

**Refugee Review Tribunal
AUSTRALIA**

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

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Questions

- 1. Is the violence in East Timor gang related and random?**
- 2. What state protection is there in East Timor available for people of Lorosae origin (those from the East of East Timor)?**

RESPONSE

1. Is the violence in East Timor gang related and random?

An article dated 5 June 2007 indicates that “East Timor President Jose Ramos Horta says most of the violence in his country is not political.” Mr Ramos Horta had said that “The security situation in Dili remains volatile in the sense that we have not been able to completely eliminate some of the causes of the violence,”... “But the violence is largely non-politically motivated. It involves youth gangs.” However, the article also indicates that two “supporters of the National Congress of Reconstruction of Timor (CNRT), the new party led by former President Xanana Gusmao” had been killed in “in what appears to be political violence before this month’s parliamentary election” (Collins, Nancy-Amelia 2007, ‘East Timor President Says Dili Remains Volatile’, *Voice of America Press Releases and Documents*, 5 June – Attachment 1).

Another article dated 22 May 2007 refers to “East Timor’s interim prime minister, Estanislau da Silva” pledging “to launch a crackdown on the ongoing gang violence that has plagued the nation despite the deployment an Australian-led peacekeeping force and a UN mission last year”. The interim prime minister held that clashes that had broken “out in relation to the presidential elections were not of a political nature” and “further held that the gang violence in East Timor tends to centre around “drunken youngsters” engaging in sporadic fights with

other gangs armed with machetes, thereby being separate from the politics of the nation” (Vestergaard, Tanja 2007, ‘Crackdown on Gang Violence Announced by East Timor Government’, *Global Insight Daily Analysis*, 22 May – Attachment 2).

An *Associated Press Newswires* article dated 3 April 2007 refers to many gang members in East Timor as “common criminals capitalizing on a general sense of lawlessness to steal and extort, but politicians have also been accused of plying gangs with amphetamines and alcohol to continue the chaos” (McGuirk, Rod 2007, ‘In shadow of violence, Asia’s newest nation prepares for polls’, *Associated Press Newswires*, 3 April – Attachment 3).

According to an article in *Time International Asia Edition* dated 19 March 2007, “[t]he lawlessness of Dili’s streets is exacerbated by gangs of unemployed youth, many of whom belong to rival martial arts clubs that have turned certain parts of the capital into no-go zones” (Beech, Hannah 2007, ‘Broken Promises’, *Time International Asia Edition*, 19 March – Attachment 4).

A recent *Reuters News* article dated 23 August 2007 indicates that “[i]t was unclear if the latest violence” between gangs in East Timor “was linked to political tensions.” According to the article, the United Nations had said that “[a] market and 10 houses were torched in East Timor during fighting between gangs armed with machetes and steel darts, while two people were reported killed in another confrontation”. There had been violence “in several districts in East Timor since early this month when President Jose Ramos-Horta appointed a coalition led by independence hero Xanana Gusmao to govern after no party won a majority in parliamentary elections on June 30.” The president’s “decision to appoint Gusmao’s coalition sparked violent protests by supporters of the former ruling party, Fretilin, which claims the right to govern after winning most votes in the polls” (“Two reported killed, houses torched in E. Timor – UN’ 2007, *Reuters News*, 23 August – Attachment 5).

A *BBC News* article dated 10 August 2007 refers to gangs of youths being involved in violence “amid protests triggered by the appointment of a new prime minister.” The violence was mainly in Dili and in the Fretilin strongholds of “Viqueque and Baucau in the east”. Fretilin, which “won the most seats in polls in June... was excluded from government after Xanana Gusmao formed a majority coalition and was named prime minister” (‘Homes burnt in E Timor violence’ 2007, *BBC News*, 10 August <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6939990.stm> - Accessed 12 September 2007 – Attachment 6).

An *Australian Associated Press General News* article dated 4 April 2007 indicates that “[c]ampaigning in East Timor’s presidential election deteriorated into violence today as sporadic fighting broke out between gangs of youths from rival parties across the capital Dili.” The “[p]olice fired tear gas and warning shots to break up spontaneous fights which erupted after a day of passionate campaigning in which thousands took to the streets in trucks and cars ahead of Monday’s presidential poll” (‘Tear gas used to break up fights during Timor campaigning’ 2007, *Australian Associated Press General News*, 4 April – Attachment 7).

Another article dated 30 March 2007 indicates that “[g]angs from rival political parties scuffled and threw rocks in East Timor, injuring at least 20 people in what was believed to be the first violence directly related to next month’s presidential elections, authorities said Friday.” A local police chief in the town of Viqueque said that supporters of “presidential candidate Jose Ramos-Horta” had “brawled with youths aligned with the rival Fretilin, the

left-leaning political party of ousted Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri... though it was unclear what triggered the dispute” (‘Rival political parties clash in East Timor ahead of elections, injuring 20’ 2007, *Associated Press Newswires*, 30 March – Attachment 8).

A report dated 15 September 2006 commissioned by AusAID provides information on gangs and youth groups in Dili. The report refers to a number of types of groups, including those with some grievance towards the ruling party, ethnically distinct gangs involved in organised crime, and martial arts groups, some aligned with political factions. The main types of groups are “[l]arge disaffected groups with some grievance from the past towards the ruling party”, martial arts groups, “Kakalok (magic or mystical) or ‘Isin Kanek’ (wound) groups”, “[l]arge bairo based ethnically distinct gangs, whose main activity appears to be organized crime”, youth groups, “[s]mall groups of young males, some recently formed, usually living in close proximity, gathering at night, often drunk, to look for trouble”, and church run groups. It is stated in the report that:

The events in April 2006 that propelled Timor Leste into an ongoing political and social crisis came as a surprise to most observers. The disintegration of the security forces into multiple factions and the emergence of large, organized street gangs and a diverse range of potentially destabilising disaffected political groups was also largely unpredicted.

The sources of the violence are also varied and complex, including long standing ethnic tensions over the control of the markets and trading routes, property disputes arising from post 1999 resettlement, rival factions within the security forces, endemic gang rivalries, and a politically driven destabilization campaign by opposition parties.

The one common thread is the involvement of large numbers of young, marginalized males. The sources of their alienation are well known through a number of recent studies which revealed a sense of disenfranchisement due to a range of factors including unemployment, security concerns, and lack of access to education.

Not all youth have resorted to violence however. The key finding of this report was the existence of hundreds of different bairo (village) based youth groups, all attempting in different but positive ways to engage and unify their communities through collective, socially oriented activities.

The report notes that “[t]he recent civil conflict in East Timor has been highly revealing not just of the social and political divisions within the Timorese security forces, but also of the existence of a large number of gangs, who perpetrated the bulk of the destruction following the disintegration of the police force.” According to the report, “[c]ommunal violence and gang warfare, in particular between rival martial arts groups considerably predates the current conflict” and “[t]he martial arts groups have long been a concern, with some 15-20 martial arts groups, and registered members estimated at around 20,000, almost all male. The alignment of some martial arts groups with different political factions has escalated the current conflict. One group ‘Korka is officially aligned with Fretilin, and PSHT is widely identified with the two main opposition parties the PSD and PD. The use of these gangs for political intimidation can be seen from recent serious clashes in Ermera, Gleno, and Suai. The leader of another group, Kung Fu Master, was also killed during clashes between police and army in Tibar, early in the conflict.” There had also been “infiltration of martial arts groups into the security forces” that “has further inflamed the situation, in addition to creating a potential for conflicting loyalty.”

The report indicates that “[o]f most concern however is the apparent ethnic nature of the current conflict. Some have been quick to dismiss this rivalry as being politically driven, yet the fighting between western and eastern gangs in Dili also considerably predates the current conflict.” There were also “[l]and disputes arising from post conflict resettlement” that also seemed “to be a major source of ongoing violence.” Many of the gangs appeared “to be led by former resistance figures, such as Lito Rambo, Kommandante Mau Kiak (recently arrested on August 18 this year) Sintu Kulao, and Ameu Van Damme. These figures are in turn said to be loyal to different factions within the security forces and political parties, with loyalties and enmities dating back to resistance times.” There were “also multiple groups of ex-FALINTIL, who feel excluded because among other reasons, they did not get jobs in the new army and police force” and other groups that were “affiliated with powerful individuals with political ambitions, or even opposition parties.” The report also notes that:

Chronic unemployment, which exceeds 50% nationwide but higher in Dili due to the drift of youth from rural areas, means recruiting is easy for such groups from the legions of unemployed youth who feel socially, economically and politically excluded. It was these disaffected, marginalised youth who comprised the bulk of the rioting mobs (Scambary, James 2006, ‘A survey of gangs and youth groups in Dili, Timor-Leste – A report commissioned by Australia’s agency for international development, AusAID’, East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) website, 15 September, pp. 1-8 http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/2006/Report_Youth_Gangs_in_Dili.pdf - Accessed 12 September 2007 – Attachment 9).

The US Department of State report on human rights practices in East Timor for 2006 refers to widespread “[m]ob and gang violence” occurring in Dili and indicates that “[t]he most severe human rights violations took place in April and May when over 30 unlawful killings committed by security forces, rebel groups, mobs, or gangs occurred.” It is stated in the report that:

During much of the year, the civilian authorities did not have effective control of the security forces. There were a series of deadly clashes between the national defense force (F-FDTL) and a variety of dissident military, police, and civilian forces. Mob and gang violence in the capital was widespread and tens of thousands of Dili residents were displaced. On May 26, at the request of the government, Australian forces subsequently joined by forces from New Zealand, Malaysia, and Portugal, began arriving and assumed responsibility for security in the capital. President Gusmao assumed security powers, and on June 27, Fretilin’s secretary general, Mari Alkatiri, resigned as prime minister and was replaced two weeks later by Jose Ramos-Horta. On August 25, the UN Integrated Mission for East Timor (UNMIT) took over policing responsibilities, but international military forces remained under a joint Australian-led command.

The report also indicates that:

During the crisis beginning in April, and through the remainder of the year, there were numerous incidents of dissident groups, gangs, and other groups preventing freedom of movement. In early May a group of dissident military police established an armed checkpoint near the town of Gleno, Ermera District, preventing travel into Dili. During the remainder of the year there were frequent occurrences of illegal, temporary checkpoints set up in Dili, often designed to target people from certain parts of the country or members of a particular group. The tension between people from the eastern and western areas of the country led to a large number of people feeling that they did not have freedom of movement within the country. Within the capital where these divisions were most marked, many neighborhoods became exclusively eastern or western, and members of one group did not feel free to travel to or

through the other group's area (US Department of State 2007, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – East Timor*, March, Introduction & Section 2(d) – Attachment 10).

Professor Andrew Goldsmith, in a seminar on East Timor for the MRT-RRT held on 7 March 2007, indicates that a west-east gang problem seemed “to be very much alive in Dili.”

Professor Goldsmith provided the following comments regarding gang related violence in East Timor:

MS BODDISON: I don't know if this is outside your area of expertise, but there is information about the gangs that were armed at the time the police imploded, basically, that there is still a lot of arms out there that haven't been accounted for. Is there still, like, a west-east problem going on between gangs?

PROF GOLDSMITH: Yes. I mean, Dili is the centre of the gang problem I think. I mean, it is an urban centre. You probably know that something like 50 per cent of the Timorese population is under the age of 15, or 15 and under, so you have a huge youth problem. Like a lot of developing countries, there are problems of urbanization; places like Dili attract a lot of people generally and a lot of young people. The west-east gang thing seems to be very much alive in Dili.

I have to say I had one of the scariest moments of my life end of November when an east and a west group sized up against each other in front of the hotel I was staying at in Dili and I knew that the situation was a bit risky because the Timorese staff were looking very anxious. As the only one of two Europeans in the building at the time and there were rumours out that gangs were looking to kill Australians at that same time, so it was a fairly nerve racking 15 minutes or so and no police arrived in that 15 minutes. The manager of the hotel managed to talk the two groups into going in different directions.

In the heart of Dili you have groups who call themselves east or west living in close proximity to each other, and I am talking in areas adjacent to the British Embassy, adjacent to the Australian Embassy residential compound and so on. These groups live in and around key embassies, key institutions in Dili.

One thing I observed in that last visit was how institutions like embassies and like the hotel I was staying at are now building high fences. If they had a fence, they are building them higher. If they don't have fences, they are building walls, and I think there is a sense of, you know, unease amongst people, even long term residents in Dili, because of this gang problem.

I talked to Australian and New Zealand police who are on patrol in the Dili area about their encounters with these gangs and I have to say even the New Zealand police who have dealt with gang issues in Auckland and Australian police who have dealt with youth problems have never seen the likes of what they encountered with these gangs in Dili. You know, not unlike I think some of the problems the Australian troops faced in trying to round up Reinado on the weekend. They don't know the terrain, they don't have a lot of local intelligence, a lot of local support, so that makes them extremely vulnerable and, in a sense, almost forces them to be reactive as things blow up, as things start to emerge.

It is very hard for outsiders to get local intelligence in places like this. We saw it in the Solomon Islands. We are seeing it in Timor so, again, I think it puts the kind of policing possible on the street, somewhat on the defensive or back foot posture and, you know, it clearly makes their job very difficult. The concerted attacks by some of these gangs I think is something many of these police have never seen the likes of.

You have probably heard about some of the weapons they use. I mean, one of the fortunate features I think of the gang warfare is that they, by and large, don't use guns, or have access to guns. Most of the activities are using rocks, darts I gather, the machetes that you have probably seen in some of the TV footage, but not guns. I think that is one of the sorts of things to be thankful for in the context of security on the street there. As you know, a group of machete-wielding youths can do damage to people very quickly (Goldsmith, Professor Andrew 2007, *Transcript of East Timor Seminar Video Conference*, 7 March – Attachment 11).

A report dated 1 February 2007 of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) during the period between 9 August 2006 and 26 January 2007, refers to a decrease “over the reporting period” of “[t]he earlier east/west-based violence in Dili”, but an increase in “localized violence... between neighbourhood youth gangs and members of rival martial arts groups, largely confined to Dili but with occasional incidents in other districts.” However, “the overall level of violence” had “decreased in recent months,” and “Prime Minister Ramos-Horta and other local leaders as well as UNMIT police, made increased efforts to bring together martial arts groups to peacefully settle their differences, to discourage violence and to work towards improvement in the security situation.” It is stated in the report that:

As had been the case from the onset of the crisis in early 2006, Dili has remained the main centre of incidents of violence, and security is still fragile in various neighbourhoods of the city. The earlier east/west-based violence in Dili, which had resulted in a number of deaths, serious injuries and burning of houses, on occasion involving persons in internally displaced persons' camps and in the surrounding areas, decreased over the reporting period. On the other hand, localized violence increased between neighbourhood youth gangs and members of rival martial arts groups, largely confined to Dili but with occasional incidents in other districts. Rocks, machetes and iron darts continued to be the most commonly used weapons in such gang-fights, in some cases causing deaths or serious injuries. Of growing concern were a few incidents in which firearms and hand-grenades were used. Nevertheless, the overall level of violence has decreased in recent months, in part due to the increase in dialogue initiatives in Dili as well as intensified community-policing efforts of UNMIT, the establishment of additional police posts in troubled areas and the installation of a toll-free national emergency line, all of which facilitated increased police responsiveness. In addition, Prime Minister Ramos-Horta and other local leaders as well as UNMIT police, made increased efforts to bring together martial arts groups to peacefully settle their differences, to discourage violence and to work towards improvement in the security situation.

The report also indicates that “[t]he nationwide presence of UNMIT police officers enhanced their understanding of the security situation in the districts and helped to pre-empt some tense situations from escalating into violence, as evidenced by the prevention of large-scale fighting between rival martial arts groups in Maubisse in early January” (United Nations Security Council 2007, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 August 2006 to 26 January 2007)’, United Nations website, S/2007/50, 1 February, p. 10 <http://documents.un.org/mother.asp> - Accessed 9 February 2007 – Attachment 12).

A RRT research response dated 29 January 2007 includes information on the security situation in Dili at that time (RRT Research & Information 2007, *Research Response TLS31222*, 29 January – Attachment 13).

Another RRT research response dated 31 October 2006, which looked at the security situation in East Timor and in Dili in particular, refers to violent clashes occurring between gangs in East Timor at that time (RRT Research & Information 2006, *Research Response TLS30844*, 31 October – Attachment 14).

2. What state protection is there in East Timor available for people of Lorosae origin (those from the East of East Timor)?

A recent report dated 28 August 2007 of the United Nation's Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) during the period between 27 January 2007 and 20 August 2007, indicates that there had been a reduction in security incidents throughout the country. Although not specifically in relation to state protection available to the Lorosae, the report refers to an "increased UNMIT police presence, together with that of the Timorese national police and the international security forces," being "instrumental in reducing the number of security incidents throughout the country, owing to augmented police response capability as well as the deterrent effect of this enhanced presence on would-be perpetrators." It is stated in the report that:

Dili remained the most troublesome district, but violent incidents also occurred in the districts of Viqueque, Ermera and Bobonaro during the electoral period. There were occasional spikes in violence attributable to the rice shortage in the second half of February and to the attempt by the international security forces to capture prison escapee and deserting military police commander Alfredo Reinado in early March (see S/2007/50, para. 10). Another sudden increase in violent disturbances occurred after the announcement of the new Government on 6 August. Overall, however, there was a visible improvement in security, especially in Dili. The incidence of serious crimes such as murder, abduction and rape continued to decrease, from about 29 cases per month in the last reporting period to about 9 in the current reporting period.

However, the report also notes that "serious, albeit temporary, escalations of violence in the second half of February, the beginning of March and again in the first half of August, serve as a reminder of the fragility of the security situation. They also demonstrate that, despite the peaceful conduct of elections and wide acceptance of the results, there is still a need to nurture a culture of non-violence and promote the peaceful resolution of differences." The report indicates that "[d]espite the increased effectiveness of the UNMIT police, there are still considerable ongoing challenges to public security in Timor-Leste." The country's "national police force is still fragile, and there are many institutional, policy and capacity weaknesses that require further substantial support, on which the reform, restructuring and rebuilding plan for the national police will focus" (United Nations Security Council 2007, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 27 January to 20 August 2007)', United Nations website, S/2007/513, 28 August, pp. 5, 7 & 8 <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm> - Accessed 7 September 2007 – Attachment 15).

The US Department of State report on human rights practices in East Timor for 2006 indicates that "[t]ensions between persons from the eastern districts (lorosae) and persons from the western districts (loromonu) were a major element in the" national crisis in April and May 2006 in East Timor. According to the report, "violence and divisions impacted all communities, but the lorosae population of Dili bore a disproportionate burden as the crisis progressed." It is stated in the report that:

Tensions between persons from the eastern districts (lorosae) and persons from the western districts (loromonu) were a major element in the April and May national crisis. Historically there had been some tension between East and West, but it was an occasional irritant rather than a major issue. These geographic divisions emerged as a defining factor as the crisis affected the capital, and at year's end many of Dili's neighborhoods had become essentially segregated. The causes involved dynamics within the security institutions, socioeconomic pressures in the capital, conflicting views regarding the role of different groups in the independence struggle, and increasingly bitter political divisions.

The crisis began with claims by hundreds of soldiers that they were disadvantaged due to their western identities. Loromonu made up the majority of the population in Dili, and many associated the lorosae population with the controversial F-FDTL intervention on April 28-29. The violence and divisions impacted all communities, but the lorosae population of Dili bore a disproportionate burden as the crisis progressed. Thousands of lorosae were displaced from their homes due to fear of violence, many had their houses burned, and many came under attack if they refused to abandon their homes or attempted to return.

Toward the end of the year, the lorosae-versus-loromonu dynamic had largely dissipated as an element in violent clashes in Dili, supplanted by an upsurge in fighting between competing martial arts groups. However, many Dili neighborhoods remained divided and some observers thought the reduction in lorosae- loromonu violence was a result of the segregation process having run its course.

The report also indicates that:

During the remainder of the year there were frequent occurrences of illegal, temporary checkpoints set up in Dili, often designed to target people from certain parts of the country or members of a particular group. The tension between people from the eastern and western areas of the country led to a large number of people feeling that they did not have freedom of movement within the country. Within the capital where these divisions were most marked, many neighborhoods became exclusively eastern or western, and members of one group did not feel free to travel to or through the other group's area (US Department of State 2007, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – East Timor*, March, Sections 2(d) & 5 – Attachment 10).

The article in *Time International Asia Edition* dated 19 March 2007 indicates that “[t]oday, tens of thousands of people from the country's east still live in makeshift refugee camps around Dili. Late last month, Australian-led peacekeepers, who were invited back to East Timor nearly a year after they had jubilantly ended their mission in 2005, clashed with a group of armed men from these camps, resulting in the deaths of two refugees” (Beech, Hannah 2007, ‘Broken Promises’, *Time International Asia Edition*, 19 March – Attachment 4).

A more recent article dated 26 June 2007 refers to a Lorosae man in a refugee camp near Dili airport saying that his family had “tried to return to their two-bedroom house on the outskirts of the city, but were attacked by loromonu” (‘East Timor election’ 2007, *ETAN*, source: *South China Morning Post*, 26 June – Attachment 16).

Professor Andrew Goldsmith, in the seminar on East Timor for the MRT-RRT held on 7 March 2007, refers to many UN missions having problems with “rolling out on the ground a consistent standard of law and order”, and to there being security problems between easterners and westerners in East Timor. His response to a question regarding the adequacy of state protection in East Timor includes the following:

I think to come back to your question in terms of the UN, the UN has in many missions had a problem with, obviously, rolling out on the ground a consistent standard of law and order, partly because of the multinational composition, different levels of training – and if you talk to police on the ground as between different countries, different degrees of willingness to take risks, to get involved in certain sorts of situations, so the overall result is unpredictable and inconsistent.

If you are an easterner in Dili, you know, you have got the question that you are remaining in a western area. The IDP camps, by the way, are one of the interesting questions in terms of sources of insecurity in Dili. There is one right by the airport with, I think, easterners living there, right by the airport in very ordinary conditions to put them at their best, and there is tensions between those two groups.

Some groups of young men will come out and attack another group then they will go back in, as you have seen probably in the news. The police or the Army will try and go back in to arrest or deal with it – the other day two men got shot by Australian soldiers, so that kind of IDP camp factor is another source of tension and insecurity and, again, it is that reaction scenario that I talked about earlier.

Individuals I spoke to in Dili in November, as I said, would plot their path where they could go in Dili comfortably, by the time of the day, the nature of the area they were going to, the route they were going to take, because they knew, or they believed that if they went down the wrong street they might suffer as a consequence of being “on the other side” on the wrong side.

So where that is a persistent or a pervasive issue for ordinary Dili people, then I think you have got a basic problem with your law and order situation. Albeit you have got lots of people with blue helmets in the area – I say “a lot” – I mean, how many do you need for a situation like Dili is an interesting question. You know, you have got I think somewhere in the order of, you know, 1500 soldiers, nearly a similar order of UNPOL, but you have got a lot of problems as well, so it is difficult to say, but the outcome I think for ordinary people on the street is, they are very careful about when and where they go.

When I was there in last November, people had been staying in their houses for night after night after night because of the problem with gangs on the street, and it had just started to loosen up a little bit around the time I was there and then I think it has obviously got worse since then. If you read some blog sites relating to Timor right now, people are much more in lock down mode right now. As you know, the Australian Government is telling people not to go there and giving people the option of leaving, if they are working there. I don't want to go there now myself (Goldsmith, Professor Andrew 2007, *Transcript of East Timor Seminar Video Conference*, 7 March – Attachment 11).

A RRT research response dated 2 March 2007 includes information regarding differences between the Lorosae and the Loromonu and whether this is a recent development. The response also provides detailed background information regarding the crisis that occurred in Timor Leste in April and May 2006 and refers to articles that indicate that friction between the Lorosae and the Loromonu was a factor in the crisis (RRT Research & Information 2007, *Research Response TLS31357*, 2 March – Attachment 17).

The RRT research response dated 31 October 2006 includes information on whether there were reports of Lorosae people being targeted by people from the west and to what extent the Timorese authorities and foreign forces were able to provide protection to the Timorese

population (RRT Research & Information 2006, *Research Response TLS30844*, 31 October – Attachment 14).

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UK Home Office <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/>

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United Nations (UN)

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) website

<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rsd>

United Nations website <http://www.un.org/>

Non-Government Organisations

Human Rights Watch <http://www.hrw.org/>

Amnesty International <http://www.amnesty.org>

International News & Politics

BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

Region Specific Links

East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) website <http://www.etan.org/>

Search Engines

Copernic <http://www.copernic.com/>

Databases:

FACTIVA (news database)

BACIS (DIMA Country Information database)

REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database)

ISYS (RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports)

RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

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2. Vestergaard, Tanja 2007, 'Crackdown on Gang Violence Announced by East Timor Government', *Global Insight Daily Analysis*, 22 May. (FACTIVA)
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4. Beech, Hannah 2007, 'Broken Promises', *Time International Asia Edition*, 19 March. (FACTIVA)
5. 'Two reported killed, houses torched in E. Timor – UN' 2007, *Reuters News*, 23 August. (FACTIVA)

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