

## SUMMARY & ASSESSMENT

The volume and profile of NGO incidents throughout 2012 suggest that NGO exposure to a number of key risk vectors has not substantially deteriorated or improved. Overall, 74 individual NGOs were victimized in 164 incidents of which 56% were authored by AOG, 32% by criminals and 12% by Afghan or International security forces. Abduction of NGO staff by AOG and criminals dropped from 36 cases in 2011 to 25 but was compensated for by an increase in the number of the most violent incident types (IED, SAF) from 39 to 45 cases. Despite this, the NGO casualty rate declined by 43% (to 11 deaths and 26 injuries in 2012) at least partly caused by improvements in NGO preparedness and situational response. However, the mitigation of ambient risks remains a challenge, increasingly so in the East where NGO exposure to violence and collateral damage has grown sharply, but primarily in the South where 46% of all conflict-related civilian deaths occurred.

Year-end data shows that AOG attacks fell by 25% although the reason for this remains disputed. While some claim it as evidence of AOG capacity degradation, ANSO believes it reflects the deliberate application of **proportionality of effort** to ensure that the response is relevant to the threat level posed by IMF. In our understanding, the resources to ramp up to previous levels of violence remain available but have simply been stood down, redeployed to other priorities, or engaged in second stage governance/political assignments. Furthermore, we have discerned a widening gap between the quick pace of IMF withdrawal and the slow growth of ANSF activity volumes while AOG have wasted no time in refocusing the bulk of their attacks on local Government and security forces. The opposition also undertook a significant escalation in Nangarhar to reinforce their stronghold in the East, in what we believe is a long range effort at strategic pre-positioning ahead of 2014. Despite the general reduction in attacks, the opposition will enter 2013 with a momentum advantage over ANSF, who are yet to prove their ability to fill the IMF void. As to the latter's engagement in the on-going transition process, we can only add that the process has so far appeared inconsequential to NGO security and safety.

Throughout 2012, both parties were faced with the risk of losing their own internal cohesion before being able to secure any military gains, but it unfortunately appears that political and diplomatic efforts on both sides will remain subordinate to military strategies as we head in to the new year. As such, the current positive de-escalation has not been meaningfully explored for fresh perspectives on possible solutions to the conflict, or to exploit eventual increases in trust and engagement between combatants. Instead we see the ongoing prioritization of short-term military objectives – still predominantly driven by foreign forces - over long-term political solutions that would seek to advance the inevitable coexistence of the forces of the Islamic Emirate with those of the Islamic Republic. With time to agree on a cease-fire prior to the upcoming presidential election in 2014 running out as we speak, the real concern must be that as one conflict ends, it may well be giving way to yet another protracted, destructive and ultimately inconclusive, military campaign.

**Tomas Muzik, ANSO Director,**

**Kabul, Afghanistan, January 2013.**

*The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author.*

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
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

# **Part 1.**


## **NGO Trends**

## 1.1 General NGO Incident Trends

**ANSO:** Total NGO security incidents, all authors, countrywide, by month 2006-2012



**ANSO:** NGO incident volume comparison by author, 2006-2012




2012 witnessed a total of 74 individual NGOs directly involved in 164 security incidents, of which 56% (91 cases) were attributed to armed opposition groups and 32% (53 cases) to criminality (*left*). Positively, the falling numbers of AOG and IMF NGO incidents caused the annual total to decrease by 9% on 2011 (164 vs. 179 incidents). Despite this slight variation, the total volume remains within normal long term ranges with no change in the observed monthly patterns and peaks coinciding with periods of peak conflict activity.

With no significant changes in author and volume, the incident count suggests that the threat profile has remained very similar to that of 2011 and that the year has not substantially deteriorated or improved NGO exposure to any of these vectors.

However, the data also suggests that despite a similar quantity of incidents, and an even higher ratio of more violent attacks (*section 1.3*), the year recorded lower NGO injury and fatality rates than the last (by 43% for the combined number of NGO deaths and injuries, bottom *left*). Although this makes for a complex area of analysis, we suspect this effect has at least partially been caused by improvements in NGO preparedness and situational response which is allowing them to ameliorate the worst effect of even the most severe incidents. Finally, the data also supports the conclusion that violence against NGOs remains seasonal, circumstantial and collateral in nature rather than suggesting any systemic or routine targeting. However, localized exceptions remain where NGOs are victimized in deliberate assaults.


**ANSO:** Aid workers killed/injured, 2006-2012



## 1.2 NGO Incident Geography & Comparison

PROVINCE	2011	2012
BADAKHSHAN	9	7
BADGHIS		2
BAGHLAN	1	3
BALKH	12	6
BAMYAN	1	
DAYKUNDI	1	1
FARAH	6	4
FARYAB	13	7
GHAZNI	2	2
GHOR	19	12
HELMAND	3	
HERAT	9	15
JAWZJAN	4	1
KABUL	10	16
KANDAHAR	4	4
KAPISA	3	2
KHOST	9	10
KUNAR	12	11
KUNDUZ	2	3
LAGHMAN	1	3
LOGAR	12	7
NANGARHAR	17	32
NIMROZ		1
NURISTAN	1	
PAKTYA	8	2
PANJSHIR	2	
PARWAN	4	2
SAMANGAN		1
SAR-E PUL	4	2
TAKHAR	3	
URUZGAN		1
WARDAK	7	9


ANSO: NGO Incidents at Q4 2012 by province and author



The table far left compares the raw number of NGO incidents caused by all authors by province and region in 2011 and 2012. The chart left provides the breakdown of provincial data for 2012 by author. The chart bottom left highlights the provinces which recorded a significant change in AOG or criminal attacks on NGOs over 2011 (defined as an increase or drop by at least three incidents for a specific author/province).

NGO incident volumes have remained consistent in most regions except for the East where a 21% increase occurred over 2011 and in the North where the volumes dropped by 30%.

ANSO: Significant change in AOG/ACG NGO incidents 2012 vs. 2011 (+/- 3 incidents)




The increase in the East was driven by spiking NGO incident volumes in Nangarhar (+88% on 2011) where NGOs faced increased exposure to AOG activity on key access roads and in district centers (including 6 collateral impacts) along with rising criminality. The province recorded a 30% growth in AOG attacks over last year as AOG moved to reinforce their eastern front ahead of the Transition. The ANSF/IMF response included the highest provincial volume for ANSF activity countrywide and an expansion of the ALP in rural areas, but going into 2013, NGOs should expect further deterioration there. The exposure of NGOs to AOG activity also intensified in Wardak (Central) where suicide and indirect fire attacks added to the well-entrenched abduction activity and in Khost which hosted targeted IED attacks on NGO premises, most commonly implemented by local AOG but sponsored by local business interests rather than political

motives. In contrast, a positive trend was observed in Paktya where NGOs concluded the year without AOG incidents.


In the North, NGO volumes dropped by nearly 50% from 2011, mainly due to a decrease in abductions in Faryab (from 9 to 3 cases) despite opposition activity increasing by 11% in the province. Crime against NGOs rose significantly where major NGO hubs met urban population centers in Herat (in the city and the districts) and in Kabul whilst growing criminality in Nangarhar was shared between the city and rural areas with intimidations and escalation of private disputes prevailing over opportunistic crime.

## 1.3 NGO Incident Types


**ANSO: AOG Attacks on NGOs, 2011 vs. 2012**




**ANSO: Criminal Attacks on NGOs, 2011 vs. 2012**



**ANSO: Detailed AOG Attack types, 2011 vs. 2012**



**ANSO: ANSF & IMF Ops on NGOs, 2011 vs. 2012**




The bulk categorization of incident types above shows that a positive change has been noted with the 31% reduction in the number of AOG abduction cases, although the number of arrests by ANSF/IMF has risen. However, the latter also successfully intervened in two cases of INGO abductions and reduced the number of their intrusions into NGO compounds and clinics (although two serious cases of IMF/ANSF occupation of NGO clinics were recorded this year).

Nonetheless, the reduction in the number of NGO abduction events was offset by an increase in AOG kinetic attacks impacting NGOs (indirect fire, SAF, RPG, IEDs and arson combined with SAF, from 39 cases in 2011 to 45 this year). This is a disturbing pattern to watch - especially in light of the 25% decline in AOG activity country-wide - as is the sustained growth of criminal robberies. However for the former, it is indicative that 54% of kinetic attacks were assessed as purely collateral, with the majority of these occurring in Nangarhar (6), Kunar (6), Laghman (2) and Wardak (3). Unpacking the



AOG attack types (*bottom left*) shows that IED strikes have risen by a compound 78% and accidental impacts of NGO compounds by 70%. Consistent with last year, SAF was more frequent against individuals (targeted killings) than against vehicles (at a checkpoint for example) and de-mining sites continued to attract most AOG robberies.

## 1.4 Significant Attacks involving NGOs

ANSO: Significant Attacks by AOG Impacting NGOs in 2012  
(# inserted in the symbol indicates # of individual incidents)




AOG Kinetic Attacks on NGOs in 2012, by targeting type  
collateral targeted



The opposition authored 45 significant attacks on NGOs this year (*map and chart above*) equally shared between purely collateral (22) and targeted (23: 19 deliberate and 4 accidental). The same proportion was preserved between the number of NGO casualties resulting from collateral impacts as opposed to targeted attacks (*below left*). The need for NGOs to reduce the risks of collateral damage remains critical in East and Central where 19 separate attacks on ANSF/GOA targets collaterally impacted NGOs this year, most frequently in provincial and district centers in Nangarhar, Kunar, Wardak and Laghman. We assess that attacking the district centers in the East will continue to factor into core AOG tactical objectives in 2013 and that the risk of collateral exposure is not likely to reduce there.

ANSO: NGO Fatalities & Casualties in 2012, by incident type  
# of NGO workers killed # of NGO workers injured





Out of 23 targeted or accidental strikes by AOG, only 6 were assessed as premeditated attempts by AOG to injure or kill NGO staff (incl. 2 in Ghor, 1 in Herat, Farah, Nangarhar and Khost) with the same number of NGO casualties resulting from such attacks (*insert chart above right*). Authors' motivations varied - ranging from attacks due to personal profile of the victim to a statement attack to enhance an AOG reputation - creating no discernable patterns in this category other than a very high success rate when the intention is to kill.

In the annual NGO casualty count (left), ten occurred during 14 criminal events (most frequently in Nangarhar - 4, Khost - 3 and Badakhshan - 2, *not shown*). Eight cases were assessed as criminal intimidations (not meant to harm, such as arson attacks or SAF from distance) and only three were assessed as pre-meditated violence to injure/kill (in Khost, Faryab and Badakhshan) with two of them most likely linked to local opposition to NGO programming. These three attacks were staged against staff in compounds and created eight casualties.

We conclude this chapter with a remark that for the first time since 2007, the NGO incident count did not include any NGO victims caused by the international military but instead included one fatality during a shoot out between pro-GOA forces.

## 1.5 NGO Abduction Trends


**ANSO: NGO staff abduction by AOG or criminals, Jan-Dec 2012**  
(#persons/# cases)



The number of NGO abduction events by AOG and criminals dropped by 30% over 2011 from 32 to 22, and the number of NGO staff detained from 223 in 2011 to 58.

The primary change was the lack of mass abductions of deminers which caused the sudden increase last year in Ghazni, Paktya and Farah. On the tactical level, 90% of abduction cases occurred in transit in rural areas and targeted as frequently a single person as groups. The average time spent in detention was approx. three days with only 25% of cases going beyond this length of time. There were no reports of NGO staff killed or seriously injured whereas eight had been killed during detention in 2011 (Farah, Ghor, Logar, Faryab). Demining agencies and health care NGOs (using both low-profile and high-profile approaches) accounted for a total 17 events, but the remaining 19 were distributed across other sectors. The vast majority of abductees were released by their abductors following negotiations with local community, the NGOs or the families. However, on two occasions - the only two involving internationals alongside national staff - the international military forces successfully intervened to rescue the victims from groups with mixed political and criminal interests.

**ANSO: NGO Staff Abducted, 2008-2012**




Out of 36 cases mapped above, 10 involved either requests for ransom payment or confiscation of assets (primarily vehicles, communication tools, demining equipment and medical supplies), with nearly half of those also including some form of information gathering. This category frequently witnessed converging criminal and political interests on the side of the abductors, however NGOs were not significantly impacted by urban kidnapping rings within large cities such as Kabul and Herat. 16 cases were primarily linked to information gathering by AOG on the personal or NGO profile of the victim, most accompanied by intimidation towards the victim or the communities. As such, most cases in this category could be interpreted primarily as shaping operations to gain influence.



## 1.6 NGO incidents involving IEDs

### ANSO: IED detonations involving NGOs in 2012

(the numbers on the map indicate the totals of all IED blasts by all authors on any target, per province in 2012)




The map compares the provincial distribution of IED attacks on NGOs in 2012 (all types) with the general occurrence of IED detonations against all targets by all authors (including AOG and criminal). The data confirms that NGOs were most vulnerable in areas which combined high IED frequency with a robust NGO presence. Ten out of 19 cases occurred in Nangarhar (mainly roadside devices) and Khost (facility-based), which ranked respectively fourth and fifth in regards to overall IED detonations this year. The availability of AOG IED resources in the two provinces also provides explanation for the prevalence of criminal IED strikes on NGOs there; commonly displaying a convergence of criminal and political interests.

NGO casualties from IEDs remained predominantly collateral. Four suicide strikes (including two VBIED attacks in Wardak) - all targeting high profile security targets - created the single largest number of NGO casualties (7) although this count has slightly regressed compared with 2011 (11 NGO casualties in three suicide attacks). Casualties in road-side IED blasts also reduced (three victims in three strikes in 2012 vs. 11 incl. three deaths in six attacks in 2011).

Whereas one can infer that NGOs mitigate the threat effectively given the low number of NGO casualties and actual strikes impacting NGOs (under 0.6% of the total country-wide), the data however indicates that static IEDs by AOG impacted NGOs more frequently this year than in 2011 (16 vs.9). This occurred despite the country-wide 25% decline in the use of this weapon by AOG on 2011 (from 4081 to 3032) and the 11% drop in collateral civilian deaths resulting from this type of attacks (from 901 in 2011 to 806 in 2012).





## 1.8 Security Risk Assessment Matrix

The matrix presents our current ranking of the primary risks to NGOs - per ANSO operational area - as detailed in the previous sections of this report. The risks are rated for likelihood and impact prior to any mitigation measures, and include the recommended mitigation tactic.


NGO RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX (Likelihood x Impact=Risk)		Impact					Risk Rating	
		Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High		
Likelihood	Very Low	1	1	2	3	3	1	Negligible Risk
	Low	1	2	3	3	3	2	Mild Risk
	Moderate	2	2	3	3	4	3	Moderate Risk
	High	3	3	3	4	5	4	Serious Risk
	Very High	3	3	4	5	5	5	Unacceptably High Risk
								0
COUNTRYWIDE								
Type of Incident		Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating		Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure		
Collateral Damage		Moderate	High	3		Minimize exposure in target rich environments, implement contingency plans		
Road-side IED		Moderate	High	3		Maintain NGO travel hours and minimize proximity to potential targets		
Abduction		Moderate	Moderate	3		Establish legitimacy, monitor profile/acceptance, & employ local staff		
Deliberate Targeting by AOG		Low	V.High	3		Maintain neutrality of programming and reach out to all parties for acceptance		
Criminality in Transit		Moderate	Moderate	3		Travel by day, avoid routines and displaying valuables, address off-duty travel safety		
EASTERN REGION								
Type of Incident		Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating		Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure		
Road-side IED		Moderate	High	4		Maintain NGO travel hours and minimize proximity to potential targets		
Collateral Damage		Moderate	Moderate	3		Minimize exposure in target rich environments, hardening of facilities (protection)		
Abduction		Low	V.High	3		Establish legitimacy, monitor profile/acceptance, & employ local staff		
AOG Checkpoint		Low	Moderate	3		Maintain NGO travel times & understand high profile vs low profile advantages		
Deliberate Targeting by AOG		V.Low	V. High	3		Maintain neutrality of programming and reach out to all parties for acceptance		
Criminality (Compound)		Moderate	Moderate	3		Maintain Access & Info Control, monitor profile & neighborhood relationships		
NORTH & NORTHEASTERN REGION								
Type of Incident		Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating		Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure		
Abduction		Low	High	3		Establish legitimacy, monitor profile/acceptance, & employ local staff		
Collateral Damage		Low	High	3		Minimize exposure in target rich environments, hardening of facilities (protection)		
AOG Checkpoint		Low	Moderate	3		Maintain NGO travel times, understand profile, instruct staff on handling		
Criminality in Transit		Moderate	Moderate	3		Travel by day, avoid routines and displaying valuables, address off-duty travel safety		
Intimidation		Moderate	Moderate	3		Maintain community acceptance & cultivate contacts with stakeholders		
WESTERN REGION								
Type of Incident		Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating		Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure		
Collateral Damage		Moderate	High	3		Minimize exposure in target rich environments, hardening of facilities (protection)		
Road-side IED		Moderate	High	3		Maintain NGO travel hours and minimize proximity to potential targets		
Abduction		Moderate	Moderate	3		Establish legitimacy, monitor profile/acceptance, & employ local staff		
Deliberate Targeting by AOG		Low	V.High	3		Maintain neutrality of programming and reach out to all parties for acceptance		
Criminality in Transit		Moderate	Low	2		Travel by day, avoid routines and displaying valuables, address off-duty travel safety		
SOUTHERN REGION								
Type of Incident		Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating		Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure		
Road-side IED		High	V.High	5		Maintain NGO travel hours and minimize proximity to potential targets		
Collateral Damage		High	V.High	5		Minimize exposure in target rich environments, hardening of facilities (protection)		
Deliberate Targeting by AOG		Moderate	V.High	4		Maintain neutrality of programming and reach out to all parties for acceptance		
Abduction		Moderate	High	4		Maintain neutrality of programming and reach out to all parties for acceptance		
Criminality in Transit		Moderate	Moderate	3		Travel by day, avoid routines and displaying valuables, address off-duty travel safety		
Criminality (Compound)		Low	Low	2		Maintain Access & Info Control, monitor profile & neighborhood relationships		
CENTRAL REGION								
Type of Incident		Likelihood	Impact	ANSO Risk Rating		Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure		
Criminality in Transit		Moderate	Low	2		Travel by day, avoid routines and displaying valuables, address off-duty travel safety		
AOG Robbery		Moderate	Low	2		Avoid displaying valuables at project sites, monitor profile & avoid routines		
Deliberate Targeting by AOG		V.Low	V.High	3		Maintain neutrality of programming and reach out to all parties for acceptance		
Road-side IED		Low	High	3		Maintain NGO travel hours and minimize proximity to potential targets		
Collateral Damage		Moderate	High	3		Minimize exposure in target rich environments, hardening of facilities (protection)		

## **Part 2.**

# **State of the Conflict**

## 2.1 General Trends


**ANSO: Comparison of general incident volumes by author, 2006-2012**



After six years of sustained growth, the conflict entered a de-escalation phase with the annual incident volume (all authors) falling by 24% this year on that of 2011 (*insert chart left*). This reduction has been driven by diminishing rates of AOG and IMF activity (25% and 57% respectively, *as per volumes represented on chart left*). We assess that the on-going IMF disengagement has been the primary cause of this change.


We have noted during the year that - despite the lower incident volume - the conflict has remained intensive and consistently followed established seasonal patterns (peak and trough, *not shown*), whereas the activity input was evenly shared between the opposition (49%) and the security forces (33% ANSF, 11% IMF). This proves that the structure of the conflict has not changed and that the current reduction is a controlled process rather than an imposition on either side. We conclude that the reduction of AOG activity is a deliberate and reversible choice in response to the IMF withdrawal. In contrast, the stagnating ANSF volumes (+2% increase on 2011) indicate that ANSF are not filling the 'gap' opened by the IMF departure yet - and will need to step up their game in 2013 in order to adjust for increasing IMF departures and AOG efforts.

**ANSO: Conflict-related Civilian Fatalities (# killed), by AOG/IMF, 2008-2010**



The civilian death toll is a tragic but illustrative barometer of the intensity and geography of the conflict. The data show that the overall 24% decrease of conflict activity has resulted in a relatively smaller reduction - 14% - of civilians collaterally killed in the conflict (*left*). A total of 2,038 people died in the conflict this year, with 90% being killed during attacks initiated by the opposition and 10% in operations led by IMF. Roadside IEDs were the leading cause with 806 people dying this way (*bottom left*). This reflects the continued reliance of AOG on 'victim-operated' devices (such as pressure-plate bombs) as the combatants seek to utilize stand-off strike capability against overwhelming IMF/ANSF numbers and technology.

**ANSO: Causes of Civilian Collateral Fatalities in 2012 (# of civilians killed)**



That the large majority of fatalities occurred in the South (46%, *not shown*) where IED activity was the most intensive (Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan) provides an indication as to where the conflict impacts the most urban centers and key access routes. The East hosted the second largest proportion of the fatalities (19%), followed by North (13%), Central (12%) and West (10%).

## 2.2 Incident Overview & Comparison

The table below presents the complete account of all incidents recorded per province and author for 2012, which can be used as an overview as to how contested certain areas are. For reference, the table includes country-wide provincial averages for each specific sector and the daily incident rate. The actual values reaching above the average are highlighted in red. Whilst some sectors may indicate a potentially positive/negative effect on NGO safety, this chart should not be used alone when assessing NGO safety and accessibility since it does not encapsulate other crucial factors such as local dynamics, actors and NGO history.

Our main observations include:

ANSO: 2012 INCIDENT DISTRIBUTION AND COMPARISON							
PROVINCE	NGO INCIDENTS	INCIDENTS TOTAL	TOTAL AOG OPS	TOTAL IMF OPS	TOTAL ANSF OPS	TOTAL CRIME	DAILY INCIDENT RATE
<b>Average</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>641</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>1.8</b>
Kandahar	4	2065	1098	152	773	42	5.7
Nangarhar	32	1973	726	149	817	281	5.4
Helmand	0	1875	811	306	737	21	5.1
Khost	10	1581	612	199	634	136	4.3
Kunar	11	1540	1306	101	106	27	4.2
Ghazni	2	1531	969	299	230	33	4.2
Paktika	0	954	596	175	172	11	2.6
Herat	15	892	299	16	478	99	2.4
Kabul	16	819	83	13	590	133	2.2
Uruzgan	1	795	445	44	291	15	2.2
Farah	4	723	399	16	270	38	2.0
Wardak	9	643	378	108	145	12	1.8
Faryab	7	637	365	17	144	111	1.7
Zabul	0	628	264	145	218	1	1.7
Badghis	2	586	391	23	139	33	1.6
Paktya	2	558	282	104	146	26	1.5
Laghman	3	541	380	33	95	33	1.5
Logar	7	476	216	112	131	17	1.3
Kunduz	3	460	163	40	190	67	1.3
Baghlan	3	383	154	33	159	37	1.0
Balkh	6	341	102	8	157	74	0.9
Kapisa	2	266	183	18	53	12	0.7
Ghor	12	210	96	6	48	60	0.6
Parwan	2	195	113	4	52	26	0.5
Badakhshan	7	184	69	10	60	45	0.5
Takhar	0	178	19	5	99	55	0.5
Jawzjan	1	174	87	6	56	25	0.5
Nuristan	0	161	132	12	15	2	0.4
Sar-e Pul	2	129	79	4	33	13	0.4
Samangan	1	105	14	1	51	39	0.3
Nimroz	1	90	32	15	37	6	0.2
Bamyan	0	37	17	1	11	8	0.1
Daykundi	1	36	6	1	11	18	0.1
Panjshir	0	18	5	0	7	6	0.0
Values highlighted in red reach above the country average value.							

- **Kandahar, Nangarhar, Helmand, Khost, Kunar and Ghazni** were the most heavily contested areas in 2012 with their daily incident rates reaching above 4.0.

- The 11 provinces where the daily incident rate reached above the country average (2/day) accounted for 57% of the NGO incident total; with just five of these 11 totaling 50%.


- For the first time, **Nangarhar** reached the second highest daily incident rate and accounted for nearly 20% of the NGO incident total.

- IMF remained heavily engaged in **11 out of 34** provinces (above the sector average of 64 IMF ops/province), including all those along the **eastern border** - except for Badakhshan (mostly controlled by ANSF) and Nuristan (dominated by the opposition) - as well as **Ghazni, Wardak and Logar**.

- **Nangarhar, Khost, Herat and Kabul** were the only provinces above 2 incidents/day where ANSF incident volume surpassed that of AOG.


## 2.3 Armed Opposition Group (AOG) Activity

**ANSO: Total AOG activity, countrywide, 2006-2012 (includes only IED, SAF, IDF and suicide attacks)**




The opposition initiated a total of 10,468 kinetic attacks this year with their activity volume decreasing by 25% from 2011. The average daily attack rate dropped from 38 attacks last year to 28 (*charts above and right*), but this reduction did not regress below the 'profit margin' gained during the summer of 2009 when the AOG campaign escalated in earnest in response to the IMF surge and the lead up to the presidential election. This year followed a familiar pattern with January and February starting low, but the winter retreat gave way to six months of solid growth when Operation Al Farooq kicked off in April, peaking in July with 41 attacks/day, carrying thru Ramazan into a still robust September/October - before trailing off sharply afterwards.

**ANSO: Total AOG initiated attacks by year, 2006-2012**



In a significant shift to targeting patterns, ANSF attracted 6618 opposition attacks (vs. 5681 in 2011) with the percentage of the attacks on this target increasing from 53% in 2011 to 72%. Meanwhile, the percentage of AOG attacks oriented at GOA-affiliated civilians also increased to match that of IMF (at 14%). This pattern indicates that AOG war effort has become increasingly 'nationalized' and that their military and 'shaping' (effect-based) operations are now converging to counter GOA influence. Combined with the geographical transfer of AOG activity to the East (analyzed in the next section), the shift illustrates that opposition leadership has already engaged in prepositioning for the post-2014 period. Despite the above, the AOG tactical palette remained consistent with 2011; close range engagements (SAF/RPG) constituting the bulk (54%), stand-off IED/IDF attacks at 44% and suicide attacks under 2%.

**ANSO: Number of AOG attacks per target group, 2010-2012**




## 2.4 AOG Attack Rate Mapping and Comparison - I

### ANSO: AOG attack volumes, per province at Q.4 2012

*(Please note this is an **incident rate map** that enables comparison of areas seeing similar attack rates. It is not a **threat map** and a lack of incidents can indicate AOG dominance (see Nuristan). Areas shared green are not implied to be safe, particularly those provinces bordered by highly insecure areas.)*

*\*365 attacks is equivalent to 1 per day*



The included map illustrates AOG attack rates per province in 2012, with the chart on the following page contrasting changes in AOG activity between 2012 and 2011.

Despite consistently high attack volumes across most provinces in the South - where Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, Ghazni and Paktika accounted for five of the eight highest AOG attack rates in the country - the region nevertheless accounted for some of the largest declines in actual AOG incident volumes this year, with Kandahar (-15%), Helmand (-66%), Ghazni (-44%), and Paktika (-50%) combining for a total of 3112 less AOG initiated incidents this year than in 2011. The single largest contributor to this was Helmand, which alone accounted for more than half of this reduction (1609 attacks less than in 2011) as the opposition continued to bear the brunt of the main IMF operational focus there. The provincial dynamics and field reports, however, indicate that less attacks by the opposition in the South does not necessarily mean reduced access. Farah and Uruzgan, neighboring Helmand, have experienced relocations of AOG networks from Helmand and both provinces recorded increased AOG attack volumes.

AOG also actively shifted their operational focus to the East, where they seem intent on reinforcing their position and maintaining a second stronghold in preparation for the post-transition period. AOG-initiated incident volumes in Kunar remained the highest in the country (1303) whilst neighboring Nangarhar demonstrated the largest actual increase (167 AOG-initiated incidents) for a 30% expansion over last year's totals - this change was swiftly reflected with the significant increase in AOG-initiated NGO incidents in the province this year (from 10 to 18, see p. 4). The main expression of the AOG offensive was indeed their enhanced operational tempo in rural areas along the infiltration corridors in the south-western flank of the province as well as in the strategically important areas adjacent to the Kabul - Torkham highway where AOG conducted shaping operations and also benefitted from entrenchment in local communities, such as in the districts of Hisarak (287% increase in AOG-initiated incidents), Bati Kot (79% increase) and Chaparhar (38% increase). *(continued on the next page)*



## 2.5 AOG Attack Rate Mapping & Comparison - II

(continued)

In contrast, while attacks against DACs in rural districts rose in Nangarhar, its urban center Jalalabad saw a 45% decline in activity. Looking forward, as the conflict will continue after IMF withdrawal, a similar pattern could be replicated across many parts of the country as AOG take firmer hold in rural districts and ANSF attempts to control urban population centers.

Increased AOG activity also spilled over into neighboring Laghman which saw the second highest actual increase in AOG attacks (+148), a coherent AOG focus on rural districts but also an aggressive intimidation campaign in and around the provincial capital. Connecting further, AOG expansion was also evident in Kapisa (with a 48% increase in attack volumes over 2011). Although vacated by the French IMF this year and transitioned to ANSF, the south-eastern flank of the province has remained a pivotal AOG stronghold on the cross-road between North, East and Central.

Outside of the shifts noted above, the North saw decreases in the majority of provinces as AOG held off on expanding their footprint there, with Baghlan and

PROVINCE	TOTAL AOG-INITIATED ATTACKS 2010	TOTAL AOG-INITIATED ATTACKS 2011	TOTAL AOG-INITIATED ATTACKS 2012	ACTUAL CHANGE 2012	% CHANGE 2011 -> 2012 (-25% +/-5%)	
Daykundi	23	33	6	-27	-82%	Below Average
Nimroz	109	104	32	-72	-69%	
Helmand	1408	2420	811	-1609	-66%	
Paktya	490	608	282	-326	-54%	
Paktika	898	1194	596	-598	-50%	
Khost	910	1105	611	-494	-45%	
Zabul	353	479	264	-215	-45%	
Ghazni	1544	1680	968	-712	-44%	
Takhar	144	34	19	-15	-44%	Average
Balkh	183	144	102	-42	-29%	
Sar-e Pul	82	112	79	-33	-29%	
Kabul	151	116	83	-33	-29%	
Jawzjan	75	111	87	-24	-22%	
Kunduz	355	205	163	-42	-20%	Above Average
Kandahar	1167	1290	1097	-193	-15%	
Ghor	84	108	96	-12	-11%	
Herat	258	317	299	-18	-6%	
Badghis	358	412	391	-21	-5%	
Logar	265	226	216	-10	-4%	
Wardak	512	384	378	-6	-2%	
Kunar	1468	1293	1303	10	1%	
Parwan	84	110	113	3	3%	
Uruzgan	363	406	445	39	10%	
Faryab	296	329	365	36	11%	
Samangan	21	12	14	2	17%	
Badakhshan	35	57	69	12	21%	
Nangarhar	505	557	724	167	30%	
Farah	257	293	399	106	36%	
Kapisa	129	124	183	59	48%	
Bamyan	4	10	17	7	70%	
Laghman	196	222	380	158	71%	
Nuristan	64	71	132	61	86%	
Baghlan	222	82	154	72	88%	
Panjshir	5	2	5	3	150%	


Faryab as outliers. While Baghlan (88% increase) absorbed much of the AOG activity that had been previously focused in Kunduz, the opposition effected a third operational front along the axis connecting Faryab to Badghis via Ghormach and southwards in Herat/Farah.

## 2.6 'Transition' - Transitioned Provinces (T1-3)

With the recent conclusion of Tranche 3 of the transition, it remains premature to assess any sustained results.

Tranche 3 (highlighted in blue in the chart below; note that ANSO data for IMF/ANSF operations are indicative only) is largely recognized as the first to transition significantly contested provinces (Uruzgan and Kapisa). However, with the exception of Badakhshan, no province bordering Pakistan - including many of the most kinetic in the country - will be completely transitioned until Tranche 5, and we assess that the outcomes from Tranche 5 will be the defining factor as to the structure of the conflict in the future.

ANSO: Mapping of Security Transition, as of January 2013  
T' designates 'Tranche' (T1-T3 finalized as of December 2012)



**Note:** Tranches each tend to take approximately 6 months, with the next one - T4 - slated to start between January and March 2013.


PROVINCE	TOTAL AOG OPS 2011	TOTAL AOG OPS 2012	AOG: % CHANGE 2011-2012	TOTAL ANSF OPS 2011	TOTAL ANSF OPS 2012	ANSF: % CHANGE 2011-2012	TOTAL IMF OPS 2011	TOTAL IMF OPS 2012	IMF: % CHANGE 2011-2012	TOTAL CRIME 2011	TOTAL CRIME 2012	ACG: % CHANGE 2011-2012
Daykundi	33	6	-82%	21	11	-48%	5	1	-80%	18	18	0%
Nimroz	104	32	-69%	58	37	-36%	41	15	-63%	16	6	-63%
Takhar	34	19	-44%	138	99	-28%	83	5	-94%	15	55	270%
Kabul	116	83	-29%	617	590	-4%	75	13	-83%	111	133	20%
Balkh	144	102	-29%	153	157	3%	27	8	-70%	118	74	-37%
Parwan	110	113	3%	86	52	-40%	30	4	-87%	24	26	8%
Uruzgan	406	445	10%	220	290	32%	15	44	193%	187	15	-92%
Samangan	12	14	17%	29	51	76%	27	1	-97%	4	39	875%
Kapisa	124	183	48%	95	53	-44%	51	18	-65%	14	12	-14%
Bamiyan	10	17	70%	18	11	-39%	6	1	-83%	8	11	38%
Panjshir	2	5	150%	2	7	250%	0	0	0%	8	6	-25%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1095</b>	<b>1019</b>	<b>-7%</b>	<b>1437</b>	<b>1358</b>	<b>-5%</b>	<b>360</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>-69%</b>	<b>523</b>	<b>395</b>	<b>-24%</b>

As shown in the data above, six of the 11 transitioned provinces (Parwan, Uruzgan, Samangan, Kapisa, Bamiyan, and Panjshir) recorded positive growth in AOG-initiated activity over 2011, with three of those - Parwan, Kapisa and Bamiyan - also seeing significant declines in ANSF activity. Amongst Tranche 3 provinces, only Uruzgan saw increased ANSF activity as the province continued to witness an ongoing escalation by all conflict groups. This reinforces the observation that in some key post-transition areas, IMF intent and effort remain in place.

The fully transitioned provinces averaged a 7% decline in AOG activity. Compared with the 25% countrywide average, it appears that fully transitioned provinces (T1-3) are generally averaging less of a decline in AOG activity than areas that are yet to undergo the process. In fact, with Nimroz and Daykundi as exceptions, AOG de-escalation never surpassed that of IMF demonstrating a parallel effort rather than a forced retreat. This leaves us with the conclusion that there is no clear correlation between the Transition, decreased AOG activity, and increased ANSF activity.


## 2.7 'Transition' - T1,2 Areas in South & East

The below data look at the districts of the more kinetic Southern and Eastern regions that were transitioned in Tranche 1 and 2, and therefore have had at least six months since the transition was completed. It would be assumed that a "successful" transition would see significantly lowered IMF activity - which most of them do - increased ANSF activity, and consistent or lowered AOG activity; potentially being one of the drivers for the 26% decrease in AOG-initiated incidents that occurred this year countrywide. Although it is not clear to what extent ACG activity will be affected by the transition, this is an important trend to monitor, as if control of districts - by either GOA or AOG actors - begins to deteriorate, criminality could flourish.




It is worth noting that due to a number of mitigating factors - including variance between districts in the initial and residual IMF presence before and after any transition process, as well as similar variations in AOG presence and activities - there is no concrete formula or fixed process for how the transition plays out, and as such, each district underwent different transition processes and changes.

**AOG Activity:** As anticipated - albeit in line with countrywide trends - every province but Laghman saw AOG activity decrease, significantly so in Ghazni, Nimroz, and Helmand. Mihtarlam was the only district to record a substantial increase.




**IMF Activity:** With the exception of the two districts in Laghman, where IMF conducted less than 15 incidents combined over either year, IMF activity decreased in every district. However, to date IMF remain active in Ghazni, Helmand, Nangarhar and Laghman.



**ANSF Activity:** With IMF activity declining, the transition should see ANSF activity expand to fill the gap. However, this occurred only in Helmand, with ANSF activity declining or stagnant in the other provinces (despite Laghman showing a significant increase in AOG activity).

**ACG Activity:** Criminality has not yet shown any notable correlating shifts at this time.



In conclusion, the transition itself does not appear to have caused any consistent shifts to the security paradigms of each district, as outside of Helmand and Ghazni - where large IMF contingents remain active - the above shows no strong correlation between the transition and decreased AOG activity or increased ANSF activity. Instead, variation in conditions rule the day, and security remains dictated by the presence and priorities of conflict actors in each location.

**Acronyms:**

**AOG** - Armed Opposition Groups specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban); Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami Gulbiddin (HIG)

**IEA** - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban)

**ALP** - Afghan Local Police

**IMF** - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF)

**ANSF** - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army)

**IED** - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb)

**IDF** - Indirect Fire (rockets, mortars)

**CAS** - Close Air Support (airstrike)

**SAF** - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK-47)

**RPG** - Rocket Propelled Grenade

**ANSO REGIONS**

For the purposes of this report, please note the following breakdown of provinces for the various ANSO Regions:

**CENTRAL:** Bamyan, Daykundi, Kabul, Kapisa, Logar, Panjshir, Parwan, Wardak

**EAST:** Khost, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktya

**SOUTH:** Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Paktika, Uruzgan, Zabul

**NORTH:** Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Samangan, Sar-e Pul

**NORTHEAST:** Badakhshan, Baghlan, Takhar, Kunduz

**WEST:** Ghor, Badghis, Farah, Herat

# REPORT ENDS

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