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HIGHLIGHTS

- **Eight NGO incidents including an IED detonation in Khost, but no NGO casualties**
- **33 civilian fatalities in two IED detonations in the North (Faryab and Balkh)**
- **Four armed robberies of 10 staff, including three in Kabul and one in Kandahar**

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

This fortnight saw a decrease in country-wide AOG activity in line with long standing trends associated with the usual regression heading towards winter and general declines in activity that correlate with the Eid holiday itself. However, despite this, the country witnessed eight NGO incidents (resulting in no casualties), two IED detonations in the North that caused over 30 civilian fatalities, and a significant number of abductions that spanned every region; with Wardak, Faryab, Herat, Ghor, Laghman, Paktika, and Ghazni amongst those provinces specifically affected.

While countrywide reporting did not indicate a statistically significant spike in overall criminality prior to Eid, in the **Central** region, the lead up to and passing of Eid resulted in a notable three robberies of IO employees inside of public taxis as they left their work place in Kabul. Outside of the capital, security incident volumes began to decline in Wardak, Kapisa and Logar, while in Daykundi, a well known local commander secured a long sought deal with the Government.

Faryab was the site of the most significant AOG activity in the **North**, which included the release of the four NGO staff abducted the previous period along the ring road, but also an Eid day BBIED detonation targeting provincial leadership in a public mosque that killed almost 50, and the abduction of 10 community development council members. Outside of Faryab, an INGO compound suffered a rare robbery in Mazar-e Sharif, an IED detonated against a minivan full of civilians in Dawlatabad (Balkh), a BBIED operative was arrested in Puli Khumri as he attempted to enter an ANP guesthouse, and IO vehicles came under SAF along the main Sar-e Pul - Shibirghan road.

The **West** accounted for four of the country's eight NGO incidents this fortnight, including three in Herat (a robbery, the targeting of an NGO program by an AOG attempting to increase its sphere of influence, and the capture of NGO staff and food stuffs in Obe that led to a drawn out fire-fight with ANSF) and one in Ghor (the capture and detainment of an NGO staff riding in a GOA ambulance). Badghis also continued to record a high volume of AOG operations against those involved in the construction of the ring road.

The **East** was the site of two NGO incidents, including an IED detonation outside of an NGO medical facility in Khost City - the fourth time this particular compound has been targeted in 2012 - and the interaction of AOG attempting to get NGO staff to accompany him into the field to help an injured colleague, followed immediately by the arrival of ANSF to investigate the NGO's dealings with this AOG. Elsewhere the East was broadly characterized by on-going AOG activities with increased operational stretch into the DACs of various districts.

The **South** reported one armed robbery of an NGO compound on the night of Eid and an IO vehicle was stopped and the inhabitants robbed in Kandahar City a few weeks prior to Eid. Outside of this, the region witnessed an additional three ANSF on IMF ("Green-on-blue") attacks, as well as one ANSF on ANSF attack, with the majority of these occurring in Helmand. Such attacks have occurred at an increased rate in 2012, and were featured prominently in the Al Farooq operational announcement and both of the IEA's public Eid statements; released one this month and one in August.

CENTRAL REGION


KABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	14
This Report Period	0

Security developments in Kabul province over the past fortnight were focused around the national capital, with little of note occurring in the province's rural districts. Inside city limits, the primary issue was ongoing opportunistic criminality, which was heavily concentrated along the Jalalabad Road in the days before Eid - a time when there is normally a detectable spike in such activity, given the household expenditures associated with this holiday.

Over this period, three separate robberies of IO staff travelling home in local taxis during the

evening time were recorded, the three conforming almost exactly to the same pattern; after leaving work and getting into local taxis in the Paktya Kot area, passengers already in the vehicle pulled pistols on the staff members, taking their valuables before forcefully ejecting them from the car, which then continued on towards the city center. Aside from this cluster of incidents, however, a wider increase in predatory criminality in the city was not recorded before Eid, although crime is known to be significantly underreported in Kabul.



The only instance of armed opposition activity in the city was an unusual one, taking the form of a brief SAF attack on the Pul-e Charki ANP checkpoint, which is situated at the eastern gate to the city. Occurring at 0100 hrs and causing no casualties, the incident can be understood as an extension of the much strengthened AOG presence in nearby Koh-e Safi.


WARDAK

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

Consistent with its long-run position, Wardak was the most kinetic of the central region's provinces the past fortnight, and moreover saw opposition operational activity not just confined to Saydabad, but present in a number of other districts as well.

However, Saydabad remained the focus of opposition activity, at a level not far below that seen at the height of the summer. While much of it comprised the normal pattern of SAF and IED attacks on ANSF and PSC convoys, there were two more unusual incidents - when opposition groups came down to the roadway and abducted civilians travelling in local vehicles while on their way to Kabul. Both incidents took place in the

Salar area, the first at 0800 hrs on the 22nd when two locals were taken out of a Corolla, and the second at 2100 hrs on the 24th, when four locals were taken from a minibus that had been stopped at an illegal checkpoint. Abductions are not uncommon in Saydabad - and across Wardak more generally - but the occurrence of two such incidents in a single fortnight is rare, and may indicate some level of focus on this tactic by Salar's opposition cadres; indeed, on the 15th of the month, just before the start of the period, another five locals were abducted from an area close by, precipitating an ANSF operation the next day that managed to find and re-



lease them.

Elsewhere, the Maidan Shahr-Bamyan road did not record any kinetic activity, which is understood to be the result of both seasonal downturns and the recent deployment of a particular ANA unit to the area (previously deployed to Helmand) who are reputed to be extremely effective, and who have taken a strict line with communities in the area - promising heavy punitive responses if they find evidence of support for the armed opposition.


DAYKUNDI

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

While there were no conflict incidents in the province this fortnight, there were further developments in the provincial political process reported in the second half of September, when a major Khadir-based independent commander began negotiations with the government over securing a governmental position (having been rebuffed in his 2002 efforts to acquire the position of provincial police chief and thus entering into political autonomy from, and occasional opposition to, the provincial government in Nili). It has

now been confirmed that the commander, formerly of Hezb-e Wahdat, is to be given an ANP position in the Faryab/Badghis area, and that a number of his lieutenants will be brought into the ANP in both Nili and the north. To this end, he and his men submitted more than 250 AK-47s and RPGs to the authorities, and now are awaiting deployment.

Integrating this commander should solve the province's key political conflict, and is also likely



to substantially reduce predatory criminality in the north of the province. Given that IMF have now departed from Daykundi, the agreement is a notable development for the newly-alone provincial government.


BAMYAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Bamyan's only security incident took the form of an armed robbery in the Shikari valley, when a group stole valuables from minibus passengers. With most of the non-local armed cadres now gone, Shikari will likely only see such criminality during the winter.

There was also a peaceful demonstration in the main bazaar by locals claiming the GOA has failed to improve the quality of the road between Bamyan and Herat. A

few days after the protest, it was announced that work would begin on tarmacking the runways both in Bamyan and Shebartu, after the approval of a large donor grant. When combined with the completion of the Kabul-Bamyan highway and the significant improvements to the Bamyan-Yakawlang road, the announcement highlights the contrast between the grievances of local protestors and




the high levels of infrastructure-focused development assistance that have been provided to the province in recent years.

PANJSHIR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

During the past fortnight, Panjshir was home to the year's fourth incident assessed to be of armed opposition authorship, taking the form of the premature detonation of a time-delay IED in Rukha district. The secondary road on which the incident occurred, away from the province's main roadway, is frequently used by senior provincial leadership, but the IED did not strike a target. As with

some of the previous kinetic activity in Panjshir, such as the IDF attack on the Dara DAC in August, this latest incident is believed to be part of the small, slow but detectable revival of HIG networks, which had lain dormant in recent years, in pockets of the Panjshir, assisted by HIG cadres in western Nuristan and other bordering provinces. To date,



government efforts to use HIG as a strategic bulwark against the IEA have been a driver of this revival.

KAPISA

Kapisa saw less than half a dozen opposition kinetic events in the past fortnight, consistent with the expected seasonal downturn - although as described in the previous report, long terms trends suggest that already by December/January a substantial re-intensification of overall conflict levels can be expected.


Tagab remained the focus of kinetic activity in the province, with Joybar seeing both an IED against an ANA patrol vehicle and a SAF attack on an ALP vehicle within a

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

few days of each other. Further south in Tagab, in the Shinkay area, AOG fighters ambushed a combined ANP/ANA/ALP force during an operation in the area, which however did not lead to any casualties.

Outside of Tagab, the only incident of note was an RCIED strike against an ALP vehicle in Nijrab's Tawachyan area, which had been affixed to a motorcycle; the blast injured three local policemen.

The security force side also main-



tained a low operational tempo, and aside from the aforementioned activity in Shinkay, there was just a single operation, conducted by IMF and ANP in Tagab's Laghmani village where three AOG members were arrested.


LOGAR

The security paradigm in Logar did not change over the past fortnight, with the prevailing characteristics detected in recent periods - heightened IMF operations and a very small amount of opposition IED activity - remaining in place. Almost a dozen IMF or joint significant actions were recorded across the province, with a particular focus on Baraki Barak, and the remainder in Puli Alam. Across all operations, 12 opposi-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

tion operatives were killed and 13 arrested, while in one of the air strikes that caused AOG fatalities, in Baraki's Shah Mazar area, three children were also killed.

The only opposition activity took the form of two IED detonations, one in Shah Mazar striking an IMF vehicle transiting on the main district road, and the other in the Yosuf Khel area of the same district, this time striking an



ANA vehicle and injuring one soldier. Such low-level AOG activity is expected to persist through the province's very cold winter.


PARWAN

Bagram and Ghorband again were the focus of kinetic activity during the past fortnight in Parwan. In Bagram, opposition fighters fired a single rocket at an IMF logistical facility, causing significant asset destruction through the ensuing fire. This is the latest in a series of damage-heavy IDF attacks on IMF facilities at and near to Bagram Air Field so far this summer; while it is possible they are

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

merely 'lucky' strikes, every further effective attack tends to weigh against this interpretation.

In Ghorband's Siyagerd area, a local religious leader was shot dead by opposition fighters for having publicly spoken against the armed opposition, in a sign of the willingness of the local opposition to shape local society by the use of violence, including - as in this



case - by targeting local leaders not directly associated with the GOA or security forces.

ACRONYMS:

Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.

NORTHERN REGION


FARYAB

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

The 21 October release of four INGO staff that had been abducted seven days earlier along the Ring Road in Shirin Tagab District marked one of a number of incidents that shined light on the expansion of reach of AOG operating throughout Faryab province. Following extensive questioning and prolonged negotiations, the NGO staff were released only after a “provincial NGO liaison” of the AOG contacted the INGO to question them regarding their identity, programming, funding, and about other NGOs in the province. This marked only the second NGO abduction this year in Faryab, a decrease from that of previous years despite escalating AOG activity and a declining presence of security actors and GOA influence throughout the province; all of which suggests that AOG could continue to test whether they can take this oppor-

tunity to increase their operating space in an attempt to further their control or provincial sphere of influence.

Potentially demonstrating an expanding operating space, Maymana also experienced an Eid day BBIED detonation outside the gates of the heavily guarded public mosque that resulted in large scale casualties including 15 civilians and 33 ANSF dead, and an additional 40 civilians and 11 ANSF - including the provincial chief of police - wounded. The incident appeared to target provincial GOA leadership (the provincial governor was also present, although not injured) while also representing a statement attack in a province where IMF has just withdrawn (late September) and a new provincial governor is in place. Of note, this occurred just three days after 15 AOG mem-



bers - including the provincial shadow governor - were killed during a casualty heavy clash in Pashtun Kot.

AOG targeted soft and hard targets elsewhere throughout the province including the abduction of ten CDC members (who openly opposed AOG influence) in Qaysar district on 15 October - one of 15 abductions recorded in Faryab this year, the majority of which have occurred to individuals perceived to support the GOA - and an ambush of the Qaramqol District chief of police on the ring road. As evidenced by the graph above, AOG activity continues to occur at an elevated level in the province, and without a strong counterbalance in place, is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future.


BALKH

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	1

On 28 October, four armed men forced their way into an INGO residential compound in Mazar City and tied up the only guard present before robbing the residence of cash and assets and then departing. Although urban centers typically experience a certain degree of criminality, this is the first robbery of NGO staff in Mazar city since November 2011 - when cash was stolen from an NGO vehicle as the staff were changing their tire - and the first robbery of an NGO compound since March 2009 (with other

NGO robberies occurring in transit).

Elsewhere, in the second of two IED detonations in the North to cause a large number of civilian casualties (see Faryab), an IED exploded against a civilian minibus in Dawlatabad on 19 October, killing 18 civilians. The timing of the detonation - 0650 hours - suggests overnight placement in line with early-morning IED strike trends. IEDs, however, are relatively rare in Dawlatabad, despite an increase this year. There have



been only six detonations in the district since 2006, of which four occurred this year. However, in terms of targeting patterns, even amongst this small sample, the current incident stands out for the high number of casualties and because the five previous IED-related incidents all targeted ANSF, GOA, or the private sector.

JAWZJAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

On 23 October, two IO vehicles came under small-arms fire while traveling on the Shibirghan-Sar-e Pul main road. The shots were fired from a distance and the vehicles managed to escape without incurring any casualties, though one vehicle sustained damage.

Although incidents on the main road in Sari Pul district are more common, with over 10 recorded this year alone, four of the last five incidents on this road have occurred on the Shirbighan side, indicating a renewed AOG focus on this stretch, although outside of this one, the others consisted

of IED strikes on hard targets (ANSF or IMF) and one IED detonation against no apparent target.

In total, October saw only four AOG-initiated incidents throughout the province. This is indicative not only of a seasonal decline, but also of a larger trend demonstrating a reversal of annually increasing AOG-initiated activity. From 2007 through the peak in 2011, AOG-initiated activity increased annually by an average of 36%, whereas there has been a 32% decline in AOG-initiated



activity thus far in 2012. Despite this decline, AOG activity has remained consistently focused on two districts: Qush Tepa and Darzab, where 55% of all AOG activity occurs in Jawzjan. After these two districts recorded five AOG initiated incidents in September, they combined for only one in October.


BAGHLAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Security incident totals decreased slightly from the last reporting period, with 14 recorded this past fortnight. This follows seasonal trends of declining insecurity, as October saw ten less incidents than September, and 20 less incidents than what was recorded in each of August, July, and June (although the same patterns did not hold true for AOG initiated activity isolated).

Amongst these, a notable incident occurred on 26 October when a

BBIED operative in an ANP uniform was arrested as he tried to greet the provincial chief of police at the ANP guesthouse in Puli Khumri City. If the BBIED was actually detonated, it would have been the first suicide attack in Baghlan this year. While attempted suicide strikes this late in the year are consistent with existing seasonal trends - of the 14 suicide attacks in Baghlan since 2006, 11 have occurred between September and November - this year has




shown a marked decline compared to an average of just over three such incidents per year between 2008 and 2011. Of note, all of these have targeted IMF or ANSF and all occurred in either Baghlani Jadid or Puli Khumri districts; the two most kinetic in the province.

BADAKHSHAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

Incidents in Badakhshan continue to result from a mixture of criminal and opposition activity, with five ACG-initiated incidents reported during the past fortnight. Of note, amongst the three AOG-initiated incidents that occurred this fortnight, all involved abductions. In line with existing trends, all these abduction related incidents involved ANSF and/or their relatives; including the 23 October release of two relatives of

ANP abducted from an armed clash in Warduj on 29 September. Abductions were rare in Badakhshan until last year, when kinetic activity in Warduj increased and 16 persons were abducted in six incidents. This year 56 persons have been abducted in 17 incidents, although a notable 26 of those abductees occurred in just two incidents in April, significantly effecting this tally. Despite one



notable abduction of NGO staff, abductions in the province follow strong trend lines, overwhelmingly targeting members of ANSF/GOA, their relatives, and their supporters.


KUNDUZ

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

This reporting period saw a decrease of seven incidents from the previous reporting period's overall total. Of particular interest was the decline in IED-related incidents. The past fortnight saw three AOG-initiated IED incidents, bringing October's total to six. This indicates the beginning of a seasonal decline of IED-related incidents in Kunduz, as the province has averaged 13 AOG-initiated IED incidents per month since the beginning of May, whereas since 2007 there has

been an average of only 4.5 such incidents in the months of November and December, although 2010 represented a significant outlier with 22 total during these months. As such, the next two months are likely to see a further decline in IED activity in line with these established seasonal trends.

Province wide, the majority of IED attacks continue to consist of RCIEDs targeting IMF and ANSF in Chahar Dara and Kunduz districts, where AOG and



international and GOA security forces all have a significant presence. To date, these two districts account for more than three-quarters of all IED activity in the province.


SAMANGAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

October saw the lowest number of incidents of any month so far this year in Samangan, with four criminal incidents and one ANSF mine clearing operation.

AOG activity in the province remains dormant following a significant joint operation in July disrupted an AOG operating in the province, but even prior to this, AOG activity was not an overwhelming factor in the province's security paradigm. The majority of security incidents in the prov-

ince are criminal in nature, with illegal checkpoints and robberies being the most common ACG tactic. Aybak has been the district with the most ACG activity this year, accounting for 56% of all criminal activity in the province. As the provincial capital, Aybak is also the epicenter of ANSF activity, accounting for 60% of all ANSF-initiated incidents in the province. However, October saw a drop in ANSF-initiated activity, with just one operation despite



2012 being the most criminally-active year on record. In contrast, ANSF has averaged about five operations per month. (prior to October), suggesting that criminality may continue to grow if ANSF activities continue to decrease.


TAKHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Like Samangan, Takhar also experienced a decrease in ANSF activities this month. The province has averaged roughly ten ANSF operations per month in 2012, but only three were recorded this October.

2012 has seen a 55% decline in criminal activity compared to this date last year. This is notable, as in contrast, criminal activity increased by an average of 35% between 2009 and 2011.

Despite being known as a transit hub for AOG elements in the region, there have been no reports of AOG-initiated activity since early August, and only 13 AOG-initiated incidents thus far in 2012 (eight being IED detonations). AOG-initiated activity was much more frequent in previous years, with 30 incidents of such recorded by the end of October 2011 and 124 by the end of October 2010. From the regional perspec-



tive, this decline is consistent with a general shift of AOG focus away from the Kunduz (and to a certain extent, the Northeast in general) and towards Faryab.


WESTERN REGION

GHOR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	1

This cycle, a local AOG intercepted a marked GOA ambulance in Dawlat Yar that was being used to transport NGO food items from Chaghcharan City to Lal Wa Sarjantal and abducted the vehicle and NGO driver. The staffer was released without the food items or the detained vehicle a few days later after the intervention of a local powerbroker. In this incident, it appears the AOG targeted the profile of the GOA vehicle, an assessment supported by the fact that direct targeting of NGOs for abduction have been very rare in the province, with this marking the first incident this year.

IEDs and abduction - at least partially due to the loss of their supply routes from the south along with an increased ANSF presence. The resumption of AOG activity in Charsada has been enabled by the failure of negotiations conducted by a team of powerbrokers from Charsada and Chaghcharan, which had intended to settle the ongoing dispute between a group belonging to the Deputy Provincial Shadow Governor (DPSG) in Charsada and another group in the north of Chaghcharan belonging to the ex-Charsada COP (who had been assassinated in August). This cycle, the AOG led by the DPSG abducted 13 individuals from the rival group as they were traveling in Charsada, indicating that the situation in the north remains volatile due to these ongoing



ing tensions.


Another development this cycle was that the longstanding dispute between two major armed groups - one belonging to a GOA official from Chaghcharan and the other to a major local commander from Du Layana - finally ceased with a comprehensive peace agreement accomplished via the mediation of the provincial governor and other provincial powerbrokers. Nevertheless, the agreement failed to include a third key group - a traditional ally to the group from Du Layana - whose leader had previously been assassinated, leaving open the possibility for continuing conflict.

FARAH

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

AOG activity declined in Farah with 34 AOG initiated incidents this month, a 25% decrease from that recorded in September. Despite this, two cases involving the targeting of GOA/ANSF high-ranking officials came to the fore. The first took place in the provincial capital on Eid when an AOG suspect entered a mosque and opened fire on the provincial chief of NDS as he was praying. In the second instance, an RCIED detonation killed the Purchaman District Governor when he was traveling with his bodyguards in the district. Targeted attacks

against GOA district level officials remain rare in the province - with only three killings recorded in total this year - and are unlikely to cause a direct impact on the NGO operational environment. However, the death of the DG will potentially redraw security dynamics across several districts in Farah and neighboring provinces. The assassinated DG was the most influential powerbroker in a district which is situated in a geographically important position bordering AOG strongholds in Bala Buluk and Gulistan, as well



as in Helmand, the southeast of Herat (Farsi), and the southwest of Ghor (Saghar and Taywara). Should no-one step into his role or be able to control the competing groups in this area, the district could potentially become a more fluid transit hub for AOG moving between Helmand, Herat, and Ghor.

HERAT


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	3

Herat was home to three NGO incidents this fortnight, all of which took place in the eastern part of the province. The first occurred when two armed individuals on foot robbed an INGO staffer of his cash and motorcycle in Pashtun Zarghun. The attack appeared opportunistic, as the province had experienced only three other ACG events involving NGOs this year, with only one other involving a robbery.

The second also took place in Pashtun Zarghun when a local AOG led by the Obe district shadow governor (DSG) entered an IDP resettlement village and searched a community leader who was contracted by an INGO program before setting fire to some of the INGO program's facilities. The search and destruction appears to originate from an inter-community dispute over the allocation of distributed assets, perceived as unfair by neighboring communities. As such, an AOG from bordering Obe attempted to expand its sphere of influence

into the northwest of Pashtun Zarghun district - strategically near Herat - by supporting the disgruntled communities in an effort to fill a new vacuum created by the recent dispersal of local AOG members, whom had either joined the APRP or diminished due to ANSF operations.

The potential for redrawing the lines of political influence in the eastern districts was further manifested when this same Obe based AOG detained INGO food item trucks along with the drivers in Obe. This was followed by an armed clash that resulted from an ANSF attempt to rescue them. While all the detainees were freed - two escaped during the clashes and two were unconditionally released afterwards - the prolonged firefight resulted in a large number of casualties to both sides, including the deaths of the Obe COP, the acting Chishti Shariff COP, and an AOG sub-commander, as well as injuries to the Obe DSG. This incident, along with ANSF follow-up oper-



ations, appears to have caused the relocation of the AOG to the north and south of Obe - where the group is able to obtain support from AOG in Badghis, Adraskan, and Kushki Kuna - and potentially to Pashtun Zarghun.

Despite this series of NGO incidents, AOG activity in the provincial capital and periphery districts (Injil and Guzara) witnessed a general lull, with no AOG incidents reported. However, at the provincial level, the volume of overall AOG activity this month (22 total) remained almost unchanged from the previous month, thus the decline in AOG operations in the city and suburbs was counterbalanced by an increase in AOG activity in the east as well as sustained operational tempo in the south (Shindand and Adraskan) where nine AOG incidents were recorded this month, including a notable two attempts at targeted killings of ANSF/GOA officials in Adraskan this cycle.


BADGHIS

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

In contrast to countrywide seasonal trends, the number of AOG initiated incidents recorded in Badghis this month reached a peak for the year with 52, a similar pattern to what had been observed in 2011, and suggesting that if the province continues to follow existing trends, that volume will start declining in November as the winter arrives.

In terms of AOG tactical choices, close range attacks with conventional forces remained the dominant tactic, accounting for 85% of all AOG incidents, but resulting in only a few casualties. Despite the culmination of the volume of

overall AOG activity, it appears likely that most attacks were sporadic and consisted of harassment fire by small units intending to disrupt ongoing efforts by ANSF/IMF to build ALP/PGM/CIP forces along the ring road. 94% of the attacks were concentrated in Ghormach, Murghab, Qadis, and Muqur - where the ring road construction is ongoing or scheduled to take place - and almost exclusively targeted ANSF/IMF forces. In such circumstances, the risk to NGOs is predominantly that of collateral involvement.



Although a decrease in AOG activity is expected to arrive with the winter, the degree of reduction is likely to be limited as the target for their activities (ANSF/IMF) may accelerate their work in an effort to avoid further delays previously caused by the unstable security environment.

EASTERN REGION

NANGARHAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	20
This Report Period	1

Nangarhar was home to one NGO incident this period, in the Memla area of Khogyani, in which an AOG fighter visited an NGO clinic to request that its manager accompany him off-site to provide medical care to an injured colleague. The manager explained that treatment could only take place at the clinic, after which some negotiations took place before the AOG fighter accepted the explanation and left. Subsequently, ANSF arrived at and surrounded both the clinic and the clinic manager's home, although they later withdrew without searching either premises or detaining anyone for questioning. The incident follows the temporary detention of an NGO staff member – and the search of the clinic at which he worked – by ANA in April (also in Memla) in an effort to gather evidence that he was providing material support to the armed opposition, along with a number of similar incidents region wide, which are likely to continue to occur in similar areas that host competing conflict parties. However, it also demonstrates the space for NGOs to operate in such places in a truly neutral manner.

In the wider province, Bati Kot and Hisarak saw the highest pro-

portion of AOG incidents. In Bati Kot, security along the district's stretch of the Torkham-Jalalabad highway continued to deteriorate, in the form of three direct attacks – on a truck carrying GOA supplies, an ANP checkpoint, and an off-duty ANBP officer (the only fatality) – and an IED detonation against an ANA vehicle. In total, the number of incidents along this segment of the highway so far this year (29) has more than tripled in comparison to the same period in 2011, consistent with a sharp increase in armed opposition activity in the district as a whole. This can in part be understood as the product of the recent presence of foreign AOG, spurred by the support that they, as well as local AOG, enjoy from the local community.

In Hisarak meanwhile, AOG fighters staged three direct attacks against ANP checkpoints in the DAC area across consecutive days. The security situation in the district – which is symptomatic of that in Nangarhar's border districts more generally – has worsened significantly over the course of the year, with 41 AOG incidents recorded so far compared to a total of 16 in 2011. The armed opposition has also proven able to establish a more concerted pres-



ence in the vicinity of the DAC, with 25 out of the total number of incidents recorded to date this year being staged against ANSF and GOA targets in that area, whereas only one such incident was recorded there in the previous year. Moreover, whilst in 2011, AOG activity peaked in July, this year, the volume of incidents has increased month to month since August, making October the most volatile on record in 2012, with 12 AOG attacks in all.

In the final incident of note, in what reports suggest was a failed abduction, a group of armed men shot the nephew of a GOA official in the leg after the boy did not respond when they beckoned him to stop as he was walking in the Farmi Hada area of Bihsud; the group then fled the area. Whilst the motive for the attack remains unknown, it is clear that the boy was targeted as a result of his relation to the GOA official, who himself was stabbed and injured in the same area on the previous day. Owing to the significant presence that the armed opposition maintains in Farmi Hadi and their increasing focus throughout Nangarhar on targeted attacks against GOA officials, it is likely that they were responsible, though no substantiating evidence had come to light by the time of writing.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: *"..by NGOs for NGOs.."*


LAGHMAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Alingar saw the highest proportion of AOG incidents this fortnight, centered predominantly upon the increasingly insecure Mehtarlam – Alingar road. Besram in particular continued to be effected, with AOG fighters staging two illegal checkpoints, on the 16th and 31st, at which passing vehicles were stopped in search of GOA employees – both of which occurred within the NGO travel window of 0900 to 1500 hrs – and a direct attack on an IMF/ANA convoy, during which two AOG fighters were killed and another two were injured, along with three ANA soldiers. Besram was not the only trouble spot along the road however; an IED detonated against an ANA vehicle on the 22nd at 1300hrs in the Kandi Rejayi area, injuring a civilian who was passing by, whilst in the Chenchar

Pul area, on the 19th at 0800 hrs, the armed opposition established another illegal checkpoint. Elsewhere in the district, an IED detonated against an IMF vehicle, prompting IMF to carry out an airstrike in the area – the most significant security forces operation to occur in the province during the period.

In Alishing, an AOG abducted an off-duty ANA soldier, an employee of the Hajj Affairs Department and a civilian, before later releasing them unharmed. The incident marks only the second abduction recorded in the district so far this year, which along with its short duration, may suggest that the armed opposition is sensitive to the possibility that more widespread activity of this kind could elicit a negative reaction amongst



the local community.

In a further development of note, reports indicate that the Haqqani Network has established a presence in Laghman, in Bad Pakh district. Local AOGs had previously been opposed to the presence of foreign fighters, though following the death of the shadow district governor of Alishing – who had played a key role in planning and executing attacks in the district and in neighbouring Bad Pakh – in an IMF airstrike on 9 September, it seems that they have turned to the HQN for operational support and leadership.

KHOST


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	1

On 27 October, an IED detonated in front of the western gate of an INGO medical facility in Khost city, having been placed there by two men who approached the gate on a motorcycle. Owing to the low explosive yield of the device however, only superficial damage was caused. The incident marks the fourth time this year that the facility has been the target of an IED detonation. At the time of writing, the identity of those responsible remains unclear, as whilst the NGO concerned had received a threatening SMS and a night letter earlier in the year, which were subsequently linked to the first three IED detonations – raising the possibility that the armed opposition were also responsible in this

instance – this had since seemingly been addressed through extensive community engagement. It is therefore possible, in the absence of further information, that the incident was criminally motivated, as a result of the competition that the facility poses to commercial medical clinics in the area.

The provincial capital was home to six other IED detonations during the period, including against an ANP vehicle and later an ANP foot patrol, injuring a total of four ANP policemen. The most significant attack of this kind occurred in Mando Zayi however, against an ANP vehicle, killing two ANP policemen and injuring three others.

In Musa Khel meanwhile, the



armed opposition continued to exert pressure on the DAC, with eight direct attacks against GOA and ANSF targets in the area over the course of ten days – the highest proportion of AOG activity recorded in any one district during the period.

Despite this operational intensity, the most casualty heavy incident occurred in Gurbuz, when an AOG attack against an IMF/ANBP base was repelled, with IMF subsequently launching an airstrike which killed nine AOG fighters.

KUNAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0


Whilst the overall volume of incidents fell in comparison to the previous period, the level of AOG activity remained broadly unchanged, the epicentres of which were Ghaziabad, Marawara and Sirkanay, with the overwhelming majority of incidents amounting to direct attacks using heavy weapons and SAF.

In Ghaziabad, the armed opposition staged a succession of attacks against GOA and ANSF targets; the most significant of which occurred on 26 October, when AOG fighters attacked an ANA base in the Sonak area, injuring three ANA soldiers. The district has become increasingly volatile over the course of the year, with a 38% increase in AOG-initiated incidents in comparison to the same period in 2011. More significantly still, whilst only two attacks

in the vicinity of the DAC were recorded last year, there have been 44 in 2012 to date, 26 of which occurred across September and October, in a demonstration that the armed opposition was able to consolidate its control over the wider district during the summer fighting season.

Meanwhile in Marawara, AOG fighters staged seven direct attacks during the period – against several ANBP checkpoints, the DAC and an IMF convoy – bringing the total number of AOG incidents recorded in October to eight; the highest on record in the district in any single month so far this year.

Sirkanay was the only district to record an AOG attack which manifested in a way other than a SAF/heavy weapons attack, when a hand grenade was thrown into



the home of an ALP member, injuring three members of his family. In a further example of AOG efforts to shape rural society in Kunar in this manner, AOG fighters shot and killed a civilian in Wata Pur whom they accused of spying for the GOA.

Lastly, cross-border shelling from Pakistan continued unabated, with 471 shells impacting in Dangam and Sirkanay – a significant increase from the 280 recorded in the first half of the month – and which in one instance resulted in three civilians being injured and their house being destroyed. However, this did not result in further demonstrations or civil unrest.

NURISTAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Nuristan saw a sharp increase in AOG activity in comparison to the previous period, with noteworthy incidents recorded in Kamdesh and Bargi Matal.

In Kamdesh, the armed opposition continued to exert pressure on ANSF targets in the DAC area, in the form of two direct attacks, during which one ANP policemen was killed and another four were injured. The incidents bring the total number of attacks recorded against the DAC in October to four – a figure on par with this year’s high for any single month (recorded in September) and thus a further indication that despite the 48 fatalities that the armed opposition has sustained amongst its ranks across the 14 previous assaults against the DAC over the

course of the year, that it retains significant capabilities which appear to be ascending even into the winter. This was also apparent in the wider district, with AOG fighters establishing an illegal checkpoint in Patigul Pul – at which they stopped passing vehicles in search of GOA employees – setting fire to the home of an ALP officer in Benuz, and planting IEDs in Yurmir Kalay and Chenar Khwar, which later killed one ALP member and an ANBP policeman.

In Bargi Matal, AOG efforts were also concentrated on the DAC, by way of three direct attacks, which killed one ANP policemen and injured four ANA soldiers. The attacks follow an absence of re-



ported incidents in the district since 14 July, when AOG fighters ambushed an ANP/ANA convoy. The lack of recent incidents is not an indication that the district is peripheral to the provincial conflict however, but rather that it is almost entirely uncontested owing to the degree of control maintained by the armed opposition there. Indeed, of the 13 AOG incidents recorded in Bargi Matal so far this year, all but three were against the DAC – the only area in which the GOA continues to maintain any meaningful presence.

SOUTH REGION

KANDAHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1


On the night of Eid, a group of gunmen entered a demining NGO compound via a wall adjoining a vacant compound, and tied up a security guard, a project officer and an unauthorized guest before stealing technical equipment. The perpetrators escaped, and the ANP subsequently took all three uninjured NGO persons in for questioning. They shortly released the guard and the project officer, but arrested the unauthorized guest. The perpetrators appeared to know that the easiest method of entry was over the wall, suggesting that those targeting the compound planned the theft in advance.

Another armed robbery targeted IO staff in Kandahar city on the 11th in the Loya Wala area, Dis-

trict 9. Recorded criminality in the city is low for its urban population size due to the strong presence and control of conflict actors, with only 19 ACG-initiated incidents recorded this year. Further to this, criminality affecting IO/NGO is lower still, with only five incidents since 2008, localized to districts 1 and 9.

Only seven IEDs detonated against security forces this fortnight (the provincial average over the past two months is ten weekly), whilst ANSF defused 48 IEDs (three VBIED) and IMF airstrikes prevented the emplacement of an additional three.

The major threat in Kandahar, however, has been AOG-ANSF



crossfire; 23 of the 72 security incidents this period were AOG-initiated SAF attacks against static ANP targets (i.e. check posts), unlike the majority of the preceding year's SAF attacks, which were primarily against mobile/patrolling ANSF targets. Nine of these SAF attacks occurred between 1600 and 1900 hrs and four between 0700 and 0900 hrs, meaning that 56% of AOG-initiated SAF attacks against ANP occurred over the five hours that occur just after daybreak or before dusk.


PAKTIKA

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Abductions and attacks against persons in transit in Paktika rose this reporting period, with two notable incidents prior to Eid. On 20 October, four ANA soldiers travelling home for the holiday were abducted in Sra Qala area of Mata Khan District and the next day two civilians suspected to be ANA soldiers were shot and killed in the Shwak area of Sharan District as they were travelling to Ghazni. AOG abductions are rare in Paktika, but not unprecedented. In 2011 and 2010 combined, only ten abductions were recorded, all targeting ANSF and GOA personnel. Before this, abductions were more frequent; occurring approximately once per month in 2008-9, with two thirds

of those in transit. Whilst these pre-Eid targeted activities are too few to draw substantive conclusions, it should be noted that they were not observed in previous years, suggesting—at this stage—these incidents are opportunistic shaping operations.

40 security incidents occurred in Paktika this fortnight, 60% of which were AOG-initiated. This security paradigm remains mostly consistent with the two preceding summer months, which averaged 23 security incidents per week. Similarly, AOG-initiated attacks continue to be conducted in a relatively diverse manner, using indirect fire, SAF attacks and roadside IEDs. However, be-



tween 9 and 16 October, there were an anomalous eight IED attacks in a single week, whereas upon average IED attacks occur four per week. Roughly half target ANSF and the remainder indiscriminate. The two IEDs that detonated this reporting period impacted against ALP, suggesting that IED attacks have returned to their normal rate, and in terms of seasonal trends, any slowdown of IED attack rates would be slightly premature, as declines occurred in December in 2010 and 2011.


HELMAND

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

The ALP continued to attract AOG-initiated kinetic activity in Helmand, with four AOG attacks targeting the ALP in two days alone (15 and 16 October) - two SAF attacks against ALP posts, and two AOG-initiated targeted killing against ALP members. Since July 2012, AOG-initiated attacks targeted Helmand-based ALP units approximately 15 times per month, whilst over the preceding 12 months they were only targeted five times per month on average. In contrast, the ANA in Helmand are only targeted approximately twice per month (since July 2012), and the ANP are targeted almost 55 times per month (same period); demonstrating that despite having fewer personnel than ANA in Helmand, the ALP is disproportionately targeted. As a project, the ALP is almost two years old, and their consolidation as an AOG target

might be attributed to an increase in AOG ‘shaping operations’ in Helmand. However, it has yet to be seen how the establishment of ALP (i.e. training, equipping and supporting local militia) has altered local power balances, and whether ALP violence is part of the grander AOG-GOA struggle, or because new power imbalances exacerbate previously existing personal grievances at the community level.

The trend of ANSF shooting IMF (‘Green-on-Blue’) and other ANSF personnel (‘Green-on-Green’) also continued. On 18 October, an ANP cook poisoned and then shot his colleagues, killing six ANP policemen, and on 24 October, two IMF soldiers were killed by an ANP policeman, with an additional two killed on 30 October; all three incidents occurred in Nahri Sarraj District. 22



Green-on-Blue incidents have occurred in the Southern region this year; ten in Helmand.


Notably, both topics (Anti-ALP activity, and ‘Green-on-Blue’) are encompassed in Mullah Omar's recent Eid Ul-Adha message which, in line with previous Eid messages, urged ANSF members to attack colleagues before defecting (via the IEA 'Call and Guidance Committee), and also called for aggression against the 'Arabaki' (Afghan community-based militias; including ALP units). Whilst it is unknown as to what extent AOG control those specific ANSF members prior to their defections and attacks, it is clear that AOG are proactively highlighting and incentivizing this recent trend of increased ANSF defections.

ZABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Targeted killings (frequently by motorcycle-borne AOG members) continued to increase during this reporting period, and were mostly centered in Shahjoy District. Four tribal elders have recently been shot at (three killed) in Shahjoy District (5, 15, 17, and 18 October); two of which were targeted over their alleged support for the ALP program. In addition, an ANP officer was assassinated whilst shopping in Shahjoy District bazaar on 25 October. Over the past four months nine other targeted killings (and attempts) occurred in Zabul Province, two were in Qalat District (15 August and 22 October) and

three occurred in quick succession in Shahjoy District (24, 27, 30 July) over accusations of those targeted being IMF/GOA spies. This trend reveals a recurrence of a violent AOG intimidation strategy centered in Shahjoy District (but also localized in Qalat District), as part of a larger ‘shaping operation’ intended to undermine support for the GOA, and degrade GOA security structures. From this recurrence, it is evident that the establishment of ALP units in Zabul (particularly Shahjoy) and their support by local tribal elders compete with AOG interests in the area, and further-



more, that these are often softer targets.

Additionally, on 22 October, Zabul witnessed a medium-sized group of protestors, including a local politician, peacefully demonstrating over the discovery of two civilian corpses in the Pato Khel area of Shin Kay District on 18 October. The demonstration was over allegations that they were killed in an IMF operation, although such killings had still not been independently confirmed at the time of writing.

URUZGAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

The security paradigm in Uruzgan Province changed significantly this reporting period. Although a similar method and geography of conflict as previous reporting cycles (mostly roadside IEDs and SAF/RPG attacks) was witnessed, the amount of violent activity decreased to only 11 security incidents, in contrast to 63 the previous reporting period. This may be anomalous, given that Eid may have meant a temporary suspension of armed conflict activity. However, this falls in line with the low level of insecurity witnessed between January and May this

year, which averaged 11-12 security incidents every two weeks.

Notably, on 17 October, the ANP were reported to have seized a medium-sized cache of IED components in the Dizak Area of Dihrawud District, amounting to approximately 15 RCIEDs. While not overly significant, given that currently the province averages approximately one IED detonation, this seizure could have a more significant impact than it would in more IED-active provinces such as Kandahar.

Lastly, the province also witnessed



a rare ANSF on IMF attack on 25 October in Chora District which killed one IMF soldier and wounded another. Only two other such attacks have been recorded in Uruzgan in the last two years, although this fits within a wider regional trend of increased 'Green-on-Blue' attacks (see Helmand).

GHAZNI


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Ghazni proved to be, once again, one of the most kinetic provinces in the South region, with 46 security incidents (59% AOG-initiated). Two particular incidents are worth highlighting.

Firstly, on 22 October, AOG abducted five civilians over allegations they were spies; ANP officers discovered their corpses on 26 October. Abduction is not uncommon in Ghazni; this summer, abductions occurred approximately twice per month, but rarely are abductees executed. A notable

40% of the 32 abductions in Ghazni in 2011-12 have targeted civilians.

Secondly, on 24 October at 1100 hrs., an AOG cell attacked a local militia group, killing two militia fighters. This skirmish falls within an ongoing series between local militias and (IEA-aligned) AOG cells in Andar District. Over the past four months 11 AOG-local militia armed clashes or targeted killings have been recorded, including one on 24 October when




an IED detonated near to a local commander's house, killing his wife and daughter, and wounding his son. Such activity is more localized and often happens away from typical AOG targets (ANSF/IMF bases or elements).

NIMROZ

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

On 25 October, an RCIED detonated against an ANBP vehicle in Chahar Burjak district, killing two ANBP policemen, and wounding two others. IED attacks are generally rare in Nimroz Province, with only three IED attacks, two defusals and two premature detonations occurring over the past four months. Although manifested insecurity remains low in Nim-

roz, it is notable that the province did witness two BBIED attacks over the past six months, and ANBP have recovered BBIED vests in at least three additional incidents. While this demonstrates that Nimroz is not entirely without violence, security incidents occur to infrequently to demonstrate sustained targeting



trends, a pattern which in and of itself remains worthy of note.

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Contact List

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR)

Tereza Beniakova - north.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 404 617

Firoz - north2.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 408 252

EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD)

Ross Baillie - east.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 248 362

Naseer - east2.afg@ngosafety.org - 077 2546 242

SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR)

Will Carter - south.afg@ngosafety.org - 0796 688 416

Faizal - south2.afg@ngosafety.org - 0700 492 550

WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT)

Taro Yamagata - west.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 322 192

Sayed Karim- west2.afg@ngosafety.org - 0707 474 135

CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL)

Rory Brown - central.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 323 792

Mukhtar - central2.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 322 116

COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL)

Tomas Muzik - director.afg@ngosafety.org - 0799 325 349

Brian Laguardia - ops.afg@ngosafety.org - 0797 165 017

Jawid Rahimi - admin.afg@ngosafety.org - 0797 093 073

Chase Hannon - mobile.afg@ngosafety.org - 0793 230 118

MISSING THIS PERIOD:

ANSO did not provide analysis for the following areas:

- ➡ Sar-e Pul, Paktya

These areas will be included in subsequent reports. If you have any information that would help us better understand the dynamics, please contact your local ANSO office.

ANSO is overseen by an NGO Advisory Board. If you have any questions or feedback, good or bad, let them know on:

Advisoryboard.afg@ngosafety.org

NGO can register up to five persons to each of ANSO mailing lists. For a registration form please contact:

Registration.afg@ngosafety.org



ANSO REGIONAL DIVISIONS

COMMON ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public Protection Forces / **DC**-District Centre / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **IMF**-International Military Forces / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device / **PDO**-Private Development Organisation / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police / **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative / **IEA**-Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-District Shadow Governor (IEA) / **PGM** - Pro-Government Militia / **APRP** - Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program