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THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Extreme non-local AOG responsible for the execution of 10 NGO-associated staff in Badakhshan
- Attack was in contravention of the IEA Code of Conduct and de facto practices
- Possible targeting of NGOs in light of IEA claim of responsibility

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

Arguably the worst AOG targeting of NGO-associated staff in Afghanistan's recent history occurred on 5 August in Kuran Wa Munjan District, Badakhshan. While erroneous reports asserted that the attack was due to banditry, all evidence confirms the contrary: in actuality, non-local AOG targeted the party of 10 aid workers in a premeditated fashion. Moreover, the attack occurred not because of inflammatory claims behind the team's status or activities, rather because it consisted of foreigners, an appealing target to extremist AOGs transiting and operating in the area following a massive AOG operation in neighboring Nuristan.

Local and international outrage has consequently focused on the lack of remorse displayed towards the victims by the general Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan umbrella (IEA, or Afghan Taliban), as well as others, drawing into question acceptable risk thresholds, perceptions of NGOs and operational practices. Of pivotal importance for NGOs, therefore, is understanding if the attack is demonstrative of AOG intentions—official or unofficial—to target the NGO

community or foreign NGO staff. After analysis, though, one sees that there is no general intent to target for execution either NGOs or their foreign staff.

Evidence to support this conclusion include the involvement of extremist, non-local AOG in the attack; the recently released IEA Code of Conduct that condemns such actions; and de facto practices of local AOGs not to harm NGO staff during detention (over 20 instances of NGO abductions have occurred country-wide as of yet in 2010, all resulting in the safe release of NGO staff).

While the above conclusion is reassuring, especially for the expansion of humanitarian aid into isolated and perilous areas, understanding and monitoring changes in the context is imperative. Foremost, extremist elements that disregard local acceptance are present along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and, second, AOG and residents are less able to ensure safety in areas which are in contention or serving as conduits for non-local AOG movement.

One must also remain sensitive to possible changing

perceptions of NGOs; although no indications exist that AOG attempts to lend legitimacy to the attack through defamation of the team, and by extension the NGO, took hold, diligence is essential. With this, IEA claims of responsibility could easily send the wrong message to average foot-soldiers, in contravention of the IEA Code of Conduct.

NGOs headquartered in Kabul City faced further concerns during the period. Of note, a complex suicide attack that targeted a PSC facility on 10 August in what is considered to be a safe area of the city was disconcerting. Additionally, a property dispute between Hazara and Kuchis erupted in violence in multiple districts within the city, due in part to longstanding disagreements and ethnic tensions. Security forces were hence caught off guard and overwhelmed when Hazara residents mobilized to voice their outrage through mob violence, targeting various ANP facilities and material due to perceived bias by District 13 ANP, as well as local shops.

KABUL

Latest developments in Kabul province were dominated by two high-profile incidents in Kabul City: a complex BBIED attack against an international PSC compound in Taimani, PD 4, on 10 August; and a two-day public upheaval spanning over Hazara parts of PD 5, 6 and 13, originally a result of a localized, but ethnically -coloured, clash over land rights.


The first incident was sparked in the morning hours of 13 August, when several hundreds of Hazara people gathered in the Kohi Kuragh locality of Dashti Barchi, PD 13, in an attempt to delineate land in the area. Local Kuchis later became involved in a dispute which resulted in armed clashes, during which 1 Hazara resident was shot dead and several other people were injured on both sides. Some reports claimed that circa 200 tents/provisional shelters belonging to the Kuchis sustained other damage in the incident; this account has, however, been refuted both by ANP as well as other sources. As of yet, ANSO has not received any further confirmation of property sustaining damage in the Kuchi settlement. Following ANPs' intervention, paired with negotiations by elderly representatives of both communities, the conflict was contained;

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

however, tensions flared up again through a demonstration launched by Hazara partisans in the early afternoon, which turned on ANP in a backlash to the ANP's purported bias during the morning events. The rioters burned 4 ANP premises (3 in PD 13 and 1 in PD 6), while another Hazara resident and an ANP member were killed during the exchange of fire; more than 20 participants on each side were reportedly injured during the altercation, and an additional number of shops and a private health clinic were burned. Subsequently, ANA assumed command of the situation and succeeded in containing the crowd of protestors by 1900 hrs. Demonstrations resumed the next morning in PD 5 and 13, but ANA brought the situation under control and reportedly prevented other protests from being staged in the afternoon. An investigation into the incident was publically announced by the President's Office.

Although a unique incident in its scale and intensity for Kabul Province, clashes between Hazara and Kuchi groups are a perennial problem in Central Afghanistan (Wardak, Logar, Ghazni). Of importance, similar ethnically-tuned conflict lines may be exploited by political entities during the upcoming parliamentary elections; however, no information currently indicates that Hazara-Kuchi clashes should re-emerge in the near future in Kabul City.

The second incident was a complex SAF/BBIED attack launched by two suicide attackers against a PSC compound in Taimani Road, Street 9, PD 4, circa 1510 hrs on



10 August. Two suicide attackers carrying BBIEDs and AK47s walked towards the side gate of the compound. One of them attempted to scale the outside wall of the compound, while the other attacker took a shooting position. The attackers were spotted by a driver of a passing car, who would immediately make a sharp U-turn, and drove full-speed away. The driver's pro-active reaction raised the attention of the PSC guards at the main gate, who then engaged the attackers. Both security guards were killed in the confrontation. The attacker who climbed the wall was shot dead by a guard from the rooftop of the compound, upon which the other attacker detonated his IED. The first casualty on the side of the PSC, however, was a company's driver who was shot dead after entering the fray. Although unsuccessful as compared to the original intent of getting inside the compound, the attack presented features of a pre-mediated action including preliminary surveillance; thus, the attack was intended to either directly target the PSC in question, or serve as generic targeting of a PSC seen as a party to the conflict by AOG. The employment of suicide bombers most likely rules out the possibility of the attack having a criminal background, for instance due to intra-PSC competition.

Other than the two mentioned attacks, the AOG incident rate for Kabul province remained rather low, declining by approximately 50% compared to the previous reporting period. Similar patterns in territorial focus, targeting and tactics were, however, reproduced; Khaki Jabar, Shakardara, Surobi, Bagrami and Karte Naw witnessed between 1 to 2 AOG-initiated incidents each.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political tensions related to the parliamentary election
- Attention-grabbing AOG attacks targeting GoA, IMF, IOs, and comingled targets
- Criminality

PARWAN

In illustration of AOG expansion, an INGO engaged in demining activities for an ongoing construction project in Kohi Safi District witnessed a sub-contractor's loader truck having been burned by AOG in Nomon Khel Area in the night of 5 August. Importantly, local ACG actors were responsive to AOG-sponsored calls for action against GoA stakeholders in the past.

Previous erroneous targeting of NGOs on the Kabul – Bamyan


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Ghorband Valley
- ACG activity in Chaharikar
- Access roads to Bagram

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

road, the risks of staff abduction nurtured by the topography of the area paired with a light ANSF set up, as well as ANP officials' own perceptions of being outnumbered by AGE, are all relevant factors that can impact NGOs operations in the province. As late July 2010 developments showed, an association with the upcoming parliamentary election can be another factor triggering hostile action by AOG-ACG, particularly in the western part of Parwan.

A regular AOG presence in the western districts of Shinwari, Siyagerd and Ghorband, with an established centre in the Namak Ab area of Shinwari, has not materialized in new security incidents, with the exception of an



SAF attack targeting an ANP checkpoint in Dara Kafshan area, Shinwari, on 6 August. However, the low level of incidents should be understood within the context of a weak ANSF and IMF presence in the area, rather than giving ground to speculations about an eventual drop in AOG activities.

Traditionally, Bagram District hosts sporadic IED attacks targeting IMF convoys. This period saw an IMF convoy detonate an IED in Barek Ab Area on 9 August, while another IED was discovered and defused in Gojar Khel area 4 days later.

KAPISA


All 5 AOG incidents reported from Kapisa during this period occurred in eastern Tagab, Nijrab and Alasay districts. Such an incident level roughly corresponds to the incident rate of the previous period, while it marks a decline in intensity as compared to the usual monthly incident rates of the first six months of this year. Still of note is the overall increase of 48% in AOG incidents from January 2010 until mid-August 2010 in comparison to the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG in Alasay, Nijrab, & Tagab
- AOG expansion
- Factional disputes in Kohistan I & II, and Mahmud Raqi

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

same period in 2009. Albeit rather low in occurrence and scale, AOG activities in these districts reflect a permanent AOG presence concomitant with a limited ANSF and IMF imprint, and as such represent the primary security concern in the province. Instability previously reported from Alasay District materialized on 1 August in an ANP clash with AOG in the Bazaar area that necessitated air support; 6 civilians were injured in the air strike. The rest of AOG incidents were of small scale and little note, encompassing an intra-AOG killing and an arson attack in Alasay; an attack of a joint IMF/ANA patrol in Tagab; as well as another attack of an IMF/ANA patrol, and an attack against a private construction project protected by ANP in Nijrab.



As for the western districts, factional clashes may affect Kohistan 1 and 2 and Mahmud Raqi during the upcoming election period, especially as the areas host a variety of opposed factional groups and, again, are lightly policed by ANSF. NGOs and other local sources confirm that the security vacuum is particularly flagrant during the night hours, when ANP forces retreat from rural areas into their bases in DACs. Significantly, an increased influx of unknown armed men during the night hours has been reported recently from all three districts mentioned.

LOGAR

The insecurity in the province is largely a result of AOG activities against IMF, ANSF and PSCs, with the Kabul-Gardez road being the main strategic focus. During this period, conflict patterns in Logar remained practically unchanged, albeit the occurrence of AOG incidents declined by almost 25% as compared to the previous period. Out of 13 AOG incidents in total, 6 were recorded


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

in Puli Alam, 3 in Charkh, and 2 in Mohammad Agha and Baraki Barak. A similar level of occurrence applied to IED activity, which was limited to only 4 IED strikes reported from Pul-e Alam and Muhammad Agha, and the same number of IEDs defused in Puli Alam, Mohammad Agha and Khushi altogether.

NGO operations continued without reported hindrance in Puli Alam and Mohammad Agha. Nevertheless, NGOs are cautioned against the risk of abduction, although only one occur-



rence specific to this threat was observed during this period: on 13 August, an IMF civilian contractor was kidnapped along with his vehicle by an unknown group while driving through Babus area in Puli Alam. NGOs will note that abductions in Logar usually emanate from ACG rather than AOG and target prominent local businessmen. The most common tactic in the past was the setting up of illegal checkpoints using the cover of a PSC.

DAYKUNDI

Daykundi province remained calm during the reporting period with only two incidents noted: on 4 August, Nili saw a demonstration concerning local residents' support for the current status quo of Gizab District as being a part of Daykundi in a backlash to purported claims over the district that were voiced in Uruzgan; while Kiti Area of Khadir District witnessed a local dispute involving an ACG that escalated in the killing of one of the involved parties on 9 August. Despite the low level of security incidents recently, NGOs with operations in the province should be aware that a 20% increase in combined AOG and


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Security vacuum
- Ethno-political tensions between Hazara and Pashtuns
- Spoilers-to-peace in Khadir and Gizab districts

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

ACG incidents for the first seven and half months of 2010 was recorded in comparison to the same period last year. As a general pattern, the Northern area of the province is prone to ACG activities, while instability related to political conflict mostly occurs in the Southern, overwhelmingly Pashtun, districts of Gizab, Kiti and Kijran, with sporadic backlashes of developments in both parts impacting on the district capital, Nili.

In the South, a recurrent issue of a local Hazara AOG commander based in Khadir, with networks extending into Nili and Gizab districts, is of note. The AOG under his command has a strong criminal record, and he is said to have been involved in the abduction of two expat INGO workers in Khadir District in July 2008 (released unharmed two weeks later). In late Spring 2010, the



commander in question received an offer from the GoA to accept the post of the District Chief of Police in the restive Gizab District, where the GoA's imprint hardly extends beyond the DAC, under the condition that he and his group disarmed. This was seen as a GoA attempt at controlling the commander, while also extending its own outreach into the district that is otherwise infiltrated by pro-Taliban AOGs from Uruzgan. Several deadlines for the commander's acceptance of the position and disarmament have passed ever since, but another offer valid for the next two weeks was re-issued following the latest round of negotiations. NGOs should note that an eventual acceptance of the Hazara commander to police Gizab District on the GoA's behalf has a potential to ignite ethnically-underlined tensions between his force and the local Pashtun majority.

BAMYAN


Bamyan remains one of the safest areas for NGO operations with the exception of Kahmard District. Predominately Taliban-affiliated AOG commuting back and forth from neighbouring Tala wa Barfak District of Baghlan are increasingly exploring Kahmard,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ Civil unrest
- ➔ ACG/AOG activity in Kahmard
- ➔ ACG/AOG along access roads from Kabul and Dushi

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

while a variety of local ACG are also active in the area. With this, Kahmard recently saw the first IMF casualty in Bamyan when AOG ambushed an IMF convoy in the Eshpushta Area on 3 August. The district is under the influence of a confluence of AOG and ACG agendas and interests, actually disallowing clear delineation among ACGs and AOGs. The GoA acknowledges heavy AOG penetration of Kahmard; however, the district remains lightly policed and the situation is not likely to change in the short term.



Besides Kahmard, NGOs should be aware of an elevated risk of attacks along the access road from Parwan to Bamyan via Ghorband Valley, as well as of banditry in the southern district of Panjab. ANSO cautions NGOs against using the access road from Kabul to Bamyan via Hajigak Pass (Wardak), as well as the road from Bamyan to Dushi via Tala wa Barfak.

WARDAK


Conflict ramifications in Wardak continue to make the province a complex environment for NGO operations. The Kabul – Kandahar Highway, which traverses Maydan Shahr, Nirkh, Saydabad and Jaghatu on its way south, is the main artery of instability primarily due to converging interests among IMF, ANSF, AOG and ACG, without leaving aside competing security and logistics companies. In blunt contrast to the eastern districts stand Bihsud

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ AOG prevalence in Saydabad and Nirkh
- ➔ Re-ignition and spill over of intra-AOG clashes from Nirkh to adjacent areas
- ➔ Attacks targeting IMF/ANSF logistics convoys along Highway 1

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

1&2, as well as Day Mirdad, which are the exceptions due to their Hazara populations and a limited strategic interest to the belligerents, rendering them virtually immune from the violence in the east. 27 AOG-initiated incidents occurred during the last period, with 12 of them in Saydabad alone, followed by 6 incidents in Nirkh, and 4 in Maydan Shahr. AOG operations targeted mainly IMF/ANSF, PSCs and, to a lesser extent, construction company projects, featuring a variation of tactical methods, ranging from roadside IED attacks and SAF assaults, to IDF attempts aimed at disrupting DACs. The level of Saydabad AOGs' technical capability came to the fore in a rare RCIED attack which struck a PSC convoy in Mullah Khel Area on 7 August, reportedly killing 4 PSC personnel.



As of yet, the inter-AOG clashes between HIG and pro-Taliban factions in Nirkh, which dominated the previous period, have not resumed. Both parties are seemingly locked down in a precarious status quo, with peace negotiations brokered by local elders still ongoing (for background, refer to the previous bi-weekly report); an armed tug of war over control of the area between HIG and pro-Taliban AOG will most likely resume due to the incompatibility of the parties' interests and the lucrative stakes involved, however, eventually featuring an additional influx of Taliban fighters and a well-coordinated resistance by HIG fighters enjoying local support. The implications of such development are yet to be seen.

PANJSHIR

Security news or incidents are rare in Panjshir, which is also the case of the last reporting period, during which no security developments came to the fore. The last reported incidents go as far back as to the series of 3 IEDs planted on the roads in Khenj (6 May),

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political rivalries

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Rukha (14 May) and Umaba (23 May), all of them targeting high-profile convoys (IMF, IO, and foreign embassy). The information gathered confirmed that the devices were not designed to cause casualties; rather, they were a local attempt at gaining publicity and creating a sensation of instability in the province, which is to be interpreted in light of political

rivalry over control of the province that gained momentum when the then Governor, partisan of Dr. Abdullah in the presidential elections, was sacked by the Kabul administration. ANSO recommends NGOs adhere to a low-profile set up, as well as avoid exposure to high-profile elements and venues, while on the move in the province.

In reaction to the lack of security information, NGOs are strongly encouraged to contact ANSO Central Region representatives with any information on changes in the context within the province.

BADAKHSHAN

On 5 August, AOG attacked an INGO-led medical expedition with SAF, resulting in the deaths of eight foreign aid workers and two Afghan aid workers in Kuran Wa Munjan District, bordering Nuristan Province. Though tragic and shocking, the incident does not represent a strategic shift on the part of AOGs, which have traditionally refrained from indiscriminate attacks on NGO workers. Rather, details and contextual information confirm that a non-local AOG motivated by opposition toward non-Muslim foreigners targeted the expedition. While the incident does reflect the presence of an extremist AOG element in an isolated geographic area of the country, it does not represent a threat to the broader


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- NGO murders
- Low-level AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

NGO community in Northeastern Afghanistan or elsewhere; however, Afghan AOG claims to the attack could send dangerously mixed messages to their own fighters as to the legitimacy of indiscriminately attacking NGO workers, which could lead to a temporary spike in NGO-direct incidents in other areas of the country. The high-profile publication of allegations of proselytizing and spying may also further damage the general reputation of NGOs in the eyes of the Afghan population, GoA, criminal elements and other opposition forces.

In the rest of Badakhshan Province the strategic environment has remained constant, with typical AOG-initiated activities reported in Kishim, Jurm, Warduj and Yaf-tali Sufla. Furthermore, activities demonstrate the continued presence, yet low-level capability, of



AOGs, especially compared to the relative efficiency of ANSF in these districts. In Jurm, an RCIED was discovered and an AOG commander arrested. In Argo, two AOGs were arrested with explosives. In Yaf-tali Sufla, an AOG was confronted while planting an IED and subsequently escaped. The only significant incident to note occurred in Warduj, where AOGs reportedly stopped private buses at night, searching for GoA employees or “foreigners.” While ideological and anti-Western AOGs are known to be more active in Warduj District, as compared to the rest of the province, INGOs with local community acceptance have been able to safely maintain operations in the district, without incident to date.

GRAPHS:

Please note that graphs in this report are current as of 4 August 2010.

BALKH


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1

The second-ever NGO reported incident in Nahri Shahi occurred this period, when two NGO staff travelling in a Surf vehicle southwards from Heyrabad in Nahri Shahi were met by armed men on a motorcycle who attempted to stop them and subsequently fired on their vehicle as they attempted to escape. While concrete evidence has not yet been revealed to suggest a criminal or political intent, it is suspected that the vehicle may have been targeted due to the fact that it was carrying field cash. As the vehicle was returning from an early morning trip, it may have been under surveillance in the area it was attacked. The road, which was also the site of the abduction of the Head of the District Department of Education in early June, as well as the NGO encounter reported in early May, does not have a guarantee of security according to district ANP. However, some NGOs continue to use the route without incident, as it is essential to their operations in the nearby villages.

As the joint IMF/ANSF operation in Chintal and Chahar Bolak districts does not appear to have hampered AOG activity neither on the main Mazar-Shibirgan Road, nor within the districts. Four attacks occurred along the Mazar-Shibirgan Road this period, including one direct fire attack on ANP checkpoints, one combined SAF attack on an ANP check-

point and IMF convoy, and two IEDs targeting ANP vehicles (one of which was followed by SAF, and the other which resulted in the death of a civilian bystander) and one IED which targeted the vehicle of a parliamentary candidate. Over half of these incidents have occurred during the day, prompting NGOs to take extraordinary precautions to avoid potential targets. Within the districts, IMF/ANSF were vigilant enough to recover all three IEDs which had been planted, primarily pressure-plate anti-personnel mines. Also within the districts, four civilian abductions were reported. On 29 July, a GoA appointee dealing with development in Chintal District was abducted and suspected to have been taken to Alborz Mountains. On 24 July two local civilians were abducted in Jar Qala Village and one of the abductees was released unharmed from the Alborz Mountains. On 26 July, a civilian was abducted following a clash with ANP in Bargah Village and was later released unharmed from Alborz Mountain. In the single fatal abduction reported this period, four armed men on motorcycles (one of whom was dressed in an ANP uniform) abducted a former Jihadi commander and local Imam from Gortepa Village of Chahar Bolak District. The following day the body of the Jihadi commander was found in Naw Abad Timurak Village and the Imam was released unharmed.

Prior to the elections in August 2009, there was a surge in fatal abductions and targeted killings in Chahar Bolak and Chintal districts, most likely due to local political rivalries surrounding the elections. The recent abductions



that have resulted in release, however, are more likely connected to AOG efforts to extort money and crops from the local population during the harvest season. The surge in abductions is logical since the increase in IMF/ANSF presence has presumably hampered the AOG's ability to place direct pressure on the local population within the village. It is apparent that AOGs who were previously centered in the area of Alizai Village of Chintal District have regrouped in the Alborz Mountain Area. The proximity of the mountains to Sholgara District may also imply increased coordination with those AOGs located in Sholgara.

In Sholgara and Kishindeh districts two separate parliamentary candidate vehicles came under SAF attack. In Kishindeh District, the attack resulted in a clash between AOGs and the candidate's bodyguards, resulting in the deaths of one bodyguard and one ANP, as well as the injury of four bodyguards and the arrests of four AOGs. While the incidents were initiated by AOGs, the motives of the attack cannot be determined to be purely anti-governmental, as armed groups are sometimes mobilized by opposing political parties in order to threaten political opponents ahead of elections. Hence, NGOs operating in areas subject to more pronounced political tensions should be cautioned of running the risk of becoming prey to political posturing by local parties.

Finally, in Mazar-e Sharif City, an IED was discovered near the western city entrance on the road to Balkh District. This is the first reported case of a roadside IED discovered within the city limits since December 2008. While such AOG-initiated incidents may potentially increase in advance of the elections, the potential for significant AOG infiltration is deterred by the overall strength of GoA within the city.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- SAF on NGO vehicle in Nahri Shahi District
- Political tension ahead of elections
- IEDs and SAF along the Ring Road

KUNDUZ

The operation reported late last period in Bagh-e Shirkat Area of Kunduz District resulted in the deaths of six AOGs and the injury of seven others. Throughout the operation, IMF launched artillery towards AOG positions, and AOGs laid IEDs in the area, two of which detonated against and IMF vehicle. Since the beginning of Ramadan, IMF and ANSF have allegedly put major operations on hold, initially slowing the pace of kinetic activity in the typical hot spots of Chahar Dara and Kunduz. As a result, AOGs have reportedly reinitiated intimidation tactics in Chahar Dara District, from which IMF and ANSF recently retreated. As a result, AOGs attacked an IMF convoy in Qaryateem Village, laid an IED in Qasab Village, and killed a community elder in Nahri Sufi who


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased activity in Aliabad District
- SVBIED in Imam Sahib
- RCIED on Khanabad Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

was accused of spying for IMF. Despite the purported reluctance of security forces to engage AOGs during the first weeks of Ramadan, AOG attacks on IMF and ANSF targets have drawn them into clashes, inevitably accompanied by close air support. One such air strike along the southern border between Aliabad and Chahar Dara resulted in the deaths of at least three AOGs and two local civilians. AOGs based in Chahar Dara appear to be focusing their attention across the river into southern Aliabad District, where a daytime attack on an ANP checkpoint near the District Centre lasted for almost one hour, killing an ANP officer. In addition to the civilian casualties caused by IMF air strikes, AOG-initiated incidents have also impacted civilians in this area, where an IED prematurely detonated against a civilian vehicle, and AOGs abducted the driver of a private truck.

In Imam Sahib District, a joint IMF/ANSF operation focused on clearing the Western part of the



district, a likely push to introduce the IMF ANP mentoring units into the area. During the first day of the operation, an SVBIED detonated north of the District Centre, killing six ANP members and one pro-government militia member and injuring several others. Two IMF vehicles were also damaged in the attack. The incident signified the third attack involving suicide bombers in Kunduz Province in the past two months. This is an abnormally high rate when compared to the eleven total attacks in the past four years, affirming suspicions that foreign and southern-based AOGs may be increasingly present in the province to support such attacks.

Despite the relative security of Khanabad District, there remains a threat of IED and targeted attacks along the Taloqan-Kunduz Road during the day. One RCIED detonated against an ANP vehicle this period, killing two ANP and injuring four others. Such attacks are still infrequent enough to deter travel along the road, and the potential threat of collateral involvement still exists.

JAWZJAN


Following a surge of armed clashes between AOGs and ANSF/IMF in Darzab and Qush Tepa districts reported last period, AOGs have resumed intimidation tactics targeting the local population. On 1 August, night letters were posted on mosques throughout each district, announcing that

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Night letters in Darzab and Qush Tepa
- Attack on ANP in Feyzabad

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

locals had until 16 September to renounce their support for the government or face consequences. In Feyzabad District, near the border with Chahar Bolak District (Balkh Province), AOGs attacked the convoy of the District Chief of Police (DCoP), north of the District Centre, injuring the DCoP and four others. While reports of armed attacks against GoA and ANSF targets were reported more frequently in 2008, such attacks decreased over the




course of the past two years, inverse to the relative increase in arrests and seizures made by ANP. The AOGs operating in Feyzabad District are linked to those operating in Chahar Bolak, and such a coordinated attack may represent increased coordination with their Balkh-based counterparts.

FARYAB

A late-reported INGO abduction in Khwaja Sabz Push District resulted in the safe release of two national INGO staff who had been in the area conducting an assessment in a White Toyota Hilux. The staff were taken on 15 July and released two weeks later. It is suspected that they were mistaken for GoA employees, and they were reportedly released through negotiations with village elders. Fighting continued this period in Shakh sub-district of Qaysar District, where AOGs appear to have the dominant hand. Stand-off tactics were also employed to the west of the District Centre, where an IED killed an influential elder along the Ring Road connecting Qaysar to Gormach District. AOGs appear to

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	13
This Report Period	0

be attempting to consolidate influence in the southern sub-district by achieving decisive control over the western access route ahead of the parliamentary elections. While IMF/ANSF have initially retreated from the area during Ramadan's first days, the imminent threat of an AOG victory will likely draw them back into the area before the month is up. A similar dynamic has emerged in eastern Bilchiragh District, where Afghan and international forces have set their sights on securing the AOG-held areas east of the District Centre ahead of the elections. Over the course of the first week of August, a series of prolonged clashes broke out in Kawlian, Qorchi and Tashqala villages, some of which resulted in both ANP, AOG and pro-government militia casualties. The final outcome of these clashes is yet to be determined; however, given the AOGs' access to re-



supply and safe haven in Darzab (Jawzjan), one may expect further confrontation ahead of the election. Though Pashtun Kot District reported little kinetic activity (one attack on an ANP checkpoint in Khwaja Na Musa sub-district), local reports of a strong AOG presence persist in Myandara Valley, south of Maymana City. Unconfirmed reports of AOG infiltration from Myandara to Kohistan District suggest that there is a continued and concerted effort to establish a presence within the province's remote and mountainous regions. Further north in Shirin Tagab District, AOGs ambushed a delegation of provincial authorities and a provincial council chairman, to which the ANP responded and no casualties or damage was reported. There remains a formidable AOG presence in Dawlatabad and Shirin Tagab districts, and such attacks against GoA and ANSF can be expected to continue.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- NGO abduction
- IMF/ANSF operations ahead of elections

SAR-E PUL

Further instability was reported in northwestern Kohistanat District this period, showing a concerted AOG effort to establish and maintain control over the single entryway in to the district, which also links Sayyad to Sar-e Pul districts. Following a seven hour-long clash in Alaf Safed Village, west of Jerghan Area, reported late last period, AOGs have re-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

portedly maintained control of the area and are blocking access into the district. A daytime abduction of an IEC official from the said area also confirms the existent threat of abduction to GoA and other affiliated persons.



Further west in Sozma Qala District, ANP discovered and defused an IED north of the District Centre on the Sar-e Pul - Sozma Qala main road. This is the second recorded IED-related incident in the district, after an RCIED detonated against a private vehicle in

June on the road leading southwards toward Kohistanat District. In Gosfandi District, unknown individuals launched two RPGs toward the District Centre which impacted an open area. This does not necessarily represent an AOG presence in Gosfandi District, in which ANSO has never recorded a single AOG-initiated incident.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG-ANSF clash
- Abduction and road closure

TAKHAR

AOGs on the border between Ishkamish District and Burka District (Baghlan) have become more active, where on the Takhar side of the border AOGs abducted an ANP member and subsequently released him after negotiations with local elders, keeping his motorcycle and weapon. In response, ANP ambushed a group attempting to infiltrate the district from Burka, killing two and injuring three others, including the commander. Further clashes are expected in this area, as AOGs will likely seek retaliation.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

In Taloqan District, an IED detonated in front of an office of a female parliamentarian candidate, causing no casualties or damage. Also, in a demonstration of opposition against the expansion of the ANA base in Taloqan City, AOGs attacked the construction company responsible for the said expansion, setting fire to a number of vehicles and other property. The attackers were warded off by a brief exchange of fire with ANP; however, further attacks against the base or against ANSF/IMF targets in the vicinity of the nearby airstrip may occur. AOGs went on the offensive in Yangi Qala District after a two



week respite which had temporarily shifted the focus to neighboring Khwaja Ghar and Darqad districts. AOGs abducted two ANSF members, one ANA and one high-ranking ANP member from a temporary checkpoint established in Pul-e Shamsuddin Area, south of Yangi Qala District Centre. The road to Khwaja Bahawuddin from Yangi Qala is still assessed to be insecure, as AOGs in effect maintain control of the area and are continuing to target ANSF along this route.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Abductions and clashes in northern Takhar
- Attack against ANA base
- Ishkamish/Burka border area

BAGHLAN

Operation Tawhid III commenced late last period with the aim of securing Dand-e Shahabuddin and Dand-e Ghorri areas of Pul-e Khumri District. Throughout the duration of the operation there was a notable decrease in AOG presence and direct-fire attacks on the Mazar-Pul-e Khumri Road, likely due to the increased ANSF and temporary

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

IMF presence in the Dand-e Ghorri Area. Despite this dip in activity, an IED detonation killed a civilian, and an armed clash erupted on the main road in the evening, suggesting that the threat along the road will likely re-emerge, particularly as IMF and ANSF once again retreat. Reportedly, IMF/ANSF have placed the Dand-e Shahabuddin Area back into the hands of a former AOG who recently surrendered to the government this Spring, which could have potentially negative consequences. In Baghlani Jadid District, the rate of incidents in the vicinity of Baghlan Old City and along the main road continued apace, with two separate morning-time IED detonations



resulting in the injury of three ANP and five ANA members, respectively. Also, two separate morning-time direct-fire attacks on ANSF targets occurred on the main road (one checkpoint and one fuel tanker convoy with ANSF protection), the former of which resulted in the deaths of four AOGs, and the injury of two ANSF and three civilians. In addition to the threat of IED and direct-fire attacks, AOGs continue to establish illegal checkpoints along the road in the early afternoon hours, north of Baghlan Old City, suggesting that the threat of abduction persists in this area.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Tenuous security west of Pul-e Khumri
- Continued threats on Kunduz-Baghlan Road
- Changing dynamics in Dand-e Shahabuddin Area

SAMANGAN


While no further kinetic activity was reported in Dara-e Suf Payan District this period, groups of armed men continue to be seen in several areas, primarily in the west of the district. Some local sources have reported illegal tax collection

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

and intimidation, and it is possible that further instances are going unreported. The second-ever recorded IED detonation occurred this period in Aybak District, when two AOGs were killed and one was badly wounded while planting an IED approximately 4 kilometers west of the provincial capital on the Aybak-Dara-e Suf Road. The injured and dead were



found to be from Aybak District, with links to the AOGs in Dara-e Suf Payan.

HERAT

During the present reporting period, Herat Province saw three incidents directly related to NGOs; however, there are no indications that the incidents were AOG related. In Herat City, on 2 August a local individual stabbed and wounded a female national staff member of an INGO with a knife. The reason in this case seems to be a private dispute.

In Injil District, a threat letter was found in the mosque on 4 August, warning beneficiaries not to take part in a training conducted by an INGO in a neighbouring village. AOG influence and presence in the area are low, suggesting that the motive might be objections to the training among a small community in Puran Village because it involves men and women alike; in further demonstration of this, the small community rejected participation in the training for this rea-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Attacks on Islam Qala Road and Herat – Qala-i-Naw Road
- Intimidation in Obe and Chishti Sharif districts
- Suicide attacks in and around Herat City

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	3

son. Negotiations were consequently held between local elders from the village where the training was scheduled and Puran Village. In conclusion, the issue seems to be solved for now.

Again in Herat City, ANSF conducted an operation in District 1 on 9 August, arresting two foreigners and one local citizen. INGO international staff were and are staying at the compound where the operation took place. At present, there is no official reporting on the arrest, but it is likely that it will be in the media during the coming weeks. Since the arrest took place at a compound where INGO staff are staying, it cannot be excluded that it might be connected with the public perception of INGOs.

In Obe and Chishti Sharif, AOG intimidated local communities, confirming a growing AOG influence in both districts. In Chishti Sharif, AOG asked parents not to send their children to school and GoA employees to quit their jobs. In Servan and Chenaran villages of Obe, AOG warned locals not to send girls who are older than 10 years to school. In addition,



AOG attacked an ANP CP in Cheshmae Shafa Area of Obe. AOG activity appears to have become significant in both districts, and it cannot be excluded that security will erode further, especially before the September election.

Islam Qala Road witnessed quite a number of direct attacks during this reporting cycle. In Sabool Area of Ghoryan, AOG attacked fuel tankers on 1 August in the late evening and on 13 August during the day. In addition, an ANP patrol was attacked on the road in Quddus Abad Area of Kohsan District on 11 August at 2300 hrs. Another road which remains concerning is the one between Herat and Qala-i-Naw, where logistic convoys have been attacked in Karukh District.

Apart from the numerous direct attacks in Herat Province during the present reporting period, IEDs remain a concern in Gulran, Kushk, Kushki Kuhna and on the Herat Airport Road. On 8 August, an SVBIED hit a vehicle of an ANP convoy in the vicinity of the Guzara DAC and a fuel tanker nearby caught fire. Similar incidents cannot be excluded in Herat City and the Herat Airport Road, especially in the run-up to the election.

BADGHIS

Ghormach and Murghab were the most unstable districts, witnessing significant AOG activity as well as ANSF/IMF operations. The focus of the AOG attacks was again ANSF. On 2 August, for example, a complex attack on an ANP patrol took place in Durahi Chelgazi Area of Ghormach, where an ambush followed an IED strike. In addition, IEDs were discovered in Ab Garmmak Area of Ghormach


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

and Qebchagh Area of Murghab. Altogether, direct attacks as well as IED related incidents concentrated on Ghormach and Murghab in Badghis during the last two weeks. In an additional example, en route from Ghormach to the Murghab District Centre two independent election candidates were abducted on 9 August.

Muqur was quieter during this reporting period; however, Qadis District was notably in the media since AOG having publicly executed a woman for adultery. A public execution shows a significant level of AOG influence in the district as well as the interest

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-ANSF/IMF clashes in Murghab and Ghormach districts
- Intimidation in Qadis District
- Abduction



of AOGs to intimidate the communities and generate media attention.

During this reporting report there was no AOG related incident recorded in Qala-i-Naw City or District; however, a land dispute turned violent and two people were injured in Far-estan Area. In addition, AOG are expected to become active in Qala-i-Naw in the run up to the elections, and the road between Qala-i-Naw and Herat remains a concern, with AOG activity especially in the Sabzak Pass Area.

FARAH

IEDs were again the dominant AOG tactic in Farah Province. During this reporting period, more than half of all IED related incidents were recorded in Farah District, and nearly all in Farah City. The most significant one was a premature detonation of a BBIED in the Abdulla Khan Mosque on 11 August. The use of IEDs/RCIEDs is quite frequent in Farah City. According to ANSO data, the last suicide attack was in November 2009, when a BBIED on a motorbike detonated


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

himself in the Bazaar Area. Although suicide attacks seem not to be the preferred AOG tactic in Farah City at present, the possibility of suicide attacks is given, especially before the upcoming elections and against high profile targets. The target of the BBIED remains unknown; however, potential areas for IEDs are District 1, the vicinity of the Governor's office, and the airport as well as bridges. Further IED related incidents were recorded in District 3 (Jada-E Band Zarari Area) and Dasht-e Sufi Area of Farah City. In addition, civilians were affected by an IED strike in Pusht Rod in Faizabad Area.

Another incident of note in Farah City, again, was the abduction of a

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs in Farah City
- High AOG activity and ANSF/IMF operations in Pusht Rod and Bala Buluk districts



civilian at an illegal AOG checkpoint in Shalwalga Area. So far, the background of the abducted is unknown, and it appears to be an isolated incident.


During the present reporting cycle, AOGs were most active in Pusht Rod District, focusing on indirect attacks on ANP checkpoints and the DAC. In Bala Buluk, an AOG presence was also quite visible, for example, through indirect and direct attacks as well as IED related incidents. ANSF/IMF conducted operations in both districts and also in Khaki Safed.

GHOR

AOG activity in Pasaband and Taywara continues to be concerning after an influx of AOGs from Helmand during the last weeks. Pasaband again saw two direct attacks against the District Administration Centre (DAC). The attack on 3 August lasted for approximately an hour and a half. The second attack, six days later, was more intense and similar to the one on 29-30 July. AOG and

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

ANP clashed in Eskochak Area (3-4 km from the DAC) at approximately 0300 hrs and then moved to Kakuri Area. The fighting ended around 1800 hrs after AOG withdrew to a mountain area further south. Reports indicate that the community – who is not linked to any local commander in the area – decided to provide armed support to ANP to prevent a further deterioration of their security environment. AOG presence was also visible again in Taywara District, where an IED strike caused civilian casualties in Ashegha Area. In addition, AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint in Nawrak Area. Further AOG ef-



orts to increase their control and intimidate the local communities in both southern districts of Ghor Province are likely to continue during the next weeks.

Apart from Pasaband and Taywara districts, there were no AOG initiated incidents recorded in other parts of Ghor during this reporting cycle. The vast majority of incidents were related to private or tribal disputes in Chaghcharan, Dawlat Yar, Tulak and Du Layna districts.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Pasaband and Taywara
- IEDs
- Armed robbery

NANGARHAR


On 9 August in Bihsud District, AOG attacked the PRT to the east of Jalalabad City with RPGs and SAF, and at least two RPGs impacted inside the PRT compound. At first glance, this attack appeared to be similar to the 30 June complex attack against JAF’s southern gate. Still, the attack against the PRT was less coordinated, with attackers escaping after a few minutes, as soon as IMF air assets approached the area. In another high-profile incident, on 2 August in Jalalabad City’s Zone 2 an RCIED detonated against the convoy of an influential presidential ad-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

viser from Kunar—the son-in-law of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—injuring eight.

Minus these high-profile assaults, the overall security environment remained rather moderate. During this reporting cycle, the amount of recorded AOG incidents decreased slightly to 24, after 27 incidents in late July. In early August, Nangarhar saw a resurgence of incidents related to explosive devices, with ten IED detonations recorded in Bati Kot, Bihsud, Jalalabad, Hisarak, and Kuz Kunar districts. Particularly Bati Kot district, with four recorded IED detonations, saw a significant increase in such incidents.

AOG intimidation attempts and threat letters continued this period, and two incidents involving night letters were recorded in Bihsud and Jalalabad City. In the



former, the local population was asked to shut down a local internet cafe, while the latter warned again community members not to work with ANSF/IMF/GoA. Except the direct assault against the PRT mentioned above, the amount of reported direct attacks remained rather stagnant across Nangarhar, with four such attacks reported from Bihsud, Chaparhar, Muhmand Dara, and Khogyani districts. Additionally, around six IDF assaults were recorded in Bihsud, Chaparhar, Kuz Kunar, and Shinwar. The security situation in and around Jalalabad City, after a comparatively violent period in June and July, returned to rather normal levels, with the majority of incidents being related to criminality and/or security force operations.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Attacks against ANSF/IMF
- AOG at large in southern Nangarhar

LAGHMAN


On 3 August in western Mihtarlam, ANSF started a comprehensive operation against AOG strongholds in areas in and around Badpash and Shahgulyan villages, facing severe resistance. Although no information was confirmed by security forces, it appears that AOG killed several ANSF, abducted more than 20 ANA, and seized at least three ANSF vehicles. The following days, between 4 and 9 August,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Armed clashes in eastern Mihtarlam
- IEDs in the Alingar and Alishing Valleys

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

IMF/ANSF conducted multiple operations in these areas in an attempt to regain control in Badpash Area. Although no additional reports were received since 9 August, it appears that the security situation in western Mihtarlam and the neighbouring Uzbeen Valley remains very volatile, and further violence cannot be excluded. Such large-scale clashes are very unusual in Mihtarlam District, although it is understood that its remote western areas inhere a significant AOG presence and are an AOG transit route from and to Surobi. Other than this significant clash, the overall security environment in Laghman



Province was comparatively calm in early August. During this reporting period, around six AOG incidents were recorded in Mihtarlam, Dawlat Shah, Qarghayi, and Alingar districts. Activity along the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway remained very low, with one IDF strike against an IMF base near the Highway and no attacks on the road recorded. IED deployment in Laghman remains concentrated on Alingar and Alishing, with one detonation and one discovery reported from Alingar, as well as one discovery in Alishing.

NURISTAN


Nuristan Province continues to inhere a very violent and dangerous environment, with significant kinetic activity reported from Barg-e Matal and Nurgaram districts in early August. Although AOG have been driven out of the District Administration Centre area of Barg-e Matal, following their district capture in late July, various armed groups remain present in surrounding areas. Clashes between AOG and security forces are frequent, and at least three

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Continuing violence in most parts of Barg-e Matal
- AOG attacks in Nurgaram

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

AOG attacks against IMF/ANSF were reported in the district during this cycle. Additionally, it appears that security forces are trying to counter an increasing AOG influx in eastern Nuristan, adding an additional component to the steadily deteriorating security environment in these areas. For instance, on 4 August in Barg-e Matal, IMF/ANSF conducted an operation to re-gain control over the main road between Barg-e Matal and Kamdesh districts. At least 10 ANSF, as well as 40 suspected AOG, were killed in subsequent clashes, exemplifying the intensity of confrontations in eastern parts of the province. Besides



the high level of violence in Barg-e Matal, Nurgaram District continues to see significant AOG activity. For example on 10 August, an IED struck the vehicle of an international demining agency. Subsequently, the vehicle was attacked with SAF, sustaining damages. IMF remain a frequent target in Nurgaram, with one IDF assault against an IMF base and one SAF attack against a helicopter recorded.

ANSO SERVICES:

For NGOs that want to evaluate districts for security purposes, ANSO offers district analyses. Please contact the respective ANSO office for details and allow two weeks for completion.


KUNAR

Kunar Province, by far the most violent province across the Eastern Region, saw again an increase of AOG-initiated incidents. 84 of such incidents were recorded in early August, which displays an 18% increase in comparison to late July and supports an already identified trend of deterioration throughout the province. As outlined in the last report, the majority of incidents is not concentrated in usual areas, such as Pech or Asmar, anymore; rather, it has spread into all parts of Kunar. Particularly the southern and central districts of Narang, Chawkay, Nurgal, and Khas Kunar along the Jalalabad-Asadabad Road have seen a rapid deterioration of their security environments within the last couple of weeks. During Winter and Spring, those districts were only of marginal relevance to the overall amount of recorded security incidents throughout Kunar. Subsequent to a comprehensive IMF/ANSF operation in

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

Marawara and surrounding areas in late June, several local AOG apparently migrated to different areas—including those along the main JAL-Asadabad Road—resulting in a significant deterioration of security there. In late July, the abovementioned districts along the highway already accounted for 24% of all AOG incidents in Kunar. During this period, around 30 direct attacks and two abductions were recorded in these districts, accounting for more than 38% of all reported AOG incidents. One should note that most direct attacks target security forces on the road, and the frequency of these assaults challenges NGO movements on the road significantly.

Additionally, according to numerous NGO reports, it appears that a Pakistani AOG has infiltrated south-eastern Kunar in recent weeks. The group is responsible for a 5 August mobile CP in Chawkay, several abductions in Chawkay, Sirkanay, and Khas Kunar, and multiple direct attacks on vehicles travelling on the road. Reportedly, the group is not only attacking security forces, but specifically looking for high-profile vehicles associated with GoA and/or humanitarian organiza-



tions, and intending to abduct such passengers. The threat of abduction, as well as the risk of being targeted with SAF, is significantly elevated along the road. Although ANSF have increased their presence significantly in response to this threat, attacks on the main Jalalabad-Asadabad Road occur on a daily basis, with no clear cut pattern with regards to the timing of such assaults identifiable. The 5 August AOG CP, occurring at 0930 hrs in the morning, underlined AOGs’ operational freedom, even while confronted with an increased presence of security forces. Additionally, several of these Pakistani AOG factions appear to be rather uncontrolled by Afghani groups and to be more hostile towards IOs and/or NGOs. Other than avoiding regular targets such as IMF/ANSF convoys and OPs, ANSO ER strongly recommends the usage of very low profile vehicles to avoid accidental targeting and sanitization of all materials potentially identifying oneself as an NGO employee. Although no clear cut pattern with regards to the timing of assaults along the road has been identified, it is understood that the highest risk of being targeted is in the afternoon and at night time. Therefore, it is not recommended to take the road after 1500 hrs.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Frequent AOG assaults along the Jalalabad-Asadabad Road
- Increased risk of abduction in Chawkay, Sirkanay, and Khas Kunar

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

PAKTYA


With only ten AOG-initiated incidents reported, AOG activity in Paktya fell again sharply, compared to 36 incidents in the previous period. It appears that the overall level of AOG activity across the province peaked in early July, when AOG incidents reached a level of more than 50 on a bi-weekly basis. Since then, recorded numbers decreased rapidly.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Direct attacks against ANSF
- IEDs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

idly. Although it is not fully understood what has been the exact driver behind this process, it appears that at least most parts of eastern Paktya—a traditional AOG stronghold and essential to its supply chain—remain highly affected by recent flooding, with several areas still inaccessible. The AOG incidents were tactically and geographically diversified, with one direct attack against ANP in Shwak, one direct attack and one IED detonation in Gardez, a direct attack in Jani Khel, a direct



assault against an ANP convoy in Lija Ahmad Khel, an attempted assassination in Sayid Karam, a double IED strike in Chamkani, one targeted assassination in Zurmat, one AOG ambush targeting ANP in Ahmadabad, and one premature detonation of an IED in Jaji.

KHOST


AOG activity across Khost Province increased slightly during this cycle, with 35 AOG incidents recorded. Still, when compared to previous months, it appears that the current amount of recorded incidents is significantly lower than usual and/or expected, resting more than 30% under the amount of incidents recorded in early July. Similar to the previous period, and in connection to the security situation in neighbouring Paktya Province, it is assumed that changed weather conditions, including flooding, are behind this unusual and sudden drop in AOG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs in Matun
- IDF in Bak and Sabari

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

activity. In line with previously identified patterns and trends, it seems that local AOG throughout Khost have differing preferences with regards to tactics. While Bak and Sabari saw a very high amount of IDF assaults (eight incidents during this cycle), the security environment in Khost City was dominated by IEDs (seven incidents). Khost City as such remains a very dangerous environment. Besides the significant challenge posed by explosive devices, AOG also continue to engage in other tactics, ranging from intimidation, to targeted killings; for example, on 14 August in Matun AOG tossed a hand grenade into Khost's court building, injuring at least one civilian.



Although AOG operational freedom suggests local support, locals occasionally resist AOG activities; for instance, on 3 August in Mando Zayi AOG opened fire on a civilian car after the driver ignored their demand to stop. The driver and three passengers were killed, driving local villagers to engage AOG with small arms fire and kill several AOG. Due to the significant influx of foreign AOG through the border with Northern Waziristan, it is understood that several AOG factions dominated by foreigners might face a lack of legitimacy across the local communities.

ANNOUNCEMENT:

In the coming months, ANSO will be helping develop an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available.

GHAZNI

Compared to the last reporting period, Ghazni Province has witnessed a continuation of similar types of incidents. The main threats across the province remain AOG direct attacks and the use of IEDs. Particularly, with more than one third of all recorded incidents, the security environment in Ghazni District was highly volatile. Nonetheless, during the present cycle Muqur, Andar and Qarabagh districts were active as well. AOG initiated direct attacks have continued against ANSF/IMF convoys, ANP check posts and DACs. As mentioned, during


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG direct and indirect attacks
- AOG attacks on schools

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

the present cycle Ghazni District was extremely active, with at least six rocket attacks targeting IMF/ANA bases and, of note, on 5 August around ten rockets were fired towards Ghazni City, wounding several civilians. In addition, ANP check posts in the district were attacked eight times, mainly with RPGs and SAF; for instance, on 6 August an IED struck the Provincial deputy CoP's vehicle while he was attempting to respond to such an attack, wounding the deputy CoP, four ANP officials and one civilian. Another incident of note occurred on 8 August in Ghazni City, when an IED detonated close to the ANP HQ main gate, wounding two ANP and eight civilians.

Intimidation and targeted attacks continued as well during the pre-



sent cycle, with this time five civilians being abducted on 3 August in Khwaja Umari District. Further incidents related to the upcoming parliamentary election were reported: on 4 August in Ghazni City (District 2), a direct attack occurred on a parliamentary candidate's compound; and six days later, in Ajristan (the DAC area), another SAF attack targeted the residence of a parliamentary candidate. Furthermore, on 6 August in Ab Band District ANP found the corpse of a candidate who was abducted by AOG on 24 July from Qarabagh District. Lastly, IMF/ANSF have launched a joint operation in Andar, Dih Yak, Qarabagh and Muqur districts.

HELMAND


Helmand Province, in conjunction with Kandahar, continues to record the bulk of activities in the Southern Region. The most significant incident occurred on 7 August in Nahri Sarraj District, when a BBIED attacker targeted an ANP vehicle, killing four ANP and wounding another ANP and 13 civilians. Further direct attacks targeting ANSF/IMF patrols and facilities were mainly concentrated in Nahri Sarraj, Marja, Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah districts. Of note, a quite unusual incident occurred in the latter district on 9

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks
- IEDs
- Military operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

August, when AOG attacked the local Shura gathering with SAF. As mentioned in the previous reporting period AOGs' tactic of choice remains the use of IEDs. During the present cycle there were 35 IED related incidents, of which 28 were detonations. Unfortunately, the number of civilians affected by the use of IEDs is still significant; for instance, on 3 August in Khanashin District nine civilians were killed as a result of a roadside IED detonation. In addition, on 2 August in Nahri Sarraj (Babaji area) another roadside IED detonated, wounding four children who were playing in the area. The same day, but in Sangin District (Inkarman area), an IED



detonation caused the death of one child and injured another one. Lastly, another child was wounded in Lashkar Gah City, also in an IED related incident. Needless to say, that IEDs accounted also for majority of IMF death reported during the present cycle. However, an isolated incident that occurred on 7 August in Musa Qala District caused an important number of casualties. An inmate inside the prison snatched a weapon from an ANP and opened fire. As a result, three prisoners, two IMF soldiers and the attacker were killed and another three IMF soldiers were wounded.

ZABUL


During this reporting period road security remained the main threat throughout Zabul Province, with 17 IED related incidents occurring. As observed during the previous reporting period, Shahjoy and Qalat districts continued to record the bulk of activity in the past two weeks. Along with the familiar pattern of IED strikes targeting ANA/IMF vehicles,

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs strikes
- IMF operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

there were three reported incidents involving PSCs escorting IMF logistical convoys. The civilian population was, once again, the collateral victim of ongoing conflict and particularly of IED deployment across the province, with several serious incidents; for instance, on 28 July in Mizan District an IED struck a private vehicle killing four occupants and wounding another three. On 4 August in Qalat District (Bakarzo area), a similar incident caused the death of four civilians. In the



same district, also on 4 August, another IED detonated killing one civilian and wounding three passengers travelling in a car.

Lastly, ANSF/IMF were relatively active during the present cycle, with several operations focused particularly on Shahjoy and Daychopan districts occurring.

PAKTIKA


Incident levels have dropped significantly in Paktika over the past two weeks compared to the previous reporting period. Nonetheless, AOG continued to target DACs and IMF bases across the province with Barmal District witnessing three attacks, Gayan three attacks and Ziruk two attacks. As mentioned in previous reports, these attacks took the form of rocket strikes or mortar fire, but this reporting period also

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG attacks on DACs
- IMF airstrikes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

saw a complex attack that occurred on 9 August in Gayan District. According to reports, seven AOG members, including one suicide attacker, approached and attacked a joint IMF/ANA base in the said district. The fire fight ensued and lasted for one hour, resulting in seven AOG members killed, including the suicide attacker, and four IMF and one ANA soldier wounded. In addition, 11 IED related incidents were reported during the present cycle with only two devices that resulted in detonation: one targeted a road construction company vehicle in Mata Khan Dis-



trict, wounding two workers, and another struck an ANP vehicle, killing five ANP officials on 2 August in Yosuf Khel. IMF/ANSF operations were limited during the present cycle; however, they resulted in the reported deaths of 21 AOG members in Sar Hawza District; another ten AOG members were reported killed in Khushamand and Jahya Khel districts.

ANSO SOUTH SERVICES: Please note that ANSO South is holding security roundtables in Kandahar City for NGOs based there. NGOs are encouraged to spread the word about ANSO services. For registration, email

registration@afgnso.org.


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KANDAHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

Kandahar Province remains extremely active and during the present cycle has witnessed several high profile attacks. On 3 August, AOG launched a complex attack against Kandahar Airfield. The attack started with a rocket strike, wounding two contractors and one IMF soldier. The attack lasted for about one hour as the AOG attempted to breach the KAF’s northern perimeter with two BBIED attackers and was followed by a ground assault involving reportedly six gunmen who engaged in a prolonged firefight with IMF. The AOG’s “modus operandi” was similar to the attack that was launched on 22 May, with one exception: the latest attack occurred during daylight hours. Despite the fact that from a tactical point of view the AOG did not succeed in breaking the KAF’s security perimeter, the attack attracted significant media attention. On 2 August, this time in Dand District, a Toyota Corolla rigged as an SVBIED detonated close to the Dand District Governor’s vehicle. The District Governor

nor escaped the attack unharmed, but six civilians, including four children, were killed. Aside from these high profile attacks AOGs demonstrated their capability to operate across the province by launching numerous direct attacks that, during the present cycle, were concentrated in Zhari, Arghandab, Maywand and Panjwayi districts. In Kandahar City, the vast majority of incidents continued to be related to IED/RCIED deployment. The most significant incident occurred on 8 August in District 4. An RCIED placed in a rickshaw struck a Kandahar Prison vehicle (a minivan) that was transporting prison officers. As a result, one worker was killed, one civilian and another 10 workers were wounded. Targeted killings continued, mostly in Kandahar City. On 8 August, the corpse of a local engineer who worked for a for-profit development agency in Kandahar City was located in District 1. Also in District 1, but on 13 August, AOG shot and killed a local engineer who was working for an international company. In addition, civilians were killed by AOG in the district of Daman, where a tribal elder and his son were killed in their



residence. The trend of increasing intimidation also affected IO national staff during the reporting period. On 3 August in District 6, an IO national staff was verbally threatened to quit his job or to face severe consequences. The following day, also in District 6 (Red Mosque area), unknown armed men riding on a motorbike fired upon an IO national staff member while he was travelling in his private vehicle. The exact motive behind these incidents is unknown; however, IO staff are considered legitimate AOG targets when they are perceived as having close links with the IMF presence. It is worthy to note that the perception of insecurity, coupled with the significant number of incidents that occur in Kandahar City, was reinforced by another incident that occurred on 11 August in Malajat and Regi Qalacha areas. During an operation, ANSF clashed with AOG and IMF air support targeted AOG positions. Beside the fact that the prolonged fire fight could be heard through the large part of the city, it confirmed once again the AOG ability to infiltrate the suburban areas despite the ANSF/IMF security posture.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG direct attacks on ANP
- AOG assassinations

ANSO VACANCIES: ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers. This month, ANSO is recruiting for a **Regional Safety Advisor (Jalalabad City)**. See the last page for application instructions.

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URUZGAN


The increase in the overall number of security incidents that had already been observed during the last reporting period continued throughout the current cycle. Also similar to the last period, AOG activities were concentrated in Tirin Kot, Dihrawud and Chora districts, with the usual pattern of IED deployment and direct attacks on ANP check posts and ANSF/IMF patrols. As seen in different areas across the country, AOG continue to target police

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

officers and politicians and as expected the frequency of such attacks is increasing in the months preceding the parliamentary elections. In Uruzgan, besides the abduction of two ANP officials that occurred on 3 August in Chora, wounding of another in Char Chino, and killing of an ANP official in Dihrawud District, another incident of note occurred in the latter district. On 4 August, a motorcycle mounted RCIED targeted a senior presidential adviser's convoy, killing one child and wounding one

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED strikes



ANP. As mentioned previously, there were also several AOG initiated direct attacks. During the present cycle they were focused in Tirin Kot, Dihrawud and Khas Uruzgan. In addition, sporadic rocket attacks were reported in Tirin Kot and Chora districts. Finally, on 31 July in Dihrawud District (Sakzai Village) an AOG destroyed a local school.

NIMROZ


The overall level of activity in Nimroz remains minimal in comparison with other provinces in the south. Among a few significant incidents, AOG attacked ANP check posts in Khash Rod District on four occasions. It is also worth noting AOG conducted a prolonged armed assault

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

on two occasions in the said district; for instance, on 7 August in Rakin area AOG attacked an ANP post for one hour, resulting in one AOG member killed and four others wounded. The following day, but in Dehmazang area, another ANP post came under attack for four hours. As a result, one ANP was wounded. Of note, in Zaranj City on 6 August, a hand grenade was hurled by suspected AOG members into an

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG illegal check points
- AOG attacks on ANP



ANP official's private residence. Lastly, in Khash Rod (Naalan area) there were reports of two separate IED-related incidents targeting civilian vehicles which reportedly resulted in three locals killed.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

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ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised militias) / **DC**-District Centre / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **IMF**-International Military Forces / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

ANSO VACANCY

ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers. This month, ANSO is recruiting for a **Regional Safety Advisor (Jalalabad City)**.

If you have NGO experience, an analytical background, and the desire to be challenged, all while being part of a close-knit team, pass your CV, cover letter, and two substantive English writing samples to operations@afgnso.org.

FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES

ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the ANSO Advisory Board at ansoab@yahoo.com.