

Refugee Review Tribunal

AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

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This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

1. What role is the JVP playing as part of the ruling power in Sri Lanka?
2. Is there a succinct/recent country summary of party/composition of the present government?
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RESPONSE

1. What role is the JVP playing as part of the ruling power in Sri Lanka?

A *Colombo Page* article dated 16 May 2006 indicates that following the resignation of a JVP Member of Parliament for health reasons, the JVP “currently has the strength of 38 parliamentary seats” in Sri Lanka’s parliament (‘JVP loses one seat in Sri Lanka Parliament’ 2006, *Colombo Page*, 16 May <http://www.colombopage.com/archive/May16130544SL.html> – Accessed 25 May 2006 – Attachment 1).

An article dated 1 May 2006 by the Economist Intelligence Unit refers to “the marginalisation of hard-line Sinhalese and Buddhist parties—the Marxist Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, People’s Liberation Front) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU, National Heritage Party)” that Sri Lanka’s President Mahinda Rajapakse “had relied on to secure the presidency.” The article indicates that “violence between government forces and the rebel LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] has risen significantly” since Mr Rajapakse became president in November 2005, and notes that:

the latest escalation of violence might be related to the Tigers' concerns about Mr Rajapakse's growing authority, and the marginalisation of hard-line Sinhalese and Buddhist parties—the Marxist Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, People's Liberation Front) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU, National Heritage Party)—that he had relied on to secure the presidency. These parties are strongly opposed both to negotiating with the LTTE and to the terms of the ceasefire, which they contend are too soft on the Tamil separatists. The influence of the JVP and JHU in the ruling United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) provided the LTTE with the justification to castigate the government for inflexibility. But there are signs that Mr Rajapakse's more moderate wing might be gaining the upper hand.

Local elections held on March 31st were the biggest indication of this. Of 266 local council seats up for election the UPFA won 225, while Mr Wickremesinghe's opposition United National Party won 33. The JVP, expecting a considerable swing in its favour, insisted on campaigning separately even though it is part of the UPFA. This tactic backfired when the party managed only to retain the single seat it won in 2002.

The victory for Mr Rajapakse's coalition seemed to justify his bid to pursue negotiations with the LTTE, particularly as he had campaigned personally in the run-up to the polls, which were presented more or less as a referendum on his tactics for dealing with the ethnic conflict. (It is true that local elections usually see a large swing to the ruling party, as local councils rely on the central government for the distribution of funds, but the fact that the JVP fared so poorly, despite expending considerable resources on its campaign, suggests its hatred of the LTTE is not as widespread or popular as it thought.)

Before the April 25th suicide attack [on Sri Lanka's army headquarters in Colombo] Mr Rajapakse might therefore have been emboldened to pursue a more moderate line against the LTTE—or even perhaps to call parliamentary elections in an effort to reduce the government's reliance in the legislature on the JVP and JHU. This apparent position of strength might have been behind the LTTE's wariness about proceeding with peace talks, or even its decision to step up its violations of the ceasefire, in an effort to provoke a harder-line response: such an audacious attack will clearly strengthen the position of hawks in the Sinhalese political establishment ('Politics: Blowing up, again' 2006, *Economist Intelligence Unit – Business Asia*, 1 May – Attachment 2).

An article dated 2 April 2006 in the *Asian Tribune* also refers to the poor result for the JVP in the Sri Lankan local government elections. According to the article:

The LG election results would have come as an unwelcome shock to the JVP. The JVP overestimated its strength and its appeal – an error it has made in the past, to its cost and peril. According to some reports it expected to win around 50 councils; as things turned out it won only one, Tissamaharama. The JVP seemed to have managed to retain its vote base of 2001 but not to expand it. Obviously the majority of the electorate does not trust the JVP to run even local councils yet, perhaps because it is yet to demonstrate its capacity and willingness to transform itself from a party of protest to a party of government. The JVP adopted a rather confrontationalist stand vis-à-vis the government in the final couple of weeks of the campaign and it is possible that some of the voters (who may have voted for the JVP otherwise) would have felt that strengthening the JVP would be tantamount to destabilising the government.

The article also indicates that the results of the local government election “demonstrate that it is in the interests of both the PA [People's Alliance] and the JVP to stay together, or at least to contest together. Sans the alliance the PA will not be able to get a majority in a parliamentary election while the JVP's number of seats will go down drastically if it contests alone. For both parties it is a case of united we stand and divided we both lose” (Gunasekara, Tisarane 2006, 'Sri Lanka: Electoral exposes', *Asian Tribune*, 2 April – Attachment 3).

A RRT research response dated 20 February 2006 includes information on the status of the JVP in the current government and provides details of the number of JVP members in Sri Lanka's parliament at that time (RRT Country Research 2006, *Research Response LKA17796*, 20 February – Attachment 4). The response refers to another RRT research response dated 16 December 2005, which provides information on the status of the JVP in Sri Lanka and its relationship with the current government (RRT Country Research 2005, *Research Response LKA17718*, 16 December – Attachment 5).

2. Is there a succinct/recent country summary of party/composition of the present government?

The final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to Sri Lanka's parliamentary elections in April 2004 indicates that the main political parties and coalitions in the 2004 election included the UPFA, which consisted "of the former People's Alliance party (PA), the JVP and a range of leftist and smaller parties, including the NUA" [National Unity Alliance], which is described as "one of the two officially recognised parties representing the Muslim minority community". The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) represented "the main force within the alliance." The report notes that the UPFA coalition won 105 of the 225 seats in Sri Lanka's parliament at the election and "managed to form a minority government." Of the 105 UPFA seats, 62 seats were won by the SLFP and 39 seats by the JVP (European Union Election Observation Mission 2004, 'Sri Lanka – Parliamentary Elections 2 April 2004 – Final Report', European Commission website, 17 June, pp 10 & 24-25

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/sri_lanka/final_%20report04.pdf – Accessed 2 June 2006 – Attachment 6).

According to the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office Country Profile of Sri Lanka, the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC) joined the government in September 2004, giving the government a small majority. However, in June 2005, the JVP had "left the Government after the President's decision to sign a post-tsunami funding arrangement with the LTTE." In presidential elections held on 17 November 2005, "Mahinda Rajapakse (SLFP) was elected President with 50.3% of the vote." Rajapakse "appointed a new ministerial team on 23 November. The JVP and JHU which supported Rajapakse's candidature decided not to join the Government. The SLFP will therefore be a minority administration" (UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2006, 'Country Profile: Sri Lanka', UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office website, 18 May

<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1019041599186> – Accessed 31 May 2006

– Attachment 7). An article dated 18 December 2005 on the World Socialist Web Site notes that the CWC had been "part of the previous United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) government but defected to the opposition prior to the November 17 presidential election." The article also refers to the newly elected President Rajapakse, seeking "to shore up his weak minority government" and attempting to woo "at least a segment of the CWC back onto the government parliamentary benches" ('Sri Lanka: police raids against CWC leaders' 2005, *World Socialist Web Site*, 18 December – Attachment 8).

According to a subsequent article dated 2 May 2006, almost all of "the key political forces in Sri Lanka have pledged their unconditional support to President Mahinda Rajapaksa's government, informed sources said." The article indicates that the JVP, JHU, CWC and Sri

Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) had “extended their fullest support for a stable government and vowed to promote a ‘southern consensus’ for a broader political alliance against terrorism” (‘JVP, JHU, CWC, SLMC pledge unconditional support to Sri Lanka government’ 2006, *Colombo Page*, 2 May <http://www.colombopage.com/archive/May2115539RA.html> – Accessed 25 May 2006 – Attachment 9).

An article dated 13 March 2006 in the *Hindustan Times* indicates “that the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), which is currently with the opposition, has decided to give “issue-based” support to the government from outside.” It is stated in the article that:

Sri Lanka’s Muslim parties and leaders are rallying round President Mahinda Rajapaksa, given his growing popularity and the weakening of the opposition United National Party (UNP).

The most significant development is that the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), which is currently with the opposition, has decided to give “issue-based” support to the government from outside. In effect, it is going to be an ally (Balachandran, PK 2006, ‘All for Tamils, nothing for Muslims?’, *Hindustan Times*, 13 March – Attachment 10).

Another article dated 26 January 2006 indicates that Sri Lanka’s President Rajapakse had “secured the defections of four opposition legislators and rewarded them with cabinet portfolios, the government said.” The defections of the four UNP MPs helped “the president to reduce his dependency on” the JVP (‘Sri Lankan president wins new support with defections’ 2006, *Agence France-Presse*, 26 January – Attachment 11).

The previously mentioned RRT research response dated 16 December 2005 includes information on the JVP’s relationship with the current government (RRT Country Research 2005, *Research Response LKA17718*, 16 December – Attachment 5).

3. Is there a succinct/recent country summary of party/composition of the opposition parties?

The final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission to Sri Lanka’s parliamentary elections in April 2004 indicates that the United National Front (UNF) coalition, which included the United National Party (UNP), the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), lost the April 2004 election to the UPFA coalition. The UNF won 82 seats at the election (European Union Election Observation Mission 2004, ‘Sri Lanka – Parliamentary Elections 2 April 2004 – Final Report’, European Commission website, 17 June, pp 10 & 25 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_observ/sri_lanka/final_%20report04.pdf – Accessed 2 June 2006 – Attachment 6).

In relation to the above-mentioned parties, the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office Country Profile of Sri Lanka indicates that the CWC joined the government in September 2004, giving the government a small majority (UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2006, ‘Country Profile: Sri Lanka’, UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office website, 18 May <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1019041599186> – Accessed 31 May 2006 – Attachment 7). The article dated 18 December 2005 on the World Socialist Web Site indicates that the CWC had subsequently defected from the UPFA government “to the opposition prior to the November 17 presidential election” (‘Sri Lanka: police raids against CWC leaders’ 2005, *World Socialist Web Site*, 18 December – Attachment 8).

The previously mentioned *Hindustan Times* article dated 13 March 2006 indicates “that the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), which is currently with the opposition, has decided to give “issue-based” support to the government from outside. In effect, it is going to be an ally” (Balachandran, PK 2006, ‘All for Tamils, nothing for Muslims?’, *Hindustan Times*, 13 March – Attachment 10).

The more recent *Colombo Page* article dated 2 May 2006, which refers to “informed sources” saying that almost all of “the key political forces in Sri Lanka have pledged their unconditional support to President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government”, mentions the CWC and SLMC as two of the parties that had “extended their fullest support for a stable government and vowed to promote a ‘southern consensus’ for a broader political alliance against terrorism” (‘JVP, JHU, CWC, SLMC pledge unconditional support to Sri Lanka government’ 2006, *Colombo Page*, 2 May <http://www.colombopage.com/archive/May2115539RA.html> – Accessed 25 May 2006 – Attachment 9).

In relation to the UNP, the *Agence France-Presse* article dated 26 January 2006 refers to the UNP as “the main opposition” in Sri Lanka. The article also indicates that four MPs from the UNP had defected to the government (‘Sri Lankan president wins new support with defections’ 2006, *Agence France-Presse*, 26 January – Attachment 11).

4. What is the present status of the UNP?

As previously mentioned, the final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission to Sri Lanka’s parliamentary elections in April 2004 indicates that the UNP was part of the UNF coalition that lost the 2004 election to the UPFA. The UNF won 82 seats at the election (European Union Election Observation Mission 2004, ‘Sri Lanka – Parliamentary Elections 2 April 2004 – Final Report’, European Commission website, 17 June, pp 10 & 25 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_observ/sri_lanka/final_%20report04.pdf – Accessed 2 June 2006 – Attachment 6).

According to the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office Country Profile of Sri Lanka, in the Sri Lanka presidential elections held on 17 November 2005, “Mahinda Rajapakse (SLFP) was elected President with 50.3% of the vote. UNP candidate and Leader of the Opposition, Ranil Wickremesinghe took 48.4%” (UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2006, ‘Country Profile: Sri Lanka’, UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office website, 18 May <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1019041599186> – Accessed 31 May 2006 – Attachment 7).

The previously mentioned *Asian Tribune* article dated 2 April 2006 notes that the success of the UPFA in the recent local government elections in Sri Lanka was not unprecedented as “ruling parties usually win local government elections when the government is new and the voters still nurse expectations.” In relation to the UNP, it is stated in the article that:

The UNP’s defeat too is far from surprising. The UNP expected to lose. It also conducted a lacklustre campaign. The state of the party coffers is as bad as the state of the party’s morale; the elephant is plagued by internal problems and the abandonment by its ally, CWC, at the last moment worsened the party’s woes. A change in the leadership may have buoyed the

party, but with Ranil Wickremesinghe still at the helm (looking the very picture of dejected incapacity) the party's inability to come out of the doldrums and perform is hardly surprising. It is not unreasonable to assume that a significant segments of the absent voters (if not the majority) are UNPers, convinced of defeat and too disheartened to make an effort to turn the things around (Gunasekara, Tisarane 2006, 'Sri Lanka: Electoral exposes', *Asian Tribune*, 2 April – Attachment 3).

Another article dated 2 April 2006 indicates that a dissident group from the UNP "might cross over provided the government change its policies, a leading UNP parliamentarian said." Mahinda Wijesekara had said that the group could "consider supporting the government or even contesting elections as an alliance". However, President Rajapaksa "should move away from Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and Jathika Hela Urumaya to secure their support". Wijesekara, who had been accused "of criticising the UNP and party leadership" by UNP leader Ranil Wickramasinghe, had been removed "from the UNP Working Committee and the co-leadership of Matara district" ('Sri Lanka: Govt. urged to sack the JVP' 2006, *BBC Sinhala*, 2 April – Attachment 12).

According to an article dated 14 March 2006, the UNP's assistant secretary had said that after the March local election, the UNP was "to undertake serious reforms". The narrow defeat in the November 2005 presidential election had "caused serious defections of seniors as well as grassroots activists to the ruling United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA)." The assistant secretary had said that the UNP would reform its policies and vision and introduce new blood "to the grassroots by sacking inefficient electoral organizers." UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, who had "resisted calls to step down from leadership with the presidential election defeat", had "agreed to broaden the base of the party's policy and decision making process in response to criticism of his style of leadership" ('Sri Lanka's main opposition party to undergo reforms' 2006, *Xinhua News Agency*, 14 March – Attachment 13).

As previously mentioned, an article dated 26 January 2006 indicates that four MPs from the UNP had defected to the government ('Sri Lankan president wins new support with defections' 2006, *Agence France-Presse*, 26 January – Attachment 11).

5. Is there any evidence to indicate that the JVP wants to harm UNP supporters?

A search of the sources consulted found limited reference to information in relation to recent violence by JVP supporters against UNP supporters. An article dated 20 March 2006 indicates that UNP MP, Bandula Gunawardene, had accused the JVP of carrying "out several attacks on" UNP supporters. "The latest attack has been at Homagama where a house of a UNPer has been attacked, damaging it seriously. According to Mr. Gunawardene only a pregnant mother and a child had been inside the house during the attack." Gunawardene had "accused the police of acting in a biased way in handling the case by arresting the UNP member whose house was attacked" ('JVP trying to incite people: Bandula' 2006, South Asian Media Net website, source: Daily Mirror, 20 March http://www.southasianmedia.net/Archive_full.cfm?nid=279087 – Accessed 26 May 2006 – Attachment 14).

A media release dated 15 March 2006 by the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence refers to a clash between JVP and UNP supporters in Akuressa town on 13 March 2006. It was "reported that a group of UNP supporters had assaulted JVP supporters over an incident where supporters of the JVP were accused by the former of pasting their posters over UNP campaign posters", and that "Mr. Chandana Priyantha, UNP supporter and Local Government

Election candidate had sustained injuries over the clash and is undergoing treatment in Karapitiya Hospital.” Each party had said that their supporters were assaulted by the supporters of the other party in the incident and both parties had complained to the police (Centre for Monitoring Election Violence 2006, ‘JVP-UNP Clash in Akuressa Town – 13-03-06’ in ‘Media Communique on Election-related Violence, Local Government Elections – 2006, 15th March 2006 – 1st Media Release’, Centre for Policy Alternatives website, 15 March http://www.cpalanka.org/cmev_15th_Mar_2006.html – Accessed 26 May 2006 – Attachment 15).

The previously mentioned RRT research response dated 20 February 2006 includes information on the nature of the JVP, whether it has chosen the parliamentary path or the war path and whether it has been involved in revenge killings against Sinhalese and former members over the past decade (RRT Country Research 2006, *Research Response LKA17796*, 20 February – Attachment 4).

The RRT research response dated 16 December 2005 includes articles that refer to attacks on JVP supporters by UNP supporters (RRT Country Research 2005, *Research Response LKA17718*, 16 December – Attachment 5).

6. Is the JVP against the peace process?

According to an article dated 29 May 2006, JVP leader Mr Somawansa Amarasinghe had said that “We adhere to only one peace. It is not the peace that of EU, Norway or SLMM. We recognize a peace that is multi-national, multi-religious and multi-cultured in a democratic unitary state”. Mr Amarasinghe had also said that sacrifices had “to be done to defeat terrorism. For this we are ready to sacrifice anything, said the JVP leader.” He had “added that the NGOs who work for separatism has put forward a UN peace keeping force after discussing with the Tigers. He said this situation should be defeated immediately” (‘Tiger terrorism should be defeated by hook or by crook – JVP’ 2006, LankaTruth website, 29 May http://www.lankatruth.com/full_story/2006/May/20060529/20060529_13.htm – Accessed 30 May 2006 – Attachment 16).

The previously mentioned article dated 1 May 2006 by the Economist Intelligence Unit notes that the JVP and JHU are both “strongly opposed both to negotiating with the LTTE and to the terms of the ceasefire, which they contend are too soft on the Tamil separatists” (‘Politics: Blowing up, again’ 2006, *Economist Intelligence Unit – Business Asia*, 1 May – Attachment 2).

An article dated 14 March 2006 indicates that since the presidential election in November 2005, “the JVP and Rajapakse have disagreed on the government’s peace policy with the Tamil Tigers -- more so on the Norwegian peace facilitation.” It is stated in the article that:

The JVP wants the Norwegians excluded from the process alleging that the Nordic country was biased towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebels.

Rajapakse, however, continues to obtain the Norwegian services in his attempts to achieve peace with the rebels (‘Sri Lanka gov’t ally not to rock boat despite differences’ 2006, *Xinhua News Agency*, 14 March – Attachment 17).

Both the RRT research response dated 20 February 2006 (RRT Country Research 2006, *Research Response LKA17796*, 20 February – Attachment 4), and the research response dated 16 December 2005 (RRT Country Research 2005, *Research Response LKA17718*, 16

December – Attachment 5), include articles that refer to the JVP's opposition to the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE.

7. Is there a recent report on treatment of Muslim Tamils in Sri Lanka?

The previously mentioned *Hindustan Times* article dated 13 March 2006 indicates “that the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), which is currently with the opposition, has decided to give “issue-based” support to the government from outside.” However, the article also notes that “the consolidation of the Muslims behind the Rajapaksa government is unlikely to result in solutions for the basic issues confronting the community”, being issues that “relate to the political aspirations and the security of the Muslims in the eastern districts of Sri Lanka, namely, Amparai, Batticaloa and Trincomalee.” There, “the community’s aspirations are thwarted and its security is threatened by the Tamil militant group, the LTTE” (Balachandran, PK 2006, ‘All for Tamils, nothing for Muslims?’, *Hindustan Times*, 13 March – Attachment 10).

An Amnesty International report dated 3 February 2006 includes information on the human rights situation of the Muslim community in eastern Sri Lanka. According to the report:

There is a long history of distrust between the Tamil and Muslim communities living in the east of Sri Lanka... There has been a partial improvement in the relationship since the CFA [ceasefire agreement] as the LTTE has sought to assure the Muslim community that it does not pose a threat to them. As tensions in the east have escalated Muslims have faced serious violence. For example, a grenade attack on a mosque in Akkaraippattu, Batticaloa district, on 18 November 2005 killed four people and injured more than twenty. It is not clear who was responsible for this attack.

The Muslim communities that Amnesty International delegates met with in Ampara and Batticaloa districts all reported incidents of harassment by the LTTE and expressed concern that the insecure security environment following the LTTE split and the deterioration in the peace process have increased their vulnerability. Some Muslims reported feeling threatened by both the government and the LTTE. One man in Kalmunai, Ampara district, told Amnesty International delegates, “In Ampara nobody has security. The Sinhalese are afraid of the LTTE, the Tamils are afraid of the government and the Muslims are afraid of both.” In addition, Muslim representatives expressed frustration at their exclusion from the peace negotiations... and their lack of equal inclusion in Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure...

Muslim leaders alleged that their communities face a variety of threats and abuses, primarily from the LTTE. They reported that Muslim businesspeople have been warned by the LTTE not to do business in Tamil areas and that, due to the worsening security situation, Muslim farmers no longer feel safe to spend the night in their paddy fields as they used to. They reported widespread extortion by the LTTE, for example being forced to pay “taxes” on any timber that they cut. However, Muslim communities allege discrimination also by the local government authorities. Some representatives described how in July 2005, when a man from their community died, the district authorities refused to allow them to bury the body in the graveyard that they had previously used, saying that their burial rights had been withdrawn. While Amnesty International is not aware whether the local government had a legitimate reason for withdrawing the burial rights, it is clear that this community believes it to be an act of discrimination.

...By far the biggest concern that the Muslim community expressed was regarding land. The issue of land has long been highly contentious and has fuelled much of the conflict among the

three communities in the east. All three communities have in the past experienced displacement and loss of land due to conflict and have had their land encroached by other communities. For example, a substantial Sinhalese population was moved into the east by the Sri Lankan authorities, resulting in others being pushed from their land, while Muslim communities have also been driven away from their agricultural land in the interior and towards the coast by LTTE activities. Each community has deeply felt grievances regarding land.

The existing tension over land has been greatly exacerbated by the tsunami and the government's policy of relocation of all of those who lived within 200 metres from the average high water line... Each community told Amnesty International of their concern that others will use the relocation as an opportunity for further "land grabbing". This was most strongly expressed by the Muslim community in Batticaloa district, which was greatly concerned that the LTTE are using tsunami relocation to settle Tamil populations on what they claim is traditionally Muslim land. However, LTTE representatives also told Amnesty International that both Muslim and Sinhalese communities are using the tsunami relocation to settle what they claim is traditionally Tamil land (Amnesty International 2006, *Sri Lanka: A Climate of Fear in the East*, AI Index: ASA 37/001/2006, 3 February – Attachment 18).

A RRT research response dated 1 February 2005 includes information on whether there is discrimination against Muslims in Sri Lanka (RRT Country Research 2005, *Research Response LKA23512*, 1 February – Attachment 19).

List of Sources Consulted

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Centre for Policy Alternatives website www.cpalanka.org

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Amnesty International website www.amnesty.org

Human Rights Watch website www.hrw.org

UNHCR *REFWORLD* UNHCR Refugee Information Online

Databases:

Public	<i>FACTIVA</i>	Reuters Business Briefing
DIMA	<i>BACIS</i>	Country Information
	<i>REFINFO</i>	IRBDC Research Responses (Canada)
RRT	<i>ISYS</i>	RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State <i>Country Reports on Human Rights Practices</i> .
RRT Library	<i>FIRST</i>	RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. 'JVP loses one seat in Sri Lanka Parliament' 2006, *Colombo Page*, 16 May. (<http://www.colombopage.com/archive/May16130544SL.html> – Accessed 25 May 2006)
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8. 'Sri Lanka: police raids against CWC leaders' 2005, *World Socialist Web Site*, 18 December. (CISNET Sri Lanka CX143070)
9. 'JVP, JHU, CWC, SLMC pledge unconditional support to Sri Lanka government' 2006, *Colombo Page*, 2 May. (<http://www.colombopage.com/archive/May2115539RA.html> – Accessed 25 May 2006)
10. Balachandran, PK 2006, 'All for Tamils, nothing for Muslims?', *Hindustan Times*, 13 March. (FACTIVA)
11. 'Sri Lankan president wins new support with defections' 2006, *Agence France-Presse*, 26 January. (FACTIVA)
12. 'Sri Lanka: Govt. urged to sack the JVP' 2006, *BBC Sinhala*, 2 April. (CISNET Sri Lanka CX152378)
13. 'Sri Lanka's main opposition party to undergo reforms' 2006, *Xinhua News Agency*, 14 March. (FACTIVA)
14. 'JVP trying to incite people: Bandula' 2006, South Asian Media Net website, source: Daily Mirror, 20 March. (http://www.southasianmedia.net/Archive_full.cfm?nid=279087 – Accessed 26 May 2006)
15. Centre for Monitoring Election Violence 2006, 'JVP-UNP Clash in Akuressa Town – 13-03-06' in 'Media Communique on Election-related Violence, Local Government Elections – 2006, 15th March 2006 – 1st Media Release', Centre for Policy Alternatives website, 15 March. (http://www.cpalanka.org/cmev_15th_Mar_2006.html – Accessed 26 May 2006)

16. 'Tiger terrorism should be defeated by hook or by crook – JVP' 2006, LankaTruth website, 29 May.
(http://www.lankatruth.com/full_story/2006/May/20060529/20060529_13.htm – Accessed 30 May 2006)

17. 'Sri Lanka gov't ally not to rock boat despite differences' 2006, *Xinhua News Agency*, 14 March. (FACTIVA)

18. Amnesty International 2006, *Sri Lanka: A Climate of Fear in the East*, AI Index: ASA 37/001/2006, 3 February.

19. RRT Country Research 2005, *Research Response LKA23512*, 1 February.