


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HIGHLIGHTS

- **ANA & IMF occupy an NGO clinic in Wardak**
- **NGO clinics robbed in Kunduz and Herat**
- **Off-duty NGO de-miner assassinated in Nangarhar**
- **Civilian casualties in IED blasts in Kandahar and Helmand**

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

In the **Central** region, a three-day occupation of an INGO clinic by an ANA/IMF combat force in Wardak, occurring in late October, highlighted the risks faced by the NGO community in areas undergoing 'clearing' operations ahead of IMF withdrawal. Whilst the sheer scope of the intrusion - the clinic was used as a mortar firing base as well as a detention center - made the incident a clear outlier, it raises concerns as to the level of ANSF accountability in the field post-transition. The high pace of IMF withdrawals was apparent in the peripheral districts of Wardak and Logar, although the pro-Government forces significantly outpaced AOG operations across the region, including the removal of key IEA commanders in Ghorband and Kohi Safi (Parwan).

A similar reduction in AOG activity was observed in the **Northern** region, with Faryab remaining the key contested area. The province featured several high-intensity conflict engagements. Further, AOG tactical reliance on conventional close-range attacks, as opposed to lower-risk stand-off tactics, served to demonstrate their confidence. In the North-East, an NGO clinic was burgled in Kunduz, while in Badakhshan, ANP briefly detained NGO staff following a local dispute with an influential power-broker. The province witnessed a more significant police operation in Ishkashim, where an ANP/NDS unit tracked down a local commander attempting to re-sell a Stinger missile.

Three out of four provinces in the **Western** region witnessed NGO incidents. Two armed robberies were recorded in Herat, whilst a third case involved an attempt by an ANSF commander to force an INGO into renting his own vehicles in a

rural setting. In Farah, a GOA venue hosting a meeting with IMF and NGO participants came under a hand-grenade attack, while a local AOG commander in Ghor, owing to his known ambition to raise his personal profile in the community, subjected a well-accepted NGO to several acts of intimidation. The ring-road in Badghis and Farah remained a hub for conflict activity; the former also underwent substantial transfers of authority from IMF to ANSF.

In the **Eastern** region, the number of NGO incidents in Nangarhar exceeded the 20 mark, representing 16% of the current country-wide total for the year. A bold AOG assassination of an off-duty NGO de-miner in Sherzad and an abduction of another NGO member in Bati Kot highlighted the risks of early morning movements in the province, also casting doubt on the ANSF capability to maintain control over key access routes including the Torkham-Jalalabad highway. In Kunar, where the opposition maintained a high pace of operations, including a failed BBIED attack on the ANP counter-terrorism department chief, an NGO field site was struck by stray RPG rounds during an AOG attack on a passing ANA convoy.

The **Southern** region did not see any changes to the NGO incident count, but recorded the largest share (34%) of AOG activity country-wide. Despite this, virtually all of its provinces exhibited a significant downturn in AOG activity. Prevalent trends included AOG reliance on close-range tactics in 54% of attacks region-wide, although IED activity exacted a significant toll on the civilian population in Kandahar and Helmand whilst Kandahar city witnessed the tenth suicide attack this year.

CENTRAL REGION

KABUL


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	14
This Report Period	0

Despite ANSF supremacy in the capital - GOA forces authored 80% of all security incidents in Kabul city this cycle, primarily dealing with criminality - the opposition managed to launch two rocket attacks towards the city, whilst sporadic AOG activity (6 attacks in total, primarily IEDs) was also reported from the main roads in the rural districts of Paghman, Shakardara, Mir Bacha Kot and Kalakan.

AOG rockets, attributed to networks operating in Kohi Safi and Deh Sabz, impacted in the vicinity of the airport and ANSF facilities in the north-east parts of Kabul

on the 4th and the 13th, the latter case consisting of multiple projectiles which killed one civilian and injured two others in the Maslakhi area of PD 9. The attacks were consistent with established patterns both in terms of targeting (Airport and large ANSF/IMF facilities) and their inaccuracy.

From 2006 to 2010, AOG rocket attacks averaged 16 a year, whereas since 2011, such activity has steadily declined - dropping from 10 in 2011 to the current 4 in 2012. ANSF-IMF preventive counter-measures such as seen this cycle in Kohi Safi (see Parwan



section), further attest to the fact that the threat from IDF has greatly decreased in the city over the last 2 years. In counterpoint, the 13 civilian fatalities resulting from attacks of this kind in the past seven years warrant against complacency when selecting the location of NGO premises and implementing site security measures.

WARDAK

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1


On the night of 23rd October, IMF helicopters dropped a sizeable ANA detail, accompanied by an IMF special forces unit, to Sewak in Chaki Wardak, apparently to 'clear' the area. During the next three days, the security forces occupied an INGO clinic in the location, using the facility as a detention center but also as a mortar firing base throughout several engagements with AOG. The forces departed on the 25th with 6 suspected AOG members in custody, leaving behind a damaged perimeter wall and equipment, as well as an amount of live ammunition and UXOs. The affected INGO has lodged a formal complaint with the GOA.

Although Wardak has not witnessed forceful breaches of medical facilities by ANSF/IMF since 2009, such incidents rose to

prominence last year with 16 cases recorded since January 2011, mostly in Nangarhar, Logar and Kunar provinces. The latest case, however, stands out for the total disrespect shown for the sanctity of the clinic and its staff. It remains to be seen if the rate and severity of such incidents will increase with the security transition.

Along with an increased pace of IMF-ANSF operations in Chaki Wardak and Saydabad, the cycle featured IMF withdrawals from Jalrez, Nirkh and Jaghatu - with only small-scale IMF teams remaining in situ embedded with ANSF.

In contrast, the opposition authored 65% of the security incidents in Wardak this cycle. Two thirds were attacks along the main roads - the highway in Saydabad




and Nirkh attracted every second AOG escalation - while the remainder consisted mainly of stand-off attacks against the district administrative centers, with Jaghatu DAC notching 6 such attacks alone. Besides marking the high morale of local AOG cadres following the departure of IMF, the AOG effort in Jaghatu was partly a response to the on-going talks among local elders and the GOA about their eventual reconciliation, and the roll-out of the ALP program in the district. This would suggest that the current frequency of conflict engagements in Jaghatu is likely to be maintained in the short term.

PARWAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Despite the seasonal decline, the Parwan-Bamyan road continued to attract early-morning AOG attacks on police targets. An IED blast and a SAF attack resulted in a total of five casualties – four policemen and a civilian – on the road this cycle. Off the main artery, the opposition networks in Ghorband suffered a serious setback, when during another SAF attack on an ALP checkpoint in Taykhan, a key IEA commander sustained fatal injuries. Besides his military leadership, the commander was known to perform

the duties of the IEA provincial shadow governor in Parwan. Nonetheless, his removal will do little to reverse the expansion of AOG influence sustained over the course of this year. Most recently, the IMF withdrawal from Kahmard district in Bamyan - located along the main access route from southern Baghlan - was reflected upon locally as another chance for the opposition, entrenched north of Salang in Baghlan, to maintain significant access between Baghlan and Parwan for the next fight-



ing season.

Elsewhere in the province, an IMF surgical airstrike killed another prominent IEA commander in the Pachakhak area of Kofi Safi, known for his involvement in IDF attacks in Kabul and Bagram districts.

KAPISA


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Although security reporting remained scarce this cycle, ANSF clearing operations and three AOG attacks attested to the high intensity of conflict engagements in Tagab, underlined further by the heavy toll of civilian injuries (13) and deaths (4) which ensued.

Omarkhel), which ultimately resulted in a combined 24 AOG, five ANA and five civilian casualties.

From the 4th to the 7th, joint ANA, NDS and ANP teams deployed to the known AOG hubs along the Tagab-Surobi road (Anarjoy,

Meanwhile, the international military slowed down the pace of their withdrawal compared to the plans outlined earlier this year, and remained low-key, as did most of the opposition - the latter initiating only two direct engage-




ments with ANSF, while a significant portion of AOG fighters seem to have relocated in advance of winter.

LOGAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

AOG activity volumes remained very low this cycle, amounting to a handful of combined small arms/heavy weapons attacks on security facilities in Baraki Barak and Kharwar, and two IED blasts in Puli Alam and Baraki Barak.

and pro-active deployments into AOG hotspots such as Baraki Rajan, Babus or Kolangar. ANSF demonstrated their capability in Kharwar with an ANA-ANP-NDS operation in the Yargul area on the 5th, during which 5 AOG fighters were eliminated and an additional 7 arrested. IMF withdrawals from Charkh and Kharwar were completed this period and are expected to be followed by the end of month by withdrawal from Baraki Barak, where a



stay-behind IMF contingent remains present in the district center. IMF withdrawal from peripheral areas has been seen locally as a significant factor driving conflict de-escalation.

NORTHERN REGION


KUNDUZ

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

On 5 November at 2300 hours, an NGO clinic in Sanduqsai area, Khanabad district, was robbed by several armed men. The NGO has received support from the local shura and GOA officials, however the identity of the perpetrators has not been established. Although the majority of the stolen items consisted of food stuffs and canned oil, the timing of the incident—following distribution of the items from an IO—and the perpetrators’ use of trucks indicate that the robbery was pre-planned. Though the area has not experienced much criminal activity, a Khanabad-based businessman was abducted in the previous month, which may indicate the presence of an emerging criminal

network. Elsewhere across the province, there were a total of six AOG-initiated incidents during the past fortnight, with two AOG escalations each recorded in Kunduz, Archi, and Chahar Dara districts, the majority being low-level AOG engagements of ANSF checkpoints and assets. The mentioned three districts have accounted for 86% of all AOG activity in the province so far this year.

At the current pace, November is likely to see a reduction in AOG activity consistent with seasonal trends, as the fighting season months (May through October) saw between 30% and 60% more




AOG-initiated incidents per month. However AOG activity in the province has been decreasing over the past year, with a 21% reduction in AOG activity from this period last year. Criminal activity has also decreased, with 14% fewer incidents against the volumes last year. Interestingly, these reductions have occurred concurrently with a significant reduction in IMF and ANSF activity. IMF activity fell 68% from last year, while ANSF activity in 2012 dropped a more modest 12% compared with figures through mid-November last year.

BADAKHSHAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1

Security reporting from the province included a late report of an NGO incident. On 19 October in Kishim district center, four NGO staff members were detained following an external dispute between an influential local elder and a non-staff driver of a vehicle that had been previously rented by the NGO. Although no charges were filed, ANP searched the NGO premises and detained four NGO staff. Three of the four NGO staff were detained for four nights, while one of the staff members was detained for one night. The event was the first reported ANSF detention of NGO staff in the province.

On 5 November in Baharak district center, ANP and NDS attempted to arrest a local commander trying to sell an old Stinger anti-aircraft missile. The man—who managed to escape—is an ex-Mujahidin commander, who has recently served as a low-level ANBP commander in Baharak and Ishkashim districts. This ANBP position was secured through family connections, and may have been an attempt to provide official “cover” for his smuggling operations. NDS were able to recover the missile, which is reported to be a relic from the 1980s war with the Soviet Union.



Three AOG incidents occurred in Jurm district, bringing the total recorded so far this year to seven. Two consisted of SAF attacks on ANP patrols in Kharendab and Soch areas; the latter area also witnessed a day-time AOG checkpoint and searches of local vehicles for GOA employees. This sudden spate in AOG activity will likely remain a temporary outlier as the majority of AOG escalations occur in the neighboring Warduj district.


FARYAB

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

An IO national staff member reported receiving a threatening phone call on 10 November, 1000 hours, while at his private residence in Dashian village, Maymana district. The caller, who claimed to represent an AOG, demanded payment from the IO staff member. The targeted nature of the incident—calling a national staff member at his house and demanding payment from the individual—suggests that a purely criminal motive cannot be ruled out.

Throughout the province, 22 incidents occurred during this reporting cycle, which included 15 AOG-initiated incidents. The pace of incidents during the past fortnight reflects a return to aver-

age figures as seen earlier this year prior to the onset of the main ‘fighting season’, as April through August averaged 28 AOG attacks per month, slightly higher than the average of 25 AOG incidents per month from January through April. In contrast, September and October were much more kinetic, with an average of 50 AOG attacks per month. AOG tactics continued to feature direct attacks consisting of SAF and/or RPGs, including in all but one AOG incident this reporting cycle and have accounted for 78% of all AOG activity so far this year. Although AOGs in other provinces may rely on IEDs as a primary tactic, they account for only 15% of



AOG activity in Faryab, of which four incidents were suicide attacks.

Faryab has also witnessed three targeted killings during the past fortnight, with two assassinations of local religious leaders in Maymana city (7 and 10 November), and the killing of a former AOG commander in Sabz Posh district on 6 November. While these incidents certainly affect local power dynamics and reflect a plethora of local competing interests, they represent minimal residual risk to NGOs.

SAMANGAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Only three incidents occurred in Samangan this reporting period. Whilst two were criminally-motivated shootings, the third incident was an AOG-initiated IED detonation.

Past midnight on 15 November, an RCIED detonated against a private fuel tanker in Aybak district, Robatak area, parked along the Aybak-Puli Khumri road. The blast also damaged another private fuel tanker as well as a refrigerated truck contracted by IMF. The trucks were parked on the side of the road for the night, and no casualties were reported. The detonation marked the first AOG-initiated incident since the night of 18 July, when a magnetic IED detonated against an IMF-contracted truck at the same location. The resulting explosion,

however, seriously damaged 23 fuel and liquid gas tankers. Much more common to Dushi, Khinjan, and Puli Khumri districts of neighboring Baghlan, AOG IED attacks on IMF-contracted fuel tankers represent outliers in the province. AOG activity in Samangan has been limited to 13 incidents so far this year, half of them occurring in Darai Sufi Payeen, whilst only the two mentioned IED attacks took place on the ring-road.

The criminal shootings occurred on 4 November from Golaye Hisar in the lower Darai Suf, where an armed group shot and killed a former policeman, and on 10 November from Khwaja Praisham of Hazrati Sultan where another personal dispute led to two casualties.



Criminal activity is more prevalent than political conflict in Samangan, with 36 criminal incidents having occurred so far this year. While one third of these incidents could be attributed to interpersonal or tribally-motivated disputes, an equal share of criminal activity was the result of robbery. These robberies—of which 81% occurred in Aybak and Dara-I Sufi Payan districts—seem to affect random targets, mostly civilians. The only case impacting NGOs this year occurred in July in Aybak when an armed group tracked and robbed an NGO party transporting a large amount of cash to a project site.


SAR-E PUL

The past fortnight witnessed a total of five total incidents in the province, of which four were attributed to AOG activity. All of which involved brief attacks on GOA or ANSF targets using SAF and/or RPGs—the most common AOG tactic in the province, accounting for more than two-thirds of all AOG incidents. The most significant AOG attack occurred at 0700 hours on 10 November, when an AOG fired an RPG at the Sozma Qala’s vehicle while it was traveling along the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Shibirghan-Sari Pul Road, Sa Shanba area, Sari Pul district—wounding the district governor and his bodyguard.

Although Sari Pul district continues to account for the majority (59%) of AOG incidents this year, there have been considerable shifts in neighboring districts. Thus far, there have been only five AOG incidents in Sayyad district in 2012, dropping 86% from the previous year. AOG activity appears to be increasing further



east, however. Sozma Qala has experienced 15 AOG incidents so far this year, while combined AOG activity in 2011 and 2010 totaled only ten incidents, with the Kata Qala area standing out with 80% of these incidents this year.


BAGHLAN

IEDs continue to be a major concern in Baghlan province, with 17 IED-related incidents (including IEDs defused by IMF/ANSF) during the past two weeks. Of those, eight were actual IED detonations—bringing this year’s total to 82 IED detonations in the province. Although IED strikes have remained relatively constant since early June, the total number of IED detonations this year marks a 68% increase compared to the equivalent period in 2011. IMF/ANSF EOD operations have also dramatically increased,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

defusing 79 IEDs so far this year, representing a 54% increase from last year. With ANSF undertaking 85% of EOD operations, this capability will remain following IMF withdrawal from the province.

Baghlani Jadid district continues to report the highest concentration of IED activity in Baghlan, accounting for 52% of all IEDs in the province, whilst Puli Khumri accounts for 28%. Despite having significantly fewer IED incidents in 2011 and 2010, these two districts still accounted



for 85% of IEDs in each year. NGOs have only been targeted on one occasion since 2007, however, with an IED detonation against a parked NGO vehicle in Tala Wa Barfak on 19 June 2012.


BALKH

Two of the 11 incidents during this reporting period were AOG attacks on the Dawlatabad district administrative center, occurring at 1900 and 2300 hours on 3 and 10 November, respectively. In both instances, RPGs were fired at the administrative center but detonated mid-air without causing damage. There have been 12 AOG-initiated incidents in Dawlatabad thus far this year. Though there are six weeks remaining in 2012, this figure already equals all

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

AOG incidents that have occurred in the district from 2006 through 2011. Since 2006, the district center has been targeted six times, but three of these incidents have occurred this year—the two RPG attacks and a 6 August IED strike unsuccessfully targeting the district governor.

It appears that AOGs are attempting to expand their influence towards the district center, and although these attacks caused mini-



mal damage, they are likely to have boosted the confidence of the AOG to operate there. More attacks in the near future cannot be ruled out, although the AOG is still more likely to attack during evening hours.

WESTERN REGION

HERAT

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	11
This Report Period	3


NGOs faced two robberies and an extortion-oriented act of intimidation this reporting period, with one robbery and the intimidation occurring in peripheral districts while another robbery was reported from the provincial capital.

In the Deh Naw of Guzara, two armed robbers broke into an INGO clinic overnight, restrained the guard and stole an assortment of office equipment and a motorcycle.

Meanwhile, an INGO national staff member traveling in a taxi in Herat’s PD7 was robbed of his cash and phone in by two armed men, in a scheme in which the taxi driver was complicit. It is important to note that unlike the seasonal reduction in AOG activity, criminal activity does not drop during the winter months, particu-

larly in the city and its immediate periphery. Further, the robberies involving taxi schemes feature quite prominently into IO and NGO risk profiles in Herat and Kabul city, in particular along the airport roads as well as in the vicinity of banks and market areas.

Lastly, an ANBP officer—former AOG member who has joined the APRP and since reintegrated into ANBP—made unspecified threats to an INGO, warning them to rent several of his vehicles for their operations in Pashtun Zarghun. Herat-based NGOs and IOs have experienced only one other documented ANSF-initiated incident this year, when a group including ANP policemen and GOA officials stole IO food items stocked in a GOA food item warehouse in Pashtun Zarghun



DAC in July 2012.

In terms of overall AOG activity, the 12 AOG incidents across the province matched last month’s volume. Of note to NGOs, all the attacks were targeted against ANP, ANBP and IMF, underlying the primary mitigation measures - a safe distance from security targets - for the safety of NGO operations. The territorial pattern also remained consistent with almost half of the total AOG attacks staged in Shin-dand (DAC and the IMF airport base) On a positive note, AOG attacks were absent in Herat city, Injil and Guzara.


BADGHIS

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

After peaking at 54 AOG incidents last month, AOG activity began a seasonal decline, with just 20 AOG incidents recorded this cycle—a reduction of nearly 30% compared to the previous cycle. 90% of AOG attacks took place in Ghormach, Murghab, and Qadis districts, aiming exclusively at ANSF targets. The aggressive posture of local AOG has been demonstrated with the fact that every third AOG attack led to ANSF casualties, with a total of 26 personnel injured or killed this cycle (though no civilian deaths have been recorded).

Meanwhile, the IMF have completed a transfer of authority in all districts except for Ghormach, with ANSF now assuming responsibility for Jawand, Qadis, Murghab, and Muqur. It is important to note, however, that the transition ceremonies were primarily symbolic, since the majority of IMF combat forces have already gradually withdrawn over the past several months, though IMF support units remain present in key areas in Muqur and Murghab.

The province nonetheless experi-



enced one insider attack when an ANA member shot and wounded an IMF soldier at the IMF base in Muqur marking only the second such event in the province for the past six years. The perpetrator was killed in the incident, and his primary motivations have not been established.


GHOR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	11
This Report Period	1

This cycle, an INGO reported a series of intimidation efforts in Taywara. The case began with a letter sent by a local AOG commander loosely associated with the IEA, requesting the INGO to register with the IEA in exchange for “protection”, although the request did not provide any further specification as to the registration authority and the process. A few days later, this was followed by two incidences of ‘harassing SAF’ reported on two separate occasions by two national staffers (one volley in the vicinity of the first staffer’s private residence and the other recorded by the other member during transit between home and work). Afterwards, other letters—indicating specific threats of violence—were delivered to the private residences of the two staffers. It is important to note that there have been no previous cases of the IEA attempting

to compel NGOs to register with them in the area. In counterpoint, the commander who initiated the campaign is known for his previous intimidation of NGOs in Taywara, including another night-letter campaign targeting three individual NGOs in October last year which did include the threat of violence, but it never materialized. Instead, they were assessed as the commander’s attempt at boosting his influence in the area and were resolved without concessions from the NGOs. It appears plausible that this latest round stems from a similar motivation as, throughout the campaign, there was no record of a hostility or rejection towards the NGO programming or presence.

Elsewhere, an AOG from northern Chaghcheran with links to the Murghab Valley—responsible for the May 2012 killing of an INGO



international staff member in Chaghcheran City and the June 2012 assassination of an ex-Provincial Judge—attacked a checkpoint affiliated with a pro-government militia loyal to the deceased Provincial Judge, in the latest round of local complex tribal disputes which interplay with the political conflict.

Tribal insecurity also affected the western part of Chaghcheran, where a theft of several donkeys in Seya Kharak area sparked a tribal clash which lead to a number of casualties. Of note, the elders of the two competing tribes had ratified a peace agreement during the last cycle, but the arrangement visibly failed to gain the full support of either tribe as it also did not include a third key group.


FARAH

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

The past fortnight experienced one NGO incident, when a hand grenade was thrown into the compound of the Provincial Department of MRRD, where members of the PRT, the GOA, a private development organization (PDO), IOs, and an NGO had gathered for an inter-agency conference and were just leaving the building. The grenade caused severe injuries to one PDO staff member and minor injuries to three others. The presence of the IMF protection unit at the entrance gate during the meeting significantly affected the compound’s profile—indicating that an important meeting was taking place. In the absence of other indicators, the association of the venue with the

IMF and GOA leadership is therefore most likely to have triggered the incident.

At the provincial level, AOG maintained consistent activity volumes in the provincial capital, as well as in the peripheral districts of Pusht Rod and Qala-I-Kah (where the opposition ambushed and killed the district NDS chief this cycle), but the rate of AOG attacks continued to slow down in key areas in Bala Buluk and Khaki Safed, where only two AOG incidents were recorded (against 10 during the last cycle). Whilst winter migrations of AOG cells partly explain this decrease, the conflict visibly intensified in Bakwa this cycle, eventually indicating a re-



allocation of resources on the side of AOGs. AOG carried out seven attacks in Bakwa, of which four directly targeted IMF supply convoys along the Herat-Kandahar highway, resulting in the destruction of 16 fuel tankers as well as several PSC vehicles. In response to this shift, ANSF and IMF conducted several operations along the highway killing a number of AOG operatives. It appears likely that the conflict will remain entrenched along the highway in Bakwa into the coming weeks.

EASTERN REGION


NANGARHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	22
This Report Period	2

Two significant incidents impacted NGO members in transit this period.

First, on 8 November at 0500 hrs, in Sherzad, an NGO national staff member was travelling to Jalalabad in a taxi when it was stopped by AOG members, who then singled him out to be searched. Upon discovering that he was carrying an NGO ID card, they accused him of being a GOA and US agent, and shot and killed him. In light of the nature of their accusations, it is unlikely that his employment by an NGO had any bearing on the AOG members' decision to target him in itself, which, given that they searched him specifically, was seemingly premeditated. Instead, it is plausible that the NGO identification, which may have appeared alien, served to confirm already held suspicions (the initial foundations of which are unclear).
 Second, on 10 November at 0700 hrs, in Bati Kot, an NGO staff

member was abducted from a taxi by armed men, who had driven alongside it and forced it to stop as it approached the Torkham – Jalalabad highway, en route to the provincial capital. The staff member was one of several passengers in the vehicle and as such it is clear that he was expressly targeted, although the identity of the armed men, and their motive, is yet to be established. There have been no previous incidents of NGOs being targeted by armed groups in the district in this manner, which suggests either that the staff member, as in the Sherzad shooting, was targeted by elements of the armed opposition – on the grounds that they believed him to be in some way affiliated with the GOA or IMF – or that the abduction was motivated primarily by financial gain or a private dispute. Regardless, the incident is yet further evidence of the worsening security situation in



Bati Kot, particularly along its stretch of the Torkham-Jalalabad highway, where AOG members staged attacks against three ANP patrols and one ANP checkpoint during the period. Whilst of these five incidents, the attack on the checkpoint was the only one to occur within the hours of 0900 and 1500 (the advised period for NGO road travel), of the 36 incidents recorded along the district's stretch of the highway in total so far this year, 17 fell within this window, which is instructive of the armed opposition's increasing confidence in the area and the absence, so far, of ANSF capability to hold the terrain overlooking the highway. This situation is unlikely to improve in the medium term and as such, NGO access both to Bati Kot, and to those districts that lie along the highway beyond it (Shinwar and Muhmand Dara) will remain problematic.


PAKTYA

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

With the onset of winter, and the relocation of several AOG cells to neighbouring provinces in which seasonal conditions pose less of a logistical challenge to their operations, AOG activity has declined in recent weeks, with the number of AOG incidents falling consistently across the last three periods, from 14 to nine and then to five in the current cycle. Those few AOG incidents that did occur were limited to Gardez, which

saw two IED detonations against ANP and IMF vehicles, Ahmadabad, where an IED detonated prematurely, and Zurmat, where AOG members staged two direct attacks on ANP targets.

In the other development of note, Gardez city, along with Ahmadabad, transitioned to ANSF control. IMF will continue to maintain a presence in the wider Gardez district however – as well



as in Chamkanay, Jaji, Ahmed Khel, Jani Khel and Zurmat – and is unlikely to cease operating in Ahmadabad entirely.

KHOST


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	0

Whilst the level of AOG activity fell during the period – amounting to an 18% decrease in AOG incidents in comparison to the second half of October – it nonetheless proved to be one of the most casualty heavy in recent months, the majority of which were civilians.

In Khost district, 10 civilians were injured, one of whom later died, when an IED, attached to a bicycle, detonated. The target of the attack is believed to have been a former IMF contractor, who was among the injured, and was therefore most likely instigated by the armed opposition.

Although the total number of IED detonations has decreased in comparison to the same period in 2011, from 121 to 62, they have accounted for 75% of all AOG

activity in Khost so far this year. This amounts to a significant shift in AOG tactics in comparison to the same period last year, during which 52% of AOG incidents were IED detonations, whilst 28% were indirect fire (IDF) attacks such as rockets or mortars (the vast majority of which were against the Sahrah Bagh IMF base), compared to only 3% in 2012. The drop in IDF can be understood as further evidence of the armed opposition's engagement in an economy of force effort – in line with a sharp decrease in the total volume of AOG incidents when compared to January to November 2011, from 232 to 86 – by which it focuses its resources upon operations which are greater in impact than in vol-



ume, such as the SVBIED attack on the Salerno IMF base on 1 June.

Consistent with its status as one of the most kinetic districts in the province, Sabari recorded both the largest proportion of AOG incidents (eight in total) and the highest number of casualties. First, on 7 November, an IED detonated against an Afghan Security Guard vehicle (ASG), killing two ASG personnel and injuring two others; this was followed by IED detonations against an IMF vehicle on 8 November, injuring two IMF soldiers, and against a private vehicle on 11 November, killing six civilians.

LAGHMAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0


Although the overall volume of incidents remained broadly consistent with the previous period, there was a sharp reduction in AOG activity, with the number of AOG incidents dropping from 12 to five.

The first half of the month was not without incidents of note however. On 8 November, at 0800 hrs, in Badpakh, an IED detonation against an ANA vehicle killed five ANA soldiers and injured another. The incident is the most casualty heavy to be recorded in the district so far this year, which whilst having originally been established in an area that was previously part of Mehtarlam, in an effort to improve the security situation there, has in-

fact become increasingly volatile. Particularly in the light of the recently established presence of the Haqqani Network in the district.

In Mehtarlam itself, AOG members fired a rocket round towards the PRT. Whilst the attack proved entirely ineffectual – the rocket missed and impacted in an open area – it is nonetheless indicative of the armed opposition's undiminished intent to strike targets in and around the provincial capital, with the number of such operations having near doubled in comparison to the same period last year.

Meanwhile in Qarghayi, on 4 November at 1900 hrs, as yet unidentified gunmen opened fire on a



civilian vehicle as it was travelling along the district's stretch of the Kabul – Jalalabad highway, killing two of its occupants. Attacks along this section of the road are not uncommon, with 24 having been recorded so far this year, though in all of these incidents, the armed opposition was responsible and the targets were GOA or ANSF actors, not civilians. As such, this recent episode marks a clear departure from established trends and is therefore likely to remain an isolated case.

ACRONYMS:

Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.


NURISTAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Nuristan recorded six AOG incidents during the period. The highest proportion of which occurred in Kamdesh, where AOG cells continued to harry ANSF and GOA targets in the DAC area, by way of two rocket attacks and two at close range with heavy weapons and SAF, injuring three ANP policemen in all. Despite the effort that the armed opposition has expended in attacking the DAC so far this year – amounting to 16 operations, including several

massed assaults – they have proven unable to overrun it; their likely intention given that no attacks against the DAC were recorded in 2011.

Nonetheless, the six AOG attacks this period are already in excess of the five incidents recorded in November 2011 as a whole. Whilst this is not especially revealing in itself, the fact that 17 attacks were recorded in October (compared to only one in October 2011),



suggest that further AOG activity - in Kamdesh in particular - can be expected before the end of the month, despite the seasonal decline.

KUNAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	1


On 5 November, AOG attacked a passing ANA convoy in the Panjshir Naw area of Nurgal district (Kunar) with heavy weapons and SAF. Several of the rounds missed and instead impacted on the opposite bank of the Kunar River, which runs parallel to the road, in Kuz Kunar (Nangarhar), where a number of NGO staff members were continuing work on the construction of a water irrigation channel, though no casualties were reported. The incident was evidently entirely collateral in nature and an extension of the manifest insecurity in Nurgal, rather than a reflection of the security environment in Kuz Kunar, which otherwise continues to be characterised by relative stability.

In the wider provincial conflict, AOG activity remained broadly consistent with the previous period, though two incidents stood out in particular.

First, on 1 November, in Ghaziabad, AOG members abducted a GOA official attached to the National Solidarity Programme in Nuristan; he is subsequently

believed to have been moved to Nuristan's Kamdesh district, where he continues to be held. At the time of the incident, the official was carrying a substantial sum of money. It remains unclear whether or not the AOG members were aware of the official's involvement in the NSP, but given that this is the first time in the district that an individual or organisation connected to it has been affected by an incident of this kind, it seems likely at this stage that it was an act of opportunism, motivated by the amount of money that he had in his possession. As such, the abduction is currently assessed to be unrelated to the NSP in itself and therefore not reflective of an elevation in the level of risk posed to those involved with it, including NGOs, more broadly.

Second, on 12 November, an AOG member opened fire on the head of the ANP provincial counter-terrorism department. In the event, the attacker was the only fatality, who was killed when the official, who was injured, returned fire. The attacker was later



found to be wearing a suicide vest, which was subsequently safely removed from his body by an IMF EOD team. The incident follows the targeted killings of the head of Kunar's Peace and Reintegration Council on 6 April, and of three IMF soldiers, and a US government official, on 8 August, in both cases by BBIED operatives. Accordingly, whilst this recent attack failed, it is nonetheless indicative of the armed opposition's continued capability to stage operations of this kind and suggests that further attempts are to be expected.

IMF activity was predominantly concentrated in Wata Pur during the period, in the form of four airstrikes – a figure on a par with the number recorded in August, which had previously been the single most airstrike intensive month in the year. Unlike those in August however, which killed a total of 34 AOG members, this latest wave proved less effective, killing four AOG members and in one instance, three civilians.

SOUTHERN REGION

KANDAHAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

The frequency of security incidents (all authors) in Kandahar Province has continued to drop this reporting period, to approximately three incidents per day; the average from the last two months being roughly seven per day.

Early morning on 8 November an AOG SVBIED detonated against a mobile ANP checkpoint next to Yarana Market in District 4, killing three ANP policemen and wounding four civilians. This marked the tenth suicide attack in Kandahar City this year, and the ninth SVBIED. Usually suicide attacks target high profile GOA/ANSF figures or IMF facilities in 'spectacular attacks'. This was not a 'spectacular' attack as such, and was assessed to have

detonated in this time and location inadvertently, as it was interdicted by an impromptu ANP checkpoint.

On 3 November, another notable security incident occurred when a District Chief of Police was killed in a coordinated AOG attack in the Gorgan area of Dand District; en route to an ANP post, AOG members riding on motorbikes fired at the ANP commander's vehicle, killing him outright. His deputy and another ANP officer were wounded. Responding to the incident, ANP killed six AOG members. Kandahar Province has long witnessed an AOG 'decapitation' strategy, in which senior ANSF commanders offi-



cial have been assassinated, most prominently including the SVBIED on Kandahar Chief of Police in late August 2012 (causing non-fatal injuries to the official).

The lethal aspects of AOG IED activity transpired through a tragic incident in Maywand where a civilian mini-van drove onto an IED in the morning of 11 November in Malang Karez, with eight passengers perishing in the blast. Road side IED attacks constituted 42% of all AOG incidents recorded in Kandahar this period.


HELMAND

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

On 4 November ANP arrested five AOG members wearing ALP uniforms in Nad Ali District, after they had found 15 pressure-plate IEDs (PPIEDs) and constituent parts for three Remote Control IEDs (RCIEDs) in their vehicle. The incident highlighted the diversity of AOG IED operations in Helmand Province, but also the suspicion of ALP units.

Firstly, two different IED technologies were seized in the same discovery: PPIEDs and RCIEDs. The PPIEDs are indiscriminate and therefore incur a much higher civilian casualty toll; often they are emplaced during darkness hours, and so mostly detonate against unsuspecting victims in morning hours. It is notable that in this

seizure there were five times as many victim operated IEDs as there were RCIEDs, which suggests that the emphasis is on batch production of low-tech PPIEDs, and more economic uses for RCIEDs. Of the 78 documented IED detonations in Helmand over the past three months only 14% were RCIED-initiated, whilst 84% were victim operated. One such device detonated on 8 November in Toghi area of Musa Qala against a civilian mini-van, killing ten and wounding seven aboard. Secondly, the incident is a glimpse into the foolhardiness of AOG logistics chains; having appropriated ALP uniforms, AOG had attempted to smuggle



the constructed IEDs through ANSF checkpoints. This high-risk deception strategy was, nonetheless, frustrated by ANP suspicion. The sheer fact that the ALP members were searched is indicative that suspicions between ANSF service personnel remain; although not being as widely reported as 'Green-on-Blue' attacks (11 incidents in Helmand this year), this year nine 'Green-on-Green' attacks have claimed 16 lives in Helmand alone, making up approximately one third of such attacks and resultant deaths in the entire South.


ZABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

On 8 November at 1800 hrs a former mayor of Shah Joy was abducted and shot dead by AOG (IEA) members as he was travelling in a private vehicle on Highway 1. Abduction trends have changed significantly in Zabul Province, which between 2006 and 2011 witnessed an average of ten documented abductions annually. In 2006, five of the six abduction targets were international community members; however, this trend has since ceased. Later, targeting trends reoriented towards civilians with alleged affiliations with IMF/ANSF/GOA and finally to ANSF and GOA officials. In contrast, this year the number of documented abductions is half this annual average. However, four of these five abductions this year occurred within the past three months, signaling a

recent increase. Also all the abductions were exclusively of GOA/ANSF actors, and occurred in Qalat, Shah Joy and Shin Kay districts at either early morning (0800 hrs) or early evening (1700 and 1800 hrs).

This year Shah Joy District has witnessed approximately one quarter of all security incidents in Zabul Province (141 of 567); disproportionately high, given that there are ten other districts in Zabul. During the past fortnight a third of all security incidents in Zabul Province occurred in Shah Joy; a slight proportional rise. However, the geographic distribution of security incidents in and around Zabul is relatively static; both in summer and winter seasons, this year and last, an average of 69% of security incidents oc-



curred on the three districts in Zabul which Highway 1 intersects: Qalat, Shah Joy and Karnak Wa Jaldak.

Also in Shah Joy District, on 31 October at 0200 hrs, six ALP and two civilian guests were killed at a checkpoint in the Jama Khel area. The attacker, a third civilian guest with reported links to the AOG (IEA), took an assortment of weapons and ammunition from the site, and remains at large. Whilst ‘Green-on-Blue’ attacks have seized the limelight in the international media, the phenomenon of ‘Green-on-Green’ attacks remains just as potent (see the Helmand section of this report).

URUZGAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0


Uruzgan Province has been uncharacteristically quiet over the past fortnight, with only five security incidents documented (four of those occurring in Tirin Kot District). Four of the five incidents this week were IED related (three within Tirin Kot), and wounded seven ANSF personnel in total. Therefore, despite the threat being reduced, it remains potent—especially so in Tirin Kot, which over the past three months has suffered 42% of Uruzgan’s total IED detonations.

On average, over the preceding three months there has been an average of 19 security incidents occurring around the province every week. This period represents a 87% drop in security incidents from the quarterly average, although the rate of security incidents had begun deceleration in

the preceding reporting period.

An entire low-level AOG detachment formally joined the reconciliation process in Khas Uruzgan District, on 8 November. However, estimates suggest that this only represents a small portion of active AOG members in this area. Nonetheless, the gesture is symbolic of the fragile winter peace in Afghanistan. Traditionally there is an influx in reintegration as the summer fighting seasons slows into a winter lull. Supplies run low, fighters run short, and reintegration payouts seem an increasingly satisfying-if only temporary-solution. However, reintegration efforts have, in the past, attracted violent repercussions from all branches of AOG institutions in the South.

Also worth noting is that Chora



District formally transitioned from IMF to ANSF security leads in a ceremony held at midday on 15 November. Only nine security incidents were documented in Chora District in 2006, but this had risen to 142 security incidents in 2011. However, over this year to date, the district has seen 76 documented incidents; a 39% drop in activity by the same time in 2011. However, much of Chora’s security incidents are related to IEDs; of 29 IED detonations, the majority were roadside IEDs, three were RCIEDs, and one was a BBIED. Notably, in seven security incidents this year 25 civilians have died from IED detonations in the district.


PAKTIKA

Paktika's security paradigm has not substantially changed since the previous reporting period and the preceding three months, which has seen an average of approximately 45 security incidents per fortnight, with roughly two thirds being AOG-initiated.

Notably, some two thirds of AOG-initiated incidents (this period) occurred in, against or targeted various district administrative centres (DACs) around Paktika Province, and 80% of those security incidents occurred during evening or night-time hours. Pak-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

tika has seen a disproportionately high amount of night-time security incidents in comparison with other provinces in the South; for example, Kandahar Province this year to date witnesses approximately 22% of its security incidents in hours of darkness. It is assessed that darkness affords AOG freedom of movement to set up IDF firing positions and skirmish SAF attacks and exfiltrate unscathed. Also worth mentioning is that such attacks rarely incur casualties; in the past fort-



night, only two AOG-initiated security incidents in the DAC incurred casualties--on 2 November one ANA soldier was wounded in an IED blast, and later that day two AOG members were killed in a premature detonation of an IED they were emplacing.

GHAZNI

Ghazni Province is generally continuing its winter slowdown. Only 18 security incidents occurred per week during this reporting period; half that of the quarterly average.


Two security incidents of note occurred this period: firstly, there was an attempt by the armed opposition to assassinate the District Governor (DG) for Qarabagh on 8 November, and secondly, there was an armed clash between two competing AOG groups in Andar District on 4 November.

In the first, the DG was wounded

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

in a SAF attack as he was travelling back from the DAC to his home. The targeting of governors is not unprecedented in Ghazni Province, although previous attempts utilized differing IEDs, including RCIED, BBIED and roadside IED (11 June; 24 August; 1 October, respectively). This is the fourth attempt against a governor in Ghazni in as many months, against as many governors, indicating that this trend is likely to continue.

The second incident highlights



that the internecine violence amongst AOG groups and militias continues. Whilst the source of this internal dispute amongst AOG remains unclear, it is clear that there is little 'unity of effort' amongst AOG elements, and that power is brokered amongst vying mid-level commanders.


NIMROZ

On 7 November between 1630 and 2000 hrs, multiple rockets were fired from the Iranian side of the border into Nimroz Province. Twelve rockets struck open areas in Chahar Burjak District, the large Southernmost district in Nimroz, bordering Iran to the West and Pakistan to the South. No casualties were suffered from the rocket strikes, and no specific locations (e.g. ANSF checkpoints)

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

appear to have been targeted. The motives remain unclear.

Cross-border security incidents are infrequent, but not uncommon. In September and December 2011, Iranian border guards shot multiple Afghan civilians attempting to cross the border illegally. On 14 September 2011 Iranian and Afghan border security forces clashed over the



establishment of new security checkpoints along the border.

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MISSING THIS PERIOD:

ANSO did not provide analysis for the following areas:

- ☞ Bamyán, Daykundi, Panjshir, Takhar, Jawzjan

These areas will be included in subsequent reports. If you have any information that would help us better understand the dynamics, please contact your local ANSO office.

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ANSO REGIONAL DIVISIONS

COMMON ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public Protection Forces / **DC**-District Centre / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **IMF**-International Military Forces / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device / **PDO**-Private Development Organisation / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police / **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative / **IEA**-Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-District Shadow Governor (IEA) / **PGM** - Pro-Government Militia / **APRP** - Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program