



Home Office

Country Policy and Information Note

Iraq: Security and humanitarian situation

Version 4.0

March 2017

Preface

This note provides country of origin information (COI) and policy guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the policy guidance contained with this note; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies.

Country information

The COI within this note has been compiled from a wide range of external information sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given to the relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made to corroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy. All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched and presented with reference to the [Common EU \[European Union\] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information \(COI\)](#), dated April 2008, and the [European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology](#), dated July 2012.

Feedback

Our goal is to continuously improve our material. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this note, please email [the Country Policy and Information Team](#).

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office’s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at:

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Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/>

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Policy guidance

Updated: 14 March 2017

1. Introduction

1.1 Basis of claim

- 1.1.1 That the general humanitarian situation in Iraq is so severe as to make removal to this country a breach of Articles 15(a) and (b) of the European Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 ('the Qualification Directive')/ Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and/or
- 1.1.2 That the security situation in Iraq presents a real risk which threatens a civilian's life or person such that removal to this country would be in breach of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.

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1.2 Other points to note

- 1.2.1 Previous Home Office country information and guidance on the security situation in Iraq had been divided into two sections: the 'contested' and 'non-contested' areas of the country. The:
 - 'contested' areas were Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk (aka Tam'in), Ninewah and Salah al-Din governorates;
 - 'non-contested' areas were Baghdad governorate, 'the south' (Babil, Basra, Kerbala, Missan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qaddisiyah, Thi-Qar and Wasit governorates) and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) (Dohuk, Erbil, Halabja and Sulamaniyyah governorates).
- 1.2.2 However, the security situation has changed since these definitions were first used. Furthermore, sources sometimes refer to 'contested' (or 'disputed') areas as the areas where sovereignty or control is disputed between the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Therefore, to avoid any confusion, the 'contested' and 'non-contested' definitions in the context of the security situation in Iraq will no longer be used.

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2. Consideration of Issues

2.1 Credibility

- 2.1.1 For guidance on assessing credibility, see the [Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).
- 2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the [Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants](#)).
- 2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the [Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis](#)).

2.2 Exclusion

- 2.2.1 Various groups have been responsible for serious human rights abuses (see [Protagonists](#)). If it is accepted that the person has been involved with such a group then decision makers must consider whether one of the Exclusion clauses is applicable.
- 2.2.2 For guidance on the exclusion clauses, discretionary leave and restricted leave, see the [Asylum Instruction on Exclusion: Article 1F and Article 33\(2\) of the Refugee Convention](#), the [Asylum Instruction on Discretionary Leave](#) and the [Asylum Instruction on Restricted Leave](#).

2.3 Assessment of risk

a. Refugee Convention

- 2.3.1 Decision makers must first consider if the person faces persecution for a Refugee Convention reason noting that a state of civil instability and/or where law and order has broken down does not of itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
- 2.3.2 It is only if the person does **not** qualify under the Refugee Convention that decision makers need to make an assessment of the need for protection firstly under Articles 15(a) and (b) of the Qualification Directive/Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and, if that is unsuccessful, under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.
- 2.3.3 For information and guidance on other categories of claim, see other [Country Policy and Information Notes \(CPINs\) on Iraq](#).

b. Humanitarian situation

- 2.3.4 A person may claim that the state of his or her documentation means that they cannot access support. For information and guidance on documentation questions, see the [Country Policy Information Note \(CPIN\) on Return/internal relocation](#).
- 2.3.5 In December 2016, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) assessed that 10 million people needed humanitarian support (see [Numbers of people in need](#)). This figure was revised upwards from 8.2 million in August 2015, and is projected to rise again to 11 million – almost a third of the population – in 2017 (it should be noted that this number represents the ‘aggregate’ rather than the ‘absolute’ number – a person may be counted more than once if they have multiple needs) (see [Projected numbers of people in need](#)).
- 2.3.6 Those in humanitarian need are located mainly in Ninewah (especially in Mosul), Anbar, Salah al-Din, Erbil and Kirkuk (see [Location of people in need \(projected numbers\)](#)).

- 2.3.7 Of those in humanitarian need there are some groups who are particularly vulnerable, including children, women, the elderly, those in conflict areas and those in areas not under Government control (see [Vulnerable groups](#)).
- 2.3.8 As of December 2016, the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) estimated that 3.1 million civilians were displaced, down from 3.4 million in July 2016. However, while the overall number has gone down, the numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) increased in certain governorates, namely Ninewah, Salah al-Din and Kirkuk (see [Numbers](#)). The numbers of IDPs are projected to increase in 2017 to 4.2 million (see [Projected numbers](#)).
- 2.3.9 The decline in IDPs reflects the return of some civilians to their home areas following the defeat of Daesh (Islamic State) in some areas, particularly in the Fallujah, Heet and Ramadi districts of Anbar and the Tikrit district of Salah al-Din (see [Number of returnees and places of return](#)). There are reports that people suspected of Daesh affiliation have been prevented from returning (see [Prevention of returns](#)); and other reports that people have been forced to return to their areas of origin, even if it is not yet safe to do so (see [Coercion to return](#)). Some IDPs, particularly from areas previously held by Daesh, meet difficult conditions on return, including poor infrastructure, destroyed houses and even (particularly Arabs) suffering reprisals from other communities (see [Conditions in places of return](#)).
- 2.3.10 IDPs are mainly in Anbar, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah al-Din, and in Dohuk and Erbil in the KRI (see [Location](#)). The majority of IDPs originate from Anbar or Ninewah (see [Origin](#)). The experiences of IDPs vary depending on location, shelter types and priority needs, as well as their individual circumstances; although food, employment and medical care are the top three priority needs in nearly all governorates (see [Overview of priority needs](#) and [Vulnerable groups](#)).
- 2.3.11 The humanitarian response in Iraq is one of the largest and most complex in the world (see [Humanitarian plans](#)). In the Country Guidance case of [AA \(Article 15\(c\)\) \(Rev 1\) Iraq CG \[2015\] UKUT 544 \(IAC\) \(30 September 2015\)](#), heard on 18-19 May 2015, the Upper Tribunal found that there is evidence of 'numerous organisations operating in Baghdad that provide assistance to displaced persons' (paragraph 200). Humanitarian coverage expanded significantly in 2016, although partners remain disproportionately located in the north of the country (see [Numbers of humanitarian partners](#) and [Location of humanitarian partners](#)). Although it is one of the highest funded appeals in the world, gaps do exist. The number of those targeted for assistance in 2017 (5.8 million) is lower than the number in humanitarian need (11 million projected in 2017) (see [Effectiveness of support](#) and [Numbers targeted for assistance](#)). The experience of humanitarian assistance varies depending on location and need (see [IDPs assisted](#)).
- 2.3.12 Sources differ in their assessment of the effectiveness of humanitarian support. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in their returns paper, assessed that support had deteriorated and that partners were struggling with displacement, but the more recent OCHA Humanitarian Response Plan assessment observed that humanitarian assistance was impressive and effective (see [Effectiveness of support](#)).

2.3.13 In general, the humanitarian situation is not so severe that a person is likely to face a breach of Articles 15(a) and (b) of the Qualification Directive/Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. However, decision makers must consider each case on its merits. There may be cases where a combination of circumstances means that a person will face a breach of Articles 15(a) and/or (b) of the Qualification Directive/Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR on return. In assessing whether an individual case reaches this threshold, decision makers must consider:

- where the person is from (as humanitarian conditions are more severe in some areas than others, and this may also impact on whether the person becomes an IDP on return, if they were not already prior to leaving the country);
- a person's individual profile, including, but not limited to, their age, gender and ethnicity;
- whether the person can access a support network

2.3.14 For general guidance on Humanitarian Protection (HP), see the [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#).

c. Security situation

2.3.15 Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive applies only to civilians, who must be genuine non-combatants and not those who are party to the conflict. Civilian status could extend to former combatants who have genuinely and permanently renounced armed activity.

2.3.16 Iraq is still the scene of internal armed conflict between Government forces (Iraqi Security Forces and/or Kurdish Peshmerga) and associated forces (Shia militia) on the one side and Daesh on the other (see [Protagonists](#)).

2.3.17 Civilians are affected by the indiscriminate nature of the current violence, which mainly includes Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and shootings, and also suicide bombings, car bombs, rockets and mortars (see [Nature of violence](#)).

2.3.18 In [AA](#), the Upper Tribunal found, based on evidence up to April 2015, that the degree of armed conflict in Iraq **did** engage Article 15(c) in:

- Anbar;
- Diyala;
- Kirkuk (aka Tam'in);
- Ninewah;
- Salah al-Din; and
- the parts of the 'Baghdad Belts' (the urban environs around Baghdad City) that border Anbar, Diyala and Salah al-Din (paragraph 204).

2.3.19 The Upper Tribunal, in [BA \(Returns to Baghdad\) Iraq CG \[2017\] UKUT 18 \(IAC\) \(23 January 2017\)](#), heard on 24-25 August 2016, reaffirmed that conditions in Baghdad (city) do **not** breach Article 15(c): 'The level of general

violence in Baghdad city remains significant, but the current evidence does not justify departing from the conclusions of the Tribunal in [\[AA\]](#) (paragraph 107 (i)). ([BA](#) considered violence in Baghdad only; it did not consider violence in other parts of Iraq).

- 2.3.20 The Upper Tribunal in [AA](#) found that the list of factors relevant to whether an area engaged Article 15(c) is ‘non-exhaustive’ but includes:
- the conduct, and relevant strength, of the parties to the conflict;
 - the number of civilian deaths and injuries, including psychological injuries caused by the conflict;
 - levels of displacement; and
 - the geographical scope of the conflict (paragraph 89).
- 2.3.21 However, the security situation has changed since April 2015, the point up to which [AA](#) considered evidence. Daesh has suffered, and continues to suffer, significant territorial losses. Daesh now only control:
- parts of Mosul and the surrounding areas;
 - Tal Afar and surrounding areas in northern Ninewah;
 - Hawija and surrounding areas in Kirkuk governorate; and
 - parts of west Anbar.
- 2.3.22 The Government and associated forces control the rest of the country (see [Control of territory](#)). Returns are taking place to areas of the country that Daesh previously controlled (see [Number of returnees and places of return](#)).
- 2.3.23 Life in Daesh-controlled areas is characterised by systematic and widespread acts of violence, gross violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights (see [Impact on vulnerable groups](#)).
- 2.3.24 In the six governorates worst affected by violence (Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah al-Din), the number of security incidents has either remained steady or steadily declined since April 2015, when the Upper Tribunal in [AA](#) considered evidence. The exception to this is Ninewah, where the number of security incidents is erratic, with high spikes in violence (see [Security incidents](#)).
- 2.3.25 Since April 2015, the number of civilian fatalities and injuries either decreased or remained steady in the six governorates worst affected by violence, although Ninewah and Anbar has seen high spikes (see [Fatalities and Injuries](#)).
- 2.3.26 The Court of Appeal, in the case of [SG \(Iraq\) v Secretary of State for the Home Department \[2012\] EWCA Civ 940 \(13 July 2012\)](#), heard on 20-21 June 2012, stated that ‘decision makers and tribunal judges are required to take Country Guidance determination into account, and to follow them unless very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence, are adduced justifying their not doing so’ (paragraph 47).
- 2.3.27 For the reasons given above, there are strong grounds to depart from [AA](#)’s assessment of Article 15(c). Parts of Anbar that Daesh no longer occupies

(including the Fallujah, Heet and Ramadi districts), Diyala, Kirkuk (except Hawija and the surrounding areas) and Salah al-Din no longer meet the threshold of Article 15(c). Ninewah and most of Anbar, however, still meets the threshold of Article 15(c).

- 2.3.28 In areas where there is no general Article 15(c) risk, decision makers must consider whether the person has any circumstances which might nevertheless place them at such risk.
- 2.3.29 For guidance on assessing risk, see [Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#) and for guidance on Article 15(c), including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#).

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2.4 Internal relocation

- 2.4.1 In general, a person can relocate to areas which do not meet the threshold of Article 15(c) and/or where they would not face humanitarian conditions sufficient to breach Articles 15(a) and (b) of the Qualification Directive/Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. For further information and guidance, see the [Country Policy Information Note \(CPIN\) on Return/internal relocation](#).
- 2.4.2 For guidance on internal relocation, see the [Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

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2.1 Certification

- 2.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
- 2.1.2 For guidance on certification, see the [Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 \(clearly unfounded claims\)](#).

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3. Policy Summary

3.1 Humanitarian situation

- 3.1.1 In general, humanitarian conditions in Iraq are not so severe as to make return a breach of Articles 15(a) and (b) of the Qualification Directive/Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. However, decision makers must consider each case on its merits. In particular decision makers must consider:
- where the person is from (as humanitarian conditions are more severe in some areas, and this may also impact on whether the person becomes an IDP on return, if they were not already prior to leaving the country);
 - a person's individual profile, including, but not limited to, their age, gender and ethnicity;
 - whether the person can access a support network

- 3.1.2 If a person faces a real risk of serious harm based on the humanitarian situation, they may be able to relocate elsewhere in Iraq.
- 3.1.3 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

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3.2 Security situation

- 3.2.1 In the Country Guidance case of [AA](#), which considered evidence up to April 2015, the Upper Tribunal found that in areas of Iraq indiscriminate violence was at such a level that substantial grounds existed for believing that a person, solely by being present there for any length of time, faced a real risk of harm which threatened their life or person (thereby engaging Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive). These areas were:
- Anbar;
 - Diyala;
 - Kirkuk (aka Tam'in);
 - Ninewah;
 - Salah al-Din; and
 - the parts of the 'Baghdad Belts' (the urban environs around Baghdad City) that border Anbar, Diyala and Salah al-Din
- 3.2.2 However, the situation has changed since then. Parts of Anbar that Daesh no longer controls or contests (including the Fallujah, Heet and Ramadi districts), Diyala, Kirkuk (except Hawija and the surrounding areas) and Salah al-Din no longer meet the threshold of Article 15(c). Ninewah and most of Anbar, however, still meets the threshold of Article 15(c).
- 3.2.3 However, decision makers should consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person's individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at enhanced risk.
- 3.2.4 In general, a person can relocate to the areas which do not meet the threshold of Article 15(c).
- 3.2.5 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

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Country Information

Updated: 22 February 2017

4. Demography

- 4.1.1 In July 2015, the US State Department (USSD) estimated Iraq's population at 37 million.¹ The World Bank put the population at 36.42 million in 2015.² The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated the population at 38.15 million in July 2016.³
- 4.1.2 Iraq is divided into 19 governorates (provinces). The Central Statistics Organization, part of Iraq's Ministry of Planning, broke down the population of each governorate as follows⁴:

Governorate/province	Population (2009 estimate)
Anbar	1,451,583
Babil	1,727,032
Baghdad	7,180,889
Basra	2,555,542
Diyala	1,370,537
Dohuk	968,901
Erbil	1,471,053
Kerbala	1,003,516
Kirkuk (aka Tam'in)	1,290,072
Missan	1,009,565
Muthanna	719,824
Najaf	1,180,681
Ninewah	3,237,918
Qadisiyah	1,121,782
Thi-Qar	1,846,788
Salah al-Din	1,258,298
Sulamaniyah	1,551,974

¹ US State Department (USSD), International Religious Freedom Report for 2015 – Iraq, Section 1. Religious Demography, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2015&dliid=256267>, accessed 21 February 2017

² World Bank, World DataBank, Iraq, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=IRQ&series=&period=>, accessed 21 February 2017

³ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, Middle East: Iraq, 21 December 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>, accessed 4 January 2017

⁴ Halabja became a governorate (province) in 2014. Previously it was part of Sulamaniyah.

Wasit	1,158,033 ⁵
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4.1.3 The total population estimate from the above data is 32.1 million, which is lower than other population estimates. This is because Government figures are based on the number of ration cards in Iraq, and there are many Iraqis who do not have ration cards. Iraq is due to have a census every ten years but it has been continually postponed because of the violence in the country; the last official census was held in 1987, which showed a population of just over 16 million.⁶ The Ministry of Planning's own population estimate is 37.9 million, which more or less correlates with estimates made by other sources (see 4.1.1).⁷

4.1.4 See [Annex A](#) for a map of Iraq.

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5. Conflict in Iraq: 2003 to present

5.1.1 To see how the conflict has evolved, see the [BBC's timeline of events](#).

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6. Protagonists

6.1 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

6.1.1 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, in a briefing updated 21 October 2016, explained:

'The army, founded in 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to replace the Saddam-era military, has been expanded in more recent times from 10 divisions to 14.

'The IA [Iraqi Army] has become increasingly effective with the aid of US training and mentoring. However with the complete withdrawal of US forces in late 2011 the IA now operates with complete independence.

'The army consists primarily of light infantry. The move to develop IA armoured elements was boosted after combat operations in 2004, when the intensity of combat needed to assault rebel-held cities such as Najaf, Samarra and Fallujah required armoured support from US units. In order to give the Iraqis their own capability in conducting high intensity warfighting operations, it was decided to launch a mechanised brigade as part of the 9th Division, the move that led to the development of what is now the 9th Armoured Division.

'The withdrawal of coalition forces has presented its own challenges for Iraqi Army. In 2008, coalition training teams deployed with IA units were being

⁵ Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Tables, Iraq's governorates by area and their relative share of area and population 1997, 2009, <http://cosit.gov.iq/en/population-manpower-statistics/life>, accessed 21 February 2017

⁶ Niqash, 'Counting Iraqis – why there may never be a census again', 20 June 2013, <http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/3238/>, accessed 4 January 2017

⁷ Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, demographic indicators, population estimation, <http://cosit.gov.iq/en/rtl-support>, accessed 21 February 2017

reinforced with logistics personnel as part of a move to ensure that Iraqi units can support themselves logistically in the field. One of the challenges facing the IA is to achieve the logistical support and aerial support that it would need to carry out operations independently. As part of the process of developing the army's capability to operate independently, there has been a major drive to develop the army's command, control, communications and intelligence infrastructure. An important development has been the delivery, in 2010-11, of 140 M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks (MBT), which should greatly enhance the capabilities of the army's sole armoured division.

'The army has been building up its artillery capabilities. In 2009 plans were formulated to add a field artillery regiment to each division. Meanwhile, the army has been taking delivery of 155 mm howitzers, both towed and self-propelled. Iraqi artillery officers have been undergoing training at the Iraqi Field Artillery School in Abu Ghraib. US instructors have also provided fire finder radar system training, to enable Iraqi personnel to detect and track incoming artillery and rocket fire.

'The Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) are a highly competent and effective element of the land forces but they do not come under army command.

'The future of joint units in the IA was thrown into further doubt in June 2013, when it was reported that over 1,000 career ethnic Kurdish soldiers defected from the army to the Peshmerga. The troops, from the 16th Armoured Brigade, apparently refused orders during a military operation in Sulaiman Bek against suspected Sunni insurgents, and requested to join the KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government]'s forces instead.'⁸

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6.2 Kurdish Peshmerga

6.2.1 The Peshmerga are the armed units of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), formed to resist the central government in Baghdad.⁹

6.2.2 A 2015 report on the Kurds by the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior commented:

'In 2009 the KDP and the PUK created the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs whose aim was to centralize administrative tasks and establish joint KDP-PUK brigades commanded by officers graduated from a military academy. However, the new ministry was not able to fulfill its tasks against the partisan politicians due to the lack of political support. Thus when the Iraqi-Kurdish region was confronted with the emergence of IS [Islamic State – Daesh], the Peshmerga forces were not a unified army at all.'¹⁰

⁸ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Iraq – Executive Summary, 26 October 2016, subscription required, accessed 9 January 2017. Available on request.

⁹ Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, 'The Kurds: History, Religion, Language, Politics', 2015, p.149, http://www.bfa.gv.at/files/broschueren/KURDS_Monographie_2015_11.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

¹⁰ Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, 'The Kurds: History, Religion, Language, Politics', p.149, 2015, http://www.bfa.gv.at/files/broschueren/KURDS_Monographie_2015_11.pdf, accessed 9

6.2.3 The 2015 USSD's human rights report noted:

'Under the federal constitution, the Kurdistan Regional Government has the right to maintain regional guard brigades, supported financially by the central government but under the regional government's control. Accordingly, the KRG established a Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. There are 12 infantry brigades under the authority of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, but the PUK and KDP controlled tens of thousands of additional military personnel.'¹¹

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6.3 Daesh

6.3.1 Daesh are also known as IS (Islamic State), ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). Daesh is the name used by the UK Government.¹²

6.3.2 Daesh are an Islamic jihadist insurgent group which emerged from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In December 2013 the group took control of Fallujah before capturing Mosul, Iraq's third-biggest city, in June 2014, advanced towards Baghdad and declared the creation of an Islamic Caliphate.¹³ However, in 2015 and 2016 Daesh suffered setbacks as Iraqi government forces and their allies regained control of some territory (see [Control of territory](#)). For further background see the [BBC profile on Daesh](#).

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6.4 Other Sunni anti-government groups

6.4.1 Although Daesh are the main insurgent group in Iraq, other Sunni anti-government groups included Jaysh Rijal-al Tariqah al-Naqshabandia (JRTN); the General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries; the Iraq Ba'ath Party; the Fallujah Military Council; the Council of Revolutionaries Tribes of Anbar; the 1920 Brigades; the Islamic Army of Iraq; Jayish al-Mujahidin and Ansar al-Islam.¹⁴

6.4.2 For further information, see [Country Information and Guidance – Iraq: Ba'athists](#)

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January 2017

¹¹ US State Department (USSD), Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 – Iraq, Section 1: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dliid=252925>, accessed 21 February 2017

¹² Gov.uk, 'Daesh: UK government response', <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/daesh>, accessed 9 January 2017

¹³ BBC News, 'What is "Islamic State?"', 2 December 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052144>, accessed 9 January 2017

¹⁴ Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 'Beyond The Islamic State: Iraq's Sunni Insurgency', October 2014, p.9, <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/beyond-islamic-state-iraqs-sunni-insurgency>, accessed 9 January 2017

6.5 Shia militia

- 6.5.1 There are also Shia militias operating in Iraq. A September 2015 Congressional Research Service report stated that estimates of the total Shia militiamen in Iraq number about 110,000-120,000.¹⁵ The main armed Shia groups operating in Iraq were the Badr Brigades; the Mahdi Army; Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hizbullah.¹⁶
- 6.5.2 For further information on the Shia militia, see [Country Information and Guidance – Iraq: Sunni \(Arab\) Muslims](#)

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7. General living standards and conditions

- 7.1.1 In 2015 (the latest assessment), the UN Human Development Index, which measures length and health of life, level of education and standard of living, ranked Iraq as 121st out of 188 countries, in the category of 'medium human development'.¹⁷
- 7.1.2 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s World Economic Outlook, issued in October 2016, noted that 'higher-than-expected oil production has pushed up the projected growth for 2016'. From a decline of 2.4% of GDP in 2015, it was projected as 10.3% rise in 2016, and a 0.5% rise in 2017.¹⁸
- 7.1.3 Using 2015 data (their latest at the time of writing), the UN Development Programme noted that:
- 99% of government revenue comes from oil, but only 1% of Iraqis are employed in the oil industry;
 - 40% of people are employed in the public sector (45% in urban areas, 28% in rural areas)
 - 17% of the workforce are women;
 - 11% of people (653,000 people) are unemployed (7% of men; 13% of women, with youth unemployment (15-24 year olds) at 18%, and higher among the higher-educated);
 - 23% of people live on less than US\$ 2.2 a day;
 - 75% of surveyed Iraqis identified poverty as their most pressing concern¹⁹
- 7.1.4 The UN categorised the situation in Iraq as a Level 3 emergency. Level 3 emergencies are defined as 'the global humanitarian system's classification

¹⁵ Congressional Research Service (CRS), 'Iraq: Politics, Security, and US Policy', 16 September 2015, p.17, <https://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>,

¹⁶ Amnesty International, 'Iraq: Absolute impunity: militia rule in Iraq', 14 October 2014, p.17, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/absolute_impunity_iraq_report.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

¹⁷ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Index (HDI), <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>, accessed 4 January 2017. The HDI uses four categories of human development: very high, high, medium and low.

¹⁸ International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, October 2016, pp.23, 46, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/pdf/text.pdf>, accessed 21 February 2017

¹⁹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 'About Iraq', <http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/countryinfo.html>, accessed 4 January 2017

for the response to the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises'.²⁰ See: [Humanitarian situation: general](#)

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8. Humanitarian situation: general

For the latest data and information, see the [UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(OCHA\)'s Humanitarian Response webpage on Iraq](#).

8.1 Numbers of people in need

- 8.1.1 In August 2015 the OCHA's assessment was that 8.2 million needed humanitarian assistance.²¹ In January 2017 the OCHA revised that figure upwards to 10 million.²²

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8.2 Projected numbers of people in need

- 8.2.1 The OCHA assessed, in December 2016, that 11 million people will need humanitarian assistance in 2017. This figure includes:

- 3 million host communities;
- 1.9 million returnees;
- 400,000 of current returnees;
- 4.2 million IDPs, of which:
 - 3.1 million are currently displaced;
 - 1.1 million may be displaced from Mosul and the surrounding areas;
 - 100,000 may be displaced from Hawija²³

- 8.2.2 The OCHA also explained that the 11 million number represents the 'aggregate' rather than the 'absolute' number of people: 'In some cases, a single person is counted several times in determining the overall level of

²⁰ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 'Where we work: Emergencies', undated, <http://www.unocha.org/where-we-work/emergencies>, accessed 4 January 2017

²¹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Needs Overview 2015, 12 August 2015, p.2, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/2015_iraq_humanitarian_needs_overview_0.pdf, accessed 5 January 2017

²² Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, December 2016 (issued 15 January 2017), p.1, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/ocha_iraq_humanitarian_bulletin_december_2016.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

²³ Of these, it is estimated that 1.1 million will live in camps and 3.1 million in host communities. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, pp.6-8, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

need. This reflects the complex reality of Iraq and the changing vulnerabilities many Iraqis are expected to experience during the year'.²⁴

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8.3 Location of people in need (projected numbers)

8.3.1 The following table, using November 2016 data from the OCHA, breaks down the location of those projected to need humanitarian assistance, in order of numbers:

Governorate	Numbers in need
Ninewah	3,294,000
Anbar	1,858,000
Salah al-Din	1,227,000
Erbil	1,097,000
Kirkuk	967,000
Dohuk	798,000
Baghdad	650,000
Diyala	484,000
Sulamaniyah	245,000
Babil	114,000
Najaf	94,000
Kerbala	88,000
Wasit	46,000
Qaddisiyah	35,000
Basra	10,000
Thi-Qar	9,000
Muthanna	6,000
Missan	5,000

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
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²⁴ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, pp.6-8, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

²⁵ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.2, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

8.4 Severity of need by location (projected numbers)

8.4.1 The below map, from the OCHA, shows the areas of Iraq in which people will need humanitarian assistance, with indicators of severity of need:



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8.5 Vulnerable groups

8.5.1 The OCHA, in December 2016, noted that there were 15 million people living in conflict-affected areas, 1.4 million of whom they assessed as 'highly vulnerable'.²⁷

8.5.2 The OCHA also projected that 8.9 million people would be in need of 'protection' assistance in 2017. Such people were described as at risk in

²⁶ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.10, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

²⁷ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.6, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

unsafe locations, from explosive hazards and mines, and of more specific forms of violence, such as gender-based violence.²⁸

8.5.3 The OCHA also noted that, of the 11 million people who may need humanitarian assistance:

- 5.1 million (48%) are children;
- 597,000 (5%) are elderly (defined as 59 and older);
- 50% are female; and
- 300,000 are resident in areas not under Government control, primarily in west Anbar²⁹

8.5.4 The OCHA noted that 2.1 million people are in need of a humanitarian 'rapid response'. These people are described as those 'on the move, in hard-to-reach areas, caught at checkpoints or stranded close to the front lines'.³⁰

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8.6 Employment and financial security

8.6.1 In a report dated December 2016, the OCHA stated:

'Three years of continuous conflict and economic stagnation have impacted nearly every aspect of Iraqi society. Poverty rates in Kurdistan have doubled and unemployment has trebled in many communities. Payrolls for government employees have been cut or delayed...and hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to migrate to urban areas for jobs and support'.³¹

8.6.2 OCHA stated that 4.7 million were in need of 'emergency livelihood' support and that 2.2 million needed 'multi-purpose cash assistance'.³²

8.6.3 For employment and financial security needs of IDPs specifically, see [Humanitarian situation: Internally Displaced Persons \(IDPs\) – Employment and financial security](#)

²⁸ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.15, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

²⁹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, pp.6-8, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

³⁰ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.23, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

³¹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.4, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

³² Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, pp. 22-24, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

8.7 Food security

- 8.7.1 The OCHA, in a report dated December 2016, noted that 2.9 million people were food insecure and 'forced to rely on severe and often irreversible coping strategies'.³³ This figure was revised upwards from April 2016, when it was assessed as 2.4 million.³⁴
- 8.7.2 The report continued: 'Agricultural production has declined by 40 per cent, undermining the country's food sufficiency'.³⁵
- 8.7.3 For food security needs of IDPs specifically, see [Humanitarian situation: Internally Displaced Persons \(IDPs\) – Food security](#)

8.8 Health and healthcare

- 8.8.1 The UN Development Programme (2015 data) noted that:
- the average household is just over 20 minutes away from their nearest health facility;
 - 2 out of 3 Iraqis have a negative opinion of health services;
 - the proportion of children dying in the first year of birth has dropped from 50 to 35 per 1000 live births³⁶
- 8.8.2 The OCHA, in December 2016, noted that 10.3 million people were in need of health care.³⁷ This figure was revised upwards from 8.5 million in April 2016.³⁸
- 8.8.3 In a report dated December 2016, the OCHA stated: 'The number of health consultations performed in health clinics has increased eightfold and around 23 hospitals and more than 230 primary health facilities have been damaged or destroyed'.³⁹

³³ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.4, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

³⁴ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraq: Humanitarian Dashboard (as of 30 April 2016), p.1, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/january_-_april_2016_humanitarian_dashboard_-_20160531.pdf, accessed 5 January 2017

³⁵ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.4, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

³⁶ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Iraq, <http://www.iq.undp.org/>, accessed 4 January 2017

³⁷ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.4, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

³⁸ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraq: Humanitarian Dashboard (as of 30 April 2016), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/january_-_april_2016_humanitarian_dashboard_-_20160531.pdf, accessed 5 January 2017

³⁹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan,

- 8.8.4 For health needs of IDPs specifically, see [Humanitarian situation: Internally Displaced Persons \(IDPs\) – Health and healthcare](#)

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8.9 Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)

- 8.9.1 The OCHA, in December 2016, noted that 8.3 million people were in need of water and sanitation.⁴⁰
- 8.9.2 For WASH needs of IDPs specifically, see [Humanitarian situation: Internally Displaced Persons \(IDPs\) – Water, Sanitation and hygiene \(WASH\)](#)

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8.10 Education

- 8.10.1 The OCHA, in December 2016, noted that 3.5 million children were in need of education support.⁴¹ In April 2016 the OCHA noted that there were 2 million children (out of 10 million) out of school.⁴²
- 8.10.2 In a report dated December 2016, the OCHA stated: ‘Schools in the governorates impacted by ISIL [Daesh] are forced to convene three sequential sessions to cope with the increased number of students. Nearly 3.5 million school-aged Iraqi children attend school irregularly, or not at’.⁴³
- 8.10.3 For education needs of IDPs specifically, see [Humanitarian situation: Internally Displaced Persons \(IDPs\) – Education](#)

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8.11 Evictions

- 8.11.1 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in their November 2016 paper on returns, noted: ‘According to reports, local authorities, security forces and tribes in several areas ordered the eviction and expulsion of whole families from their home areas on account of their or other family members’ real or perceived ISIS affiliation’.⁴⁴

Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.4,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

⁴⁰ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.4,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

⁴¹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.4,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

⁴² Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraq: Humanitarian Dashboard (as of 30 April 2016), p.1, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/january_-_april_2016_humanitarian_dashboard_-_20160531.pdf, accessed 17 August 2016

⁴³ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.4,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

⁴⁴ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNCHR Position on Returns to Iraq, 14 November

- 8.11.2 The OCHA noted that more than 6,000 people, from Anbar, Diyala and Salah al-Din, were forcibly expelled from Kirkuk in October 2016. However, the source also noted that since late October, evictions ‘significantly decreased’.⁴⁵

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8.12 Mosul operation

- 8.12.1 The OCHA, in December 2016, stated:

‘Military sources confirm that as many as 500,000 civilians remain in the central and eastern part of the city [Mosul] and that close to 700,000 are concentrated in the densely populated western sections. Nearly every accessible family, whether displaced or resident in their homes, is vulnerable. Without emergency support, these families will be unable to survive. Conditions in retaken areas are difficult. Buildings and infrastructure are damaged, services have been cut, supplies are irregular and many areas are contaminated by explosive hazards. Families who opt to stay in their homes require life-saving food support, water, health care and specialized protection assistance. During the first two months of the military campaign, more than 339,000 vulnerable people in and out of camps have been reached with emergency response packages containing food, water and hygiene items within 48 hours of areas being retaken.’⁴⁶

- 8.12.2 The source noted that up to 1.5 million people are likely to require some form of humanitarian assistance in Mosul, including 500,000 who may flee and 850,000 who are likely to remain in their homes.⁴⁷

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9. Humanitarian situation: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

For the latest data and information, see the [International Organisation for Migration \(IOM\)’s Displacement Tracking Matrix](#) and the [UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(OCHA\)’s Humanitarian Response webpage on Iraq](#).

2016, para 25, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/58299e694.html>, accessed 9 January 2016

⁴⁵ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, November 2016 (issued 10 December 2016), p.3, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/document/iraq-humanitarian-bulletin-november-2016-issued-10-december>, accessed 6 January 2017

⁴⁶ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.5, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

⁴⁷ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.30, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

9.1 Numbers

9.1.1 As of 2 February 2017, the IOM identified that 3,030,006 individuals (505,001 families) were displaced in Iraq after January 2014, dispersed across 106 districts and 3,661 locations.⁴⁸ This represented a decline from July 2016, when the IOM identified 3,369,252 individuals (561,542 families) displaced in Iraq, dispersed across 105 districts and 3,823 locations.⁴⁹

9.1.2 Between 5 January and 2 February 2017, the IOM found that:

- the overall displaced population increased by 1%;
- the displaced populations in Ninewah and Salah al-Din increased (by 13% and 3% respectively) due to military operations in Salah al-Din, Hawija (Kirkuk) and Ninewah;
- most governorates reported a decrease in displacement – particularly in Anbar (7%) and Baghdad (4%).⁵⁰

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9.2 Projected numbers

9.2.1 The OCHA, in December 2016, projected that the number of IDPs in 2017 may reach 4.2 million. This figure is based on 'Government plans, military projections and assessments during the final months of 2016'.⁵¹

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9.3 Location

9.3.1 The IOM provided the following map showing the location of displaced families:


⁴⁸ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Iraq Mission, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 64, February 2017, p.1, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & Publications], accessed 21 February 2017

⁴⁹ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 50, July 2016, p.3, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & publications], accessed 4 January 2017

⁵⁰ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Iraq Mission, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 64, February 2017, p.1, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & Publications], accessed 21 February 2017

⁵¹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, pp.6-8, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

Map showing location of displaced families in Iraq, February 2017



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9.3.2 The following table, using November 2016 data from IOM, shows the number of IDPs hosted in each of Iraq's governorates:

Governorate	IDP families	IDP individuals	% of all IDPs in Iraq
Anbar	41,590	249,540	8%
Babil	7,720	46,320	2%
Baghdad	62,965	377,790	12%
Basra	1,768	10,608	0%
Diyala	13,286	79,716	3%
Dohuk	65,989	395,934	13%
Erbil	57,633	345,798	11%
Kerbala	10,936	65,616	2%
Kirkuk	62,829	376,974	12%
Missan	894	5,364	0%
Muthanna	774	4,644	0%
Najaf	13,092	78,552	3%

⁵² International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Iraq Mission, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 64, February 2017, p.2, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & Publications], accessed 21 February 2017

Ninewah	76,961	461,766	15%
Qadissiyah	4,004	24,024	1%
Salah al-Din	54,2012	325,212	11%
Sulamaniyah	25,542	153,252	5%
Thi-Qar	1,391	8,346	0%
Wassit	4,386	26,316	1%


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9.4 Origin

9.4.1 The IOM provided the following map showing the origin of displaced families:

Map showing origin of displaced families, February 2017



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⁵³ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Iraq Mission, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 64, February 2017, p.3, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & Publications], accessed 21 February 2017

⁵⁴ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Iraq Mission, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 64, February 2017, p.4, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & Publications], accessed 21 February 2017

9.4.2 There are eight governorates from which all of Iraq's IDPs originate. The following table, using February 2017 data from the IOM, shows the how many IDPs originate from each of these eight governorates:

Governorate	Individuals	Those displaced within the governorate ⁵⁵	% of all IDPs in Iraq
Anbar	822,714	241,260 (29%)	27%
Babil	29,226	14,862 (51%)	1%
Baghdad	43,332	22,608 (52%)	1%
Diyala	102,390	66,492 (65%)	3%
Erbil	16,038	16,008 (99.8%)	1%
Kirkuk	227,154	164,662 (72%)	7%
Ninewah	1,327,230	438,294 (33%)	44%
Salah al-Din	461,922	264,510 (57%)	15%

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
9.5 Shelter types

The following map showed displaced populations by shelter types:

⁵⁵ Most IDPs remain in their governorate of origin. The exceptions to this are IDPs from Anbar, 71% of whom are scattered throughout Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulamaniyah (although more remain within Anbar than in any individual governorate) and IDPs from Ninewah, 67% of whom are scattered throughout Iraq (with 42% in the KRI, particularly in Dohuk (30%)). See International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Iraq Mission, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 64, February 2017, p.5, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & Publications], accessed 21 February 2017

⁵⁶ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Iraq Mission, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 64, February 2017, p.5, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & Publications], accessed 21 February 2017

Map showing shelter types used by displaced people in Iraq



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9.5.1 The same source observed that:

- the majority of identified IDPs (61%, or 1,853,892 individuals) are reportedly housed in private dwellings. Of the total IDP population, 46% (1,387,518) are living in rented houses, 16% (456,432) are with host families, and less than 1% (9,942) are in hotels/motels;
- 16%, or 495,840 individuals, are in critical shelters. Of these, 8% (245,802) are in unfurnished buildings, 4% (127,614) are in informal settlements, 3% (98,682) are in religious buildings, and 1% (17,328) are in school buildings;

⁵⁷ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Iraq Mission, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 64, February 2017, p.8, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & Publications], accessed 21 February 2017

- IDPs living in camps represent 20% of the total IDP population (603,084 individuals). Those who shelter arrangements are unknown represent 3% of the total IDP population (77,190).⁵⁸

9.5.2 The OCHA, in December 2016, noted that 4.7 million people need 'shelter and non-food items'. It also noted that 2.7 million people are in need of 'camp coordination and camp management' support.⁵⁹

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9.6 Number of returnees and places of return

9.6.1 The following table from the IOM shows the governorates of Iraq to where previous IDPs have returned:

Governorate of return	District of return	Families	Individuals
Anbar	Al-Rutba	1,700	10,200
Anbar	Falluja	43,633	261,798
Anbar	Haditha	1,631	9,786
Anbar	Heet	16,469	98,814
Anbar	Ramadi	48,224	289,344
Anbar Total		111,657	669,942
Baghdad	Abu Ghraib	1,278	7,668
Baghdad	Kadhimia	1,294	7,764
Baghdad	Mahmoudiya	2,606	15,636
Baghdad Total		5,178	31,068
Diyala	Al-Khalis	11,662	69,972
Diyala	Al-Muqdadia	8,006	48,036
Diyala	Khanaqin	13,676	82,056
Diyala	Kifri	200	1,200
Diyala Total		33,544	201,264
Erbil	Makhmur	4,837	29,022
Erbil Total		4,837	29,022
Kirkuk	Daquq	161	966
Kirkuk	Kirkuk	413	2,478
Kirkuk Total		574	3,444
Ninewa	Al-Hamdaniya	167	1,002
Ninewa	Mosul	8,025	48,150
Ninewa	Sinjar	4,861	29,166
Ninewa	Telafar	14,765	88,590
Ninewa	Tilkaif	3,239	19,434
Ninewa Total		31,057	186,342
Salah al-Din	Al-Daur	9,106	54,636
Salah al-Din	Al-Fares	1,053	6,318
Salah al-Din	Al-Shirqat	5,810	34,860
Salah al-Din	Baiji	4,701	28,206
Salah al-Din	Balad	4,663	27,978
Salah al-Din	Samarra	7,334	44,004
Salah al-Din	Tikrit	28,625	171,750
Salah al-Din	Tooz	1,188	7,128
Salah al-Din Total		62,480	374,880
Total		249,327	1,495,962

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⁵⁸ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Iraq Mission, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 64, February 2017, p.8, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & Publications], accessed 21 February 2017

⁵⁹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, pp.19-20, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

⁶⁰ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Iraq Mission, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 64, February 2017, p.11, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & Publications], accessed 21 February 2017

- 9.6.2 The IOM observed that, between 5 January and 2 February 2017, the returnee population increased by 7%. Most returns were to Anbar (which saw a 12% increase), particularly towards Fallujah, Heet and Ramadi districts.⁶¹

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9.7 Coercion to return

- 9.7.1 The UNHCR, in their November 2016 paper on returns, noted:

‘As areas are retaken from ISIS, IDPs, particularly Sunni Arabs, reportedly face mounting pressure if not outright coercion from local authorities to return to their areas of origin. Reported means of pressure employed include, inter alia, notifications with deadlines to leave, harassment, forcible evictions, confiscation of identity documents, arrests for lack of legal documentation or under the Anti-Terrorism Law, and increasingly, destruction of homes and immediate forced returns to areas of origin or forced relocation to IDP camps. Such returns carry a high risk of secondary displacement.’⁶²

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9.8 Prevention of returns

- 9.8.1 While in cases people have been coerced to return to their area of origin, there are also reports that people are prevented from returning home. The UNHCR, in their November 2016 paper on returns, also observed that:

‘...individuals, families or tribes suspected of having been affiliated with ISIS have been prevented from returning to their areas of origin. In some instances, Kurdish security forces and forces affiliated with the PMU [Popular Mobilisation Units – Shia militia] have also been accused of deliberately destroying Sunni Arab and Sunni Turkmen villages in reprisal acts and/or to prevent returns in order to consolidate control over an Area. For example, the entire population of the Sunni Arab town of Jurf Al-Sakhr (Babel Governorate, estimated population of 70,000 to 80,000) has reportedly been barred from returning by the ISF and forces affiliated with the PMUs. Militiamen were also reportedly seen burning down homes in the town after it was retaken from ISIS in late October 2014. Local authorities and tribes have reportedly also banned the return of families or tribes identified as having been associated with ISIS.’⁶³

- 9.8.2 The source added:

‘Returnees must undergo security screening and obtain approval to return from various local actors in return areas, including the military force controlling the area, local authorities and tribes. In some areas, returns have

⁶¹ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Iraq Mission, Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round 64, February 2017, p.10, <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/> [Last DTM Rounds & Publications], accessed 21 February 2017

⁶² UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNCHR Position on Returns to Iraq, 14 November 2016, para 30, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/58299e694.html>, accessed 20 February 2017

⁶³ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNCHR Position on Returns to Iraq, 14 November 2016, para 25, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/58299e694.html>, accessed 9 January 2017

been delayed by local actors who assert that the areas first need to be fully secured and demined and services re-established. However, returns have reportedly also been prevented on the basis of discriminatory criteria, including on account of IDPs' ethnic/religious profile and/or perceived political opinion.⁶⁴

- 9.8.3 The OCHA, in December 2016, observed: 'Efforts by local authorities to move families to their original homes, even if conditions for safe, voluntary, dignified returns are not yet in place, are expected to accelerate as soon as ISIL is expelled from Mosul, Hawiga and Tel Afar. Early projections suggest that as many as 1.5 million to 2 million people will be encouraged to return to their areas of origin in 2017'.⁶⁵

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9.9 Conditions in places of return

- 9.9.1 The UNHCR, in their November 2016 paper on returns, observed that spontaneous returns to previous Daesh-held areas are taking place 'despite conditions not being suitable for returns in safety and dignity'. The source continued:

'ISIS has reportedly routinely mined and booby-trapped homes, public places and roads in areas from which it has retreated, and as a result casualties among returnees have been reported. Returnees are often faced with destruction, damage or secondary occupation of homes, damaged or non-existent basic infrastructure, slow restoration of basic services and lack of livelihood opportunities. Protection monitoring in IDP camps indicates that a substantial number of IDP families prefer not to return to their areas of origin until services such as water, electricity, schools and medical facilities are restored. IDPs also expressed concerns over threats to security they would face upon return, including by ISIS, or the ISF and associated forces.'⁶⁶

- 9.9.2 The source added:

'In areas retaken from ISIS, forces affiliated with the PMUs, tribal groups and Kurdish security forces have reportedly engaged in widespread reprisal acts against Sunni Arab and Turkmen inhabitants and returnees on account of their real or perceived support for or affiliation with ISIS. Reported abuses include arbitrary arrest and abduction, forced disappearance, extra-judicial killing, forced displacement and the looting and deliberate burning and destruction of homes, shops and mosques, and, in some cases, the deliberate destruction of whole villages. In Sinjar District (Ninewa), Yazidi

⁶⁴ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNCHR Position on Returns to Iraq, 14 November 2016, para 38, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/58299e694.html>, accessed 9 January 2016

⁶⁵ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, November 2016 (issued 10 December 2016), 16 December 2016, p. 4, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/document/iraq-humanitarian-bulletin-november-2016-issued-10-december>, accessed 20 February 2017

⁶⁶ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNCHR Position on Returns to Iraq, 14 November 2016, paras 36-37, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/58299e694.html>, accessed 9 January 2016

self-defence groups have reportedly also been implicated in retaliatory attacks against Sunni Arab civilians, including women and children.⁶⁷

For further information and guidance, see [Country Information and Guidance – Iraq: Sunni \(Arab\) Muslims](#)

9.9.3 The OCHA, in December 2016, observed:

‘The conditions facing returning families vary enormously. Some return areas are contaminated by explosive hazards. Public infrastructure and private housing have been destroyed and damaged in at least half of all retaken areas. Essential services are available in only some districts and there are very few employment opportunities until local economies start to take off. Many families expect compensation. Acts of retaliation continue to fuel social tensions, particularly in communities where local populations are perceived as having supported ISIL.’⁶⁸

9.9.4 The source also noted: ‘Plans to rebuild both Fallujah and Ramadi are underway, but progress is moderate due to the lack of equipment to remove the rubble and the likely presence of improvised explosive devices. While rebuilding work is ongoing, humanitarian partners are planning to install units containing a tent, a water tank and essential cooking kits inside the houses that need rehabilitation’.⁶⁹

9.9.5 In Fallujah food availability is low, although most schools are undamaged and basic services are in place. Humanitarian partners continue to provide assistance in the camps around Fallujah.⁷⁰

9.9.6 The OCHA, in January 2017, observed:

‘Despite a strong preference amongst displaced families to return home at their earliest opportunity, returnee communities continue to have high humanitarian needs, especially in areas that have sustained a high level of infrastructural damage, like Fallujah and Ramadi. Clearing rubble and mines and other unexploded ordnance is proving a slow process, as is the restoration of public services. Amongst people opting to remain in displacement, damage to property and risks from unexploded ordnance are high on the list of reasons for remaining where they are.

‘A lack of livelihood opportunities is also high on the list of reasons to remain in displacement. Common means of employment like agriculture and local

⁶⁷ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNCHR Position on Returns to Iraq, 14 November 2016, para 23, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/58299e694.html>, accessed 9 January 2016

⁶⁸ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.5, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 22 February 2017

⁶⁹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, November 2016 (issued 10 December 2016), 16 December 2016, p. 4, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/document/iraq-humanitarian-bulletin-november-2016-issued-10-december>, accessed 6 January 2017

⁷⁰ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, November 2016 (issued 10 December 2016), 16 December 2016, p. 4, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/document/iraq-humanitarian-bulletin-november-2016-issued-10-december>, accessed 6 January 2017

enterprise have both been severely affected by conflict, not least by displacement and the ongoing presence of unexploded ordnance in farming areas, hampering the re-cultivation of the land. According to recent reports, government employees are returning to work and most families in Fallujah, Ramadi and Heet have at least one family member in employment.

‘Vulnerable families like female-headed households are particularly hard-hit by the shortage of employment opportunities. Trade routes have been re-established and the price of staple foodstuffs has stabilized, but the lack of sufficient income has led to some families borrowing money. The first groups of returnees include people who have exhausted their savings while in displacement, who are particularly vulnerable to the shortage of livelihood options. Their financial predicament is further compounded by the cost of repairing property and accessing private healthcare where state services have not yet caught up, causing them to go increasingly into debt, or become reliant on friends and family.

‘In return areas humanitarian partners are collaborating with authorities and stabilization actors to meet needs across the spectrum. Efforts are being made to provide vulnerable families with the humanitarian assistance they require while in the early stages of re-establishing their lives.

‘In the meantime, humanitarian needs among the displaced population remain high with newly arrived people from Ninewa, Kirkuk and people displaced by insecurity in Ana, Ru’ua and Ka’im districts in western Anbar. Humanitarian partners are providing emergency response to new arrivals and service provision continues in camps and settlements. However, partners have reported challenges in mobilizing resources to sustain the response.’⁷¹

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9.10 Overview of priority needs

9.10.1 The organisation REACH, in their humanitarian survey of June 2016, interviewed 4,573 IDP households across the country (although not in Anbar and Kirkuk).⁷² The following table shows REACH’s findings of priority needs amongst IDPs:

⁷¹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, December 2016 (issued 15 January 2017), p.4, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/ocha_iraq_humanitarian_bulletin_december_2016.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

⁷² REACH, ‘Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps’, Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p. 6, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

Table 1: Top three priority needs, by governorate

Governorate	Food	Employment	Medical care	Clothing	Shelter	Education	Psychosocial support	Sanitation	Water	Vocational training	Documentation
Babylon	50%	51%	8%	39%	6%	16%	3%	4%	3%	3%	1%
Baghdad	73%	54%	54%	6%	9%	13%	0%	0%	3%	0%	6%
Basrah	81%	68%	16%	7%	60%	22%	2%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Dahuk	77%	35%	51%	17%	10%	22%	3%	7%	7%	1%	3%
Diyala	85%	27%	65%	10%	21%	15%	4%	2%	13%	2%	0%
Erbil	68%	79%	46%	7%	6%	11%	20%	1%	0%	4%	2%
Kerbala	47%	65%	1%	38%	3%	31%	7%	1%	0%	3%	3%
Missan	49%	57%	14%	0%	0%	18%	27%	0%	1%	26%	10%
Muthanna	74%	55%	68%	26%	4%	2%	3%	6%	0%	0%	0%
Najaf	57%	75%	7%	30%	21%	11%	20%	4%	4%	1%	5%
Ninewa	73%	51%	55%	18%	11%	33%	8%	3%	2%	1%	0%
Qadissiya	51%	46%	5%	49%	3%	17%	0%	7%	0%	0%	1%
Salah al-Din	81%	40%	59%	1%	53%	1%	2%	1%	11%	0%	3%
Sulaymaniyah	88%	41%	36%	28%	10%	24%	4%	19%	3%	1%	0%
Thi-Qar	20%	39%	23%	32%	48%	3%	3%	0%	2%	0%	0%
Wassit	54%	73%	5%	18%	8%	23%	2%	3%	1%	3%	0%
Overall	75%	52%	45%	16%	13%	16%	7%	3%	4%	1%	2%

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9.11 Employment and financial security

9.11.1 REACH, in their June 2016 humanitarian assessment of IDPs, reported:

'IDP households outside camps have often depleted their financial resources and are resorting to increasingly negative coping mechanisms to afford basic needs. Taking on debt to satisfy basic needs has increased by over one third to a total of 30% of all households since the MCNA [Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment] II (June 2015), while relying on savings decreased drastically from MCNA II (64% of all IDPs) to MCNA III (35%), indicating a depletion of resources. Limited financial means have negatively affected access to basic services: whilst overall reported access to basic services such as healthcare or education remained constant since the MCNA II, financial costs are currently the single most reported barrier to accessing these services.'⁷⁴

9.11.2 The source added:

⁷³ REACH, 'Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps', Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p. 13, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

⁷⁴ REACH, 'Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps', Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p. 2, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

‘Employment was the second most reported need across Iraq, reported by 52% of IDP households. The majority of IDP households reported not having access to a regular source of income, primarily relying on seasonal work or short-term employment. The lack of sustainable livelihoods opportunities negatively affected households’ ability to access food, health and education services, with more than three out of four IDP households reporting that they did not generate sufficient income to meet their basic needs. In addition, 17% of IDP households reported not having had any source of income in the month prior to the assessment.’⁷⁵

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9.12 Food security

9.12.1 REACH, in their June 2016 humanitarian assessment of IDPs, stated:

‘Food remained the most commonly reported priority need (by 75% of all households), with households increasingly relying on debt or external assistance to meet their basic food needs. Indeed, 80% of households who took on debt did so to buy food. This trend was particularly prevalent in South Iraq, where 55% of IDP households reported primarily relying on outside assistance or credit to access food. Increasing proportions of IDPs in the KRI are primarily purchasing food on credit; from 5% of households in the MCNA I (October 2014) over 7% in the MCNA II (June 2015) to 21% of households in the MCNA III. With limited resources to buy food, 65% of households country-wide reported buying lower quality food, while a sizeable proportion of households reported eating less overall, either as a result of limiting their food portions or reducing the number of meals eaten per day.’⁷⁶

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9.13 Health and healthcare

9.13.1 REACH, in their June 2016 humanitarian assessment of IDPs, reported:

‘Healthcare is an emerging priority need across Iraq, reported by 45% of IDP households as one of their top three priority needs. Financial costs were the most reported barrier to accessing healthcare services, mentioned by 81% of those who reported problems accessing such services. Since the first MCNA in October 2014, the reported barriers to accessing healthcare in the KRI have shifted. Whilst the reported presence of functioning health services increased, the ability to afford these services has steadily decreased, with 47% of households reporting associated costs as a barrier to healthcare access in the MCNA I, compared to 67% of households in the MCNA II, and

⁷⁵ REACH, ‘Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps’, Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p.3, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

⁷⁶ REACH, ‘Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps’, Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, pp. 2-3, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

86% of households in the MCNA III. This suggests that whilst facilities may be available, IDPs outside camps with limited funds cannot access them.⁷⁷

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9.14 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

9.14.1 REACH, in their 2016 humanitarian assessment of IDPs, reported:

‘The majority of IDP households across Iraq reported drinking water from either a private water network or a network shared with other families in a shelter (72%). However, substantially higher proportions of households in Centre and South Iraq reported buying their drinking water from shops. Households drinking water from a private or communal network (as opposed to buying water from the shop) were three times more likely to report cases of diarrhea. In addition, households with poor access to electricity were much more likely to report water shortages: 11% of households accessing less than 10 hours of electricity per day reported water shortages, compared to only 4% of households with access to more than ten hours of electricity daily.’⁷⁸

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9.15 Education

9.15.1 REACH, in their 2016 humanitarian assessment of IDPs, noted:

‘The single most reported barrier to education, as reported by 44% of households, was the costs associated with schooling. The most cited barriers to education were costs, distance to the closest age-appropriate school, and continuous movement in displacement, as was already the case in the MCNA II (June 2015). However, whilst the proportion of households reporting the costs of education to be the primary barrier to accessing them remained stable (MCNA II at 32%; MCNA III at 30%), the proportion reporting distance to the closest school as barrier to education decreased significantly since MCNA II, from 30% to 18% of households. Also, the proportion of households reporting continuous movement as barrier to education in displacement decreased by 56%, from 30% (MCNA II) to 13% (MCNA III, excluding Baghdad and Salah al-Din). This illustrates that whilst households become more stable and are theoretically in a better position to access services, a lack of funds is still preventing a vulnerable group of children from attending school.’⁷⁹

⁷⁷ REACH, ‘Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps’, Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p.3, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

⁷⁸ REACH, ‘Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps’, Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p.3, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

⁷⁹ REACH, ‘Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps’, Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p.3, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

- 9.15.2 In a report dated December 2016, the OCHA stated that ‘more than 600,000 displaced children have missed an entire year of education’.⁸⁰

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9.16 Vulnerable groups

- 9.16.1 REACH, in their 2016 humanitarian assessment of IDPs, noted:

‘The IDP population across the country includes vulnerable groups – separated minors and physically or mentally disabled. Across the assessed governorates, 3% of IDP households reported to host at least one unaccompanied minor, a living arrangement which was more common in Salah al-Din, where 10% of IDP households reported hosting one or more unaccompanied minors. This was also reported by 6% of households in Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah, respectively. 5% of households reported having at least one of household members to be mentally disabled and 4% reported having a physically disabled person in their household, raising protection concerns, as well as questions around accessibility to services for these more vulnerable individuals. Persons with particular nutritional needs included pregnant and/ or lactating women (14%) and minors (51%).’⁸¹

- 9.16.2 The UNHCR, in their November 2016 paper on returns, observed: ‘Members of the poorest households and female-headed households often face particular challenges to finding employment or livelihood opportunities in their displacement locations, and many have to resort to negative coping strategies’.⁸²

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10. Humanitarian support

10.1 Humanitarian plans

- 10.1.1 The internationally-coordinated Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), as of 12 January 2017, secured 85% (US \$727 million) of the US\$ 861 million requested for 2016.⁸³
- 10.1.2 The Mosul Flash Appeal was launched in July 2016 to ‘scale up preparedness of efforts ahead of the military operation to retake Mosul’. The

⁸⁰ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.4, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRQ_Advance_Exec_Summary_HRP_2017_FINAL.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

⁸¹ REACH, ‘Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps’, Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p.12, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 22 February 2017

⁸² UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNCHR Position on Returns to Iraq, 14 November 2016, para 44, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/58299e694.html>, accessed 9 January 2016

⁸³ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, December 2016 (issued 15 January 2017), p.1, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/ocha_iraq_humanitarian_bulletin_december_2016.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

Appeal requested US\$284 million.⁸⁴ As of January 2017, it received 96% funding.⁸⁵

- 10.1.3 The Iraq Humanitarian Pooled Fund allocated and disbursed about US\$ 41 million to support the humanitarian operations in Mosul. This Fund 'helped partners set up camps and emergency sites prior to the start of the military campaign on Mosul and enabled the immediate provision of life-saving assistance to families displaced by the fighting'.⁸⁶

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10.2 Numbers of humanitarian partners

- 10.2.1 The OCHA broke down the numbers of partners who deal with particular humanitarian needs:

Humanitarian need	Numbers of partners
Health	30
Protection	78
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)	46
Food security	30
Shelter and non-food items	35
Camp coordination and camp management	9
Education	28
Emergency livelihoods	23
Rapid response	10
Multi-purpose cash assistance	11

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⁸⁴ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, November 2016 (issued 10 December 2016), p.5, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/document/iraq-humanitarian-bulletin-november-2016-issued-10-december>, accessed 6 January 2017


⁸⁵ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, December 2016 (issued 15 January 2017), p.4, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/ocha_iraq_humanitarian_bulletin_december_2016.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

⁸⁶ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, November 2016 (issued 10 December 2016), p.5, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/document/iraq-humanitarian-bulletin-november-2016-issued-10-december>, accessed 6 January 2017

⁸⁷ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, pp.16-24,

10.3 Location of humanitarian partners

- 10.3.1 The OCHA, in December 2016, noted: 'Humanitarian coverage has expanded significantly in 2016, supported strongly by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Centre (JCMC) in Baghdad and the Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC) in Erbil'. By the end of 2016, partners were active in more than 25 major operational locations, an increase of 67% from 2015. However, they remain disproportionately concentrated in the north of the country.⁸⁸
- 10.3.2 The following map from the OCHA shows the location of the 146 organisations providing humanitarian assistance to civilians in Iraq:



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<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/documents>, accessed 5 January 2017

⁸⁸ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.13,

<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/documents>, accessed 5 January 2017

⁸⁹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.13,

10.4 Numbers targeted for assistance

- 10.4.1 The OCHA, in January 2017, noted that 7.3 million people are currently targeted for assistance.⁹⁰
- 10.4.2 The OCHA, in December 2016, noted that in 2017 humanitarian partners aim to provide assistance to 5.8 million people. This is a lower number than those who need support in recognition of the 'limits of humanitarian action in a context of volatile armed conflict, deep-running divisions, the Government's fiscal gap and limited capacities and funding'. The full cost of meeting aggregate humanitarian needs is over US \$3 billion. The cost of the Government's humanitarian package is US \$930 million.⁹¹

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10.5 IDPs assisted

- 10.5.1 REACH, in their June 2016 humanitarian survey of IDPs, stated:
- 'Country-wide 9% of IDP households reported not having received any form of assistance since they were displaced, though the frequency and amount of this support vary widely. Notably, IDP households in Baghdad and Salah al-Din were less likely to have received assistance since displacement, with 71% of IDP households in Baghdad and 85% in Salah al-Din reported not to have received assistance. Whilst there was little overall variation in the proportion of IDP households who received food assistance in most governorates (75% overall), only 45% of IDP households in Diyala reported having received food assistance since their displacement, and 56% of IDP households in Baghdad.
- 'Food assistance was the most frequently reported form of assistance received by households, as reported by 75% of IDP households across Iraq, followed by cash assistance, reportedly received by 69% of IDP households. However, whilst 62% of households who had received food assistance in the past reported having received it three times or more, the majority of households reporting receiving cash assistance (65%) reported having received it only once'.⁹²

<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/documents>, accessed 5 January 2017

⁹⁰ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, December 2016 (issued 15 January 2017), p.1,

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/ocha_iraq_humanitarian_bulletin_december_2016.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

⁹¹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, pp.11, 14,

<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/documents>, accessed 5 January 2017


⁹² REACH, 'Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps', Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p.12,

http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_iraq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

10.5.2 The report added: ‘The government was the primary provider of cash assistance, as well as fuel assistance. Of those who reported having received cash assistance (69%) or fuel assistance (48%) in the past, respectively 89% and 75% reported to have received it from the government’.⁹³

10.5.3 The chart below shows the main types of assistance received by households having received assistance since arrival at their current location. Data comes from REACH.

Type of assistance received by households reporting having received assistance since arrival at their current location



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10.6 Public Distribution System (PDS)

10.6.1 A report from the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI), covering the period 1 February 2013 to 31 January 2015, noted:

‘Given the weak economic and partly catastrophic security situations in wide parts of the country, most social support comes from family and tribes. The only significant social safety net is the Public Distribution System (PDS), which is the main source of food for poor people. Despite suffering from poor internal controls and inefficient supply chains, PDS has supported many Iraqi families with monthly basic food rations since its establishment in 1991’.⁹⁵

10.6.2 The OCHA, in December 2016, noted: ‘Through the Public Distribution System, the Government provides families with barrels of kerosene throughout the winter. Efforts are also ongoing to include recently-registered

⁹³ REACH, ‘Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps’, Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p.13, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

⁹⁴ REACH, ‘Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps’, Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p.13, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

⁹⁵ Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI), Iraq Country Report 2016, p. 22, http://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Iraq.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

displaced people across the country in this public distribution, to receive either barrels or 20-litre jerry cans of fuel, depending on their location and storage space available to them'.⁹⁶

10.6.3 REACH, in their June 2016 humanitarian assessment of IDPs, noted:


'Whilst overall 75% of IDP households reported having been able to access their local public distribution system (PDS) since their displacement, the timing and amount received differs significantly across governorates. As only 1% of households reported to primarily rely on food assistance from the government, this suggests that government support, such as PDS, is supplementary to their food sources at best. Whereas across Iraq two in three IDP households reported accessing their local PDS in the same month or one month prior to the assessment, 26% of households in North Iraq reported having had access to PDS only more than two months ago. At the same time, only 5% of IDP households in North Iraq and 11% of households in Centre Iraq reported having received the full ration of food they were entitled to the last time they accessed their local public distribution system. In contrast, 58% of governorates in the South reported receiving the full ration.'⁹⁷

10.6.4 The following chart, from REACH, shows the proportion of IDP households who have not been able to access their local PDS system since displacement, by governorate:

⁹⁶ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, November 2016 (issued 10 December 2016), p. 4, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/document/iraq-humanitarian-bulletin-november-2016-issued-10-december>, accessed 6 January 2017

⁹⁷ REACH, 'Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps', Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p.20, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

Proportion of households who have not been able to access their local Public Distribution System since displacement, by governorate



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10.7 Effectiveness of support

10.7.1 The OCHA noted that the humanitarian operation in Iraq is ‘one of the largest and most complex in the world’. It added: ‘Although the Iraq appeal is one of the highest funded humanitarian appeals in the world, major gaps exist across all sectors, most particularly in shelter, health and education clusters’.⁹⁹

10.7.2 The OCHA, in December 2016, stated:

‘Already, major achievements have been made. During the past year, access has expanded dramatically, operational practice and coverage have increased significantly, clusters are performing more effectively, advocacy has intensified and response and delivery have improved in both speed and quality. Plans are better prepared, resources are more evenly spread across sectors, affected people are consulted and are providing feedback more regularly, information products are clearer and more relevant and coordination with Government structures is stronger. The Inter-Cluster Coordination Group continues to streamline protection and gender, shorten the time between emergency and first-line responses and bring clusters together to ensure coordinated responses in emergency sites and camps.’¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ REACH, ‘Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps’, Iraq, Assessment Report, June 2016, p.20, http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_irq_report_multi_cluster_needs_assessment_iii_july_2016.pdf, accessed 4 January 2017

⁹⁹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, November 2016 (issued 10 December 2016), p. 5, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/document/iraq-humanitarian-bulletin-november-2016-issued-10-december>, accessed 6 January 2017

¹⁰⁰ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan,

10.7.3 The source further commented:

‘An impressive national effort involving the Government, civil society and countless communities has been mounted to address the humanitarian crisis. For three years, the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government have provided aid, coordinated assistance and helped to secure the safety of populations who need assistance. The people of Iraq have welcomed displaced families into their homes and communities and local groups and religious organisations have worked tirelessly to provide shelter, care and support. Overwhelmed by the scale and complexity of the crisis, the Government has reached out to humanitarian partners, seeking help to provide emergency aid and protection to newly displaced families, support populations during their displacement, and help families to return to their homes when conditions are safe.’¹⁰¹

10.7.4 The UNHCR, in their November 2016 paper on returns, stated:

‘In areas of displacement, local authorities and communities are reported to be overstretched and services that were already under-performing prior to the most recent conflict have reportedly further deteriorated. including access to potable water, sanitation, disposal of solid waste, education, and health care. IDPs, who are often cut off from their usual source of income and traditional social and other support networks, are reported to be particularly affected by the weak service provision.’¹⁰²

10.7.5 The source added: ‘Humanitarian partners are struggling to shelter newly displaced civilians as absorption capacities at existing displacement camps are overwhelmed and the establishment of additional sites requires funds and land allocations’.¹⁰³

10.7.6 See also: [US Aid, Complex Emergency Factsheet](#), 30 September 2016

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10.8 Effectiveness of support in Mosul

10.8.1 The OCHA observed:

‘The Iraqi Security Forces have adopted a humanitarian concept of operations putting civilian protection at the centre of their military strategy for Mosul. During the early stages of the military campaign, security forces asked civilians to remain in their homes, promising that every effort will be made to protect them. By mid-December, with observers predicting a longer and more difficult battle than expected, Government and humanitarians were forced to envision [sic] the possibility of a prolonged siege of the city,

Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.12,

<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/documents>, accessed 5 January 2017

¹⁰¹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.6,

<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/documents>, accessed 5 January 2017

¹⁰² UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNCHR Position on Returns to Iraq, 14 November 2016, para 44, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/58299e694.html>, accessed 9 January 2016

¹⁰³ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNCHR Position on Returns to Iraq, 14 November 2016, para 45, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/58299e694.html>, accessed 9 January 2016

widespread hunger and the impact on civilians of a lack of water and medical care during the intensely cold winter months.¹⁰⁴

10.8.2 The OCHA also noted:

‘87 per cent of people displaced by the fighting are currently sheltering in emergency sites and camps in northern Iraq, where assistance is being provided by government and humanitarian partners. Temporary schools are providing learning opportunities for 12,000 displaced children, and protection services have been provided to 132,000 people, including psychosocial services for 17,000 children. Access missions into newly-retaken areas of eastern Mosul were stalled in mid- January following attacks that killed and injured civilians and aid workers. Since the beginning of January, access missions have recommenced, and continue to pave the way for distributions, ensuring people can access the assistance they need. Winter conditions are causing additional hardships, with snow falling in some areas and continual rains causing flooding in others.’¹⁰⁵

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¹⁰⁴ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, 16 December 2016, p.5, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/documents>, accessed 5 January 2017


¹⁰⁵ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Bulletin, December 2016 (issued 15 January 2017), p.2, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/ocha_iraq_humanitarian_bulletin_december_2016.pdf, accessed 21 February 2017

11. Security situation

11.1 Control of territory

11.1.1 The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provided the following map showing the control of terrain in Iraq, dated December 2016.

Map showing control of terrain in Iraq, December 2016



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11.1.2 Underneath the map, the ISW summarised that:

- Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are continuing to retake Mosul and its environs, breaching the city limits on 1 November;
- there are still Daesh-held areas in Mosul;

¹⁰⁶ Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iraq Control of Terrain, 15 December 2016, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Bobby%20map%2015%20DEC%202016%20PDF.pdf>, accessed 22 February 2017

- ISF and Peshmerga have consolidated gains around Makhmur;
- Peshmerga retook Bashiqa, north-east of Mosul, although their involvement in the Mosul operation has now largely concluded;
- Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs) (Shia militias) launched operations west of Mosul and recaptured Tel Afar airbase;
- ISF launched an operation in Shirqat to counter any Daesh counter-attack¹⁰⁷

11.1.3 These maps are regularly updated to reflect the changing situation. See the [The Institute for the Study of War \(ISW\)](#) for the latest map and summary of control of terrain, as well as previous maps and summaries.

11.1.4 Useful additional sources include:

- [ISW's 'ISIS Sanctuary Map'](#) to see Daesh's current control of terrain.
- [ISW's Iraq Situation Reports](#)
- [The Long War Journal](#)
- [Musings on Iraq \(Joel Wing blog\)](#)

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11.2 The 'Baghdad Belts'

11.2.1 The ISW, in an undated briefing, explained:

'The Baghdad belts are residential, agricultural, and industrial areas that encircle the city, and networks of roadways, rivers, and other lines of communication that lie within a twenty or thirty mile radius of Baghdad and connect the capital to the rest of Iraq. Beginning in the north, the belts include the cities of Taji [Baghdad governorate¹⁰⁸], clockwise to Tarmiyah [Baghdad governorate¹⁰⁹], Baqubah [Diyala governorate¹¹⁰], Buhriz [Diyala governorate¹¹¹], Besmayah and Nahrwan [Baghdad governorate¹¹²], Salman

¹⁰⁷ Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Iraq Control of Terrain, 15 December 2016, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Bobby%20map%2015%20DEC%202016%20PDF.pdf>, accessed 22 February 2017

¹⁰⁸ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraq- Baghdad Governorate, Kadhimia District, 9 August 2014, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/Baghdad_Gov_Kadhimia_District.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

¹⁰⁹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Baghdad governorate, Tarmia district, 9 August 2014, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/Baghdad_Gov_Tarmia_District.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

¹¹⁰ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Baghdad governorate, 19 July 2014, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/M_A012%20Iraq%20Governorate%20map_Baghdad_0.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

¹¹¹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Baghdad governorate, 19 July 2014, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/M_A012%20Iraq%20Governorate%20map_Baghdad_0.pdf, accessed 15 August 2016

¹¹² Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraq- Baghdad Governorate, Mada'in District, 9 August 2014, http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/Baghdad_Gov_Mada'in_District_1.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

Pak [Baghdad governorate¹¹³], Mahmudiya [Baghdad governorate¹¹⁴], Sadr al-Yusufiyah [Baghdad governorate¹¹⁵], Fallujah [Anbar governorate¹¹⁶], and Karmah [Anbar governorate¹¹⁷]. This "clock" can be divided into quadrants: Northeast, Southeast, Southwest, and Northwest.¹¹⁸

11.2.2 According to the Long War Journal (LWJ), in 2006 a forerunner to Daesh, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), devised a strategy to attack the Iraqi capital by taking over the belt regions that surrounding Baghdad. The plan was discovered after US forces found a map on the body of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, ISI's leader, who was killed in Baqubah (Diyala) in 2006.¹¹⁹

11.2.3 An article in Al-Monitor, dated 11 March 2016, noted:

'Critical to understanding the security of Baghdad and the surrounding regions, there are six regions surrounding the capital from the north, west and southwest, forming what is known as the "Baghdad Belt."

'These regions are Latifiya, Taji, al-Mushahada, al-Tarmia, Arab Jibor and al-Mada'in, and they are mostly Sunni and considered "fertile terrorist soil," according to the deputy head of the security committee in Baghdad's provincial council, Saad al-Matlabi. He told Al-Monitor the areas lie along the borders with the Iraqi provinces of Salahuddin, Diyala and Anbar, where huge battles are still raging between Iraqi security forces and the Popular Mobilization Units against IS.

'Despite the constant reinforcement and the security plans for the Baghdad Belt, 30 IS fighters managed to reach Abu Ghraib city on the capital's outskirts and kill 13 Iraqi soldiers.

'A few days before this incident, the security forces decided to build a wall and set up new checkpoints around Baghdad, but the parliamentary

¹¹³ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraq- Baghdad Governorate, Mada'in District, 9 August 2014, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/Baghdad_Gov_Mada%27in_District_1.pdf, accessed 15 August 2016

¹¹⁴ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraq- Baghdad Governorate, Mahmoudiya District, http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/Baghdad_Gov_Mahmoudiya_District_0.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

¹¹⁵ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraq- Baghdad Governorate, Mahmoudiya District, http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/Baghdad_Gov_Mahmoudiya_District_0.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

¹¹⁶ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraq – Anbar Governorate, Falluja District, 9 August 2014, http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/Anbar_Gov_Falluja_District.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

¹¹⁷ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Iraq – Anbar Governorate, Falluja District, 9 August 2014, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/Anbar_Gov_Falluja_District.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

¹¹⁸ Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 'Baghdad belts', undated, <http://www.understandingwar.org/region/baghdad-belts>, accessed 9 January 2017

¹¹⁹ Long War Journal (LWJ), 'Analysis: ISIS, allies reviving 'Baghdad belts' battle plan', 14 June 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/analysis_isis_allies.php#ixzz3PHlpCSic, accessed 9 January 2017

Sunni blocs rejected this decision and dismissed it as an attempt to cause a rift.

‘Shiite Anwar TV2, which broadcasts from Kuwait, reported in its Feb. 18 program "Sani'ou al-Hadath" that the “Baghdad Belt still harbors terrorism.”¹²⁰

11.2.4 The ISW noted in its update of 11 May 2016 that ‘ISIS carried out explosive attacks in Baghdad and its environs to undermine an increasingly fragile Iraqi government through April and early May [2016]’.¹²¹

11.2.5 A report by the UNHCR, dated May 2016, noted:

‘ISIS reportedly uses its presence in Fallujah (Al-Anbar) to stage attacks into western Baghdad governorate, as demonstrated in late February 2016, when ISIS fighters reportedly launched a lightning offensive in the Abu Ghraib District of western Baghdad governorate, temporarily occupying several buildings and a grain silo. Confronted with an ISF counter offensive, ISIS reportedly quickly withdrew to its safe havens around Fallujah City. Despite having been pushed out of the southern Baghdad belts and its stronghold in Jurf Al-Sakhr (northern Babel) in October 2014, ISIS is said to have re-established its presence south of Baghdad as demonstrated by its ability to launch attacks in southern Baghdad.’¹²²

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11.3 Security incidents

11.3.1 The following graph, using data from [Joel Wing's Musings on Iraq](#), shows the number of security incidents in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah al-Din from June 2014 to November 2016.¹²³ These are the six worst-affected governorates. Joel Wing does sometimes provide data on security incidents in the south and the KRI, but these typically occur infrequently and/or the data is at low levels.


¹²⁰ Al-Monitor, ‘The rise of Islamic State sleeper cells in Baghdad’, 11 March 2016, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/iraq-baghdad-belts-harbor-islamic-state.html>, accessed 9 January 2017

¹²¹ Institute for the Study of War (ISW), ‘ISIS’s explosive attacks in the greater Baghdad area: April 4-May, 11, 2016’, 11 May 2016, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isiss-explosive-attacks-greater-baghdad-area-april-4-may-11-2016>, accessed 16 February 2017

¹²² UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Relevant COI for Assessments on the Availability of an Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative (IFA/IRA) in Baghdad for Sunni Arabs from ISIS-Held Areas’, p. 21, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1465288084_575537dd4.pdf, accessed 9 January 2017

¹²³ Graphs/charts have been compiled by the author based on data from the sources referred to.

Graph showing security incidents in the six worst-affected governorates, June 2014 to January 2017¹²⁴



11.3.2 The [Iraq Body Count database](#) also document security incidents.

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
11.4 Fatalities

11.4.1 The following graph, using data from the [UN Assistance Mission for Iraq \(UNAMI\)](#), shows civilians killed in the six worst-affected governorates between June 2014 and November 2016.¹²⁵ The UN's data is collected from the worst-affected governorates, and therefore does not typically include the south or the KRI.

¹²⁴ No data could be found for December 2016.


¹²⁵ UNAMI offers the following caveat: 'In general, UNAMI has been hindered in effectively verifying casualties in conflict areas; in some cases, UNAMI could only partially verify certain incidents. UNAMI has also received, without being able to verify, reports of large numbers of casualties along with unknown numbers of persons who have died from secondary effects of violence after having fled their homes due to exposure to the elements, lack of water, food, medicines and health care. Since the start of the military operations to retake Mosul and other areas in Ninewa, UNAMI has received several reports of incidents involving civilian casualties, which at times it has been unable to verify. For these reasons, the figures reported have to be considered as the absolute minimum'. See website provided in the hyperlink above for further information.

Graph showing civilian fatalities in the six worst-affected governorates, June 2014 to January 2017



11.4.2 The following graph, using data from [Iraq Body Count \(IBC\)](#), shows civilians killed in the six worst-affected governorates, between June 2014 and October 2016:

Graph showing civilian fatalities in the six worst-affected governorates, June 2014 to December 2016, using data from Iraq Body Count (IBC)



11.4.3 IBC also provides statistics on civilian casualties in the southern governorates and the KRI, although these are significantly lower figures than those above.

11.4.4 Joel Wing, like UN Iraq and IBC, does provide data on civilian fatalities, although this data has not been used in this document. Generally, the data follows the same pattern as that provided by UN Iraq and IBC, although at


higher levels, reflecting differences in data collecting methodologies. Refer directly to the [blog](#) for more information. Data is found in monthly articles entitled 'Violence in Iraq [Month Year]'.

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11.5 Injuries

- 11.5.1 Using data from the [UN Assistance Mission in Iraq \(UNAMI\)](#), the following graph shows a comparison between the six worst-affected governorates of civilians injured between June 2014 and November 2016:

Graph showing civilian injuries in the six worst-affected governorates, June 2014 to January 2017




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11.6 Nature of violence

- 11.6.1 The following table, using data from [Joel Wing's Musings on Iraq](#), shows the nature of violent attacks in the six worst-affected governorates between June 2014 and November 2016:

Chart showing the nature of violent attacks in six worst-affected governorates, June 2014 to January 2017



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11.7 Impact on vulnerable groups

11.7.1 The UNHCR, in their November 2016 paper on returns, commented on Daesh attacks: 'While some attacks reportedly target security personnel, others appear deliberately aimed at civilians, including in mosques, markets, restaurants, playgrounds, often in Shi'ite-majority neighbourhoods or towns'.¹²⁷

11.7.2 In December 2016, the OCHA reported:

'Iraqi civilians in conflict areas are in extreme danger. Families in Mosul, Hawiga and Tel Afar, and other districts under the control of ISIL, face some of the gravest threats in the Middle East. Civilians risk being caught in cross-fire and are subjected to bombardment; they face execution, abduction, rape, looting, detention and expulsion. Thousands of people are already caught between the front lines of opposing forces and tens of thousands more may become trapped in the months ahead.'¹²⁸

11.7.3 The source added: 'An estimated 3.6 million children in Iraq – one in five – are at serious risk of death, injury, sexual violence, abduction and recruitment into armed groups. The number of reported grave child rights

¹²⁶ Other refers to artillery, bicycle bomb, grenade, motorcycle bomb, rocket and sound bomb.

¹²⁷ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNCHR Position on Returns to Iraq, 14 November 2016, para 11, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/58299e694.html>, accessed 9 January 2016

¹²⁸ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, p.5, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/documents>, accessed 5 January 2017

violations increased threefold in the first six months in 2016 compared to the same period in 2015'.¹²⁹

11.7.4 The UN Secretary-General report published in January 2017 found:

'As more civilians are liberated from ISIL, the extent of the human rights violations committed is becoming evident. UNAMI has received innumerable reports of serious and systematic violations of international humanitarian law and gross abuses of human rights perpetrated by ISIL. The organization continued to use civilians and civilian infrastructure and private homes as shields. In contravention of international law, ISIL conducted organized terrorist activities directly targeting civilians, including shelling civilian locations and using snipers to kill civilians attempting to flee areas under its control.

'ISIL carried out systematic forced transfers of civilians as it withdrew from areas in the face of the Iraqi security forces' advances during the Mosul operation. ISIL continued to forcibly move people from subdistricts around and inside Mosul...

'ISIL carried out mass abductions of civilians, including former members of the Iraqi security forces and their families, persons whose family members had joined pro-government forces and others that it suspected of not supporting its ideology...


'UNAMI also received a small number of reports of violations committed by government and pro-government forces, and has referred these cases to the Government of Iraq for investigation...UNAMI has also received reports of civilians being killed and injured as a result of government operations and air strikes carried out by the Iraqi and international counter-ISIL coalition air forces.'¹³⁰

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¹²⁹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, Advance Executive Summary, Iraq, p.5, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/documents>, accessed 5 January 2017

¹³⁰ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2299 (2016), 26 January 2017, paras 34-43, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_75.pdf, accessed 16 February 2017

Annex A: Map of Iraq



¹³¹ Map of Iraq, Nations Online Project, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/iraq_map.htm, accessed 9 January 2017

Version Control and Contacts

Contacts

If you have any questions about the note and your line manager or senior caseworker cannot help you or you think that the note has factual errors then email [the Country Policy and Information Team](#).

If you notice any formatting errors in this note (broken links, spelling mistakes and so on) or have any comments about the layout or navigability of the note then you can email [the Guidance, Rules and Forms Team](#).

Clearance

Below is information on when this version of the note was cleared:

- version **4.0**
- valid from **March 2017**

Changes from last version of this guidance

Updated statistics, COI and guidance

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