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## HIGHLIGHTS

- Lower than average AOG attack volume
- Above average suicide attack rate
- Various areas 'transitioned' this period
- NGO staff fatality in Herat

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## COUNTRY SUMMARY

From a conflict perspective, this period marked a break in the 5 year trend that noted considerable year on year growth in AOG activity levels for the month of January. While some years exhibited greater increases than others, for example there was a 105% increase between 2008 and 2009, the 5 year average has been 57% in the year to year comparative attack volumes for January. However, As visually represented in the graph on page 14, there was a 27% decrease this year when compared to January 2011. This is not too surprising considering the less than average volume noted in December, though a single specific causative factor is unlikely. It is more probable that a variety of factors are in play at present beyond the standard seasonal impacts.

Despite the downturn in conventional tactics noted above, the volume of suicide attacks recorded in the month of January were at their highest rate since 2010, with the South continuing to bear the brunt of these attacks. In counterpoint, Kabul has continued a rather lengthy period of calm, with little of note being reported from both the city and the province as a whole. In addition, this month also noted the continuing high tempo of security force operations, one of the factors likely impacting AOG activity levels.

The process of transition is ongoing, with various areas identified as part of the second tranche completing their official handovers this period. As was the case in the first round, this is mostly a ceremonial event resulting in little change to the physi-

cal structures and operant realities for the local security apparatus. Some areas, in particular Panjshir, however observed the actual wholesale physical withdrawal of ISAF elements from the province while others marked the first stages of redeployment. These types of actions should not be unexpected when viewed through the lens of 'withdrawal', the eventual end state that the transition process is leading towards, as they will likely become more common as 2014 approaches. This is reinforced by the announcement this period of the withdrawal of French forces ahead of the perceived schedule; demonstrating that both that this process is fluid and developing its own momentum as well as subject to the influence of external factors (be they political or strategic) beyond the state and needs of the actual conflict.

The first NGO incident reported from the West this period also involved the first staff fatality this year. A female staff member was targeted and killed by small arms fire while en route to her workplace. However, at present this incident is assessed as being the result of an interpersonal issue rather than related to her employment. Criminality also struck the NGO community in other ways, as seen in the attempted use of the 'slashed tire scheme' in Kabul. While common enough in the capital, the targeting of a vehicle departing a bank location represents a new element in this established tactic and further reinforces the need to brief staff members on the appropriate 'actions on' when faced with such circumstances in order to minimise asset loss.

# CENTRAL REGION

## KABUL


|                    | NGO Incidents |
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A case of irregular ANP behaviour and money extortion from NGO expats at a checkpoint in PD 10, Kabul City, perturbed an otherwise very calm period in Kabul. The incident took place at a 'Ring of Steel' checkpoint in Qalae Fatullah in the late evening hours on the 20<sup>th</sup>. A group of NGO expat workers were found without their passports and stopped on the side of the road until their driver paid a small amount of cash to the police. A similar situation occurred at the same checkpoint two days earlier to another organization, yet the NGO protagonists opted for the transparent solution of having their passports delivered by a second car, upon which they were allowed to leave. Whilst it is not a legal requirement for expatriates to carry their passports, the ANP clearly took advantage of the situation to extort a small bribe in the first case. However, yielding to such requests creates a precedent which NGOs should take great pains to avoid in the future.

A variant of the 'slash tyre & grab' scheme, a well-established TTP in Kabul, was experienced by staff members of an international inter-governmental agency with a profile similar to an NGO on the 25<sup>th</sup> in PD 2, Jade Asmayi & Haji Abdul Rahman Area during a drive from Azizi Bank in PD 2. The staff members effectively identified the attempt and mitigated the threat. Yet, the case also confirmed that similar schemes have become a frequent occurrence targeting visitors to the banks in the city center.

The province remained devoid of AOG escalations and even ANSF-IMF activity related to the political conflict was low. Out of 32 incidents recorded this cycle, just 5 related to ANSF-IMF arrests of AOG suspects in Kabul City (Share Naw in PD 1, Company Area in PD 5, Puli Charkhi in PD 12 and Charaye Nawruz in PD 16) and the final one in Paghman (Chenghar). On another occasion, the police force identified and seized a Toyota Corolla containing a load of explosive materiel abandoned on the side of the road on the highway in Surobi (Tonale Khaki). It is probable that the explosives were bound for Kabul City.

Henceforth, the cycle also prolonged the period without AOG attacks in the capital. Considering the Abdul Fazel strike during the Ashura commemoration, a case apart since the attack likely originated outside domestic AOG circles, the most recent record of activity authored and claimed by established AOG date back to the Traditional Loya Jirga period (mid-November) and further to the SVBIED attack on the IMF 'Rhino' bus on the Darulaman Road in the end of October. The speculations naturally abound as to the reasons of the current lull. The obvious factors encompass AOG deliberate prioritization of other areas of operations where the attacks also make more difference in the military sense (such as Kandahar & Paktika), although it is also possible that the IEA leadership enforced a temporary ban on spectacular attacks in the after-



math of Ashura in reaction to the particularly negative public exposure it received after the attack. This could reflect a motivation to investigate the attack and/or to restore IEA leadership's image as a force able to control its own area of operations, which could in turn represent a confidence-building measure (if not an explicit requirement by the other side) for the upcoming political dialogue between IMF/US and the IEA. In the past, IEA used spectacular attacks in Kabul on several occasions to reject allegations of their involvement in exactly the same dialogue which they seem to have endorsed since the last couple of weeks now. Yet, from a different angle and given the absence of explicit AOG messaging on the above, it could also be that local IEA structures simply lack an effective leadership as well as boots & supplies on the ground, in particular following the concerted ANSF-IMF campaign in the fall while the on-set of the winter further impacted the logistics. Of note, there is a stream of credible reporting which suggests that the IEA have been busy appointing new leaders tasked to change the status quo. The latest nominations would include a new shadow governor for Kabul City, his military subordinate, and a couple of shadow district governors in the rural districts along the main access routes towards Kabul. Among these, the prominence of IEA loyalists from the northern districts of Kabul (Shakardara, Qarabagh) and Kapisa is noteworthy. At this stage, it is too early to generalize as to the reliability of the information and the eventual impact of such nominations on AOG motivation & capacity to resume activity in the capital.

# KAPISA

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date       | 0             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

In the short span of time since the late December incident, Tagab witnessed a second ANA-on-IMF shooting on the 20<sup>th</sup>. Two days later, ANSF with IMF support initiated a comprehensive clear-up operation in Alasay which extended until the end of the cycle. Both developments marked high casualty numbers, including on the civilian side in Alasay. The Tagab shooting influenced decisions on the French participation in ISAF and NTM-A missions, and it also raised the stakes high for IMF-ANSF to demonstrate force during their move into Alasay.


In the morning of the 20<sup>th</sup>, an ANA soldier turned his weapon on a group of unarmed IMF soldiers engaged in a jogging exercise at the ANA/IMF base in Shinkay/Payenda Khel. The shooter managed to kill 4 IMF on the spot and injured an additional 16 servicemen, 8 suffering life threatening injuries. The attacker was detained; his motivation has not been plausibly established so far.

The Alasay offensive initiated on the 22<sup>nd</sup>. Aimed at securing the district center and the main access routes throughout Ishpi and Skeen Valleys, ANSF-IMF motivations were also driven by the envisaged roll-out of the ALP and the fact that the communities seemed reluctant to support the program unless ANSF establish a more regular presence on the ground to protect them against eventual AOG retributions. Over 1000 ANA and ANP personnel (incl. MOI QRF) joined in the operations. Ground and air support was provided by IMF who also dealt with a credibility deficit following the political aftermath

of the Tagab shooting.

The operation sparked a series of engagements with AOG which resulted in 30 documented AOG casualties (including 18 killed) against 3 on the side of ANSF and nil for IMF. However, the casualty account also included 4 killed and 17 injured civilians, mostly during clashes and air-strikes in the Alasay/Tagab borderland (Darwali & Ali Shah Khel Areas) and in the DAC area where 7 civilians were impacted in rocket fire initiated by AOG. More tangible than the ANA's hearts & minds component in the form of material and food assistance to over 80 households, the security forces left behind a reinforced ANP dispositive including a series of permanent 24hr manned checkpoints around the district center as well as in Ishpi and Skeen, whilst the ANA and IMF maintain their presence in the FOB in the district center (Hasankhel) and back up the police with regular patrolling of the roads. Whether this is enough to wrestle the district out from AOG control remains to be seen. At present it is obvious that the ball remains on the ANSF-IMF side. The former will need to demonstrate an ability to police the district against AOG intrusions in the long-term whilst the latter are already running against the clock of the 2013 sped-up withdrawal.

Trending from the years 2008-2011 indicates that AOG activity in Kapisa usually maintains a degree of intensity during the winter months, a feature which differs from the established trends in other 'kinetic' parts of Central, such as Wardak and Logar. Yet, the combined 21 AOG-authored



incidents in January 2012 nearly doubled the previous highest benchmark of AOG volumes recorded for the month of January (13 attacks in 2010). This cycle alone, AOG authored 15 out of 22 security incidents.

It is not surprising that in the face of the overwhelming fire power deployed by ANSF-IMF into Alasay, AOG proactive engagements in the same district remained limited to three strikes on the DAC (two IDF and one long-range/sniper fire) whilst the neighbouring Tagab boasted with 10 AOG attacks split between SAF/IDF attacks on police checkpoints (7 cases), ambushes of security convoys (2), and a less common hand grenade attack on the perimeter of Tagab DAC. Two IED strikes on an ANP convoy in Shukhi (Mahmudi Raqi) and on an ALP check point in Dara Ghain (Nijrab) completed the picture.

For the upcoming weeks, NGO should factor in further clashes in Alasay/Tagab borderland as the IMF penetrate the rural areas to establish the ALP whilst the AOG return to the district to claim back their territory. Whereas territorial/positional fighting is not so much a part of the established trends, effective ambushes and close-range attacks on security personnel and infrastructure are, including in the population centers. In the past, AOG commanders would turn their weapons on the communities or individuals accused of collusion with GOA-IMF, or used the same justification to extort financial or material support from the communities and contractors. On the IMF-ANSF side, further clear-up operations may be expected in Tagab.

## LOGAR

The year opened into a relatively calm period in Logar. This cycle, AOG authored 6 out of 15 security incidents which concentrated in the peripheral districts of Charkh (3), Azra, Kharwar and Baraki Barak (1 each). Likewise, the IMF-ANSF conflict-related activity was low and reverted to a handful of targeted arrest operations in Azra, Baraki Barak and Puli Alam.


In Charkh, the only casualty linked to 3 AOG attacks was a civilian injured in the cross-fire between AOG and an IMF patrol right in the district center on the 20<sup>th</sup>. The remaining IED strike on an IMF convoy in Dabare Khawaja and an arson attack on a fuel tanker in Bandoka were not lethal. Yet, effective IED strikes constitute a common feature in Baraki Barak. This period, a roadside bomb detonated against an IMF vehicle in Mohmand Area and injured at least 3 IMF soldiers. Looking back at 2011, 10 IED strikes in Baraki Barak killed 2 ANP, 1 IMF and 2 civilians, and injured an additional 5 IMF and 2 ANP members. Paradoxically, the bomb-planting in Baraki Barak took the heaviest toll on the AOG side as an additional three premature detonations killed 7 and injured 4 opposition fighters last year.

Another typical feature, two abductions were also recorded this

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date       | 0             |
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cycle. In the afternoon hours on the 28<sup>th</sup>, a domestic AOG unit apprehended two locals employed with the police force in Nangarhar whilst returning home to Azra from Hisarak thru the Spandoka section of the main road. In a lucky turn of the event, the community managed to negotiate the safe release of the abductees the same day, demonstrating the extent to which local identities prevail over ideological motivations in the local context. Yet, the two components, local identity and political connections, can also become complementary when it comes to political negotiations. For instance, anecdotal evidence notated this cycle suggests that the district authorities in both Hisarak and Azra have come up with a concerted attempt to use their former HIG connections to approach local AOG elements in order to negotiate safe passage along the routes between Azra and Hisarak.

In the second case, two local elders (and former jihadi commanders) disappeared with a large amount of cash from the highway near Khedir. The reporting suggested that the money was indeed a payment issued by the IMF to be distributed in the community of which the two individuals served as representatives towards IMF. Criminal rather than politi-



cal motivations appear plausible although the incident is yet to be assessed as it unfolds.

Overall, low AOG volumes notated in January (8 AOG authored incidents) remain compatible with the trending of the past years, including AOG territorial focus on the peripheral areas such as Charkh and Kharwar and the selection of targets (ANSF-IMF incl. civilian contractors). Similar incident volumes can be expected to prolong into the next month, although the experience from the past years suggests that AOG will slowly commence to draw the action closer to the strategic routes and the populations centers of Puli Alam, Muhammad Agha and Baraki Barak. Last year was also specific due to AOG focus on spectacular attacks in the DACs, including Azra, Khushi, Puli Alam and Muhammad Agha. This is partly explicable due to the fact that the Azra/Khushi corridor became popular with non-local AOG networks throughout the year. As the external factors which had led to this shift in the first place remain place (IMF effort at sealing the border in Loya Paktya and in Nangarhar) whilst the access thru Logar remains open, it is reasonable to assume that NGOs will continue to face an elevated risk of exposure to AOG attacks in the district centers this year.

### Information on Graphs:

The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the **1st of February 2012**

## WARDAK


|                    | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date       | 0             |
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This cycle, overt AOG activity reverted to a meager 2 incidents in the peripheral areas as the conflict dynamics remained driven by IMF-ANSF pressurizing AOG networks in Saydabad and Nirkh.

The district center of Day Mirdad witnessed a concerted SAF & heavy weapons fire attack on the DAC which nevertheless remained inaccurate and inconclusive. In Nirkh, three ANP members manning a check point in Karimdad were found shot dead in the facility and the fourth member went missing, raising suspicion as to his collusion in the incident. Overall, combined AOG incident volumes recorded in January (6 incidents) mark a significant drop down when compared to AOG activity in the same period during the previous three years (17, 11 and 9 attacks respectively for 2011, 2010 and 2009) and are at least partly attributable to the on-going IMF initiatives in Saydabad and Nirkh.

In Saydabad, at least 5 separate operations targeted AOG bases

along or nearby the Highway. During a clash in Baghak, IMF killed 5 and arrested 2 AOG fighters. Larger numbers of AOG fighters were captured in Aw Naray, Sheikhabad, Yosufkhel and Mohammad Azimkhel. Nirkh received another important portion of IMF-ANSF attention. Four arrest operations targeted HIG and IEA networks in Tokarak, Qalai Tarakhel, Abdara and Durrani resulting in a dozen of AOG arrests. Besides the military effort, IMF-ANSF continued to capitalize upon AOG partisan tensions. GOA officials made no secret about their on-going efforts to open the doors for segments of the local HIG landscape to join the peace process. Whilst both sides understand that the driver behind reconciliation efforts primarily stem from HIG progressively losing ground to IEA rather than from the fighters' genuine recognition of the Kabul regime, the communities also question the ability of the ANSF and IMF to protect the reconciled & disarmed



fighters against retributions from their own party as well as from the opposing AOG camps. NGOs with operations in Nirkh should keep abreast with the eventual changes in local power dynamics. Rather than disarming and joining the APRP, the insertion of HIG units onto GOA side, for instance as ALP, could be a feasible scenario in play and one which has already been seen some areas such as Baghlan. There, such a change helped the IMF-GOA stem IEA growth but also provided impunity for local militias to sort out their own agenda without fearing disciplinary actions from the central government.

Saydabad and Nirkh will most likely remain in the IMF spotlight in the weeks to come and ever more as the AOG reactivate after the winter break. Yet NGOs may also expect extensive IMF-ANSF operations to shift towards Chaki Wardak, Jaghatu and Day Mirdad in the anticipation of the ALP roll-out there.

## PANJSHIR

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date       | 0             |
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Following the departure of IMF troops including the PRT personnel from the valley, Panjshir got back to the usual calm, sporadically coloured by political intrigues and factional rivalries. The said PRT facility has been handed over to the authorities and dedicated to host the Panjshir University in the future.

This cycle, ANP reported a seizure of an assortment of old weaponry, incl. home-made bombs, from a cache discovered in the Malima Area in the Dara District Center, which also constituted the sole security event reported so far this year.

## DAYKUNDI


A series of criminal escalations ranging from violent disputes to arson attacks and attempts at armed robberies was recorded over the last three cycles. According to an NGO report received this cycle, an NGO road mission experienced a criminal attempt in late December in Dahani Karamat, Sangi Takht. Transiting from Nili towards Sangi Takht in a rented mini-van, a senior field member, accompanied by his daughter, her friend, and a driver were blocked on the road for almost two hours by a group of armed youngsters from a nearby village. The group, obviously on the lookout for easy income from travellers, is known locally for enjoying the protection of a local commander himself linked to a prominent warlord. When the gunmen's pursuit of money from the passengers did not yield any significant amount, the attackers attempted to drive away in the vehicle. This attempt also failed as none of them could drive. They then kept pressurizing the two male passengers to accept to drive the vehicle to a particular location, which both men refused. The gunmen finally left the passengers unharmed and escaped after having spotted a group of

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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ANP on motorcycles approaching the location. The NGO staff members identified all four attackers. Unlike the ANP who as per the NGO account wouldn't seem eager to follow up the case, the community leaders committed to engage the criminal ring and the mentioned commander in a dialogue to save the NGO from harm in the future. Of note, the event marked the sole NGO-related incident during 2011.

From a broader perspective, the documented crime rates in Daykundi remain low and had even decreased by 30% in a yearly comparison between 2010 and 2011. The last year actually saw much less road-side criminality than 2010. In counterpoint, NGOs present in Daykundi will usually agree that the culture of crime & impunity, occasionally endorsed by local commanders with informal or formal links to the authorities, continues to prosper across the province and the crimes committed in the rural communities sometimes do not reach outsiders and the communities, often for fear of retributions from the perpetrators.

In line with seasonal trends, bad



weather and absence of manifested political violence dominated the province including the notorious conflict zones. In Tamazan, recent efforts at mediation encompassed a wide range of actors including the provincial authorities, the central government/IDLG and IMF, and actually coincided with the security handover of the province into ANSF hands. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the cross-border ANP & community infighting over the control of access routes between Gizab and Nili has de-escalated or has just merely frozen over the winter months.


For the rest of the winter season, NGO safety concerns will most likely revolve around precarious weather conditions and road access. Weather issues should be factored into planning all across the Central Highlands. During the previous cycle, an avalanche killed two and injured three pedestrians on a secondary road in the Qalamqool Qurgha Area of Khedir. Adoption of a 'worst-case' mindset whilst ensuring the logistical background for NGO travels and operations is recommended..

## BAMYAN

An ANP-NDS arrest operation in the Ghandak Area of Shibar constituted the sole security incident this cycle, and prolonged the series of arrests of local AOG affiliates reported in December. On the 26<sup>th</sup>, the force traced a local mullah to his residence where an assortment of weaponry was also seized. Although the Ghandak Area and the Shikary Valley are reputed for sporadic activity of armed criminal groups, political

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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escalations remain extremely rare and prove that if active at all, the local marginalized AOG networks are not eager to bring action to their home field. It is the fact that the adjacent districts in Baghlan and Parwan remain the main hotspots of AOG activity in the area and that the local tradition is more one of an ideological endorsement than of overt fighting for AOG cause.




## PARWAN

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Heavy snowfalls impacted the traffic in the Salang Palass and caused the tunnels to close for several days. It is noteworthy that the MOI's Salang Maintenance Department marked some tangible improvements of its capacity to manage natural disasters along the ring road this year. These include the establishment of 16 emergency rooms (9 on the Parwan side, 6 in Baghlan) designed for an approximate 30-50 persons each and equipped with emergency supplies incl. VHF communications, and staffed with full-time personnel trained in disaster management. Despite the parallel expansion of health care facilities which now include a mobile medical unit based out of Gawara Sang, access to emergency health care along the road remains a major weakness, especially on the Baghlan side. Self-reliance on emergency supplies and situational awareness including updates on weather and the road condition should be a part of NGO contingency planning for winter/early spring movements.

In the Ghorband Valley, a com-

mand-wire IED fixed in a gas cylinder was discovered on the main Parwan – Bamyān road in Danda Area (Ghorband District) in the early afternoon of the 26<sup>th</sup>. The event marked the first manifestation of AOG presence in the valley this year and provided further substance to the projections of an AOG return following their premature exit due to ANSF-IMF clearing operations in the fall. Overall, IEDs remain a constant, yet minor, portion of the local AOG portfolio. The 2011 IED statistics remained on par with the rates recorded for 2010, the pivotal year for AOG resurgence in Ghorband. Both years marked 13 emplacements incl. 5 effective detonations in 2011 (4 of them occurred before 1030 hrs) and 8 in 2010. As a reference, IED detonations constituted less than 10% of AOG-initiated incidents in the Ghorband Valley in 2011, having been four times less frequent than SAF ambushes. Yet, road-side bombs constitute a logical AOG choice during the 'lean' periods when the networks deploy



a minimum number of personnel on the ground and as such they will continue to pose a danger for civilian road movements throughout the year.

From a different angle, continued IMF SOF emphasis on boosting the ALP in Ghorband sparked criticism from the local and provincial ANP structures which resent the low level of accountability of the ALP to ANP and the IMF sidelining the ANP in the recruitment process. It is of note that the majority of nearly 200 ALP members have been mainly constituted of Jamiat supporters. This might estrange the militiamen from the local regular police force which includes a Hizbi Islami majority. Whilst the AOG return to the valley remains quite certain, the infiltration routes from Baghlan and Wardak have been left unsecured, and the place of ALP in the local distribution of force and the program's impact on AOG access remain to be seen.

**NOTICE:** Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

**ANSO:** *"..by NGOs for NGOs.."*

# NOTHERN REGION


## BALKH

Despite a low volume of incident reporting (the province notched only 9 incidents this period, relatively similar to the last 2 reporting cycles, which recorded 11 and 6 respectively), Balkh continues to see activity—both political and security related—that is of some interest to the NGO sector, as the well documented winter lull prepares to turn into the historically more volatile spring. Of relatively superficial note to the short term—but part of a larger dynamic with significant long term implications—Balkh Province witnessed a ceremony marking the transition of security from IMF to GOA. The ceremony, which occurred on the 25th, marked one of three that occurred this period (including also districts in Badakhshan and Shibirghan City), and drew VIPs to the area, but denoted no shifts to the security paradigm or significant incidents (outside of the increased defensive posture throughout Mazar-e Sharif City in preparation). Prior to this, Mazar-e Sharif City had transitioned independently during Phase 1 of the transition process on July 23rd. According to multiple sources from IMF, the transition ceremonies do not denote a significant shift on the day on which they occur, but rather mark a point in the process when ANSF has the capability—and has taken the responsibility—to take the lead in security related matters within the designated area, while IMF moves to a mentoring (monitoring and supportive) role. Hence, it is rarely the case that the

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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actual security situation looks different on the ground the day before a ceremony and the day after, as the process is designed to be fluid, but as IMF forces begin to leave the region in large numbers over the next months/years, the effect may become more tangible.

Mazar-e Sharif saw other relatively notable developments, including anecdotal reports about a relative spike in crime—somewhat supported by recorded incidents including the killing of a civilian in PD#1 and the breaking in and robbing of a GOA employee’s residence on January 20th—and also hosted a large demonstration on the 21st around the Mahkama area (in the vicinity of the Blue Mosque). The latter demonstration revolved around an issue originating from outside of Mazar (in Marmal District), regarding an argument about whether a divorce carried out by local religious elders—but not documented by the law—held legal ground. The husband had decided 6 months after the “divorce” that the couple was not divorced, and subsequently attempted to block the divorced wife’s newly arranged marriage. In response, the court arrested both individuals as it sought to rule on whether to honour the earlier divorce. The demonstration—the second one concerning this issue (with the first occurring in Marmal)—drew a crowd of approximately 800 in an argument that was fundamentally between the courts and the religious elders, and the issue had not been re-



solved as of the writing of this report.

Outside of Mazar-e Sharif, there was no documented movement in how IMF would deal with the contested CIP process—as noted in prior reports—but the districts where CIPs in Balkh operate (Chimtal and Chahar Bolak), began to see a slight increase in activity (with similar increases occurring in some of the other CIP deployed areas). While the 2 districts combined for only 4 incidents (including a robbery and 2 separate killings), it marked an increase from the 2 that occurred over the first half of January, and the 6 which occurred over the entire previous month (all of which were attributed to government or IMF forces). 3 of the incidents occurred in Chahar Bolak, and took place amidst multiple reports from the area that AOGs are beginning to move back into the often contested districts west of Mazar City.

Lastly, although a short follow up IMF mission took place after the large operation in Tandorak (Chahark Kint District) on January 9th, no plans for a hold phase are currently underway in the area. In a likely unrelated incident elsewhere in the district (Baba Qara)—also occurring at the end of the PRP on the 14th—a group of 30 armed men stopped the vehicle of residents of Feroz Nakhshir District (Samangan) as they were collecting and transporting wood. The perpetrators beat and robbed the locals, setting fire to their vehicle. The area is relatively remote, and usually accessed via Samangan. These mark the only incidents recorded in the district this year.




## BAGHLAN

Baghlani Jadid District continued to account for the lion's share of security incident reporting in Baghlan Province (9 of 16 this period), with an additional 6 incidents occurring in Puli Khumri. The beginning of the cycle witnessed 4 straight security incidents in Baghlani Jadid between the 16th and the 19th—2 of which were IED related and 2 of which consisted of IMF night raids—with an additional 3 IED related incidents in the district later in the cycle (all on the 26th or 27th). Of those 5 IED related incidents, one involved the discovery and removal of 3 RCIEDs in Qaiser Khel village and 2 involved IED discoveries in the same area on the main Kunduz – Puli Khumri road, but the most significant involved an IED detonation against the private vehicle of the District Chief of Police at 1600 in the District Center. In the latter, the vehicle was parked at the time of detonation with nobody in it, and the detonation caused no injuries. Despite an overall lack of casual-

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ties, the proliferation of IEDs in the province is worth monitoring. Outside of these 7, the other 2 incidents in Baghlani Jadid consisted of large numbers of AOG members surrendering to the GOA, with a group on the 28th reportedly including 50 individuals at one time. At the time of this report, anecdotal sources suggested that the majority of these individuals were from a HiG background, and that—with no concrete practice in place—they had surrendered, but been immediately given their weapons back and summarily dismissed, causing some to question whether any process was in place to deal with surrenders. This represents a significant volume of surrenders, and—although it is unclear what percentage of these were actual combatants—this could conceivably have some effect on the current security paradigm. It is worth noting that Baghlani Jadid is famous for the shuffling back and forth of armed group loyalties.



In addition to the 9 incidents in Baghlani Jadid, 6 incidents occurred in Puli Khumri, the most significant of those including 2 separate incidents on the 26th involving the discovery and removal of IEDs, one of which occurred on the Mazar – Puli Khumri road. Also of note was the seizure of 2 suicide vests amongst some ruins in the Dandi Ghorri area.


The province noted a relative increase in the volume of incident reporting—up from 11 the previous cycle, and 12 the cycle before that—which was largely divided between IED seizures—including those along main road between Puli Khumri and Kunduz and Puli Khumri and Mazar—and AOG surrenders/IMF operations. This is consistent with reports of an increased AOG presence in the northern districts of Baghlan, but it should be noted that the vast majority of IEDs continue to be discovered and do not detonate.

## JAWZJAN

Although a ceremony marking the transition of security for Shibirghan from IMF to the GOA on the 28th grabbed the most headline this period, the more significant development may have been the resurfacing of AOG activity in the Tri-Provincial Area (TPA)—specifically in Qush Tapa District—which had been relatively quiet since the deployment of CIPs, and had not seen any security incidents since mid December 2011 (the 14th). In all, Jawzjan witnessed 8 security incidents this reporting period, with 2 each in Shibirghan and Aqcha, and 4 in

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the TPA (3 in Qush Tapa and 1 in Darzab). Of note amongst the 4 in the TPA, 2 of them involved the direct targeting of CIPs, including 1 IED detonation (of the 2 which occurred in the province) and an attack against a CIP checkpoint, and 1 of them (Darzab) involved the killing of a former Jihadi commander in the District Center. The CIP project was credited by many for the relative lull it created in AOG activity in most of the areas where it was deployed, but the deployment occurred relatively close to natural




winter lulls in activity, and it remains unclear what the situation will look like when AOGs begin to return to the area in the spring. An increase in the direct targeting of CIPs could suggest a volatile spring for the project areas—and the CIPs in particular—but more time and analysis will be required.

## FARYAB

As of the writing of this report, Faryab had witnessed only 14 security incidents this period—a relatively low volume for the volatile province—with 4 each in the kinetic districts of Qaysar and Pashtun Kot, and 1 each in Dawlatabad and Qaramqol in the northern portion of the province. Of these 14, nearly half (6) were AOG attacks on ANP positions (mostly ANP checkpoints), with a further 2 of them being other AOG initiated incidents (an attack on a telecommunications tower and an attack against the home of an AOG member who had surrendered to the GOA). Only 3 of these were initiated by GOA forces. The high percentage of incident reporting in Qaysar and Pashtun Kot remain roughly in line with existing trends as the 4 incidents in Qaysar does not represent a high volume, though the 4 in Pashtun Kot is more noteworthy. Outside of this—occurring the PRP but not reported until later—3 IED related inci-

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ents occurred in Dawlatabad District on the 13th and 15th. On the 13th, 3 RCIEDs were found in the Shor Darya area, and elsewhere (in Bazaari Qala Village), an IED detonated outside of a Mosque—reportedly targeting a CIP commander. Also in Dawlatabad—on the 15th, but in Jarqala Village—an RCIED detonated targeting a different CIP commander. Neither of these detonations resulted in any casualties, but they are noteworthy, as Dawlatabad has been one of the few districts where the arrival of CIPs has not correlated with a significant lull in security reporting (and where—to the contrary—CIPs appear to be being targeted, a trend which has shown up to a lesser degree in Kunduz, and now in the Tri-Provincial Area). While some of this may be because of the timing—the CIP program was rolled out later in Dawlatabad than elsewhere, and the “winter lull” may already be coming to an



end—it has also been suggested by strong sources that 2 key AOG leaders involved in the building and placement of IEDs have returned to the area in early January, and this may correlate with an increase in IED activity, the often noted tactic of choice (along with night time attacks against ANP check posts) as they attempt to take back territory. The incidents that occurred in Dawlatabad and neighbouring Qaramqol this period were of less note, and consisted of a criminal robbery of a local residence and a search operation which netted AT mines.

In terms of the province in general, the majority of the above remains consistent—although somewhat low in volume—with the existing security paradigm, which is likely to see increases in activity as the spring arrives.


## TAKHAR

In an extremely quiet cycle, all 6 of the incidents that occurred in Takhar this reporting period were initiated by GOA/IMF forces, and consisted of search operations and/or arrests. Notable amongst these was one which was conducted by ANSF/IMF at 2200 hours on the 28th, which IMF claims killed the AOG leader responsible for planning the December 25th IED attack that killed Parliament Member Bik in Taluqan (with 2 others arrested in the raid as well). In other operations, 4 other AOG or ACG members were reportedly arrested, with 1 AOG member voluntarily surrendering,

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and in terms of seizures, a private vehicle carrying a large volume of explosives was seized along the Takhar – Badakhshan road on the 29th (in Kalafgan District) and 2 homemade IEDs were seized in Darqad District (in conjunction with a medium volume of ammunition). Although the noted explosives were of import, no known target or group had been tied to either of them as of the writing of this report.

Takhar was also one of 2 North Region provinces that postponed a planned transition ceremony—marking the change of security



responsibility from IMF to GOA—which had been scheduled to occur on the 30th. The ceremony was postponed due to inclement weather which would not allow helicopters to land, and a new date had not been decided upon at the time of this report. However, the change was not otherwise security related, and the province is still scheduled to transition this tranche.

## SAR-E PUL


While NGOs may be most interested in the 2 security incidents that occurred along the Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan road this reporting period, the population of Sar-e Pul continues to wait for a decision from the Central Government in the wake of a series of demonstrations and meetings that have been held regarding the potential removal of the Provincial Governor of Sar-e Pul. The anti-PG movement, based topically on the PG’s alleged allowance (or subsequent cover up) of crimes against civilians, has been a source of contention for months now, and has resulted in a drawn out political process played out both in demonstrations on the streets of Sar-e Pul, and in the halls of the government in Kabul. Multiple sources suggest that the anti-PG contingent repeatedly threatened new rounds of demonstrations over the past 2 weeks, but continued to postpone them as the Central Government promised to keep working on the issue, and many believe that the Provincial Governor is set to be replaced (as the Deputy Governor—who

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had been in many ways the leader of the anti-PG party—had already been at the end of the PRP). Potentially in response to this continued unrest, the transition ceremony—which was scheduled to occur on the 31st of January—had been postponed as of the writing of this report.

In terms of manifested insecurity, the province witnessed only 4 incidents this period, with 3 of those occurring in Sar-e Pul District. While 1 (on the 16th) denoted the surrendering of 8 AOG members, 2 of them (on the dates noted above) marked new insecurity recorded on the long contested Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan road.

On the 10th, at 1600 hours—a relatively early hour in the evening—4 armed men established an illegal checkpoint in the Imam Jafar area of the Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan road, where they stopped vehicles to check them for GOA/ANSF employees. Of more note, on the 28th, at 1700 in the Sayed Abad area of the same road, a group of 7-10 armed men—believed to be members of




an AOG—shot 2 masons as they were working on constructing an ANP checkpoint, killing 1 of them and injuring the other. Although the masons denote civilian casualties, the direct targeting of civilians working for the GOA (or IMF) has occurred with some level of regularity before, most often in the case of truck drivers (especially those transporting fuel to IMF installations). These 2 incidents—in conjunction with the 2 illegal checkpoints that took place over the last week of December (1 AOG attributed and 1 AOG attributed)—suggest that the lull that had mostly occurred since the late summer of 2011 has ended, and AOGs are feeling more comfortable operating openly around the main road and throughout the province. This is relatively consistent with the same period in 2011, when the road saw a number of illegal check points starting early in the winter months, and there is a strong likelihood that more insecurity—predominantly illegal checkpoints—will occur along this road.

## SAMANGAN

Samangan continues to record a low volume of incidents, with only 3 noted this reporting period, 2 of those being interpersonal disputes (1 in Aybak and 1 in Dara-I Sufi Payin), and 1 in the District Center of Hazrati Sultan, where 11 security guards from a private road construction project were disarmed. None of the above incidents denote especially exceptional events, nor shifts in the existing—and relatively stable—security paradigm for the province, but 1 notable incident did occur late last reporting period

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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(only reported this period), and consisted of the finding of a significant cache in Hazrati Sultan on the 15th. There were also other seizures of ammunition and explosives from Ruyi Du Ab on the 11th (as reported last reporting period). This is of some significance. Although there are rarely strong AOG operations in these districts, the province remains a potential safe haven for AOGs moving from east to west (or vice versa), especially those coming from Baghlan when IMF opera-



tions increase in the area. At this time, Baghlan has begun to see more insecurity, and IMF/ANSF operations are likely to increase. However, Samangan remains relatively stable at this time, with the noted incidents of only mild significance to, and almost none to the province’s immediate security paradigm.

## KUNDUZ


Kunduz saw an upswing in incident reporting this cycle, recording 20 security incidents as opposed to the 16 which were recorded over the first half of January, and the 15 recorded the cycle before that, with this number likely to increase (due to late reporting). While a significant 10 of those incidents were IED related, the actual percentage remained consistent with the last 2 periods (8 and 7, each denoting a mostly similar percentage). In fact, it is of note that despite the 10 IED related incidents, only 2 of those resulted in actual detonations, and 1 of those 2 was premature causing no casualties. Further to this, 5 of the IED discoveries—as well as both of the detonations—occurred in Kunduz District. Other noted AOG tactics this period included 2 incidents consisting of AOG attacks on pro-government militia members.

The most notable of the above IED related incidents was a detonation against an NDS vehicle on January 18th in the Kunduz

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Buzkashi field. The explosion was notable due to the fact that it occurred in a public place in the middle of the day (1430), but it does not necessarily represent a shift or outlier, as Kunduz District alone witnessed 50 IED detonations in 2011, making the 2 that occurred this period roughly consistent with the overall security paradigm from the previous year. The detonation did not occur during an actual match—where a large number of civilian casualties may have occurred—and only the NDS officer himself was injured (he lived). It is assessed as likely that AOG attributed insecurity—especially IED related—will continue to climb as the winter comes to an end.

Outside of this, significant reporting included 2 notable roadside events, both attributed to criminal motives. The first was on the 28th of January, along the Kunduz – Shir Khan Bandar Road in Imam Sahib District, when a vehicle of 4 GOA employees was stopped by armed



men at approximately 1700 hours. One of the 4—a cook—attempted to violently resist, and was shot and killed on the spot, while the secretary of the head of a Kunduz Customs department was abducted, with the driver and a bodyguard tied up and abandoned. Although insecurity is relatively rife throughout the province, it is worth noting that besides an abduction that occurred on December 21st, 2011, no similar incident had occurred on a road in Imam Sahbi since an illegal checkpoint on the Imam Sahib – Besos road on June 4th, making this an exception—although not a total outlier—to the overall security paradigm for the province. The secretary was subsequently released on the 30th, reportedly after the payment of a ransom. The other roadside incident was an armed robbery in Khanabad on the 28th (at 2000 hours) along the Khanabad – Taloqan road. Both incidents occurred outside of regular NGO travel hours.


## BADAKHSHAN

On January 24th, the responsibility for the security of 7 districts in Badakhshan (Yaftali Sufla, Shahri Buzurg, Baharak, Tishkan, Kishim, Argo and Arghanj Khwa) and Fayzabad City was transferred from the IMF to GOA. Amongst those notably absent from the transition were Warduj (which has witnessed 12 of Badakhshan’s last 20 security incidents) and the strategically important Kuran Wa Munjan (which borders the more kinetic Eastern Region). Outside of this ceremony, only 2 security incidents were recorded this reporting period.

On January 18th, an AOG broke

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into and searched the private residences of 2 former Jihadi commanders (both Jamiat affiliated), seizing weapons and ammunition. The commanders returned during the above, and engaged the AOG in a brief fire fight, which resulted in injuries to a local child. These commanders were not standing up actual Pro-Government militias, but each was known to work with the GOA/ANSF, and be in control of a small group of armed men. This illustrates the strong presence the AOG has built in the area, and their willingness to openly engage significant targets



in the area. As the drug trafficking season gets closer, it will be noteworthy to see if/how existing power structures deal with this group. Safety related—but not security related—the most significant event in the province remained the series of avalanches caused by heavy snow that reportedly killed over 40 and injured more than 60 throughout the province.

# WESTERN REGION

## HERAT

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
This reporting period Herat experienced one NGO related incident. On 17 January, in the vicinity of the city Citadel, 2 armed men riding a motorcycle shot and seriously injured a female NGO staff member while she was en route to her office by foot. The modus operandi of the attackers and the circumstances of the incident indicated a targeted attack rather than a random crime.

Although initial reporting suggested that the political background of the victim (a former candidate for the 2010 Provincial Council), or the victim's involvement in the NGO's activity related to gender issues, may have played a role in the targeting, the current investigation appears to favour reasons unrelated to the NGO position, but rather pointing to a personal dispute as the most likely motive. This seems to fit with the security paradigm in Herat city, where similar cases of targeted killings had already been recorded (with 3 other cases recorded this period in districts 2, 6 and 8, involving

(respectively) a PSC driver, a local businessmen and 2 members of a family killed in Naw Abad area). As of the writing of this report, none of them had been confirmed as ideologically motivated.

Besides the above incidents related to criminal activity, the city remained relatively quiet. The noteworthy seizure of a motorcycle rigged with explosives, as well as the detention of an ANP official working at the ANP HQ demonstrate the continuing potential for AOG activity in the area (and at the same time suggesting increased concerns about the infiltration of AOG elements into ANSF).

Elsewhere in the province, AOG initiated attacks were recorded in Injil (where during the night time an IMF supply convoy came under attack on the Herat – Turghundi Highway) and in Gulran, where AOG ambushed an ANBP patrol vehicle, killing 5 ANBP servicemen. Only 3 IED related incidents occurred this



period, including 2 detonations and an IED discovery (on the main road to the Guzara DAC). The choice of targets indicates that AOGs remain focused on security forces as both strikes occurred on ANP/ALP vehicles (in Farsi and Shindand respectively).

Similar to the previous period the APRP process has continued into the current reporting cycle with a reported 55 AOG fighters from Obe, Guzara, Shindand and Pashtun Zarghun joining the process. Noteworthy amongst these, the reconciliation of a prominent commander from Pashtun Zarghun and a number of his associates may have a positive impact on the security situation in the province and potentially encourage some other groups to join the process. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the APRP will be able to ensure the sustainability of this or future reconciliation (s).

### ACRONYMS:

Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.

## GHOR


In the last fortnight Ghor remained relatively quiet and hosted only 5 security events. Besides Chaghcharan, where the ANP arrested an individual in relation to a criminal case, reported security events were concentrated on the southern districts of Taywara and Pasaband.

On 16 January during the evening hours, an AOG attacked local residences in the area of Taywara District Center with small arms fire. A fire fight ensued with the ANP, but did not cause reported casualties. Just a few hours later, the ANP located and defused an RCIED rigged on a motorcycle in the same area. Finally—on the following day—security forces located 4 explosive devices (AP mines) which were emplaced on a roadside, still in the vicinity of the DAC.

Similar to the temporary abduc-

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tion of the Head of the local Shura that was reported during the last period in Taywara; this series of incidents seems to be related to the longstanding conflict between a local prominent commander (who recently seems to have been disconnected from his support by Helmandi AOGs) and his rival, an MP originating from the district. The exacerbation of this conflict had already caused a significant deterioration to the operating environment for NGOs in the area during the last months of the previous year. The second week of this reporting period however, saw a rather unexpected development in the situation, as (according to multiple sources) the fore mentioned commander was abducted along with 4 of his associates in Pasaband, while apparently in transit to



Baghran District of Helmand. At the time of writing this report, the exact circumstances behind the incident remain unclear, but it appears that an exogenous AOG was behind the abduction and the incident is likely related to recent tensions between the commander and his former allies (Helmandi AOGs).

Nonetheless, the harsh winter conditions reported across the province, and resulting limited mobility, will likely continue to influence security reporting from the province as no significant incidents were noted during the second week of the reporting period (and—for the reporting period—beyond those incidents mentioned above).

## BADGHIS

In the last two weeks, a total of 22 security incidents were reported in Badghis, with 10 of those attributed to AOGs. This volume displays a drop in AOG activity in comparison with the PRP, which saw 15 AOG initiated incidents.

The geographical distribution of AOG authored incidents shows that AOG activity was focused in particular on Murghab (a historic AOG hot spot in the province) and Qadis – which together combined to account for more than 58% of all AOG initiated incidents, followed after by Muqur, Ghormach and Jawand districts.


In line with well established tactical trends in the province, AOG direct attacks were once again prominent, with 9 concurrencies. The majority of these attacks targeted ANP check posts, notably on 4 separate occasions in Qadis

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and 2 in Murghab. Significantly, a prolonged armed clash was reported in Panirak area of Murghab, that resulted in 2 AOG killed, while reportedly 1 ANP was killed and 1 ALP member was wounded in the fire fight.

This period, IED emplacement was focused also on Murghab, which experienced 5 out of the total 7 IED related incidents. Effective AOG IED activity decreased this reporting cycle, with only one device that resulted in detonation, whereas the PRP experienced 4 such strikes. The blast damaged an IMF patrolling vehicle and caused injuries to 2 IMF soldiers (in Shore Akazai area of Murghab).

On the ANSF/IMF side, documented operations were rather limited and affected mainly



Murghab, Ghormach and Jawand, nonetheless it appears that they created significant impacts. This was due in particular to an operation conducted by IMF and ANA special forces in Panirak area (following the above described AOG attack on an ANP CP), that resulted in a reported 15 AOG members killed (incl. an AOG commander) and another 6 arrested.

Lastly, this reporting period saw also a transition ceremony for Qala-I-Naw city marking the shift of security responsibilities from IMF to ANSF. The event took place on 31 January with GOA and ISAF representatives in attendance and passed without reported incidents.

## FARAH


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An increase in overall incident volumes has been recorded in Farah this reporting period with a total of 32 security events, as compared to the 26 recorded over the PRP. The volume of AOG initiated incidents, however, remained in line with the previous period, with 13 incidents being attributed to AOGs, with ANSF/IMF operations driving the upwards trend.

In the last fortnight, the districts of Bakwa, Bala Buluk, Khaki Safed and Pusht Rod accounted for the majority of AOG authored incidents. In Bakwa, AOG continued to focus their efforts on disrupting vehicular movement along the Herat – Kandahar Highway, with an IED strike targeting an ANA vehicle (which injured 3 ANA soldiers) and a direct attack on an IMF supply convoy reported in Dilaram Bazaar area.


In Farah, the use of victim operated IEDs (as opposed to using more discriminating and precise remote controlled devices) continued to represent a significant threat to the local population, as well as NGOs operating in the area. This was highlighted when a roadside IED detonated on a public transport vehicle while it was travelling on the main Farah – Farah Rod road (Orya area of Bala Buluk), wounding 13 passengers.

Intimidation of the local population by AOGs was again evident, with 2 incidents reported from Bala Buluk and Pusht Rod. While an ANP was abducted by an AOG while en route to his duty station in Seya Jangal area of Bala Buluk, 2 AOG members riding on a motorcycle shot and killed a local elder in Pusht Rod, Sang Golak area. In regards to the lat-



ter case, the victim is believed to have been killed over the accusation that he was cooperating with the GOA.

This period security forces were also active across the provinces leading 15 documented operations. Whereas in Farah City, the security situation remained stable (with only 2 small scale operations carried out in districts 3 and 4), the main ANSF efforts were concentrated on the bordering district of Lash Wa Juwayn (primarily against the smuggling and drug businesses) as well as in Bala Buluk and Bakwa, where a total of 12 suspected AOG members were arrested during 3 separate operations.



# EASTERN REGION

## NANGARHAR


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The development of greatest long-term significance that took place during the past fortnight was the January 26<sup>th</sup> ceremony marking the official handover of primary security responsibilities to Afghan National Security Forces, in Jalalabad City and the surrounding districts of Behsud, Sorkh Rod, Kuz Kunar and Kama. The event itself did not draw any specific AOG threat reporting or incidents, and already over the weekend following the transition ceremony, truck convoys were visible transporting used IMF vehicles out of the city westwards, in what appears to be the early stages of physical exit.

Some points on the subject of transition are worth considering. First, the armed opposition continues to maintain an active presence in the city and its environs, and this is likely to be an enduring fact of the security landscape in central Nangarhar in 2012 and beyond. Indeed, with a new Shadow Governor appointed for Jalalabad in December, reportedly because of the insufficiently aggressive campaign of his predecessor, we may see further pushes this spring to expand a campaign of targeting GOA and ANSF figures and facilities (although unlikely to reach the scale of the HQN-assisted campaign in early 2011). Some notable recent incidents demonstrating the ongoing active AOG campaign included a

grenade attack on a GOA official's residence in Zone 4 and a discovery of a large culvert IED on a sideroad in the same zone's Chehel Metra; an IED detonation near Zone 2's Mia Omar high school; a night letter on a UN employee's home; and a magnetic IED detonation on a fuel tanker near the main entrance to JAF. There was also an IDF attack on an IMF convoy just north of Behsud bridge.

Yet in spite of this enduring presence, in the long-term there is likely to be a sufficiently strong and cohesive GOA and ANSF leadership in Jalalabad to prevent any major, systemic threats to the political and security order in the area of the provincial capital. However, while ANSF are quite competent in Jalalabad itself, they remain physically and psychologically unprepared for such security responsibilities in the rural districts to the south of the city, and these areas are likely to remain very insecure for the foreseeable future. Some notable demonstrations of ongoing rural insecurity were recorded over the past fortnight, the most significant being a VBIED attack on the Shinwar IMF-ANSF facility that serves as the primary base for the southeast of Nangarhar; 3 ANA soldiers were injured in the blast, which also killed the driver of the vehicle. Another incident, different in form, was also recorded, which



points to a dynamic that may become increasingly relevant in the long-term: on January 28<sup>th</sup>, ANP overseeing an IO distribution of relief goods 'confiscated', or more accurately stole, a substantial quantity of the relief goods, asserting they too were impoverished Afghans. This type of incident may unfortunately become more common in the future, as GOA and international oversight struggles to keep up with the sheer quantity of men under official and semi-official arms.

More broadly, districts such as Chaparhar, Bati Kot, Khogyani and a number of others along the southern border with Kurram Agency remain deeply problematic, their rural nature also making the work of the security forces much more difficult than in the security force-laden provincial capital.

The final point with regard to transition: the fact that the ANSF now have primary responsibilities for security in the city does not mean that IMF will not conduct further night raids on high value targets, such as with the fatal raid on Sabar Lal Melma in September 2011, or with the more recent failed raid on the Zone 3 home of another senior Salafi figure on January 11<sup>th</sup>; indeed it is highly likely that more of these raids will be seen, particularly against figures suspected of association with the non-IEA, transnational AOGs operating in Kunar and Nuristan.



## KUNAR


|                    | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date       | 0             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

Kunar was home to a number of important incidents and developments in the second half of January. First of all, with regards to changes in force disposition, a further ALP programme became functional during the period, in Narang; similar programmes in Nurgal, Chawkay and Wata Pur are set to start soon, complementing the existing ALP units that have been operating in Khas Kunar over the past 18 months and Sirkanay over the past 2 months. These programmes each involve approximately 300 armed men acting as an auxiliary police force, albeit without the right to arrest, and are paid and directly managed by the Ministry of Interior. The primary objectives of these programmes in Kunar, as mentioned in December’s second bi-weekly report, are to increase security along the Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway, to prevent AOG infiltration into the districts’ central valleys from outside (both from Pech to the west and Pakistan to the east), and perhaps also to buttress the positions of key anti-AOG commanders and groups in these districts in advance of an IMF drawdown in Kunar – which, though, remains some time away. The programmes are likely to have a medium-term positive impact on conflict levels in these districts, although they may both attract more AOG attacks in the short term, and raise levels of armed predation against local communities in the longer term.

On the operational front, the only IMF operation took place in Chawkay’s restive Dewagal valley, likely as part of the preparation of that district’s security environ-

ment for its ALP programme. In the operation, IMF claimed 5 AOG fighters and a female civilian were killed, although others claims (inaccurately, it appears) the deceased were all civilians, which sparked a peaceful demonstration in Asadabad 3 days later. From the AOG side, multiple significant abductions, robberies and kinetic events took place across the province, although absolute levels were down in line with seasonal trends. The Pech Valley area was particularly active, with perhaps the biggest event the mass abduction of 14 Nuristani ANP policemen on the 27<sup>th</sup> in Lechalam, with tribal elder intervention causing them to be released in two batches over the coming 48 hours – although not without each having to take an oath not to go back to their work with the ANP. In response to this episode, Nuristani governmental representatives stated that if the situation in Pech, which has created ongoing and significant difficulties for their isolated province, does not improve, the Nuristani security forces would contemplate operations of their own in Pech; while their problem is a real one, it remains to be seen at the time of writing whether this is anything more than an empty threat, particularly as they are under-resourced as it is.

Earlier in the period, AOG fighters stopped and looted trucks bringing food supplies to Nuristan’s ANP in Manogai’s Wadagram area, while in Chapa Dara’s Gosalak on the 22<sup>nd</sup>, a privately contracted food supply convoy was also stopped and looted by AOG fighters. Indeed,



this checkpoint in Gosalak remained operational, including during the daytime, as of the 31<sup>st</sup>, indicating the confidence of the armed opposition groups operating in this strategically important corridor, and the limits of ANSF and IMF influence deep in the Pech. Finally, sporadic fighting against IMF and ANSF patrol convoys also continued at a significant level over the past fortnight, with the only reported injuries coming from civilians caught in the cross-fire.

Elsewhere, in Marawara 5 civilians were abducted, fate unknown, by gunmen reportedly in retaliation for allegedly providing information to the IMF that led to airstrikes against AOG locations on the 12<sup>th</sup>, and there were a number of other AOG direct attacks on IMF and ANSF targets in the district, as there were in its southern neighbour Sirkanay. In Khas Kunar, there were two separate IED incidents involving IMF vehicles, the first injuring one soldier but the second on the 28<sup>th</sup> killing 2 and injuring 3 others, in an unusually effective strike. In the provincial capital the situation remained broadly quiet, with just one mortar attack on the PRT, a single shooting of a civilian in Kerala, and three armed attacks on ANP, in Nawabad and Shagai areas. Finally, in Asmar a junior member of the High Peace Council, a Nuristani cleric, was abducted by an AOG on the 26<sup>th</sup>, and the group responsible, identified as the Gujjar tribe’s contribution to the IEA, is reportedly using the cleric as leverage to demand the release of a notable Gujjar prisoner – although if the individual is in GOA or IMF custody remains unclear.

# KHOST

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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
Khost saw a substantial increase in the number of AOG-initiated kinetic incidents in the past fortnight, after a relatively quiet 6 weeks from the start of December to mid-January. If the pattern continues, which it should if it follows that of previous years, then we have already returned to levels of AOG-initiated incidents near the long-run average of approximately 100 a month. The mild winters, the value that both AOGs and the security forces place on Khost, and the ongoing resilience of the HQN, remain important factors driving the early start to the province’s intense fighting season.

This period’s conflict activity remained primarily located in the main battlefields of the province, that is: Khost city and its environs, the central districts of Sabari and Bak, and the border districts of Tani, Gurbuz and Tere Zayi.

First, in and around Khost city, IEDs remained the central threat, with a total of 8 detonations and 6 discoveries. Most noteworthy amongst them, two IEDs were detonated in Bilan Manzel, the first a magnetic IED that damaged a private truck transporting firewood for the IMF, and the second an RCIED placed in a culvert that struck an IMF vehicle as it travelled on a secondary road in the area. These are the first recorded IED strikes against IMF and IMF-associated actors in Bilan Manzel, which is approximately 1km east of the city centre, and

so represents an important new area of risk for NGOs travelling in that area. Other IED incidents took place a little further out of the city. Most notably, in Ghurumbi village, west of the city on the way to Sheikh Zahed University, a roadside IED detonated prematurely, while behind Salerno on the opposite side of the city, in Kunday village, an IED struck an IMF vehicle and injured 3 soldiers. In Pirano village, also near Salerno, two IEDs were planted next to a civilian residence for unknown reasons, the first detonating and the second being discovered by ANP responders. Other IEDs were discovered in and around the above locations, as well as one roadside IED in near the Melma Kot gardens. As a result of this increasing presence in the past month, ANSF have also remained active in attempting to break down the AOG networks in the provincial capital, conducting significant numbers of raids on residences around the city and likely keeping AOG activities at a level below what they otherwise would be.

Direct attacks were almost entirely restricted to border areas, including Gurbuz, Khost’s Laken, Tani and Tere Zayi, although there was a brief exchange of fire with an IMF convoy near the Sabari DAC. IDF attacks were similarly distributed, primarily affecting Tere Zayi border areas and the Sabari DAC area.




IMF also continued an active operational tempo, focusing on clearing operations in and around the provincial capital, and in the key districts of Sabari, Tere Zayi and Nadir Shah Kot. In Khost city and the wider district, a dozen AOG members were arrested across operations, including two HQN commanders. In Sabari, 9 AOG members were arrested and 4 killed, the killings resulting from two separate airstrikes that interrupted IED emplacement. A similar airstrike killed 3 further AOG fighters in the Laken area of Khost while they were attempting to plant an IED, while another 3 were killed in the same circumstances in Nadir Shah Kot. Also in that district, IMF arrested 4 suspected AOG members – a district development council member and 3 relatives – during a clearing operation, showing the blurred lines of allegiance in rural districts such as this one. Finally, in Bak a HQN commander and 6 others were arrested in another clearing operation. Interestingly, IMF themselves reported an elevated number of cases where search operations for specific AOG commanders did not lead to their capture, in what may be a sign of increasing security measures being used by the opposition as a result of the heavy and effective IMF campaign against the HQN command structure in the province over the past 12 months.

## LAGHMAN

During the period, Qarghayi district was also officially ‘transitioned’ from IMF to ANSF responsibility. Almost 2 weeks prior to the ceremony, two IEDs had detonated in the Surkhakan area – one prematurely but one successfully striking an ANA vehicle, injuring 2 soldiers. Yet beyond these incidents the Qarghayi stretch of the Highway has been relatively quiet recently, and much safer than during the equivalent period in 2011. It thus appears that the district’s transition to a relatively well-prepared ANSF will likely not face any major security challenges in the near-term, although there will likely be ongoing low-level AOG activity in the Tangi Abrisham and Kheiroi Khel areas.

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date       | 0             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

In Mehtarlam district, Palawan Baba was home to the most serious incidents recorded; on the 16<sup>th</sup> an IED detonated close to an ANP vehicle, although not striking it, while more seriously, on the 29<sup>th</sup> AOG fighters shot and killed an ANA soldier. However, ANSF were also active in Mehtarlam; in two separate operations, 9 AOG members were arrested on the 24<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup>, while around the same time ANP and NDS were reported to have gone to a number of villages in the environs of the capital with a list of suspects, informing them that they were under surveillance and any activities against the GOA would cause the ANSF to act.



In Alishing, the first direct attack on the DAC in 2011 and 2012 took place, injuring 2 ANP and 2 NDS officers, in a sign of AOG intentions to step up their pressure on the small GOA presence in the district’s centre. In Alingar, an IED detonated against an ANSF convoy, killing one ANP and injuring one ANA soldier and one further ANP. That same day, ANP arrested two Pakistani doctors, seemingly independent of the GOA or NGOs, in the Noralam area, who were accused of treating an AOG commander injured in an IMF airstrike on the area on the 21<sup>st</sup>.


## PAKTYA

With Paktya remaining home to extremely cold winter weather, the intensity of its conflict continued to be heavily subdued. Little AOG activity was recorded during this period, consistent with the substantial reduction in AOG presence due to the arrival of winter weather and temperatures in the past month, with the main operational tempo in this quieter season of the year resting with the ANSF and IMF, who conducted operations in Zurmat and Wuza Zadran, Jaji and Gardez. These dynamics are likely to remain in place for the coming 6-8 weeks.

Yet in spite of a low conflict intensity, some notable developments are worth exploring. Most significantly, in the early morning of the 30<sup>th</sup>, IMF conducted a raid

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date       | 0             |
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on the Dubai Hotel restaurant and guesthouse in Gardez city, detaining one man; reportedly operating on the information that he was a BBIED operative, it appears instead that he was a high value facilitator for the region’s primary Arab armed opposition group, reporting to the FATA-based leadership on developments in Afghanistan. While his nationality remains unclear, with conflicting reports that he is either Pakistani or from Paktika, the presence of such a figure in the southeast is a matter of note – particularly by indicating the nexus of the HQN and the aforementioned Arab AOG on both sides of the south-eastern border.



Jaji was the second district in which interesting events took place. ANP arrested an ALP policeman for allegedly have connections to the armed opposition on January 25<sup>th</sup>, in the first recorded such case in Paktya since ALP programmes were established in the northern border districts. However, it is easy to read too much into this, as the underlying truth is that the growing number of ALP units across the eastern region have simply made it evermore statistically probable that such connections would also develop, as they have in the numerically greater ANP and ANA.

# SOUTHERN REGION

## KANDAHAR

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date       | 0             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

In the last fortnight, AOGs in Kandahar continued to focus on the targeted killings of civilian and GOA leaders, however it was yet another high-profile attack involving suicide operatives that dominated this reporting period.


On 19 January, an SVBIED detonated against an IMF convoy as it was approaching the main gate leading to the Kandahar Airfield area. Much like the suicide attacks recorded during the previous cycle, the incident involved numerous civilian casualties. Although the intended target was an IMF convoy, the attack occurred in the early afternoon and along the often frequented Kandahar – Spin Boldak Highway, resulting in 6 civilians killed and another 10 people wounded (incl. 9 civilians) as well as damages to a number of vehicles in the vicinity.

In regards to Kandahar Province, this incident marks the 5<sup>th</sup> suicide attack recorded already in January alone. Kandahar and Helmand have shown an increased rate of suicide attacks of late, although it should be noted that the province experienced a similar suicide attack campaign shortly after Rama-

dan last year. This recent campaign is indicative of the sustained capabilities of armed opposition, as well as their ability to explore security force vulnerabilities - in particular while in transit. It should be noted that while this wave of suicide attacks does not change the NGO threat picture (with the latter remaining outside of the AOG usual scope of targets), as mentioned in the previous report, it nevertheless demonstrates an increased risk of collateral involvement from such incidents.

In Kandahar city, the AOG campaign of targeted killings also continued this period. In the last two weeks, 5 AOG initiated targeted attacks occurred within the city, resulting in 1 ANP wounded and the deaths of 2 Council members (from Panjwayi and Dand), an ANP officer (also from Dand) and a local female (the details of the latter incident remain unclear, however anecdotal reporting suggests a possible association with GOA as the motive behind the killing).

Other AOG tactical patterns have



not change significantly in the last fortnight, as IED emplacement continued to affect mainly Kandahar city (with 7 IED related incidents), followed by Panjwayi, Zhari and Maywand districts. In addition to districts 5 and 9 of Kandahar City, a concentration of IEDs has been observed in District 8 (with 3 devices) and 4 (with 2, including the only detonation reported this period within the city).

Similar to last year's trends, ANSF/IMF continue to maintain a high tempo of operations during the winter season. At least 22 operations were recorded this period, primarily in the areas of AOG concentration such as Kandahar, Maywand, Panjwayi and Zhari. Although security forces have achieved some operational successes recently, as (for instance) with the arrest of 10 AOG members in Kandahar City or a significant ratio of IED recovery/disposals, at this stage there is no indication that the province will experience a seasonal break in activities given the strategic importance of the area for parties involved in the conflict.

### NEW STAFF ANNOUNCEMENT ANSO SOUTH OFFICE:

We are pleased to announce that the vacancies in our South office have now been filled and that shortly the office will once again be operating at full capacity.

Mr. Mohibullah will be taking over the South Counterpart position while Mr. Peter Dimitroff (a former South RSA of whom many will be familiar with) will be returning to us in order to fulfill that role. Once they are instu and fully operational email notices will be issued and any questions or concerns you have about the Southern Region will be responded to accordingly.

We wish them the best of luck in their endeavors.


## PAKTIKA

Similar to Paktya, Paktika is heavily affected by the harsh winter environment that the mountainous and isolated province attracts each year, pushing AOG activity down dramatically from its extreme summer peaks. However, reflecting the generally much more violently contested nature of the strategically important province, and the prevalence of IDF forms of attack there, even through the winter AOG presence and operations remain at a significant level – both in terms of the number of incidents, and in the enduring occurrence of complex attacks.

In this regard, the two most significant incidents that occurred in the province did so on the same day, January 21<sup>st</sup>, within 1km of each other in the restive Barmal district which shares a border and tribal linkages with the Pakistani agency of South Waziristan. Early that morning in the Nawe Adda area of Margha, just on the rural side of its main bazaar, a road construction company (RCC) convoy, which seems to have primarily comprised its PSC detail, was attacked with SAF and RPGs, with the exchange of fire leading

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date       | 0             |
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to the killing of two of the AOG attackers. Approximately 2 hours later, and roughly 1km away in the Darya Khan area, a further gun battle took place between 2 armed BBIED operatives and an ANA convoy, which appears to have recognised the hostile nature of the attackers and initiated the exchange. One of the vests was struck by a bullet and caused it to detonate, killing both attackers and wounding a passing civilian. This is the latest significant incidence of insecurity in Barmal, which remains one of the most dangerous places in the country, including in terms of the number of BBIED and VBIED operations that come in from Waziristan and take place there; during 2011 there were 3 VBIED and 1 BBIED attacks in Barmal alone. It is, moreover, the second time that this RCC has been attacked in the past 12 months; in March 2011 a complex attack involving a truck VBIED levelled the RCC's compound buildings, killing 24 and injuring 60 more. The other incidents in the district, in the DAC and Shkin areas, were IDF attacks on IMF facilities, which



were not reported to have caused any casualties or damage.

The remaining AOG incidents were also nearly all IDF attacks, almost exclusively in Dila and Gayan, although there were also 2 IED detonations that successfully struck their IMF vehicle targets in Dila, in each case involving a secondary device that was discovered and defused. The only direct attacks took place in Mata Khan and Yousef Khel districts, 2 in the former and 1 in the latter, and targeted ANSF and PSC convoys.

IMF operational tempo was low, consistent with the winter environment, with just 7 operations recorded in all. Across them, taking place in Dila, Sar Hawza, Jani Khel and Sharana, just 5 AOG fighters were detained and small weapons caches retrieved, in stark contrast to the usually highly deadly consequences from IMF operations during the fighting season.

### ANSO STAFF CONTACT DETAILS:

Please note that a full listing of the contact details for all ANSO staff is provided on the last page of this report.

## URUZGAN


After a busy reporting period prior to this one, Uruzgan has experienced a significant decrease in the overall incident volumes over the past two weeks. Although the final figures may change following the capture of late reporting, the current data shows that the province recorded a combined 11 incidents, of which 4 were authored by AOGs. In counterpoint, the conclusive figures for the previous cycle indicate that Uruzgan saw a combined 40 incidents during the first two weeks of January, with 12 of them attributed to AOGs.

The sharp drop reported this period reflects less favourable weather conditions recorded across the province as well as a seasonal break in activities.

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date       | 0             |
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Whereas no AOG direct attacks were reported across the province, IED emplacement, as well as instances of targeted killings, dominated this reporting period in Uruzgan. In the last fortnight, AOG IED activity was focused on Tirin Kot District with at least 6 recorded incidents, of which 2 devices detonated. Noteworthy amongst these, an IED detonated on an ANP foot patrol in Jalabi area, killing one ANP. Another IED – emplaced in the vicinity of an ANP check point in Tirin Kot city - detonated prematurely, with no reported casualties.

AOG intimidation efforts manifested themselves with 2 separate cases of targeted killings, both



reported from Dihrawud District. On 16 January, an NDS employee was killed in Ismael Agha Village. In the same area, though several hours later, AOG shot and killed an ALP member.

Besides 3 IEDs disposals, the province saw only a handful of documented ANSF/IMF operations in Chora and Tirin Kot, which nonetheless resulted in 9 AOG members detained and 1 killed.

## ZABUL


AOG operations in Zabul were minimal this reporting period, and consisted of IED deployment and 2 cases of direct attacks. Four IED related incidents were recorded across the province, suggesting that AOG activity is indeed limited at the moment. Amongst these incidents, only one device detonated, however it did cause casualties. On 17 January in Mizan District, an RCIED struck an ANA vehicle while travelling through Muqurak area. The detonation claimed the life of 1 ANA soldier, and caused injuries to another. Besides Mizan, IED discoveries were reported in Tarnak Wa Jaldak and in Shahjoy, where 2 devices were located during two separate incidents reported from

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date       | 0             |
| This Report Period | 0             |

the Bazaar area (on 18 and 24 January).

Only 2 AOG direct attacks were recorded this period, with 1 occurring in Shahjoy (where an AOG attacked an ANP post, wounding 1 ANP) and another in Naw Bahar, where a small arms attack took place in the DAC area. Whereas in the last fortnight the province experienced only a handful of AOG authored incidents, ANSF/IMF operations accounted for the majority of security events (although still demonstrating a downturn trend in volume).

In the last two weeks these operations were focused on Qalat and Tarnak Wa Jaldak districts, and



resulted in the seizure of a small amount of weapons and ammunition, as well as the detention of 7 suspects.

As is frequently the case in the province, safety issues—and more precisely road incidents—continue to play an important role and caused numerous casualties amongst the population. Illustrating this point, this reporting period (in Sangar Manda area of Tarnak Wa Jaldak,) a local Saracha vehicle collided with a fuel tanker, wounding 6 local civilians.

## GHAZNI

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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
In the last two weeks Ghazni experienced a decrease in overall incident volumes, which most likely was related to the harsh climatic conditions and heavy snowfalls reported throughout the province. This period, difficult weather conditions in particular affected the districts of Nawur, Jaghatu, Jaghuri, Malistani, Ajristan and Giro.

Although limited in number, AOG direct and indirect attacks were focused on the districts of Ghazni, Gelan, Andar, Qarabagh and Rashidan. In the last fortnight the province saw at least 8 AOG initiated direct attacks, which - in addition to ANSF and IMF installations - targeted the district centres of Rashidan (on 2 occasions), then Gelan and Zana Khan (1 each). AOG rocket attacks continued in the Gelan DAC area against the IMF base (with the projectiles impacting inside the base perimeter, causing

some minor damage but no casualties) and in Qarabagh against another IMF base located in the DAC area.

In Ghazni City (where the official ceremony of the transition was held during the previous period) a group of 20 AOG fighters operating in Dih Yak joined the GOA through the peace and reconciliation program and handed over their weapons during an official event in the Governor's compound on the 16<sup>th</sup>. The event is worthy to underline, as not only is it highly unusual for the area, but also because local sources raised doubts in regards as to whether the group was composed of genuine AOG fighters or whether there were alternate narratives, which would result in no real impact on the security paradigm in the province.

ANSF/IMF were active this period, with at least 11 documented



operations in Ghazni, Dih Yak and Gelan, which resulted in 3 AOG killed (incl. a mid-level commander in Gelan) and another 2 arrested. Besides weapons and ammunition seizures, an air strike was reported in Muqur destroying AOG VHF equipment. Most significantly on the security forces side was the ground operation supported by air assets that allowed ANSF/IMF to recapture the district centre of Nawa (on the 23<sup>rd</sup>) that had been under AOG total control over the past four years.

The recapture of the DAC area of Nawa seems to be another sign of concentration of military efforts on populated areas such as district centres (for all parties involved in the conflict) but also an attempt to re-establish the GOA presence in district.

## NIMROZ

|                    | NGO Incidents |
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
ANSF/IMF operations and cases of what appears to be targeted killings were featured this reporting period in Nimroz.

In Ghor Ghor city, a local civilian was killed by unknown armed men in the Bazaar area (allegedly over a family dispute), and 2 similar incidents were reported in Zaranj City involving ANSF personnel. On 16 January, an NDS employee was shot dead in Dost Mohammad area, while an ANP official was wounded by small arms fire 6 days later also in the city.

Similar to other southern areas, Zaranj had already experienced cases (although sporadic) of tar-

geted killings in the past, which were mainly related to business or family disputes. Although the victims of these recent cases were GOA employees, the incidents, according to local sources, appear to be related to criminal activity rather than the result of genuine AOG activity or political targeting.

As mentioned previously, ANSF/IMF operations continued throughout this period, and not surprisingly, these continued to be focused on the most unstable district of Nimroz - Khash Rod (which is also frequently used by AOGs active in Helmand as a



support base). These operations resulted in the reported deaths of 7 AOG fighters and the destruction of an IED making facility. Also noteworthy, one of these operations caused a reported 3 civilian fatalities (in Khair Abad Village) and subsequently triggered a moderately sized demonstration against frequently IMF night raids, which have been the subject of frequent demonstrations and frustration across the country.



**Afghanistan NGO Safety Office**  
Analysis & Advice for Humanitarians

**INFO+**

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### PROVINCES NOT INCLUDED THIS PERIOD:

ANSO did not provide analysis for the following areas:



These areas will be included in subsequent reports. If you have any information that would help us better understand the dynamics, please contact your local ANSO office.

ANSO is overseen by an NGO Advisory Board. If you have any questions or feedback, good or bad, let them know on:

[Advisoryboard.afg@ngosafety.org](mailto:Advisoryboard.afg@ngosafety.org)

NGO can register up to five persons to each of ANSO mailing lists. For a registration form please contact:

[Registration.afg@ngosafety.org](mailto:Registration.afg@ngosafety.org)



ANSO REGIONAL DIVISIONS

### COMMON ACRONYMS

**ACG**-Armed Criminal Group / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised militias) / **DC**-District Centre / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **IMF**-International Military Forces / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device / **PDO**-Private Development Organisation / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police / **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative / **IEA**-Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-District Shadow Governor (IEA) / **PGM** - Pro-Government Militia / **APRP** - Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program