

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Conflict (AOG) related incidents are increasing across the country.
- Attacks against NGO by AOGs on the increase
- Attacks and threats against NSP increasing in the South, South-East, East, and Central regions.

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
COUNTRY SUMMARY

The total volume of AOG initiated attacks recorded in the first 4 months of 2008 is up approx 30% over the same period last year (see graph right). This increase was observed across the country, with the biggest increases observed in the Central, Western, and Northern regions (+54%, +37%, +35% respectively)

This country-wide and substantial increase suggest strongly that the conflict will broaden again substantially this year. As the conflict expands and AOG gain influence and control over more territory, NGO will certainly come into more contact with

AOG INITIATED ATTACKS PER MONTH—ANNUAL COMPARISON

(Shows combined suicide, indirect fire and close range attacks only)



AOG transiting or operating in their area. Information collected last year suggest that NGO incidents tend to increase when this occurs, not only because AOGs start vetting those in

its area of operation, but also because security forces are often less able or willing to respond to criminal incidents and thus give criminals more freedom of movement.

NGO DATA & TRENDS


Although incident levels against NGO look surprisingly similar to last year, there are significant differences.

First, attacks against NGO from AOG are up significantly (+40%).

Second, NGO attacks from AOG have been surprisingly violent in recent months, resulting in at least 9 fatalities and the destruction of two NGO offices.

Although certain programs, like NSP, are being targeted specifically in some parts of the country, there are no clear indications yet that AOG are systematically targeting NGOs. That said, information suggest that AOG in some areas are currently debating the fate of NGOs and therefore this issue will need close monitoring over the coming months.

NGO INCIDENTS PER MONTH - ANNUAL COMPARISON
 (Includes Robbery, Assault, Murder, Intimidation, Arson, Abduction and Armed Attack)



KABUL

The threat traffic has been high recently, especially related to attack scenarios within Kabul city. Much of this may have been linked to the 27 April Afghanistan Islamic Revolution Day attack.

There was also a spike in reports related to the discovery of rockets primed to launch in the city. This suggests that a larger scale attack was planned and that security efforts were at least partially suc-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks against high profile targets
- IED and rocket attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

cessful that day. At the same time, the incident demonstrates the limitations of security forces to completely stop a well-planned attack.

The defining characteristic of threats in the coming months may be the willingness of perpetrators to kill indiscriminately. While so far NGO do not appear to be directly targeted in this province, government buildings, military convoys, international hotels and social venues, embassies, and the main road to the airport remain viable targets in at least the near future.



Overall, security incidents are climbing dramatically. Criminal incidents in the province remain on par with last year (with almost all occurring within the Kabul city district). But AOG incidents more than doubled (from 11 to 28) in the first quarter compared to last year. April has shown no sign of a slow-down.

WARDAK

Wardak— known to have a considerable AOG presence—is experiencing a rise in AOG incidents, which can be expected to increase dramatically in May. The entire province is risky for NGO operations, with Sayed Abad, Jalrez, Nirkh, and Maydan Sharh especially dangerous. So far this year, Sayed Abad, Charkh, Mayden Shahr, and Jalrez have all experienced AOG incidents.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Rocket and IED attacks
- Use of terror tactics/intimidation

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Recent incidents demonstrate an expansion of tactics and threats in the province. Most troubling was the beheading of two ANP who disappeared from a check post. This is the first such execution we've recorded in the province since November (the only such incident we recorded there last year).

Also, within the last week period there have been night letter threats in two districts: In Nirkh threatening letters warning people to halt work with NSP projects were randomly distributed. In Charkh, there were threats warn-



ing schools not to teach from a planned curriculum. Also in the past week, AOG kidnapped five local staff working on a PRT construction project in Sayed Abad.

While abductions have not directly affected NGO this year, last year there were two incidents of NGO abductions in Wardak, and the province should be considered a high risk area for abductions.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

PARWAN

Parwan has been largely safe for NGO operations, and is typically one the central region’s quieter provinces. There are no current indications of the likelihood of drastic change. The threat incidents levels have been similar to those of last year and if this trend


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage in the area of Bagram Airbase
- NGO-targeted criminal abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

continues we can expect to see a slight increase of incidents in May. What incidents do occur are typically directed at police and military targets, most notably Bagram Airbase.

The direct NGO incidents which have occurred so far this year have been a theft and an abduction that was likely criminal rather than AOG. Earlier in the month there was an indirect threat in the



form of randomly distributed night letters warning against cooperation with the government and NGO, but so far it is an isolated incident and the origin of the letters unknown.

BAMYAN

Bamyan Province is consistently one of the Central Region’s safest provinces. Typically the greatest security threat to NGO is crime, most notably armed highway robberies. These can occur throughout the year, with March through October being the most likely time. Clashes resulting from land


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing threat of IED/mines
- Armed robbery along roadways

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

disputes between rival ethnic/tribal groups are also relatively common. While these do not pose a direct threat to NGO, they may pose the threat of indirect collateral damage.

Last year we recorded only one AOG incident. So far this year there has been at least two IED incidents. This suggests some increase in AOG activity, but it is still too early to gauge the significance.



There are unconfirmed reports that AOG from Baghlan Province are planning infiltration into Bamyan’s Kahmard and Shiber districts. In March a PRT truck was stuck by an IED, but beyond that we have no evidence of AOG activity in Kahmard.

DAYKUNDI

Daykundi’s relative isolation limits available information on and the ability to assess the province’s security situation. There are limited or no security forces throughout the entire province and most security is imposed by local tribes


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Low security presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

who are largely able to control the AOG movement.

In general, the northern part of Daykundi Province is believed to be safe and the south (Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran) unstable. Kajran and Gizab are especially prone to clashes between the local population and AOG moving between Helmand and Uruzgan. These districts are considered to be unsafe for NGO operations.



There have too few incidents to determine trends beyond those mentioned above, and recent reports from the northern part of the province indicate that that area is safe for NGO operation.

LOGAR

Logar is becoming increasingly risky for NGO operations. AOG incidents in the first quarter of this year are nearly double that of the same time last year (15 vs. 8). There has been no slowdown in April, and incidents can be expected to continue to climb in May. While the predominant


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- attacks to schools or other non security-related targets

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	2

threat this year has been small arms, rocket, and RPG attacks on security forces/police, this month saw several incidents that indicate a move toward more direct threats to the general and NGO communities. These include the burning of three schools, the surrounding of two INGO staff in Baraki Barak by gunmen, and the possible kidnapping of two NGO workers by criminals.

Most incident areas are in the high traffic areas of Muhammad Agha



and Puli Alam, but the southern districts of Kwawar, Charkh, and Baraki Barak (which combined have borders with Paktya, Ghazni, and Wardak) are likely the most heavily AOG infiltrated and dangerous areas for NGO.

KAPISA

Most of Kapisa should be considered risky for NGO operations, with the possible exception of the district capital of Mahmud Raqi. Nijrab and Tagab should be considered extremely dangerous. Security incidents in those districts so far this year have been far more numerous than at the same time last year.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Spread of attacks to schools

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Tagab is especially hostile due to current security and poppy eradication activities. Successful security operations in Tagab could help quell AOG activity in the province, but so far this year there is every indication that the area will become even less stable.

The overwhelming number of incidents in Kapisa have been attacks on security forces (especially police), which so far this year has made collateral damage the most likely threat for




NGO. The April burning of a school in Tagab could be an early signal that the AOG threat is expanding to the more general populace, but so far this year it is the only incident of its type.

PANJSHIR

While security information coming from Panjshir is extremely limited, Panjshir appears to be consistently calm and likely the safest province in the Central Region.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

There have been no known AOG initiated incidents recorded in the province since before 2007. Since January 2007, we have recorded only one minor criminal incident.



FARYAB

Faryab Province was calm during this period but overall incident volumes have steadily increased. Events illustrating this increasing trend include hasty SAF attacks, IED activity and rocket attacks which primarily occur in and around Qaisar (Faryab Province)


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Factional tensions
- Crime, primarily road robbery

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

and Ghormach Districts (Badghis Province, Western Region).

AOG associated events are anticipated to continue due to the apparent inactivity of local security entities in remote areas of Ghormach (which leads to the migration of insecurity North). However, security forces (ANP, ABP and ANP) are reportedly attempting to consolidate at a regional level to try to address this prob-



lem. It is hoped that this initiative will result in increased level of planning and coordination therefore resulting in an improved level of policing throughout the regional border area.

JAWZJAN


Jawzjan province remained relatively calm thought this period, however one NGO incident was reported. A night letter was delivered to an INGO in Qushtepa District of Jawzjan Province. The letters stated that the INGO would be attacked if it did not close its office and stop its activities within the district. The exact motive behind this incident remains unknown at this stage but provincial authorities suspect that the night letter was issued by AOG.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased crime due to drought
- Increase AOG activity
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

Khanaqa and Fizabad districts are still the main areas of insecurity within Jawzjan Province. Sources attribute most incidents to a local criminal group originally from Mingajik district. In addition reports have surfaced that a group of Mawlawis and radical Mullahs are currently teaching at a number of Madrasas in Mingajik district, some with historical Taliban ties. This has not translated into reportable incidents yet however NGOs should be aware of the potential anti-western sentiment within the community and adjust their behaviour and activities accordingly.



On a strategic level it is reported that District Tashkils (police manning numbers) in Jawzjan have been cut by fifty percent. This information therefore suggests a potential downturn in ANP presence and capacity throughout the region. Unnamed officials in Jawzjan have attributed the recent rise in attacks within the province, in part, to this cut in police numbers and have ongoing requests for immediate and urgent assistance to resolve this police strength issue.

BADAKSHAN


Badakshan Province remains calm with only minor incidents reported.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Escalating AOG activity
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

The more significant incidents to occur in the province are rocket attacks targeting GoA or affiliated targets by suspected ACG elements operating thought Fizabad district.



SAR-E-PUL


Sar-e-Pul Province remained stable with only one significant incident occurring throughout this analytical period. The incident, an ANP check post attack maintains (according to localized sources) factional and ACG linkages and remains somewhat anomalous for the province.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing crime rates

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Throughout the wider Sar-e-Pul community political tensions remain high within Sangcharak District. This current domestic unrest is primarily due to the detaining of the acting District Governor on charges of alleged criminal negligence. Furthermore NGOs operating within the region are again advised to maintain an active and obvious separation from international military organs. This advi-



sory is given more poignant significance due to the local belief (rumour based) that said international forces disturbed iconic sites (dug holes) in Sayad, Kohistanat and Sancharak districts.

BALKH

The security situation in Balkh Province remains calm and stable however, the province witnessed a number of notable events.

An INGO national employee, whose disappearance was reported on Feb 13th has been found murdered. The body was discovered in close proximity to the victim's residence concealed in a septic tank. Motive surrounding the event remains inconclusive however AOG or even ACG involvement remains unlikely at this time due to the nature and concealment of the crime.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Crime
- Drug related activity.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Within Mazar-e-Sharif City two Afghan males attempted to gain entry to an INGO compound stating they were officials from the "Governmental Security Department" and where conducting an NGO site security assessment. As the two men had no official documentation (or uniforms) the men were denied entry and left without incident. New information pertaining to the event has proven the men were in fact legitimate officers. If government security officials wish to enter NGO establishments, they should be able to provide identification and reasonable justification.

AOG activity within Balkh province is ongoing with AOG elements executing sporadic attacks



targeting ANSF. Afghan Security forces, who are trying to stem this somewhat localized AOG activity, continue to conduct arrests and search operations within Char Bulak and surrounding districts (Jawzjan border areas).

Credible sources continue to hypothesize that AOG elements (primarily paid ACG) remain active within the province and continue to focus attention upon Char Bulak district as a relative safe haven for operations and housing. ANSF operations in the area are therefore likely to be ongoing and perhaps intensify, which may pose an indirect threat to NGOs

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
BAGHLAN

Baghlan Province remains relatively calm. Tala Wa Barfak, Baghlani Jadid and Narhin Districts remain the epicenters of AOG activity ranging from IED (primarily roadside placement) to larger scale attacks targeting GoA establishments. Although no NGO personnel have been directly targeted by AOG hostilities these remain high risk areas.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Escalating AOG activity
- Risk of IED related incident



KUNDUZ

During this reporting period the security situation in Kunduz continued to deteriorate due to ongoing AOG associated events.

Whilst these AOG incidents remain an ongoing concern, the events do not lean or suggest a comprehensive and or organized AOG operation in the province.


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Recently, AOG elements distributed a numbers of night letters in the Province particularly in Ali Abad district threatening parents to avoid sending their daughters to school. Secular education centers have been historical targets of AOG intimidation, due to AOG preference for madrassas or religious education. More of these threats are probable in the medium term.

Furthermore Afghan military supported by international actors' have increased their numbers and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Escalating AOG activity
- Ongoing military operations.
- IEDs



operations in the region. The ongoing operations launched in Chahardara and Aliabad districts have apparently yielded minimal results thus far with only two suspects arrested from Kocha-e-Qazaq Village (Aliabad district). Due to these operations, NGOs are advised to avoid Chahardara and Aliabad districts.

TAKHAR

The overall security situation in the Province has been assessed as calm this reporting period.


The local population of Ishkamish District is allegedly harbouring some anti-international sentiment.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

This information is primarily due to the search of a local powerbroker's residence by international military. Whilst the search of the 22nd April was apparently legitimate, the affected powerbroker has made comments within the community to the effect that this action was an attempt to discredit himself and his supporters in the northeast region.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity
- Rocket attacks



KHOST

The security situation has continued to worsen as the weather improves and AOG have increased their presence in the eastern districts. AOG attacks on NSP facilities, especially in the districts of Sabari and Tere Zayi indicate a change in AOG tactics. It appears that AOG in Khost have decided that the hard feelings that may come from disrupting NSP programs are worth forcing the end


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks on NSDP projects in Sabari and Tere Zayi Districts
- IEDs on Gardez- Khost Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

of government activity along the border. NSP programs in border districts are at high risk of attack, although so far the AOG have been careful to damage property and have not harmed staff.

The Khost-Gardez road remains a high risk for IEDs and the use of pressure activated mines is common. There were nine IED incidents reported this period and IED attacks will likely continue to increase over the summer. Reports continue to be received of plots to use VBIED against IMF and the use of BBIED against



GOA facilities is likely. Rocket and direct fire attacks on DACs, particularly Bak and Sabari Districts is likely to increase. AOG indirect fire remains inaccurate and a greater threat to neighbours than the DAC. Border posts in the province will continue to be the target of attacks as AOG attempt to keep the border open for infiltration, retreat and smuggling.

KUNAR


The security situation continues to deteriorate on a cycle of a relatively quieter week followed by clashes throughout the province. The Asadabad PRT has been the target of increasing numbers of rocket attacks some of which have caused civilian casualties but have yet to actually hit the base. AOG indirect fire capability remains very poor and additional IMF assets to detect AOG should reduce the volume of attacks shortly. Several incidents have occurred which have soured relations be-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- indirect fire threat to Asadabad City
- Pech and Sirkanay Districts
- More violent protest due the flag issue

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

tween IMF and locals. Clashes between IMF and AOG have again resulted in air strikes which may have killed civilians. Details are still being sought on exact casualty figures. In Asadabad IMF issued Afghan flags for the national holiday with writing on them that were portrayed by AOG as being defamatory toward Islam. The flags were manufactured in Pakistan and the IMF intent was to generate patriotism. This event lead to demonstrations that degenerated into rock throwing and temporary blocking of the main highway. In Chapa Dara on the pretext of protesting the flag issue a police HQ was looted of its firearms. IMF relations with locals can be expected to get worse as AOG activity and violence increase over the summer



with potential negative consequences for all international organizations. Ghaziabad District is becoming extremely dangerous with the destruction of six IMF contracted trucks and the murder or mutilation of their drivers being the latest outrage.

An ANBP post was destroyed and 13 policemen killed or injured in Sirkanay District. ANBP posts along the border have recently been strengthened and have been making headway against infiltration. As a result it appears that AOG have started a campaign to eradicate them. More attacks on border posts can be expected.

NANGARHAR

A member of an ACG plotting to kidnap Japanese nationals in Nangarhar was arrested by ANP on 27 April in Achin. The investigation continues. There have been a number of threats specifying Japanese NGOs as target for kidnapping but none have occurred.

On 29 April a BBIED attacked the Khogyani DAC during a counter-narcotics meeting and caused significant casualties including the deaths of the Police Chief and head of the NDS. Another significant incident was the arrest of a suicide vest bomber in Jalalabad who had reportedly had

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Suicide attacks against GOA
- IEDs in Kama and Ghosta
- AOGs in southeast districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

been recruited in Helmand. His target had been an IMF convoy and his vest firing mechanism may have malfunctioned.

AOG are reportedly infiltrating the south-east districts and have plans to launch attacks in Achin, Nazyan, Dur Baba and Bati Kot Districts. With the intensification of AOG operations the border districts will become very dangerous for international staff to operate in.

Demonstrations over food prices can be expected until relief comes with the wheat harvest in approximately one week. These demonstrations may be used as cover for AOG activity in the hope rioting discredits the government.



Although Nangarhar remains relatively quiet recent events in Pakistan have the potential to seriously disrupt NGO activities. The Lashkar-i-Islam, a tribal militia commanded by Mangol Bagh has taken control of much of the Khyber Agency. This puts a pro-AOG/ anti-IMF force in control of the main supply route for Afghanistan with the option of disrupting or cutting the Torkham- Peshawar Highway at will. On the down side for AOG IMF efforts at buying support among other tribal forces appears to be disrupting AOG medium term plans to cut IMF logistics. The situation is very confused and volatile. FATA and NWFP remain high risks for NGO travel especially from ACG.

LAGHMAN

IEDs continue to be the primary security threat in Laghman. Although the number of IEDs has increased recently the sophistication of the devices has not improved with the majority being located before detonation. It was thought that an IED cell that had been trained outside the province and perhaps included foreigners was active along the Alingar and Alishing Roads. The activities of this group may have come to an


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- IDF toward GOA and IMF facilities
- AOG attacks along Highway 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

end on 25 April when five men planting a large IED on a secondary road south of the Alingar Road inadvertently blew themselves up. Three were killed and two were wounded and arrested. One is reported to have been a Pakistani national. There also continue to be rumours of IEDs planted with the intention of there being “found” for reward money. Although this may be the case in some instances most reports of IEDs are given to the police who do not issue rewards.

The ANA base under construction in south-west Laghman was the scene of a lethal IED strike on



a civilian company delivering water. More attacks on the roads leading to this facility can be expected.

AOG attacked ANP on Highway 1 with small arms and RPGs such attacks are likely to increase. The use of extremely low profile transport continues to be the best defence against IEDs and ambushes set for security forces.

NURISTAN


The situation in eastern Nuristan is slowly becoming slightly more favourable for humanitarian projects as the GOA and IMF assert their authority along the Pakistani border. It is however too early to recommend any NGO operations

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-IMF clashes in east districts
- High threat to non-local NGO staff
- High criminal threat in western

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

commence in the province. The border post and bridge at Ghomaresh which had been seized by AOG in August 2007 were taken by security forces this week in the ongoing struggle to seal the border from AOG infiltration. Road projects to link major towns in the east and central districts are also progressing. A large shura of AOG leaders was held in March and since then some minor commanders appear to be sitting on the sidelines waiting for develop-



ments. The western and northern parts of the province still have little GOA or security force presence and aren't likely to until roads are completed in the east.

PAKTYA


The number of violent incidents in Paktya has increased noticeably to a recent average of eight per week as AOG operations intensify. Attacks on DACs, the "execution" of locals accused of spying for IMF or GOA, ambushes of IMF convoys and the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs on Gardez- Khost road
- Increased attacks on DACs
- Increased intimidation of local population

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

employment of IEDs have all increased. IEDs are increasingly common on the Gardez-Khost road and have been used to target local vehicles. The motives of these attacks on non-security force vehicles are unknown and personnel disputes can't be ruled out. So far NGOs have not been attacked although the probability is that "anti-NSP" operations will spread from Khost. Several murders of locals accused of spying highlight the danger to locals of suspected of assisting security



forces. NGOs must do everything they can to prevent the perception that they collect information about AOG for the security forces. The most hostile area of the province is Zurmat with nearly 50% of violent incidents occurring in the district including three murders

BADGHIS


After coming out of a particularly tough winter, Badghis Province has seen a small, but steady increase in AOG activity.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in the north
- Illegal road blocks
- Armed clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

AOG activity in this area is assessed to be linked with narcotic/ weapons trade through porous areas of the international border. In addition to AOG activity, ACG activity is also present in the form of illegal road-blocks, which have become more common over the past two months. It can be expected that both AOG and ACG



activities will continue in this province for the foreseeable future.

GHOR


As with Badghis, Ghor province is awakening after the severe winter and over the past two months, AOG presence and activities have steadily increased, elevating operational concerns for INGO in this province. There has been an increase in AOG activities in Ghor this year. The reason for such an increase is due to the on going

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Tribal tensions
- Crime
- AOG activities increase

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

military activities in Helmand Province to the south. It is assessed that AOG activities in this sector remain transient in nature and it is believed that the AOG units operating in this area are Auxiliary units supporting supply routes into Helmand Province. It is anticipated that Ghor can expect to see more AOG activity in the border region should British forces escalate their activities by pushing AOG units northwards. It is believed that Ghor province remains a critical link in the sup-



ply chain to support AOG activities in Helmand, which is evident by the number of Caches, which have been discovered in the region. Therefore, the province should be considered by INGO's as a 'High-Risk' province for project operations.

FARAH


Farah Province maintains a steady activity rate. Activities in Farah are mainly AOG related, however, ACG activities are also present. The main risk in this province is armed attack and kidnap operations for both political and finan-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction along the Ring Road.
- AOG activities increasing
- Increased use of IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

cial reasons. In relation to armed attacks, this form of activity is predominantly conducted by AOG units and is heaviest along the Herat-Kandahar ring road. Coupled with armed attacks, is the high number of kidnappings along the very same road. In most cases, kidnapping has been related to targets of opportunity rather than well planned operations for a single purpose; whilst armed attacks are more conceived events on



poorly defended targets such as police check points. The province remains a high-risk area for INGO's operating in the area and is expected to pose the same problem for the foreseeable future.

HERAT

Herat Province continues to see an escalation in predominantly criminal based activities. Such activities often have a nexus to political and organized crime groups who have an interest in positions of power and or control


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ACG activities to increase
- Serious abduction risk
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

of the illicit trade routes. Whilst Herat does see some AOG activity and it is acknowledged that there is a link to some ACG, it is envisaged that organised criminal activities will remain the provinces most acute problem.

Specifically, it can be expected that illicit trades, such as the export of narcotics and illegal imports will fuel such activities. These activities will drive the need to seize power in order to control



the lucrative import/export routes. In turn, the province's rural areas can expect to see more clashes between rival tribal groups as they attempt to dominate routes passing through their areas.

KANDAHAR

At present there exists a heightened threat level to NGO staff and activities within Kandahar Province. Following a direct threat against an NGO distribution site recently, information (as detailed in the Threat Warning issued 28 April 08) indicates a heightened abduction threat within Kandahar City (as well as along main routes in the vicinity of city limits) against NGO international staff. As seen in previous abduction/kidnap incidents, the relevance of who perpetrated the initial event (ACG/AOG) is negated when high value targets (i.e. internationals) are involved. AOG elements will most likely become the end users due to the political cache such individuals represent, a reality that is facili-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- Force escalation shootings
- Abduction threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

tated by the firmly established nexus between criminal and armed opposition activity. NGO are advised to continue strictly observing and implementing standard movement security protocols. In addition, organisations planning field sites or regional office visits are advised to delay their movements temporarily (minimum 2 weeks) as well as restrict all non-essential movement.

Trends within Kandahar have clearly indicated a steady upwards escalation in AOG activity levels as the year progresses, with AOG initiated attacks up 31% in comparison to 2007. For perspective, April 2008 levels are on par with June of last year (generally considered the start of the summer fighting season). While most of these incidents are small in scale (i.e. ambush against ANP) the unpredictability, as well as implementa-



tion of new/modified tactics, directly impact NGO security. Of specific concern is the indiscriminate targeting practices being utilized by AOG elements when deploying suicide strikes which are resulting in high levels of civilians casualties (121 since mid-February). Many of these devices have been deployed in civilian concentration points (i.e. central bazaars, city centers) and pose a threat to NGO security. If this continues (and all indicators suggest it will) then the likelihood of collateral involvement in a strike increases dramatically. NGO are advised to review routes and travel habits and avoid areas of known security force activity, checkpoints, and transit, especially those that occur in population centers as these are most likely to be encountered by staff members.

ZABUL


There were two separate incidents involving the targeting of culverts/bridges reported within Zabul this week. One of the incidents occurred on Hwy 1, the other within Qalat suggesting that this was part of an attempt to disrupt security force mobility.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction threat (Hwy 1)
- AOG checkpoints
- Ambush threat along Hwy 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

While further investigation into these incidents is required to fully understand the rationale behind them, the willingness of AOG elements to target critical infrastructure (as seen with the attacks against telecommunication facilities region wide as well as the attacks against power facilities in Helmand) has been firmly established. Whatever the reason, it may have an impact on NGO freedom of movement and access. Not only may it result in physical



barriers to movement, but it adds a further destabilising influence on the already tenuous security situation along Hwy 1 and other main routes in the province.

NIMROZ

The suicide attack which occurred on the 17th of April marks the fourth such event within Nimroz for 2008. While AOG targeting patterns have remained stable, with efforts focused on security and road construction elements, there has been a steadily increasing level of coordination and sophistication in the execution of such attacks. The utilisation of an IED strike to initiate an attack, the use of follow on suicide attacks (“waves”), and as seen in the latest attack, the distribution of follow up night letters, all demon-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction threat in isolated areas
- Attacks against ANP.
- Suicide attack threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

strate a new level of AOG vigour and intent not previously seen. In addition, suicide attacks have also become increasingly more frequent since the first recorded event in November of last year. By end of April, the suicide attack volume in Nimroz has already surpassed 2007 year end totals.

The last two suicide attacks also mark a diversion in deployment tactics, with attacks occurring in close proximity to heavy civilian traffic areas (near the main Zaranj mosque for example) indicating a willingness to inflict heavy civilian casualties (20 in total for the last 2 attacks) to achieve limited tactical success. This mirrors trends already established in other prov-



inces within the SR, with Kandahar and Helmand being the most affected.

Presently there are no indications that NGO have been, nor will likely be, the direct targets of such attacks, if AOG continue to engage targets accordingly, this will result in a concomitant increase in risk of collateral involvement in an attack. Please refer to the Kandahar Provincial section for further detail.

PAKTIKA

Negotiations are presently ongoing regarding the INGO staff member who was kidnapped on the 3rd of April within the Urgan District. No further updates are available at this time.

AOG activity trends have been developing consistently with those reported from 2007. The slow yet steady escalation in AOG activity reported previously peaked in this reporting period, with the highest


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IED
- Attacks against IMF convoys
- Intimidation against civilians

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

weekly incident volume occurring this week. While this province has not followed general SR trends (earlier initiation with higher incident volumes) thus far, this week likely marks the initiation of earnest AOG operations within Paktika. As with 2007, incident volumes (with accompanied deterioration in security) will continue to escalate through to the summer months with a peak expected in July/August.

As with 2008 AOG activity continues to be comparatively geographically dispersed, though the three north-eastern districts of



Barmal, Urgan, and Ziruk account for 56% of total incidents reported this year. This can be partially attributed to the confluence of unstable national (Eastern Region districts of Khost and Paktya) and international border regions in this area. The remaining 44% of incidents are distributed equally between the remaining 10 districts of Paktika.

HELMAND


There were no significant changes in the security context within Helmand during this reporting period as the steady downwards trend in AOG activity continues. This

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IED
- Suicide attack threat
- Criminal activity/corruption along the main routes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

trend is in line with 2007; likely reflecting the impact the poppy cultivation cycles has on local AOG operational capacity. However, the deployment of additional IMF assets to the province will likely result in periodic spikes in district level volatility as these units “surge” into areas and actively engage, and are engaged by, the AOG elements insitu. This situation will likely have a limited



impact on NGO security as the affected areas will be those that are known to harbour high levels of AOG, areas which generally have no significant NGO presence.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”



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[Deutsche Welthungerhilfe](http://www.DeutscheWelthungerhilfe.org)

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ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Ghazni
- Uruzgan

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better please contact us.

THE ANSO MANDATE

Scope of Services, P.1, 2008

The community of NGOs has established ANSO in recognition of their interdependence and shared responsibility towards security management.

They have acknowledged that ANSO is important in maintaining the impartiality, independence and political neutrality of NGOs by allowing them to be free from dependence upon security information originating from political or military sources.

They have also recognized the need to avoid association with the military in the complex Afghanistan environment and have therefore perceived a valuable role for ANSO in protecting NGO from direct contact with the military.

The community recognizes that the success of ANSO in fulfilling these functions is dependant upon the willingness of NGOs to cooperate with one another in the area of security management and to support ANSO in delivering these objectives.

In so forming ANSO then, the NGO community has accepted the inherent obligation to contribute and participate for the effective management of their own security.