upon humanitarian aid. Almost 60% of the population receives humanitarian aid and over two fifths of all food eaten in the area is flown in by WFP. Without this sustained effort the population would starve.

The widespread deficiencies reached a peak several months after gaps in the WFP pipeline that led to the food actually distributed having a niacin content lower than that known to cause overt clinical pellagra in otherwise healthy experimental subjects. The choice of foodstuffs to fly into Kuito has been increasingly confined to maize cereal. This coincided with the increased mortality, severe malnutrition becoming the major cause of death and kwashiorkor being the dominant form of severe malnutrition. It is critical to take steps to improve the quality of the diet that is eaten in Kuito and surrounding area." (Professor Michael Holden, FANTA project, August 2001)

## Health

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### **Alarming morbidity and mortality rates in areas with large concentrations of displaced populations (March 2002)**

- Vaccine-preventable diseases, as well as a sharp increase in HIV/AIDS, contributing to very high morbidity and mortality rates among IDPs

"Morbidity and mortality rates have reached alarming levels, particularly in areas with large concentrations of displaced populations including Caconda, Camacupa, Luena, Tchilembo, Chipindo, Chicomba, Bunjei, Mavinga, Golungo Alto and Calandula. A recent mortality survey in Caconda confirms that the status of recently arrived populations is critical, with under-five mortality rates reaching as high as 12.6 per 10,000 deaths per day. Cases of vaccine preventable diseases, including polio, measles and meningitis continue in areas throughout Angola. In September, one case of wild poliovirus was confirmed in Lunda Sul Province and in December, three cases of the virus were confirmed among Angolan refugees in Zambia. During the first five weeks of 2002, more than 1,030 cases of measles and 87 cases of meningitis were registered throughout the country. According to a study conducted in November 2001, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Angola increased three-fold between 1999 and 2001. Limited access to basic services, understaffed health facilities and shortages of essential medicines and vaccines continue to undermine the effectiveness of the health care system in all provinces." (UN OCHA 7 March 2002)

### **National health system unable to meet the needs of internally displaced persons and other at-risk populations (2001)**

- Health care non-existent or inaccessible for majority of population
- Potential for epidemics in urban areas and IDP camps remains high

"The health situation in Angola continues to worsen. Three decades of violence has destroyed water and sanitation systems throughout the country. Health care services are nonexistent or inaccessible for the majority of the population. IDPs are moving into already overcrowded urban and semi-urban areas without functioning health infrastructures. As a result, the potential for epidemics in urban areas and IDP camps remains high. Malaria, tuberculosis, measles, and diarrheal diseases are among the most common ailments of Angolans. In FY 2000, recurrent epidemics of polio and meningitis were reported. Immunization coverage is generally low in Angola." (USAID 2 April 2001)

19. The [UN Inter-Agency] assessment [of April 2000] confirmed that the health system in Angola was unable to meet the needs of at-risk populations, including the displaced. None of the hospitals visited during the assessment had sufficient essential medicines. All were found to be understaffed, underfunded and in need of basic equipment. Throughout the country, there were shortages of both general and trained medical personnel and in several locations staff had not received salaries for a number of months. The conditions of hospitals and health posts varied. In some cases, buildings were adequate, while in others, roofs were in need of repair. More than 50 per cent of the buildings lacked a regular supply of potable water and many had inadequate sanitary facilities.

20. Malaria, diarrhoea, tuberculosis and upper respiratory track infections were reported in the majority of locations visited. Measles and polio were reported in a few locations. Other diseases include meningitis and sleeping sickness. Suspected cases of HIV have been recorded, though it is suggested that this disease is significantly underreported. Tuberculosis and diarrhoea were prevalent in transit centres where severe overcrowding, appalling sanitation and extreme destitution had put the displaced at risk of infection. Skin diseases were also widespread.

21. Vaccinations were incomplete in many locations. Large numbers of children under five had received only one dose of a multi-dose vaccine or none at all. Coverage for children over five was even more limited. In all locations visited, delivery practices were rudimentary. Although problems with birthing are common, there were virtually no delivery or post-delivery facilities in either hospitals or health posts.

22. In some areas with a high concentration of mine victims, for example Andulo, Negage and Maquela do Zombo, the medical services were found to be inadequate. There were no appropriate evacuation methods and local health facilities lacked the necessary blood and surgical equipment to treat mine victims. Prostheses are available at only five centres in the country." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 19-22)

### **Displaced are particularly vulnerable to reproductive health and sexually transmitted diseases (2000-2001)**

- Maternal and infant mortality rates are the worst in Africa
- Internally displaced women at higher risk than others of dying from pregnancy-related causes
- HIV/STDs threaten the health of displaced women and children due to lack of protection and awareness
- International agencies lack the resources to improve the situation of reproductive health

"Angola falls under the category of a chronic emergency, yet even the most basic minimum standards for reproductive health (RH) services are not being met. Even the many NGOs and UN agencies that signed on to the Inter-Agency Field Manual for Reproductive Health in Emergency Situations [WHO, UNFPA, UNHCR] are not coming close to meeting the minimum standards they committed to by signing on to this document. This is due not so much to a lack of interest or concern, but a lack of resources. And in some

cases this is due to the pervading attitude of international health agencies that reproductive health services fall outside of emergency lifesaving interventions.

Although the needs are great in both the IDP and local communities, we were told that IDPs did have special needs and considerations. In the four provinces that we visited, health workers said that awareness of reproductive health issues is lower among IDPs than in the local communities. We were also told that IDPs often wait too long to access services. The reasons for this are unclear. We did hear complaints that IDPs were not treated well at certain health facilities, and that they lack faith in the health system. We also heard that some health workers demand payment from patients as a way to supplement meager salaries, and that IDPs are less likely to be able to pay for the services. At some hospital maternities we visited, the IDPs were sleeping on the floor because they did not have sheets to put on the mattresses.

[...]

Angola has one of the highest maternal mortality ratios in the world, estimated at 1,500 per 100,000 compared to bordering Namibia at 370 per 100,000 and Canada at 5 per 100,000. This should not be surprising since fertility rates are high, use of family planning is low, ante-natal care is not widely available, and many women do not have access to emergency obstetric services. UNFPA-Angola produced a report in June 1999 titled *The Demographic Profile and the Reproductive Health of the IDPs*. The findings of this report are based on interviews with 1,422 IDPs in Huila, Benguela, Malanje and Zaire provinces. This study reports that the average number of children per woman interviewed was 8.6. The infant mortality rate is 125 per 1,000 in Angola, whereas in Canada, for instance, it is 5.5 per 1,000." (Women's Commission February 2001, p. 8)

"Of serious concern is the growing prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. For example, the number of reported HIV/AIDS cases among pregnant women in Luanda city has increased four-fold in the last ten years from 0.9 percent in 1989 to 3.4 percent in 1999. National data indicates that HIV/AIDS is spreading at an alarming rate, affecting both women and men and jeopardising the rehabilitation of the country. Displaced populations are particularly vulnerable due to the lack of protection and HIV/AIDS awareness, poor health care services and limited opportunities to generate income." (UN November 2000, Humanitarian Context)

"Prevention of HIV/AIDS infection: HIV/AIDS cases are currently estimated as being low in Angola but are increasing due to uncontrolled migrations through borders with neighbouring countries, massive internal displacements and the presence of large groups of soldiers known to engage in risky sexual behaviour. Poverty is also leading to ever-greater numbers of occasional sexual workers. Furthermore, with promiscuity, poor standards of living, constant migration of husbands in the neighbouring countries (with extremely high rates), the risk of contracting STDs and HIV/AIDS is higher among women of [child bearing age] and adolescents.

[...]

The maternal and infant mortality rates are the worst in Africa, estimated in 1998 at 1,854/100,000 and 166/1,000 live births, respectively. The estimated national contraceptive prevalence rate is very low (3 percent), and only 19 percent of women have assisted deliveries. IDP women are known to be at higher risk of dying from pregnancy related causes due to lack of access to health services and life in stressful conditions. A survey conducted by UNFPA and the implementing agencies in 1999 with 710 men and women in IDP camps and periurban areas of Matala, Chibia, Lubango, Lobito, Baia Farta and Benguela indicated that there is: (1) very poor attendance of pregnant women; (2) a lack of knowledge about child spacing and sexuality issues, among men and women; (3) little use of family planning methods; (4) little knowledge about STDs/AIDS; and, (5) an overall expectation of large family size. With regard to questions about forced sex, 19 percent of women indicated they knew of women who were forced to have sex, while 11.4 percent of men affirmed that they knew of men who were forced to have sex." (UN 30 November 1999, pp. 42, 50)

***For a full report on reproductive health among IDPs in Angola with detailed information on the situations in Bie, Malanje, Moxico, Huambo and Luanda, see the Women's Commission assessment of February 2001 available from the Women's Commission or the Global IDP Project.***

## **Children are especially vulnerable to psychological stress from exposure to conflict (February 2001)**

"According to the Christian Children's Fund (CCF), Angola's children are especially vulnerable to psychological stress from exposure to ongoing violent conflict. CCF estimates that 82% of children in IDP camps have come under fire, more than 66% say they have seen people killed or tortured and 24% have lost a limb. Therefore, psychological trauma is a significant issue among IDP youth (and surely IDPs of all ages) and one requiring much greater attention." (Women's Commission February 2001, p. 13)

## **Water and sanitation**

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### **Vast majority of displaced communities use contaminated water sources (November 2001)**

- 90 percent of displaced communities use contaminated water sources, resulting in potentially fatal water-borne diseases
- Problem is most acute in overcrowded camps and transit centres

"At least 60 percent of the general population and 90 percent of displaced communities use contaminated water sources. Water systems in provincial and municipal centres are over-loaded, and in many locations, no longer functional. Problems with water quality and quantity are most acute in areas where large numbers of displaced persons are living in overcrowded camps and transit centres. Lack of hygiene awareness is a major factor leading to persistently high levels of diarrhoea. Water-related diseases continue to be one of the most common causes of morbidity across the country and a frequent cause of under-five mortality. In the majority of IDP areas, the number of latrines is inadequate for population densities. An estimated 75 percent of latrines in these areas have reached capacity levels. The shortage and over-use of latrines, particularly in highly populated areas, continues to contaminate watercourses, contributing further to the pollution of community water sources." (UN November 2001)

## **Shelter and non-food items**

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### **More than 84,000 newly displaced persons in various locations are in urgent need of shelter and essential survival items (March 2002)**

"More than 84,000 newly displaced persons in Bocoio, Caconda, Camacupa, Cruzeiro, Huambo, Kuito, Luena, Matala and Wako Kungo are in urgent need of essential survival items and appropriate shelter. With the exception of IDPs in Kuito, where water and sanitation interventions are ongoing, these same populations lack access to basic water and sanitation. A direct correlation exists between inadequate shelter, contaminated water sources, unhygienic faecal disposal and high levels of malnutrition, morbidity and mortality in these areas. Urgent funding is required to reinforce the pipeline for non-food items. Support is also required to increase agency capacity for transporting essential non-food items, shelter materials and water and sanitation equipment to critical areas." (UN OCHA 7 March 2002)

### **Thousands of IDPs remain in sub-standard transit centres (December 2001)**

- Approximately 17,500 IDPs continue to live in sub-standard conditions in 13 transit centres in nine provinces

"Since April 2000, 35 transit centres have been closed. Approximately 17,500 IDPs continue to live in sub-standard conditions in 13 transit centres in the Provinces of Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huíla, Kuanza Sul, Luanda, Malanje and Uíge. During December, new transit centres were opened in Kuito (Bié Province) to accommodate the continuous influx of new IDPs. Despite attempts to close transit centres and warehouses in Benguela and Lobito (Benguela Province), Bongo and Longonjo (Huambo Province) and Caconda (Huíla Province) by the end of 2001, persistent insecurity, constant new arrivals and inadequate registration procedures have forced these centres to remain open." (UN OCHA 31 December 2001)

### **Life in tents or warehouses embarrassing for people accustomed to having their own homes (2001)**

*Excerpt taken from Andrade study conducted in 1996-1997:*

"Most respondents considered that adapting to the new physical environment had been difficult and slow. Previously respondents had been used to having their own houses and working their fields, thus guaranteeing subsistence for themselves and their families: after displacement many did not have access to their own houses and fields.

Life in tents or warehouses was embarrassing for people who were accustomed to having their own house: they had to live in a group and sleep alongside others. Some people built houses, but in Malanje city displaced people found it difficult to make bricks because they were used to living in houses of wattle and daub in rural areas. Some displaced people (most of them from Cuale, Malanje) rented houses, either from local residents or from displaced people who had come in previous decades. This contributed to the marked feeling of insecurity." (Andrade 2001, sect. 5.1)

*For more information on the feelings of IDPs during period of displacement, see Filomena Andrade report available from Development Workshop - Angola.*

### **Internally displaced persons live in crowded camps, in derelict buildings, and in and underneath train carriages (1998-2000)**

- Displaced populations generally live in crowded mud house shanty towns
- Huts are clustered together in areas of about 10,000 houses
- In transit centre in Caala, displaced living in and under train carriages
- Other displaced persons reside in derelict buildings

"During his [the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis M. Deng] visit to the province of Huambo, the Representative saw both the problems and prospects facing the internally displaced. In a transit centre in the town of Caala, the internally displaced were found to be living in appalling conditions, in a derelict building and in and underneath two train carriages. The Representative was struck by the overriding sense of despair and depression amongst the displaced." (UNHCHR 10 November 2000, para. 8)

"Q. It's estimated that some 2 million Angolans are displaced within the country, many of them living in camps for internally displaced people (IDPs). Describe an IDP camp.

A. There are thousands of predominantly mud houses spread all over once-cultivated hillsides. The houses are mostly arranged in lines and, as more IDPs arrive, they become burgeoning neighborhoods with little space. There are pathways. The houses have grass roofs, some are covered by plastic. They are one room and very close together – about four feet between houses. They are usually clustered, in areas of about 10,000 houses. The hillsides, which used to be all green with vegetation, are now covered with huts. From a distance, they look like the tops of igloos. All camps have open areas, all defoliated, for football, or where there are clinics and a meeting hall. Some people have been there for seven years, but most camps have been built since February 1999." (CARE 11 September 2000, Question 3)

"In the inland cities [in the areas controlled by the government,] many IDPs live in abandoned buildings or with friends or relatives. Many of the displaced on the coast live in shanties thrown up on the outskirts of towns, or in camps set up away from the cities themselves.

[...]

In the capital of Moxico province, Luena, a town of 150,000, some 60,000 people are estimated to be internally displaced from other areas of Angola. They have taken over several municipal buildings, including the old seminary, cinema, museum and railway station. The World Food Programme distributes some food and health care. The living conditions of the people are miserable, their motivation to return home poor; they remain socially isolated in ghettoized buildings in the town centre."(Vines 1998, p. 92)

# ACCESS TO EDUCATION

## General

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### **Access to education is most difficult for displaced women and children (2001/ 2002)**

- More than 180,000 children and adolescents and 30,000 women in IDP camps are estimated not to have access to formal or informal education
- As little as 45 percent of Angola's school-age children attend school

"The most vulnerable populations in this sector are children and women in IDP settings. Agencies estimate that more than 180,000 school-aged children and adolescents and 30,000 women in IDP camps do not have access to formal or informal education. In addition, approximately one million displaced and vulnerable children living in resident communities or resettlement areas are not integrated into existing educational programmes. During 2002, partners will target approximately one-third of the most vulnerable children, adolescents and women in 54 accessible municipalities throughout the country. In addition, 8,000 teachers and educational promoters will benefit from technical training programmes and educational materials." (UN November 2001)

"As little as 45% of Angola's school age children attend school. Dropout rates remain high, particularly among girls - estimates show that as many as 65% of adolescent girls are illiterate. Virtually none of the children who are permanently or temporarily outside the formal school system have access to other educational opportunities, including non-formal education. Teaching is severely hampered by the lack of basic materials and high pupil-teacher ratios in almost all classrooms make it difficult for children to learn. In several provinces, schools have been forced to shut due to the lack or absence of teachers. Teacher training is often poor, affecting professional performance and leading to lower educational standards." (UNICEF 11 February 2002)

### **National education crisis highlighted by severe problems in Luanda (June 2001)**

- Luanda is only place in Angola where children stand a chance of getting an adequate education
- Teacher to pupil ration in Luanda is 1:80 in some cases
- Government unable to accommodate large number of war-displaced arriving in city
- Only 45 percent of school-age children attending school

"While some teaching at under-staffed and under-equipped schools takes place in the provinces, the only place in Angola where children stand a chance of getting an adequate education is Luanda, the capital. And even here, the constraints are immense. The government has not been able to accommodate the large number of war-displaced or starving families arriving in the city to live with extended families or to look for work.

[...]

An Oxfam report on primary education in Luanda found a severe lack of classroom space, high teacher/pupil ratios (1-80 in some cases), wastage because of high failure and drop-out rates, the lack of trained teaching staff (only 48 percent of primary school teachers in Luanda are adequately trained), and lack of learning and teaching materials (teachers and pupils have to buy their own). With an official global poverty rate of about 67 percent, not many parents can afford all the costs associated with sending their

children to school. By the end of 2000, official statistics indicated that only about 45 percent of Angola's children of school-going age were in class." (IRIN-SA 14 June 2001)

### **IDP parents are often unable to pay bribes or otherwise pay for schooling (2001)**

- Displaced parents cannot pay extra fees or bribes required by some school authorities
- Education for IDPs provided by external actors generally only available in camps
- Even in IDP camps, parents cannot afford to keep children in school since they need their labour to survive

"Although there is great awareness of the importance of education among the displaced, there is a long way to go before most displaced children receive even a basic education. Displaced parents often cannot pay the 'extra fees' or bribes, which the teachers and administrative staff at the schools demand to provide certificates of matriculation. (The request for 'extra fees' is not surprising: teachers' salaries average about US\$20 per month, and payment is often two to six months late.) Interestingly, this seems to be less of a problem in Huambo than in, for example, Luanda. A significant number of parents who were displaced from Huambo province to Luanda (that is, some of the families who fled in December 1998) sent their children to schools in Huambo, when the city became safe again, because they didn't have to pay as many bribes and the quality of the education was better than in Luanda.

Education provided by external actors, such as UNICEF, is concentrated in the IDP camps and urban areas. One displaced woman described how her children only got access to education when they moved to Kasseque III camp. They had first fled from Sambo to Missão do Kuando and later Escóla 113 (both of which were large IDP settlements, accommodating several thousand persons, that received minimal assistance from agencies). They arrived at Kasseque III one-and-a-half years after they first took flight. Even though Kasseque III is regarded as one of the best IDP camps and transit centres in Angola, most of the children living there do not get past the first year of school. Parents cannot afford to keep their children in school when they need their labour; and hunger and illness among the pupils and a lack of qualified teachers keeps children away. Because most children have either not finished their schooling or have never attended school before, the ages of those in the first grade can range from 6 to 14 years.

Some displaced persons we spoke with told how they had organised education for their children in transit centres by asking the teachers among them to teach their children in return for a small amount of food or cash. Later, some of these schemes were supported by outside agencies, such as UNICEF. In villages where the displaced have resettled and others are returning home, several schools and health centres are being built as part of food-for-work projects. ADRA-Angolana, together with the government and WFP, provide food for the workers and some construction material for school buildings. The agencies only become involved when the projects are initiated by the villagers." (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, p. 43)

# ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

## **Self-reliance**

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### **Majority of IDPs are absorbed by overstretched host communities (2001/ 2002)**

- Resident populations have been forced to bear the social burdens caused by massive levels of displacement

"Virtually all newly displaced persons in Angola are destitute, having lost both individual and communal assets during displacement, as well as their normal means of livelihood. In the absence of sustained and effective Government services, resident populations have been forced to shoulder the social burden caused by the massive levels of displacement. The overwhelming majority of displaced persons continue to be absorbed into host communities, placing additional strains on the coping capacities of already-poor families and intensifying competition for meagre resources, including land, employment and income-generating opportunities. Basic infrastructures in provincial and municipal centres remain weak or non-existent and most displaced and resident populations have only limited access to minimum services, including potable water, sanitation, health care and primary education. The majority of households lack survival items including soap, oil, sugar and salt, and in areas where coping mechanisms are collapsing and social roles are under stress, family and community violence is increasingly common." (UN November 2001)

### **Displacement has forced communities to find innovative coping strategies (2001)**

- Despite the strains, displaced groups usually stay intact under the leadership of traditional elders
- Church groups often fill in where basic social infrastructure and services have collapsed
- Various other social formations and networks are used to ensure cohesion and protect communities from further vulnerability

"Many populations in Angola face situations that appear beyond their control. With social structures under enormous and continuous strain, communities are forced to find innovative ways to cope, maintain cohesion, and preserve a sense of dignity. Despite the pressures created by prolonged warfare, many displaced groups remain in tact. With few exceptions, groups travel together until they reach safe haven under the leadership of their traditional elders. Once they arrive at a new location, elders assume responsibility for negotiating with local authorities and protecting the interests of the community.

[...]

Church groups provide a social support network that reaches communities on both sides of the conflict. In many locations, these groups fill in where basic social infrastructure and services have collapsed. Local churches help to educate children and care for the sick and the elderly. They also provide a forum for dialogue between host and displaced communities and help to support traditional elders during negotiations with local authorities. A variety of other social formations and networks are used to ensure cohesion and protect communities from further vulnerability. Consultative forums, sometimes held within *jangos*, are convened by community notables, and increasingly by other members, to discuss problems and agree on future courses of action. Women *kitandeiras* often form rotating credit and savings networks which function as important elements in the informal market sector. Kinship networks are used to redistribute resources and provide support and social security to extended family members. In provincial centres and

municipal towns, political affiliations are sometimes rewarded with access to agricultural lands and other important resources, including household items." (UN November 2001)

### **Study in Huambo shows that IDPs work in many different ways to gain livelihood and protect themselves (2001)**

- Villagers establish civil defence groups to handle potential security threats in rural areas
- IDPs collect firewood, work for others and participate in petty trade to gain livelihood
- Stealing and food ration fraud are also means by which IDPs survive

*Below are excerpts from a study on self-reliance conducted in Huambo province. For the full report, please see Caught Between Borders available through NRC's Global IDP Project:*

"Given this insecurity, both displaced persons and the local population carry guns when they go into the fields. It is startling to note that the farther from the towns one goes, the more weapons one sees among the civilians. Civil defence groups, composed of both men and women, have been organised both by the local population and the authorities. Men carry the weapons, women patrol the paths and roads. Some members of the civil defence teams carry light weapons to protect settlements and markets. On the roads into towns, members of the civil defence regularly check that people are not carrying weapons and bombs hidden in their bags and baskets. Sometimes, a small civil defence group is left to protect houses and crops in villages from which most of the population has already fled.

[...]

Collecting firewood is probably the most common survival strategy used by displaced persons, whether they live in or outside camps. There has been a shortage of energy throughout Huambo province for the past eight years. With infrastructure largely destroyed, very little fossil fuel (gas, diesel and gasoline) reaches the interior, thus prices have skyrocketed<sup>3</sup>. In addition, since the 1992-94 war, deforestation has taken place on a massive scale in the most populated areas, i.e., the corridor along the Benguela railway. The deforestation can be partly attributed to the lack of other energy sources, but mostly because firewood collection has been one of the best survival strategies for displaced and other vulnerable populations. Workers charge so little for their labour that even when road transport is functioning, consumers will opt for the cheaper firewood rather than other fuels.

[...]

Petty trading in streets and markets is most common in urban areas, but is occasionally also practiced in rural areas. Among the displaced in Huambo, it is mostly women who use petty trading as a source of income. Women who have access to some cash place themselves on the outskirts of markets or in markets, such as São Pedro, where they buy from local producers. A farmer may not have the experience or skill to sell his produce to consumers, so he may prefer to sell his goods in bulk to these trade women. The women do not make a great profit from their work: they may buy a wheelbarrow-load of cabbage to resell at the market, and make only enough to provide one or two meals for their families. Others sell fruits and vegetables in residential areas, or anything from used clothes and shoes to washing powder.

Informal trading also takes place inside the IDP camps and transit centres. Cigarettes, soap, matches, cooking oil and firewood are sold there in small quantities. Women dominate as sellers of low-priced goods. High-priced merchandise is generally sold by men, but few displaced men have the financial resources to enter that sector of the market.

[...]

There have been some instances of stealing among the displaced. In Ekunha, the local population reported an increase in produce stolen from their fields and yards and blamed the thievery on the desperate circumstances of the displaced persons living among them. In general, though, there has been little of this kind of activity, despite the poverty and desperation of the displaced. Displaced persons themselves said

that only the most desperate, and those who had no social conscience, stole. They emphasised that these kinds of negative survival strategies were not accepted by the society.

Cheating with food ration cards, however, is not regarded as stealing, and is done more frequently. Families split up and go to different camps/transit centres to register, and thus benefit from multiple sources of food. Sometimes, families will build huts in different locations where NGOs and/or ICRC provide food rations and then travel back and forth to get double rations. Since food is given out on certain days in each location, it is not difficult to move between the camps at the appropriate times. The government and various NGOs tried to stop this practice by registering all displaced persons by name, but since most displaced persons have no identity cards, the system is often ineffective." (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, pp. 33-41)

### **Solidarity amongst IDPs can be lacking in peri-urban environments (May 2001)**

- Solidarity in peri-urban environments is fragile at best
- People must move to whichever barrios have space, meaning that communities do not necessarily stay together
- Social cohesion weak; networks few and fragile

#### ***Excerpt taken from Paul Robson study of community structures in peri-urban Angola:***

"The study revealed that traditional institutions, including traditional institutions of solidarity, even in rural areas, had been transformed in the last 100 years mainly due to processes linked to colonial occupation, the growing influence of Christianity and the de-stabilisation of rural areas by low-intensity conflict in the last 25 years. This transformation was most marked in the west-central areas of the country, the areas of the Ambundu and Ovimbundu language groups, which have been most affected by colonisation and low-intensity conflict. These areas are also the ones that were the main origin of migratory flows to the cities included in this study. This means that a considerable part of the migrants to the cities brought with them institutions that probably were not as vigorous as had been thought at the start of the study.

Moreover, the social heterogeneity of a large part of peri-urban areas has not allowed traditional rites and institutions to continue among people living close to each other, given that these traditions were not shared by neighbours. People from the same area do not necessarily arrive in the city at the same time. While most migration is ultimately due to displacement because of war and insecurity, migratory flows to the cities are very complex. Migration takes place in times of (relative) peace as well as in times of war. Migration and displacement often take place in stages, and many displaced people have been forced to move a number of times. Not all migration is of large groups of people and, even when people set out as a group, the tendency is for the group to break up during the journey or at each stage.

Other factors explaining the social heterogeneity of these areas are the intense movements of people between *barrios*, particularly to adjust to rising rents and house prices, and the variable and constantly changing morphology of peri-urban areas. People say that 'where you manage to find a space is where you have to live' and thus 'the people are mixed together'. In all the three cities studied (Luanda, Huambo and Lubango) neighbors may be from different regions, from different towns or villages, of different economic levels and have lived in the *barrio* for a different length of time.

Social heterogeneity has consequences for the density and extension of social networks. Trusting social relations are not necessarily established with neighbours and relationships with neighbours are often loose, with the result that local social cohesion is weak and social networks are few and fragile. 'Neighbourliness is not usual.' Social networks exist, but usually they are not built on relations between neighbors." (Robson and Roque May 2001, Solidarity in peri-urban areas)

*For more information on social support in peri-urban areas, see Robson and Roque report entitled "Here in the city, everything has to be paid for: locating the community in peri-urban Angola" as well as Communities and Reconstruction in Angola – both available from the Development Workshop – Angola.*

### **Many IDPs rely on kinship and other informal networks to make ends meet (2000-2001)**

- Displaced persons living within resident communities are often hosted by members of the same kinship network
- Limited resources among host populations mean that aid to IDPs is not always forthcoming
- Assets, including humanitarian aid, are often sold or exchanged as part of coping strategies of displaced populations

*Excerpt taken Andrade study conducted in 1996-1997 regarding the perception of IDPs about the assistance they received from resident communities during initial periods of flight:*

"There are different opinions about the aid that others gave them, or might have given them, while they were fleeing. Some of the interviewees think that lack of support in circumstances like this should be seen in the context of the shortages from which the whole country suffers: it is not possible to give things you do not have. But others consider that this was not always the real reason. In some cases this is linked to the double lives people have led, whereby communities, groups, and individuals were (and may still be) having to accommodate both parties to the conflict. For example, the Cuale Group was going from Massango towards the south of Malanje Province at a time when the war had not yet spread to the whole province. Many inhabitants of areas along the route did not want to 'compromise themselves' with people coming from an unknown place, for unknown reasons, and with an unknown destination. In certain cases (for example, the Tumbulo Group) displaced people decided to skirt round any kind of human settlement. The reasons were the same – they did not know who was there, who they were, or which 'side' they were on. It also happened that while some took this position, others used this situation to gain something for themselves; taking advantage of people who were already in difficult circumstances, and were easier to exploit." (Andrade 2001, sects. 4, 5.3)

"At the Damba Maria camp along this road [Benguela province], hundreds of formerly displaced people from the nearby town of Chongoroi live on untended ground, with little sign of agriculture nearby. Now settled for too long to qualify for food relief, these people rely on informal networks, fishing and distant and difficult agricultural or urban work to feed their families. Much of the land around them is owned by others, who have let it lie in fallow." (Reuters 28 December 2000)

"The massive level of internal displacement in Angola has intensified the degree of poverty at the same time that it has forced additional people into outright destitution. Displaced people living within resident communities are usually hosted by families from the same kinship network. With the majority of the Angolan population living at, or below, the poverty line, however, resources in most households are limited and can be extended very little without creating further hardship. During the past eight years, agencies estimate that a majority of host households have become destitute as scarce assets are shared among larger numbers of people. Although international assistance is provided to registered IDPs, most host families do not qualify for aid, unfortunately cut off from services that would help to sustain their households." (UN November 2000, p. 10)

"Although the pace of resettlement initiatives increased during the [reporting] period, the majority of displaced populations in the country, whether living in transit centres, camps or among resident communities, do not yet have access to adequate agricultural land. Most displaced persons continue to survive through a combination of kinship exchange, petty-commodity production, selling of charcoal and

firewood, food preparation and brewing. Assets, including emergency items provided by aid agencies, are routinely exchanged or sold as part of the coping strategies of the populations." (UNSC 10 October 2000)

*For more information on coping strategies of internally displaced persons, see Filomena Andrade study in Communities and Reconstruction in Angola available from the Development Workshop - Angola.*

### **IDPs obliged to re-adapt skills to new income-generating activities (2001)**

- Agricultural and manual skills are less in demand
- IDPs in urban areas obliged to learn commercial skills such as selling firewood or doing domestic work for others
- Generally, one-third of money earned is saved as "reserve fund" for displaced families

"The displaced people who were interviewed had all arrived at their places of refuge with agricultural and manual skills, but these skills were less in demand in their new places of residence. All displaced people had to find new ways of making a living, even if it was painful, but 'there was no alternative' as they had to find a way to survive. Usually this meant a big change in the way they spent their time. If they had previously worked six to eight hours per day, they now had to work eight to eleven hours per day to guarantee subsistence for their families.

More in demand in urban areas are commercial skills. Some of the displaced learnt these skills more rapidly than others (even if they had never worked in this area before) and so adapted more rapidly to the urban environment and managed to acquire a status envied by their peers. In Cuale (Malanje), most of the interviewees had to stop farming and take up cutting and selling firewood or charcoal.

[...]

Many interviewees suffered when first they arrived at the place they currently live, because they did not know who to go to for assistance. Some only registered for assistance after a few days or (even) months, when they received advice from other displaced people. To survive and as a way of 'getting their lives sorted out', many did domestic work for others or worked in other people's fields (sowing, tilling, watering, and harvesting vegetables).

After they had settled into the new place, displaced people tended to find other sources of income. Some went into trade, some into farming (with or without NGO support), and others into producing and selling charcoal or firewood.

The income that displaced people manage to generate depends on a series of factors, many of which are outside their control. Climatic conditions determine the quantity and quality of what is cultivated, and influences the volume of their earnings and the amount consumed. Selling anything depends mainly on demand.

Displaced people use the money obtained from their work in three ways: part goes to replace the initial investment; some goes to buying food; the third part forms a 'reserve fund' (for days when there is no revenue). This division of funds is done every day." (Andrade 2001, sects. 4, 5.3)

*For more information on coping strategies of internally displaced persons, see Filomena Andrade report available from the Development Workshop - Angola.*

### **Displaced persons have very limited access to agriculture land (April 2000)**

- Internally displaced persons either have no access to land, or only to small, unproductive plots

- Landless displaced persons are often forced to work for no wages on latifundios
- At same time, only small percentage of land is under cultivation

***As noted by the UN Inter-Agency Rapid Assessment Mission in April 2000:***

"In more than 80 percent of the locations visited [by the Inter-Agency Rapid Assessment Team], displaced persons require land and agricultural inputs. In some locations where displaced populations have received land, for example Malanje, the amount is less than the .25 hectares specified in the emergency recommendations. In other cases, the land which has been provided is unproductive. In twenty of the locations visited, displaced populations have received no land from provincial authorities. Of particular concern, displaced populations who have not received land are obliged to work on latifundios where they receive no wages and have only limited access to extremely small plots of land.

With few exceptions, populations do not have adequate seeds or tools for the upcoming planting seasons. The assessment confirms that displaced persons consumed many of the seeds distributed during 1999, usually because they were delivered late, or because of food insecurity. The assessment also confirms that seed distributions in the Planalto must occur immediately, before the planting season ends in May. Distributions in the lowlands can be delayed until July in time for the August planting season. Most displaced populations who are farming achieve low yields due to poor quality soil. Fertilisers are required to improve productivity and increase food security." (OCHA 15 April 2000, pp.13-14)

***At same time, only small percentage of arable land in country is under cultivation:***

"In 1996, statistics indicate that less than four percent of the country's productive arable land was under cultivation. Fear of mutilation or death continues to force farmers off productive land and into urban areas. This obviously aggravates chronic food shortages, placing ever-increasing demands on urban centres. The fear of mines translates into even greater insecurity for provincial services by effectively denying displaced population's access to necessary medicine and services normally delivered over land.

In a country such as Angola, where the livelihood of a large part of the population is dependent on agriculture, the long-term prospects for social stability depend on the reduction of mine hazards." (UN 30 November 1999, p. 72)

# DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

## Documentation

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### **Lack of legal documentation leads to problems for displaced children (2001-2002)**

- Only 5 percent of children have had their births registered, according to government estimates
- Lack of documentation reduces access to education, health services and legal assistance, while increasing the risk for young boys of being recruited into the armed forces
- Children without documents are easy targets for abuse

"The Ministry of Justice estimates that only about 5% of children have had their births registered, which means that unregistered children do not legally exist and therefore cannot enrol in schools. It also becomes difficult for young boys to prove their age and have consequently greater risk of early recruitment into the armed forces. Displaced youths are particularly vulnerable, as they may not have the family or community support to protect them. In 2001, the Government approved a campaign led by the Ministry of Justice for the registration of three million children in 18 months." (UNICEF 11 February 2002)

"Children separated from their families, in particular following attacks and/or displacement, are of serious concern. Children who lack legal documentation, particularly those who have been forcibly displaced, suffer a lack of access to health services, schooling and even legal assistance when attempting to seek redress for violations of their rights. The numerous street children also face daily various hardships and dangers. Children are exploited as labourers and are subjected to sexual violence. Their lack of documentation leads to constant harassment by police officers. They are easy and silent targets for abuse." (UNSC 11 April 2001, para. 36)

### **Displaced persons who have lost personal identification documents are often subject to harassment (2000-2001)**

- Incidents of harassment of IDPs without documentation reported
- Lack of documents can endanger legal individual rights

"84. The [UN] Representative [on Internally Displaced Persons] was informed of incidents of harassment of displaced persons, in particular of those who have been displaced from UNITA-controlled areas, largely because they lack formal identity documents. It was noted that lack of such documents also limits access to education, health facilities and employment. The Government should take the necessary steps to issue to all internally displaced persons all documents necessary for the enjoyment and exercise of their legal rights. In particular, authorities should facilitate the issuance of new documents or the replacement of documents lost in the course of displacement." (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 84)

"Many Angolans have never had personal identification documents or have lost them during displacement. In order to ensure legal individual rights participants acknowledged the importance of making such documents available promptly and free of charge to the internally displaced. Furthermore, such effort could contribute to the establishment of improved mechanisms for establishing the whereabouts of displaced persons separated from their families." (NRC September 2000, Prevention and Protection)

## ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

### Family unity

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#### **Up to 100,000 children are separated from their birth families – and the number is increasing (March 2002)**

- Approximately 4,650 separated children were registered in 17 provinces during the last six months of 2001

"The number of children who are separated from their families as a result of sudden and disorganised displacement is increasing markedly, most notably in the Provinces of Moxico, Bié, Huambo and Kuanza Sul. Approximately 4,650 separated children were registered in 17 provinces during the last six months of 2001. Partners estimate that more than 100,000 children are currently separated from their birth families throughout the country. The condition of separated children is critical in many areas, including Luena, where orphanages and feeding centres are overwhelmed by steady influxes of newly arrived youth, many of whom are malnourished. Support for family tracing and care for separated children remains inadequate." (UN OCHA 7 March 2002)

#### **Conscription means women often flee their homes with children but no men (November 2001)**

- Newly displaced women describe how as soon as government forces recapture a village from UNITA, men of all ages are targets for military recruitment

" 'Once you join the army, that's forever,' Pedro says. 'You die there.' "

Pedro, 26, is one of the many young Angolan men who are worried by a fresh initiative by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) to recruit new soldiers.

In the last few weeks, radio announcements have been instructing young men aged between 18 and 20 to report to military bases around the country to register for military service, as is normal at this time of year.

But the FAA also have the legal right to conscript men up to the age of 30 who have not previously served for two years. Many young men fear that even those who have served their time could still be forced to put on uniforms.

The army has recently stepped up its operations in the eastern province of Moxico, saying that the aim is to capture Jonas Savimbi and to destroy the last UNITA forces in a region where the rebels are well established. Young men who hear this worry that it will be a signal for the military to make a particular effort this year - after 26 years of war - to get more of them into the army.

Whether or not this is actually happening remains unclear. The conscription laws in Angola are never applied consistently.

Women arriving in highland cities such as Kuito, after fighting has forced them to flee their villages, have frequently made the journey with children but no men. They tell how as soon as the FAA recapture a village from UNITA, the men are seen as fair game for recruitment, however old they may be. UNITA are

also known to forcibly conscript, and have also seized children for military service." (IRIN 23 November 2001)

### **Displacement has changed traditional family roles (2001)**

- Following displacement, men remain the principal decision-makers, and undertake new income-generating activities
- Women often become the main agents of social and family cohesion, and assume numerous additional responsibilities
- Children are often withdrawn from school to help with domestic and agricultural work

"Communities have proven highly instrumental in reducing vulnerabilities by transforming social roles within the family. Although the role of men is often eclipsed in IDP settings, they remain the principal decision-makers. Men help with land and charcoal preparation and are responsible for constructing community buildings and tending livestock. Men also procure agricultural inputs. In addition, men brew and sell alcohol and where possible, fish and hunt. Following displacement, Angolan women assume additional responsibilities and often become the main agents of social and family cohesion. In most IDP settings, women are responsible for food procurement and preparation, water collection and shelter construction. Women care for the children and elderly and tend sick members of the family. Women help to prepare and maintain the land, collect firewood and also prepare charcoal. Women sell both food and non-food items (NFI) in the market and are responsible for procuring family assets, including clothing and cooking pots. Young girls are often withdrawn from school to assist their mothers and other women in the family and boys are sometimes sent to the fields, particularly during peak periods of planting and harvesting." (UN November 2001)

### **Displacement can have severe negative impact on individual and communal identity (2001)**

- Different age groups and sexes affected differently by displacement
- Difficult memories of flight create problems in adapting to new place of refuge
- IDPs express strong feelings of loss of identity, common kinship values and social function

#### ***Excerpt taken from Andrade study conducted in 1996-1997:***

"Displacement affected the different age groups and the sexes differently. Some young people were born at the places of refuge (the place or area to which displaced people fled), and some arrived there when very young, so do not remember the things that happened. Older people do remember and their memories are negative: deaths of immediate family members, hunger illness or rape. These recollections create difficulties in adapting to their places of refuge.

Men older than eighteen have quite detailed memories, and can talk about the reasons and conditions for their displacement and the decision to go. Women of this age group have more selective memories, and focus on the problems that their own families experienced. They follow the opinions and decisions of their families and other men in the family, normally the older ones. Old men and women are cautious about stating their opinions, but their memories are strongly marked by feelings of loss: cattle, goods, strength, values, power, dignity, and status. Their age means that they have little hope of reconstructing their lives before they die, and this forms part of their sense of loss.

Displaced people, particularly those older than thirty, are clearly disillusioned by the breakdown of stability which came after the 1992 elections, shattering the peace which had been created by the Bicesse Accord. They display pessimism about the future, and deep distrust. Most of them feel a betrayal of the confidence that they had placed in the institutions and in the peace process. They feel used and kicked around between interests that are not theirs, and which they cannot influence.

[...]

The people who left their places of origin under fire were completely disoriented – they had faced death in the most immediate sense possible. But death also took other forms: abandoning children during the journey, leaving the wounded, untended, unsuccessful births, and death from hunger. These had a large psychological impact, as people had to make absurd choices that left them feeling guilty. A factor that weighed heavily psychologically and caused grief was 'leaving the dead without even burying them'. Older people showed the greatest anguish about this, since they have a particular respect for ancestors and for death rituals. Younger people see this as less important than a birth when on the move (with the subsequent forced abandonment of the baby), or an attack in which many people died, or hunger and exhaustion.

Two kinds of loss were mentioned, and were the source of strong feelings. The first kind is the loss of material items that sustain people (a guarantee of the future) or show wealth (and confirm status). The second kind refers to the loss of places, meaning spaces where people were protected by the family, where there was a solid nucleus of common kinship values and where each person's social function was clearly defined and respected. Even if these values and functions were not always so easy and clear, their loss is keenly felt when they were abandoned unwillingly. This is true whether people moved during fighting or during more stable periods." (Andrade 2000, sect. 4)

***For more information on coping strategies of internally displaced persons, see Filomena Andrade study in Communities and Reconstruction in Angola as well as Robson and Roque report on social support in peri-urban environments, both available from the Development Workshop - Angola.***

# PROPERTY ISSUES

## General

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### **Valuable land remains in hands of powerful economic and military interest groups (December 2000)**

- Large and relatively secure coastal strip of land has fallen prey to economic and military interests linked to the oil industry
- These powerful interest groups are reluctant to lease the land to displaced persons for fear of future ownership claims
- Powerful landowners known to influence the location of displaced persons camps in order to acquire cheap labour pools near land plots

#### *As reported by Reuters in late December 2000:*

"Though land tenure has been at the root of many squabbles for thousands of years, in Angola it has an unusual nature because of recent history and the tide of land-poor people fleeing war to urban centres.

[...]

Economic change swept Angola after Marxist-Leninism was officially abolished in 1989. In a series of so-called privatisations in the 1990s, powerful politicians obtained concessions for potentially lucrative property and land, although in theory these remain state property. In this chaotic liberalisation, ordinary people's rights to use land shrivelled and ownership has become unclear.

[...]

Many Angolans have fled violence in the countryside to government-held urban centres, often fed by the U.N. World Food Programme, Médedins sans Frontières, and others. Displaced people and residents grow what they can within the narrow security perimeters of these isolated towns and food finds its way into local markets by various routes.

The land is worth little in commercial terms, however, because of the insecurity.

In some places, such as the large and relatively secure coastal strip stretching from Lobito to Benguela and southwards for another 50 km to Dombe Grande, land has real commercial value and potential.

For this reason, it has fallen prey to powerful economic and even military interests linked to the oil-rich government. Many are reluctant even to lease the land to the displaced or other poor people, in case of future ownership claims.

People from Damba Maria, Dombe Grande and other areas sometimes work as labourers for big farmers in a system known by some here as 'chinyango.'

The standard of payment is one kilogram (two pounds) of fuba (maize meal) per day is not enough to feed a family but the alternative – unemployment – is worse.

And because of their weak links with local communities, displaced people are at the bottom of any pecking order.

'People with a lot of land are exploiting the weakness of deslocados so they can pay little. This is a generalised thing,' the U.N. official said. 'In Benguela, it is the big farmers. Inland, the farmers are smaller-scale, so the problem is not so bad.'

A diplomat in the capital Luanda also said powerful landowners in various parts of the country had influenced the location of some camps for deslocados, to provide pools of cheap labour for their farms. 'This is a real betrayal of the people,' she said.

The land issue is acquiring new urgency today. The economic changes and, to some extent, government military successes in the past year that have reduced risk levels in some parts of the country, have provoked a scramble for land by some senior officials." (Reuters 28 December 2000)

# PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

## General

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### **Resettlement plans are underway for IDPs living in sub-standard camps and transit centres – but movement is slow (January 2002)**

- Provincial authorities and humanitarian partners develop resettlement plan for populations living in sub-standard conditions in Kuito and Camacupa
- Still, due to constant new arrivals more than 17,500 IDPs continue to live in at least 25 sub-standard transit centres and warehouses in nine provinces
- Instead of the transit centres and warehouses being closed by the end of 2001 as planned, four new centres open in Huambo in January 2002

"IDP camps and transit centres in many parts of the country have reached full capacity as a result of the continuous arrival of newly displaced populations. In a number of locations, including Kuito, Camacupa, Huambo and Luena, new arrivals are living in sub-standard conditions without access to adequate shelter and basic services.

During January, resettlement activities remained limited as a result of persistent insecurity, difficulties in identifying appropriate sites and seasonal rains. In addition, minimum standards remained unmet at a number of resettlement sites, including Betania in Huambo Province.

In a positive step forward, provincial authorities and humanitarian partners worked together to develop a resettlement plan for populations living in sub-standard conditions in Kuito and Camacupa.

In Bengo Province, approximately 38,000 IDPs in Caxito will move from the Cambambe II IDP camp to the Açucareira resettlement site following the rainy season. Construction of houses at the site is already underway. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) has distributed more than 3,000 hectares of agricultural land for use by IDPs at the new site.

In Bié Province, provincial authorities and humanitarian partners developed a provincial resettlement plan to address the problem of overcrowded camps and transit centres in Kuito and Camacupa. According to the first phase of the plan, more than 32,500 IDPs currently living in sub-standard conditions in Kuito's IDP camps will be resettled at proposed sites in Cunhinga and within the periphery of Kuito during April 2002.

In Huambo Province, the Ministry for Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) reported that 865 IDPs were moved from three transit centres in Huambo town to the Betania resettlement site during January. Partners visited the site, which was originally designed as a resettlement area for former combatants, and reported a critical lack of shelter and essential non-food items, including kitchen kits and blankets.

In Kuando Kubango Province, 132 new arrivals at the Menongue reception centre were resettled at the Savipanda and Chipompo resettlement sites. By the end of the month, more than 185 new arrivals remained at the reception centre awaiting resettlement. The Savipanda site is reaching full capacity and new resettlement sites are urgently required.

[...]

More than 17,500 IDPs continue to live in at least 25 sub-standard transit centres and warehouses in Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huíla, Kuanza Norte, Kuanza Sul, Luanda, Malanje and Moxico Provinces. Due to the continuous arrival of new IDPs, reception and registration centres in Kuito and Luena have been transformed into transit centres. In addition, four new transit centres have been opened in Huambo since December. Despite attempts to close transit centres and warehouses by the end of 2001, persistent insecurity, constant new arrivals and inadequate registration procedures have forced these centres to remain open." (UN OCHA 31 January 2002)

### **Almost ½ million IDPs resettled in temporary areas between 1998 and end of 2001**

- Approximately 498,500 IDPs resettled in temporary areas in 16 provinces, over three years

"Between 1998, when hostilities resumed, and the end of December 2001, approximately 498,500 IDPs were resettled in temporary areas in the Provinces of Bengo, Benguela, Bié, Cunene, Huambo, Huíla, Kuando Kubango, Kuanza Norte, Kuanza Sul, Luanda, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje, Moxico, Namibe and Uíge. During December, resettlement activities slowed significantly as a result of seasonal rains and the continuous influx of new IDPs in provincial capitals and peri-urban centres. Minimum standards remained unmet at a number of resettlement sites." (UN OCHA, 31 December 2001)

"During 2001, approximately 177,000 IDPs were temporarily resettled in peri-urban areas with access to agricultural land [...]"

Fifty percent of all resettlement initiatives during the past 20 months have been conducted in compliance with the Norms. Most of the first resettlement activities were done outside the parameters of the Norms. During the last four-five months, however, compliance rates have increased to nearly 70 percent.

Resettlement areas continue to be targeted. Between May and December 2001, 63 security incidents occurred at or in close proximity to resettlement areas in 12 provinces." (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

### **U.S. pledges money for resettlement of demobilised soldiers (October 2001)**

- USAID grants Angola 1.5 million USD for resettlement of demobilised soldiers
- Programmes expected to benefit some 300 families

"The US, through its co-operation agency, USAID is granting Angola 1.5 million dollars next year for the resettlement of the country's demobilised soldiers.

The national news agency (ANGOP), reported Sunday that the programme would benefit some 300 families of soldiers demobilised under the Bicesse and Lusaka peace accords, who are based in the Huíla, Huambo, Benguela and Bengo Provinces.

The Angolan National Institute for Social Re-integration (IRSEM), said the USAID intervention is in support of the Luanda government's scheme for the ex-combatants." (PANA 14 October 2001)

### **UN supported Angolan government in the planning and execution of resettlement programmes in 2000**

- OCHA and MINARS collaborated to develop minimal operational standards for return and resettlement

- OCHA has also worked with NGOs and local authorities to support the execution of resettlement programmes at the provincial level

***At the central level, OCHA worked in close collaboration with MINARS to draft minimum operational standards for return and resettlement:***

"In a major step forward, MINARS and OCHA worked closely together during May and June [2000] to develop minimum operational standards for resettlement and return. The draft norms were widely discussed by UN Agencies, NGOs, donors and Government representatives. The norms describe pre-conditions for resettlement as well as targets for post-relocation assistance and were formally approved by the Council of Ministers in mid-October." (UN November 2000, p. 5)

"During the discussion that followed the presentation of the results of the Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs at the NHCG, the Government of Angola, UN Agencies and international organizations agreed on the need to define minimum operational standards for resettlement. A draft of the proposed minimum operational standards will be reviewed by the NHCG at the next monthly meeting." (OCHA 19 June 2000)

***The UN has also supported provincial governments like that of Huambo Province:***

"The United Nations will support Angolan the Central Huambo Province government in the execution of its program to resettle over 73,000 war-displaced victims. The U.N.-Angola Coordinator for Humanitarian Aid, Zoraida Mesa, said Friday [11 August 2000] that her organization is working to set basic conditions to improve the standards of the displaced people there. These war victims will be given seeds, foodstuffs and working tools at the first stage. According to Mesa, the United Nations will also support non-governmental organizations that will execute education, health, agriculture projects, and various other social projects in the camps. The Huambo government controls 311,000 war-displaced people and has implemented its resettling program on the outskirts cities of Caala, Huambo, and the Longonjo and Ekunha villages." (GOA 15 August 2000)

**MSF criticised UN for supporting government resettlement programmes in conditions of rising insecurity (July 2000)**

- MSF noted that any relocation of displaced persons must be conducted in safety and with the willingness of displaced persons themselves
- The UN responded that, indeed, minimum standards of security were a precondition for any movement of displaced persons

***MSF made the following comments in July 2000:***

"Despite such indications of rising insecurity outside of town centers, the Angolan authorities, backed by members of the international community and the UN, have undertaken a plan to return IDPs to their home villages or to other locations. MSF believes that any relocation must ensure that basic minimum standards are in place prior to the movement of the population. In particular, any return of displaced persons must be voluntary.

Additionally, in some locations, the World Food Program (WFP) has made drastic cuts in the numbers of beneficiaries receiving food distributions. MSF is concerned that if WFP general food distributions are dramatically reduced, IDPs may have no choice but to venture out of the town centers in search of food, jeopardizing their safety." (MSF 26 July 2000)

***The UN responded to MSF concerns with the following statement in August 2000:***

"Minimum standards of security are a precondition for the resettlement of Angolans displaced by the country's civil war, UN humanitarian sources said on Tuesday [1 August 2000] in response to concerns voiced by the international medical relief organisation, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).

[...]

But a UN humanitarian source told IRIN that 'MSF has got it slightly wrong. All UN agencies maintain that there has to be minimum operating standards for resettlement.

[...]

He [the humanitarian source] acknowledged that 'there has been problems relating to provincial governments regarding voluntary resettlement,' but UN agencies had drawn the attention of authorities to the problem when it occurred." (IRIN-SA 1 August 2000)

# HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

## General

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### **Humanitarian aid is severely hampered by insecurity and poor infrastructure (2002)**

- Humanitarian aid reaches only 10-15 percent of the country in limited areas
- As many as 500,000 people living in inaccessible areas are estimated to be in need of assistance

"Humanitarian aid reaches approximately 10 to 15 percent of the country in limited zones in and around the major provincial towns where security can be guaranteed. In UNITA-held areas, humanitarian access is virtually nonexistent. Humanitarian workers face extremely difficult, and even dangerous, working conditions. Armed attacks, acts of banditry, and landmines are a constant risk. The lack of access is exacerbated by the fact that Angola's infrastructure is almost entirely destroyed by fighting, looting, lack of maintenance, and landmines." (HRW 5 March 2002)

"International agencies currently have access to 60 percent of the 272 locations where IDPs are concentrated and only 73 percent of reported displaced populations. The rest of the areas where IDPs are concentrated are inaccessible to international agencies.

As many as 500,000 people living in inaccessible areas are estimated to be in need of assistance. Of these, 280,000 are thought to be in critical distress.

Due to insecurity and logistical constraints, more than 60 percent of all humanitarian aid is transported by air.

The Angolan humanitarian operation is one of the most expensive in the world due to exorbitantly high transport costs.

Four airstrips are currently under repair, including the airstrip at Kuito. Delivery of assistance in all of these critical locations – Uige, Luena, Negage and Kuito, is severely hampered. Seventeen airstrips in total require repair. Although the Government has recently repaired a handful of bridges on the key surface route between Huambo and Kuito, hundreds more are damaged or destroyed. Eighteen priority surface routes require either upgrading or repair.

Insecurity is rampant along surface routes, limiting the safe passage of convoys. During 2001, more than 75 convoys were attacked.

At least seven provinces, accounting for 40 percent of the entire countryside, are heavily mined, preventing the free movement of people and goods." (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

### **Displaced in Bié, cut off from international aid, are dying of hunger, according to local authorities (December 2001)**

- Humanitarian situation in various parts of country, especially those inaccessible to international organisations, deteriorating with upsurge in military activity

- Local official reports that up to 80 people died from hunger and lack of medical care in Cuemba, Bié province, in the first two weeks of December 2001

"With a government offensive against UNITA in full swing, the humanitarian situation in some parts of Angola - particularly in areas to which aid organisations have no access - has been deteriorating. LUSA on Thursday quoted a local official as saying that nearly 80 people had died from hunger and a lack of medical care in Cuemba in Bie province in the first two weeks of December.

Cuemba, located about 160 km east of Kuito, lies outside areas targeted by international humanitarian agencies. With its bridges down and roads mined, the only aid reaching Cuemba has been ferried in by the Angolan air force, according to LUSA. Humanitarian, civic and church bodies have been appealing to the government to create safe corridors in areas like Cuemba for at least the past year so that much needed aid can be delivered to those affected by the war." (IRIN-SA 21 December 2001)

### **Plane accident in Kuito highlights constraints to delivery of humanitarian aid (November 2001)**

- Cargo plane damaged and grounded after hitting pothole on the runway of Kuito airstrip while landing
- Runway's state of disrepair has hindered delivery of humanitarian aid for more than two years
- In absence of other functioning infrastructure, Kuito airstrip is essential for delivery of more than 80 percent of all relief aid to Bié province

"Humanitarian officials in Angola expect a damaged Boeing 727 plane to be removed from the Kuito airstrip in Bie province by the end of the week, without affecting the delivery of food aid to the needy.

The Boeing, delivering cargo to businesses in the province, was damaged and grounded when it hit a pothole on the runway while landing. No one was injured, but the accident once again highlighted the dismal state of the airstrip in the provincial capital. The runway's state of disrepair has hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid and, for more than two years, been a bone of contention between relief organisations and the provincial government, which is responsible for ensuring its maintenance.

World Food Programme (WFP) deputy head of air operations in Luanda, Jose Fernandez, told IRIN that WFP had decided a while ago to use smaller craft to transport food to the airport because the runway could not accommodate bigger planes. Fernandez said the distribution of food to the needy would not be affected by the accident because even though WFP had to suspend its flights to Kuito until the runway was cleared, there was enough food aid in the city to last for about two months.

The state of Kuito's airport, through which more than 80 percent of all relief aid reaches Bie, has made headlines before. While Bie governor Paulino dos Santos told IRIN in May that a private company contracted to the government was responsible for the repairs, work has been sporadic. Only 150 metres of the 2 km runway has so far been rehabilitated and there are fears that the rainy season, which normally lasts until April, could prevent planes from landing there altogether.

[...]

The [UN and US-led] delegation which visited Kuito also raised the condition of the road between Kuito and Camacupa, about 80 km away, which was opened earlier this year, granting humanitarian workers access to thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing fighting between government and rebel UNITA troops. All aid to Camacupa has to be transported by road from Kuito. A bridge and a stretch of road in a state of disrepair near to Camacupa could cause the town to be cut off during the rainy season.

WFP Angola Representative, Ronald Sibanda, said during the visit that the ruined infrastructure could cause a 'logistical nightmare' during the rainy season. 'We are trying our best to pre-position stocks before

the rains begin, but there is a limit to how much we can pre-position. It doesn't remove the need for improving the basic infrastructure, because this is a lifeline,' he said.

In another development, humanitarian officials confirmed to IRIN that the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) had begun delivering emergency food supplies to certain areas in the province which were under FAA control but were inaccessible to humanitarian workers. As an initiative of the FAA, the deliveries fall under the authority of the presidency and not the provincial government. IRIN was unable to obtain information on the volume or precise locations of the deliveries." (IRIN 6 November 2001)

### **Issue of "humanitarian corridors" in Angola revisited by UN Security Council (October 2001)**

- UNSC asked Angola's warring parties to permit access for humanitarian workers
- 500,000 Angolans in need of food and medicine cannot be reached
- UN may raise issue of "humanitarian corridors" with Angolan government by end of year

"The United Nations Security Council has asked Angola's warring parties to grant humanitarian workers access to at-risk communities, saying it is deeply concerned about humanitarian conditions in the country. UN statistics indicate at least 500,000 Angolans in desperate need of food and medicine cannot be reached.

Security Council President Richard Ryan said in a statement on Wednesday [18 October 2001] that the Council had received an extensive briefing from Ibrahim Gambari, the Secretary-General's special adviser on Africa, on the work of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA). 'Council members expressed deep concern about the humanitarian situation. They asked that access to the at-risk population be granted to humanitarian workers,' Ryan said.

The issue of getting to Angola's most vulnerable populations, who cannot access humanitarian assistance because of the ongoing civil war, was raised by the church and other civic bodies earlier this year, when they called on the government and UNITA to create conditions for the establishment of 'humanitarian corridors' in areas they control. Other international NGOs have also echoed the call. The UN has expressed support for the concept and could raise the issue with Angolan authorities, at least, by the end of the year, a source told IRIN.

However, UNITA spokesman Joffre Justino told IRIN that without a bilateral ceasefire, UNITA could not provide humanitarian workers with safety guarantees. He said it would be impossible since UNITA now operated as a guerrilla force and did not 'control' any part of the country. The responsibility for creating humanitarian corridors, he said, lay with the Angolan government. The Angolan military authorities, however, in spite of claiming to control 90 percent of the country, have had to reduce their security perimeters around many towns in recent months under increasing pressure from UNITA." (IRIN-SA 18 October 2001)

### **Humanitarian agencies targeted in May and June 2001**

- Sixteen World Vision staff members missing following rebel attack in Kwanza Norte
- Two WFP planes deliberately attacked while delivering food to Kuito, Bie

***Attack of World Vision staff in Kwanza Norte in May 2001:***

"Sixteen World Vision staff members are missing after rebels Monday took over a northern Angola city more than 130 east of the capital city, Luanda. The rebel group known as UNITA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, captured the town of Golungo Alto in Kwanza Norte province. Four other World Vision staff reached the town of Ndalatando shortly after noon Monday, following a 27-mile trek.

The fighting forced the Christian humanitarian organization to suspend its \$1 million Golungo Alto program helping 60,000 people, including 9,700 from outlying areas displaced by fighting.

'We are concerned about our staff and are praying for their safety,' said Anne Mesopir, director of World Vision's work in Angola. 'We're also concerned about the people of Golungo Alto. We were due to distribute monthly food rations to more than 4,000 people today.'

World Vision is working with the United Nations and other aid agencies to establish a relief station for people displaced by this latest fighting. Ms. Mesopir has dispatched a truck to the area to transport staff as they are found, as well as women and children in need of assistance." (World Vision 21 May 2001)

***Attack on WFP planes:***

"The World Food Programme and the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, a.i. in Angola repudiate the second deliberate attack within the last week on two of its food aid aircraft.

A missile was fired on Friday at two WFP chartered cargo aircraft, 45 km from the central highlands city Kuito, capital of Bié Province. It exploded at some distance from the first Hercules airplane, but caused no damage.

The two aircraft, bearing 17 MTs of maize each, were forced to abort their humanitarian mission and return to the coastal airbase Catumbela.

WFP will temporarily suspend all cargo flights in Angola, pending a thorough investigation of the incident.

Failure to re-establish the food airlift into Kuito will result in dire consequences to at risk populations in the city and surrounding areas. With the highest proportion of internally displaced persons in the country and record levels of malnutrition, Kuito has only five days of emergency food stocks to sustain a population of over 200,000 people.

The attack took place at approximately 1300 GMT. The aircraft, one of them painted white and clearly marked with WFP insignia on the side, were following a well-known flight route, and had the clearance of both Angolan air-traffic authorities and the military.

Pilots were careful to follow security procedures established to guard against such instances. WFP and the UN team are greatly relieved that there were no casualties or damage to the aircraft as a result of the attack." (WFP 15 June 2001)

## **Insecurity triggered international initiative to create humanitarian corridors in 1999**

- U.N. agencies lack access to fourteen out of eighteen provinces (September 1999)
- The Government first turns down UN appeals to negotiate the creation of humanitarian corridors because it does not want to "legitimise" UNITA
- It later softens its position after attacks on aid workers attempting to administer polio vaccinations in the provinces

"The most pressing priority for U.N. agencies in 1999 is to get unhindered access for relief efforts. According to the U.N. by April 1999, 1.6 million people have been displaced by the conflict, including 680,000 in 1998. The U.N. agencies do not presently have access to fourteen out of eighteen provinces. Ramiro da Silva and Martin Griffiths, the deputy to the under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs visited Luanda in March to have talks with the government on opening up humanitarian corridors and presented the government with a 'non-paper'-a formal document with no official status-on the issue. The government responded that it did not believe in any contact with UNITA as this would legitimize the rebels. On April 2 [1999] in London the World Food Program called upon the government and rebels to accept the creation of humanitarian corridors so that relief could be effectively distributed. The U.N. would also like to do a comprehensive humanitarian needs assessment in government and UNITA-controlled areas. However, on April 6 [1999] the Angolan government turned down this appeal saying the timing was not right and that the government would eventually open its own corridors. The urgency of safe humanitarian corridors was underscored on April 15 when six aid workers were killed in an ambush on a road south of Luanda between Lobito and Sumbe, when they were on their way to a meeting to discuss help for newly displaced people.

A second, similar attack occurred on June 12 [1999] when two humanitarian workers were killed and two injured near Barraca, Bengo province. The workers, of the NGO Instituto Portugues de Medicina Preventiva were ambushed by an armed group while they were carrying out a polio eradication campaign and driving in clearly identified vehicles. The attackers were reported to have taken some items and set fire to the vehicles. U.N. Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Sergio Vieira De Mello on June 16 [1999] issued a statement urging the Angolan government and UNITA rebels to take immediate measures to bring those responsible for the act to justice and to improve the security and protection for humanitarian workers. A further attack on an aid convoy occurred on July 20 [1999] between Lucala and Samba Caju, on the six hundred kilometer journey from Luanda to Uige. Many people were killed and about thirty vehicles destroyed, including a vehicle belonging to the Catholic aid agency Caritas International.

The government slightly softened its position in July over humanitarian assistance to areas controlled by UNITA. President dos Santos agreed to let the U.N. humanitarian assistance unit (UCAH) and the International Committee of the Red Cross contact UNITA about conducting a polio vaccination drive in rebel areas. On August 10 the government softened its position further and announced that it would authorize the opening of 'humanitarian corridors' under the auspices of the ICRC to ease the transport of emergency aid to the war." (HRW 30 September 1999, chapter X, "Humanitarian Aid Corridors")

*For more on the establishment of humanitarian corridors, see report by Anna Richardson entitled "Negotiating humanitarian access in Angola: 1990-2000" [\[External link\]](#).*

## **Shooting down of UN planes underlines the level of insecurity in Angola in late 1998 and early 1999**

- Two United Nations aircraft with a total of 15 passengers and 8 crew members respectively shot down on 26 December 1998 and 2 January 1999

- In response to these developments, the UN limited air operations in Angola to the most essential medical and casualty evacuations; it withdrew all personnel from the provinces

"The negative public atmosphere created by the Angola media campaign against the United Nations has been compounded by incidents of harassment and non-cooperation with MONUA in several areas of the country, including Luanda. In view of the increased security threat, MONUA, in close coordination with the Secretariat, continued to review the deployment of its teams and decided, in December 1998, to relocate all United Nations team sites to safer areas.

The exposure of United Nations personnel in Angola to grave security risks was demonstrated by the apparent shooting down near Huambo of two United Nations aircraft, with a total of 15 passengers and 8 crew members, on 26 December 1998 and 2 January 1999 respectively. Both aircraft, chartered by MONUA, went down in areas of active military operations. The two Angolan parties denied any responsibility for those incidents. Despite strong and repeated appeals by me, my Special Representative and the Security Council, UNITA and the Government initially showed no inclination to cooperate with MONUA in the search and rescue operations or to cease hostilities in the areas where the aircraft had gone down. Attempts to survey the sites by using United Nations aircraft were not successful, since neither party gave consent to such an operation. In the meantime, the Government presented to the press a purported deserter who claimed that he was aware of several survivors of the first crash. This statement was repeated by some government officials.

[...]

In response to these developments, the United Nations decided to limit its air operations in Angola to the most essential medical and casualty evacuations and to expedite the withdrawal of all its personnel to Luanda, as also requested by the Government. The deployment and rotation of United Nations personnel to the mission area has been stopped." (UNSC 17 January 1999, paras. 7,8,11)

# NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

## Government response

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### Summary of reported government contributions in 2001

"The Government reports that 17.17 million dollars was sent directly to the provinces during 2001 under phase II of PNEAH, the Government's national emergency programme, for resettlement activities, social infrastructure and agricultural programmes.

In May 2001, phase II was extended and an additional 12.5 million was reportedly allocated to Governors in hard-hit regions, including Bié.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration reportedly received 17 million dollars for 8,000 metric tonnes of food and emergency items. The assistance was supposed to be sent to areas inaccessible to humanitarian agencies.

Fifteen million dollars was reportedly channelled to agricultural programmes in support of resettlement.

Twenty million dollars was reportedly channelled to the new Fund for Peace and Reconciliation.

In the 2002 budget, MINARS has reportedly been allocated 38 million dollars of which 10 million is allocated to direct assistance and 28 million will be used for fuel subsidies for WFP and ICRC and tax exemptions for humanitarian assistance." (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

### President dos Santos considers the situation of internal displacement in the country as "serious" (November 2001)

- President dos Santos admits the government need to reassess its strategies to resolve the problem of internal displacement in the country
- Government priorities to include increasing access, improving water supply, improving the education and health sectors, and launching resettlement campaigns

"The Angolan Head of State, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, has recommended, in Luanda, the study of eventual sources of extraordinary or special funds to finance the execution of policies for the resolution of the displaced population's plight.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos made this remark when addressing the nation in the framework of the 26th anniversary of the independence, on November 11.

The statesman added that we have to know how to combine the preparation of huge plots of fertile lands with scheme of organization of the territories in the provinces, with the stimulation of the agricultural and cattle breeding activity with the rural trade and the boost of the staff training and employment.

He considered the situation of the nearly four million existing displaced persons as serious, underlining that they live on the international charity and solidarity of the government and other philanthropic organizations.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos said that following this situation, the unemployment rate reaches 60 per cent of the active population, plus the large number of demobilized and war veterans, that live in a very precarious situation.

The President also considered the people resettlement and reintegration in the communities as very slow.

He said that the normalization of the country's life implies that the government has to reassess its strategy for the resolution of the displaced population's problem and the sovereign bodies of all the society study together eventual sources of financing for the execution of policies following this strategy.

The Head of State recommended the government to have priority over the creation of ways of access, conditions for the supply of water, education and health and to launch resettlement campaigns, appealing to the national solidarity." (Government of Angola 12 November 2001)

### **Angolan government delivers 7 million USD in medical supplies (October 2001)**

- Mosquito nets, vaccines, lab equipment, and other goods will be provided in the provinces
- 2.5 million USD will go to the Expanded Program of Immunisations (EPI)
- 4.5 million to go for malaria, TB, HIV and other diseases

"At ANGOMEDICA in Luanda, the Ministry of Health at the presence of WHO Representative, Parliament and Government high officials from MINARS, Min of Education, Min of Planning as well as delegates from the International Community, delivered yesterday medical goods to the Provinces for 7 million USD. [...]

Among the targeted diseases responsible for the high mortality rates in Angola are: Malaria, Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, Trypanosomiasis, Leprosy and the Schistosomiasis. With exception for the MTD drugs provided by WHO for Leprosy, the efforts made by the GoA with provision of medicines will be able to address for almost a year the other above mentioned main endemic diseases. Mosquitos nets, vaccines, laboratory equipment and reagents to test HIV for blood safety in transfusions and equipment cars for sleeping sickness mobile teams are also among the goods provided in this stock.

With this 7 million USD, out of which 2.5 are for the Expanded Program of Immunizations (EPI) and 4.5 for Malaria, TB, HIV and Tryp , the MoH has already spent 10 out of the 34,5 million dollars budgeted last year by GoA as additional extra resource for the following three years to fight endemic diseases." (WHO 4 October 2001)

### **GoA decrees Norms on the Resettlement on Internally Displaced Populations (January 2001)**

- GoA officially publishes decree on 5 January 2001
- In February 2001, a technical working group is formed to develop standard operating procedures for the implementation of Norms

#### ***Decree published on 5 January 2001:***

"The decree on norms on the resettlement of internally displaced populations was officially published by the Government of Angola on 5 January 2001. In late February 2001, a technical working group was formed under the leadership of the Ministry for Assistance and Social Resettlement to develop standard operating procedures for implementation of the norms. The aim of the technical working group, which includes 11 government ministries and departments, United Nations agencies and NGOs, is to produce a set

of legally binding procedures that guarantee the standardized application of the norms countrywide and identify benchmarks for monitoring the resettlement process." (UNSC 11 April 2001, para. 27)

***Planning already in progress for the implementation of the Norms at the provincial level via technical working group:***

"In February, under the leadership of MINARS, a technical working group was formed to develop standard operating procedures (regulamento) for the implementation of the Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations, approved by the Council of Ministers in October 2000. The key aim of the technical working group, which includes 11 Government ministries and departments, UN Agencies and NGOs, is to produce a set of legally binding procedures that guarantee the standardised application of the Norms countrywide and identify benchmarks for the monitoring of the resettlement process.

- Provincial Protection Plans

A key component of the IDP Humanitarian Principles Strategy, proposed by the Inter-Agency Protection Working Group in January, is the training of state and non-state actors at the provincial level on humanitarian principles and the development of provincial protection plans. The aim of the training programme is to sensitise key actors about humanitarian principles and the Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Populations, build momentum and consensus around the need to protect IDPs and develop a concrete action plan aimed at direct protection. Provincial workshops involve 30-40 participants, including representatives of Government ministries, Angolan Army and National Police liaison officers, civilian and military provincial attorneys, representatives of national and international NGOs, religious organisations and UN Agencies. Since December [2000], provincial workshops have been held in Uíge and Zaire Provinces. During February [2001], a similar workshop was conducted in Malanje Province. In each of the three provinces where provincial workshops have been held, provincial protection plans have been developed and submitted to the Provincial Governor for analysis, feedback and endorsement." (OCHA 28 February 2001)

"During March [2001], Provincial Protection Workshops were conducted in the Provinces of Benguela, Bié and Huambo. The aim of the workshops was to sensitise key actors about humanitarian principles and the Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Populations, build momentum and consensus around the need to protect IDPs and develop a concrete plan of action aimed at direct protection. By the end of March, provincial protection plans had been developed in six provinces and presented to provincial Governors for review and endorsement. In Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Uíge and Zaire, partners have begun implementation of the plans. In Malanje, the provincial Governor approved the plan of action although no steps have been taken to implement its recommendations." (OCHA 18 April 2001)

"47. Pursuant to the norms, responsibility for resettlement and return is invested in provincial governments, which will oversee the process through the Provincial Humanitarian Coordination Group (PHCG) and the reactivated Sub-Group on Displaced Persons and Refugees. The norms specify preconditions for resettlement and targets for post-relocation assistance and as such address issues concerning the identification of resettlement sites, in terms of being verified as mine free, responsibility for which rests with the National Institute for the Removal of Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance (INAROE), and verified by the relevant defence and security organs as secure. The norms also provide for the voluntary nature of the resettlement process, involving all interested parties and beneficiaries in the planning and management of the relocation. State administration must be extended to resettlement or return sites, and health and education personnel will be supported, including through the provision of appropriate medical and teaching supplies, by the relevant government ministries. The authorities will work with humanitarian agencies to ensure the availability of water points in sufficient quantity and quality and to provide adequate sanitation. The displaced will be provided with seeds and tools and with food rations for a period to be determined. Preparation of resettlement sites will be supported through food-for-work projects. Finally, the PHCG will carry out regular assessments of the resettlement process.

[...]

51. The development of the norms was a fundamental component of a more appropriate response, to respect the safety and dignity of the displaced. Even before their formal adoption by the Council of Ministers in October 2000, the draft minimum standards [MINARS] were reportedly used as the de facto frame of reference by government officials and humanitarian organizations at the provincial level. They were also widely used in the preparation of the provincial Plans of Emergency Action in September [2000]. During 2001, the Government plans to relocate large numbers of displaced persons on the basis of the new norms. Estimates of the numbers involved range from 500,000 to up to 1 million. Whatever the eventual figure, effective implementation of the norms on resettlement, and monitoring, will be key to the whole process." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 47, 51)

*To study the Government decree of 5 January 2001 in detail, please consult the unofficial English translation available under sources below or the original document in Portuguese available by fax from the Global IDP Project.*

### **Prior to publication of Norms, GoA worked in collaboration with OCHA to develop minimum operational standards for resettlement and return (September-November 2000)**

- Norms describe pre-conditions for resettlement as well as targets for post-relocation assistance
- Norms developed around three themes: voluntariness, security and IDP participation

"In a major step forward, MINARS and OCHA worked closely together during May and June [2000] to develop minimum operational standards for resettlement and return. The draft norms were widely discussed by UN Agencies, NGOs, donors and Government representatives. The norms describe pre-conditions for resettlement as well as targets for post-relocation assistance and were formally approved by the Council of Ministers in mid-October." (UN November 2000, p. 5)

"In order to ensure safe and durable return and resettlement, the Angolan government, in close collaboration with OCHA, has drafted a set of Minimum Standards for Return and Resettlement (MINOPS). These draft standards were presented to the workshop by a representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs (MINARS). According to the representative of MINARS, these standards are developed around three key themes: Voluntariness, Security and IDP Participation. The MINOPS, consisting of nine points of concern, are divided up between conditions to be fulfilled before return/resettlement can be initiated and conditions to be fulfilled after return/resettlement has been completed. They cover issues such as security, presence and functioning of relevant State institutions, the role of the humanitarian community as well as the provision of land and basic social services." (NRC September 2000, Minimum Standards of Return and Resettlement)

### **Some commitment to humanitarian sectors shown by GoA with implementation of PNEAH (2000-2001)**

- US\$ 55 million PNEAH launched in October 1999
- National programme to provide humanitarian assistance to war-affected in two phases: Phase I focuses on humanitarian relief; Phase II focuses on land distribution, resettlement, and the rehabilitation of social infrastructure
- Effective implementation of programme questionable
- It is reported that as much as US\$ 34 million was unspent at end of Phase I

***PNEAH launched in 2000 to support humanitarian programming of Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS):***

"37. In July 1999, in a belated governmental effort to address the humanitarian situation, the Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Humanitarian Situation was established, comprising MINARS, MINADER, MINSAs and also the Ministries of Planning, Territorial Administration, and Commerce. In October 1999, the Commission launched a US\$ 55 million National Programme for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH) to be implemented in two phases. During the first phase (August 1999-March 2000), emergency assistance was to be provided to 'at-risk populations' in the provinces of Bengo, Malanje, Moxico, Huambo, Cuando Cubango, Uige and Luan[da]. The second phase (April 2000-January 2001) was to focus on resettlement in the provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Kwanza Norte and Huila." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 35-37)

"[T]he GoA has designed the National Emergency Programme for Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH) to complement the programmes of Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS). The management and implementation of the Programme are assured by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Humanitarian Situation, integrating the ministries of Planning; Social Affairs and Reintegration; Territorial Administration; Health; Commerce; and Agriculture and Rural Development.

The Programme plans two phases of implementation. The first with a value calculated at US\$ 21,580,390 for the priority provinces of Huambo, Bié, Malange, Moxico, kuando Kubango and Luanda, and the second phase calculated at US\$ 34,000,000 that will be extended to the provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul and Kwanza Norte.

PNEAH will provide humanitarian assistance to populations affected by the war and aid the process of reinstallation, thus possessing a character of emergency response while establishing the necessary linkages to ensure a perfect union with rehabilitation activities. In this manner, the global strategy of GoA humanitarian assistance should pass through three phases: emergency, rehabilitation, and development in coordination with programmes and projects that benefit from assistance from the international community.

PNEAH plans to shape the concept of assistance through an efficient management of resources that guarantees auto-sufficiency of populations. This will be achieved through close coordination with activities developed by the international humanitarian community and result in the elaboration of a common strategy, the elimination of duplication of interventions, and a clear distribution of responsibilities among programme implementers.

The principal objectives are founded primarily in the necessity to alleviate the needs of populations affected by the conflict and to promote initiatives of agricultural production for auto-sufficiency through resettlement projects for populations, the distribution of land and agricultural inputs, and the rehabilitation of basic community infrastructure.

The lines of strategic orientation will adhere to a coordination structure that will permit transparency of action and accountability to Government; logistical support and transport services to confront the emergency situation in priority provinces; a quick disbursement fund with ready access for commercial trade in rural areas with goods of primary necessity; and technical human resource competence and capacity.

For its implementation, PNEAH is divided into Sub-Programmes focused on assistance to the emergency, resettlement and rehabilitation and aid to the handicapped. It also includes projects that are related to sectors in the Consolidated Appeal, that will be complementary to the GoA Programme for Food Security and Nutrition, Health and Basic Sanitation, NFI, and Mine and Explosive Ordnance Awareness, with special attention given to children at risk." (UN 30 November 1999, pp. 10-11)

***Implementation of national programme has been on-going ever since:***

"In July 1999, the GRA allocated \$55 million to the National Program for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH) for two phases of activity. Phase I focuses on humanitarian relief; Phase II focuses on land distribution, resettlement, and the rehabilitation of social infrastructure. Under Phase I, \$15 million has been spent, while \$23 million has been distributed to the governors directly in accordance with the government's decentralization policy under Phase II. The remaining \$17 million has been allocated to the governors. At this time, a more detailed breakdown of funds that have been spent is not available." (USAID 2 April 2001)

"A major development during the year has been the increasing commitment to humanitarian sectors demonstrated by the Government. Under the first phase of the Government's National Programme for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (PNHEA), US\$ 55 million was allocated in July 1999 for assistance to hard-hit provinces. According to Government reports, by the end of August [2000], 14,430 metric tonnes (MTS) of emergency assistance, including food, agricultural inputs, medicines and relief items totaling US\$ 13 million, had been dispatched by the Inter-ministerial Commission for the Humanitarian Situation (CISH)...

In August [2000], the Government announced that US\$ 17 million would be allocated for the second phase of PNEAH, scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of 2000. The aim of the second phase is to promote sustainability of communities through land distribution, resettlement, agricultural inputs and rehabilitation of social infrastructures." (UN November 2000, 2000 in Review)

***Still, the commitment of the GoA to the programme has not been overwhelming:***

"65. Yet, the donors' desire to reduce the Government's reliance on the international community is understandable. The Government has in the past, and for reasons related to the collapse of consecutive peace agreements, tended to consider the responsibility of providing assistance to its displaced and war-affected population as resting with the United Nations. It has since shown an increased commitment to emergency assistance, starting with the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Humanitarian Situation in July 1999 and the elaboration by that Commission of the National Programme for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance. However, the inter-agency mission of March 2000 noted that the scale and scope of assistance delivered under the National Programme was yet to be clearly determined. More recent sources indicate that the US\$ 55 million allocated under the first phase of the National Programme was not spent and that in excess of US\$ 34 million remains, though only US\$ 17 million of this was rolled into the budget for 2000, making overall expenditure less than originally claimed." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 65)

**Angolan government has been heavily criticised for not taking greater action to support IDPs and other vulnerable populations (January - March 2001)**

- Angolan oil and diamond industries support one of fastest-growing economies in Africa
- Still, Angolan people are some of the poorest in the world
- Government attitude toward the displaced has been described as one of "neglect"
- Only 2.8% of GoA budget spent on national health

***Comments on the GoA from the UN Senior Inter-Agency Network following its mission to Angola in March 2001:***

"The GoA has undertaken a process of decentralisation of responsibilities to the provinces. This, however, has not been accompanied by devolution of necessary resources. The GoA is currently in the process of elaborating its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Addressing the issue of internal displacement is

a key condition for poverty reduction. Accordingly, there is a need for greater integration of humanitarian priorities, such as the delivery of basic services and the strengthening of the justice system." (OCHA 23 March 2001, Government Responsibility and Accountability)

***Comments on the GoA from the UN Representative on Internally Displaced Persons following his visit to Angola in late 2000:***

"35. As emphasized in the Guiding Principles, the primary responsibility for meeting the protection and assistance needs of the internally displaced rests with the national authorities (Principle 3). In Angola, however, the Government's attitude to the displaced has, in the past, been described as one of neglect: 'The Government does very little for those people under its control, and most of the time it asks very little of them. They are left alone to sink or swim without the benefit of any social safety net ... Government structures such as MINARS [Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration], and the Ministries of Health and Education exist, but are so chronically underfunded as to be almost entirely ineffectual.' However, 'most Angolans have tended to prefer this form of neglect to UNITA's form of draconian social control'. Such an assessment gives particular cause for concern when one considers Angola's endowments of natural resources, in particular its oil reserves. Angola is the second largest oil exporter in sub-Saharan Africa, with the oil sector accounting for an estimated 53 per cent of gross domestic product between 1994 and 1998, and around 95 per cent of export receipts. In 1997, Angola exported crude oil to the value of over US\$ 4 billion."

[...]

66. Donors are said to feel strongly that the international community should not be expected to provide unlimited assistance and that the Government must assume greater responsibility by reallocating funds towards the social and emergency sectors. Such a view is increasingly convincing given high oil prices, from which the Government gains a substantial proportion of its revenues. Also, the changing military situation in the country, with a move away from conventional warfare to counter-insurgency strategies, should allow for reduced military spending and the redirection of funds to the humanitarian effort – though the Representative was informed by one senior government official that funds freed by any reductions in military spending would be used to expedite payments on debts accrued through government investment in the oil industry. The need to repay such debts notwithstanding, the Representative strongly recommends that the Government commit additional resources to the humanitarian effort, not least because a greater and more visible commitment on its part may prompt a similar response from donors." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 35, 66)

***Comments on the GoA in an Economist article published in January 2001;***

"IMAGINE two countries. The first, with one of the fastest-growing economies in Africa, will receive \$3.5 billion of investment from the international oil industry each year for the next ten years. By 2005 it will have become Africa's largest oil producer. The second is rated by the UN's Human Development Index a dismal 160th out of 174 countries. With a third of its children dying before their fifth birthday, and with two-fifths suffering from malnutrition, it is considered by Unicef to be "the worst place in the world to be a child". Both descriptions fit Angola, home to shocking juxtapositions.

After decades of civil war between the government and the UNITA rebels, most Angolans no longer wish for much more than to survive from one day to the next. Yet the offshore oil industry, and even the onshore diamond industry, continue to thrive, the revenue financing the war, on both sides, and fattening the pockets of the warlords. Most people get no benefit whatsoever from oil or diamonds; they are kept alive with the help of the hundreds of international aid agencies working in Angola.

But the agencies are growing weary with picking up the pieces left by the country's war, and some are voicing their frustrations in public. At the end of last year, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), which won the 1999 Nobel peace prize, released a strongly worded report; this followed on the heels of two other hard-hitting documents from World Vision and Save the Children. All three pin the blame on the Angolan

government and the Angolan rebels and international oil and diamond companies. They all point out that the country has the resources to look after its people, if it cared to do so.

The MSF report illustrates this argument with health statistics. In 1999, it says, only 2.8% of the budget was spent on health. In the city of Kuito, one of the areas worst hit by the war, only 1.2% of the central hospital's requirements is provided by the government. The shortfall has to be made up by aid agencies. "Oil production in the country is estimated at close to 800,000 barrels a day," writes MSF, "yet there is not a drop of diesel for the hospital generators, the only source of power in most large hospitals." This neglect, says MSF, is not, as the government claims, a consequence of the war but "the result of deliberate choices".

Donor fatigue is making it hard for the relief agencies to raise money for their Angolan operations. The UN has just launched an all-agency appeal for Angola for 2001. It is asking for \$202m but will, as in previous years, be lucky to raise half of that. Adding insult to injury, the Angolan government regularly complains that the relief groups are not doing enough. It also makes their work harder by not issuing work visas: MSF alone is wasting \$100,000 a year on flying its staff in and out of the country to renew their temporary visas.

Some aid workers have begun to ask themselves what they are doing. Clearly, they are helping to keep millions of people alive. Yet, by relieving the government of responsibility, are they too contributing to the continuation of the war?" (The Economist 11 January 2001 as found on MSF website)

*See also the OXFAM report entitled "Angola's Wealth: Stories of War and Neglect" for more information on the prosperity of the oil and diamond industries in Angola [\[External link\]](#).*

### **National Institute for the Removal of Obstacles and Explosive Devices (INAROOE) continues demining work in many parts of Angola (November 2000)**

- INAROOE estimates that there are between 6 and 8 million landmines in Angola
- INAROOE has disarmed 15,000 landmines and some 200,000 explosive devices over the last five years

"A source in the National Institute for the Removal of Obstacles and Explosive Devices, Inarooee, said in Luanda today that there are between 6 and 8 million land mines planted in various parts of Angolan territory, over and above other kinds of explosive devices that have not been detonated yet.

Inarooee official Angelo Lopes further noted that '(...) no one is able to tell accurately how many land mines have been planted in Angolan territory over the years. It is thought that there are between 6 and 8 million mines throughout the country, in addition to thousands of other types of explosive devices, the vestiges of the fighting which resumed in earnest in December 1998. These devices can be found in many parts of Angola.

[...]

Angelo Lopes also disclosed that 'Inarooee disarmed 15,000 land mines and some 200,000 assorted explosive devices over the last five years, but this figure is quite insignificant.

[...]

Inarooee has published a report on accidents with land mines and explosive devices to which Lusa had access today. According to it, the first half of this year saw the occurrence of 204 mine-related accidents throughout the country, killing 100 people and wounding a further 327. Of these, 327 civilians and 95 military personnel. The status of the other five persons affected by mine accidents over this period is not known yet.

With 81 killed or wounded, Uige Province was the part of the country worst hit by these occurrences. It was followed by Bie Province with 76, and Malanje with 72.

Most of those affected – 251 of them – were killed or wounded when they traveled in a vehicle on the road, and a mine went off. Another 36 (figure as received) were killed when they stepped on explosive devices. Of these, 32 met with their deaths when they were working in the fields, and another 24 when they were looking for wood to use as fuel.

The Inaroe report also states that there are 2,617 recorded mine fields in Angola. The most mined provinces are those of Bie, with 394 known mine fields, Moxico with 301, Malanje with 255, Cuando Cubango with 246, and Benguela with 201." (AFP 27 November 2000)

## **Regional response**

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### **Central African countries meet to coordinate policies and efforts on behalf of refugees and IDPs (November 2001)**

- Meeting organised by the l'Association des Parlementaires Europeens pour l'Afrique (AWEPA) brings together representatives of five central African governments, including Angola, to attempt to synchronise policies and efforts related to refugees and IDPs
- One point of discussion was the possibility of expanding the mandate of UNHCR to increase its capacity to assist IDPs

"Representatives from the governments of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo, Gabon and Angola met last week in the DRC capital, Kinshasa, to synchronise their policies and efforts on behalf of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region.

The meeting was organised by the l'Association des Parlementaires Europeens pour l'Afrique (AWEPA), in collaboration with the government of the DRC and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, from 24 to 26 Oct. AWEPA is an association of current and former members of national parliaments in Europe that works 'to support the functioning of parliaments in Africa and to keep Africa on the political agenda in Europe'.

Primary objectives of the conference included the promotion of human rights and in particular the rights of refugees, with special attention to women and children in light of their vulnerability; seeking long-term solutions to the problems of refugees and IDPs with a view to a safe return to their place of origin; and adoption in each country of national legislation and a national commission for refugees where no such thing already exists. Discussions were held regarding the possibilities of expanding the mandate of UNHCR to increase their capacity to assist IDPs uprooted by war, and providing assistance to local populations that host refugees." (IRIN 1 November 2001)

## **International political response**

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### **Refugees International calls upon US government to continue to support IDPs in Angola (March 2002)**

- Refugees International (RI) argues that US should continue to fund UNHCR's IDP program in Angola, as it believes UNHCR is the UN agency best able to help displaced people
- The US would be inconsistent if it supports UNHCR's work with IDPs in Afghanistan but withdraws from such support in Africa, charges RI

"For the last two years, the United States has supported an important and successful effort to protect internally displaced people in Angola. That program, run by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, has dramatically improved conditions for displaced people near Luanda and in the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire.

[...]

Although the UNHCR's program for internally displaced people (IDPs) deals directly with only 200,000 of Angola's 3-4 million IDPs, its impact is far broader. Angola was the first nation to adopt as law a set of protections for IDPs based on work done by Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng at the Brookings Institution. Conditions for many IDPs remain deplorable, but the standards are causing the government to pay more attention to the internal victims of Angola's long civil war.

The expansion of services for internally displaced people, who suffer many of the same problems as refugees but lack the same legal protections, is an important humanitarian development, one that is encouraging the international community to focus on helping IDPs around the world.

[...]

The IDP work in Angola has succeeded in part because the UNHCR, the UN agency best able to help displaced people, has run the program with U.S. support. However, I understand, that the U.S. funding is about to end. One reason is that the U.S. doesn't believe that the UNHCR is the appropriate agency to assist IDPs. If this is correct, it would be a step backwards. It would reverse an increasing and significant U.S. commitment to the protection of IDPs, and it would weaken the UNHCR's ability and interest in providing such protection.

Although it may be possible for the European Union and other donors to fund a portion of this program, I hope that the U.S. will not bail out of an effort that it helped inspire, thereby signaling a declining interest in IDP protection. It seems inconsistent for the U.S. to support the UNHCR's work with IDPs in Afghanistan while backing away from similar protections in Africa.

I hope that the U.S. will continue to work to help bring the protections for IDPs up to the level received by refugees." (RI 1 March 2002)

### **Widespread agreement that the United Nations could play a more proactive role in Angola (December 2001)**

- UN USG Ibrahim Gambari tells the Security Council that the Angolan government would not object to facilitating contacts with UNITA through the UN
- Issues on which the government wished to begin immediate cooperation include the resettlement of IDPs
- Security Council members expressed widespread support for the idea of the UN becoming more proactive in Angola

"A convergence of opinion was emerging for the first time that the United Nations should play a more proactive role in the Angolan peace process, Ibrahim Gambari, Under-Secretary-General and Special Advisor of the Secretary-General for Special Assignments in Africa told the Security Council this morning.

Briefing Council members on his recent mission to Angola, he said the Angolan Government would not object to a church role in facilitating contacts with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) through the United Nations. Issues on which the Government wished to begin immediate cooperation included management of the Fund for Peace and Reconciliation; pilot projects for demobilized soldiers and resettled internally displaced persons; and assistance in the electoral process.

Among the issues that the Government felt required further consideration, he said, were modalities for disarming UNITA combatants and weapons collection; direct contacts with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi; and the possibility of establishing humanitarian corridors. While ruling out any attempts to resolve the Angolan conflict outside the Lusaka Protocol framework or to renegotiate the Protocol, the Government recognized the need for some adjustments to take account of the changed realities on the ground.

He said the position of UNITA parliamentarians was that the Lusaka Protocol should be implemented with adjustments indicated in the 12-point peace plan that UNITA had communicated to the United Nations. While reiterating their commitment to dialogue within the Lusaka Protocol, they cautioned that the Protocol should not be used simply as a platform to obtain Mr. Savimbi's surrender. Although the parliamentary group could largely convey UNITA's position, the final decision lay with Mr. Savimbi.

Following Mr. Gambari's briefing, Council members expressed widespread support for the idea of the United Nations becoming more proactive in Angola. Many saw the Government's willingness to engage the Organization as an opportunity to be seized and one that would definitely enhance the peace process. Speakers also urged the Angolan church and civil society organizations to continue efforts aimed at national reconciliation and called on Mr. Savimbi and UNITA to return to the negotiating table and dialogue." (UN SC 21 December 2001)

### **International sanctions against UNITA remain in force (December 2000-October 2001)**

- UN Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, established in April 2000
- Mechanism released report in December 2000 and addendum in April 2001
- Committee emphasizes the need to deprive UNITA of its diamond income
- Supplementary report submitted in October 2001 and mandate extended

#### ***Most recent extension of mandate:***

"The Security Council this afternoon decided to extend the mandate of the monitoring mechanism on sanctions against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) for six months, ending on 19 April 2002." (UNSC 19 October 2001)

#### ***Following the release of the April 2001 addendum:***

"The Mechanism's overall assessment is that 'sanctions continue to play an important part in efforts to resolve the Angolan conflict. With no fixed arms supply lines and diminishing revenue from diamonds, UNITA's military capacity has been significantly reduced'.

The addendum gives further information about arms smuggling to UNITA, and concludes that 'the central role played by the identified brokering companies in the procurement of arms by UNITA is overwhelming and cannot be overemphasised.' It stresses that, 'the need to tighten the regulations governing the activities

and operations of arms-brokering companies has become urgent. Similarly, the establishment of an international register of the dubious companies involved in sanctions-busting should be given due consideration'.

[...]

The Mechanism did not find evidence that any major changes in UNITA structures in Africa have taken place. Burkina Faso and Togo continue to be important countries of residence for senior UNITA officials and their family members.

However, the Mechanism stated that 'there are indications that some of the countries of importance to UNITA are re-examining their policies'. Information received by the Mechanism suggests a significant move by Cote d'Ivoire to deny UNITA officials passports.

[...]

UNITA's income from diamonds did drop dramatically from 1999, when it was estimated to be at least \$300 million. However, the Mechanism's findings point out that the drop was due to UNITA's more limited capacity to mine rather than the imposition of sanctions.

The addendum points out that there was an increase in non-UNITA smuggling during 2000, "which clearly means that illicit Angolan diamonds are reaching diamond markets regardless of the certificate of origin system and which also makes the tracing of UNITA diamonds more problematic". It continues that "diamond smuggling from Angola has been estimated to have increased to \$250 million in 2000 according to industry sources". (Action for Southern Africa 25 April 2001)

***Following the release of the initial December 2000 report:***

"New recommendations to prevent violations of the sanctions against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) were published today [28 December 2000] in a report released at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

The report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, which was set up by the Council in April, points out that "in order for the measures against UNITA to be taken seriously, the Security Council should consider applying sanctions against any Government found to be intentionally violating them." Among its recommendations, the report calls for the implementation of a "certificate of origin" scheme aimed at clarifying where diamonds come from. "This will both protect the legitimate industry and begin to clarify the problem of illicit diamonds," the report notes.

While concluding that UNITA's capacity to produce diamonds has been hampered by the military advances of government forces, the report emphasizes the need to continue to deprive the rebel group of its diamond income. "As UNITA's traditional allies and arms suppliers and conduits become more hesitant, as a result of publicity and the 'name and shame' campaign, we expect UNITA to seek new and unexpected friends and to explore more subtle and refined ways of evading the sanctions," the report states.

The report provides an array of information on the underground trade in arms and diamonds to Angola, naming those responsible and tracing their business dealings in other parts of Africa and around the world. It notes that stemming the problem in Angola will have wider implications for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Sierra Leone.

'We have to take into account that there are many common elements in terms of arms, diamond dealers and air transport carriers involved in these conflicts,' the authors write. 'It would not be a surprise to see emerging the same names, companies and activities related to the organized crime profiting from death, destruction and greed. Those elements have no nationality or loyalty of any kind and can be found today in Angola and tomorrow somewhere else,' they warn.

The Monitoring Mechanism was established by the Security Council on 18 April [2000] to collect information on violations of the sanctions against UNITA and recommend ways to improve their

implementation. Its members were Ambassador Juan Larrain of Chile (Chairman), Ambassador Lena Sundh of Sweden, Ms. Christine Gordon of the United Kingdom, Mr. James Manzou of Zimbabwe and Mr. Ismaila Seck of Senegal." (DPI 28 December 2000)

*For a full copy of the 21 December report, please refer to original document [\[External link\]](#). Also of importance is the Mechanism's Supplementary Report to the UN Security Council dated October 2001 [\[External link\]](#). Further information about the Monitoring Mechanism can be found at "UN Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions established to prevent violations by UNITA" [\[Internal link\]](#).*

### **Angolan peace process Troika re-activates activities with the opening of the UN Office in Angola (September 2000)**

- Troika of observers composed of the U.S., Portugal and Russia has decided to reactivate activities
- Troika says that mechanisms of sanctions against UNITA must be reinforced

"The Angolan peace process Troika of observers composed of the U.S., Portugal and Russia has decided to re-activate its activities with the opening of the United Nations Office to Angola (UNOA) in Luanda. The decision is contained in a declaration issued on Friday in New York after a meeting of the Troika member countries, held alongside the UN General Assembly summit. The Troika says that the mechanisms of sanctions imposed on Jonas Savimbi's organization must be reinforced as a necessary instrument to coerce the rebel group to give up its military option. The document adds that this measure aims to compel UNITA rebels to abandon bellicose actions and join the Angolan democratic society, as a political partner to contest for power through elections." (GOA 19 September 2000)

## **International humanitarian response**

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### **Four NGOs give rare oral briefing to the UN Security Council on the humanitarian and human rights situation in Angola (March 2002)**

*Human Rights Watch, Médecins Sans Frontières, Oxfam and Save the Children testified before the Security Council in an Arria Formula briefing (an informal meeting of the members of the Security Council rather than of the Security Council per se)*

***Human Rights Watch** charged that the UN and the government of Angola are failing to protect the rights of millions of people displaced by the country's civil war. For the full briefing [click here](#).*

***Médecins Sans Frontières** focused on the lack of access to vulnerable civilians and the forced displacement of populations. For the full briefing [click here](#).*

***Oxfam** warned that Angola is at a crossroads between peace and a descent into fresh bloodshed. For the news release [click here](#).*

*(Save the Children did not publish a briefing paper)*

**UN USG for Humanitarian Affairs notes increasing cooperation between government of Angola and humanitarian community – but stresses that much more needs to be done (February 2002)**

- UN USG Kenzo Oshima briefs the Security Council on developments in Angola
- Reported positive achievements include innovative rights-based humanitarian strategy developed by the government in partnership with the humanitarian community
- USG Oshima reiterates the constraints faced by the humanitarian community as a result of the appalling state of the country's infrastructure
- USG Oshima calls upon the government to take various key steps, including establishing 'days of tranquility'; closing the remaining transit centres and ceasing all forms of harassment
- The establishment of OCHA's 'Unit on Internal Displacement' is noted, with reference to the fact Angola will be one of its top priorities in 2002

"Another positive development in the Angola operation is the increasing cooperation between the Government of Angola and the humanitarian community. A protection strategy for IDPs was recently developed, and is being implemented in full partnership with the Government. This has resulted in a number of important achievements, including joint Government and UN monitoring of violations. In addition to this, the 2002 UN Consolidated Appeal was developed, for the first time, jointly by the Government and the humanitarian community. This includes an innovative rights-based humanitarian strategy that is based on core principles in the Angolan Constitution. The Government has shown its commitment to this strategy by setting out 40 'partnership targets' that it intends to meet this year.

***Recommended Action***

12. While acknowledging these positive achievements on the part of the Government, clearly, much more needs to be done and quickly for that matter. For example, one of the major constraints to delivering humanitarian aid is the appalling state of the country's infrastructure. Four of the airstrips used by humanitarian agencies are currently under repair, limiting the number of humanitarian flights, and in some cases putting humanitarian personnel at risk. Repairs on the Kuito airstrip, located in one of the hardest-hit areas in the country, have been delayed for more than 22 months. Damaged bridges also severely limit the use of surface routes. The combination of widespread insecurity and damaged infrastructure forces WFP (World Food Programme), which manages the logistics network, to deliver upto 60 percent of all humanitarian assistance by air. This is one of the reasons why the Angolan humanitarian operation is one of the most expensive in the world after Afghanistan.

13. In addition to urgently repairing infrastructure such as the Kuito airstrip, there are a number of steps that must be taken by the Government in order to take greater responsibility to help alleviate the suffering of its own people, including action to :

Secure surface routes which would lower the cost of delivering humanitarian assistance;

Establish days of tranquility in order to allow access for polio and other immunization, and for the delivery of much needed humanitarian assistance;

Implement partnership targets agreed to in the 2002 Appeal, including the closure of the remaining 13 sub-standard transit centers;

Cease all forms of harassment; and

Increase Government funding for humanitarian programmes.

14. Most importantly, both parties to the conflict must desist from using military strategies that directly impact on civilians, and ensure that humanitarian agencies have unhindered and continuous access to all affected populations.

[...]

16. Another action I would like to mention is, as Members of the Council may be aware, the recent establishment of a 'Unit on Internal Displacement' within my office, OCHA. I have asked this Unit, which is dedicated to strengthening the international response to internal displacement, to address Angola as one of its top priorities in 2002." (UN OCHA 13 February 2002)

### **UN Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement conducts mission to Angola in March 2001**

- UN Special Coordinator, together with representatives from FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and NGO community, undertook mission to Angola in March 2001
- Objectives of mission were to assess the needs of the displaced and the capacity of humanitarian actors to respond to such needs

"The Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement, led by the UN Special Coordinator on Internal Displacement, together with representatives of FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, the Office of the Representative of the Secretary General on IDPs, and the NGO community, undertook a mission to Angola from 12 to 17 March. The main objectives of the mission were to: assess the nature and magnitude of the assistance and protection needs of internally displaced persons, particularly with regard to women and children; to review the operational capacity of UN agencies and other humanitarian actors on the ground to respond to such needs, with a view of identifying any gaps in the humanitarian response; to review existing institutional arrangements within and between the UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement, NGOs and the Government, and to make recommendations to concerned agencies, organisations and the Government for future action. The Mission also set out to assess the extent of implementation of the recommendations stemming from the visit to Angola of the RSG on IDPs in November 2000.

The mission met with Government officials as well as representatives of United Nations, the Red Cross Movement, other international organizations, civil society and non-governmental organisations, and members of the diplomatic community. The delegation travelled to the Provinces of Bié and Huambo and visited Viana in Luanda." (OCHA 23 March 2001, Background)

*For full details and recommendations from the Senior Network mission, please refer to the report published in March 2001 [\[External link\]](#).*

### **UN Representative on Internally Displaced Persons visited Angola in November 2000**

- Dr. Francis M. Deng visits Angola from 31 to 9 October 2000
- Overall, the Representative finds a marked improvement in the situation of the internally displaced
- Despite improvements, insecurity and problems of access continue to make the situation for internally displaced persons extremely difficult
- Recommendations made by the Representative in the January 2001 addendum to his mission report

"At the invitation of the Government of Angola, the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis M. Deng, undertook an official visit to Angola from 31 October to 9 November.

The objectives of the Representative's visit were to study the situation of internal displacement in the country and to dialogue with the Government, international agencies, non-governmental organizations and other relevant actors towards ensuring effective responses to the current conditions of the internally displaced in Angola.

[...]

The Representative's visit to Angola should be seen in the context of other international missions to the country this year, beginning with the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke and the subsequent inter-agency mission in March, led by the Emergency Relief Coordinator a.i., Carolyn McAskie. Both these visits drew international attention to the plight of the internally displaced and raised serious concerns as to the extent to which their needs were being met by the Government and the international community. The Representative's visit provided an opportunity to assess the extent of progress which has been made, the extent to which the needs of the displaced are being addressed, what gaps exist and how these might be filled.

[...]

Overall, the Representative found a marked improvement in the situation of the internally displaced and in terms of the national and international response to their plight. Emphasising the primary responsibility of the State for meeting the needs of its internally displaced population, the Representative was encouraged to learn that the Government has taken important steps to improve institutional arrangements at the national and provincial levels and its coordination with the international community, in particular United Nations agencies. In addition, the Representative noted with appreciation the development by the Government, in cooperation with United Nations agencies, of a legal framework spelling out minimum standards for the return and resettlement of the internally displaced, incorporating the standards contained in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement . . .

[...]

Such developments notwithstanding, the Representative's visits to the field revealed that a number of problems remain. Humanitarian action is constrained by the prevailing climate of insecurity, characterised by armed attacks on civilians, banditry, and the extensive presence and continued use of landmines, giving rise to problems of access, which is generally limited to provincial capitals and certain towns. There are also severe logistical constraints. Much of the infrastructure is destroyed and road access throughout the country is limited by insecurity. In the absence of effective surface distribution of assistance, there is an increased reliance on air transport which is costly. In addition, airstrips in places such as Kuito, which is entirely dependent on air support, are in urgent need of repair. Because of the increased insecurity of the war and in order to discourage reliance on the international community to provide assistance to the displaced, donor countries are reducing funding for humanitarian operations." (UNHCHR 10 November 2000, paras. 1,2,4,5,6)

***The following list of recommendations was made by the Representative in his full January 2001 report:***

"113. Some tangible improvements have been made in regard to the situation of the internally displaced and in the national and international response to the problem. The Representative is encouraged by the steps taken by the Government to improve institutional arrangements at the national and provincial levels and its coordination with the international community, in particular United Nations agencies. The Representative notes with appreciation the development by the Government, in cooperation with United Nations agencies, of the norms for the resettlement of internally displaced persons, based on the Guiding Principles. The Representative also welcomes the progress made by the Humanitarian Coordinator, the United Nations Country Team and NGOs in improving the international humanitarian response, which has resulted in the stabilization of displaced populations, demonstrated most visibly by the resettlement of the majority of vulnerable displaced populations previously residing in deplorable conditions in transit centres.

114. Such developments notwithstanding, the Representative's visits to the field revealed that coordination often is not effective on the ground and that a number of serious humanitarian and protection concerns remain which must be addressed. In particular, the Representative is concerned at the lack of effective protection accorded to the physical security and human rights of the displaced and the civilian population. In the light of such concerns, a number of recommendations, already introduced in appropriate contexts in the previous sections, are summarized in this concluding section.

**Development of standard operational procedures to ensure the uniform implementation of the norms on resettlement and the involvement of humanitarian organizations in security assessments**

115. Given the increasing emphasis on resettlement of displaced populations, the Representative encourages MINARS, in cooperation with international agencies, to draft standard operating procedures to ensure implementation of the technical provisions provided in the MINOPS. The Representative also encourages MINARS to ensure the involvement of humanitarian agencies in security assessments of prospective resettlement sites and to provide mechanisms for resolving conflicting security assessments of specific sites between the authorities and humanitarian organizations.

**Full implementation of the norms on resettlement within security perimeters**

116. The Representative stresses the fundamental need to ensure the safety and security of the displaced. To the extent to which resettlement is required, it must be undertaken within the security perimeters of towns and cities and in full accordance with the norms on resettlement and applicable human rights standards.

**Increased engagement of the Government and donors in the humanitarian response**

117. While acknowledging the increasing efforts of the Government to respond to the humanitarian situation, the Representative strongly recommends that the Government commit additional resources to the humanitarian effort, not least because a greater and more visible commitment on the part of the Government might prompt a similar response from donors. Angola is one of the richest countries in Africa in oil and other resources and should be able to shoulder a larger part of the humanitarian burden.

**More effective coordination within the Government and with the United Nations and NGOs, and reinvigoration of the Humanitarian Coordination Group**

118. While some improvements have been noted, problems remain at the national level between different ministries which impede the efforts of the United Nations to advocate policies effectively with the Government. In an effort to address these problems, the Representative urges the reinvigoration of the national Humanitarian Coordination Group, which should bring all relevant governmental and international actors together on a monthly basis. Similarly, emphasis should be placed on ensuring more effective coordination at the field level through the active participation of all relevant actors in provincial coordination structures, including monitoring the implementation of humanitarian assistance.

**Agreed criteria for targeting food distributions**

119. The Representative, noting the existence of the Vulnerability and Assessment Working Group, underlines the importance of ensuring that there is a consensus among humanitarian partners on the criteria on which targeted food distributions are based, so as to ensure that all vulnerable groups receive food distributions on which, for lack of alternatives, they depend. In this connection, the Representative reiterates his concerns that reductions in general food distributions have been forced on WFP by donors at a time of significant increases in admissions of moderately malnourished displaced and resident children to supplementary feeding centres.

**Increased access to populations in need**

120. Given the security constraints in areas that are not under government control, the Representative recommends that international agencies and NGOs cooperate more fully with church groups and national and local NGOs which are able to operate in insecure areas and have access to the displaced.

#### **Adequate maintenance and repair of airstrips and provision of logistical capacity**

121. Given the humanitarian operation's continued dependency on air transportation, the relevant authorities should ensure that airstrips such as that at Kuito are repaired as soon as possible and adequately maintained thereafter. Requests by WFP for additional aircraft should be responded to positively, so as to ensure that existing levels of access are maintained if not increased.

#### **Extension of vaccination coverage**

122. In view of the prevalence of polio and other diseases amongst displaced populations, especially children, the Representative suggests that the Government consider the possibility of allowing international agencies to extend vaccination coverage to UNITA-held areas, assuming that adequate security guarantees can be obtained.

#### **Provision of primary and also secondary education**

123. The Government should take steps, beginning with an increase in the allocation of resources to the Ministry of Education, to ensure that displaced children and children in general have access to primary and secondary education. Failure to invest sufficiently in education may have serious consequences for the future development of the country.

#### **Increased awareness of abuses against children**

124. The Representative was particularly alarmed by reports that children are being abducted and traded by UNITA for use as forced labour. Local NGOs and church groups which may have access to the areas concerned are encouraged to collect additional and more detailed information, which should be brought to the attention of the national authorities and the international community.

#### **A more focused and active approach to protection by the Government in particular and also by the international community**

125. Given that the primary responsibility for the protection of the displaced rests with the Government, the Representative suggests a number of courses of action which could be taken by the authorities:

(a) National legislation on internally displaced persons . The Government is encouraged, in cooperation with the international community, to develop and adopt national legislation which clearly articulates the rights of the displaced and the obligations towards them of the national authorities and other actors, such as UNITA.

(b) Dissemination of the Guiding Principles . Efforts should be undertaken to raise awareness among the displaced of their human rights as restated in the Guiding Principles. To this end, wide dissemination of the Principles among local NGOs, church groups and displaced communities is essential.

(c) Training of military and police personnel . Greater efforts should be taken to train the military and police on the human rights of the internally displaced and the civilian population, so as to enhance protection and help prevent arbitrary displacement. The Representative welcomes the efforts which are being taken to this end by the Human Rights Division of UNOEA and by ICRC and recommends that such efforts be expanded.

(d) Timely receipt of salaries and supplies by military personnel . In an effort to prevent looting by government troops and the harassment, violence and displacement associated with it, the Representative suggests that the Government take the necessary measures to ensure that military personnel receive salaries and supplies in a timely manner.

(e) Accountability of police and military personnel . The Government must take suitable measures to ensure that its military and police personnel are held accountable for human rights violations against the displaced and civilian population. The Ministry of Justice's proposed policy to ensure accountability of police and military personnel should be finalized as soon as possible and the requisite human and financial resources provided to make it effective on the ground. The Attorney-General is requested to instruct his provincial-level staff to visit the displaced, collect testimony and information on human rights violations, and instigate criminal proceedings against the perpetrators.

(f) Issuance of personal documentation . Given the problems of harassment experienced by the displaced, the Representative recommends that the Government take the necessary steps to issue to all internally displaced persons all documents necessary for the enjoyment and exercise of their legal rights. In particular, the authorities should facilitate the issuance of new documents or the replacement of documents lost in the course of displacement.

(g) Judicial capacity building and accountability . Serious efforts need to be undertaken to build the national and provincial capacity to prevent and address protection problems. The Representative proposes that the Human Rights Division of UNOA and UNICEF, in cooperation with the Government, consider seeking funds for the proposed project on strengthening the judiciary at the municipal level within the framework of a technical cooperation project with OHCHR.

(h) Enhanced protection role for the international community . In the absence of effective national and provincial capacity to address and prevent protection problems, it is imperative that the international community enhances its role in regard to protection. A number of measures are suggested in this regard:

i. Convening of a brainstorming session on protection , for all relevant members of the humanitarian community, using the IASC protection policy paper as the basis for discussions and strategy formulation;

ii. Despatch of an inter-agency mission to the country to assist in a thorough review of protection issues and to identify appropriate response and preventive strategies; in this regard, the Representative strongly recommends that the forthcoming mission to Angola by the Senior Inter-Agency Network give due focus to protection issues and strategies for response and prevention, including by ensuring that members of the mission have sufficient expertise in protection work;

iii. Enhancement of the international protection presence in the provinces to ensure effective monitoring, reporting and follow-up on violations of the rights of the internally displaced, including training of field-based staff in identifying and raising protection concerns, either directly or through other actors at the national, regional or international levels; revision, if necessary, of the design, placement and content of relief activities, so as to deter human rights abuses; expansion of the UNOA Human Rights Division's capacity and presence throughout the country; establishment of a protection working group within each province; and the establishment of a small protection strategy team in Luanda to support the provincial-level protection working groups. In addition, given its comparative advantage in protection, UNHCR is encouraged to examine further possibilities for an enhanced presence and the development of nationwide inter-agency protection strategies in regard to internally displaced persons.

## **Landmines**

126. Given the catastrophic landmine situation throughout the country and the problems it gives rise to in terms of security, access and resettlement, the Government is strongly encouraged to implement the Ottawa

Convention without delay. Adequate donor response to the 2001 CAP is necessary to ensure a comprehensive approach to mine action, which the donors themselves favour.

### **Comprehensive peace and national reconciliation**

127. Although the Government claims to control over 90 per cent of the country, UNITA is still able to effectively employ guerrilla tactics which are exacting a heavy price on the displaced and civilian population. Moreover, the ongoing state of insecurity is a major constraint on the humanitarian response and undermines the long-term development prospects for the country and the possibility of durable solutions for the internally displaced. As such, vigorous efforts must be pursued by all relevant actors towards the achievement of a sustainable political solution to the conflict, and national reconciliation.

128. In the space of seven months, from April to November 2000, the Government and the international community have taken significant steps to improve the conditions of the internally displaced in Angola. And they have done so in very difficult circumstances, characterized by ongoing insecurity, problems of access, logistical difficulties and reduced donor support. Such developments and constraints notwithstanding, further substantial efforts are required to address effectively the ongoing humanitarian and, especially, protection problems identified in this report. The international community has a clear role to play in addressing these problems. However, its efforts should not be substituted for those of the Government but should support the Government, which, in turn, should seek to consolidate its leadership role and fully assume its responsibility for the displaced, including by providing increased financial resources to the humanitarian effort." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 113-128)

*For the full details of the visit and its findings, please consult the initial release of the UNHCHR about his visit [\[External link\]](#) as well as the full report of the Special Representative [\[External link\]](#).*

## **International coordination**

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### **Problems noted by UN Representative on Internally Displaced Persons with regard to effective implementation of existing coordination mechanisms (January 2001)**

- The Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) is increasingly marginalized, receiving fewer funds and forced to send all emergency legislation through the Inter-Ministerial Commission
- Coordination between MINARS, the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Territorial Administration has been complicated and uneven
- Coordination with international partners is also lacking – Humanitarian Coordination Group has met only once since April 2000

"69. While coordination mechanisms exist at the national and provincial levels, there appear to be problems with their effective implementation which may have direct and indirect repercussions for the internally displaced. At the national level, concerns were raised pertaining to coordination problems within the Government. Although the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Humanitarian Situation was a welcome step demonstrating increased governmental commitment to addressing the humanitarian situation, it has not been without its problems. Concerns were expressed over the increasingly unclear role of MINARS, which should be the focal point for the coordination of the humanitarian response. The Representative was informed that MINARS had been increasingly marginalized, receiving fewer funds and forced to send all emergency legislation through the Inter-Ministerial Commission. This is further complicated by the appointment of the Minister of Planning as the chair of the Inter-Ministerial Commission and the apparent reluctance of her Ministry to assume full

responsibility for emergency assistance. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Territorial Administration is seeking an increased role in resettlement, given the role of the provincial governors in the process. Coordination between these three ministries had been described as complicated and uneven and as giving rise to problems for the United Nations in being able to advocate policies effectively with the Government. There is an obvious need for effective coordination within the Government and with the United Nations and NGOs. To this end, the Representative urges the reinvigoration of the national Humanitarian Coordination Group, which is supposed to bring all relevant governmental and international actors together on a monthly basis but which has seemingly met only once since April 2000." (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 69)

### **New information format introduced to improve work of Humanitarian Coordination Group (HCG) (February 2001)**

- New information format will be used by both the Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UTCAH) and OCHA to compile standardized information on a monthly basis
- Information format will be used to monitor the progress of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
- The creation of a database is being discussed to cover key trends and indicators in the humanitarian sector

"To ensure that the humanitarian assistance activities are integrated across sectors and coordinated between partners, key indicators including displacement rates, nutrition rates and disease outbreaks will be monitored on a regular basis. A first and important step in this direction was the introduction in January 2001 of an information format for the Humanitarian Coordination Group (HCG). The new format, which covers a wide-range of humanitarian sectors, will be used jointly by UTCAH and OCHA to compile information on a monthly basis. The secretariat for the HCG will collect the information in the standardised format from the 18 provinces and create a series of charts and maps showing important developments and trends for each sector. This information will be presented to key policy-makers, including Vice-Ministers, Heads of Agencies and Ambassadors, who attend the monthly HCG. The format will be used to monitor the progress of the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal and adjust the overall humanitarian operation at the national level as required. The first meeting of the HCG is tentatively scheduled for the beginning of April [2001].

#### **Integrated Information**

In an effort to standardise the process of information management, the Inter-Agency Technical Team has begun to discuss the development of an integrated multi-sectoral database. The database would cover key trends and indicators and would be introduced and maintained in each province. Currently, at least four different agency databases are operational in the field and virtually every Government ministry operates some form of data-tracking mechanism.

An information task force composed of representatives from appropriate Government departments, UN Agencies and NGOs will be formed shortly to conduct an inventory of these systems, identifying areas of overlap and information gaps. During coming months, the taskforce will aim to design a simple, robust, integrated database that can be introduced into the provinces by the end of the year. The taskforce will build on existing systems while taking into consideration the sensitive issues of data credibility and data collection." (OCHA 28 February 2001)

## **US Ambassador to the UN makes criticism of UN coordination in Angola following his visit to the country in July 2000**

- Ambassador Holbrooke is highly critical of UN coordination in his report to ECOSOC
- Following his criticism, the GoA requests UNHCR to assist with internally displaced persons
- A UNHCR assessment mission for expanded programming follows in late May 2000

"The UN debate on internal displacement focused on internally displaced persons in Angola. Ambassador Holbrooke had recently visited Angola, where WFP was the coordinating UN agency for displaced persons, and was highly critical of what he saw, telling ECOSOC, 'Anyone in this room who's been in Angola knows full well that the UN response is inadequate to the problem. Anyone who's been in Luanda knows that the UN agencies there are passing the buck.'

Shortly after Holbrooke's Security Council speech, the Angolan government requested UNHCR to assist with internally displaced people. In April, UNHCR sent an assessment mission, followed in late May, by a mission conducted by 12 senior staff, paving the way for an expanded field operation in the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire.

At the ECOSOC meeting, Holbrooke pledged \$2 million from the United States for UNHCR to expand its assistance program in northern Angola 'to cover emergency relief and protection needs of internal refugees.' But, in the absence of a lead agency approach, Holbrooke warned, 'Let's see if the UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, and all the other organizations really do work together in the future. It's easy to talk about in this room. I find it unlikely that it will happen in the most difficult conditions—in a place like Luanda, where the agencies are in different buildings, where they don't have phone communications, when they work under the most difficult of circumstances—but let's give it a shot. The world will be watching.'" (USCR July 2000)

## **Different coordination structures established over the years to assist internally displaced populations (1998-2000)**

- TWG, made up of representatives from the GoA, UN Agencies, donors, national and international NGOs, established and scheduled to meet every two weeks to discuss technical aspects of the humanitarian challenges in Angola
- UCAH, through its IDP monitor, acts as a focal point for IDPs
- Activities conducted on behalf of IDPs include: definition of guidelines, coordination of assistance projects, advocacy of humanitarian principles, negotiation of access, maintenance of an IDP database and reporting

### ***Technical UN-GoA Working Group for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (TWG):***

"The Technical Working Group for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (TWG) met for the first time on 8 June [2000]. Composed of high-level technical representatives from the Government, UN Agencies, donors, national and international NGOs and sub-groups of the NHCG, the TWG has been formed to analyze, discuss and offer technical recommendations to the National Humanitarian Coordination Group (NHCG) and the Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Humanitarian Situation regarding operating procedures for humanitarian assistance programs. The TWG is scheduled to meet every two weeks under the chairmanship of MINARS." (OCHA 19 June 2000)

### ***International coordination: The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) (1998-1999)***

"UCAH has been facilitating the coordination of humanitarian operations since May 1993 in Angola. The UCAH Field Coordination Unit will continue [in year 2000] to monitor the evolution of the overall humanitarian situation and provide appropriate information to humanitarian actors at central and provincial levels.

UCAH Field Advisors are present in provinces where the humanitarian condition is particularly critical and assistance is being delivered. The Field Coordination Unit based in Luanda supports these Field Advisors. This Unit ensures the appropriate follow-up and analysis of all issues reported by the field and maintains contact with humanitarian operators in Luanda.

In addition to its main responsibilities as facilitator of the coordination of effective implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes, OCHA was entrusted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of the UN with a specific mandate related to IDPs. Therefore, UCAH will continue to monitor and report on displacements and war-affected populations throughout the country.

Field Advisors play an essential role in the evaluation of proposals submitted to the Emergency Response Fund. These proposals are most often generated in the field with input from an UCAH Field Advisor, where present." (UN 30 November 1999, p. 96)

## **International donor response (2001-2002)**

### **Poor response to funding requests in UN Consolidated Appeal 2001 – but the need for funding is evermore urgent (March 2002)**

- By April 2002, still only 50 percent of the 2001 CAP was funded
- At the same time, the Humanitarian Coordinator in Angola stresses that urgent funding is needed to ensure that life-saving assistance gets to the people who need it without delay

"Although conditions worsened during the year, funding for humanitarian programmes was substantially lower than expected. By October, only 44 percent of the USD 233 million requested in the revised 2001 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal had been funded. Agencies working in sectors with high funding levels, including refugees (80 percent), security (57 percent), coordination and support services (52 percent), food assistance (50 percent) and health (41 percent), were able to implement sectoral strategies. Agencies working in poorly funded sectors, including protection (29 percent), water and sanitation (17 percent), education (16 percent) and mine action (2 percent), were forced to curtail important programmes linked to the integrated approach." (UN November 2001)

***By April 2002, still only 50% of the 2001 CAP was funded. Up-to-date summaries of CAP requirements and contributions can be accessed on the financial tracking system of the UN OCHA ReliefWeb [\[external link\]](#)***

"The United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr Erick de Mul, appealed today to donors for urgent funding to keep the humanitarian operation in Angola running.

The humanitarian situation in the country is deteriorating sharply. Despite the recent death of the head of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, on 22 February, military operations are ongoing. According to Mr de Mul, 'The continuation of the war will inevitably lead to increased and deepening vulnerability.'

Humanitarian partners estimate that if current trends continue, approximately 300,000 Angolans will become newly displaced during the next six months, bringing the total number of displaced in the country to 4.6 million and increasing the current emergency caseload by nearly 25 percent.

The humanitarian operation is stretched to the limit. UN Agencies and NGOs are already operating at full capacity and do not have sufficient resources to address the critical needs of additional internally displaced persons.

'As a result of inadequate funding, humanitarian organisations are facing a shortfall of emergency stocks and lack personnel and capacity to respond to rapidly growing needs. Millions of vulnerable people are living in life-threatening conditions and more will be at serious risk if action is not taken immediately. Urgent funding is required to ensure that life-saving assistance gets to the people who need it without delay,' said de Mul." (UN OCHA 7 March 2002)

### **ECHO to channel Euros 8 million through partner organisations (February 2002)**

- ECHO will support humanitarian programmes in fields of health, nutrition, water/ sanitation, emergency relief, protection and air transport
- Key objectives include improving the health conditions of vulnerable populations and ensuring access, coordination and supply of goods to humanitarian operations

"The European Commission has adopted a new global plan covering 2002 to provide continuing humanitarian support for victims of the war in Angola. Euros 8 million will be channelled by the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) through partner organisations and international agencies operating in the country.

Angola has been affected by conflict for more than thirty years. In December 1998, four years after the signature of the Lusaka peace agreements, hostilities resumed leading to a serious worsening in the humanitarian situation of the population. Last year, the intensification of the conflict created an unexpected increase of population displacements and restricted resettlement and return. Although there were some positive expectations for 2001, overall the humanitarian situation has deteriorated. Access to vulnerable groups and security are still major constraints for the humanitarian relief community. The donor community and the European Commission requests warring parties to create conditions for the establishment of "humanitarian corridors" in areas they control. This will give access to populations at risk and reduce the costs of humanitarian operations undertaken. Without real progress being made on this specific aspect, aid agencies and NGOs operating in the country will not be able to target their assistance more efficiently. It is estimated that as many as 500,000 inaccessible people require basic assistance, including food aid, shelter, medicines and other items essential for their survival.

The Commission, through its Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), will support humanitarian programmes in fields of health, nutrition, water/sanitation, emergency relief, protection and air transport, working through various international organisations and NGOs. Key objectives are mainly to improve the health conditions of vulnerable populations and to ensure access, co-ordination and supply of goods to humanitarian operations financed in the region." (ECHO 11 February 2002)

### **UN requests USD 232,768,666 in 2002 CAP (November 2001)**

"In a positive step forward, the Government and humanitarian partners are adopting a rights-based strategy in the 2002 Appeal to ensure that assistance is provided in accordance with core principles contained in the Angolan constitution and on the basis of international standards. Through the new partnership targets, humanitarian actors will be moving systematically during

the next several years towards the gradual attainment of the rights expressed in Angolan law. Recognising that conditions are highly variable, the operation will continue to be focused, cost-effective, pragmatic and flexible enough to cover rapid onset emergencies, prolonged emergencies and resettlement initiatives.

The overall direction of the operation will remain the same, with agencies continuing to integrate programmes through coordination structures at the national and provincial levels. On the basis of assessments, food agencies will shift from general distributions to targeted assistance for the most vulnerable groups and will promote self-reliance through food-for-work. Populations living in transit centres and displaced camps will be relocated in accordance with the Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Populations and food security increased as a result of integrated agricultural programmes. Major efforts will be made to lower morbidity and mortality through targeted programmes in water and sanitation, nutrition, polio eradication, and mother and child healthcare. Learning opportunities will be boosted by expanding access to both formal and nonformal education systems and mine action will be integrated into the humanitarian operation. Agencies will support campaigns to provide proof of identity to Angolan citizens and will help to address protection issues by implementing Provincial Protection Plans.

The Government will continue to coordinate the humanitarian operation with support from the United Nations and is expected to significantly increase resources for emergency programmes and humanitarian sectors. The Government will also ensure that humanitarian activities are linked to strategies for poverty alleviation and national reconciliation. To cover their part of the humanitarian operation, UN Agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGO) are requesting **US\$ 232,768,666** for 130 projects in 13 sectors. Projects have been included in the Appeal on the basis of clear priorities. To ensure the success of the integrated approach, adequate funding is required for all aspects of the operation." (UN November 2001)

### **USAID has provided significant support to programmes benefiting IDPs in Angola (April 2001)**

- USAID/OFDA programmes in 2000 provided nearly \$3.6 million in emergency assistance targeting both IDP and vulnerable resident populations
- In addition to USAID assistance, State/PRM provided \$2 million to UNHCR to support IDP programmes in northern Angola in 2000
- In FY 2001 to date, State/PRM has contributed \$2.3 million to UNHCR to support their IDP activities in Angola

"In FY 2000, USAID/OFDA supported the establishment of a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) project to deploy civil/military liaison security officers in the provinces to facilitate and enhance the exchange of information regarding security incidents among the Angolan military, civil police, and NGOs. The program has been successful and will be expanded in 2001. USAID/OFDA also continued funding World Food Program (WFP) air transport of personnel from international and local NGOs, the donor community, U.N. Agencies, and the diplomatic corps. This \$1 million in support of air transport allows entry into areas that are otherwise inaccessible due to security concerns.

[...]

USAID/OFDA programs in FY 2000 provided nearly \$3.6 million in emergency assistance that targeted both IDP and vulnerable resident populations. Grants to Africare, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), International Medical Corps (IMC), Medecins sans Frontieres/Belgium (MSF/B), and the Development Workshop implemented agriculture, emergency health and feeding, and water initiatives in Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Malanje and Kuito.

In addition to USAID assistance to IDPs in Angola, State/PRM provided \$2 million to UNHCR to support IDP relief and reintegration programs in northern Angola. In FY 2001 to date, State/PRM has contributed \$2.3 million to UNHCR to support their IDP activities in Angola.

[...]

#### U.S. GOVERNMENT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA

Agency & Implementing Partners	Sector	Regions	Amount
FY2000			
USAID	\$98,887,521		
USAID/OFDA	\$6,083,393		
Africare	Food Security	Bié	\$816,670
IMC	Health	Malanje, Huambo	\$1,892,480
Dev. Workshop	Water/Sanitation	Huambo,	\$391,900
UNOCHA	Information Coordination	All	\$600,000
UNDP	Civil/Military Liaison and Security	Huambo, Kuito, Malanje, Uige, and Luanda	\$15,000
UNICEF	Health/Nutrition	All	\$997,343
WFP	Air Transport	All	\$1,000,000
WFP	Administrative	All	\$370,000
USAID/FFP	\$49,537,725		
WFP	Food Assistance	All	\$37,361,025
ICRC	Food Assistance	All	\$12,176,700
\$A 416(b)	\$28,266,403		
WFP	Food Assistance	All	\$28,266,403
USAID/AFR	Health, Agriculture, Civil Society	All	\$7,000,000
State/PRM**	\$2,550,000		
UNHCR	IDP Assistance	Uige, Zaire, Luanda	\$2,000,000
UNHCR	Refugee Assistance	Luanda	\$450,000
WFP	Refugee Assistance	Luanda	\$100,000
USG FY2000	\$93,347,521		
FY2001			
USAID	\$20,447,732		
USAID/OFDA	\$4,149,932		
OXFAM/GB	Water/Sanitation	Bie, Huambo, Malanje	\$1,999,932
UNDP	Civil/Military Liaison and Security	Huambo, Kuito, Malanje, Uige, Luanda	\$50,000
UNOCHA	Field Coordination	All	\$600,000
UNOCHA	Emergency Response Fund	All	\$500,000
WFP	Air Support	All	\$1,000,000
FY2001			
USAID/FFP	\$18,397,800		
WFP	Food Assistance	All	\$11,000,000
ICRC	Food Assistance	All	\$7,397,800
State/ PRM	—	—	\$2,300,000
UNHCR	IDP Assistance	Uige, Zaire, Luanda	\$2,300,000

Total USG FY 2001	\$24,847,732		
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*\* Several programs that were funded in FY 1999 and implemented in FY 2000 are outlined in the report above. However, only FY 2000 and FY 2001 funding is including in this table.*

*\*\* State/PRM figures include only Angola-specific funding. For more information on regional assistance through State/PRM, see "Refugees" and "Other USG Assistance" section above" (USAID 2 April 2001)*

## **Selected activities of international agencies (2001-2002)**

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### **Overview of humanitarian operation in 2001**

- Humanitarian operation in Angola comprises 10 UN agencies, 100 international NGOS and more than 340 national NGOs
- Numerous government ministries and departments also involved in humanitarian assistance
- Overall coordination of the humanitarian operation is by the government Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) and by UN OCHA

"The humanitarian operation remained large, with ten UN Agencies, 100 international NGOs and more than 340 national NGOs either active or registered. Eleven technical ministries and departments and all Provincial Governments were also involved in humanitarian assistance. Overall coordination of the operation was undertaken by the Minister of Social Affairs and Reintegration on the part of the Government and by the Humanitarian Coordinator on the part of the United Nations, supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which continued to serve as the Coordinator's secretariat. Under the leadership of the Government, serious efforts were made to build on the achievements of the previous year.

[...]

The majority of organisations provide humanitarian assistance, although many are also involved in rehabilitation and development. Although overall humanitarian coverage remains limited due to persistent and widespread insecurity, organisations are currently working in 12 sectors and in all 18 provinces. Since the resumption of hostilities in 1998, agencies have focused on saving lives, stabilising populations in acute distress, and laying the groundwork for future recovery. Given the complexity of the humanitarian operation, strong strategic and operational coordination mechanisms continue to be needed at both central and provincial levels. The main priorities for coordination continue to be: 1) developing a shared analysis of core priorities through common assessments; 2) preparing joint plans of action that integrate programmes at the sectoral level; 3) monitoring programmes to ensure maximum impact; and 4) adjusting operations through the National and Provincial Emergency Plans of Action to meet changing needs and conditions." (UN November 2001)

### **Wide-ranging UNICEF programme benefits displaced children, among others (1999-2003)**

- UNICEF focus in Angola includes increased learning for school-age children, especially those in IDP camps, and mines awareness among displaced populations

"The Government of Angola/UNICEF Programme of Cooperation 1999-2003 aims to ensure greater realization of children's rights in Angola, through interventions in specific areas of health and nutrition, water and sanitation, education, child protection and mine awareness. The Country Programme aims to contribute to medium to long term strategies to qualitatively improve the situation of children and women in Angola, while responding to acute emergency needs.

The specific focus is on:

Reduction of morbidity and mortality of children from preventable diseases through increased immunization coverage, improved protection and curative strategies for malaria - the biggest killer of under-5 children - and the reduction of water born diseases through improved access to water and sanitation.

Eradication of polio by the year 2005 and immunization of at least three million children every year against polio.

Support for the protection of children's rights against abuses and violence, to be re-united with their families and to have their births registered.

Increased learning for school age children, particularly displaced children living in camps.

Promotion of mine awareness in 14 provinces to reduce the number of landmine victims, particularly among displaced populations.

Increased awareness, particularly among youth, on the dangers of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmittable diseases.

UNICEF has seven sub-offices - Huambo, Kuito, , Malange, Lobito, Lubango, Luena and Uige - and these work in close co-ordination with the Government, UN agencies and NGOs. Security costs are shared with other UN agencies." (UNICEF 11 February 2002)

### **WFP promotes self-reliance strategies for IDPs (December 2001)**

- WFP supporting distribution of seeds and tools to complement government's resettlement efforts that give IDPs parcels of land for agricultural activities
- WFP programs assist and feed over 1 million people in Angola

"At the end of a 12-day visit to Angola, the United Nations World Food Programme Regional Director for the Central Africa Region, Holdbrook Arthur reaffirmed WFP's strategy of promoting mechanisms of self-reliance for the country's internally displaced in order to diminish their dependence on international aid.

'In the meantime, there is an urgent need to improve runway conditions in airports countrywide, in order to increase the efficiency of the airlift of food supplies to thousands of Angolans who rely on food aid for their survival,' said Arthur.

Just as important, he said, is the need to repair many of Angola's roads and bridges, damaged by years of war and neglect, to diminish the high level of reliance on food delivery by air.

[...]

Spurred by the preoccupation recently expressed by donors that the WFP's interventions in Angola have not met with sufficient support from the nation's government, Arthur's visit resulted in various assurances by ministers and governors that greater effort will be spent on ensuring WFP has greater access to roads countrywide.

[...]

'We are aware that the Angolan government has engaged in a resettlement effort, distributing parcels of land to IDPs so that they can participate in agricultural activities to enable the internally displaced persons to produce their own food towards self-reliance. Accordingly, WFP is actively supporting the distribution of seeds and tools, and seed protection food aid,' said Arthur. 'I have confidence this effort will eventually imply in greater food security for Angolans.'

WFP's programs currently assist and feed over 1 million people in this war-ravaged sub-nation in Sub Saharan Africa. Over 60 per cent of all food delivered to 14 of Angola's 18 provinces is transported by air." (WFP 4 December 2001)

### **OCHA trains government officials in IDP protection (November 2001)**

- 40 government officials receive training in IDP protection from OCHA, supported by various other agencies

"From 26-30 November 40 Government officials received training in IDP protection. The training was conducted by OCHA, with support from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and senior staff from the military attorney's office. Participants included members of the joint chiefs of staff, the Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Peace Process, the Ministry of External Relations (MIREX) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS). In addition, all of the provincial coordinators from the Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH) and provincial national officers and field assistants from OCHA participated." (UN OCHA 30 November 2001)

### **UNHCR conducts self-evaluation of IDP work in Angola (November 2000-May 2001)**

- "Real time" evaluation of UNHCR work with regard to IDPs tasked to answer question of whether UNHCR IDP operation should continue into 2001
- Final analysis concluded that work should continue but should be phased out by end of year

"In July 2000, UNHCR's Operational Review Board decided that UNHCR's IDP intervention in Angola, launched the previous month, should be subject to a 'real-time evaluation' in October 2000 in order to assess progress to date, and to make recommendations on the future of the programme.

[...]

The evaluation was tasked with answering the following question:

*Should UNHCR's Angola IDP operation continue into 2001, and if so, under what conditions and in what form?*

The short answer to the first part of the question is yes, for the following reasons:

momentum, and the negative consequences of not continuing: to withdraw after having made a visible entrée in this sector would seriously undermine UNHCR's credibility, and undo the foundation that has already been laid.

impact: UNHCR's programmes have already had a definite and positive impact upon the humanitarian situation of thousands of needy persons; winding up these programmes would at this point be morally irresponsible, and leave these and future beneficiaries in the lurch.

Nonetheless, while the programme is both worthy and worthwhile, it faces a number of challenges that should be dealt with in next year's programme. The mission's findings and recommendations regarding the operational context, the effectiveness of the programme, and the role of UNHCR is a wider perspective are listed below. In summary, the recommendation of this real-time evaluation is: 'continue, commit, embed and phase out'.

[...]

*Given the circumscribed and time-bounded character of the intervention, and given also the characteristics of the IDP caseload, UNHCR must ensure that all its programmes can be handed over and 'owned' by other stakeholders by the end of the 2001.*" (UNHCR November 2000)

***For the full details and recommendations of the November 2000 UNHCR real-time evaluation, please consult the original document [\[External link\]](#). Also see May 2001 report entitled UNHCR's programme for internally displaced people in Angola [\[External link\]](#).***

### **WFP leads efforts to improve registration procedures for internally displaced persons (February 2001)**

- Targeting and Registration Working Group established in January 2001 under WFP leadership
- New registration procedures to be applied to persons displaced since October 2000
- A new standardised registration card has been designed with input from MINARS and WFP partners

"In January 2000, a Targeting and Registration Working Group composed of representatives of UN Agencies and NGOs was set up under WFP leadership to review WFP food distribution strategies and formulate recommendations aimed at harmonising food aid interventions countrywide.

As part of this process, partners agreed on new registration procedures and redesigned registration documents for implementation in March 2001. Consistent with the strategy outlined in WFP's newly approved Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO), the new procedures will apply only to IDPs who arrived in October 2000 or later. Longer-term IDPs are not covered by the new system. In provinces where massive influxes of displaced populations occurred during, or after, the agricultural campaign or where IDPs were not registered in time to receive agricultural inputs, the new registration system will be extended to populations who arrived prior to the cut-off date.

The new system will be implemented under the auspices of the Provincial Sub-Group on IDPs and Refugees. A provincial verification working group composed of representatives from WFP, MINARS and the main food distribution partners will be appointed under the Sub-Group to coordinate the technical aspects of registration. Registration teams composed of technical staff from MINARS, WFP, food distribution partners and a community representative will be established to implement registration of the newly arrived IDPs, using the definition for internally displaced persons contained in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

In a positive step forward, registration and verification under the new system will be conducted as soon displaced populations arrive. A new standardised registration card, designed on the basis of inputs from MINARS and WFP partners, will be used countrywide." (OCHA 28 February 2001)

### **Selected activities of international NGOs (2001-2002)**

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## **MSF working to increase humanitarian access to IDPs and other vulnerable populations (March 2002)**

- MSF's programmes in Angola represent one of the organization's largest operations - supported by 80 international volunteers and 850 national staff
- MSF laments the situation of inaccessibility to hundreds of thousands of needy Angolan civilians
- MSF calls for negotiation of humanitarian access to specific locations throughout Angola , where acute humanitarian emergencies are ongoing or suspected

"MSF has been working in Angola since 1983. Our activities in this country represent one of our organization's largest operations and are supported by 80 international volunteers and 850 national personnel. MSF works in ten of Angola's 18 provinces, running primary health care services in displaced camps, nutritional programs, supporting hospitals and other health structures, and running surgical, sleeping sickness and tuberculosis programs.

[...]

Before the resumption of the war at the end of 1998, MSF provided humanitarian assistance to Angolans in both Government and UNITA controlled areas. While the Government presently claims to control over ninety percent of the country, the conditions necessary for the provision of humanitarian assistance exist in few parts of the country like provincial capitals or other main Government-held towns.

Since early 1999, hundred of thousands of Angolan civilians live in areas deprived of humanitarian assistance. These are zones where control is contested and fluid, UNITA held territory, or inaccessible areas under Government control. These civilians' plight, until very recently, has been ignored by the international community despite the acute emergency situation they experience. MSF has over the past year collected substantial medical and nutritional data confirming the acute emergency situation of some of these populations who manage to reach our health structures:

During 2001, for example, approximately 50,000 displaced persons (IDPs) arrived in Camacupa (Bie Province). Most of the people came from areas under Government control that were inaccessible to humanitarian organizations, and where no medical or social assistance was provided. Many arrived in a state where they needed to be urgently admitted for medical and nutritional treatment in MSF's programs.

In Huila province, since October 2001, approximately 17,000 IDPs arrived in displaced sites in Matala from Chipindo and Chicomba. These are two municipalities that have been inaccessible to humanitarian organizations since 1998. In November 2001, mortality rates among these displaced exceeded emergency thresholds reaching between 2.9 and 6.3 deaths per day for every 10,000 persons (and between 7.6 and 17 deaths per 10.000 persons per day for the under 5 years population). High rates of global acute malnutrition were recorded in February 2002 in these sites, reaching 19% among new arrivals.

There are several reasons why populations such as these have not benefited from the assistance of MSF and other humanitarian organizations since the resumption of the war in 1998.

Increased insecurity and the changes in the type of warfare have certainly been a significant impediment. Another major factor, however, has been the politicisation of access in the form of an unwillingness by the Angolan Government to facilitate it, and the lack of will by UNITA to make the presence of humanitarian organizations possible in areas where it operates. In addition, while it has been difficult to identify credible UNITA interlocutors, compliance with UN sanctions should not have affected the negotiation of access for humanitarian organizations. A major obstacle over the past years has been the lack of political will by all parties, including the Security Council, to actively support negotiated access to these populations.

From our experience and current field perspective, MSF believes that access can be substantially increased only with the consent of all parties to the conflict and not through militarized corridors. As a first and

immediate step, MSF favors the negotiation of humanitarian access to specific locations throughout Angola, where acute humanitarian emergencies are ongoing or suspected." (MSF 5 March 2002)

### **Action Against Hunger running five new programmes to assist IDPs (February 2002)**

- AAH has seven bases, two logistic bases and five new programmes to assist IDPs in Angola
- Programmes include nutritional and health assistance, as well as development activities with food security and water activities
- AAH is the only international organization present in some locations

"Action Against Hunger has been present in Angola since 1993. Specifically, AAH has seven bases, two logistic bases and five new programs to assist the many displaced victims in the civil war-torn country.

**Caconda base**, situated in the center of Plano Alto region (Huila Province) is one of the emergencies of the year 2001. In the last month alone, 5,000 displaced victims arrived and the global malnutrition rates are over 21%. Two programs give nutritional and health assistance to the population (resident and the displaced). Action Against Hunger is the only international organization present in this area. Due to security reasons we had to evacuate the base two weeks ago, but the team is back from a two week forced absence.

**Ganda base**, situated also in the Plano Alto region (Benguela Province) has been our emergency base since 1999. Today the nutritional situation is under control with one Therapeutic Feeding Center and three Supplementary Feeding Centers. AAH also supports the hospital with a capacity building and health program. We are the only international organization in the region with three expatriate fieldworkers who stay in Ganda Town due to the instable security situation.

**Matala Base** has a development program with food security and water activities. A team of three expatriates just arrived. The program started in January. In the next months the humanitarian situation could be worse due to the arrival of thousands displaced in the last months.

**Cuito Cunavale Base**, known as "the end of the world", has a nutritional and health program in a very difficult and lonely place. It will probably be one of the major emergencies for the next year due to the military operation in the east of Cuando Cubango Province. There is one expatriate fieldworker there today, maybe two next month.

**Lubango and Menongue bases:** Logistical bases to support the operation in Cuito Cunavale, Caconda and Matala.

**Luanda, Capital Base** has a coordination team residence and a nutritional program. Next year we hope to have a very strong Nutritional and Capacity Building program." (AAH 22 February 2002)

### **Church World Service supporting emergency and rehabilitation projects for IDPs (January 2002)**

- Evangelical Reformed Church of Angola (IERA) pursuing a one-year emergency and rehabilitation project aimed at 41,000 IDPs in three provinces
- IERA project includes areas of health, agriculture/ food security, rehabilitation, water/ sanitation, distribution of relief goods and landmine awareness

"The Evangelical Reformed Church of Angola (IERA), a member of the Action by Churches Together (ACT) International network, is seeking support for its work in assisting internally displaced persons.

IERA is pursuing a one-year emergency and rehabilitation project in three main provinces of Angola, Uige, Zaire and Kwanza-Sul. The principal beneficiaries of this work will be 9,000 vulnerable families - or some 41,000 persons -- who have been displaced. The IERA project incorporates health services, agricultural inputs and land for food security purposes; building and rehabilitating health and school facilities; water and sanitation programs; AIDS awareness; distribution of relief goods; food assistance; and landmine awareness.

***Specific Objectives include:***

Providing health facilities and AIDS awareness to the displaced people and improve the training for nurses and midwives as well as traditional healers.

Improving food security through small kitchen gardens/vegetable plots.

Distribution of small animals will also take place.

Providing educational materials to the IDP schools and also integrate some of the teachers from the IDP community into the local educational systems. Also construct basic schools.

Providing relief food to the most vulnerable people such as widows, orphans and elderly people.

Promoting and encouraging tree planting by the IDPs in order to avoid de-forestation." (CWD 10 January 2002)

**Mines Advisory Group running awareness project in Luena (December 2001)**

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG) informs community on how to minimise risks posed by mines in day-to-day life
- Two MAG emergency response teams clearing high-priority areas around Luena, in eastern Moxico province

"Thousands of people who have fled their homes because of the civil war in Angola have been forced on to land contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance.

The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) is running a project designed to help displaced people in the Luena area in the east of the country to find land that is safe from mines.

MAG staff point out dangerous areas and provide information on how to minimise the risks posed by mines in the day-to-day life of the community. Two MAG emergency response teams have been clearing high-priority areas. They destroy landmines and unexploded ordnance found by the community, and assist mine victims.

Among the communities aided by MAG staff is the Vicky camp near Sacassange village, about five km from the town of Luena. The camp was set up a year ago for people who fled their own village.

'There was so much fighting, many people were killed. Too many to count. All our crops were destroyed. So, we came here' camp spokesman Jose Luige told the visitors. 'We will not go back until the fighting stops.'

MAG has worked in the territory extensively over the years and has good information about the location and position of mined areas.

It also helped select a safe area for the Vicky camp to be built. There is very little 'safe' land around Luena and inevitably there are minefields. There is a minefield only 500 metres from the edge of the camp." (AlertNet 12 December 2001)

### **Lutheran World Federation/ Department of World Service (LWF/ WS) looking after more than 80,000 IDPs (December 2001)**

- Lutheran World Federation/ Department of World Service (LWF/ WS) requesting additional funds to cater for increased number of IDPs in its areas of operation

"Appeal Target: US\$ 2,125,288

Balance Requested from ACT Network: US\$ 806,014

The Lutheran World Federation / Department of World Service (LWF/WS) has revised their programme in the appeal to cater for the increased number of displaced people in their areas of operation. It is estimated that the number of IDPs has gone up fourfold to the planned figure and by the end of November 2001 there were 80,000 people under the care of the LWF. This increased number calls for more basic relief items to be procured for distribution to the new IDPs. As the settlements have increased in number from 2 at the beginning of the year 2000 to the current 14, distribution of relief goods have also become a challenge as the operational areas, especially in Luena, have become wider and more spaced out. The current transport facilities available have become insufficient and in this revision, LWF proposes to procure an additional truck using funds saved from the air transport budget line as WFP has taken care of most of the air transport costs." (ACT 18 December 2001)

## **References to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement**

### **Known references to the Guiding Principles (as of April 2002)**

- Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
- Other references to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
- Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
- Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

### **References to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation**

<p><b>Norms on the Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons:</b> The Guiding Principles first of all formed the basis for Minimum Operational Standards (MINOPS) for Resettlement and Return of internally displaced persons, developed by the Government in cooperation with UN agencies in the summer of 2000. In October 2000, these standards were approved by the Council of Ministers and published in a Government Decree (1/01) of 5 January 2001 as the Norms on the Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons. The preamble to the Decree states that the Guiding Principles establish the general principles governing the treatment of internally displaced persons.</p>
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<p><b>Source:</b> Government of Angola</p>
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<p><b>Date:</b> 5 January 2001</p>
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<p><b>Documents:</b></p>
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- Government Decree Number 1/ 01 [unofficial translation]
- Original document in Portuguese available by fax from the Global IDP Project

### Other references to the Guiding Principles

**Commission on Human rights (58th session):** In his briefing to the Commission on mass exoduses and displaced persons, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis Deng, made particular note of ongoing developments in Angola with regard to the protection of IDPs. Dr. Deng noted that since his last report to the Commission, in January 2001, significant steps have been taken by the Government and the UN in developing a national strategy for the protection of internally displaced persons, which includes efforts to promote and implement the Guiding Principles (see section below on training).

**Source:** Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Dr. Francis Deng

**Date:** 16 January 2002

**Documents:**

- Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/54; Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, 16 January 2002 (page 10) [Internet]

**High-level advocacy of the Guiding Principles:** During his visit to Angola in October-November 2000, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis Deng, welcomed the development by the Government, in cooperation with the UN, of the norms for the resettlement of internally displaced persons, based on the Guiding Principles. Notwithstanding this, Dr. Deng also called on the Government, inter alia, to develop and adopt national legislation on internally displaced persons; to ensure wide dissemination of the Guiding Principles; and to make greater efforts to train the military and police on the rights of IDPs and the civilian population.

**Source:** Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Dr. Francis Deng

**Date:** October-November 2000

**Documents:**

- Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs to the Commission of Human Rights, Profiles in displacement, Angola, 25 January 2001 [Internet]

### Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages

Following his visit to Angola in 2000, the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Dr. Francis Deng, stressed that while the Guiding Principles are available in Portuguese, it may also be useful to facilitate their translation into local languages such as Umbundu and Kimbundu. He encouraged local NGOs and church groups to undertake such efforts, with the assistance of the national authorities and/or international agencies and NGOs.

**Date:** 2000

**Documents:**

- GP in Portuguese [Internet]

### Training on the Guiding Principles

Government/ UN provincial protection plans: This involves a joint Government/ UN training group composed of representatives from the military, the judiciary, the Attorney-General's Office, the national police, the Ministry for Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS), UNHCR and UN OCHA. Participants identify problems specific to their province on the basis of the Guiding Principles, and the steps which need to be taken, and by whom, to address these problems. The resulting protection plan is monitored at provincial level by OCHA-led teams and at the national level by a joint technical group composed of UN agencies.

To support these efforts, the UN country team has established a system for collecting information and monitoring the conditions of IDPs at the provincial level. The system involves regular interviewing with displaced persons in camps by OCHA field advisers using a questionnaire based on the Norms on Resettlement and the Guiding Principles.

**Documents:**

- Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/54; Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, 16 January 2002 (page 10) [Internet]
- Humanitarian situation in Angola monthly analysis: Nov 2001, UN OCHA, 30 November 2001 [Internet]

**UN training workshop:** UNHCR, UN OCHA and the Human Rights Division (HRD) of the UN Office in Angola jointly conducted a 5-day workshop which provided training to senior officers and provincial humanitarian coordinators of the Government's Technical Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH), as well as 10 OCHA national officers and 5 HRD national officers, on monitoring compliance at the field level with international and national human rights standards, including the Guiding Principles.

**Date:** November 2001

**Documents:**

- Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/54; Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, 16 January 2002 (page 10) [Internet]

**NRC training workshop:** The Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), in collaboration with the Angolan government, held a 3-day training workshop on the Guiding Principles in Luanda, Angola. The workshop was part of a global NRC effort to disseminate and explain the Guiding Principles to representatives of governments, NGOs, the UN agencies and the displaced themselves, in order to ensure better protection and assistance to internally displaced persons. Over forty participants worked in groups and discussed the Guiding Principles in relation to the specific situation of internal displacement in Angola.

**Sources:** Angolan government, national and international NGOs, UN agencies

**Date:** 29-31 August 2000

**Documents:**

- Report of the Workshop on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, NRC, 29-31 August 2000 [Internal link]

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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ACF	Action contre la Faim
CISH	Inter-ministerial Commission for the Humanitarian Situation
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FLEC	Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave
FAPLA	The People's Armed forces for the Liberation of Angola
GoA	Government of Angola
GURN	Government of Unity and National Reconciliation
HCG	Humanitarian Coordination Group
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus
IASC	United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
INAROOE	National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Obstacles and Ordnance
MINARS	Ministry of Social Affairs and Re-Integration
MINOPS	Minimum Standards of Return and Resettlement
MONUA	United Nations Angola Observation Mission
MPLA	Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MT	Metric Tonne
NFI	Non-food items
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NHCG	National Humanitarian Coordination Group
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PNEAH	National Emergency Programme for Humanitarian Assistance
SCF	Save the Children Fund
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
TB	Tuberculosis
UCAH	Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNOA	United Nations Office in Angola
USD	United States Dollars
UTCAH	Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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