ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

December 2016
Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan

December 2016

Report to Congress

Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $234,000 in Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017. This includes $22,000 in expenses and $211,000 in labor.

Generated on November 3, 2016
Ref ID: 5-C4C5E62
This report is submitted in accordance with Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291) as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92). This report includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, as well as a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report is the fourth in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2017, and it was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State.

This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1 through November 30, 2016. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress, and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2016, to May 31, 2017.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have shown promising but inconsistent progress as they near the end of their third year in the lead for security of their country and the second year maintaining full security responsibility with limited U.S. or coalition support on the battlefield. During the June 1 to November 30, 2016, reporting period, the ANDSF effectively executed their 2016 summer campaign plan, Operation Shafaq; capability gaps in key areas such as intelligence, aviation, and logistics are improving but still hinder effectiveness. The ANDSF retained control of major population areas and quickly responded to and reversed any Taliban gains.

The United States currently maintains a force posture of up to 9,800 military personnel in Afghanistan. Based on an assessment of the security conditions and the strength of Afghan forces, President Obama announced on July 6, 2016, that the United States will draw down to approximately 8,400 military personnel by January 2017, rather than to 5,500 military personnel as he previously announced in October 2015. The force presence of 8,400 military personnel will allow United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to continue to conduct two well-defined and complementary missions: supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda, its associates, and other terrorist groups such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) affiliate in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region, ISIL – Khorasan (ISIL-K); and training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support (RS) mission.

The President’s July 2016 decision reaffirms the U.S. Government’s enduring commitment to the ANDSF, to the Afghan Government, and most importantly to the Afghan people. The decision also recognizes that the ANDSF will require more time and assistance to develop into an effective, sustainable, and affordable force that can protect the Afghan people and contribute to regional and international security. During this reporting period, 39 NATO Allies and partner nations and the broader international community also reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan. This commitment includes continued support to the RS mission both through continued financial contributions to the ANDSF as well as to economic development announced at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July and the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan in October 2016 respectively.

THREAT ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY CONDITIONS

The ANDSF continue to face a resilient insurgency and a myriad of terrorist and criminal networks; however, the Afghan Government remains in control of all major population centers and key lines of communication. The Taliban did not achieve any of the stated campaign objectives of its 2016 summer campaign, Operation Omari. Taliban territorial gains during this reporting period were fleeting, as the ANDSF consistently retook district centers and population

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1 Per the reporting requirement outlined in section 1213 of the NDAA for FY 2016, this report does not contain an assessment of the risks to the mission in Afghanistan of such a drawdown, because there was no drawdown of U.S. forces during this reporting period.

2 ISIL is also known by its Arabic name “Daesh” or as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
areas within days of a loss. Although security conditions vary across the provinces, the Taliban have exploited their localized and temporary successes by portraying these events as major strategic shifts through the use of social media and other public information campaigns.

Consistent with historical trends, overall levels of violence increased during the traditional 2016 spring and summer fighting season with a brief lull during Ramadan (June 5 to July 6, 2016). Reported casualties for both the ANSF and the Taliban continued their upward trend from the previous two reporting periods. The increase in ANDSF casualties can be attributed, in part, to an increase in the number of insurgent attacks on fixed ANDSF positions including inadequately protected checkpoints. Insurgent fighting in urban areas and continued use of high-profile attacks contributed to the trend of high civilian casualties seen in the last several reporting periods. Women and children also continue to be affected disproportionately by the conflict.

The ANDSF largely repelled insurgent attacks in Helmand Province and several attempts to isolate Kunduz City in July, August, and October 2016. Although the ANDSF experienced minor setbacks during these and other insurgent offensives, they frequently regained lost terrain. Between June and August 2016, violence in Nangarhar Province was higher than usual, primarily due to Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and coalition efforts to disrupt and degrade ISIL-K. The number of high-profile attacks in Kabul was lower than during the same time period last year; however, insurgents did perpetrate several attacks that garnered public attention, including attacks on the American University of Kabul in August and on the Ministry of Defense (MoD) headquarters in September 2016.

Following the May 21, 2016, death of Mullah Mansour, the Taliban quickly appointed Mullah Haybatullah Akhundzada as their leader. Since then, the Taliban have largely coalesced around Haybatullah with limited public fracturing or dissension. Haybatullah’s appointment has not had a major effect – either positive or negative – on the Taliban’s operational effectiveness.

Although al Qaeda’s core leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region has been degraded, elements continue to seek safe haven on both sides of the border to regenerate and conduct attack planning. The continued development of an al Qaeda affiliate in the region, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), highlights the dynamic nature of the region’s terrorist and militant landscape, posing risks to the mission and to U.S. interests.

ISIL-K continues to focus on establishing itself in Nangarhar Province in the east, although ASSF counterterrorism operations and ANDSF clearing operations – with USFOR-A enabling support – have diminished ISIL-K’s ability to build a base of support. In addition, ISIL-K’s aggressive targeting of Taliban elements in the area and its use of harsh tactics similar to ISIL’s core in Iraq and Syria, have alienated the group from the local population. Although ISIL-K’s operational capacity has diminished, U.S. and Afghan forces remain focused against the group.

Consistent mid-level military-to-military dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan on specific issues, such as the shared threat from ISIL-K, and occasional discussions at higher levels of the military and government early in the reporting period, were encouraging. At the same time, militant groups, including Taliban and Haqqani senior leadership, retained safe havens inside Pakistani territory. Sustained Pakistani efforts to disrupt active Haqqani Network threats were
not observed during the reporting period. The United States continues to be clear with Pakistan about steps it should take to improve the security environment and deny safe havens to terrorist and extremist groups.

Cross-border firing incidents in June and July 2016 at the Torkham Gate border crossing have also complicated efforts to increase Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation on both peace and reconciliation and counterterrorism issues. Despite these and other complications, the United States continues to support an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process for a negotiated resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan, and is working with international partners, to set conditions for a peaceful political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban and other militant groups. On September 22, 2016, the Afghan government signed a peace agreement with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin group, demonstrating the potential for insurgent groups to participate in an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned political reconciliation process.

**ANDSF DEVELOPMENT**

The ANDSF effectively executed their 2016 spring and summer campaign plan and largely maintained their commitment to implementing key reforms and operational imperatives as part of a sustainable security strategy to allocate forces across the country more effectively. This progress was most evident in late August and October 2016 when the ANDSF repelled several major Taliban attacks against provincial capitals in several parts of the country, quickly retaking lost territory from the Taliban. Although the ANDSF denied the insurgency any strategic successes, the ANDSF have also demonstrated the need for continued U.S. and coalition support to address persistent capability gaps and deficiencies.

Despite an increasingly offensive-oriented strategy, the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) offensive maneuver capability is still limited. The ANDSF also lack a mature operational readiness cycle to ensure forces are well-rested and well-trained before returning to combat. During Operation *Shafaq*, corruption and the ANDSF’s limited logistics and personnel management capabilities hindered their ability to make lasting gains in reducing insurgent influence in various parts of the country.

ANDSF capabilities in aviation, logistics, combined arms operations and conducting offensive clearing operations continue to improve, but the ANDSF require further development before they can consistently pressure the insurgency. ANA-ANP coordination for planning processes and for major, offensive cross-pillar operations have also showed modest improvement. ANA corps are better utilizing their organic indirect fires, including mortars and D-30 howitzers, and increasingly integrating ground-based fires with aerial fires from the Afghan Air Force (AAF). The Afghan National Police (ANP) are becoming more effective at exercising command and control over ANP pillars within their regions, but areas such as personnel accountability remain key deficiencies. Ministry of Interior (MoI) reforms also continued to help address Afghan Local Police (ALP) personnel accountability and effectiveness shortcomings. In addition, ANP and ALP personnel continue to abandon static checkpoints more frequently than ANA personnel due to leadership deficiencies and threats of Taliban attacks on vulnerable checkpoints.

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3 Cross-pillar refers to operations or activities in which more than one ANDSF force component (e.g., ANA, ANP, ASSF), or pillar, participates.
The ASSF remain the most capable element of the Afghan forces and one of the best special operations forces in the region. Although U.S. forces often provide enabling support to the ASSF for counterterrorism operations, the ASSF are capable of conducting independent operations using their organic intelligence and aviation assets. Because of ASSF proficiency, the ANDSF frequently misuses ASSF elements for more conventional missions, which degrades the ASSF’s operational readiness.

The AAF’s capability to provide airlift, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and organic aerial fires continue to improve as the Department of Defense (DoD) fields more aircraft to the AAF and as its pilots and crews gain operational experience. With the fielding of 12 additional MD-530 attack helicopters during the reporting period and several more months of operational employment of the A-29 light attack aircraft, the AAF demonstrated increasing effectiveness in providing aerial fires in support of ANA ground forces. The use of A-29s and MD-530s in particular were critical to the success of ANDSF offensive clearing operations during Operation Shafaq. After a little more than six months of conducting combat operations, the ANDSF is proving increasingly effective at integrating the A-29 into operations. The AAF is also working more closely with the ANA to improve aerial fires integration through the further development of Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATAC).

Disparity among Afghan leadership at all levels continues to result in inconsistent progress among the ANA corps and ANP zones. When the MoD, MoI, and ANDSF leadership are actively involved, competent, and not corrupt, the Afghans have made solid progress in implementing and sustaining needed reforms to improve ANDSF capabilities. After leadership changes during this reporting period, several corps have conducted effective cross-pillar operations, commanders have increased operational effectiveness by integrating combat enablers into operations, and senior ministry officials have demonstrated foresight in strategic management and provision of support to the ANDSF. In contrast, in ANA corps where leadership is weak or corrupt on a consistent basis, and in many parts of the MoI and ANP, capabilities often lag or regress, hindering overall operational capability and impeding progress on instituting transparent and accountable systems and processes.

MINISTERIAL CAPACITY

RS continues to develop the MoD’s and MoI’s capacity and capability to support the ANDSF. Although both ministries have shown steady, demonstrable progress in improving their ability to manage complex processes like procurement and budgeting, their support to the ANDSF in other areas such as logistics, maintenance, and personnel management remains deficient. Inefficient inventory management and supply distribution processes degrades the operational readiness of both ANA and ANP units. RS advisors are assisting the MoD and the MoI to develop plans to regenerate ANDSF combat and policing capability as the MoD and the MoI transition from the

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4 CASEVAC is typically conducted in a non-standard vehicle and may or may not provide care en route to a medical facility. MEDEVAC is typically conducted in a dedicated medical vehicle that has equipment designed to provide care en route to a medical facility.

5 ATACs are responsible for aircraft coordination, airspace de-confliction, and oversight of the proper procedures for employment of aerial fires in close proximity to ANDSF ground forces.
2016 summer to the 2016-2017 winter campaign plan. Although still in its nascent stages, RS is working closely with the MoD and the MoI to establish and implement an operational readiness cycle within each ministry.

Since moving into its new headquarters building in Kabul early in 2016, the MoD continues to improve internal synchronization and coordination. The MoD and General Staff (GS) leadership were committed to executing Operation Shafaq effectively and largely adhered to the campaign plan. In addition, MoD-level support to strategic communication efforts for the campaign and in response to major events demonstrated growing capacity in this area. Despite modest progress, the MoD’s use of systems and processes to prosecute allegations of gross violations of human rights (GVHR) and investigations and reporting processes for instances of corruption remains problematic and insufficient given the number of allegations.

Although the MoI re-established the ANP zone headquarters to address command and control issues within the ANP, the MoI has not sufficiently empowered, supplied, or staffed all of the zone headquarters. As a result, each ANP zone headquarters varies in effectiveness. Despite the MoI establishing a number of initiatives to address corruption within its own ranks more effectively, such as the Transparency and Accountability in Law Enforcement Committee and improving the MoI Inspector General (IG) fuel and ammunition inspection programs, progress remains limited. Conversely, the MoI has made more progress in its execution of anti- and counter-corruption policing activities through the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), which has proven itself to be an effective investigations body. The MCTF frequently investigates corrupt senior leaders for prosecution and refers them to the Attorney General’s Office (AGO). The MoI continues to demonstrate a willingness and ability to integrate women into the ANP; MoI efforts have been more successful than similar MoD efforts with the ANA and the AAF.

Developing improved cross-ministerial coordination remains a work in progress but there have been some signs of improvement during this reporting period. For example, as a result of greater communication and coordination at the ministerial level on ANDSF strategic and operational planning processes, all of the ANDSF pillars worked well together when conducting larger, cross-pillar offensive operations as part of Operation Shafaq throughout the summer. The Operations Coordination Centers at the regional (OCC-R) and provincial (OCC-P) level continue to be underutilized as cross-pillar coordination mechanisms. However, MoD-MoI and ANA-ANP coordination on intelligence has improved as the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF continue to capitalize on the growing capability of Afghan intelligence organizations including the Nasrat (a national-level intelligence fusion center). At the tactical level, ANA and ANP coordination continues to suffer due to poor communication among lower level commanders, mistrust between pillars, informal relationships based off of political patronage or local power dynamics, and insufficient ANA support to ANP checkpoints or positions that come under insurgent attack.

**ANDSF FUNDING**

The ANDSF continue to be funded primarily by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), a DoD appropriation. For FY 2016, Congress appropriated $3.65 billion in ASFF. For FY 2017, DoD requested $3.45 billion. At the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, the majority of NATO member states and RS operational partners agreed to continue their national contributions
to the financial sustainment of the ANDSF until the end of 2020 at or near the level of their previous financial pledges. Combined contributions total approximately $900 million per year.

In addition to U.S. and international financial support, the Afghan Government is committed to contributing to funding the ANDSF. This commitment is critical to sustaining international donor confidence and support. Although President Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, and the Afghan Government remain committed to increasing their government’s contributions to security costs over time, current economic growth rates suggest that the Afghan Government will require significant U.S. and international security assistance funding for the foreseeable future.

ANDSF security assistance funding from the United States and international donors, coupled with Afghan Government funding, remains critical to mission success. In order to maintain donor confidence and improve Afghan ministerial capacity simultaneously, the RS train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission focuses on appropriate and effective oversight of ANDSF funding. The coalition, through Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), continues to implement extensive controls and oversight measures including independent audits and conditions on the use of donor-provided funds, enforce transparency and accountability, and further enable Afghan financial management within the MoD, the MoI, and the Ministry of Finance. The Afghan Government has also pledged to continue pursuing anti-corruption reforms and promoting transparency and accountability to ensure the effective use of U.S. and international funding.

LOOKING AHEAD

Just as the ANDSF demonstrated their ability to build upon progress made in 2015, the ANDSF are again incorporating lessons learned from the 2016 summer campaign plan, Operation Shafaq, as they plan for the 2016-2017 winter campaign plan, Operation Shafaq II. Because of greater RS and Afghan leadership emphasis on personnel management, collective training, and increased readiness rates throughout this reporting period, the 2016-2017 winter campaign can build upon positive momentum to ensure the ANDSF sufficiently regenerate their combat and policing capability moving into 2017.

Although the Afghan Government faced many political challenges throughout this reporting period, the United States and the international community continue to view the Afghan Government as a credible partner capable of providing leadership on key issues and implementing needed reforms to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of the Afghan security institutions. The United States, its NATO Allies, and its operational partners remain committed to partnership with the Afghan government and will continue to support the Afghan people as the United States pursues its national security interests in regional stability and counterterrorism, with the ultimate goal of a sovereign, secure, stable, and unified Afghanistan.
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The United States currently maintains approximately 9,800 military personnel in Afghanistan as part of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). In July 2016, President Obama announced that the United States will draw down to approximately 8,400 military personnel in Afghanistan by January 2017, rather than down to 5,500 as previously announced. These personnel will maintain a presence at a small number of bases in Kabul and Bagram with regional outstations, including in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province in the east, and Kandahar Province in the south.

This presence enables a platform that will allow the United States both to pursue counterterrorism targets and to develop the ANDSF further, capitalizing on the effectiveness demonstrated by increased expeditionary advising teams that provide tailored support to the regional ANDSF commands for both enduring and emergent capability gaps. This posture reflects a consolidation of U.S. forces and takes advantage of efficiencies gained by working with and sharing functions with coalition partners and the ANDSF.

1.1 U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan remains centered on working with NATO Allies, operational partners, and the international community to provide financial and advisory support to the Afghan Government to enable a well-trained, equipped, and sustainable ANDSF that provides security in Afghanistan; and on continuing efforts to defeat the remnants of core al Qaeda and disrupt other extremist groups, such as ISIL-K, to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorist groups to plan and execute attacks against the United States, U.S. persons overseas, or allies and partners.

The U.S. and Afghan Governments agree that the best way to ensure lasting peace and security in Afghanistan is reconciliation and a political settlement with the Taliban. The United States continues to support an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned reconciliation process as the surest path to peace in Afghanistan and supports any process that includes violent extremist groups laying down their arms. The success of an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process will require the Taliban and other armed opposition groups to end violence, break ties with international terrorist groups, and accept Afghan constitutional safeguards for women and ethnic minorities. As the Afghan Government works toward this end with the Taliban and other groups, developing ANDSF capabilities, improving MoD and MoI capacity, and supporting Afghan leadership are critical to enabling the Afghan Government to secure the country against a persistent insurgent threat. In a positive sign of the potential for insurgent groups to accept and to participate in an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process, on September 22, 2016, the Afghan Government signed a peace agreement with the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin group.

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1.2 U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

As part of his July 2016 announcement, the President reaffirmed that the current U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are to disrupt threats posed by al Qaeda, support the ANDSF, and give the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. In early 2016, the President expanded U.S. counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan to include targeting ISIL-K as part of the broader fight against ISIL. The ultimate goal of U.S. and international efforts is a sovereign, secure, stable, and unified Afghanistan.

To achieve U.S. objectives and build upon the gains of the last 15 years, USFOR-A is conducting two well-defined and complementary missions with support from the Afghan Government and the Afghan people. First, through OFS, U.S. forces are continuing the counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda and its associates and against ISIL-K in Afghanistan to prevent the resurgence and external plotting of terrorist groups against the homeland and U.S. targets and interests in the region. Second, in coordination with NATO Allies and operational partner nations, U.S. forces are conducting a TAA mission to continue building the capabilities and long-term sustainability of the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI. The U.S. supports the institutionalization of ANDSF gains by conducting functionally based security force assistance (SFA) as part of the NATO-led RS mission. U.S. and coalition forces conduct TAA efforts at the ANA corps level, the ANP zone level, and with MoD and the MoI to improve their ability to support and sustain the fighting force. Reflecting the importance of building Afghan aviation and special operations capabilities, U.S. and coalition forces also TAA the AAF and special operations units at the tactical level.

To support these two specific missions and to support the ANDSF more effectively, President Obama approved additional operational authorities for U.S. military personnel serving in Afghanistan. These new authorities address additional limited circumstances in which U.S. forces may accompany or provide combat enabler support to the ANDSF; they expand the aperture through which U.S. forces can support conventional Afghan forces in their fight against the Taliban. Specifically, the additional flexibility provides greater opportunities for U.S. forces to support Afghan conventional forces proactively in two critical ways: providing more enabling support, especially through close air support; and by accompanying and advising Afghan conventional forces on the ground and in the air.

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8 Functionally based SFA is a term developed by ISAF in 2013 to describe its shift to a primary emphasis on capacity building as its combat mission was winding down. According to the RS Security Force Assistance Guide 3.12, SFA is defined as a unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Fundamental guidance for joint forces conducting SFA is published in Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance, April 29, 2013. According to this document, SFA consists of “Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions” (Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, July 12, 2010). The activities described as SFA, particularly the advisory effort focused on “essential functions,” are elements of security cooperation activities normally defined by NATO and DoD as defense institution reform and defense institution building.

1.3 U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

U.S. counterterrorism efforts remain focused on the defeat of al Qaeda and its associates, protecting U.S. forces, and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists to plan attacks against the U.S. homeland and against U.S. interests and partners. Counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan have helped to ensure that there has not been another major terrorist attack against the U.S. homeland since September 11, 2001. However, the existence of other extremist groups in Afghanistan, such as ISIL-K, requires a U.S. presence in the region that can monitor and address threats, even as the United States builds an Afghan capability to deter terrorist exploitation of Afghan territory.

In early 2016 the President authorized U.S. forces to target individuals based on their status as members of ISIL-K in order to disrupt and degrade the group’s ability to threaten U.S., coalition, and Afghan Government interests. Previously, U.S. forces were only authorized to take direct action against members of ISIL-K if they posed an imminent threat to U.S. or coalition forces or took a direct part in hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces. Degrading ISIL-K is part of the U.S. global effort to counter ISIL. In addition to U.S. unilateral efforts, USFOR-A is enabling the ANDSF to conduct independent operations against ISIL-K and is encouraging more robust intelligence and operational cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other regional partners to impede the spread of the organization.

As a matter of international law, the United States remains in an armed conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, and against ISIL. The United States continues to rely on the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force and the President’s constitutional authority as the Commander in Chief as its domestic legal basis for the use of force when required. Beyond operations in support of the counterterrorism mission and enabler support to the ANDSF in limited circumstances, U.S. forces no longer engage in offensive combat operations in Afghanistan; in particular, the United States does not conduct offensive operations against members of the Taliban or members of the Taliban-led insurgency. However, U.S. forces may take appropriate action against those groups or individuals that imminently threaten or directly participate in hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces regardless of their membership in a particular terrorist or extremist group.

The U.S. counterterrorism mission complements the TAA mission to build the capacity of the ANDSF. Limited U.S. direct counterterrorism action, coupled with a stronger and increasingly capable ANDSF, will help preserve the security gains to date and contribute to a robust, enduring counterterrorism partnership. The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) supports U.S. counterterrorism efforts by training, advising, and assisting the ASSF and accompanying them on certain operations. The ASSF will continue to conduct operations throughout the country using their growing organic capabilities to address both insurgent and transnational threats. The focus of SOJTF-A TAA efforts remains building the ASSF’s capacity in logistics, command and control, intelligence analysis and sharing, aviation, and interoperability between the ASSF and conventional forces.
1.4 NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

The RS mission remains focused on training, advising, and assisting the ANSF, the MoD, and the MoI in all aspects of their ability to achieve and maintain a stable Afghanistan. At the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, RS Allies and operational partners agreed to sustain the RS mission beyond 2016. Although the United States will decrease the U.S. military presence by January 2017 from 9,800 forces to approximately 8,400 forces, the United States will continue to provide approximately the same number of forces to the RS mission in 2017 and consult with NATO Allies and operational partners about the requirements of the RS mission to ensure that the U.S. and NATO missions are mutually supportive.

The RS mission is based on a limited regional TAA approach and is currently executed through geographic and functional (e.g. aviation) “spokes” at coalition train, advise, and assist commands (TAAC) in the north, south, east, west, and the capital. In addition to the TAAC in Kabul, the central “hub” includes the RS headquarters and ministerial advisors. The United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey serve as “framework nations,” each leading a regional TAAC and responsible for coordinating support and capabilities within its respective command region. In a change from the previous reporting period, TAA efforts to ANDSF pillars in the southeast and southwest that were previously overseen by two regional Advise and Assist Cells are now being conducted by two regional task forces, TF Anvil and TF Forge.

The regional TAACs persistently cover four of the six ANA corps as well as the associated regional ANP zone headquarters. The two task forces oversee expeditionary advising with the ANA 203rd and 215th Corps and ANP Zone 303 and Zone 505. The TAACs and the task forces serve as the principal connections between the ministries and fielded forces. They play a central role in the coalition’s ability to assess the efficacy of its ministerial advising efforts, determine how well the ministries support ongoing ANDSF security operations, and provide an outer ring of security for the coalition. In support of this mission, and because the ANDSF will have key enabler gaps in the near term, coalition forces provide limited non-combat enabling support, primarily intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) to the ANDSF as the Afghans continue to field and develop their organic capabilities. In addition, the United States can provide aerial fires in support of the ANDSF in specific circumstances through OFS.

The RS mission is refining its construct to improve its ability to address ANDSF capability gaps. The commitment, troop contributions, and pledges of NATO Allies and operational partners at the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw gave the coalition both the time and resources to make this change. The RS mission will retain its limited regional approach with the TAACs and TFs aligned with the regional ANA corps and ANP zones. To assist with ANDSF capability development across the country, the coalition is increasingly relying upon expeditionary advising teams that provide immediate, focused, and tailored TAA support to the ANDSF for both

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9 NATO launched its non-combat RS Mission on January 1, 2015, following the conclusion of the previous NATO-led combat mission of ISAF and the assumption of full security responsibility by the ANDSF. The legal framework for the NATO presence in Afghanistan is provided by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which entered into force on January 1, 2015. The SOFA prescribes the terms and conditions under which NATO forces will be deployed in Afghanistan.
enduring and emergent capability gaps. As RS refines the mission construct, TAA efforts in the
central “hub” focused on developing the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI will continue.

As of November 30, 2016, RS was composed of military personnel from 39 nations (26 NATO
Allies and 13 operational partner nations), consisting of 10,981 NATO and 1,630 partner
personnel, totalling 12,611 personnel (see Figure 1). The United States remains the largest force
contributor in Afghanistan.

**Figure 1: Resolute Support Mission Troop Contributing Nations, as of November 30, 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Non-NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>18</td>
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* Numbers of personnel are approximate as they change daily.

**Functional Advising**

The cornerstone of the RS mission is functionally based SFA, an advisory effort focused on
developing functions, systems, processes, and organizational development connected between
the ministry and operational levels. Military and civilian advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on three levels of advising:

- **Level One:** Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a continuous, usually daily, basis from either a joint workspace or through daily meetings and phone conversations.

- **Level Two:** Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a less frequent basis (determined by commanders) to ensure their continued development. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to and capability of their Afghan counterpart, the threat level to advisors, and coalition resources.

- **Level Three:** Advisors are not co-located with their Afghan counterparts and train, advise, and assist their Afghan counterparts from a centralized location. Expeditionary advising teams and visits are planned and coordinated with Afghan counterparts to assist periodically in terms of operations and sustainment.

U.S. and coalition advisors focus the TAA mission within the MoD and the MoI on generating, employing, and sustaining capabilities within the ANDSF; advising extends to the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters levels. Unlike the previous International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, which focused primarily on combat operations with a secondary focus on generating, training, and equipping the ANDSF and building ministry capacity, the main effort for RS is ministry and ANDSF capacity-building at the national and regional levels.

The RS mission focuses on eight essential functions (EFs) and associated sub-functions, as well as gender integration efforts, in order to develop a capable and sustainable MoD, MoI, and ANDSF. A U.S. or coalition general officer, or a member of the DoD Senior Executive Service, is typically the lead for each of the eight EFs. RS advisors focus their efforts on building a responsible and efficient MoD and MoI that can support an effective, sustainable, affordable, and credible ANDSF capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan. In addition to the EF structures, during this reporting period, DoD, in concert with USFOR-A, began establishing pools of former advisors and regional and functional experts to provide additional expertise and support to functional advisory efforts at the ministerial level.

**Essential Function 1: Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute**

EF 1 has three priorities: increase resource management capability within the ministries; build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and set conditions to sustain an effective ANDSF in the future. Resource management includes formulating a defense strategy, generating requirements by determining the products and services that need to be purchased to support that strategy, developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements, executing a spend plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget, and monitoring the status of funds expended. Advising efforts in this area are focused on enhancing resource management and procurement capability in accordance with Afghan laws, policies, and regulations; assisting with
the drafting and execution of annual funding commitment letters;\textsuperscript{10} and helping the Afghans with the initial integration of various Afghan personnel management and payroll systems into the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS).\textsuperscript{11} During this reporting period, EF 1 underwent a restructuring and it now includes additional elements of CSTC-A, including the Contracting Execution Cell. This reorganization optimizes finance, budget, and procurement TAA efforts and enhances the opportunities for efficiencies and synergy across EF 1 and other advising directorates.

\textbf{Essential Function 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight}

Ensuring third-party oversight of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process is an international community-stipulated requirement for continued funding. EF 2 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help improve internal controls, as well as to maintain accountability and oversight to help improve transparency and positively effect oversight of Afghan financial and non-financial processes, including those pertaining to fuel and salaries. CSTC-A continues to administer measures, such as financial commitment letters that establish performance expectations and implement internal controls over all aspects of resource management, to help ensure the Afghan Government’s proper use of funds from the United States and international donors. EF 2 supports the Inspectors General in the MoD and the MoI and their staffs in the development and implementation of the Counter and Anti-Corruption Plan, including the Ministerial Internal Control Program (MICP) and Annual Inspection Plans.

\textbf{Essential Function 3: Civilian Governance of the Afghan Security Institutions and Adherence to Rule of Law}

In order to provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan’s institutions of governance, the ANDSF must operate effectively and respect human rights. EF 3 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help ensure the ANDSF respect and adhere to the rule of law and operate in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. Efforts focus primarily on assisting the ANDSF to prevent and, when necessary, respond properly to GVHRs, such as extra-judicial killings, and significant acts of corruption. RS advisors continue to engage with all levels of ANDSF leadership to reinforce the importance of preventing and responding to GVHRs and all types of human rights violations – not only to maintain long-term viability, but also to retain U.S. and coalition assistance to the ANDSF.

\textbf{Essential Function 4: Force Generation}

EF 4 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and the

\textsuperscript{10} CSTC-A commitment letters stipulate how the MoD and the MoI can allocate funding for the Afghan fiscal year and under what conditions CSTC-A will provide funding. CSTC-A commitment letters also identify various legal constraints, such as the Berry Amendment and the Leahy law, that apply to U.S. funding.

\textsuperscript{11} APPS is an enterprise resource planning system that will integrate existing MoD and MoI systems for personnel management and payroll into a single platform providing timely and accurate accountability of all personnel, including civilians, within the MoD and the MoI.
ANP utilize the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and place qualified personnel into assignments based on force requirements. The force generation TAA mission is grounded in an interconnected and mutually supportive five-fold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANSF build more professional forces. The RS Capabilities Development Directorate works closely with EF 4 advisors to assist the MoD and the MoI as they develop their official personnel and equipment requirements through the tashkil development process.

**Essential Function 5: Sustain the Force**

EF 5 advisors work to help the ANSF sustain combat power through the development of appropriate maintenance, medical support, and logistics systems. The primary focus of EF 5 is assisting the ANP and the ANA in logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons, predominantly at the ANA corps, ANP zone, and national levels to help them support an affordable and sustainable ANDSF. Advisors in EF 5 also assist the ANP and ANA on points of injury care, ground medical evacuation, medical logistics, medical equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. Additionally, EF 5 advisors work with the Afghans on communication, information, and infrastructure to develop a sustainable communication network. The RS Combined Joint Engineering team also provides support through engineering TAA efforts in support of ANDSF sustainment.

**Essential Function 6: Plan, Resource, and Execute Effective Security Campaigns**

EF 6 advisors work to help the ANSF effectively employ all elements of the ANDSF in support of the Afghan Government. It is divided into two parts: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. In support of developing strategic planning and policy, advisors assist strategic planning efforts at the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC), the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts develop the capability of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives. The strategic guidance and objectives that are developed are in turn translated into operational and seasonal security campaign plans.

**Essential Function 7: Develop Sufficient Intelligence Capabilities and Processes**

EF 7 advisors work to help the ANDSF develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence, the ANA GS G2 (Intelligence Directorate), the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI), and the Afghan National Threat Intelligence Center, also known as the Nasrat. The goal of this effort is to help the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations. RS intelligence

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12 Tashkil means “organization” in Dari and refers to the official list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MoD and MoI to detail authorized staff positions and equipment items for each unit.

13 The DPI tasks and coordinates intelligence at a basic level, produces analysis and intelligence products capable of informing senior MoI leaders and shaping MoI operations, and effectively targets terrorist and criminal networks through the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC).
advisors work at the national and regional levels to mature Afghan intelligence capabilities, work with analysts as they learn to prepare intelligence estimates in support of military and policing plans and strategies, and help the ANA and the ANP field expanded ISR capabilities. Additionally, advisors assist the ANP and ANA intelligence schools’ development of instructors to train future intelligence personnel. EF 7 has four main lines of effort: intelligence integration with operations, intelligence cycle development, training self-sufficiency, and sustainment of intelligence capabilities.

**Essential Function 8: Maintain Internal and External Strategic Communication Capability**

EF 8 advisors work with the Afghan Government to help develop counter-insurgent messaging and offer a positive narrative to both the Afghan people and the international community. Advisors help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice, both within their own organizations and externally. EF 8 advisors focus on bridging gaps and overcoming challenges to improved communication within the MoD, the MoI, and the ANSF while continuing to reinforce successes and look for opportunities for improvement. Building the MoD and the MoI strategic communication capability depends more on developing human capital and institutionalizing processes than on managing resources or developing technical systems.

**Resolute Support Gender Office**

The RS Gender Office seeks to train, advise, and assist Afghan leadership to ensure that an appropriate gender perspective is incorporated into all policy and strategy planning within the security ministries and into policy implementation at the ANA corps and ANP zone levels. The RS Gender Office is considered a “stand alone” advising directorate, though each EF has a gender focal point as gender issues are integral to the efforts of each EF. Recognizing this interdependency, gender issues are included in all major RS briefings and forums with senior RS and Afghan leaders. The RS Gender Office supports the Afghan Government as it implements the Afghan constitutional guarantee of equal rights to men and women,14 as well as Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), which addresses the inordinate impact of war on women and the role women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Commands and Regional Task Forces**15

RS advisors conduct their TAA mission with the ANDSF at the ANA corps and ANP zone levels through the TAACs and the regional task forces. The four coalition framework nations maintain a central “hub” in Kabul and regional presence in four “spokes” in the north, south, east, and west regions of the country through the TAACs. Turkey leads TAAC-Capital (TAAC-C) in the Kabul area, the United States leads TAAC-East (TAAC-E) and TAAC-South (TAAC-S), Italy leads TAAC-West (TAAC-W), and Germany leads TAAC-North (TAAC-N). Personnel at each TAAC conduct training and provide advice and assistance to their Afghan counterparts depending on the need identified by the coalition and their Afghan partners. In addition, TF

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15 Additional information on each TAAC’s activities can be found throughout the report.
Forge and TF Anvil provide oversight of expeditionary advising efforts that support the ANA corps and the ANP zones in the southeast and southwest formerly covered by regional Advise and Assist Cells to ensure full coverage of all ANA corps and ANP zones. Finally, TAAC-Air provides TAA support to the AAF.

The TAACs and TFs verify and validate Afghan reporting at the ANA corps and ANP zone level, while reinforcing the importance of building and improving the systems and processes that support combat operations. With the re-establishment of the ANP zones, the TAACs and TFs are focusing TAA support at the ANP zone headquarters level rather than at the provincial police headquarters level. TFs Anvil and Forge have also proven successful at strengthening relationships among the MoD, the MoI, the ANA corps, and the ANP zones in areas without a persistent coalition presence. RS relies on the TFs and their expeditionary advising teams\textsuperscript{16} to maintain progress in building Afghan capabilities in select parts of the country.

\textit{Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital}

TAAC-C, which includes Kabul Province (except Sarobi District), provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 111th Capital Division, ANP Zone 101 / Kabul City Police, Afghan Border Police (ABP), and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) elements operating in Kabul. Turkish forces lead the TAA effort with forces from several additional contributing nations. TAAC-C maintains Level 1 advising with the ANA 111\textsuperscript{th} Capital Division and Level 1 and 2 advising with ANP Zone 101 and the Kabul City Police.

\textit{Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East}

TAAC-E, which includes U.S. and Polish forces, covers the provinces of Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, and Nuristan. TAAC-E provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 201\textsuperscript{st} Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 202. TAAC-E maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

\textit{Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South}

TAAC-S, led by U.S. forces, includes the provinces of Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul. TAAC-S provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 205\textsuperscript{th} Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 404. TAAC-S maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

\textit{Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West}

TAAC-W, led by Italian forces, includes Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat provinces. TAAC-W provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 207\textsuperscript{th} Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 606. TAAC-W maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

\textsuperscript{16} Expeditionary advising teams are composed of a mission command cell to provide command and control for the advising effort; the team is further augmented by select functional advisors as appropriate.
Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North

TAAC-N, led by German forces, includes the provinces of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e-Pul, and Takhar. However, current TAA efforts are limited primarily to the Mazar-e-Sharif area. TAAC-N provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 209th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zones 707 and 808. TAAC-N maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

Task Force Forge and Task Force Anvil

TF Forge oversees expeditionary TAA efforts in support of the ANA 215th Corps and ANP Zone 505. TF Anvil oversees expeditionary TAA efforts in support of the ANA 203rd and ANP Zone 303. Expeditionary advising efforts will focus on sustained ANDSF progress in performing the eight EFs, assisting with typical warfighting and policing functions and operations, or to address other enduring or emergent ANDSF capability gaps as appropriate.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air

TAAC-Air, led by U.S. forces, is a functional command that covers all of Afghanistan. RS advisors provide functionally based SFA to the AAF from the ministerial level down to the wing, group, and squadron level. TAAC-Air’s advising priorities for this reporting period included ensuring the timely flow of human capital into formal training programs, improving operational level command and control, encouraging AAF force management and a flying hours program, improving in-country maintenance and logistics, and developing and fully integrating aviation platforms including the MD-530 and A-29.

1.5 INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS

Assessments of MoD and MoI progress are built around the completion of mutually agreed processes or outcomes between the coalition and the associated ministry. Each EF lead is accountable for progress in ministerial development through actions identified in a program of actions and milestones (PoAM) developed in conjunction with Afghan counterparts in the MoD and the MoI. The PoAMs consist of five categories of information: essential function, system, organization, process, and action. Annex A lists the indicators of effectiveness for the MoD and the MoI under each PoAM.

The leader of each EF identifies critical processes in order to develop milestones and measure progress for their EF. These processes are completed over time by the execution of a series of supporting actions or tasks that achieve the desired effect or preclude undesired effects. Progress toward each milestone is dependent upon the progress made within each of the listed actions or tasks. A five-stage capability and effectiveness scale (see Figure 2) is used to rate overall ministerial progress on actions and milestones, and the associated series of tasks listed in each EF PoAM.
Levels three through five are based on a combination of focused advising and reporting, data-informed assessments, and the professional judgement and subjective assessment of the EF lead. Each EF directorate maintains and updates their PoAM assessments using the tracking methodology maintained by the RS SFA Center, which is responsible for the integration, coordination, management, and synchronization of functionally based SFA across the coalition.

Every six months, the SFA Center and EF directorates refine the PoAMs to ensure they accurately project the ministries’ ability to achieve functional milestones. After an assessment of the PoAMs completed in October 2016, each EF adjusted its respective PoAM to reflect the current operating environment, mission progress, and development of the MoD and the MoI.

The TAAC and TF commanders account for ANDSF progress at the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters level through the Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report (MAAR). The MAAR tracks ANDSF capability development by assessing their progress along the five pillars of leadership, combined arms operations, command and control, personnel and training, and sustainment. Similar to the PoAMs, the MAAR has five capability and effectiveness ratings.

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17 In addition to the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters, the MAAR also provides an assessment of the AAF headquarters, ANASOC division headquarters, the Ktah Khas at the kandak level, Special Mission Wing (SMW) headquarters, General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) headquarters, and the ALP Staff Directorate within the MoI.

18 The NATO Special Operations Forces Military Assistance Handbook (July 2014) states that Leadership is the ability of the commander and subordinate leaders (including staff primaries) to demonstrate a mastery of their functional area, and provide purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish all assigned tasks and missions while being accountable for their actions and responsibilities. Combined arms operations is the ability to field and integrate new systems and develop the capability to bring all available forces, assets, and enabler systems to bear effectively. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over all assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Personnel and training is the ability to conduct individual and collective mission-focused training, institutional training, and to assess and maintain proficiency on all critical tasks. Sustainment is the ability to sustain training and operational missions independently.
The MAAR is one component of the larger RS assessment; it reflects the advisors’ assessment of the ANDSF at the headquarters level. On May 1, 2016, RS revised the MAAR overall capability rating definition levels (see Figure 2 above) to mirror those used in the PoAM capability and effectiveness scale, to enhance unity of effort within the EFs and other RS advising directorates, and to align coalition assessment metrics more effectively.

Advisors at the regional TAACs submit their monthly assessments of ANDSF capabilities to the Afghan Assessment Group within RS, which then synthesizes them into an overarching assessment of the ANDSF as it relates to the campaign plan. MoD and MoI advisors use the EF milestone assessments along with the ministerial leadership’s strategic priorities to develop their focus areas for TAA efforts. Assessments of ANDSF progress on achieving milestones are conducted continuously, and are collected by the SFA Center on a monthly basis. Each month, the EF leads provide their assessments to the RS senior advisors to the MoD and the MoI, and synchronize TAA efforts across the multiple functional areas of focus. The Afghan Assessment Group and the SFA Center continuously determine methods to improve and streamline reporting and assessment processes. Despite changes to the milestones in the PoAMs, the MAAR assessment methodology, or advisor reporting mechanisms, the strategic conditions for the success of the RS mission have not changed.
SECTION 2 – THREAT ASSESSMENT

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from both the Afghan insurgency and extremist networks, including the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and to a lesser extent al Qaeda, and other insurgent and extremist groups, which continue to attempt to reassert their authority and prominence. These pervasive insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks constitute a threat to Afghanistan’s stability. Revenue from opium trafficking continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks have increased in some areas of Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for various groups. These include the Taliban, al Qaeda, AQIS, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISIL-K, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. This sanctuary and these groups remain a security challenge for both countries and pose a threat to regional stability and security.

2.1 IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

The Afghan Government’s relationship with Pakistan remains a critical aspect of enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan. Since the beginning of President Ghani’s tenure, leaders from both countries have generally made a concerted effort to improve relations and better address mutual security interests, such as the threat from various extremist groups that reside in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Addressing long-term issues associated with the large Afghan refugee population in Pakistan also continues to hamstring bilateral relations. The United States continues to work closely with international partners to set conditions for an eventual Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process for a negotiated resolution of the conflict and peaceful political settlement. During this reporting period, progress has been limited in advancing a potential peace process.

Attacks in Afghanistan attributed to Pakistan-based militant networks continue to undermine the bilateral relationship more than any other issue. Efforts to increase military collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan are critical to maintaining pressure on militant and terrorist groups to address the enduring security challenges and eliminate terrorist safe havens on both sides of the border. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations deteriorated following a major Haqqani Network attack against a National Directorate of Security (NDS) building in Kabul on April 19, 2016, and continued to do so as tensions over construction at the Torkham Gate border crossing in June 2016 led to exchanges of gunfire that resulted in casualties to both Afghan and Pakistani military personnel.

Despite these clashes and other tensions, Afghanistan and Pakistan have taken cautious steps toward improving the bilateral relationship. Multiple high-level engagements have produced efforts to deescalate border tensions, attempts to advance political reconciliation talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, and fostered greater military-to-military cooperation. For example, Afghanistan and Pakistan have established a high-level mechanism for deescalating border tension, though it is still being implemented slowly. The first working level meeting of the mechanism occurred on July 26, 2016 in Kabul, Afghanistan, and both sides agreed to meet
again. RS also continues to facilitate bilateral cooperation through its Tripartite Joint Operations Center. Meetings focus on shared interests such as countering the threat from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the threat from ISIL-K, and continued discussions to establish a Bilateral Military Coordination Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).

Afghan-oriented militant groups, including Taliban and Haqqani Network senior leadership, retain freedom of action from safe havens inside Pakistani territory. The United States continues to be clear with Pakistan about steps it should take to improve the security environment and deny safe havens to terrorist and extremist groups.

2.2 CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS

The security situation in Afghanistan continues to face a resilient insurgency. However, after their second year with full security responsibility for their country with limited U.S. and coalition support, Afghan forces have shown determination and continued capability growth in their fight against the Taliban-led insurgency. The Afghan Government retains control of Kabul, major population centers, transit routes, provincial capitals, and a vast majority of district centers. Meanwhile, the Taliban continue to contest district centers, threaten provincial capitals, and temporarily seize main lines of communication throughout the country, especially in high priority areas like Kunduz City and Helmand Province. As of late September 2016, RS assessed that the Taliban had control or influence over approximately 10 percent of the population and was contesting the Afghan Government for control of at least another 20 percent.

The ANDSF are generally capable and effective at protecting major population centers, preventing the Taliban from maintaining prolonged control of specific areas, and at responding to Taliban attacks. This was most evident in late August and early October 2016 when the Taliban attempted to conduct several major attacks against major population centers including in Jani Khel, Tarin Kowt, Achin, Lashkar Gah, and Kunduz, and the ANDSF successfully repelled them or frequently retook any territory that was lost. At the same time, the Taliban have proven capable of taking rural areas, returning to areas after the ANDSF have cleared but not maintained a holding presence, and conducting attacks that undermine public confidence in the Afghan Government’s ability to provide security. Both the ANDSF and the Taliban sustained higher reported casualties this reporting period.

The Taliban and other insurgent groups continue to perpetrate high-profile attacks, particularly in the capital region, to attract media attention, create the perception of insecurity, and undercut the legitimacy of the Afghan government. From June 1 to November 30, 2016, there were 10 high-profile attacks in Kabul, a modest decrease from the same time period in 2015. The 10 high-profile attacks in Kabul included an attack on the American University in Afghanistan on August 25, 2016, that killed 7 students, 3 ANP, and 2 security guards, as well as a set of twin bombings outside the Afghan MoD headquarters building on September 5, 2016, that resulted in 24 civilian and ANDSF fatalities and more than 90 wounded. Although the number of high-profile attacks decreased during this reporting period, the number of kidnappings for ransom increased, particularly of westerners and non-Afghans.
Both the ANDSF and Taliban operational tempo decreased during Ramadan this year (June 5 to July 6, 2016). The second half of July 2016, however, saw a return to historically normal levels of violence across the country for the summer. Following an elevated level of attacks in 2015, insurgent offensive operational tempo has generally increased, most notably with a 60 percent increase in effective attacks on ANDSF static checkpoints. Insurgents also continue to use social media and other means to portray greater effectiveness, influence, and territorial gains than are actually occurring.

In addition to Helmand Province, Nangarhar Province saw elevated levels of violence this reporting period when compared to other provinces, due primarily to ANA clearing operations and ASSF counterterrorism operations against ISIL-K elements in southern Nangarhar between June and August 2016. Other major changes to security conditions included an increase in violence in both Ghazni and Wardak provinces west of Kabul when compared to the previous reporting period, but Taliban gains in these parts of the country were minimal and fleeting. Similarly, in August and September 2016, Taliban fighters challenged security forces in Uruzgan Province in an attempt to capture, or at least seriously threaten, the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt. Finally, despite Taliban attempts to isolate Kunduz City throughout July, August, and October 2016, the ANA 209th Corps and ASSF pillars maintained control of most district centers across the province and were able to quickly re-take all Taliban gains.

Since late 2015, private militias and other non-state actors have played a more public role in maintaining security in their respective regions – particularly in the north – as there is a tendency for local and provincial government officials and warlords to employ these groups to address local security challenges. In addition, over the last several months the Afghan Government has begun using Afghan Government funds to establish and support local security forces, also known as National Uprising Forces, in rural areas to provide additional security in remote parts of the country. The inclusion of these groups and other non-state entities remains a component of overall security and stability efforts, but raises policy and implementation questions as these groups have limited accountability, regard for human rights, and can exacerbate tribal and ethnic tensions if not properly monitored.

**Threats from Insurgent and Terrorist Groups**

Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. There is a high concentration of terrorist and extremist organizations operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with several known designated organizations operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, creating a complex threat environment.

The Taliban had been able to demonstrate increasing capability to threaten district centers, but the ANSDF have also proven their ability to recover areas lost to the Taliban quickly. Seeking to exploit ANDSF weaknesses and the reduced international military presence, the Taliban are maintaining their control in some rural areas that lack effective Afghan Government representation, continuing a trend since the beginning of the RS mission and OFS. Although al Qaeda’s capacity has been degraded, it still provides some limited support to insurgent groups targeting Afghan and coalition forces. Despite internal fractions within the Taliban and between
the Taliban and ISIL-K, many groups continue to cooperate at the tactical level. These relationships are episodic and often shaped along ideological, religious, tribal, or ethnic lines.

Al Qaeda remains focused on survival, regeneration, and planning and facilitating future attacks, and it remains a threat to the United States and its interests. The organization has a sustained presence concentrated in the east and northeast with smaller elements in the southeast. Some lower- and mid-level Taliban leaders provide limited enabling and facilitation support to al Qaeda, but during this reporting period there have been no signs of a stronger relationship at the strategic level. In addition, al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, AQIS, has built a presence in the south and southeast of Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Whereas al Qaeda continues to recruit from Arab populations, AQIS is composed primarily of militants from within the broader South and Central Asia region.

Of the groups involved in the Taliban-led insurgency, the Haqqani Network remains the greatest threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces and continues to be a critical enabler of al Qaeda. Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani’s role as Taliban deputy has solidified Haqqani influence within the Taliban. Sirajuddin Haqqani’s position has likely allowed the Haqqani Network to increase its area of operations within Afghanistan and provided the Taliban with additional operational and planning capabilities.

Despite a high operational tempo throughout the reporting period, threats to the Taliban’s cohesion impacted the group’s effectiveness and distracted from its focus on the ANDSF, although to a lesser degree than during the previous reporting period. The announcement of Mullah Akhundzada as leader of the movement on May 25, 2016, has not had a negative impact on tactical operations, and cohesiveness among senior leaders has improved compared to levels seen under the former leader Mullah Mansour.

During this reporting period, the Taliban operational tempo was similar to their previous summer campaigns, including a brief lull in June 2016 during Ramadan and an increase in violence after both Ramadan and Eid. Though its operations were largely confined to Helmand and Kunduz provinces, the Taliban conducted attacks nationwide. Several provinces, such as Baghlan Province, remain contested between ANDSF and Taliban control, and are under greater insurgent threat to infrastructure and ground lines of communication and transportation. The Taliban also gained territory in Uruzgan Province in early September 2016; however, the ANDSF quickly retook key areas such as territory surrounding the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt.

ISIL-K has regressed since its operational emergence and initial growth in 2015. Several factors have disrupted ISIL-K’s growth strategy and diminished its operational capacity, including U.S. offensive counterterrorism operations against the group after receiving expanded targeting authorities, ANDSF operations, pressure from the Taliban, and difficulties gaining local community support. During the last reporting period, ISIL-K had a limited presence in six provinces; however, it is now largely confined to a handful of districts in southern Nangarhar. Nonetheless, ISIL-K remains a threat to Afghan and regional security, a threat to U.S. and coalition forces, and retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks in urban centers such as a suicide attack on a mosque in Kabul that killed more than 30 Afghan civilians on November 20, 2016.
ISIL-K is still conducting low-level recruiting and distributing propaganda in various provinces across Afghanistan, but it does not have the ability to conduct multiple operations across the country. Moreover, command and control and funding from core ISIL elements in Iraq and Syria is limited. Rather than relying on external funding, ISIL-K is attempting to develop funding streams within Afghanistan, which has put it into conflict with the Taliban and other groups vying to raise revenue from illegal checkpoints and the trade of illicit goods. ISIL-K continues to draw its members from disaffected TTP fighters, former Afghan Taliban, and other militants who believe that associating with or pledging fealty to ISIL-K will further their interests. On August 12, 2016, the United States confirmed that ISIL-K leader Hafiz Safeed Khan had been killed in an airstrike in July 2016; despite his importance to the group, it is too early to determine the ultimate effect on ISIL-K’s operational capability.

**Security Trends**

From June 1 to November 30, 2016, there were a total of 5,271 effective enemy-initiated attacks, with a monthly average of 79 (see Figure 3). By comparison, the total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks during the same time period last year was 5,822, with a monthly average of 971.

*Figure 3: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks*

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<th>Number of Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks</th>
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Effective enemy-initiated attacks are those enemy-initiated attacks that result in at least one non-insurgent casualty, either killed or wounded.
Reflective of the historical increase in violence during the traditional spring and summer fighting season, the number of reported effective enemy-initiated attacks decreased as the Taliban and the ANSF’s summer campaigns drew to a close. The overall level of reported enemy-initiated attacks during this reporting period was approximately the same as the same time period the previous year. Consistent with the two previous reporting periods and the overall trend since the end of the U.S. and NATO combat missions and the transition to the RS mission, very few reported effective enemy-initiated attacks involved coalition or U.S. forces.

The coalition relies largely on ANSF reporting for all metrics, including effective enemy-initiated attacks, which are a subset of all security incidents. Although the data collected and compiled by the ANSF is still considered useful and is consistent with UN and other sources, coalition analysts continue to refine metrics to assess the security situation accurately.

Direct fire remains by far the largest source of effective enemy-initiated attacks, followed by IED explosions and mine strikes (see Figure 4). Consistent with trends over the last several years, indirect fire and surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) remain the least frequent source of effective enemy-initiated attacks. The number of IED explosions and mine strikes has continued its downward trend over the last two years. This decrease in insurgent use of IEDs is due in part to insurgents facing challenges with financing their IED operations, which require more resources than direct fire attacks. The number of direct fire attacks has grown dramatically, as the Taliban increased attacks on vulnerable ANA and ANP fixed positions.

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20 Reports on security incidents and effective enemy-initiated attacks are often delayed by several weeks due to translation and long reporting timelines through the ANSF chain of command. In addition, ANSF units frequently do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, such as indirect fire or attempted IED explosions that do not wound or kill ANSF personnel.

21 Security incidents comprise all enemy action including enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire, such as mortar, rocket, and artillery; SAFIRE and explosive hazard events including executed attacks (IED explosion, mine strike); and potential or attempted attacks (IEDs or mines found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins). Security incidents do not include friendly action (e.g., direct fire and indirect fire that are initiated by friendly forces). Due to this change in reporting since the ISAF mission, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is the most representative metric of overall security conditions rather than the total number of reported security incidents. This change in reporting metrics for security trends is indicative of the challenges associated with the coalition’s increasing reliance on the ANSF for nearly all types of reporting data.
ANDSF Casualties

ANDSF casualties increased during this reporting period, and total figures increased over those reported during the same time periods in 2015 and 2016. The majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result of direct fire attacks, with IED explosions and mine strikes contributing at a much lower level. ANA casualties were higher than the same period one year ago, with the highest number of casualties occurring in the south and east. Compared to the same time period one year ago, ANP and ALP casualties are slightly lower. Consistent with recent trends, ANP and ALP casualties continue to be higher than ANA casualties.

ANDSF casualties during the traditional spring and summer fighting season have remained at elevated levels since 2014 when they became the lead for security of their country. In addition, ANDSF casualties during the winter season increased each of the last two years. The increase is due largely to very mild winters during the past two years, which have allowed the insurgents greater freedom of movement of personnel and supplies across the country, particularly in remote areas typically less accessible due to harsh winter conditions.

U.S. Casualties and Insider Attacks

Although OFS and RS are designed as non-combat missions, conducting counterterrorism operations and training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF entail risks to U.S. and coalition forces. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, 1,850 U.S.

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22 Additional information on ANDSF casualties can be found in the classified annex to this report.
military personnel have been killed-in-action (KIA) and 20,195 have been wounded-in-action (WIA), as of November 30, 2016. During the reporting period, there were 7 U.S. military KIA and 43 U.S. military WIA. In addition, two U.S. civilians were killed and two were wounded.

On August 23, 2016, a U.S. Army soldier was killed by an IED that detonated near his patrol while conducting dismounted operations near Lashkar Gar, Helmand Province. Additionally, six ANA soldiers and one U.S. soldier were wounded in that attack.

On October 4, 2016, a U.S. Army soldier was killed by an IED while conducting operations with Afghan forces. The mission in Achin District, Nangarhar Province, was conducted as part of a larger USFOR-A counterterrorism mission against ISIL-K.

On November 2, 2016, two U.S. Army soldiers were killed while advising and conducting operations with Afghan forces around Kunduz District, Kunduz Province. Two U.S. Army soldiers were also wounded during the operation.

On November 12, 2016, two U.S. Army soldiers were killed by an IED at Bagram Airfield. Sixteen U.S. service members, one Polish soldier participating in the NATO mission, and two U.S. contractors were also wounded in the attack. An investigation to determine the exact circumstances of the event is ongoing.

During this reporting period, there was one insider attack against U.S. personnel. On October 19, 2016, an ANDSF member fired upon U.S. personnel conducting duties as part of the train, advise, and assist mission. One U.S. military member and one U.S. civilian died as a result of wounds sustained in the attack; one U.S. service member and two U.S. civilians also sustained wounds.

Given the reduced number of insider attacks over the last several years, coalition advisors assess that current force protection measures have been successful in limiting the number of insider attacks (also known as “green-on-blue” attacks), although it is impossible to mitigate all risk to U.S. personnel. Investigation and analysis of insider attacks will continue to shape the coalition’s approach to mitigating the insider threat. RS Headquarters employs Joint Casualty Assessment Teams following any insider attack. These teams seek to determine the causes of the attack quickly, wherever possible, and to identify any lessons learned for immediate dissemination throughout the command. The Joint Casualty Assessment Team report is the foundation for more in-depth analyses conducted by the Insider Threat Assessment Board to determine causation, motivation, and additional lessons learned.

Afghan security forces are at risk for attacks from within their own forces (otherwise known as “green-on-green” attacks). During this reporting period, there were 26 “green-on-green” attacks. RS advisors continue to engage both the MoD and the MoI on the requirement for formal personnel screening to be included in official policy at the national level. Compared to the previous reporting period and to the same time period last year, insider attacks against the ANDSF, and the deaths caused by those attacks, have decreased slightly, though WIA figures have risen.
Civilian Casualties

The RS Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT) collects information on civilian casualties for the coalition; it relies primarily on operational reports from the TAACs and the ANDSF. From June 1 to November 30, 2016, CCMT documented more than 3,700 civilian casualties, of which approximately one third were deaths and two thirds were injuries. This represents an approximately 20 percent decrease compared to the same time period in 2015.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) also tracks civilian casualties. UNAMA’s data from July through September 2016 (their latest available data) reports a higher number of civilian casualties than CCMT data for the same three-month time period, reporting 3,231 civilian casualties, with 961 deaths and 2,270 injured. The difference in total casualties between CCMT and UNAMA is likely attributable to different collection methodologies. Both sources indicate decreasing civilian casualties from July through September 2016 compared to the same time period in 2015. Both sources also report similar percentages of civilian deaths as a component of total casualties documented.

Preventing civilian casualties remains a major concern of the ANDSF, the Afghan government, and U.S. and coalition forces. U.S. and coalition advisors continue to work closely with the Afghan government to reduce civilian casualties by raising awareness of the importance of civilian casualty prevention and mitigation. The coalition is continuing TAA efforts with the ANDSF on practical measures they can adopt at the tactical level to prevent civilian casualties. The Afghan government also continues to host its Civilian Casualty Avoidance and Mitigation Board, with the most recent meeting occurring on August 15, 2016. This board is scheduled to meet quarterly to discuss civilian casualty prevention procedures. In addition, the Afghan government, with coalition support, is developing a national civilian casualty prevention policy. Senior leaders from the MoD, the MoI, and the ONSC have approved the current draft and it is awaiting President Ghani’s approval.

Security of Afghan Women and Girls

During this reporting period, conflict-related violence detracted from the security of Afghan women and girls. In addition to the toll violence takes on civilians, and in particular Afghan women and girls, insurgent groups and other anti-government elements restrict and limit women’s rights and freedom of movement in areas of the country that these groups control. For

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24 UNAMA obtains information through direct site visits to hospitals and medical facilities by locally employed staff, physical examination of evidence gathered at the location of incidents, and information and reports gathered by other UN entities and non-governmental organizations. This collection methodology allows UNAMA to obtain civilian casualty data on women and children, a level of granularity CCMT cannot obtain due to its reliance on ANDSF operational reporting. Despite different collection methodologies, definitions, and terminology, the general trends of civilian casualties are consistent between both UNAMA and CCMT.

25 Information on the security of women and girls addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1531(c)(1)(A) of the FY 2016 NDAA.
instance, in some of these areas UNAMA has documented cases of “justice” punishments administered to women by Taliban shadow courts, often for perceived “moral crimes.” These punishments can be quite severe including lashings and executions.

RS and CCMT do not explicitly track security incidents or effective enemy-initiated attacks that cause casualties to Afghan women and girls. According to UNAMA reporting, over the first half of 2016 anti-government elements such as the Taliban or other terrorist or insurgent groups and pro-government forces caused nearly the same percentage of female civilian fatalities. Moreover, women casualties attributed to pro-government forces – which include Afghan Government funded units outside of the ANDSF or local government-backed militias – increased by more than forty percent. This was likely due to an increased operational tempo throughout the country from all parties to the conflict. Although the available UNAMA data predates the current June 1 through November 30, 2016, reporting period, these data and trends are consistent with other available sources of civilian casualty information for the reporting period.

The Afghan Government recently released the implementation plan and accompanying monitoring and evaluation plan for the National Action Plan (NAP) for Women. The implementation of the NAP has now been budgeted at $39.66 million, of which Afghanistan will contribute $11.32 million, demonstrating Afghanistan’s commitment to implementation. The Afghan Government is determined to increase women’s participation in the security sector and has listed the MoD and the MoI as the implementing agencies for the NAP. Both ministries have formally committed to supporting gender initiatives within each ministry. Although demonstrable progress has been made, such as increasing the number of women sensitive facilities and developing human resource strategies for female recruitment, several initiatives have seen uneven implementation. For example, despite the Afghan cabinet approving an anti-harassment regulation in September 2015, implementation has been uneven and harassment remains a pervasive problem across the country, especially in urban areas.

The MoD and the MoI, working through the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, are finalizing a plan to develop a service that enables external reporting, oversight, training, victim support, and reporting. This organization will enable members of the ANDSF and the broader Afghan population to report gender-based violence and human rights violations anonymously and safely to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, which can take action or assist with law enforcement or legal processes as appropriate. The agency’s proposed budget includes programs for marketing and outreach to all of Afghanistan’s provinces, particularly remote areas where the population has limited access to government services.

2.3 ANTICIPATED SECURITY CONDITIONS

The continued stability of the Afghan Government and the effectiveness of the ANDSF throughout the rest of 2016 and in 2017 will have a significant impact on the future threat environment in Afghanistan. Discord between various political, ethnic, and tribal factions within the Afghan Government, as well as delays in or fallouts from potential parliamentary elections, could be contributing factors to a degradation of the security situation. Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups will present a formidable challenge to Afghan forces as these groups continue offensives into the traditional spring and summer fighting season, and rural areas may remain
contested between Taliban and ANDSF over the next year. During the last two years, the historically reduced tempo of insurgent activity during the winter months has been less pronounced than in previous years. This is largely attributable to mild winters, which facilitated greater insurgent mobility. As of the end of this reporting period, both Taliban and ANDSF operations were expected to decrease somewhat until the start of the 2017 summer campaigns.

The insurgency will continue exploiting vulnerabilities in ANDSF force posture by conducting concentrated attacks. The Taliban are likely to use smaller groupings of fighters as the AAF’s capabilities grow. They will likely use harassing attacks against lightly defended checkpoints, challenge the reach of the ANDSF into rural areas, isolate areas by staging smaller attacks in surrounding areas, and impede ground lines of communication ahead of attacks against district and provincial centers in order to isolate key urban areas.

For the next two years, insurgents will likely focus on traditional areas of operation, such as Helmand and Kunduz Provinces, while also seeking to expand their influence throughout rural Afghanistan and conduct attacks in the north, east, and in Kabul. The Taliban will continue to plan high-profile attacks and to portray localized tactical successes as strategic victories within the media. In addition, the Taliban may continue its recent efforts to overrun a provincial capital, such as Kunduz City, Kunduz Province, or Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province.

ISIL-K’s manning level suggests the group will not present a security impact outside isolated provinces in eastern Afghanistan. This assessment could change, however, if the group demonstrates increased capability to conduct attacks in urban areas or execute high-profile attacks.
SECTION 3 – OVERVIEW OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

After focusing on resetting their forces in key parts of the country during the first half of 2016, including the ANA 215th Corps and ANP units under ANP Zone 505 in Helmand and Nimroz provinces, the ANDSF made promising but inconsistent progress during this reporting period. Although many challenges remain, such as coordinating cross-pillar responses to insurgent attacks, deterring high-profile attacks, and integrating various operational capabilities, the ANDSF proved themselves capable of defending strategic territory and quickly re-taking lost territory. ANDSF operational tempo remained high during the spring and summer campaign, Operation Shafaq, as well as during insurgent offensives in Kunduz and Helmand provinces.

3.1 STRATEGY

The ANDSF continue to move towards a more offensive-oriented and sustainable security strategy that emphasizes mobility and mandates the reduction of static positions and checkpoints. Their performance during the 2016 spring and summer campaign, Operation Shafaq, demonstrated that the ANDSF are capable of holding key terrain such as major urban areas and key lines of communication. In addition, MoD and MoI leadership are driving long-term transformations across the ANDSF through refinement of a five-year National Military Strategy for the ministries and the force pillars. This five-year plan outlines three primary joint actions: reintegration, security, and stability. Both Operation Shafaq and the National Military Strategy support and further presidential objectives, demonstrating increased consistency and coherence in national level strategic planning and guidance.

During Operation Shafaq, the ANDSF security strategy better integrated capabilities such as ISR and aerial fires and capitalized on force consolidation to increase maneuverability and generate additional offensive combat and policing capability. This new strategy proved successful with the ANDSF demonstrating marked improvement in their ability to gain and maintain control of critical terrain such as major population areas, urban areas, and key lines of transportation and communication.

During the reporting period, the Afghans developed their 2016-2017 winter campaign plan with assistance from RS advisors. The plan focuses on consolidating gains made in government-controlled areas; regenerating combat and policing capability particularly with ASSF elements and components of several ANA corps; establishing an operational readiness cycle; increasing collective training; and continuing to focus on leadership development. Building on the success of collective training efforts conducted during Operation Shafaq, ANA Chief of the General Staff, General Qadam Shah, directed that the winter campaign plan emphasize collective training and force regeneration across the ANA corps to increase their operational capability further.

26 The National Military Strategy supports and furthers the Afghan National Strategic Planning System, which is comprised of the National Threat Assessment, National Security Policy, National Security Strategy, and the National Campaign Plan.
In August 2016, RS, the MoD, and the MoI signed the Common Policy Agreement on Operational Conditions that placed conditionality on the implementation of reforms that support the 2016-2017 winter campaign plan. The agreement describes ANDSF operational goals and establishes a framework of responsibilities between the ANDSF and RS and includes 12 conditions for the MoD and 10 for the MoI that are focused on improving operational readiness, better utilizing the ASSF, personnel manning, reducing corruption within the ANDSF, and force optimization initiatives to help generate additional offensive maneuver capability. Through enforcing accountability mechanisms in the bilateral commitment process, RS has already withheld funding and assets from the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF when certain conditions have not been met. These actions have been effective at prompting adjustments to ANDSF strategy and the operational employment of forces to increase their effectiveness against the insurgency.

3.2 BUDGET

The Afghan Government relies on international funding for the vast majority of its security costs. Continued foreign funding is necessary to support the ANDSF at the appropriate size and with the requisite capabilities to secure Afghanistan. The requirement to fund the current ANDSF force structure in FY 2016 is $5.01 billion; the expected FY 2017 requirement is approximately $4.91 billion. For FY 2016, the United States funded $3.65 billion of the cost ($2.57 billion for the MoD and $1.08 billion for the MoI) through the ASFF. Approximately $1.762 billion of the FY 2016 ASFF was provided directly to the Afghan Government ($1.29 billion for the MoD and $472 million for the MoI) to fund salaries, incentive pay, equipment, facilities maintenance, and fuel costs. The other $1.887 billion of the FY 2016 ASFF is executed by DoD primarily through contracts on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. The remaining $1.36 billion of ANDSF costs were funded by international donors ($860 million for ANP salaries, information technology, aviation training and maintenance, uniforms, and medical supplies) and the Afghan Government ($500 million, primarily for food and subsistence). The United States, along with international partners, is working closely with the Afghans to reduce ANDSF costs further through a number of cost savings initiatives, most notably the divestiture of excess facilities. As of November 30, 2016, the MoI has divested 28 out of 104 facilities and the MoD has divested 38 out of 90 facilities as part of the Solar Year (SY) 1395\textsuperscript{27} divestment plan. Further, FY 1395 commitment letters require both ministries to identify a divestment strategy for the remaining bases and facilities. RS is also working with the MoD and the MoI to provide flexibility with divestment plans should the MoD or the MoI need to retain bases on the divestment list. The divestment of excess facilities will reduce electrical and operations and maintenance costs and ensure the ANDSF are maximizing facility use.

The ANDSF continue to improve their ability to contract for recurring expenses, such as food, to ensure that products and services are provided for the ANA and ANP at fair prices. Moreover, CSTC-A continues to take steps to increase the MoD and MoI’s ability to manage international donor funding directly and in a fiscally transparent and accountable manner. Finally, CSTC-A is able to leverage its bilateral funding commitment letters to hold the MoD and the MoI

\textsuperscript{27} The Afghan solar year calendar is the official calendar of Afghanistan; nearly all Afghan-generated documents rely on the Afghan solar year. SY 1395 runs from March 20, 2016 – March 20, 2017.
accountable for managing programs effectively and to ensure transparency and accountability remains an important aspect of MoD, MoI, and ANDSF operations.

3.3 FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The current ANDSF authorized force level as part of the tashkil remains at 352,000 ANA and ANP personnel\(^{28}\) plus 30,000 ALP. The ALP is funded solely by the United States, and although it is overseen by the MoI, it is not part of the 352,000 authorized ANDSF tashkil.

During the reporting period, the ANDSF have initiated changes to the force structure of the MoD and the MoI. The most significant initiative is the establishment of the National Mission Brigade and associated headquarters element, which will consist of elements of the ANA 6\(^{th}\) Special Operations Kandak (SOK) and the Ktah Khas. The brigade will have approximately 200 personnel to provide command and control capabilities for ASSF elements during contingency operations across the country. The National Mission Brigade headquarters remains in the early stages of being equipped and is scheduled to be fully operational in early 2018.

Other changes include establishing 81 new AAF maintenance technical staff to support the additional A-29 and MD-530 aircraft that arrived during the year; 63 technicians to support the data migration and transition from AHRIMS to APPS software and equipment; and additional positions in the ANA to provide security and investigations support for the new MoD headquarters building.

The ANA Corps are creating reserve kandaks\(^{29}\), using former ANA soldiers as a trained force to serve locally in support functions, such as providing base security and manning checkpoints. As of September 2016, the 201\(^{st}\) and 209\(^{th}\) Corps have established reserve kandaks with approximately 600 reserve soldiers each, the 111\(^{th}\) Capital Division has established a reserve kandak of 300 soldiers, and the 207\(^{th}\) Corps is in the planning process. These changes were made within the confines of the authorized 195,000 tashkil level for the ANA.

**Attrition**

The reporting period began with a slight uptick in attrition after hitting record highs in late spring of 2016 but quickly decreased close to average levels. Attrition levels vary widely between the different corps and zones; aggregate attrition within the ANDSF during this reporting period averaged 2.36 percent, consistent with the three-year historical average of 2.21 percent. The ANA averaged 2.62 percent attrition, as compared to the three-year historical average of 2.55 percent. ANP attrition averaged 2.11 percent, consistent with the three-year historical average of 1.88 percent. During the reporting period, overall ANDSF recruitment has generally kept pace with losses, resulting in a fairly constant end strength.

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\(^{28}\) The 352,000 authorized strength includes 195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP.

\(^{29}\) A kandak is a battalion-size element of the ANA.
Although separations, retirements, and KIAs contribute to overall attrition, the number of ANDSF personnel dropped from the rolls dominates ANDSF attrition, representing more than 75 percent of all personnel losses. ANA soldiers and ANP police dropped from the rolls rarely return to duty, which increases the recruitment effort required to maintain the overall force size. Consistent with previous reporting periods, the ANA continues to have a higher rate of soldiers dropped from the rolls than the ANP.

Several factors are known to contribute to the high number of ANDSF personnel dropped from rolls, including poor leadership and leader accountability, lack of casualty and martyr care, poor implementation and understanding of leave policies, lack of timely and accurate pay, and inadequate living and working conditions. In addition, units in high-threat areas are often not granted leave due to operational requirements and receive only limited rest and training between deployments due to the absence of an operational readiness cycle. Attrition remains a larger problem for the ANA than for the ANP in part because of the more widespread deployments across the country that the ANA faces compared to the ANP. Current ANA personnel management policies do not allow soldiers to serve in their home areas in order to decrease the potential for local influence. However, these policies have the second-order effect of increasing transportation costs and creating additional obstacles for soldiers attempting to take authorized leave, which contributes to the problem of soldiers going absent without leave.

ANA and ANP both have policies to prevent personnel from going absent without leave, though enforcement is inconsistent. Coalition advisory efforts continue to focus on the ANDSF’s ability to regenerate forces through recruitment and operational readiness programs. The coalition is no longer encouraging Afghans to use pay incentives and salary mechanisms to address retention, as there is lack of evidence on their effectiveness. A general lack of timely and accurate reporting discipline across the ANDSF has inhibited the effective allocation of resources. Coalition advisors continue to work with the ANDSF to address these issues by helping the Afghans improve leadership through merit-based selection and assignment of commanders, enhanced leadership development and training, and ministerial capacity building related to personnel accountability and management. In spite of these challenges, the size of the ANDSF has remained relatively stable, although it is several thousand personnel below the authorized 352,000 level.

**Force Posture**

The ANDSF are effective when conducting deliberate, offensive operations, yet persistent planning challenges contribute to inefficiencies in force employment. In remote areas, the ANP employs small units, often at checkpoints where they are more vulnerable to attacks. In many cases, small groups of ANP at checkpoints abandon their posts in the face of insurgent attacks. The force posture of the ANA is improving following strategy adjustments implemented during Operation Shafiq, but continues to suffer from an overuse of static checkpoints. ANDSF progress on checkpoint consolidation and the appropriate allocation of forces across the country is still uneven. Implementation of various force consolidation initiatives remains a challenge due

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30 Individuals are dropped from the rolls when they leave their units without authorization for more than 30 days. Some personnel who leave without authorization, including those dropped from the rolls, eventually return to their units.
to political pressure from local officials and complaints from the local population over concerns that insurgents can exploit terrain where the ANDSF do not maintain a persistent presence.

These posture challenges limit combat maneuver capabilities. In some instances during this reporting period, the ANDSF were not able to maneuver kandak-size formations from both conventional and ASSF elements sufficiently to support one another against an agile insurgency. In addition, some ANA corps were unable to maximize their offensive combat power against the enemy and instead maneuvered smaller portions of their forces. Broadly emplaced checkpoints spread the ANDSF too thin and create challenges for logistics, supply management, and the provision of reinforcements. Combined, these factors make fixed positions vulnerable to insurgent attacks and contributed to the high ANDSF casualty rate.

Coalition advisors at the TAACs, TF Anvil, and TF Forge are conducting training programs with the ANDSF to build combat maneuver capabilities through helping them adjust their tendency to remain stationary. TAAC-W is providing training on the use of mobile checkpoints to increase the ANA 207th Corps’ offensive maneuver power. Under the terms of the Common Policy Agreement, coalition advisors have the ability to use incentives and impose penalties to reduce the number of ANDSF checkpoints. The policy agreement requires that the ANA reduce the number of checkpoints, staff each checkpoint with at least a platoon-sized element for those checkpoints it does retain, and have a written concept plan describing the operational purpose for each checkpoint. RS advisors can penalize lack of progress on these reforms by withdrawing advisors and withholding funds. In addition, advisors with the MoD and the 111th Capital Division are helping the ANA recall forces from the 111th Capital Division, which had been supporting efforts in Kunduz and Helmand provinces, back to Kabul to prepare for future operations.

3.4 CAPABILITIES

The 2016 summer campaign saw the ANDSF shift to a more sustainable security model, where the ANA and ANP retained control of recently cleared population centers and disrupted Taliban attacks in more remote locations. This demonstrated a marked improvement in maneuver capability, cross-pillar coordination, and integration of various operational capabilities over the 2015 summer campaign. However, the ANDSF still face shortfalls in combat enablers and non-combat enablers such as logistics systems, sustainment, and personnel management.

**Operational Capabilities**

Coalition TAA continues to focus on the integration of combat enablers, such as ISR, artillery, aerial fires, counter-IED capabilities, and support from specialized units such as the Mobile Strike Force brigades. The ANDSF are showing resiliency and their performance during the summer campaign demonstrated their increased operational capabilities, such as ANDSF independent intelligence-driven operations and the integration of aircraft such as A-29 and MD-530s into operations. Using these capabilities, the ANDSF successfully disrupted the Taliban in

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31 Additional information on ANA and ANP force component capabilities and MoD and MoI capacity and ministerial support to the ANDSF are detailed in the relevant sections below.
northern Kunduz province, stopped coordinated attacks in southern Helmand Province, and cleared several areas of Nangarhar province from several militant groups, including ISIL-K.

With eight A-29 light attack aircraft, and an additional eighteen MD-530 helicopters delivered during the year, plus the training and employment of additional ATACs, the ANDSF has shown progress integrating close air attack capability. The AAF is capable of employing both rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft for airstrikes, but is still developing its close air attack and armed overwatch capabilities. Nonetheless, the increasing AAF close air attack capability has bolstered ANDSF ground forces’ motivation and enhanced their will to fight.

The ANDSF successfully cleared the lines of communication between key regional population centers and protected the vast majority of the populace. This demonstrates the ANA corps’ improved ability to plan, execute, and sustain simultaneous operations, to integrate Afghan combat enablers such as attack aircraft, and to coordinate with the ANP during security operations. The ASSF, who benefit from a close partnership with coalition forces and a greater degree of U.S. enabler support, are increasingly able to execute a vast array of security options and have proven successful in disrupting high-profile attack networks.

At the corps level, the ANA struggles with conducting sufficiently detailed operational planning that incorporates key aspects of the national-level security strategy. Although the ANDSF are generally capable of conducting large-scale, offensive operations with coordination between corps, some challenges remain. For instance, coordination between the ANA 215th and ANA 205th Corps for operations along the border between Helmand and Kandahar provinces was insufficient and hindered operational effectiveness. In addition, ANDSF employment of the ASSF is not in line with their capabilities; there is still an over reliance on ASSF for standard offensive actions.

Although the ANP are still frequently on the front lines of direct combat with the insurgency and struggling to hold areas cleared by the ANA, they are incrementally developing their ability to serve as an anti-crime and community policing force. In some parts of the country, such as in ANP Zone 606 in the west, the ANP are now capable of providing a wide range of more traditional police functions, including crime investigation and traditional law enforcement duties. The ANP’s use of intelligence to drive both policing operations and typical counterinsurgency operations remains limited, but growing.

ANDSF counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) capability continues to improve. However, the National Engineer School, which is the primary ANDSF C-IED training facility, remains insufficiently resourced. To maintain a high level of training for C-IED technicians, the coalition conducted multiple mobile training courses on route clearance and C-IED equipment maintenance, explosive ordnance disposal, and improvised explosive device (IED) defeat. During the reporting period, more than 250 personnel completed the EOD course, more than 225 completed the IED course, and 39 completed the route clearance course. The lack of an experienced staff at the national level knowledgeable on the capabilities and proper employment of C-IED equipment and procedures impedes the ANDSF’s ability to institute widespread improvements to explosive ordnance disposal and C-IED training activities.
Challenges remain with maintenance and logistics support, which is generally unsynchronized or poorly executed, hindering operational effectiveness. ANDSF sustainment lacks timeliness, mission focus, and a sense of Afghan ownership of the deeply rooted challenges and obstructions to effective support. Poor prioritization of repair and maintenance operations by ANDSF leadership, as well as poor coordination throughout the supply chain, prevents ANDSF equipment readiness from reaching adequate levels.

Over the last few months, the ANDSF planning process improved at the national level. Whereas the coalition worked closely with the ANDSF to develop Operation Shafaq, the Afghans took more of a leading role in the development of the winter 2016-2017 campaign. In addition, MoD planners incorporated the MoI into the planning process, reflecting an increased level of cooperation between the ministries.

**Leadership Challenges**

At the strategic level, Afghan leadership within the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF is uneven. At the ministerial level, delays in resource management and strategic planning due to leadership challenges hinder the MoD and the MoI’s ability to support the ANDSF. Moreover, senior leaders often intervene in tactical and operational issues, diverting focus from strategic level issues, and undermining nascent command and control processes. The inability of ANDSF leaders across the force to effectively command and control operations, coupled with poor discipline of junior leaders in some units, hinders effectiveness in nearly every ministry functional and ANDSF capability area.

Leadership at the ANP zone, ANA corps, brigade, and kandak level remains a key factor in ANDSF unit success, but is uneven across the force. For instance, ineffective leaders in the ANA 205th and 215th Corps were replaced early in the year, but strong leadership in the ANA 203rd Corps has contributed to an improved security situation in their region south and west of Kabul. Commanders frequently report to whom they prefer rather than enforcing effective mission command, resulting in leaders not adequately empowered to perform their duties. Given these leadership challenges, the ANDSF continues to rely on U.S. and coalition advisors to ensure sufficient attention to command relationships; however, the limited number of advisors, and their placement at the corps and higher levels, limits the ability to influence leadership throughout the chain of command.

Leadership appointments generally are not meritocratic. RS officials continue to emphasize that the selection, placement, and empowerment of the right military and civilian leadership within the security ministries are essential to ANDSF success. RS advisors and training efforts continue to focus on improving the ANDSF’s technical and tactical capabilities, but more robust leader development is required to build and retain a professional force.

**Ministerial and Cross-Pillar Coordination**

Ministerial coordination continues to improve at the national level more so than at the corps and zone levels. Although the ANDSF continue to improve cross-pillar synchronization, they struggle to forecast requirements, indicating the need to develop leaders’ planning capability at
the national level. Additionally, varying degrees of trust between leaders of the various ANDSF institutions limits effectiveness. The lack of trust between GS G2, the NDS, MoI, and the Office of the Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategic Intelligence, continues to hamper open intelligence sharing.

Reporting and cross-pillar coordination remains a problem across the ANDSF at the regional level and below. Units often bypass the OCCs and send reports to higher authorities within their own ministries, complicating planning and support during cross-pillar operations and crisis response. Although SOPs exist to correct these problems, many are not signed or are not being implemented below the ministerial level.

When utilized, the OCC-Rs generally have proven effective at integrating ANA and ANP activities, providing an accurate picture of the force dispositions across their respective regions and promoting the integration of all ANDSF functions into the operational planning process. Similar to other ANDSF institutions, the degree of functionality depends on the selection and empowerment of capable leaders. Tactical coordination between ANA and ANP forces through the OCC-Ps is not as effective, leading to confusion at the district level as to the appropriate lead agency. The OCC-Ps are still developing their capability to manage information and suffer from insufficient manning, equipment, and ministerial-level guidance and from conflicts with existing local and informal command and control channels.

Although effective cross-pillar coordination and interoperability remains a challenge, the ANA and ANP have proven capable of cooperating in small and large scale operations. The ANA and ANP integrated assets during operations around Kandahar city during summer 2016 to delay and deny Taliban attempts to isolate Kandahar city, and the ANA partnered with the ANP to relocate the ANP Zone 202 headquarters to a new location.

Strategic communication coordination provides an example of strong coordination among the MoD, the MoI, and the Afghan Presidential Palace. The presidential spokesman chairs a weekly strategic communication meeting to synchronize messaging on security issues with the MoD and the MoI. As a result, the Afghan government is better able to counteract insurgent information operations. For example, after small-scale Taliban attacks in Helmand and Kunduz provinces, the MoD and the MoI deployed media centers to each area to manage the narrative and reinforce the message that Taliban gains were not as significant as reported and were quickly reversed. Although strong at the national level, challenges remain in provincial and local level strategic communication operations because they do not synchronize and coordinate messages effectively. This ineffectiveness is being mitigated through the national-level deployable media centers.

3.5 ASSESSMENT

Although the Taliban experienced some small-scale, episodic success, the ANDSF are generally performing better than at the same point last year, although the ANP continues to lag behind the ANA in its development. The 2016 summer campaign also offered genuine operational-level experience that the ANSDF intend to build upon in the coming winter campaign. By

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32 Assessments of the ANDSF by force pillar can be found in the classified annex to this report.
implementing a sustainable security strategy that better allocates forces across the country, the ANDSF improved its performance compared to 2015. Although challenges remain in optimizing their force posture, such as an overreliance on checkpoints and limited maneuver combat capability, the change in strategy enabled the ANDSF to retain control of key terrain and population centers and to disrupt Taliban operations in remote areas.

Integration of ISR and aerial fires is improving and contributing to successes across the country. ScanEagle has provided timely and accurate ISR, allowing for intelligence-driven operations at the tactical level. The AAF’s integration of A-29s and MD-530s has surpassed expectations with the capability to conduct deliberate airstrikes, and further integration with ATACs will build upon the air-ground integration and close air attack capabilities of the ANA.

ASSF elements in both the MoD and the MoI are more proficient than conventional forces. The ASSF continue to be effective when utilized in deliberate operations where special operations forces are most appropriate, but the ANDSF continue to rely heavily on the ASSF for conventional operations where the ANA or ANP would be more appropriate. Reducing ANA commanders’ misuse of ASSF to conduct operations better suited to ANA units remains a challenge.

Despite developing structures such as the ANA 20th Division headquarters under the ANA 209th Corps and the OCC-Rs in the previous reporting period to address command and control deficiencies, commanders continue to bypass the chain of command, leading to difficulties in coordination within and across pillars. The MoI is still underutilizing the ANP zone headquarters, and MoI senior leaders often bypass zone headquarters commanders to contact the provincial level directly. The ANDSF continue to struggle with operational-level planning and leadership remains slow to address challenges in enabler integration, notably including logistics forecasting and aerial fires in the planning for large operations. The ANDSF are still developing their ability to conduct multiple operations simultaneously on a national scale, yet the operational-level experience gained in the summer 2016 campaign is already proving instrumental in developing the winter 2016-2017 campaign.
SECTION 4 – MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

4.1 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The MoD oversees the ANA, which includes the AAF and several pillars within the ASSF: the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC), the Ktah Khas, and the SMW (see Figure 5). Lieutenant General Abdullah Khan Habibi began serving as Acting Minister of Defense on May 10, 2016, and was confirmed by the Afghan parliament on June 20, 2016. The MoD and the ANA GS are focused on implementing a number of constructive policies and systemic processes to increase transparency, decrease corruption, and increase the quality of leadership within the MoD. Specific efforts include potentially requiring all MoD senior leaders to submit asset declaration forms to increase transparency and accountability, forcing the retirement of 56 general officers in accordance with Afghan law on mandatory retirement age, the removal of several corps and brigade commanders due to ineffectiveness and corruption, and the creation of ten senior civilian positions in the MoD.

Figure 5: Ministry of Defense Organizational Chart
The overall MoD authorized end strength includes positions for MoD headquarters, various command staffs, the ANA, the AAF, and elements of the ASSF (see Figure 6).\textsuperscript{33} The MoD also includes an additional 8,004 authorized civilian positions that augment the military force for certain duties, build institutional knowledge and experience within the ministry, and free up soldiers to perform inherently military functions.

\textit{Figure 6: Ministry of Defense Manning Authorization}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MoD Echelons</th>
<th>Solar Year 1393</th>
<th>Solar Year 1394</th>
<th>Solar Year 1395</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense Headquarters</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>2,765</td>
<td>2,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Staff</td>
<td>6,481</td>
<td>6,243</td>
<td>6,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Commands</td>
<td>27,104</td>
<td>25,365</td>
<td>31,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Commands</td>
<td>117,715</td>
<td>119,252</td>
<td>121,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
<td>10,740</td>
<td>11,651</td>
<td>11,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force and SMW</td>
<td>7,947</td>
<td>7,981</td>
<td>8,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTHS Accounts\textsuperscript{34}</td>
<td>13,359</td>
<td>13,359</td>
<td>13,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassigned Resources</td>
<td>8,779</td>
<td>8,384</td>
<td>6,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Authorized</strong></td>
<td><strong>195,000 military</strong> (includes R coded positions)\textsuperscript{35}</td>
<td><strong>195,000 military</strong> (includes R coded positions)</td>
<td><strong>195,000 military and 8,004 civilian</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Resource Management and Procurement}

The primary focus of resource management and procurement advisory efforts over the last several months has been defining resource management and procurement requirements, standardizing the contracting bid process, and evaluating the effectiveness of framework agreements that allow sub-contracts (e.g., one framework MoD food contract with sub-contracts for each province).

The MoD continues to make great use of young, college educated, and technically proficient Afghans recruited and trained through the Functional Area Support Team (FAST) program. During this reporting period, FAST program hiring has continued; there are currently 164 out of a projected 300 personnel in the program. FAST team members hired to date have been employed primarily in resource management and acquisitions-related positions in the MoD headquarters and have immediately increased the capacity of their new organizations. Efforts are continuing to hire the remaining positions, which will be employed both at the ministry and at the ANA corps headquarters. Additional capability due to FAST team members and coalition advisory efforts have increased the MoD’s data analysis and cost modeling capabilities, which

\textsuperscript{33} Although the MoD and MoI budget process coincides with the Afghan fiscal year, the \textit{tashkil} process coincides with the Afghan solar year. The Afghan fiscal year follows the SY numbering system, but is offset by one quarter. FY 1395 runs from December 21, 2015 – December 20, 2016.

\textsuperscript{34} TTHS denotes training, transient, holding, and students.

\textsuperscript{35} “R” coded positions denotes positions currently filled by military personnel that will revert to civilian positions once they are vacated.
will help budget execution efforts as they increase the accuracy of budget estimates. EF 1 advisors are working with the MoD and EF 4 advisors to develop a system to transition FAST team members into traditional civil servant tashkil positions within the next three years.

The MoD has shown good progress in executing the contract needs identified in the current FY 1395 Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan. As of November 30, 2016, the MoD has approved 320 requirements, awarded 140 contracts, and has 59 contracts pending; this represents an approximately 76 percent budget execution rate for their FY 1395 budget. The MoD delivered its FY 1396 Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan in September 2016, in accordance with the FY 1395 commitment letter. This document will ensure that MoD resource management and procurement offices are able to meet their FY 1396 contracting demands in a timely manner. Of note, the FY 1396 budget makes use of multi-year framework contracts, which increase the efficiency of the contracting process for recurring contract needs, such as food and fuel.

Although there have been improvements in the MoD’s ability to track resource management and procurement needs through the acquisition process, EF 1 advisors still assist the Afghans in this area. The primary focus of procurement advisory efforts has been the approval of requirements through the Requirements Approval Board (RAB) process and the subsequent solicitation and approval of associated contracts.36 Those advisory efforts have influenced the implementation of internal MoD budget unit requirements review and approval processes, as well as the consideration and consolidation of corps’ requirements at the budget unit level into framework agreements.

Legal Affairs

The MoD has the basic systems and organizations to investigate and adjudicate allegations of GVHR and corruption and has shown continued progress in identifying, investigating, and appropriately acting upon GVHR allegations. Minister Habibi is actively involved, requesting monthly reports of GVHR investigations and making inquiries on stalled cases. Although the ministry has improved in terms of self-reporting and investigating, especially when RS advisors refer cases, political will from MoD, GS, and ANA corps leadership to hold violators accountable remains intermittent.

Although a lack political will, as well as other institutional issues, hinder the MoD’s ability to investigate and prosecute GVHRs, the MoD’s capacity to conduct sustainable internal Human Rights and Law of Armed Conflict training is expanding. In coordination with the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, coalition advisors support training for ministerial and ANA personnel at all levels in areas such as the Law of Armed Conflict, human rights investigations, and various anti-corruption initiatives. RS advisors emphasize the importance of these training programs, and other efforts to address GVHR and corruption, to ensure compliance with the DoD Leahy Law and sustain international community and donor confidence. Although the MoD has improved its ability to take remedial actions in cases of

36 The RAB consists of members of CSTC-A and the Afghan Government; the purpose is to conduct an independent validation of a contracting or procurement requirement to ensure it is compliant with Afghan law. Procurements valued greater than approximately $35,000 U.S. dollars must be submitted to the RAB prior to consideration by the National Procurement Commission.
credible GVHR allegations, there is room for improvement. The ANA Legal School is implementing a human rights training module for all new recruits and has been supporting attendance at separate human rights training at the ANA corps level since October 2015. TAAC-S advised the ANA Legal School as they conducted Law of Armed Conflict training with the ANA 205th Corps. Coalition advisors are currently working to broaden the training and assist the MoD with conducting it at the kandak level.

MoD personnel and resources are sufficient to support increased emphasis on corruption investigations and prosecutions. However, increased senior leadership support is necessary to address counter-corruption and anti-corruption efforts fully. MoD information sharing among GS G2, GS IG, and GS Legal regarding major corruption allegations is still sporadic, and senior leaders do not demonstrate the will to investigate cases fully and prepare investigations for appropriate prosecutions. Additionally, the GS G2 only investigates corruption seasonally as a result of the ANA prioritizing combat missions during the summer. ANA corps leadership support for pursuing corruption investigations varies by corps, and the MoD continues to display an uneven ability to order or influence corps commanders who choose not to pursue investigation into a particular allegation. Within the GS, the organization structure prevents effective prosecution of corruption. The ANA Criminal Investigation Division (CID) office is part of the GS Legal department; as a result, the GS Legal department prevents CID from investigating corrupt prosecutors.

Although there is much room for improvement, the MoD’s courts martial system is becoming more effective. EF 3 advisors continue to streamline the criminal reporting process from kandak to corps level, which is resulting in more investigations and prosecutions. In one notable example, TAAC-S, in coordination with EF 3 advisors in the MoD, successfully encouraged the 205th Corps and MoD to prosecute a brigadier general military judge who was attempting to extort money from potential defendants in return for promises to dismiss charges. EF 3 coordinated with the Afghan Supreme Court to have the officer stripped of his judge status upon his conviction. Another example of Afghan initiative to conduct investigations was observed when the 205th Corps Legal Advisor observed multiple instances of unreported extra-judicial killings and GVHRs. The corps assumed authority over these cases and thoroughly investigated each incident.

**Personnel Management**

Effective AHRIMS implementation is important to enhancing the MoD’s personnel management capacity, improving pay systems and accountability mechanisms, and effectively addressing retention. However, AHRIMS implementation remains slow due to limited personnel skills and network access. As of November 19, 2016, 85 percent of ANA personnel have been slotted into AHRIMS.

Biometric registration remains a critical prerequisite for APPS, the overarching electronic system that will integrate personnel management, biometric ID cards, and payroll systems, but only an estimated 80 percent of the ANA have completed the iris and fingerprint scans necessary for enrollment into the biometric database. In August 2016, coalition advisors worked closely with MoD and ANA officials to verify all biometric information for ANA personnel who had already
enrolled. In August 2016, coalition advisors and the ANDSF began a comprehensive personal asset inventory initiative to review and update personnel records for all ANA personnel, as much of the data in AHRIMS is incomplete and has errors. Completion of the review is expected in summer 2017. The process is slow due to lack of corps and kandak commander emphasis on AHRIMS enforcement, as well as electrical power and network connectivity problems for ANA corps and kandaks with AHRIMS computer terminals.

The MoD’s identification card system has integrated AHRIMS to download ID card information automatically, which allows AHRIMS data entry operators to complete the personnel records without having to manually type ID card numbers, improving accountability and transparency while reducing errors. However, AHRIMS has not been used as intended by the ANDSF. Personnel managers are not using AHRIMS for the full range of personnel actions, such as to transfer soldiers between units or to move them to inactive lists when they retire, and there is a lack of Afghan leader emphasis on using the system. When personnel data for ANA soldiers is entered, it is infrequently and unreliably updated. To counter these problems, EF 4 advisors are prioritizing AHRIMS training and emphasizing use of the system to commanders, and contractors are training AHRIMS data entry personnel on the corps staff. On a positive note, advisors report that trained AHRIMS operators are frequently assigned to proper positions at units to make use of their skills.

Afghan training schools continue to produce qualified graduates; during this reporting period, the MoD and ANA training schools generated approximately 8,430 graduates in 14 different advanced training courses. The Marshall Fahim National Defense University, the primary professional military education institution for the ANA, is responsible for officer initial education through the National Military Academy of Afghanistan and the Afghan National Army Officer Academy. The MoD and ANA have made limited progress in improving merit-based selection of candidates for all schools, particularly initial officer training but are not effectively assigning graduates to commands or organizations where they can have the greatest impact.

RS advisors are using the conditions of the Common Policy Agreement to ensure brigade and kandak commanders attend pre-command courses prior to taking command. As of November 30, 2016, the brigade pre-command course has trained 60 individuals and the kandak pre-command course has trained 102 individuals. The ANA has also established a two-week-capstone course for new general officers, which provides training opportunities in the United States for the top performers. During the 2016-2017 winter campaign, the ANA and advisors will emphasize pre-command course attendance as part of the focus on establishing an operational readiness cycle. To help address some of the leadership challenges in the ANA 215th Corps, TF Forge advisors continue to assist the Afghans in adopting a merit-based selection system for leaders at the kandak level.

The management of personnel with technical skills remains an area for improvement. Specialists, such as mechanics and ATACs, are often improperly assigned when returning to their units following completion of training courses. Rather than employ trained soldiers in duties that make use of their skills, commanders often meet immediate operational needs by assigning specialists to checkpoints or other duties that do not make use of the soldiers’ skills.
ANA Regional Corps Battle Schools (RCBS) do a sufficient job of training, but courses are not fully attended. Moreover, some ANA corps struggle to send infantry units, even at the tolai\(^{37}\) level, to the RCBS for collective training. For example, the ANA 201\(^{st}\) Corps struggles to send infantry companies to the RCBS for collective training due to their heavy commitment to fixed site security. Although there were some challenges due to the operational tempo in the 2016 summer campaign, most corps established a tolai or kandak-level or battalion operational readiness cycle within each brigade.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

MoD maintenance and sustainment programs remain moderately productive as the ANA typically focuses on repairing the equipment that is most valuable to it, such as D-30 artillery systems. Coalition advisors are also working to build the MoD and ANA’s capacity by conducting fuel and ammunition working groups with ANA counterparts that feed into the monthly ministerial-level meeting to enhance the accuracy and timeliness of reporting of inventories and consumption data.

Coalition advisors at the ministry and TAACs emphasize use of the Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS)\(^{38}\) to increase oversight of ANA equipment. Senior MoD leaders, including the First Deputy Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, have taken positive steps to encourage Core-IMS implementation and issued directives in support. EF 5 advisors are assisting Afghan counterparts with uploading 40 entries of critically important and high-usage repair parts and ammunition into Core-IMS. As of October 31, 2016, initial entry was completed at all corps and the 111 Capital Division. This is a major positive step as it indicated willingness and ability to use the Core-IMS system at each unit. However, problems persist in ensuring clerks reliably deduct equipment from the system when issued, leading to inaccurate inventory lists that do not match their paper counterparts.

The MoD and the ANA suffer from a distribution challenge rather than a lack of inventory for spare parts and supplies. The Central Supply Depot has been inconsistently receiving, processing, and distributing supplies in a timely, predictable, and transparent manner. The ANA Chief of the General Staff emphasized the ANA’s commitment to improve logistics distribution, which resulted in improvements in logistics coordination by the GS G3 during the reporting period. In addition, the ANA corps continue to struggle with logistics forecasting and cross-leveling across their units, but they have improved their proficiency in requisitioning parts and supplies. The national level provisioning of spare parts does not always keep up with demand from the ANA corps, especially during the traditional spring and summer fighting season. Moreover, major discrepancies in ammunition consumption reports often exist between operational and sustainment channels. Finally, the MoD also does not have any transportation officers in their tashkil that could focus on utilizing the various distribution methods to move needed supplies and parts.

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\(^{37}\) A tolai is a company-size unit in the ANA.

\(^{38}\) Core-IMS is a flexible, web-based system designed to address a comprehensive set of warehouse inventory management needs from inventory initialization through order processing across multiple warehouses. Core-IMS provides efficient asset visibility at all levels in the inventory.
ANA Logistics Command provides regional support through forward supply depots (FSD)\textsuperscript{39} in each geographic region. In practice however, ANA Logistics Command has not embraced its role as the manager of logistics distribution and remains passive when corps commanders exert personal control over the FSDs. This factor varies with each corps, and remains dependent on the relationships forged by each commander. In the 203\textsuperscript{rd} Corps, the relationship is good and the FSD is functional, whereas in the 215\textsuperscript{th} Corps a bad relationship exists between the corps commander and the FSD. As a result, the FSD hoards supplies.

The ANA continues to build organic maintenance capabilities, the effects of which are greatly dependent on leadership. Notably, the 207\textsuperscript{th} Corps has demonstrated Afghan ownership of maintenance programs; the unit has a strong drive to maintain and repair organic vehicles, and the level of proficiency has surpassed expectations. Conversely, in the 215\textsuperscript{th} Corps, commanders continue to assign mechanics to other positions rather than build maintenance capacity.

A request for proposal for the National Maintenance Strategy\textsuperscript{40} contract, which will help address long-term ANA maintenance deficiencies by providing immediate contract logistics and maintenance support, was published on June 15, 2016, closed in October, and is expected to be awarded in April 2017. In the interim, the current ANA maintenance contract is providing training for ANA mechanics, supply specialists, and maintenance supervisors at each ANA corps to help improve organic maintenance capability.

From August through October 2016, EF 5 expeditionary sustainment advising teams conducted initial visits to each corps. Logistics advisors from these teams conducted training and assessed each corps’ logistics systems and processes to identify opportunities for improvement in property book accountability, warehouse operations, and management of organic maintenance and commodities. EF 5 has created similar ammunition assistance teams to help address ANA deficiencies in ammunition storage and safety procedures.

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

The MoD is demonstrating steady and measurable progress in its planning capability at the strategic level, although progress has been greater at the operational level. Afghan planners are not fully proficient in planning processes, developing strategic and operational planning products, and ensuring those products are implemented at the lower levels of the ANA. The ANA adopted several aspects of the 2016 spring and summer campaign plan, Operation *Shafaq*, at the *kandak* and brigade level, but sustained progress in implementing strategic and operational planning at the lower levels remains underdeveloped. Further, a persistent gap exists in nesting short-term operational planning from the GS G3 (Operations and Plans) with long-term strategic

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\textsuperscript{39}The FSDs are focused on distribution of supply parts in each corps’ geographic area, but they are not part of the corps or its chain of command. ANA Logistics Command maintains official control over the FSDs to improve the linkage between the FSD and the Central Supply Depot.

\textsuperscript{40}The National Maintenance Strategy consists of a logistics support maintenance contract that will provide contractor support at 23 key national and regional nodes to conduct maintenance and supply chain management operations and training and support for the ANDSF leadership and operators in maintenance and supply chain management operations.
planning conducted in the GS G5 (Plans), which would connect the seasonal campaign plans from year to year.

The ANA developed the 2016-2017 winter campaign plan, Operation Shafaq II, with less assistance from RS advisors than with the summer campaign plan, indicating the MoD’s maturing planning capability. The winter campaign focuses on consolidating gains made in government-controlled areas; regenerating ANA combat power with elements of the ANA 205th, 209th, and 215th Corps as the priority; establishing an operational readiness cycle; increasing collective training; and continuing to focus on leadership development.

On September 16, 2016, Minister Abdullah Khan Habibi signed the Common Policy Agreement, a set of guidelines to help the ANDSF improve internal behaviors, professionalize the force, and generate combat power. Coalition advisors provide monthly reports to both Afghan and coalition leadership on the policy agreement implementation progress, which triggers both rewards and penalties based on MoD compliance.

EF 6 advisors have focused on five-year operational and strategic planning, targeting procedures, readiness reporting, air ground integration, force generation and operational planning. In the short term, the objective is to demonstrate well-planned and executed summer and winter campaigns, and to use these as the basis for an enduring annual campaign cycle, underpinned by an operational readiness cycle and nested within the five-year plan developed by GS G5.

**Intelligence**

Although ANA elements are still developing their ability to conduct intelligence-driven operations, the MoD continues to grow its intelligence collection, analysis, and ISR enabler capabilities. The GS G2 (Intelligence) and the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) have improved their collaboration with the GS G3. However, overall coordination and communication with external intelligence elements such as the NDS or ANA forces in the field is an area for further improvement. The NMIC’s move into the new MoD headquarters building, along with increased assignment of intelligence personnel within the authorized *tashkil*, have also facilitated improved intelligence coordination within the MoD.

The ANA intelligence capabilities continue to grow and increase in self-sufficiency. The National Information Management System (NIMS) continues to expand, with more than 100,000 intelligence reports entered into the system. ANA corps intelligence capability is improving with training provided by mobile training teams, Intelligence Training Center, GS G2, and the NMIC. In addition, the MoD intelligence training center continues to add Afghan-led courses and is refining its curriculum to incorporate lessons learned. Gaps continue to exist in intelligence support to corps operations, ScanEagle fielding, and budget processes.

The ANA targeting process is improving and benefits from integration of new and developing capabilities from across the ANA. The ScanEagle ISR platform has been integrated into the targeting process thereby improving target development and validation. Additionally, the GS G3 has embraced the new capabilities provided by the A-29s and developed a GS-level A-29 targeting procedure to standardize roles and responsibilities for use in the targeting process.
In addition to processes, the fielding of systems continues to develop ISR and aerial fires support capabilities for the ANA. As of November 30, 2016, the ANDSF has fielded 2 ScanEagle systems, 6 aerostat systems, 20 of 20 Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) towers, 120 of 120 Wolfhound systems, 256 of 256 Harris 7800H radios, and 60 of 353 Harris 7800W radio systems. During ScanEagle fielding, initial training took longer than expected due to the poor student selection; subsequently, there has been an increased focus by the Afghan GS G2 on selecting the best qualified candidates for training.

The MoD and ANA continue to rely on contractor support to maintain ISR systems, although 20 positions have been identified as critical operator/sustainers for 2 new RAID towers to expand ISR supported force protection capability. As with other skilled specialists in the ANA, personnel management continues to affect capabilities adversely. Leaders tend to assign ISR system-trained crews to positions that do not make use of crew knowledge and maintenance skills.

During this reporting period, field service representatives began installing equipment on the ANA’s tactical wide band network system. This will increase the ANA’s data and voice capabilities to support intelligence requirements including increased access to and use of Full Motion Video, Voice over Internet Protocol, and access to MoDNet and NIMS. The full construction of the network will take approximately 18 months across all corps. As of October 31, the 203rd Corps equipment for the first phase of construction has been installed, and site surveys have been completed for all corps; installation for 209th Corps was completed in October 2016.

**Strategic Communication**

The MoD strategic communication office improved its media engagements significantly, holding frequent and timely press conferences at the national and corps level. During emergent insurgent activities in Helmand and Kunduz provinces in August 2016, MoD spokesmen directed the emplacement of local media centers to coordinate the provincial messaging as operations commenced. In both instances, the Afghan Government was able to combat the Taliban narrative quickly and effectively. These reactions demonstrated that the MoD is developing sustained capabilities to establish ad hoc communication infrastructure necessary for quick response during crisis situations.

The MoD also demonstrated improvements in its ability to execute national down to provincial level strategic messaging during Operation Shafaq, a deliberate function in support of operations. Weekly planning meetings, frequent joint press conferences, and multiple national and provincial level media events resulted in significant positive coverage of the ANA-led offensive to drive ISIL-K from eastern Afghanistan.

During this reporting period, the MoD information operations section established its first ever budget line of 14 million Afghanis in the FY 1395 budget. This budget facilitated the establishment of three contracts to support the dissemination of key information. The first contract, focused on the printing of handbills, was awarded in late July. The second contract was
awarded in early August to assess and repair radios-in-a-box. The third, a broadcasting contract, was awarded to National Afghan Radio on August 22, 2016.

MoD religious and cultural affairs and public affairs offices demonstrated further commitment to educating ANA corps strategic communication personnel by creating public affairs officer and information operations mobile training teams. The mobile training teams began deploying to various ANA corps in August 2016, and were designed to directly support efforts to develop the Operation Shafaq communication plan. In addition to providing an organic training capability, these teams provide a surge capacity to meet additional media needs and to set the groundwork for a sustainable training program to complement training conducted at the Afghan School of Public Affairs.

MoD information operations personnel completed five iterations of the Afghan Information Dissemination Operations Course during this reporting period. The course trains an average of 15 ANA students per session. This organic training capability enables the MoD to train officers from information operations divisions of various major ANA commands in basic psychological operations and product development.

As with many areas of the MoD and the ANA, personnel management of trained specialists remains problematic. At the ANA corps level, personnel trained to conduct information operations and to support the MoD strategic communication objectives, continue to be given assignments that do not use their skills. This practice continues despite MoD directives forbidding it, which degrades the MoD’s ability to counteract and respond to the Taliban’s propaganda efforts.

Advisors for MoD strategic communication continue to promote efforts to empower staff and to improve internal staff functions. Other advisory focus areas with MoD strategic communication capability include improvement of standard operating procedures for National Military Command Center public affairs officer information flow, proactive public affairs planning procedures, a curriculum review of the MoD School of Public Affairs, and further improvement of budgeting and procurement processes.

**Gender Office Efforts**

Gender issues remain a priority for RS and Afghan senior leaders. The Women in Security Advisory Committee meetings are held quarterly with both the Ministers of Defense and Interior attending. Among the various reasons for the limited participation of women in the ANSF is the lack of suitable infrastructure and facilities. Through women’s participation projects, the MoD seeks to increase the number of gender sensitive facilities to encourage and support increased recruitment of women.

Following the lead of the MoI’s successful female police officer training program, the MoD partnered with the 3rd Infantry Brigade from Turkey to provide additional capacity to recruit and train females for the ANA. Of the 109 women who attended the four-month training, every one

41 The RS commander chairs the committee along with honorary co-chair Mrs. Rula Ghani, President Ghani’s wife.
of them graduated on August 26, 2016, and enrolled in Kabul Military Training Center for further training. The training session in Turkey has been successful; it achieved the major objective of attracting a large number of women to the ANA, significantly increasing overall recruitment figures. However, the ANA lacks a robust female human resources strategy that, combined with a comprehensive training strategy and implementation plan, would identify and create a connection between recruiting requirements and position requirements.

The MoD recruits women primarily through ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC) and recently provided incentives for females serving in the ANA to boost recruitment and assist retention. However, recruiting is conducted to achieve target numbers, rather than to fill projected need and vacancies on the tashkil. As a result, women recruited into the ANA do not necessarily fill duty positions following basic training completion. Although the MoD is generally successful at recruiting women, it lags in placement and integration, in part because no comprehensive career progression model for women exists within the MoD. Even when positions are included in the ANA tashkil, many female-only positions are occupied by males, preventing females from being placed appropriately.

Additionally, Human Rights and Women's Affairs Directorate, in coordination with GS G1 (Human Resources), GS G3 Force Management, the Minister of Defense, and RS is prioritizing a list of 164 females that have not been promoted in more than six years to ensure equitable promotion based on tashkil positions and funding availability. The MoD is developing a plan to correct the current recruitment, training, and assignment process.

Despite having fewer women than the MoI and the ANP, the MoD and the ANA are increasingly providing specialty training opportunities to female members of the ANA. Each month from May to August 2016, RS strategic communication advisors trained four ANA female officers in public affairs and professional development topics. Training topics included the media embed process, writing press releases, and conducting media interviews with live camera recorded practical exercises. In other efforts, the MoD is developing a training plan to conduct human rights and ethnic equality seminars and training at all levels of the ANA, and female officer representatives from MoD are attending the Gender-Based Violence and Women's Health Course.

4.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

The ANA GS provides command and control over all of Afghanistan’s ground and air forces, which include the ANA conventional forces in the ANA corps, the AAF, the SMW, and the ANASOC, which includes the Ktah Khas. In total, the ANA comprises 24 combat brigades, three combat air wings, 24 branch and basic training schools, and additional support facilities (e.g. depots, hospitals).

Afghan National Army Strength

The ANA is authorized up to 195,000 personnel as part of its tashkil. As of November 2016, ANA manning was approximately 168,327 personnel. This includes 7,660 AAF personnel and approximately 887 women between both the ANA and AAF. Civilians are not included in these
numbers. See Figure 7 below for authorized *tashkil* level, current end strength, and gain/loss for each month over the last year.

**Figure 7: ANA Strength**

![Graph showing ANA Strength over time](image)

Note: The ANA military strength depicted above includes the military members of the AAF, which is a component of the ANA.

* Attrition encompasses all unplanned and planned losses.
** Gain includes all gains (recruits, re-accessions, and return from dropped from the rolls) to ANA strength.

Recruiting remains the ANA’s primary means of force generation, although it also pursues renewal of contracts with service members and encourages those that have been dropped from rolls to return. In January 2016, the GS G1 (Personnel), in collaboration with the ANA Training and Education Command and the ANAREC, published their goals for recruitment during SY 1395 of more than 67,000 new recruits as well as more than 12,000 “re-contracts” (i.e., renewals, extensions) from separated personnel. This goal equates to approximately 4,800 new recruits per month. Throughout this reporting period the MoD and the ANA have failed to reach this goal.

The MoD is improving its inclusion of women in the armed forces but remains well below its stated goals, in part due to a lack of a career progression model for women. The MoD aims to recruit 484 females per year and plans to have 1,455 females serving by the end of 2016. As of November 2016, only 887 females are serving, indicating a gap of approximately one year’s recruiting efforts.

Monthly attrition rates averaged 2.62 percent, consistent with the three-year historical average of 2.55 percent. Some of the most common causes cited for retention and attrition challenges

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42 ANDSF personnel strength, recruiting, retention, and attrition information is derived from Afghan reporting. RS analysts interpret the Afghan data and rectify discrepancies and inconsistencies.
include quality of leadership and several soldier “quality of life” issues, such as compensation, insufficient casualty and martyr care, absence or misunderstanding of leave policies and procedures, and inadequate living and working conditions.

**Afghan National Army Structure**

The largest ANA elements are the six regional corps, typically composed of a headquarters *kandak*, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty *kandaks*. The 201<sup>st</sup> Corps, 203<sup>rd</sup> Corps, 205<sup>th</sup> Corps, 207<sup>th</sup> Corps, 209<sup>th</sup> Corps, and 215<sup>th</sup> Corps are responsible for their geographic regions aligning with provincial boundaries (see Figure 8). The 111<sup>th</sup> Capital Division is independent from any corps, and is responsible for security in Kabul.

*Figure 8: ANA Corps and 111<sup>th</sup> Capital Division Boundaries*

Other national-level assets include two Mobile Strike Force brigades and the National Engineer Brigade. The two Mobile Strike Force brigades consist of seven Mobile Strike Force *kandaks* based in Kabul and Kandahar Province.

**Afghan Air Force**

The AAF is the primary air enabler for the ANDSF, responsible for air mobility and close air attack across all of Afghanistan. The AAF can independently plan for and provide air assets for
logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, human remains return, CASEVAC, non-traditional ISR, air interdiction, armed overwatch, and aerial escort mission sets. The AAF headquarters is in Kabul and provides command and control of three wings, the Kabul Air Wing, Kandahar Air Wing, Shindand Air Wing, and 11 detachments, 5 of which have aircraft assigned (Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Shorab, Gardez, and in Herat Province). TAAC-Air provides tactical level train, advise, and assist support to the AAF at Kabul and Kandahar.

The AAF is authorized up to 8,407 personnel as part of its tashkil. During this reporting period, AAF end strength remained close to 7,912 personnel (see Figure 9). This figure includes 252 civilians and 64 women. To help increase the number of women within the AAF, the SY 1395 tashkil makes 114 positions available to women. Cumulatively, the AAF increased their overall tashkil authorizations by 589 in the SY 1395 tashkil. The majority of the growth resulted from the creation of the Kabul Air Wing Attack group (composed of MD-530s, A-29s and the air-ground integration cell) and the A-29 maintenance squadron. Additionally, the AAF gained 20 new flight medic positions in its SY 1395 tashkil and is working to fill positions from upcoming medic training school graduates.

Figure 9: AAF Strength

The AAF has some of the highest retention and lowest attrition rates in the ANDSF. Attrition is consistently less than one percent of the force and 93 percent of AAF pilots and maintenance personnel renewed their enlistment agreement when their tour is complete. However, recruiting individuals with the requisite education and language capabilities remains a challenge. Furthermore, the timeline required to train both pilots and maintenance personnel is significant.
Given these challenges, any shortfall in recruiting or a higher than anticipated training attrition rate causes a major effect on the AAF’s current ability to operate and to maintain the future force.

In partnership with coalition and international partners, TAAC-Air continues to expand capacity to train pilots and maintenance personnel in locations including the United States, the Czech Republic, and the United Arab Emirates. This construct of conducting an increasing amount of training abroad enables the AAF to focus on combat operations while continuing to develop human capital.

**Airframes**

As of November 30, 2016, the AAF has a total of 116 aircraft,\(^4^3\) compared to 104 during the previous reporting period. Fixed-wing platforms include C-208s, C-130s, and A-29s; rotary-wing platforms include Mi-35s,\(^4^4\) Mi-17s, MD-530s, and Cheetahs.\(^4^5\) Deliveries of the remaining twelve A-29 aircraft will continue through 2018. Although the AAF continues to develop pilots, some platforms are limited by an insufficient number of flight engineers or other personnel that comprise a fully trained flight crew.\(^4^6\) Figure 10 details the number of AAF airframes, fully trained pilots, and fully trained flight crews.

**Figure 10: Summary of AAF Airframes, Pilots, and Aircrews***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Qualified Aircrews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8(^4^7)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47(^4^8)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-35</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheetah</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
<td><strong>116</strong></td>
<td><strong>83</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*as of November 30, 2016

\(^4^3\) SMW aircraft are not included in this total.

\(^4^4\) The Government of India donated four Mi-35s in December 2015, three of which had been delivered as of May 31, 2016. The AAF’s previous fleet of Mi-35 aircraft has reached the end of their service life; they are no longer included in the official *tashkil* and the coalition does not provide TAA support to these aircraft or their crews.

\(^4^5\) The Government of India donated three Cheetah helicopters during the first half of 2015. The coalition does not provide TAA support to these aircraft or their crews.

\(^4^6\) The C-130 crew complement is three pilots, two loadmasters, and one engineer. The C-208 flight crew complement is two pilots. The A-29 crew complement is one pilot. The Mi-17 crew complement is two pilots, two gunners, and one flight engineer. The MD-530 crew complement is two pilots.

\(^4^7\) This reflects the number in Afghanistan available for combat operations. There are currently 12 aircraft at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia being used for training Afghan pilots and maintenance personnel.

\(^4^8\) This number does not include the additional Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW.
The C-130 transport aircraft provides a medium- airlift capability in support of personnel and equipment transport, CASEVAC, and human remains return capabilities.

C-130s operate from Kabul and can conduct operations throughout Afghanistan to improved airfields. Contract logistics support (CLS) provides sustainment for the C-130 fleet. The contract includes an AAF maintenance personnel training component to help build the AAF’s organic maintenance capability. There are currently 54 AAF maintenance personnel in training for the C-130.

AAF C-130s have been used primarily as a strategic airlift capability for large passenger movements and CASEVAC operations. In addition, they have been used to transport cargo that is too large or unsuitable for the C-208 or Mi-17 aircraft such as maintenance equipment and parts, bombs, and weapons. C-130s have recently been used to transport MD-530 helicopters to support combat operations across Afghanistan.

C-130 operations are currently limited by a shortage in qualified aircrew members. TAAC-Air and the AAF are working hard to accelerate the growth of flight engineers and loadmasters through in-country training. There are adequate numbers of pilots at various stages of the training pipeline, and two new crews were trained in 2016. There are currently four trained C-130 crews.
C-208 Aircraft

The C-208 aircraft provides light-lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and human remains recovery capabilities for the ANSDF. TAAC-Air is working to expand the employment envelope for the C-208 by developing a soft field landing and air drop capabilities. This in turn will free Mi-17 helicopters for other mission sets and operating environments for which it is uniquely designed.

C-208s operate from Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand and can forward deploy to improved and some unimproved airfields throughout the country. A mix of CLS and organic maintenance provides sustainment support for the C-208 fleet and will be required for the foreseeable future.

The AAF has a shortage of qualified C-208 aircrew members primarily due to reassignment of C-208 pilots to A-29 and PC-12 aircraft. The C-208 utilization will continue to grow as new aircrews are trained. Low pilot manning numbers will improve as the training pipeline increases pilot output throughout 2016. Recent training efforts in the C-208 include aircraft commander, instructor pilot, and evaluator pilot upgrades in support of building a self-sustaining force. There are currently 11 trained C-208 crews.
The AAF use the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to attack targets of strategic significance and to provide critical air support, such as aerial fires, to ground forces. The A-29 can carry Mk-81 250-lb bombs, Mk-82 500-lb bombs, rockets, and two .50 cal machine guns mounted in the wings. The A-29 is also capable of employing laser-guided bombs, but due to low aircrew experience levels, technical issues with front seat targeting and aircraft performance limitations, employment training has been delayed. However, the A-29 pilots continue to achieve high accuracy with unguided bombs, and there has been no operational impact due to the delay of the laser-guided bomb training.

Eight A-29s are in Afghanistan along with their Afghan pilots and associated maintenance personnel. Twelve more Afghan A-29s are at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, to support pilot and maintenance training, and will be delivered to Kabul by late 2018.

The second class of eight A-29 pilots are scheduled to complete training by March 2017. The third class of 21 maintenance personnel arrived at Moody Air Force Base in September 2016. The remaining twelve A-29 deliveries to Afghanistan will be synchronized with subsequent graduating classes of pilots and maintenance personnel. The current schedule builds the AAF A-29 fleet to 12 by 2017 summer campaign and is set to achieve a fully fielded capability of 20 airframes by the end of 2018. In addition, 90 maintenance personnel will be trained over this timeframe, and the AAF is forecast to achieve organic maintenance capability for the A-29 by 2022. Initially, the AAF will rely on CLS to sustain the A-29s while Afghan maintenance personnel continue to be trained in the United States. Twenty-seven maintenance personnel have returned from training in the United States and are continuing maintenance training in Afghanistan.
The Mi-17 helicopter conducts day and night personnel transport, CASEVAC, resupply, close combat attack, aerial escort, and aerial assault missions. Making up just less than half of total AAF aircraft, the Mi-17 is considered the “workhorse” of the AAF. The AAF is capable of deploying and operating Mi-17s throughout the country.

Thirteen Mi-17s are configured with a fixed forward firing capability and seven of those are also capable of employing rockets. Armed Mi-17s accounted for more than 81 percent of the aerial fires missions tasked in support of ANDSF operations during the reporting period. Using the Mi-17s as armed gunships limits the AAF’s ability to employ Mi-17s in support of other mission sets such as CASEVAC and aerial resupply.

The AAF has an adequate number of Mi-17 aircrews to operate the current fleet but it is not projected to reach full manning until 2017. During the reporting period, Mi-17 gunship-qualified aircrews increased from 28 to 35, including two qualified AAF instructor pilots.

AAF capability to maintain Mi-17s is adequate with more than 338 AAF maintenance personnel, but the AAF relies on CLS for heavy work and aircraft overhauls. Given the AAF’s high Mi-17 utilization rate, CLS is critical to absorbing the extra phase maintenance work required for the AAF to maintain an operational fleet. Moreover, at the current attrition and flying hour rates, the number of AAF Mi-17s available for 2017 will be significantly diminished, and the MI-17 fleet will become unsustainable by mid-2018, virtually eliminating the AAFs vertical transport and lift capability. TAAC-Air advising efforts are helping the AAF mitigate these challenges by improving logistics processes, improving planning for and prioritization of Mi-17s, and using other airframes for mission sets currently reliant upon Mi-17s.
The MD-530 helicopter provides close air attack and aerial escort capability to the ANSF. In August 2016, the last four MD-530s were delivered to Kabul after undergoing upgrade modifications in the United States, bringing the total to 27 delivered since March 2015. The MD-530 has two weapons pylons, capable of firing .50 caliber machine guns and rockets. Building upon progress during the last reporting period, the AAF has developed and executed limited expeditionary capability for the MD-530 facilitating operations outside of Kabul, including in Kandahar Province, Mazar-e-Sharif in Balkh, Shorab in Helmand, and Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan.

The AAF currently relies on CLS for MD-530 sustainment but is building its organic maintenance capability. As of November 30, 2016, there are only 34 AAF maintenance personnel for the MD-530. TAAC-Air is working with the AAF to increase the number of MD-530 pilot and maintainer students in training in order to maximize independence and sustainability of the fleet. Full aircrew manning is forecast to be achieved by 2018.
Training

The development of human capital remains a critical component of overall AAF progress. The AAF has not yet trained sufficient operations and maintenance personnel for its current and projected fleet. The AAF possesses good capability in current mission sets with the crews and aircraft on-hand, but does not yet have the capacity to meet demands, driving high operations tempos and trade-offs in fleet management and employment strategy. Although senior AAF leadership is slow in promoting strategic change, TAAC-Air has seen positive developments in the overall leadership emphasis on training aircrews. The pipeline for potential pilots remains limited, but is growing.

The AAF continues to struggle with identifying candidates in sufficient time to complete the complex, multi-agency vetting process prior to training start dates and with adequate English language skills to begin training. Training effectiveness is assessed using metrics based on completion of English language training accomplished at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and completion of the associated technical training. All C-130 loadmasters, flight engineers, maintenance personnel, and pilots, as well as A-29 pilots and maintenance personnel, require 55 out of 100 on the English Comprehension Level exam prior to departing for training in the United States. Once there, all AAF trainees go to DLI to improve their English language scores until they reach the proficiency level required for each position. Additionally, there is an English language training contract in Afghanistan with 18 instructors – 17 in Kabul, 1 in Kandahar – that provide English language instruction to improve the proficiency and scores of those Afghans awaiting training.

As of November 30, 2016, 223 students are enrolled in 6 U.S.-funded training programs that support AAF development. Training courses cover basic pilot training, aviation safety, and language training, in addition to airframe-specific training for aircrew and maintenance personnel. This includes 172 enrolled in pilot training and 32 training to be aviation mechanics. On average, it takes three to four years to train a pilot and five to seven years to train an expert maintainer. Two A-29 pilots are scheduled to attend the instructor pilot course in December 2016, which will enable a unit training capability previously only provided by coalition advisors.

TAAC-Air focused TAA efforts on developing professional aviation practices, including mission planning, avoidance of civilian casualties, and airspace discipline. Advising continued on air-to-ground integration, the Afghan national targeting policy and procedures to nominate, process, prioritize and execute targeting. TAAC-A advisors are developing training programs to build future capabilities, such as using the A-29 to deliver precision guided munitions, and airdrop capabilities for the C-208 to alleviate cargo requirements from the Mi-17.

Development of a cadre of ATACs is an important aspect of ensuring the AAF’s growing capabilities are utilized to support ANDSF ground forces. TAAC-Air worked with the AAF to integrate aerial fires by embedding ATACs and Air Liaison Officers with the ANA corps. Furthermore, TAAC-Air established training programs to improve air to ground integration and minimize civilian casualties. The Afghan air academy, Pohantoon-e-Hawayee (PeH), graduated 105 ATACs before June 1 for 205th, 209th, and 207th Corps. PeH graduated 25 more on October 25, 2016. TAAC-Air conducted exercises for the graduates to give them practical range
experience coordinating aerial fires. TAAC-Air is rewriting the PeH courseware to share with PeH instructors to increase the skill set of ATAC graduates.

**Sustainment**

TAAC-Air’s sustainment TAA efforts included establishing a flying hour management program and developing an airframe overhaul scheduling process. Logistics TAA efforts focused on ammunition supply management, vehicle maintenance, supply processes, and improving inventory accountability.

All AAF aircraft platforms will require varying degrees of CLS through at least 2023. Some platforms, such as the C-208, are nearly independent of CLS and others such as the Mi-17 are nearly entirely dependent on it. Additionally, as coalition advisors draw down, the ability for AAF to get parts and sustain their systems will become a challenge, particularly for the Mi-17, as they currently lack planning and discipline required to keep their fleet operational. In the Kabul area, maintenance support is relatively stable due to coalition and CLS presence. However, outside of Kabul, the AAF has limited CLS presence and continues to face difficulties with fleet readiness; on site Afghan maintainers manage the day-to-day maintenance of those aircraft, but the aircraft must return to a base with CLS maintenance for the more specialized phase inspections.

The long-term advising objective is to develop a mix of organic and contract maintenance and logistics management support, allowing organic maintenance to conduct routine maintenance and time-based inspections and contract maintenance to perform heavy, depot-level repairs and aircraft overhauls.

The ANDSF demand for Mi-17 airlift, when coupled with maintenance inspection requirements required to be conducted at regular hourly intervals, exceeds the AAF’s ability to maintain aircraft. Unless a disciplined flying hour program, including mission prioritization and appropriate tasking processes is implemented, TAAC-Air anticipates a backlog of Mi-17 overhauls in 2018. This will hinder the AAF’s operational capability.

Additionally, as coalition advisors draw down, the ability of the AAF to order parts and sustain its systems will present a challenge, as it currently lacks the planning and discipline required to sustain the fleet and continues to rely primarily on paper-based rather than automated systems such as Core-IMS.

During this reporting period, the AAF began effectively utilizing its own aviation fuel contract with coalition oversight. This was a positive step forward in capabilities; previously, the coalition had taken the lead to order and account for aviation fuel. There have been challenges, however, as fuel payments have been delayed at the MoD level. Also, AAF mission requirements within hostile areas have exceeded the fuel distribution capability of the MoD and ANA logistics and supply elements.
Operations

Over the past 12 months, the AAF has seen an increase in its aerial fires capabilities following the delivery of eight A-29 light attack aircraft and an increase of 18 MD-530 helicopters to a total of 27. The AAF’s A-29 capabilities, while still limited by pilot and aircraft numbers, have demonstrated positive and encouraging growth since their first combat operations in April 2016. The MD-530 is proving to be a flexible and effective close attack air platform, and the AAF has demonstrated the capability to integrate A-29s, MD-530s, ScanEagle ISR, and ATACs for airstrikes in support of operations in Helmand Province.

TAAC-Air advisors continue to stress the importance of incorporating air assets into Afghan operational planning. The AAF has demonstrated responsiveness to ground forces by stationing aircraft across the country and by conducting missions in support of nearby ground forces as requested. Through emphasizing deliberate and integrated air-ground operations in TAA efforts, the advisors are building the Afghan capability to shape the battlefield.

The AAF is improving in its air-ground integration capabilities, based upon lessons learned from the 2015 campaign and are integrating more attack aircraft during 2016. ATACs are gaining proficiency during air-to-ground exercises. The ATACs are capable of amplifying the effects of air strikes through direct coordination between the corps and aircraft, even though the majority of aerial attack missions are conducted to support last-minute requests for assistance. Air-ground integration is gradually improving as the corps recognize the improved support they receive from aviation assets when ATACs are employed correctly.

Tactical employment of the A-29 has exceeded expectations and continues to improve. As of November 30, 2016, the A-29 force has undertaken 156 missions since the first operational mission on April 14, 2016. Crews are making sound professional decisions, deploying munitions effectively and precisely, and exercising good judgement and restraint and adherence to the targeting process to prevent civilian casualties. As a result, there have been no civilian casualty incidents attributed to the A-29. ATACs are increasingly integrated into operations and enhancing A-29 effectiveness during air-to-ground engagements. In addition, the winter 2016-2017 campaign plan will provide an opportunity to reduce operations and conduct advanced day training for the ATACs and further develop night capabilities.

The AAF continues to utilize its Mi-17s at a very high rate, with the fleet flying more hours than in 2015. The lack of a disciplined flying hour program and nearly exclusive focus on support missions is contributing to a reduction in pilot training, increased maintenance demands, a high accident rate, and lower aircraft maintenance availability rates. In addition, ground commanders routinely do not plan to maximize the cargo carried by the aircraft, which unnecessarily increases aircraft utilization. The AAF’s use of a contractor for non-combat missions, particularly AAF and ANA soldier transport, alleviates some of the burden from the Mi-17s, though not at a sufficient rate to mitigate the need to adhere to a flying hour program or increase the fleet size. In addition, in order to alleviate strain on the Mi-17 fleet, RS advisors are assisting the AAF to increase the percentage of cargo carried by the C-208 and C-130s and developing an airdrop capability for the C-208.
The AAF has made great strides in developing CASEVAC capabilities; CASEVAC missions increased 25 percent over 2015 and their response times continue to decrease. As of November 30, 2016, AAF moved 8,276 patients this year, compared to 6,476 during the same timeframe in 2015. The AAF flies between 1 and 10 CASEVAC missions daily utilizing the Mi-17, C-130, C-208 and Ariana contracted aircraft. The AAF is increasingly reliant on the C-208 aircraft for CASEVAC, decreasing the heavy demand on the Mi-17 helicopters. The AAF has increased its total number of flight medics by 20, representing a 40 percent increase in personnel supporting CASEVAC missions. In August 2016, 12 of these medics completed training and the remaining 8 are scheduled to commence training in the winter 2016-2017 training period.

MoD Afghan Special Security Forces

The MoD ASSF components – the ANASOC, the Ktah Khas, and the SMW – continue to demonstrate that they are the most capable forces within the ANDSF and as a result have the highest operational tempo. Afghan special operations forces are widely considered to be some of the best in the region and continue to mature with further coalition assistance. They have proven their ability to conduct counterterrorism raids successfully and they are furthering their capability to analyze and exploit intelligence gained from these operations. SOJTF-A and NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) tactical-level TAA efforts with Afghan special operations forces have resulted in an increase in the number of Afghan independent and enabled operations; the ASSF conducts more than 80 percent of its operations unilaterally. The ASSF maintains the lowest attrition rate amongst all ANDSF pillars except the AAF, with an attrition rate of 1.02 percent during this reporting period, and maintains an 88.5 percent reenlistment rate.

The ASSF are increasingly able to achieve tactical and operational level success, including deterring high-profile attacks, disrupting resource stream networks, and denying terrorist and insurgent freedom to maneuver. Due to their high levels of effectiveness, the confidence ANDSF leadership place in the ASSF, and the ability to conduct operations at night, the ASSF tend to be overused, leading to challenges with the implementation and adherence to an effective operational readiness cycle. Ministry and GS leadership understand the capabilities and intended purpose of the ASSF, yet still use them for tasks such as retaking district centers and manning static checkpoints.

MoD ASSF pillars rely primarily on MoD elements and typically the closest ANA corps headquarters and regional logistics node for sustainment support. ASSF units – primarily the ANASOC – rely heavily on HMMWVs and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles with heavy armor to provide a protected mobility capability and carry large caliber weapons such as the M2 .50 caliber machine gun.

Enhanced cross-pillar coordination and resource allocation will better enable the ASSF to improve its mobility and maneuverability across Afghanistan. In addition, cross-pillar coordination will address gaps in the ASSF’s logistic sustainment, intelligence fusion and development, and operational coordination capabilities.

49 High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles
The ANASOC’s mission is to increase the Afghan Government’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency, stability operations, and, as directed, execute special operations against terrorist and insurgent networks in coordination with other ANDSF pillars. ANASOC is a division-level headquarters responsible for command and control of all ANA special operations forces. The ANASOC is currently authorized 11,700 personnel and is organized into 10 battalion-sized ANA Commando SOKs. The SOKs are the primary tactical elements of the ANASOC and conduct elite, light-infantry operations against threat networks in support of the regional corps’ counterinsurgency operations and provide a strategic response capability against strategic targets. Each SOK contains eight ANA Special Forces teams and several support elements. Nine of the 10 SOKs are aligned with specific ANA corps. The 6th SOK, located in the Kabul area, functions as the ANA’s national mission unit as part of the National Mission Brigade. While the ANASOC comprises approximately six percent of the ANA manning, it conducts a majority of the ANA’s offensive missions.

The ANASOC continues to be used for mission sets outside of its intended purpose, including checkpoint security, static defensive missions, and short notice ministerial-directed missions that lack proper operational planning. Aside from failing to make use of the unique capabilities and expertise ANASOC can provide, these misuses contribute to problems with operational readiness. Throughout the 2016 spring and summer campaign, the ANASOC’s operational tempo remained high and, coupled with ineffective logistical support from ANA corps, resulted in lower ANASOC operational readiness rates. Despite these challenges, the ANASOC continued to achieve multiple operational successes such as the liberation of detainees held by the Taliban and the removal of hundreds of insurgent and terrorist group members from the battlefield.

ANASOC has prioritized force generation during this reporting period. It partnered with the ANA Recruiting and Training Commands to conduct targeted recruiting campaigns with an emphasis on logistics, intelligence, signals support, and medically trained personnel. In addition, retention remains high; between 90 and 95 percent of personnel reenlist. At times, recruiting and retention can outpace training capacity; current class sizes at the ANASOC School of Excellence well exceed capacity, and the school remains under resourced. For calendar year 2016, ANASOC School of Excellence will conduct 107 courses, which includes 2 Commando courses (1,664 graduates), 1 Special Forces Qualification Courses (153 graduates), and 98 specialty courses (3,268 graduates).

Ktah Khas

The Ktah Khas is a light infantry special operations kandak consisting of three operational companies, a training company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, a support company, and a headquarters company. These additional companies support the Ktah Khas training cycle and support operations including transportation for the Ktah Khas strike forces, explosive ordnance disposal to conduct counter-IED operations, and supporting the female tactical platoon which enables interactions with women and children on missions. Ktah Khas platoons and companies are accomplished in independently conducting intelligence-driven
counterterrorism raids, particularly against high-value individuals, and vehicle interdictions utilizing both ground and air mobility platforms. The *Ktah Khas* is authorized 1,280 personnel and at approximately 1,050 personnel, it remains close to full strength.

As with other ASSF institutions, the *Ktah Khas* is adversely affected by overuse, and subject to over involvement of MoD management. The MoD, and the GS G3 in particular, are heavily involved in the operational control and maneuver of *Ktah Khas* forces. During this reporting period, the *Ktah Khas* were frequently used in crisis or emergency situations, such as rapid deployments to Kunduz and Helmand in response to Taliban offensives. Although successful, these deployments disrupted the *Ktah Khas*’ force generation and training processes and degraded readiness of units for specialized, night-time counterterrorism operations.

The *Ktah Khas* commander and staff effectively lead operational planning with limited coalition support. They are quick to execute operations in and around Kabul; however, operations in other areas are often delayed or hindered due to insufficient logistical capabilities such as transportation and life support. Although continuing to develop, *Ktah Khas* leadership deficiencies have slowed advances in *Ktah Khas* operational capacity, leadership development, expeditionary mission command, and personnel management. Moreover, poor internal communication between staff elements and operational units persists, hindering effective logistical support.

*Ktah Khas* conducted a strong recruiting and training effort during the 2016 summer, which resulted in filling approximately 200 vacancies in its end strength. *Ktah Khas* relied on pamphlets, brochures, and posters to enhance efforts to reach potential recruits. It is continuing to develop its ATAC capability, which allows *Ktah Khas* personnel to coordinate aviation assets and aerial fires support on behalf of the *Ktah Khas* commander on the ground.

**Special Mission Wing**

The SMW is a special aviation wing that provides expeditionary reach for the ASSF for counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks in Afghanistan. The SMW enables helicopter assault force raids and provides resupply, close air attack, CASEVAC, and ISR support for ASSF and ANA conventional forces. The SMW is the only ANDSF pillar with night-vision, rotary-wing air assault, and fixed-wing ISR capabilities. The SMW consists of four squadrons, two located in Kabul, one in Kandahar Airfield, and one in Mazar-e-Sharif. The SMW is now permanently based in northern, central, and southern Afghanistan providing the ASSF with operational reach across Afghanistan.

The SMW currently has more than 745 personnel out of an authorized 858 person end strength. Recruiting standards for the SMW are higher than for the AAF or other ANDSF pillars. Both the MoD and the coalition vet all SMW recruits to ensure they are capable of maintaining a high standard of operations and professionalism. The SMW struggles to find qualified candidates to fill pilot and maintenance personnel slots.
Although among the best trained Afghan forces, the SMW has similar command and control struggles as other elements of the ASSF. ANA General Officers frequently call or task SMW units directly with missions rather than going through proper channels. These circumventions divert SMW assets from planned missions and disrupt the flying hour and maintenance management programs.

**Airframes**

The SMW now possesses 23 of 30 authorized Mi-17 V5s, 5 of 6 authorized Mi-17 V1s, and 17 of 18 authorized PC-12s. The Mi-17 V1s are used primarily for counternarcotics missions. Figure 11 details the number of SMW airframes, fully trained pilots, and fully trained flight crews. In addition to the number of pilots listed below, there are currently one Mi-17 and four PC-12 co-pilots in training.

**Figure 11: Summary of SMW Airframes, Pilots, and Aircrews***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Fully Trained Pilots</th>
<th>Qualified Aircrews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mi-1740</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC-12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*as of November 30, 2016

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40 This includes the Mi-17 V5 and Mi-17 V1 variants.
**Mi-17 Helicopter**

The primary mission of the Mi-17 fleet is to enable ASSF helicopter assault force raids for both counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions. Additionally, the Mi-17s are used to conduct resupply operations, CASEVAC, quick reaction force and personnel movement, and provide reconnaissance support.

Two of the Mi-17 V5 airframes began heavy repairs or overhauls during the summer of 2016. Heavy repairs and overhauls require specialty Mi-17 maintenance infrastructure, and are conducted by contracted maintenance teams in third-country locations, such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. In addition, one of the counternarcotics-focused Mi-17 V1s underwent a cockpit modification in the summer of 2016. Finally, the Mi-17 Vs are capable of being armed with fixed forward-firing weapons, including a .50 caliber machine gun and rocket pods.
The SMW utilizes the PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft to conduct ISR in support of counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations, including overwatch of ASSF ground assault forces and helicopter assault force raids during both daytime and night time operations.

Seventeen PC-12 aircraft are currently operational, providing the ANDSF with day and night surveillance and air-based signals intelligence capabilities. The PC-12 can send full motion video to a ground station, and the onboard crew can perform real time analysis of data being collected. Despite these capabilities, SMW personnel still require training to improve the integration of intelligence into combat operations.
**Sustainment**

SMW organic logistics and maintenance capacity is growing and is stronger than AAF maintenance capability due to higher standards and better training. The SMW is prioritizing funding for facility maintenance, new construction, and vehicle repairs. Contractors are required to perform all maintenance on the PC-12 fleet even though SMW has a limited Afghan PC-12 maintenance capability to conduct launch and recovery operations with 23 maintenance personnel. Attracting qualified personnel remains a top priority to develop the PC-12 maintenance training program.

A combination of contractors and approximately 145 SMW maintenance personnel provide sustainment support for the Mi-17 fleet. Afghan SMW maintenance personnel perform approximately 55 percent of low-level scheduled service inspections for the Mi-17, but cannot conduct the complex, depot-level maintenance required to sustain the aging Mi-17 fleet over the long term.

To develop its organic maintenance capacity further, the SMW has developed a detailed five-year maintenance plan that will aim to have it independent of coalition and contractor support by December 2020. Training of maintenance personnel remains a slow process, as it takes between five and seven years to train and mature an aircraft mechanic sufficiently to work independently.

**Operations**

The SMW operates four squadrons capable of conducting independent missions in support of ASSF elements. They continue to demonstrate improvements in operational effectiveness and efficiency, as well as independence. For more than a year, more than 85 percent of all helicopter assault operations planned are executed unilaterally by the Afghans.

The SMW demonstrated national-level coordination capabilities when it conducted three simultaneous helicopter assault force raids during the same night. PC-12 aircraft provided live ISR capabilities at locations in Kandahar, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif, enabling Mi-17 crews to successfully insert more than 100 soldiers successfully, capture Taliban prisoners, and return with all team members.

Most SMW missions are counterterrorism missions, with air movements, CASEVAC, and a small number of counternarcotics missions also flown during this reporting period. The SMW remains agile and capable to execute increasing numbers of planned and short-notice missions in support of ASSF.

The SMW continues to plan new capabilities in support of the ASSF. A “fast rope” rappelling modification, which allows for insertions of soldiers into dense or urban terrain where a helicopter cannot land, has been installed on one Mi-17, and is undergoing testing and validation exercises with elements of the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU). Afghan aircrew training to support fast rope insertions is being developed and is scheduled to begin in summer 2017. Once operational, the GCPSU will have the ability to conduct assaults in dense urban areas such as Kabul.
SECTION 5 – MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

5.1 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

The MoI oversees the ANP, which includes four pillars and three sub-pillars that focus on providing security for specialized mission sets, investigations, and supporting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations (see Figure 12). The MoI is led by General Taj Mohammed Jahid, who was confirmed as Minister on January 24, 2016.

Ahead of the SY 1396 *tashkil* development process, President Ghani directed that the MoI establish a commission to develop strategies to optimize headquarters staff and identify critical personnel requirements and changes for the MoI and the ANP. The commission was chaired by the MoI’s Chief Legal Officer Major General Shuja and included experienced professional police officers with more than 10 years of service in the force. The commission’s key structural recommendations include consolidating the Deputy Minister (DM) offices of Counter Crime and Counter Narcotics and the DM offices of Administration and Support, the establishment of a new Highway Directorate from within the ABP, creation of a Crisis Response Directorate to improve disaster response and synchronization of relief efforts, realignment of the ANCOP under the DM for Security to improve counterinsurgency activity coordination, and elimination of the redundant First DM position. The recommendations were delivered to MoI leadership and as of November 2016, Minister Jahid has approved the strategies to optimize the headquarters staff.

*Figure 12: Ministry of Interior Organizational Chart*

In addition to RS advisory efforts, eight other organizations and several bilateral advising programs continue to focus on MoI institutional reform and improving the professionalism of the ANP. These organizations include the European Union Police mission, the UN Development
Program, UNAMA, the German Police Project Team, and U.S. Government agencies, including the Department of State and Department of Justice. Several of the organizations coordinate their efforts through the International Community Advisor Steering Council, which meets weekly in Kabul.

The overall MoI authorized uniformed end strength includes positions for the MoI headquarters and the ANP pillars (see Figure 13). The Afghan Government also funds more than 9,500 civilian positions for the MoI. Beginning in SY 1394, the MoI adjusted its tashkil to begin counting the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) under the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) authorized level. However, the AACP remains a separate pillar and retains a separate command and control system.

**Figure 13: Ministry of Interior Manning Authorization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police by Pillar</th>
<th>Solar Year 1393</th>
<th>Police by Pillar</th>
<th>Solar Year 1394</th>
<th>Solar Year 1395</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
<td>22,955</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
<td>23,315</td>
<td>23,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
<td>15,223</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
<td>16,203</td>
<td>17,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Anti-Crime Police &amp; General Command of Police Special Units</td>
<td>10,864</td>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>2,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
<td>90,299</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police (includes Afghan Anti-Crime Police)</td>
<td>100,402</td>
<td>103,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior HQ &amp; Institutional Support</td>
<td>14,659</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior HQ &amp; Institutional Support</td>
<td>15,144</td>
<td>10,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTHS Accounts</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>TTHS Accounts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated Resources</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unallocated Resources</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Police Authorized</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total Police Authorized</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resource Management and Procurement**

The MoI continues to use the National Procurement Authority’s contract writing services to compensate for its limited capacity to draft and manage complex procurement contracting actions. Additionally, the National Procurement Authority developed procurement training programs and is teaching procurement law to the MoD and MoI in order to improve ministerial contracting processes and adherence to policy and law. As a result, the MoI has demonstrated noticeable improvement in its contracting capabilities over the last several months. Specifically,

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51 Beginning in SY 1394 the MoI and ANP began counting the AACP as part of the AUP on its tashkil although it remains a separate force pillar.

52 In SY 1395 the MoI and ANP adjusted the training, transient, holding, and student account on their tashkil to account for those members participating in out-of-country training for periods greater than six months.
it has established a number of FY 1395 contracts and multi-year framework contracts for recurring expenses, such as food and fuel.

The MoI continues to make steady progress on its FY 1395 budget execution, with 69 percent of its $936 million budget executed. As of November 30, 2016, the MoI has awarded contracts totaling $12 million in FY 1395, and the Requirements Approval Board had approved 155 of 277 contracts identified in the FY 1395 Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan. Finally, 48 framework contract bids have been advertised; 22 of those contracts have completed the entire contract bid process and have been awarded.

The MoI is better positioned to execute its procurement plan in FY 1396 because it began preparations earlier in the budget cycle than in previous years. The MoI’s FY 1396 Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan was delivered in June 2016 in accordance with the FY 1395 commitment letter. The Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan is critical to ensuring the MoI resource management and procurement offices are positioned to meet the FY 1396 contracting demands in a timely and efficient manner. Additionally, the use of two-year framework contracts, representing 60 to 70 percent of recurring annual requirements, enables the MoI to have the majority of its annual contracting process completed well before FY 1396.

Similar to the MoD’s FAST program, the MoI Subject Matter Expert (SME) program recruits young, college-educated, and technically-proficient Afghans to provide skilled civilian support to the MoI. As of November 30, 2016, the SME program hired 269 people out of an authorization of 300. SMEs have been employed across the country, within the ministry offices and in the ANP zones. The successful integration of SMEs into the MoI and their high job satisfaction has resulted in less than 10 percent turnover during the program’s 3 years of operation. As with the MoD’s FAST program, EF 1 advisors are working with the MoI and EF 4 advisors to transition SMEs into civil servant tashkil positions within the next three years. CSTC-A is working with the MoI while also developing the FY 1396 commitment letters to make funding for the SME program contingent upon progress on transitioning these personnel into full-time, permanent civilian positions in the MoI.

**Legal Affairs**

The MoI possesses the basic systems and organizations to investigate and adjudicate allegations of GVHR and corruption. However, the MoI leadership’s political will to hold violators accountable remains inconsistent at best, and many of the internal components within MoI devoted to investigating GVHRs are also tasked with other responsibilities. The volume of corruption and GVHR allegations identified within the MoI consistently surpasses those within the MoD, and the MoI has not demonstrated the capacity to train personnel on rule of law issues.

The MoI is progressing slowly in its ability to investigate GVHR cases, with known incidences of GVHRs often remaining uninvestigated for months. Although a multi-disciplinary committee with responsibility for reporting and tracking GVHR investigations was created in December 2015, the committee has only met sporadically since then. In August 2016, CSTC-A imposed a penalty on the MoI headquarters preventing use of U.S. funds for travel until investigations are...
launched for all cases and until the committee documents an internal operating procedure to explain how it will responsibly oversee the prosecution process.

During this reporting period, the MoI made limited progress on intra-ministerial (Human Rights Department, Criminal Investigative Division) and inter-ministerial (Attorney General’s Office, Ministry of Justice) coordination and cooperation on GVHR cases. As the reporting period came to a close, RS increased its focus on TAA efforts with the ANP to prevent violations of human rights and reduce corruption. Despite initial optimism when the new Afghan Attorney General was appointed in February 2016, the process to refer cases to the Attorney General’s Office is broken. Cases are referred, but the Attorney General’s Office frequently does not act upon these referrals in a timely manner or at all in many instances.

EF 2 advisors continue to work with the MoI IG office, particularly the Professional Standards Unit, Anti-Corruption Unit, and the Analysis and Evaluation offices, to develop MoI capacity to investigate and conduct oversight over ministerial activities. Major TAA activities this reporting period included assisting the MoI with implementation of the Counter and Anti-Corruption Plan, further development and oversight of the MICP, and improvement of planning, execution, and reporting of scheduled and special inspections. In addition, coalition advisors are working with the MoI to develop the IG capacity at the police zones. In August 2016, three officers were appointed per zone, and the MoI continues efforts to build their staff.

Despite attempts at political interference, threats, and bribery, the MCTF has demonstrated improvements in effectiveness and capability, as evidenced by the recent arrests and suspension of senior officials for corruption. The MCTF has high-level support within the Afghan Government, and President Ghani has pledged to double the size of the MCTF to more than 300 personnel. On June 30, 2016, President Ghani named the MCTF as the investigative arm of his newly created Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), and the MCTF subsequently dedicated a team of 12 investigators to support the ACJC. The ACJC establishment has the full support of the international community. During this reporting period, the MCTF, through ASFF funds, purchased sophisticated law enforcement equipment to improve their surveillance capabilities.

**Personnel Management**

The MoI utilizes Web-Enabled Payroll System (WEPS), a United National Development Program (UNDP)-developed system, as its primary payroll system. While the WEPS provides automated computation of pay, the system is vulnerable to manual adjustment and does not currently integrate into AHRIMS, which affects the validity of personnel records used in WEPS. The ongoing development of APPS will improve the payroll capability through integration of personnel management and automated pay processes.

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53 The objective of the ACJC is to increase coordination between prosecutors and investigators by co-locating them within the same organization, enabling rapid action against accusations of corruption. The ACJC opened August 23, 2016, but is still not fully operational.

54 ANP provincial headquarters send personnel status reports to UNDP-managed WEPS. UNDP manages WEPS as a part of its responsibilities in implementing the support for payroll management program under Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).
In July 2016, the Commander, RS submitted a letter to Minister Jahid directing him to provide the coalition with a viable action plan to address personnel accountability and “ghost” personnel in Helmand and within the ANP overall. The conditions in the letter call for a full inspection of the ANP’s personal asset inventory and complete and accurate AHRIMS, biometric ID card, and payroll systems records that have been verified and validated by various MoI offices including the IG. Entry of biometric data into the system that will eventually link to the biometric ID cards is slow but steady at the zone level, but in general the MoI has made more progress than the MoD. While data entry progresses, data management still presents a challenge; personnel managers are not reliably using AHRIMS for personnel transactions, causing the computer record to inaccurately reflect paper records.

Readiness reporting within the MoI remains a challenge for ANP pillars. Further development of the National Police Coordination Cell remains integral to improving both readiness reporting and command and control. Coalition advisors are working with the MoI to improve readiness reporting mechanisms to better inform senior MoI decision makers. TAA efforts this reporting period also included assistance to the MoI in developing, signing, and implementing readiness reporting SOPs for the ANP zone headquarters and across the MoI. Advisors lack confidence in readiness data reported from echelons lower than the zone, where advisors are not present to validate the data.

As of November 19, 2016, the MoI has successfully reduced the number of untrained ANP to 2.45 percent. Additionally, the Police Institutional Advisory Team has visited four Regional Training Centers (RTC). The objective of the RTC visits is to develop a better understanding of systemic issues across the institutional training enterprise in order to improve TAA efforts at ANP Training General Command. Additional coalition advisory efforts during this reporting period included the execution of three “train-the-trainer” courses, counter-IED courses for ANP personnel, and checkpoint training workshops with ANP pillars in Kabul.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

Although the SY 1395 tashkil increased the personnel authorizations for the MoI Security Assistance Office, it remains under-staffed and disconnected from the major elements of the MoI logistics chain. From May through August 2016, the MoI Chief of Logistics position was vacant. EF 5 advising efforts made filling the position its top priority, and by August 2016, the position was filled.

Persistent challenges with the MoI and ANP management of logistics and maintenance includes a lack of qualified personnel to fill tashkil authorizations, in large part because personnel with specialized skills, such as Core-IMS training, are routinely diverted to support immediate operational needs outside of their specialties. As a consequence, the MoI and ANP zone headquarters do not effectively use Core-IMS, and requisitions for supplies and spare parts often take months before processing. To address the problem, the MoI has assigned at least two contracted logistics specialists to each zone headquarters to assist in Core-IMS implementation. These specialists assist in data entry and management and provide training to ANP members how to use the Core-IMS system.
During this reporting period, a distribution plan for approximately 87,000 M16s and M4s was finalized, and a contract was awarded in August that included a one-for-one return of AK47s. Serviceable AK-47s turned in by the ANA will be transferred to the ALP; unserviceable weapons will be demilitarized in accordance with U.S. end-use monitoring requirements.

Less than 15 percent of the MoI’s fleet of more than 47,000 vehicles is composed of tactical vehicles, including protected mobility vehicles. EF 5 advisors are focused on increasing the MoI’s tactical vehicle ratio because the MoI force pillars are often far from urban centers and major lines of communication and transportation. Similar to that in the MoD, this effort includes reducing the size and diversity of the fleet to make it easier to sustain. The MoI relies almost entirely on CLS for maintenance support, which continues to result in high operational readiness rates for its fleet. However, as a result, the MoI and ANP forces have minimal organic maintenance capability.

MoI advisors have continued to focus with their counterparts on a transition to NATO-standard weapons, finalizing the SY 1395 Fuel Contract, planning for the winter campaign, estimating cost of disposable and vehicle demilitarization and disposal processes, and improving the timeliness and accuracy of monthly consolidated logistics readiness reports.

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

Overall deficiencies in the MoI planning process reflect the challenges associated with the decentralized nature of the MoI and its various force pillars, the limited ability of ANP staff at the operational and tactical level to implement strategic guidance, competing priorities, and external influencers at the lower levels. Institutional and structural changes within the MoI have helped to improve its strategic level planning capability, but this capability lags behind the MoD. During this reporting period, Minister Jahid signed the Common Policy Agreement to help the MoI and the ANP improve internal behaviors, professionalize the force, and generate greater policing capability and mobility. Coalition advisors will provide monthly reports to both the Afghans and RS leadership on the Common Policy Agreement implementation progress; the MoI’s compliance with these guidelines will trigger both rewards and penalties.

Since the establishment of the police zone headquarters in November 2015, the ANP is still integrating the zones into their operational and planning processes. Minister Jahid, a former ANA corps commander, had little experience at the national level or in the MoI prior to his appointment. As a result, establishment of systems, processes, and command structure during his tenure remains slow. As of September 2016, Minister Jahid has not signed the standard operating procedure to assign responsibilities to the zones and codify their use. As a result, the MoI has not defined planning products required from the zones and bypasses the zone chain of command.

Minister Jahid recently chaired the first Strategic Leadership Board, developed in concert with coalition advisors, which uses an improved monitoring and evaluation system to provide relevant feedback on progress. The board has two key outputs: decisions on priorities and resourcing in order to maintain progress on the strategic goals of the MoI Strategic Plan (MISP), and requests
for associated international support. The MoI is reviewing the five strategic goals of the MISP to ensure that the subordinate objectives are both comprehensive and relevant. Some restructuring of the MoI will be necessary to ensure efficient implementation and effective command.

At the operational level, the ANP demonstrated effectiveness in crisis and event planning, but lacks the ability to incorporate strategic guidance. Although ANP leaders have begun working more closely with their ANA counterparts on deliberate, planned operations, ANP operational planners are often less involved in planning for larger counter-offensive operations and crisis situations.

**Intelligence**

The greatest challenge within MoI intelligence is redundancy within the MoI’s internal intelligence organizations and its underdeveloped ISR capabilities. Because no single organization exists in the MoI to coordinate intelligence operations and direct priorities among the various intelligence units, the MoI suffers from duplication of intelligence efforts. These issues are less acute for MoI intelligence support to ASSF pillars, which continued to improve during this reporting period.

The MoI’s Operational Intelligence Unit (OIU), composed of more than 1,830 personnel, served as the primary human intelligence collection capability for the DPI and conducted source operations nationwide alongside the ANP Pillars. OIU personnel in the provinces remain subordinate to the DPI and work alongside Provincial Chiefs of Police. As part of its SY 1395 ministerial plan, OIU expanded its source network during this reporting period while working to increase cooperation both within the MoI and across pillars.

The integration of biometric and forensic information with police operations, investigations and judicial prosecution will improve after the relocation of several MoI intelligence units to the new MoI headquarters facility. Additionally, the targeting component of the MoI intelligence cycle, the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC), will be closer to the ANCOP, AUP; and ABP, facilitating a stronger relationship between police intelligence and operations.

The Police Intelligence Training Center (PITC) continued to expand police intelligence-based training within the ANP pillars and to surpass its training course delivery goals outlined in its SY 1395 ministerial plan. The PITC continued to work with the Training General Command and the MoI to secure funding to support current training as well as additional efforts to increase their mobile training team capability. After a review of their basic course offerings, PITC is currently developing intermediate intelligence courses.

**Strategic Communication**

At the ministerial level, the MoI continues to be an effective communications office that actively messages success and responds in a timely fashion to emerging crises. However, below the ministerial level, the MoI has uneven capacity to develop effective messaging independent of ministerial-level direction. A contributing factor to this capacity challenge is insufficient Manning within the MoI Media and Public Affairs Directorate (MPAD). LOTFA discontinued
its support for the salaries of 22 national technical advisors within the MPAD in March 2016, and CSTC-A has been providing temporary funding since April 2016. As of August 2016, the MoI was attempting to reorganize its tashkil to ensure sufficient funding and personnel slots for those civilian positions.

The MPAD successfully develops and distributes counter-messaging that responds to insurgents’ messaging in the media space. After recent high-profile attacks on police recruits in June 2016 and on a Hazara political demonstration in July 2016, the MoI quickly coordinated information and messaging efforts with its MoD counterparts to release timely and accurate media releases. During the attack against the Northgate Hotel contractor compound in August 2016, the MoI also used social media effectively to communicate emergency messages and updates to the public. Afghan Government communicators now use a WhatsApp social media group to coordinate information and messaging in order to reduce response time and to disseminate facts before insurgents have an opportunity to influence the public narrative.

During insurgent activities in Helmand and Kunduz provinces in August 2016, both the MoI and the MoD directed local Strategic Communication Media Centers to coordinate messaging at the provincial level. In both cases, the Afghan Government disseminated its desired messages broadly and rapidly, indicating that both the MoD and the MoI are increasingly capable of establishing coordinated communication and ad hoc infrastructure that enable quick reaction and responses during crisis situations.

The MoI also demonstrated strong strategic communication capability during Operation Shafaq in Nangarhar Province in July and August 2016. MoI personnel worked closely with their MoD and ANA counterparts to generative positive media coverage of ANDSF operations in the area. This coordination included the Independent Directorate of Local Governance spokeswoman in press activities, further demonstrating the Afghan Government’s “whole-of-government approach” to fighting the insurgency.

Beyond counter-messaging efforts, the MPAD has continued to develop its communication capabilities in support of the MoI and ANP. Over the course of 2016, the MPAD has partnered with EUPOL to develop a survey-based media campaign to educate police and the Afghan public on the expected standards of conduct for police officers. This initiative advances a key effort from the MoI to rebrand the ANP as a police force providing community policing in the eyes of the Afghan population.

**Gender Office Efforts**

The proportion of women in the MoI and ANP is much higher than that in the MoD and the ANA. The MoI has been more successful, in part because it has demonstrated and articulated the unique policing capability women bring to the ANP. Moreover, the MoI has begun developing a formal career progression plan for women that develops their skills and enhances their eligibility for promotion.

Over the last few months, the MoI and ANP have begun addressing deficiencies in support to women in the GCPSU. The GCPSU is making several facility improvements and tailoring
training interventions for female officers to help meet goals outlined in the current GCPSU Human Rights and Gender Action Plan draft. The GCPSU Human Rights and Gender Officer routinely visits female facilities and meets with National Mission Unit commanders and female members to establish cultural requirements for female staff facilities. Female recruits receive initial training at the Special Police Training Center prior to their assigned post within the Command.

The MoI has identified facilities requirements for the women in the ANP; examples include training centers, barracks, changing rooms, toilets, child care, classrooms, and gyms. In particular, the new MoI headquarters building was built with an integrated child care center. The MoI has also undertaken improvements to the Family Response Units to ensure safe facilities for ANP staff, women, and children who report abuse.

Building on the progress from the conventional female ANP training course, in September 2016, the first female non-commissioned officer training program commenced in Sivas, Turkey, with 250 new recruits attending. In support of this program, the MoI has developed a recruitment conference plan to recruit 1,200 women over the next year from across the provinces to fill this training program. The RS Gender Office has also conducted or facilitated several training programs with the MoI and ANP forces during this reporting period. For example, the TAAC-S gender office provided training on first aid, defensive tactics, and weapons handling for local policewomen at the Joint Regional ANDSF Center and Kandahar International Airport. Additionally, it worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and EF 3 advisors to continue first aid and human rights training for local policewomen. In a joint effort with U.S. and Romanian Special Forces, the TAAC-S gender office conducted training with a select group of Afghan policewomen to integrate them into Afghan special operations, which provides the added benefit of permitting direct interaction with Afghan civilian women during tactical operations.

Despite this progress, the MoI and ANP gender integration efforts have room for improvement. Of specific concern, many female-only positions are currently filled by males, frequently due to institutional, cultural, or leadership obstacles. Because there is no formal process to remove males from female-only positions, many women are left without an assignment to a tashkil position.

5.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The ANP maintain civil order, reduce corruption, and prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics to provide security for individuals and the community, as well as safeguard legal rights and freedoms. Although the ANP currently focus on working with and alongside the ANA to fight the insurgency, the long-term goal remains to transition the ANP to a more traditional community police force.

ANP forces are often on the front lines during the “hold” phase of counterinsurgency operations, but they are not sufficiently trained or equipped for traditional counterinsurgency tactics; they have limited or no crew-served weapons, anti-armor weapons, armored vehicles, or ISR assets. This focus and employment on more typical counterinsurgency-type functions has hindered the
ANP’s development of sufficient anti-crime and other community policing capabilities. The ANP is generally recognized to be several years behind the ANA in its development.

Afghan National Police Strength

The ANP have an authorized end strength of up to 157,000 personnel; as of November 20, 2016, the ANP had approximately 147,635 personnel (see Figure 14). This does not include approximately 501 students in the police academy, 188 in the Staff College Command, and 2,704 enrolled in ten Regional Training Centers. Although the number of women within the ANP continues to increase and is now approximately 2,635, women comprise 1.78 percent of the total ANP end strength. Given the challenges associated with “ghost” personnel and other personnel accountability issues, RS is employing measures such as the personnel asset inventory process to gain greater visibility and accountability of ANP end strength.

Figure 14: ANP Strength

Note: The ANP strength depicted above includes the AUP, the ABP, the ANCOP, and the AACP.
* Attrition encompasses all unplanned and planned losses.
** Gain includes all gains (recruits, re-accessions, and return from dropped from the rolls) to ANP strength.

During this reporting period, the ANP average attrition rate was 2.11 percent, which is consistent with its three year historical average of 1.88 percent. Although the ANP continues to demonstrate positive recruiting rates, reenlistment remains the primary challenge to maintaining effective strength. As in the ANA, the number of ANP personnel who are dropped from the rolls continues to be the largest portion of overall ANP attrition. ANP personnel frequently deploy to remote checkpoints with minimal provisions and equipment for lengthy time periods; the

55 ANDSF personnel strength, recruiting, retention, and attrition information is derived from Afghan reporting. RS analysts interpret the Afghan data and rectify discrepancies and inconsistencies.
combination of difficult living conditions and near-constant possibility of combat contributes to many ANP personnel leaving the ranks.

The ANP General Recruiting Command leadership submitted a petition to the LOTFA / MoI Pay and Compensation Board to re-establish re-contracting incentive pay for all police in order to curb the rising attrition rate. Additionally, the LOTFA/MoI Pay and Compensation Board is conducting a comprehensive study of the ANP salary structure to reconcile current salaries with the rising cost of living.

**Afghan National Police Structure**

The ANP is composed of four pillars – the AUP, the ANCOP, the ABP, and the AACP – the GCPSU, and three additional sub-pillars – the ALP, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). The ALP and the APPF are not counted as part of the 157,000 *tashkil*, but provide additional security under the MoI: the ALP are funded by ASFF while the APPF do not receive any U.S. funding. The ANP is divided into eight zones that generally align with the ANA corps areas of responsibility. There are nine ANCOP brigades, eight of which are with an ANP zone and an additional brigade located in Helmand Province (see Figure 15).

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56 The AUP includes the Provincial Police Headquarters, District Police Headquarters, Police Precincts, Traffic Police, and the General Directorate of Firefighting and Emergency Response.
In response to security challenges in Kunduz during this reporting period, the MoI formed three additional police districts by transferring 58 *tashkil* personnel authorizations from existing districts and redirecting authorizations saved from the previous downsizing of underequipped MoI explosive ordnance disposal teams. The MoI also reorganized the GCPSU’s Investigation and Surveillance Units to improve intelligence collection within the Afghan provinces. Finally, in June 2016, the AUP General Command was disbanded and the former commander was appointed First Deputy, DM for Security, a position that will maintain supervisory oversight of the ALP.

The ANP’s leadership and management organizational structure remains a challenge within the ANP zone headquarters. Some zones, including ANP Zone 606, are substantially further along in their development. However, all ANP zone headquarters continue to lack full command and control of all police forces within their region.

**Afghan Uniform Police**

With its approximately 86,000-person end strength, the AUP is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary police force that the local populace will encounter in their daily lives. The AUP consists of the traffic police, the fire and rescue departments, and a provincial police headquarters in each of the 34 provinces.
The mission of the AUP is to maintain the rule of law and provide security and civil order, prevent cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and prevent the smuggling of weapons and other public property like historical and cultural relics. Other duties of the AUP include the detention of criminal suspects to be handed over to the judicial system, maintenance of reliable security measures for key infrastructure including roads and facilities, intelligence collection, and the provision of firefighting and rescue services during natural or man-made disasters. Leadership across AUP units varies, but generally senior MoI and AUP leaders do not empower the lower levels to make decisions. Moreover, local AUP units and leaders are susceptible to influence by local power brokers and government officials.

**Afghan Local Police**

The ALP is designed to provide security within villages and rural areas to protect the population from insurgent attacks, protect facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. ALP personnel are typically recruited with local elder approval and employed within villages to provide local security and prevent the spread of insurgent influence and activity in that area. The current ALP end strength is approximately 28,367 out of an authorized end strength of 30,000. ALP units are present in all eight police zones throughout the country, but they are not in four provinces (Panjshir, Bamyan, Khost, and Nimroz). NSOCC-A provides TAA support to the ALP at the ALP Staff Directorate level.

Compared to the previous several reporting periods, the ALP have made notable progress; nevertheless, many challenges remain. The ALP continue to have challenges related to leadership, training, funding for sustainment, and insufficient equipment support. Despite these obstacles, the ALP’s capability and operational effectiveness continues to increase, and the coalition has worked to support MoI-led efforts to increase accountability and oversight. For example, over the last several months approximately 76 percent of all weapons, equipment, vehicles, and ammunition provided to the ALP have been registered with the MoI Directorate of logistics, and over 100 ALP have been referred to the justice system due to misuse of authorities or human rights abuses.

The ALP continue to be tactically misemployed by Provincial and District chiefs of police. Moreover, when ALP checkpoints come under attack, they are often not reinforced by neighbouring ANP or ANA forces. The MoI and ALP Staff Directorate are developing a map of checkpoints to manage the locations of checkpoints across the nation. Once completed, the National Police Command Center will use the new map to establish plans for quick reaction forces to provide direct support to ALP checkpoints under attack.

The coalition, and NSOCC-A advisors in particular, continue to support the MoI-led ALP district assessments, which have proven effective at increasing accountability and oversight. Annual ALP self-assessments include assessing equipment, the number of personnel, recruitment, training, personal protective equipment, pay, logistics, vehicle maintenance, and tactical employment. Assessment teams are composed of personnel from ALP, AUP, MoI Logistics, and the General Recruiting Command. In addition, the next set of assessment teams have been
tasked with properly cataloguing and serializing ALP equipment, weapons, vehicles, and other major items to develop an ALP property book, which will increase transparency and oversight.

Support to the ALP from the ANP National Logistics Center has improved over the last several months. However, limited accountability for equipment and supplies at the ANP provincial headquarters results in the diversion or misallocation of these items, in particular motorcycles and pickup trucks, before they can be distributed to the intended ALP units. To address this issue, the MoI Deputy Minister for Security and Deputy Minister for Support released a directive mandating that all ALP supplies and equipment received at the ANP Regional Logistics Centers must be signed for and distributed by an ALP chief or their designee.

The AUP take a majority of the training slots at the various ANP training centers, leaving few remaining spots for the ALP. In addition, when training slots are available, provincial and district chiefs of police often will not take ALP Guardians off of checkpoints to attend training. Moreover, the remote, rural locations of many ALP Guardians make traveling to regional training centers a challenge. To address this, the MoI has sent mobile training teams to some of the more remote districts and villages. As of November 22, 2016, 23,774 ALP Guardians have received training, and 412 are currently in training.

ALP personnel continued to be enrolled in personnel and pay systems throughout the reporting period. As of November 22, 2016, 22,595 ALP Guardians have been slotted into tashkil positions in AHRIMS with 15,981 personnel records uploaded into the system, and 22,888 ALP Guardians have been enrolled in the electronic funds transfer and/or mobile money systems. The ALP does not report the number of ALP Guardians being paid by trusted agents. Although integration into electronic databases will assist in preventing corruption and improving personnel management, effective leadership is required to enforce continued use of the system.

**Afghan National Civil Order Police**

The ANCOP provides the primary offensive capability within the ANP. The ANCOP mission includes dealing with civil unrest and reacting to insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas. The ANCOP also conducts civil order presence patrols and provides response capabilities to handle crisis or counterterrorism events in urban and metropolitan areas and to mitigate violent public incidents. ANCOP units support the ANA during clearing operations providing intelligence, tactical support, and manpower to hold and secure terrain as it is seized. With approximately 15,000 personnel, the ANCOP current end strength has remained close to its authorized manning level.

The ANCOP consists of nine brigades, eight of which are largely aligned with the ANP zones, the ninth of which is deployed to Helmand. Because ANCOP units receive a higher level of training than typical AUP or other ANP pillars and have an often misunderstood mission set, local police commanders and political officials frequently misemploy ANCOP units for tasks outside their mission set.
**Afghan Border Police**

The ABP is strategically arrayed to secure and safeguard national borders, provide security at Afghanistan’s international airports, and maintain security in the border security zone – which extends 30 miles into the territory of Afghanistan – in order to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. This includes securing and patrolling border and control entry ports, such as airports and border-crossing points, and guarding against the illegal entry of persons, weapons, narcotics, and other goods. ABP forces along the border are trained and equipped with rifles, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and 82mm mortars. The ABP current end strength is approximately 20,982 personnel out of an authorized strength of 23,599. The ABP headquarters is located in Kabul, and brigade-level units are assigned to six zones throughout the country that nest under the ANP zones. RS advisors continue to train, advise, and assist the ABP at the headquarters level through the ANP zones.

ABP responsibilities are categorized into two distinct sets: a paramilitary mission and a more traditional border police-type mission. This dual mission supports the overall ANDSF model of achieving layered security and unity of effort with both ABP and ANA forces along the borders. The paramilitary mission involves providing security in the 30 mile zone along Afghanistan’s border. The policing mission involves providing security in the 30 mile zone along Afghanistan’s border. The policing mission involves providing security in the 30 mile zone along Afghanistan’s border. The policing mission involves providing security in the 30 mile zone along Afghanistan’s border. On June 30, 2016, the Ministry of Finance assumed responsibility for the 614 Afghan Customs Police from the ABP.

**Afghan Anti-Crime Police**

The AACP provides specialist police expertise and counterterrorism, anti-corruption, criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics, and specialized security detail support. Coalition subject matter experts work side-by-side with their Afghan counterparts in the AACP’s forensic and biometric programs to support evidence-based operations. AACP personnel also work closely with criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges to ensure that the police remain the primary face of the rule of law. AACP structures include the AACP headquarters, the Criminal Investigation Directorate, and the Counterterrorism Police division. The AACP also includes the MCTF. With approximately 100 police officers, the AACP manning has stayed close to its full end strength as authorized under the *tashkil*.

**Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan**

The CNPA is the lead ANDSF pillar for counternarcotics efforts. It consists of regular narcotics police and specialized units that are located in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit, National Interdiction Unit, and the Intelligence Investigation Unit. The CNPA has approximately 2,000 personnel assigned, with approximately half in Kabul and the other half in the provinces.

The MoI’s National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), which are components of the CNPA, continue to demonstrate their capability through interdiction.

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57 Evidence-based operations entail arresting individuals for whom there is sufficient unclassified evidence to attain a conviction in an Afghan court of law.
operations that target senior narcotics traffickers. CNPA operations during this reporting period included the arrest of a major drug producer and trafficker in eastern Afghanistan with ties to the Taliban, multiple operations in and around Kabul and in Kandahar Province that resulted in the seizure of narcotics and processing equipment, and a coordinated helicopter raid in concert with the SMW that resulted in significant narcotics seizures in eastern Afghanistan. NSOCC-A provides support to the NIU for joint counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations, training, and sustainment. These advisors collaborate with U.S. Government interagency partners such as the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Agency.

Afghan Public Protection Force

The APPF is a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MoI and was originally established to provide contract-based facility and convoy security services, its current end strength is approximately 16,000 personnel. The APPF currently guards key infrastructure, facilities, governmental and non-governmental public welfare projects, and other international projects. The APPF also escorts and protects convoys against insurgent attacks and provides security for NGOs and international organizations with diplomatic immunity and political agencies of foreign countries located in Afghanistan. In addition, the APPF is responsible for protecting facilities donated to the Afghan government by international organizations and the private sector. No set tashkil authorization exists for the APPF, and the force is largely funded by billing customers for contracted work. Currently, NATO and U.S. forces do not support the APPF financially except through the security contracts already in place, and the coalition does not advise the APPF as part of the RS mission.

MoI Afghan Special Security Forces

General Command of Police Special Units

The GCPSU is the MOI component of the ASSF, and provides the ANP with a capability to conduct rule-of-law operations based on evidence in accordance with Afghanistan’s Criminal Procedure Code, execute high-risk arrests, and respond to high-profile attacks. The GCPSU also often provides rapid response to critical situations such as emergencies or hostage scenarios. Due to its employment in these situations, the GCPSU incurs a higher rate of casualties than other specialized ANP units, which contributes to combat fatigue, higher attrition, and challenges with maintaining overall personnel and equipment readiness. The GCPSU authorized end strength is approximately 7,042 with a current end strength of approximately 5,881 personnel as of November 20, 2016.

The GCPSU is responsible for the command and control of all MoI special police units, including three National Mission Units, 33 PSUs that operate in direct support of the provincial chiefs of police, and 19 Investigative and Surveillance Units. In practice, because provincial chiefs of police and provincial governors oversee payroll systems and salaries for the PSUs, they

58 The APPF was established subsequent to Presidential Decree #62 signed on August 17, 2010. The decree’s intent was to decrease the presence of private security contractors operating in Afghanistan. However, in August 2015 President Ghani signed Presidential Decree #66 which allows U.S. forces, NATO, and their respective contractors to use private security contractors outside of NATO and U.S. facilities or if they are in “direct support” of the ANDSF.
are frequently more responsive to provincial officials’ directives than to the GCPSU chain of command.

The GCPSU Special Police Training Center provides both basic and advanced infantry training. There are two advanced infantry courses per year with 25 students in each class. GCPSU recruits are typically drawn from other ANP units – usually AUP – and are chosen specifically for their skills and experience.

During this reporting period, a number of high-risk arrest operations demonstrate the ability to conduct complex, independent helicopter and ground assault force operations. However, the GCPSU remain reliant on coalition enabler support, including ISR support, rather than the appropriate ANP units in that zone.
SECTION 6 – FINANCING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The ANDSF continue to be funded primarily through annual congressional appropriations to the DoD via ASFF, which supports the equipping, sustainment, training, and operations of Afghanistan’s security forces. NATO Allies and partner nations also play a prominent role in the financial support of the ANDSF by contributing to the NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF), which supports the ANA, and the UNDP-administered LOTFA, which pays the salaries of police and builds MoI capacity. In addition, the Afghan Government draws upon its domestic revenues to contribute to ANDSF sustainment and operations and to pay for food for ANDSF personnel. The ANDSF will continue to depend on coalition security and advisory assistance and donor financial assistance for 2016 and beyond. At the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the Afghan Government did reiterate its original commitment made at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago to increase financial support incrementally each year to its own security forces until it assumes full financial control of the ANDSF in 2024, also known as the “decade of transformation.”

6.1 HOLDING THE AFGHAN MINISTRIES ACCOUNTABLE

CSTC-A continues to oversee measures to ensure the Afghan Government’s proper use of funds from the United States and international donors. Good stewardship of U.S. taxpayer dollars remains a top priority for USFOR-A, which has incorporated the recommendations of independent agencies, the DoDIG, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) into its processes. CSTC-A continues to place stringent financial controls on U.S. and international contributions through a series of financial commitment letters with the MoD and the MoI. USFOR-A is also developing a financial intelligence and forensic accounting capability to gain greater oversight of U.S. funds. The financial commitment letter process assists the Afghan Government in its ability to implement transparent and accountable fiscal processes that are essential to securing continued funding from the international community. The conditions contained in the commitment letters address critical conditions the ANDSF must meet to help ensure continued progress towards increasing Afghan capacity, capability, and self-sustainment.

The FY 1395 commitment letters are comprehensive and include more than 80 conditions that encourage transparency and accountability of equipment and resources. These letters establish expectations for the responsible management of direct contributions from ASFF, NATF, and LOTFA. If the criteria spelled out in the commitment letters are not met, funds can be decremented from total direct contributions or withheld until corrective steps are taken. These enforcement mechanisms underpin U.S. messaging to Afghan leadership that they must demonstrate accountability and transparency in the expenditure of donor funds.

Since the end of the first quarter of FY 1395 on March 19, 2016, the coalition has begun conducting quarterly reviews at the two-star general officer level to assess MoD and MoI progress on meeting conditions outlined in the commitment letters and determine responses as appropriate when the Afghans do not meet conditions. The first two quarters of SY 1395 have...
seen mixed success in meeting the conditions outlined in the commitment letters. The second quarter saw a slight improvement, with 66 percent of conditions demonstrating satisfactory progress compared to 60 percent demonstrating satisfactory progress in the first quarter. Recommended penalties decreased from 12 (seven for the MoI and five for the MoD) in the first quarter to only five (four for the MoI and one for the MoD) in the second quarter. However, all second quarter penalties were a repeat from the first quarter. Additionally, the second quarter included five recommended incentives (four for the MoD and one for the MoI) for meeting conditions in the Commitment Letters. Penalties for non-compliance include reduced fuel allocations and withholding of equipment and are most often imposed as part of the MoD Executive Steering Committee and MoI Executive Oversight Council meetings.

6.2 U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

The United States provides the bulk of funding necessary to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF through ASFF, an annual appropriation made available to the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, for the purpose of providing assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan. ASFF is a key enabler and critical component of the U.S. mission, providing the funding necessary to establish an effective, sustainable, and affordable ANDSF. The FY 2016 ASFF appropriation is $3.652 billion, and the President’s FY 2017 budget request includes $3.449 billion for ASFF. Since FY 2005, Congress has appropriated more than $67 billion for ASFF.

6.3 INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

At the 2011 Bonn Conference, the international community agreed to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF beyond the end of the NATO ISAF mission on December 31, 2014. At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, the international community reaffirmed its commitment to this process and to the financial sustainment of the ANDSF. Financial commitments made during, or in the run up to, the Chicago Summit totaled more than $1 billion per year for 2015, 2016, and 2017 (in 2012 dollars), divided between NATF and LOTFA.\(^59\) At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the international community reaffirmed its commitment to the financial sustainment of the ANDSF, and nations renewed their financial pledges through 2017.\(^60\) Finally, during the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the majority of donor nations pledged funding for Afghanistan at or near the level of their previous financial pledges for the years 2018, 2019, and 2020, reaching over 90 percent of total annual contributions from the 2012 Chicago Summit.

International donors provide funding either on a bilateral basis or through one of two multi-lateral channels, NATF and LOTFA. Approximately one-half of all international contributions for ANDSF sustainment, which were reconfirmed at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, are expected to flow through the NATF, with the remainder through LOTFA. To provide transparency and accountability of donor funding, donor nations have the opportunity to

\(^{59}\) Commitments at the Chicago Summit were made in Euros and other national currencies. Due to fluctuations in exchange rates and the increased strength of the U.S. dollar, the value of funding provided by international donors in FY 2016 is estimated at approximately $913 million based on October 2016 exchange rates.

\(^{60}\) Donor commitments can be found in the classified annex to this report.
participate in the Kabul-based ANDSF Funding Oversight and Coordination Body, co-chaired by the Afghan Ministry of Finance and representatives from major international donors, which receives regular updates from the Afghan Government and CSTC-A.

DoD manages NATF on behalf of international donors to provide support and sustainment of the ANA. Since the beginning of the NATF in 2007, 31 nations have contributed more than $1.5 billion. For calendar year 2016, 31 nations have pledged $405.5 million, and as of August 2016, NATF had received $221.5 million in contributions. Since Afghan FY 1394, CSTC-A has enforced a NATF commitment letter with the MoD and the MoI that relies on the same stringent controls included in ASFF commitment letters.

The UNDP has managed LOTFA since its inception in 2002. The UNDP receives and manages donor contributions through LOTFA to pay the salaries of up to 157,000 members of the ANP, and CSTC-A coordinates closely with the UNDP regarding the use of LOTFA. Donor nations have the opportunity to participate in the LOTFA Project Board, which provides oversight over activities funded by LOTFA.

6.4 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS

The primary responsibility for sustaining the ANDSF in the future rests with the Afghan Government. The 2012 NATO Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan specifies that “as the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan Government grow, Afghanistan’s yearly share will increase progressively from at least $500 million in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces.” Given Afghanistan’s persistent security challenges and limited economic growth, fulfilling this commitment will be a challenge. However, the U.S. Government and international donors agree that the Afghan Government should continue to increase its ANDSF funding contributions over time so as to assume significant financial responsibility for the ANDSF by 2024.

The Afghan Government committed to providing $500 million, or 25 billion Afghanis, at the 2012 exchange rate, in support of the ANDSF starting in 2015 with the expectation from the international community that this contribution would gradually increase over time. The 2016 Afghan national budget allocates 26.8 billion Afghanis ($393 million) for the ANDSF. Although this is below the original $500 million pledged at the Chicago Summit, due to the decline in the Afghani’s value over the last several years, the United States and international community accept that the Afghan Government is meeting its obligations in its local currency and that the government is showing a gradual increase in its ANDSF contributions. The United States is also working with the ANDSF to bring costs down to a level sustainable for the United States and international community in the near term and the Afghan Government over the long term.

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61 Since 2012, the value of the Afghani has fallen roughly 22 percent relative to the U.S. dollar.
Efforts to Increase the Afghan Government’s Financial Responsibility for the ANDSF

Increasing Afghan Government revenue is important to long-term ANDSF sustainment and to the stability of the Afghan Government. The ability of the Afghan Government to assume increased financial responsibility for the ANDSF is also closely tied to the functioning and growth of the Afghan economy. During this reporting period, the Afghan government took important steps to increase legitimate government revenue and to facilitate economic growth, but the prospects for robust economic growth in the near-term remain limited. The United States, the international community, the Afghan Government, and civil society organizations continue to work together in mutually reinforcing ways to support a sustainable Afghan economy, and to those ends, on June 29, 2016 Afghanistan became a member of the World Trade Organization.

During this reporting period, FY 1395 Afghan Government revenue continued its upward trend. The Afghan Government collected nearly 9.8 billion Afghanis through May 2016, five months into the fiscal year. The increased collections reflect roughly a 30 percent year-over-year improvement. Ministry of Finance officials continue to attribute the enhanced performance to internal improvements, such as personnel changes and increased attention on anti-corruption initiatives, as well as the additional revenue measures enacted in 2015. The MoD and the MoI’s use of framework contracts have also contributed to cost reductions in contracted goods and services as a direct result of open tender bidding and regionalizing contracts by provinces. The Ministry of Finance’s internal year-end revenue target is 144 billion Afghanis, while the FY 1395 budget calls for 133 billion Afghanis, leaving open the possibility of a year-end budget surplus.

The Afghan Government continues to implement a range of economic, governance, and anti-corruption reforms. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) provided a construct to help guide Afghan-led reforms, many related to economic and financial development, as international donors continue providing extraordinary levels of assistance. The TMAF was replaced by the “Self-Reliance Through Mutual Accountability Framework,” (SMAF) adopted at the Senior Officials Meeting in September 2015. The SMAF outlines the reform commitments of the Afghan Government through 2018 and lays out agreed principles of effective international donor assistance. During the October 2016 Brussels Conference on development assistance for Afghanistan, the Afghan Government presented their renewed SMAF and Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework, which detail the government’s strategic plan for achieving self-reliance and provide benchmarks for reform efforts. Other international fora, such as the Asian Development Bank-sponsored Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program, the Heart of Asia Istanbul Process, and the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, provide opportunities for regional leaders to break down trade barriers, increase cross-border investment, and improve trade routes in Central and South Asia.

CSTC-A continues to work with the Afghan Government to ensure appropriate oversight of direct contributions to the MoI and the MoD. The FY 1395 commitment letters consolidated, eliminated, or refined 85 of the original 170 conditions in the FY 1394 commitment letters. Additional changes include structuring incentives to encourage the government to meet its Chicago commitment of $500 million annually. The conditions for Afghan Government use of
ASFF contributions within the FY 1395 commitment letters focus on improving and implementing enduring ANDSF processes and systems directly linked to strengthening accountability of equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel, personnel, and pay – all areas of opportunity for corruption and graft.

Finally, CSTC-A is assisting the MoD and the MoI as they develop their resource management and procurement capacity. This effort focuses on strengthening the MoD and the MoI’s ability to manage their fiscal resources more effectively while helping to provide oversight of U.S. and international funding being spent by the Afghans. For instance, CSTC-A is integrating all ASFF- and LOTFA-funded forces into the AHRIMS in order to account for all personnel disbursements to ANDSF. Initiatives such as the MoI subject matter expert program, the MoD’s FAST program, and implementation of the APPS will help automate and streamline the payroll process and reduce the incidence of “ghost” soldiers or “no-shows” receiving pay. As the ANA implements the APPS, CSTC-A plans to provide full funding only for authorized tashkil positions that are paid electronically and fund all other positions at 80 percent of the authorized amount. CSTC-A continues to perform and assist with independent assessments and audits to ensure appropriate scrutiny of Afghan financial processes and make recommendations for improving Afghan capabilities. Improving the ability of the MoD and the MoI to provide appropriate oversight and accountability of international funding for the ANDSF and developing Afghan capability in financial management will remain a core focus of the RS TAA mission.
ANNEX A – INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

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<tr>
<th>Essential Function</th>
<th>Indicators of Effectiveness</th>
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| **EF 1:** Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution | • The MoD and MoI are able to accurately identify requirements, programs and funding over a 3-year horizon based on strategic guidance  
• MoD and MoI are able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements  
• Ministry of Finance provides timely guidance to MoI and MoD for budget development and formulation process  
• MoD and MoI are able to execute their spend plan within budget and stipulated timeframes  
• MoD and MoI are able to solicit, evaluate, submit, and award procurement contracts to ensure timely acquisition and budget execution as planned  
• MoD employs a payroll execution process that can fully pay all their employees accurately, timely and in a secure fashion  
• MoI possesses an effective and efficient system to recruit and hire subject matter experts.  
• MoD possesses an effective and efficient means to manage, train, and effectively employ contracted FAST personnel to build capacity within the Ministry. Further, the MoD provides a means for contracted FAST employees to compete through a merit based process for civilian *tashkil* positions. |
| **EF 2:** Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight | • MoD and MoI fully implement respective Counter and Anti-Corruption plans and internal controls  
• MoD and MoI engage with anti-corruption initiatives carried out by relevant non-governmental organizations and governments to gather information, gain insight into trends and initiatives, and share expertise in order to build internal capacity and capability. |
| **EF 3:** Rule of Law and Governance | • MoD identifies, investigates and appropriately acts on GVHR allegations  
• MoD achieves organizational capacity to support GVHR and CAC process and has appropriately staffed and qualified units to prevent or address GVHR and corruption  
• MoD and MoI identifies, investigates, and appropriately acts upon corruption  
• MoI identifies, investigates, and tracks GVHR cases to final adjudication |
EF 4: Force Generation

- MoI appropriately staffs and qualifies units to prevent and address GVHR and corruption
- MoD utilizes the automated personnel management system of record down to the corps level for slotting personnel and maintaining sufficiently accurate and complete personnel records
- MoI utilizes the automated personnel management system of record down to the provincial headquarters level for slotting personnel and maintaining sufficiently accurate and complete personnel records
- MoD establishes a system to integrate and synchronize lessons learned, tactics, doctrine, and programs of instruction with manpower, budget, logistics, and facility requirements
- Based on force structure requirements, MoD and MoI deliver and maintain a professional workforce through established career paths, merit-based advancement, and career/talent management of personnel in order to meet Afghanistan's current and future internal security requirements
- ANA establishes a system for training in air and ground coordination to improve integration capability
- ANDSF embrace civilianization in line with the 2012 Chicago Summit goal. ANDSF Develop a sustainable civilian workforce strategy and realistic civilianization implementation plan
- ANP are trained and qualified in accordance with current approved ANP curriculum and able to pass a performance check

EF 5: Logistics and Maintenance

- Measurement and reporting of logistics information has command emphasis within the MoD and ANA
- Both MoD and ANA, and MoI and ANP codify processes for generating and capturing requirements
- Transition management of national nodes and inventory management of commodities to MoD and MoI
- ANA organic maintenance is supplemented by contractors
- ANP adequately executes a demand-based inventory management system.
- MoI assumes responsibility for equipment maintenance, which is transitioned from the coalition-funded AMS contract
- MoD and MoI have developed a sustainable operational medical resource optimization process
- MoD and MoI have sufficient numbers of trained and qualified health care personnel to fill tashkil.
- MoD and MoI have operational and sustainable medical logistics processes
- Afghan-backed Afghan Medical Council (AfMC): establishes and sustains ANDSF and Afghan national healthcare
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EF 6: Command and Control Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• MoD and MoI are capable of managing their portions of frequency spectrum for the Afghan government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MoD and MoI are able to identify and sustain key information and communications technology infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MoD and MoI are able to sustain information management systems throughout their lifecycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MoD and MoI implement fundamental cybersecurity structures and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MoD and MoI are able to produce and sustain information and communications technology forces that are manned, trained and equipped to conduct operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Office of the National Security Council delivers strategic security documents through a robust process |
| MoD and GS deliver strategic defense documents through a robust process |
| MoI Deputy Ministry for Strategy and Policy & Deputy Minister Security deliver strategic interior documents through a robust process and resulting implementation, delivering guidance to ensure a robust departmental force management process |
| ANDSF plan and issue orders from the operational to the tactical level |
| ANDSF coordinate and execute effective operations |
| ANASOC capable of employing ground assault forces, operating logistics systems, and budgeting |
| AAF conducts sustainable operations, including staff planning functions, air mobility operations, and aerial fires missions |
| ANDSF demonstrates emerging capabilities in force generation |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EF 7: Intelligence</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• MoI expands and evaluates operational intelligence capability in support of MoI requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• DPI provides planning, programming and budgeting management for MoI intelligence capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• DPI contributes to the National Campaign Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• DPI develops operational intelligence in support of MoI requirements and counter corruption efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MoI creates, expands and maintains ISR capabilities in support of intelligence requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• President of Afghanistan and National Security Advisor establish the National Intelligence Directorate as part of the Office of the National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MoD develops collection management capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MoD intelligence is integrated into corps-level planning and operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- MoD is able to train, field, employ, and sustain ISR enablers
- Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence conducts strategic analysis and develops strategic estimates for the strategic planning process
- Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence provides planning, programming and budgeting management for MoD and ANA intelligence capacity building
- Development of MoD intelligence sustainment capability
- MoD conducts national security and counterintelligence activities against internal and external threats including special operations, analysis, personnel security, and foreign disclosure duties
- MoD conducts sustainable geographical intelligence and topography support to MoD components and other national-level organizations
- MoD conducts sustainable technical intelligence operations to support overall intelligence collection effort
- MoD conducts sustainable human intelligence collection operations to support GS G2 and Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence
- MoD develops the ANA intelligence institutional training capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EF 8: Strategic Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- MoD Public Affairs develops and sustains policies and procedures designed to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic communication guidance, priorities and direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MoD Public Affairs plans, synchronizes, and implements public affairs policy, plans, and guidance in support of strategic and operational plans, goals, and objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MoD Public Affairs executes planned and directed public affairs operations and tasks in support of public information, community engagement, and command information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MoI Public Affairs plans, synchronizes, and implements public affairs policy, plans, and guidance in support of strategic and operational plans, goals, and objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MoI Public Affairs develops and sustains policies and procedures designed to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic communication guidance, priorities and direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MoD GS G3 Information Operations develops plans and annexes in order to provide required guidance to subordinate units; assesses the performance and effectiveness of information operations in subordinate units; and integrates non-lethal effects into the MoD targeting process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MoD: conducts information operations in support of national-level security and crisis response operations, assists subordinate units with planning and execution of operational-level information operations, and provides information operations training as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MoD conducts sustainment operations in order to effectively manage resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Gender | • MoD and ANA implement approved strategies and plans to increase women's participation in the ANDSF through addressing women's recruitment, selection, training placement, promotion, progression retention and support  
• MoD provides appropriate and safe facilities, equipment, training career opportunities and working environments for women in the ANDSF  
• MoD takes action to reduce and respond to sexual harassment and gender-based violence in ANDSF workplaces  
• MoI and ANP implement approved strategies and plans to increase women's meaningful participation in the ANDSF through addressing women's recruitment, selection, training, placement, promotion, progression, retention and support  
• MoI provides appropriate and safe facilities, equipment, training/career opportunities and working environments for women in the ANDSF  
• MoI takes action to reduce and respond to sexual harassment and gender-based violence in ANDSF workplaces |
# ANNEX B – ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACP</td>
<td>Afghan Anti-Crime Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resource Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAREC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Recruiting Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANASOC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPS</td>
<td>Afghan Personnel and Pay System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATAC</td>
<td>Afghan Tactical Air Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bilateral Security Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASEVAC</td>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMT</td>
<td>Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLS</td>
<td>Contract Logistics Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core-IMS</td>
<td>Core-Information Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLI</td>
<td>Defense Language Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPI</td>
<td>Directorate of Police Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>Essential Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Functional Area Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Forward Supply Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GCPSU</td>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVHR</td>
<td>Gross Violation of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL-K</td>
<td>Islamic State – Khorasan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed-in-Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOTFA</td>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAR</td>
<td>Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCTF</td>
<td>Major Crimes Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISP</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Strategic Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPAD</td>
<td>Media and Public Affairs Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATF</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Information Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMIC</td>
<td>National Military Intelligence Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSOCC-A</td>
<td>NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTEC</td>
<td>Network Targeting and Exploitation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC – P</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center – Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC – R</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center – Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONSC</td>
<td>Office of the National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>PITC</td>
<td>Police Intelligence Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoAM</td>
<td>Program of Actions and Milestones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAID</td>
<td>Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Resolute Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFIRE</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOJTF-A</td>
<td>Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOK</td>
<td>Special Operations <em>Kandaks</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY</td>
<td>Solar Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAAC</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAAC-Air</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAAC-C</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAAC-E</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAAC-N</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAAC-S</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAAC-W</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMAF</td>
<td>Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTHS</td>
<td>Training, Transient, Holding, Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>United States Forces – Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Wounded-in-Action</td>
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</tbody>
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