As the winter arrived, the Central region saw the largest casualty inducing attack of the fortnight when an SVBIED detonated amongst a cluster of GOA facilities in the center of Maidan Shahr (Wardak) causing eight deaths and over 120 injured. Casualties included five NGO staff as well as two separate NGO compounds collaterally damaged, illustrating the risks that NGOs face with compounds in major population centers and/or near GOA facilities in contested areas.

Logar was the site of the only other NGO incident in this region when a demining site was robbed of VHF equipment and mobile phones. In Kabul, Shia and Sunni students get into a violent scuffle at Kabul University during Ashura, and a BBIED operative was shot and killed - his vest partially detonating - in a target rich environment in the sixth suicide attack inside the nation’s capital this year.

The East witnessed the highest number of NGO direct incidents this period; four in all, with three occurring in Nangarhar - including NGO staff detainments by AOG (subsequently released) and IMF (still at large) as well as the temporary occupation of an NGO compound during a protracted firefight - and one in Kunar (collateral damage occurring to an NGO compound as the result of a stray mortar round). The East has accounted for 32% of all NGO incidents in 2012 to date, of which 58% have been opposition authored, 28% criminal, and 15% by IMF/ANSF combined. IED activity and abductions were recorded in numbers throughout the region, including an SVBIED attack against an IMF base in Nangarhar and an IED in Khost city that killed three civilians and injured 23.

Finally, in the South, a UXO detonation caused injuries to four NGO de-miners in Nimroz (leading to the eventual death of two of them), while Kandahar City saw its eleventh suicide attack this year; also marking the second to occur in November. Elsewhere, provinces other than Helmand witnessed seasonal decreases in AOG activity going into the winter.

Despite a traffic accident involving an INGO vehicle that swerved to miss a child who ran in front of them in Herat, the West was devoid of NGO security incidents, but rather characterized – in general – by seasonal declines in recorded AOG activity; specifically in Badghis and Farah. However, although fewer, the AOG attacks in Badghis were more robust, causing significantly higher casualties. In Ghor, complicated relationships between conflict actors - where the ALP is in the process of developing - continue to create the potential for destabilization despite this overall decrease in activity.

The North witnessed no NGO incidents this period, but did amass a relatively large and diverse number of attacks along main transit routes including the ring road in Baghlan - where most notably Provincial and District level leadership were fired upon as they attempted to take on new positions - Jawzjan (along both the Shibghhan-Andkhoy road where an abduction occurred, and along the Sar-e Pul-Shibghhan road) and Faryab. Faryab shook off seasonal trends and continued to witness a high volume of incident reporting, with much of it occurring on the main Maymana-Ghormach road, although some also on the more traveled Maymana-Shibghhan road. A notable attack in Faryab included five individuals opening fire on spectators at a Buzkashi game in Khwaja Sabz Posh for unknown reasons.

Despite a traffic accident involving an INGO vehicle that swerved to miss a child who ran in front of them in Herat, the West was devoid of NGO security incidents, but rather characterized – in general – by seasonal declines in recorded AOG activity; specifically in Badghis and Farah. However, although fewer, the AOG attacks in Badghis were more robust, causing significantly higher casualties. In Ghor, complicated relationships between conflict actors - where the ALP is in the process of developing - continue to create the potential for destabilization despite this overall decrease in activity.
Two significant events monopolized security reporting in Kabul city during the second half of November: the semi-foiled BBIED incident in Wazir Akbar Khan and the bout of sectarian violence that took place at Kabul University during Ashura.

Firstly, the city witnessed its second incident over the past three months involving a BBIED operative managing to enter a protected diplomatic and military area of downtown Kabul. On the morning of the 21st, a BBIED operative wearing a PSC-like uniform was identified by ANA soldiers as he was walking along a restricted lane near Camp Eggers, the home of the Chief Justice of the Afghan Supreme Court, and a number of other notable governmental and diplomatic facilities. The soldiers shot and killed the operative before he could get to his target and detonate his vest, although part of it did ultimately detonate, killing a nearby PSC guard and a local civilian, and injuring two ANA soldiers. Furthermore, a senior ANA officer who runs a department in the Ministry of Defence was also mildly injured, as was his driver, as they were passing nearby in a vehicle when the blast occurred.

With this marking only the sixth complex/suicide attack in Kabul city thus far in 2012, as compared to 14 total in 2011, this attack and the previous one like it instead represent something more akin to minor disturbances, and are not enough to suggest a reversal of the recent trend towards improving security conditions in the capital city.

That is not to say that the opposition has lost its capability to successfully penetrate Kabul’s ever-more effective defensive security measures at times - and with enough effort some attacks are bound to get through - but it is also likely that the emphasis that the armed opposition has placed on staging such large attacks in Kabul has changed for a number of reasons. For one, in the context of IMF withdrawals from many actively contested rural districts in the central region’s more insecure provinces, as part of the third phase of transition, the opposition is presented with an opportunity for significant gains if they make a concerted effort to fill the vacuum these withdrawals may create (and there is evidence that this is occurring, for instance in southern Wardak).

Moreover, with Haqqani (HQN) expansion in the east, as well as continued operational focus in the southeast up as far as Wardak (where a HQN-signature SVBIED was detonated during the current period), that network, which has been so central to the complex attack campaign against Kabul targets, is relatively well occupied. Other factors, such as reconciliation negotiations and the controlled de-escalation in the run-up to 2014, also likely play into this.

The other major issue in Kabul over the past fortnight was of a significantly different nature. While there was no repetition of the BBIED attack during 2011’s Ashura observations (which occurred amongst a procession of worshippers in the Murad Khane area of District 1), a disagreement between Shia and Sunni students at Kabul University’s male dormitories over the acceptability of conducting a Shia ceremony within the campus mosque led to a brawl in which three students were killed (two thrown from balconies and one trampled underfoot); a further 28 students were injured to varying degrees, with a number suffering wounds from knives and stones, and the dormitories also being moderately damaged.

As a result of the disturbance, ANP were stationed at the scene for the coming two days, and the whole university put on three months’ leave, alongside the Medical Faculty, the Polytechnic, and the Teacher Training College, as a precaution. However, there were no other disturbances related to Ashura across the city or elsewhere, standing in stark contrast to a series of bomb attacks on mourning processions across the border, and thus reinforcing the notion of relative sectarian tolerance here.

Finally, on the lighter side, the afternoon of the 28th saw rumours of an ANSF seizure of a VBIED in District 6 (Darulaman area), but these turned out to be a scene being shot for a docu-drama to be broadcast on local television.
The single most significant incident that occurred in Wardak province in the past fortnight was the large SVBIED that was detonated in the provincial capital Maidan Shahr. Having entered the town from the south, the driver of the Mazda truck – its flatbed laid with explosives and covered in firewood to disguise it – drove past the Olympics Committee sports ground and down an unpaved lane where a number of governmental facilities shared a presence with two NGO compounds.

The driver detonated his VBIED after parking adjacent to the government’s identification department on one side, and the hostel of an NGO midwifery school on the other. These buildings were almost entirely destroyed in the blast, while the midwifery school – separate from the hostel - an NGO office, the provincial governor’s guesthouse, the provincial prison and the northern side of the OCCP (Operations Coordination Center - Provincial: the IMF-ANSF coordination center) suffered significant damage to exterior walls and fortifications, as well as to building interiors.

Damage to windows was inflicted on the ANP HQ and on buildings up to 250 metres away, with the majority of the more than 120 people injured suffering from flying glass in the main bazaar to the north. Amongst the injured were also five NGO employees, with the midwives very lucky that the event occurred during their absence from the hostel as a result of Muharram holidays. Two ANP guards at the ID department were killed, and six civilians – who were either walking in the immediate area of the blast or in their homes just behind the buildings that took the brunt of the impact – also lost their lives.

Whether or not there was a specific intended target remains unclear. The OCCP, frequently visited by IMF, would have been the most natural target, but if it was, the driver stopped 20 meters too late. While local sources have postured that a prison break may have been the objective, this is incongruous with the blunt force that the SVBIED caused – as opposed to a unit of tactical operatives for instance.

It is most likely that the general area was itself the target, for a number of reasons. First, the high concentration of relatively exposed governmental and military facilities in the area, close to the southern outskirts where AOG presence is strongly felt, make it an attractive target to inflict significant damage on a range of locations, in spite of the collateral involvement of the NGOs. Moreover, rather than striking military facilities away to the north of the town, the proximity of the blast site to the central bazaar made the VBIED be acutely felt across the provincial capital, making the opposition’s presence in the provincial capital tangible in a way that it hadn’t been up to that point.

The tactical form of the attack, and its similarities to other such truck-based VBIEDs across the southeast region, points to Haqqani (HQN) authorship, and the driver is currently believed to have been from an area immediately across the border from Khost. In Wardak and Logar so far in 2012, this type of large SVBIED has been an important element in the opposition’s arsenal, with multiple strikes occurring already in Saylabad, Puli Alam and Baraki Barak: this latest VBIED was the fifth that has been deployed, although the first to lean more towards governmental rather than military targets.

Moreover, the incident comes at a time when there are significant security force changes occurring in Wardak, with IMF withdrawals from some southern districts and a decrease in ANA numbers in some of the same places. As mentioned in the previous report, IMF withdrew conventional presence from Jalrez, Nirkh and Jaghatu in the first half of the month (leaving a small number of special forces in the first two); however, in the southern districts of Jaghatu and Saylabad, ANA have also been scaling back their presence more recently; meanwhile, along the highway the number of fixed ANA positions has significantly dropped, creating greater gaps in security force coverage of this strategic roadway than before.

One effect of these changes has been the increasing pressure the opposition has placed on security forces. In Jaghatu, there have been nearly a dozen attacks on the DAC in the past three weeks, while on the 16th, opposition members raised two white IEA flags in a symbolic gesture of their strength; while ANP were removing them, they were targeted by an RCIED. Along the highway, there has also been a spike in incidents, at a level similar to the summer peak; alongside the normal targeting of security forces, there were also two abduction cases, one involving three Ghazni-based GOA employees travelling to Kabul.

In all then, the opposition has demonstrated their strength across a number of areas in the province recently, and with November’s activity higher than October’s, there appears to be no imminent sign of abatement.
**LOGAR**

While overall very quiet, Logar did experience another NGO incident focused around the armed robbery of demining equipment from a rural worksite by armed opposition members. Overwhelmingly focused on Mohammad Agha district, these robberies – three of which have occurred since July – revolve around the easy access that armed opposition members have to the valuable equipment normally found at demining work sites, which by dint of their location in areas of importance to previous iterations of conflict are also often found in areas of contemporary insecurity. The equipment normally includes VHF handsets, mine detectors and mobile phones, and in this most recent incident, it was VHFs and mobiles that were seized by three opposition fighters riding a single motorcycle.

However, over the rest of the fortnight, there were just three other AOG-authored incidents recorded; one took the form of an RCIED against an ANP vehicle on a section of the Kabul-Gardez highway between Kolangar and Puli Alam town, while there were two attacks on ANP CPs in the Porak area. A major reason for this relative quiet is the outflow of AOG forces from the province over the past two months, and the manifest long-term preference of the armed opposition to avoid much fighting in Logar during its bitterly cold winter; proximity to the international border also helps the opposition in this regard.

This downturn has occurred despite the IMF withdrawals from southern Logar that took place in late October. In Baraki Barak, the only one of the three southwestern districts where a small foreign force presence remains, an airstrike killed seven AOG members in Ibrahimkhel including two unit commanders. Finally, a teacher in Mohammad Agha who had a long-running personal conflict with a fellow villager was fatally shot and killed as he was walking to school.

**PARWAN**

Three of the four opposition-authored incidents that occurred in Parwan over the past fortnight did so in the Ghorband valley, which continues to be the main focus of provincial insecurity. There were two cases of armed attack on ANP targets, one on the highway in the Gawaragak area, and one away from the roadway in Dara Kafshan; in both cases ANP escaped unhurt and did not inflict any casualties on the opposition.

The only other incident took the form of an RCIED against an ANP vehicle on the highway, in the Ushtor Shahr area of Shinwari with, again, no one injured.

This volume - with a total of six incidents in or around the highway - is significantly higher than during Novembers in previous years. This points towards the confirmation of increasing localization of AOG presence in the valley - with more locals now actively participating in the armed opposition - and as such makes it likely the valley will sustain low-level opposition activity during the winter (unlike previous years).

The remaining AOG incident occurred in Bagram, where an IMF vehicle was struck by an RCIED in the Rabat area, close to the junction with the main Kabul–Salaang highway. Given the opposition’s maintenance of a small presence in the district - which is primarily focused against the airfield - they retain the capability to conduct such strikes, although it is only the second IED that has occurred in the district so far this year (the other, in August, also occurred in this area).

Finally, in Surkh-e Parsa, two local boys were temporarily abducted from their home by unknown gunmen, in what was understood to be part of the ongoing problem of economically-motivated criminality that is found in the wider Ghorband area – a characteristic that also facilitates opposition expansion in the area.
A single incident broke the calm that otherwise pervaded Bamyan’s security landscape during the past fortnight, occurring in the province’s northeast, where insecurity generated by AOG networks based across the border in Baghlan Province’s Tala wa Barfak District has become significantly worse this year.

On the 23rd, a group of 15 opposition fighters from Tala wa Barfak attacked the main ANP CP in Kahmard’s Eshpushta area – which guards the road at the provincial border – with small arms. This CP has been attacked three times already this year, once as a successful ‘lure’ to target security force responders in a demonstration of the tactical sophistication these networks have been able to employ more recently.

In this case however, the opposition group was surprised by ANA helicopter reinforcements – although in fact it was an ANA patrol that had been conducting a flyover entirely separate from the clash in Eshpushta. After being fired on by the opposition fighters, the ANA helicopters engaged the fighters, also receiving backup from another air patrol, and quickly forced them into a retreat.

Of the 15, three AOG fighters were killed by the aerial assault, including one of the most important of Tala wa Barfak’s AOG commanders, which is likely to cause some pause in opposition cross-border activity into eastern Kahmard, and a further three were injured.

In spite of security force operations in Tala wa Barfak in recent weeks, it is clear that these networks retain an intent and capability of projecting power into eastern Kahmard, including into northern Shikari and up to Dar Band on the road towards Ruyi Du Ab. While there is already a lower level of activity when compared to the summer, similar to Ghorband it is likely that some level - albeit a reduced one - of activity will continue throughout the winter months.

**NOTICE:** Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

**ANSO:** “..by NGOs for NGOs..”
The end of the fighting season has not come to Faryab, where, after being in decrease for four weeks, the overall incident volume grew again from 25 security incidents recorded the PRP to 31 this cycle. As has become typical for the province in the second half of 2012, 70% of this fortnight’s incidents were initiated by AOG and only four by ANSF.

AOG active in the South of the province - namely in Almar, Qaysar and Pashtun Kot - have spent the past four months capitalizing on the IMF withdrawal and the accompanying reduction in ANSF activity and for now show no intention of slowing their rate of activity in the face of the coming winter months. Similarly, the killing of a provincial-level AOG commander in Myan Dara village, Pashtun Kot, on 23 October had a very brief, if any, discernible impact on the rate of AOG activity in the province.

Since August this year, fluctuations in the volume of incidents in the above three districts have driven any volume shifts recorded in the province at large, and this cycle remained true to that pattern, with the number of incidents recorded in the three districts doubling between the beginning and end of November.

Out of all the targeted areas, the increasing intensity of AOG attacks has been most acutely felt on the main road connecting Maymana with Ghormach district. Despite passing through two of the most kinetic districts in the province - Almar and Qaysar - the road itself only recorded seven AOG-initiated incidents during the months of July and August. This has now risen to 22 AOG attacks on the road or in the immediate vicinity in October and November. Ten out of the 11 attacks witnessed on the road in November consisted of close range SAF and RPG attacks against ANSF targets, mostly ANP checkpoints. This development points towards a continued and increasing confidence and assertiveness of local AOG as they gain a firmer foothold in the areas surrounding the road.

Elsewhere, the Maymana-Shibirghan road also saw trouble, recording two incidents this cycle. The other incident on the Maymana-Shibirghan road took place on what has been comparatively a calmer portion of the road that passes through Khwaja Sabz Posh, when an ANP vehicle came under SAF attack while traversing the area at 1100 (also on 27 November). Recent anecdotal reports have pointed towards the presence of a new AOG in the normally calmer district, indicating that the shooting was not related to the other incident on the main road that same day. Lastly, two days after this attack, five AOG members opened fire on spectators at a buzkashi game in the district center. The ANP were present and intervened, and one AOG member was killed, two other wounded and the remaining two arrested. No injuries to any of the civilians present were reported.

Although a number of civilians died during the Eid suicide bombing in Maymana on 26 October, an attack involving SAF into a crowd of civilians remains an outlier in the province, at least for this year. On 26 February 2011 a BBIED detonated at a buzkashi match in Shirin Tagab district center, killing four civilians and injuring 22, but distinctly targeting a local powerbroker. The outcome of this year’s incident in Khwaja Sabz Posh and the manner in which it was carried out marks it at best as a questionably executed copycat attack - although without the obvious target - indicating that the group responsible is local, unstructured and, at least for now, without significant support from provincial level AOG leadership.
The security landscape in Baghlan was dominated by the events surrounding the dismissal of the district governor (DG) and the district chief of police (DCOP) of Baghlan Jadid district. After the DG refused to allow the replacement of the DCOP following a shoot out between ANA and ANP officers on 25 October, a decision was made to replace both the DG and the DCOP. The newly appointed DG and DCOP however failed to reach Baghlan Jadid district center on their first attempt on 26 November, as the convoy in which they were traveling along with the provincial COP (PCOP) came under a SAF and RPG attack in the Parchawa area of the main road. At 0300 on 27 November. ANSF carried out an operation in areas surrounding the district center and targeting two local commanders aligned with the former DG - who was to be replaced - and assumed to be behind the attack. One of the commanders was killed in the operation, while the other together with the former DG escaped the district. The newly appointed DG and DCOP reached the district the following day and took their positions. For the moment, the transfer of power in the district appears to be complete, although the situation requires close monitoring in the coming months.

In spite of this, the overall number of security incidents in Baghlan decreased by close to half when compared to the previous cycle. In a pattern similar to that observed in Kunduz, AOG-initiated activity has dropped sharply, and all four of those AOG-initiated incidents that were recorded took place in Baghlan Jadid. Three of those occurred on the main Puli Khumri-Kunduz road: an RCIED unsuccessfully targeted the DCOP of Khanabad (Kunduz) in Charshanbe Tepa area on 18 November at 1300, a fuel tanker came under SAF and RPG attack in Jari Khushk area on 25 November at 1900 and two AOG members were killed when the IED they were transporting on a motorcycle detonated in Parchawa area on 29 November at 1910.

A significant number of AOG in Baghlan Jadid are local and can therefore be expected to continue staging attacks on the main road over the coming winter, albeit at a slower rate than that experienced during summer months.

AOG-initiated activity has been steadily in decline in Kunduz since the June peak and has now decreased to almost nothing as no AOG-initiated incidents targeting GOA, IMF, ANSF or civilian infrastructure were recorded in the province this cycle. The decline in AOG activity in Kunduz is in stark contrast with the current situation in Faryab, where AOG-driven activity has been on the increase this year and cycle. In fact, the only AOG-initiated incident in the second half of November was a dispute between an AOG and an ACG in Khanabad district on the 24th, which developed into an armed clash that left one AOG and two ACG members dead. Khanabad district hosts a plethora of armed groups and militias, including those that failed to qualify into the ALP program when it was introduced to the district. The most extreme manifestation of the conflict between the local AOG and other militias took place in Kanam Kalan area on 2 September, when a PGM entered a village and killed 13 local civilians who were suspected of aiding a local AOG in the previous killing of one of the PGM members. IMF and ANSF did not follow the example set by the AOG and continued to operate in Archi, Khanabad and Chahar Dara districts. The ANSF/IMF focus on Archi appears to have pushed at least some of the AOG into neighboring Khwaja Ghar (Takhar), where a string of AOG attacks was recorded during this cycle.

At six total this period, the number of recorded ACG-initiated incidents remained slightly above the average compared to the previous months. In an incident similar to the kidnapping of a young boy in Mazar this cycle, the son of a local doctor was kidnapped in Kunduz city on the 17th but freed on the 22nd in an NDS/ANP operation in the city. Five members of the ACG behind the kidnapping were also arrested in the operation.
BALKH

Balkh has maintained a mostly consistent rate of recorded security incidents since the beginning of October which, at 26 average, is not significantly below the average of 29 per month recorded thus far for the entire year. A rise in the number of criminally motivated incidents in the second half of November has compensated for the 33% fall in AOG and ANSF-initiated incidents typical to the end of the fighting season.

In the most high-profile criminal incident, a young son of a prominent businessman from Mazar-e Sharif was kidnapped when he was left alone in a parked car. The incident took place on 26 November at 1700 in front of the Muzafar bazaar in central Mazar. Together with the kidnapping of the son of a local doctor in Kunduz on 17 November, the incidents serve as a reminder that those locals perceived to be affluent or influential and their family members are often at greater risk of abduction in provincial urban centers than middle class citizens associated with IOs or international NGOs.

AOG-initiated activity in the province during this cycle was limited to two incidents, each a high-profile attack in a district center. First, on 16 November AOG fired three mortar rounds towards the DAC in Chahar Bolak. Several days later on the 19th, an RCIED detonated in front of a bank in Balkh district center just as several ALP members were entering it to withdraw their salaries, killing one ALP member. The incidents came after two RPG and mortar round attacks against the Dawlatabad DAC on 3 and 10 November.

The decision to concentrate AOG activity in Balkh into strikes against and in district centers in the ‘West of Mazar’ area came most likely as a reaction against continued ANSF and IMF activity in Chimtal district as well as ANSF operations in Chahar Bolak. The presence of the ALP, formalized in the districts this September, has furthermore hampered the ability of AOG to move freely between the villages. It is therefore likely that as AOG-initiated attacks continue to decline in the countryside, as a function of the coming winter, high-profile attacks against targets in district centers in the area will continue to take place with some low level regularity.

JAWZJAN

Insecurity along the main roads marked the primary areas of concern in Jawzjan this reporting period. On 17 November at approximately 1600 hours a Toyota 4x4 belonging to a private construction company was stopped on the main Mazar-Andkhoy road in Khwaja Du Koh district, and one international and four national members of the staff were abducted. The four national staff were later released on the 19th from the same area, while the whereabouts of the international member remains unknown.

Reports indicate that the construction staff were abducted by a relatively small local armed group that operates in the Dashte Laili area on the border between Jawzjan and Faryab and maintains links with both AOG and ACG.

No AOG or ACG-initiated incidents have been recorded this year on the Jawzjan portion of the Mazar-Andkhoy road. The incident is therefore a significant outlier, however it also highlights the relative accessibility of the road to various armed groups from the Dashte Laili area and the need to cross the area well before dusk.

The Shibirghan-Sar-e Pul road was also affected by AOG attacks this cycle. The first took place on the 18th at 2300 when an AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint in Ki Kertak Jar village and the second on the 27th when an ANA convoy came under SAF attack in Sehanbe area at 0800.

The areas surrounding the road on the border between Jawzjan and Sar-e Pul belong to a single AOG operational space. While attacks on the Sar-e Pul portion of the road were more common this year, increased ANSF activity in the Shiram area of Sar-e Pul in the second half of November likely pushed local AOGs into staging attacks on the Jawzjan side of the road.

In spite of the two attacks this cycle, AOG do not yet have unrestricted daytime access to the main road. While the nighttime attack consisted of a 30 min firefight, the morning attack only consisted of several rounds of SAF fired from a distance.
Three AOG-initiated incidents in Khwaja Ghar during this cycle were the first AOG-initiated incidents in the province since the RCIED attack that killed the Mayor of Ishkamish on 13 August. The incidents took place in Mingchokor and Cheka areas and consisted of close-range SAF and RPG attacks against ALP checkpoint and patrols. The fighting culminated with an IMF operation on 25 November during which one suspected AOG member was arrested.

Khwaja Ghar is not known to host a consistent AOG presence, however AOG from neighboring Archi (Kunduz) transit through the district with some regularity. Several ANSF and IMF operations took place in Archi this cycle, thus likely pushing AOG into Takhar province.

AOG tend to refrain from initiating attacks in districts that are used for transit or other kinds of logistical support to avoid calling attention to themselves, and the exact motive behind the attacks in Khwaja Ghar remains unclear. It is however possible that the approaching end of the fighting season and the ANSF and IMF presence in Archi pushed the group into taking advantage of the targets before leaving the area for the winter.

At only five, the volume of recorded security incidents in Badakhshan was relatively low this cycle. In the only AOG-initiated incident, AOG set up an illegal checkpoint in Warduj district on the main road leading to Ishkashim, in Bashund area on the 26th. Intensive ANSF operations took place in Warduj in October and November in an effort to uproot local AOGs, however as this incident indicates the use of the Baharak-Ishkashim road free of AOG interference remains unlikely for the immediate future. As the Fayzabad-Shighnan road has now become impassable due to weather, there are no remaining direct access roads to Ishkashim from Fayzabad on which movement would be advisable. Unless the AOG presence and activity in Warduj shifts dramatically, Ishkashim will remain inaccessible by road through Afghanistan until likely April of 2013. Of note, other roads closed by weather include Fayzabad-Yawan and Ragh-Darwaz.

Only two incidents were reported in Sar-e Pul this cycle: a premature RCIED detonation in Sozma Qala on 24 November and an ANSF operation in Shiram area of Sar-e Pul district on the 27th. During the operation a mid-level AOG commander was killed and another AOG member was arrested. The killed AOG commander was known to operate in the Shiram and Nimadan areas of Sar-e Pul district and was likely involved in the staging of AOG incidents on the Shibirghan-Sar-e Pul main road.

The ANSF presence and activity along the Sar-e Pul section of the this road however appears to have pushed some of the AOGs active there north into Jawzjan, where two incidents were recorded on the road this cycle. As such, the security paradigm on the main road for Sar-e Pul remains - at current - unaltered.
This cycle, Ghor experienced several notable events despite a continuing seasonal decline in AOG activity that resulted in only eight AOG incidents recorded this month, a 27% reduction compared to that of October. GOA/ANSF established ALP - although not yet officially announced - in the northern part of Chaghcharan and southern tip of Du Layna; the first ALP consists mainly of a group associated with the ex-Provincial Judge who had been assassinated by a local AOG from Murghab Valley this June, while the second group is loyal to a prominent local commander in Du Layna who joined the APRP in May. Whereas the long-term impact of the expansion of the ALP program remains questionable - due to the potential for further intensification of tribal disputes, thus creating more space for IEA elements to infiltrate - in the short term, the establishment of ALP in these strategic locations is likely to curtail AOG migrations from the northern stronghold in Charsada and Murghab Valley and the south in Taywara and Passaband going into the winter.

Meanwhile, GOA initiated negotiations with a key local AOG in Shahrak and offered mediations to solve longstanding disputes between its commander and the commander of a rival group (which had reintegrated into the ANP years back). The first group is known to be associated with a high-ranking GOA official in Kabul - although also maintaining loose ties with the IEA - and exerts some degree of control over the northwest of the district where the Herat-Chaghcharan highway is situated. However, despite the GOA’s negotiation efforts at the provincial level, IMF launched a unilateral air-strike from the Shindand military airbase (Herat) in an attempt to assassinate that same commander following a previously attempted night-raid against his group in October which resulted in the death of 11 members and the arrest of five others. In such a case, it appears likely that stability in this key area – where the main supply route from Herat lies – largely depends on how the provincial GOA will be able to coordinate/negotiate with IMF and other high-ranking GOA officials who are taking a firm stance against this group.

The volume of AOG activity maintained that of the PRP this cycle, leading to a total of 41 AOG incidents recorded for November, a 24% reduction compared to that of October. Despite this, AOG maintained their aggressive posture against ANSF. Tactics remained consistent with the previous cycle, as opposed to employing “harassment fire” - which tends to cause less casualties - as they had focused on until last month, AOG employed dedicated tactics that caused more casualties while remaining focused on Ghormach, Muqur, Murghab, and Qadis. Illustrating this, AOG initiated an attack against an ANA vehicle with an RCIED strike in Muqur this cycle, whereas immediately following the explosion they employed SAF and RPGs which killed three ANA soldiers and wounded four others.

Further to this, AOG operations extended into Jawand - where activity had rarely been witnessed - with three incidents recorded, one of which involved a large number of AOG fighters attacking the DAC which turned into a protracted SAF exchange with ANSF.

These all resulted in the total ANSF casualty figures for the entire province increasing 62% with fatalities up 100% in comparison to October, despite the downturn in overall AOG incident volumes, clearly illustrating a lower volume but a higher effectiveness. In response to this aggression, ANSF conducted a clearing operation in Muqur which resulted in the deaths of nine AOG fighters including three commanders, and injuries to three others.
**HERAT**

This cycle, an INGO rented vehicle got involved in a traffic accident which resulted in the driver sustaining injuries when the vehicle swerved to avoid hitting a child. Of note, although this particular incident was not tallied as an “NGO security incident,” it shines a light on the non-conflict related difficulties involving NGO movements that the winter is likely to bring.

In fact, NGOs have been more effected by criminality in Herat this year than by AOG (7:6) with all three of the NGO incidents recorded over the first half of November attributed to criminality. Further to this, out of those incidents effecting NGOs in Herat City itself, two out of the three thus far this year were ACG attributed.

As for general security issues, the level of AOG activity remained almost unchanged this month - with 21 AOG incidents - compared to that of October. Whilst this figure represents a 56% reduction from the recorded peak in July, AOG operations in Herat thus far have appeared less affected by seasonal declines this year than at the same period over the last two, as indicated by the lack of decrease in comparison to October (in 2010, AOG activity decreased 56% from October to November, and 46% over the same periods in 2011).

The majority of AOG operational focus has remained on ANSF in the southern districts (Adraskan and Shindand), and this cycle the rest of the province witnessed only one AOG incident which occurred in Kohsan when an RCIED detonated in the vicinity of the ANBP HQ. The provincial capital as well as peripheral districts (Guzara and Injil) remained calm without any AOG or ACG authored incidents, while eight ANSF initiated incidents – mostly search operations – were recorded, indicating that ANSF remain the dominant actor in those areas.

**NGO Incidents**

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**FARAH**

The volume of overall security incidents declined further this month in line with nationwide seasonal trends, with 56 recorded accounting for a 13% reduction compared with the previous month’s volume. This drop was attributed mainly to downscaling of AOG activity with 22 AOG incidents accounting for a 37% decrease, whilst in contrast, ANSF accelerated its operational tempo with 22 incidents, nearly a 30% increase. It is likely that the proportion between AOG and ANSF initiated incidents will shift further toward the latter actor as the seasonal downturn continues over the winter, and ANSF will likely continue to attempt to expand control, particularly in strategic districts such as Bala Buluk and Bakwa, until the armed opposition regains its operational capacity next spring.

In terms of AOG tactical choices, the use of IEDs has become more common proportionately as AOG’s resources/manpower have been drained. While the number of close range attacks with conventional forces declined at 40% this month compared with that of the last month, the reduction of IED attacks was limited to 25%. Particularly, this cycle, IED related incidents were more frequently witnessed in central districts (Farah, Pusht Rod, and Khaki Safed) with four effective IED detonations and 19 pressure plate IEDs (PPIED) discovered and neutralized by ANSF. Traditional AOG hotspots in Bala Buluk and Bakwa recorded no effective IED detonations but eight PPIEDs discovered by ANSF along the Herat-Kandahar highway. However, on 16 November, a roadside IED detonated against a local civilian transport in Pusht Rod which resulted in the fatalities of 18 local civilians and injuries to more than ten others, indicating the indiscriminate nature of IED attacks, although such a scale of civilian casualties caused by a single strike has been very rare in the province.
On 21 November, at 0700 in Nazyan, an AOG abducted three demining agency national staff members from their vehicles. The staff had travelled to the district to conduct an assessment. The precise area in which the incident occurred, Da Nazyano Khola, is remote and as such it was likely motivated by AOG hostility towards those who are evidently non-locals, and thus cause for suspicion, rather than to the specific NGO and its activities. Indeed, whilst the armed opposition maintains a significant presence in Nazyan, there is strong support among the local community for NGOs, and in fact the community used its influence to secure the release of these deminers the following day.

Two other NGO incidents occurred during the period as well. First, on 25 November in Khogyani, IMF arrested an NGO community health supervisor, along with five members of his family, after having searched his home. Whilst the arrest was likely motivated by IMF suspicion that he was affiliated with the armed opposition, it remains unclear whether it was related to his employment at a clinic, where he may have treated AOG members in accordance with established humanitarian principles and which would therefore make his arrest a cause for concern, or to personal ties.

Then on 28 November, in Lal Pur, during an AOG attack against the DAC, several AOG members established a forward position in the vicinity of an NGO clinic, which sustained superficial damage when ANSF returned fire. The AOG members later entered the clinic after one of their number was injured, though the staff members who had been in the building when the attack began had since either fled or hid. The AOG cadre left when ANSF repelled the attack, which was followed a short time later by an ANP clearing operation in which eight AOG members were killed.

Whilst the overall volume of NGO incidents in the district has fallen in comparison to the same period last year - from 27 to 15 - the armed opposition has demonstrated greater capability to attack the DAC, with three staged so far this year – a figure equal to the total number of attacks recorded against it from 2006 to 2011.

In the wider provincial conflict, the intensity of AOG activity increased in comparison to the first half of the month, from 23 AOG incidents to 32, two of which, in Muhmand Dara and Chaparhar, stood out in particular.

In Muhmand Dara, on 23 November, an AOG member drove an SVBIED into the main gate of the Torkham IMF base, injuring five Afghan Security Guards who were stationed there. Whilst suicide attacks are not without precedent in the district, this is the first since 27 August 2009, when a BBIED operative detonated his suicide vest in a dining facility used by Pakistani tribal militiamen at the Torkham border crossing, killing 22 people and injuring 15 others. Given the infrequency of suicide operations since 2009, and the otherwise low level of AOG incidents in Muhmand Dara, it is likely that such attacks will remain few and far between.

Meanwhile in Chaparhar, on 28 November, AOG members forced their way into the home of the deputy district governor and shot and killed him. The incident follows the targeted killing of the previous deputy district governor, along with two other GOA officials on 19 June in a SAF attack on their vehicle, and as such serves to underscore the worsening security environment in the district, where AOG activity as a whole has increased in comparison to the same period last year, from 43 AOG incidents to 56. Further targeted killings can be expected as the armed opposition continue to attempt to use its growing influence to shape political and social life in Chaparhar.
KUNAR

Kunar was home to one NGO incident during the period, when, on 22 November, during an AOG attack on the Shegal DAC, a stray mortar round landed in the vicinity of an NGO health facility, causing damage, though superficial, to its perimeter. The incident is the eighth of its kind to be recorded in the eastern region so far this year, following collateral damage to NGO facilities (all but one a clinic) during AOG assaults on DACs in districts in Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman. That the number of such incidents has doubled in comparison to the same period last year is a barometer of the worsening security situation in the districts in which they occurred – including Lal Pur (see Nangarhar), Mehtarlam and Asadabad – with armed opposition cadres proving able to establish a significant presence within range of the district administrative centers there. Further incidents of this nature, though sporadic, are therefore foreseeable, with medical NGOs likely to be disproportionately affected, given that the nature of their activities often requires them to endure close proximity to conflict and/or DACs.

Meanwhile, in Wata Pur, in the Gambiri area, on 28 November, an influential former Hezb-i-Islami commander and four other civilians were shot and killed. He and three associates had travelled to the area to negotiate the release of his son, who had been abducted on 26 November, but were instead held captive along with him, before all five were killed the following day. The commander had recently joined the APRP and as such it seems likely that the armed opposition was responsible, in a further demonstration of their hostility towards the process, following the killing of two APRP officials in Nari, and an NDS officer, who had attempted to persuade AOG members in Dangam to join, on 11 June.

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| LAGHMAN

Following the relative lull at the beginning of the month, there was a return to conflict activity this period, driven by a tripling in the number of AOG incidents, from five to 15, the most significant of which took place along the Mehtarlam–Ailingar highway.

First, on 16 November at 1200 in Mehtarlam, in the Abuzi Pul area, AOG members attacked an ANP convoy with heavy weapons and SAF, prompting a six hour firefight in which six AOG members were killed and two ANP policemen were injured. Two days later, again at 1200, AOG cadres conducted coordinated attacks against sections of an ANA convoy in the Kanda, Perwai and Kokhi areas of Ailingar, although no casualties were reported. In both instances, it transpires that the convoys were surveying the highway in preparation for the deployment of ALP, in a bid to secure it, a process that began on 27 November, when ANSF launched clearing operations in the Naly, Khan Qala and Abuzi areas of Mehtarlam, sparking a series of armed clashes during which 13 AOG members were killed and three ANA soldiers, along with four civilians, were injured. It is likely that similar operations, along other sections of the highway, will be undertaken in the coming weeks.

In another incident of note, in Mehtarlam, an IED, that had been planted in front of a girls’ school by AOG members, detonated, injuring two schoolgirls, in what was likely an attempt to erode civilian confidence in the ability of the government to provide for their security. Whilst attacks on schools are of understandable concern to NGOs involved in the education sector, the residual risk to them and their projects – given that only eight other such incidents have been recorded in the eastern region this year, the impact of which have typically been limited to damage to the buildings themselves, rather than casualties – is assessed to be low.

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PAKTYA

Whilst the overall volume of incidents continued to decline in line with seasonal trends, the period saw a minor increase in AOG activity in comparison to the first half of the month, with AOG incidents rising from five to seven. Of these, the majority were concentrated in Sayid Karam, in the form of IED detonations against an ANP vehicle on 22 November – injuring one ANP policeman – and an IMF vehicle on 25 November, as well as two SAF attacks on the homes of ANP officers.

IMF and ANSF operations had a greater impact by contrast, with two AOG members killed in a clearing operation in Jaji on 16 November and seven others, among them a mid-level commander, arrested in subsequent operations in the district and in neighbouring Gardez. This dynamic is set to continue throughout winter, owing to the technological disparity between the security forces and the armed opposition, which allows the former to minimize the impact of the cold on their ability to operate.

KHOST

In Khost City, which transitioned on 21 November, three civilians were killed and 23 others were injured, when an IED, attached to a bicycle, detonated on the 26th. The target of the attack, given that there have been no conclusive reports that any of the casualties were affiliated with the GOA or IMF, along with precise method of detonation, remains unclear, raising the possibility that it detonated prematurely. The incident was one of six IED detonations that occurred in and around the provincial capital during the period, though none of the other five proved fatal. Khost also recorded a direct attack against an Afghan Security Guard checkpoint – which stands out not because of its impact, but because of the rarity of close range attacks of this kind in the district, with only 11 having been recorded so far this year, out of a total of 97 AOG incidents, the majority of which (80) were IED detonations, the armed opposition’s preferred tactic. As in this period, IED detonations are not only the most prevalent form of AOG activity in the district, but typically the most significant, as was also demonstrated in the first half of the month, on 10 November, when an IED, again attached to a bicycle, detonated, injuring ten civilians, one of whom later died. Indeed, across the year so far, IED detonations accounted for 48 of the 49 recorded fatalities, 29 of whom were civilians, in an indication of the willingness of the armed opposition to incur a high civilian death toll during such operations.

Outside of Khost, the highest proportion of AOG incidents occurred in Tere Zayi, by way of two direct attacks, against an ANBP checkpoint and an ANSF convoy, and one mortar attack on an ANBP base. Meanwhile in Tani, on 25 November, two AOG members riding motorcycles shot and killed a low-ranking GOA official. The attack is the first of its kind to be recorded in the district so far this year and it remains to be seen whether or not it was politically motivated. Nevertheless, it is an indication, despite the sharp drop in AOG incidents in Tani in comparison to the same period last year (from 76 to 28), that the armed opposition retains the ability to plan and execute significant operations in the area. This was also made apparent on 27 November, when ANSF discovered a motorcycle rigged as an RCIED in the district, which detonated when they attempted to defuse it, injuring five ANSF personnel.
On 28 November, an SVBIED consisting of a Zaranj tricycle prematurely detonated en route into Kandahar City, marking the eleventh suicide attack in the city in as many months. Whilst the overall rate of suicide attacks in Kandahar City has decreased in comparison to last year (by 28%), it is notable that suicide attacks do not significantly decrease (and sometimes increase) during the winter months. This is uncharacteristic of the overall trends of violence in Kandahar, which dramatically peak in the summer. Only three of the eleven suicide attacks this year in Kandahar City occurred in the summer. The above suggesting that suicide attacks may continue going into the winter period.

Another notable security incident, a targeted killing, occurred on 16 November in District 8, when a district council member was shot on his way to the mosque at 0500. Two separate issues are brought to the fore in this incident. Firstly, the majority of targeted killings occur when individuals follow a predictable daily movement routine, susceptible to surveillance. In this case, it has been individuals attending prayers at their preferred mosque. In other cases, for instance, individuals have been killed when departing work. Secondly, the number of targeted killings in Kandahar City has decreased substantially since last year; in the same reporting period in 2011, five targeted killings occurred in Kandahar City - a representative sample for the year. This reporting period, comparatively, only one targeted killing was documented in the city. Notably, this is a significant decrease in the endemic use of targeted killings as a tool of conflict in Kandahar, although the target profile of victims remains largely unchanged: GOA/ANSF officials.

ANSF activity remains high in Uruzgan Province, despite the onset of the winter season. At least seven ANA, ANP, and ALP operations in the province resulted in armed clashes with AOG members during this reporting period, while over the preceding month only three ANSF operations had been documented. The operations mostly occurred in the districts of Chora, Dihrawud, Char Chino and Khas Uruzgan. Despite this upsurge in ANSF activity, and continuing decline in AOG activity, the security paradigm in Uruzgan continues to be dominated by IED related activity. This reporting period, 45% of security incidents in the province were IED related. Seven IEDs detonated against patrolling ANSF vehicles, in one incident, wounding three ALP personnel. On the other hand, five IEDs were located and defused by ANSF personnel, and four AOG members were detained whilst emplacing IEDs.

Worthy of note is that no civilians or civilian vehicles appeared to be injured or damaged by IEDs during this reporting period. This is reflective of the TTPs and IED technologies employed in the province. In one incident, the ANSF EOD team defused a roadside IED which had a 300m command wire (for detonation) attached to it. This form of remote control initiated device, which relies on the visual confirmation of an AOG ‘spotter’ and then manual operation/detonation, may explain why IED targeting has been limited to ANSF vehicles, unlike the indiscriminate IED targeting observed in other southern provinces, such as Helmand, so characteristic of victim operated devices. Although there are no major thoroughfares which IEDs in Uruzgan appear to gravitate to, given the command wire technologies employed, it is highly probable that ANSF vehicles set routine routes of movement (albeit with differing travel times), allowing for potential AOG surveillance.
**Zabul**

On 16 November, the representative for Kuchi tribes within the provincial ministry of Tribal Affairs was shot dead as he attended evening prayers in a mosque outside Qalat City. Targeted killings in the province, however, appear to have decreased significantly; in October 2012, for instance, three tribal elders (associated with the ALP program) were targeted and killed in separate incidents, in what was assessed as part of an AOG ‘shaping strategy’, designed to undermine, deter and prevent growth of ALP units. In the same month, a shopkeeper was also shot dead outside Qalat City, after AOG members alleged he was an ANA contractor. This month (November), however, the only targeted killing was of the aforementioned Kuchi representative.

Despite this apparent decrease of targeted killings in the province, AOG ‘shaping operations’ appear to be continuing in a different form: abduction. Following the PRP’s documented cases, on 22 November, two GOA employees were abducted from their home outside Qalat City, marking the fifth abduction (or abduction attempt) since the beginning of September. At this frequency, abduction of GOA/ANSF-aligned persons now occurs approximately once every three weeks in Zabul. In contrast, over the preceding 12 months, there were only three documented abductions in the entire province.

**Helmand**

On 22 November a local doctor in Marjah District was shot dead by two ACG members at night. The precise motives remain unclear, however despite only low levels of ACG activity recorded, the incident underscores one of the non-AOG security risks that locals in the province must manage.

More generally, the overall rate of security incidents has increased in Helmand during this reporting period. Over the preceding two months, an average of 58 security incidents occurred every reporting period. During this reporting period, however, 77 security incidents have occurred in Helmand. Nonetheless, this same period last year witnessed 78 security incidents—indicating a potential return to those previous levels of violence for the winter season.

Notably, there has been a spike in security incidents related to the narcotics industry during this reporting period, which occurs in line with this poppy season (the second of two annual cycles - the first occurring in late Spring). In seven separate incidents this reporting period, GOA-led counter-narcotics operations had resulted in the detention of 23 farmers, the seizure and/or destruction of 119 water pumps irrigating poppy farms, and the eradication of 895 acres of poppy yield. Eventually, on 25 November 2012, poppy eradication forces faced opposition when they were ambushed by an AOG cell with small arms fire, and on the same day discovered and defused water pumps rigged with IEDs; such campaigns have occasionally been met with armed resistance for a variety of reasons. Moreover, the pre-planned selection of cultivated areas to eradicate is questionable, as it only targets a small portion of poppy-cultivated land, and its effects as a deterrent do not appear to have curbed opium production in the province. Purportedly, eradication forces target lands which have been illegally ‘expropriated’ from government ownership. Notably, in 2011, the latest arrests made by eradication forces occurred on 17 December, suggesting that the coming fortnight would also witness continued counter-narcotics activity.
**NIMROZ**

On 17 November in Chahar Burredjak District (an expansive district, which has extensive borders with both Iran and Pakistan), a landmine exploded injuring four NGO staff members from a demining team as they were conducting their activities; two were severely wounded, and later died of injuries. The explosive remnant of war was triggered accidentally in the minefield in which they were conducting demining activities, and was not an attack.

Two targeted killings also took place during this reporting period (15 and 18 November), both inside Zaranj City. In one episode, the former director of the Hajj and Religious Affairs department (now working with the Zaranj Department of Justice) was shot whilst travelling the mosque. An ANP officer was targeted in the other. In both incidents, the killings were perpetrated by AOG operatives mounted on motorcy- cle. ANSF later apprehended suspected perpetrators.

This year, there have been only five other targeted killings in Nimroz Province, mostly within Zaranj and Khash Rod Districts.

**GHAZNI**

Andar District remained heavily contested, with 22% of the province’s security incidents falling within the district. Four ANSF personnel and nine AOG members were killed in six different firefights. A further three AOG members were wounded, and five more detained in the same incidents. Two civilians were injured in the crossfire, underlining that there is a low, but extant security risk for civilians in the province.

So far, Ghazni Province appears mostly unaffected by the seasonal change, as the security paradigm remains consistent with previous security trends. Since September, an average of 64 security incidents occur each reporting period; the same number of security incidents documented this period. In contrast to the corresponding reporting period in 2011, overall security activity has decreased this year in Ghazni Province by some 18%—a marginally smaller decrease than overall trends in violence around Afghanistan, indicating that the security paradigm in Ghazni is slower to change.

**PAKTIKA**

The frequency of security incidents slowed some to 35 this reporting period after the preceding two months averaged approximately 44 security incidents per fortnight.

Following last period’s report, 69% of security incidents within Paktika this reporting cycle occurred within, or targeted, the DACs. In contrast, since August this year, 51% of security incidents targeted or occurred within DACs, and since the beginning of the year, only 43% of security incidents. Of documented security incidents in the corresponding reporting period in 2011 (16-30 November), only 38% occurred within or targeted the DACs. Collectively, these statistics support the hypothesis that conflict (and insecurity) within Paktika is increasingly “urbanized”; security incidents, once disperse around the province’s rural areas, have gravitated towards, and now nucleated, around GOA administrative centers. This slowly-evolving change in Paktika’s security paradigm is partly due to the winterization of conflict, and partly due to strategic changes in AOG TTPs.
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MISSING THIS PERIOD:
ANSO did not provide analysis for the following areas:
- Daykundi, Kapisa, Panjshir, Samangan, Nuristan
These areas will be included in subsequent reports. If you have any information that would help us better understand the dynamics, please contact your local ANSO office.

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Registration.afg@ngosafety.org

COMMON ACRONYMS