Background Paper

China: Official corruption

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</table>

CONTENTS

1. Overview ................................................................................................................. 1
2. Corruption in China.................................................................................................. 1
   2.1. Scale of corruption ......................................................................................... 1
   2.2. Public concern about corruption .................................................................... 3
   2.3. Government approach ...................................................................................... 3
   2.4. Media coverage of corruption ......................................................................... 5
3. Major areas of official corruption ........................................................................... 7
   3.1. Local government officials ............................................................................. 7
   3.2. Business and state-owned enterprise ................................................................ 8
   3.3. Official involvement in organised crime ....................................................... 10
   3.4. Judiciary ........................................................................................................ 11
   3.5. Military ........................................................................................................ 13
   3.6. Police ............................................................................................................ 14
4. Official avenues for complaint ............................................................................... 15
   4.1. Anti-corruption agencies ............................................................................... 15
       4.1.1. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection .................................. 15
       4.1.2. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate ....................................................... 17
       4.1.3. The Ministry of Supervision .................................................................. 17
       4.1.4. The National Bureau of Corruption Prevention ...................................... 18
   4.2. Petitioning ...................................................................................................... 18
References .................................................................................................................. 21
1. OVERVIEW

This paper provides background information on official corruption in China. The first section of this paper describes the scale of corruption and provides information on public concern and media coverage of corruption. This section also examines the approach of the new Chinese leadership towards corruption, as well as information on ongoing and past government policies. The second part of the paper discusses major areas of official corruption, including business and state-owned enterprise, the judiciary, the military and the police. Finally, the paper provides information on avenues for complaint about official corruption, including information on China’s key anti-corruption agencies.

2. CORRUPTION IN CHINA

Official corruption is currently a highly topical issue in China in the wake of a number of corruption scandals involving Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government officials over the past 12 months. In response to widespread media coverage and public concern about official corruption, the new Chinese leadership has launched an anti-corruption campaign that seeks to address the pervasiveness of official corruption in China. However, the endemic character of corruption in China has some commentators sceptical about the potential endurance and success of the new government’s approach.

2.1. Scale of corruption

Corruption is a pervasive problem in China. The 2012 Anti-Corruption Blue Book, published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, notes that corruption in China touches ‘virtually all...”

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5 Hua Ti reports that the Chinese Academy of Social Science is China’s ‘top social science research institution and think tank’. See: Ti, H 2012, Creatively corrupt: How abuse of power in China spreads and innovates, 21 February,
Corruption threatens China’s future

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid=186268
Department of State 2012,

Minzner, C 2011,

$120 billion, fled mainly to US’ 2011,

seek Post 8

22 February 2012

innovates/4728


7 Transparency International 2012, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012


11 Hao, T & Yinan, Z 2012, ‘Corruption is crucial threat, Wen says’, China Daily, 27 March


corners of society, from the economic, political and judicial fields to the social, cultural and educational ones’. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 ranks China the 80th most corrupt country out of 176. A 2011 Chinese Central Bank report found that from the 1990s to 2008, as many as 18,000 people, including members of the CCP, government, security apparatus and judiciary, as well as staff from state-owned enterprises, fled China with an estimated USD120 billion (AUD116 billion) in stolen public funds. In 2008, The Los Angeles Times estimated that corruption accounted for between three and 15 per cent of China’s seven trillion dollar (USD) economy, tainting businesses, land transactions, farming operations, factories and affecting practically every contact a citizen has with officialdom.

Corrupt practices are evident in many areas of Chinese society but most sources agree that corruption problems are concentrated in sectors with extensive state involvement, such as construction, land use, infrastructure, property development and banking. Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said in March 2012 that ‘corruption tends to occur frequently in departments that possess great power and in areas where the management of funds is centralised’. According to the US Department of State (USDOS) 2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, ‘The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, [over 2011] the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity’.
2.2. Public concern about corruption

Corruption is a top concern for the Chinese public. In 2010, the Chinese government reportedly received over one million complaints and accusations of official corruption from citizens. Concern about the pervasiveness of corruption has led to an increasing number of public protests. According to Agence France Presse, ‘the public is increasingly intolerant of perceived official corruption, with a growing number of people taking to the streets and social networking sites to criticise the government and protest against pollution and graft’. Nonetheless, the Business Anti-Corruption Portal reports that the new Chinese leadership has garnered ‘high expectation and trust among the general public’ in terms of potential anti-corruption efforts.

2.3. Government approach

In response to recent corruption scandals, associated media coverage and growing public concern and unrest, the new Chinese leadership, led by recently inaugurated President and CCP general secretary Xi Jinping, has supported an anti-corruption campaign that aims to crack down on graft, extravagance and other abuses of power and inappropriate behaviours by CCP members and government officials. Xi Jinping, like CCP leaders before him, has publicly acknowledged that

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15 “China’s Hu orders party to fight corruption” 2012, Agence France Presse, 9 January
16 “China’s Hu orders party to fight corruption” 2012, Agence France Presse, 9 January
17 The Business Anti-Corruption Portal aims to provide small and medium sized companies in developing countries with tools and information on how to recognise and fight corruption. It is financed by Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. Business Anti-Corruption Portal n.d., About the Business Anti-Corruption Portal <http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/en/about/about-this-portal/> Accessed 5 March 2013
official corruption threatens the legitimacy of the CCP and its ability to govern. Numerous initiatives have been launched by the Chinese government over the past two years ‘with much public fanfare’ to ease public concern and to address corrupt practices, with promises of steep penalties and convictions. However, a lack of political will and the resistance of local officials and other groups who have vested interests in keeping the system opaque is a major impediment to government reform efforts.

The endemic character of corruption in China has some commentators sceptical about the potential endurance and success of the new government’s anti-corruption campaign. According to Wang Yukai, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Governance, the government’s current campaign approach ‘is not sustainable’ in part because there are ‘too many separate institutions tasked with fighting graft under the party, the police and the judiciary’, which results in many investigations and allegations getting ‘stuck’ in bureaucracy. Although an 8 February 2013 Forbes article judges that the campaign is a ‘fast, low-risk way to ease anxiety and earn goodwill among the Chinese people’, it also views the campaign as little more than ‘pseudo house cleaning’ that ‘reveals a lack of political will and power to fundamentally challenge’ the systemic causes of corruption. Moreover, the Economist Intelligence Unit judges that the campaign ‘shows no signs of being any more successful than those conducted in the past’ and states that it will ‘peter out soon, leaving unresolved the generalised corruption associated with the party-state bureaucracy’.

In terms of the Chinese government’s approach to corruption more broadly, since 2008 the government has shifted from a punitive-only approach to corruption management, to one

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23 Economist Intelligence Unit 2013, China Politics: The party is not yet over for corrupt officials, 12 February; Li, J 2013, ‘Does China’s anti-corruption campaign spell the end of the mistress economy?’, Forbes, 8 February <http://www.forbes.com/sites/junhli/2013/02/08/chinas-anti-corruption-campaign-pushes-luxury-underground/> Accessed 13 February 2013
24 Economist Intelligence Unit 2013, China Politics: The party is not yet over for corrupt officials, 12 February
combining punitive and preventive measures (such as education and supervision). The CCP anti-corruption organ, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, has signalled its intention to continue this approach under the new leadership, as reported in November 2012 and January 2013 Xinhua articles. In 2010, the Chinese government issued China’s first corruption white paper along with measures to ‘subject officials to financial audits, encourage reporting of corruption and protect whistle-blowers’, according to the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China (USCECC) 2011 Annual Report. In January 2012, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection issued a communiqué which judged that China’s ‘war’ on corruption had ‘scored evident achievements’, but that ‘prominent problems still exist’. Acknowledging the public’s concern about corruption, the communiqué stated that government anti-corruption efforts are occurring in an environment of ‘higher expectations’ and cautioned that ‘corruption cannot be eradicated in the short term’.  

2.4. Media coverage of corruption

Since the February 2012 investigation of Bo Xilai, the powerful and popular former Chongqing party chief, and his wife over corruption and murder accusations, corruption has been a front-page issue in China, with Chinese and some international media outlets reporting on corruption involving low to high-level officials on almost a daily basis. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the new leadership’s ‘rhetorical’ support for anti-corruption

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efforts has made ‘muckrakers’ more confident about voicing accusations, and has created greater space for public discussion of such matters’. Forbes magazine and a 5 January 2013 article from The Guardian point out that a new feature of media coverage of corruption in China has been the rising popularity of social media platforms such as Sina Weibo and Tencent Weixin. These platforms allow users to ‘instantly expose the gritty details’ of corruption scandals and ‘vent their disgust with government misbehaviour’. Several corruption scandals have recently been exposed by the public and ‘rogue journalists’ on social media platforms and have then been widely disseminated by what The Guardian characterises as ‘unusually freewheeling coverage in state-owned media’.

Reports indicate that despite the recent surge in reporting on corruption, significant government controls on such reporting still exist. Freedom House considers that although the Chinese government tolerates some reporting on corruption, it stops reporting where it ‘starts to touch on broader political questions or generates widespread discontent with core central government policies (as opposed to individual local officials)’. Both the Economist Intelligence Unit and The Guardian opine that despite the fact that ‘broad latitude has been given to some internet users in the anti-corruption frenzy’, reporting on top-level CCP officials has remained ‘tightly controlled’, with Chinese censors quashing reports that target the party’s highest leaders. Further, the Economist Intelligence Unit reports that ‘state-owned newspapers have published articles calling for the online revelation of scandals to be regulated, suggesting that officials are already beginning to lose their appetite for running the gauntlet of online criticism’. As noted by the Business Anti-Corruption Portal, such government restrictions on freedom of speech and the media deprive the public of an ‘effective long term instrument in the fight against corruption’.

34 The term ‘muckraker’ is has been used in media reporting on China to refer to journalists, ‘citizen journalists’ or internet users who seek to expose official corruption scandals or other evidence of wrongdoing by the state apparatus. For more information see: Jacobs, A 2013, ‘Chinese Blogger Thrives as Muckraker’, The New York Times, 5 February <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/world/asia/chinese-blogger-thrives-in-role-of-muckraker.html?ref=world&pagewanted=all> Accessed 6 February 2013; Bandurski, D 2013, Veteran muckraker forced to leave paper, China Media Project, 1 March <http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/03/01/31597/> Accessed 11 March 2013
35 Economist Intelligence Unit 2013, China Politics: The party is not yet over for corrupt officials, 12 February
41 Economist Intelligence Unit 2013, China Politics: The party is not yet over for corrupt officials, 12 February
3. MAJOR AREAS OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

Official corruption in China is particularly severe in areas with significant state involvement – for example, the construction, mining and real estate sectors.\textsuperscript{43} Within the state apparatus, corruption is a widespread and costly problem at the local level.\textsuperscript{44} Business and organised crime engage in corrupt activity with local government officials, the judiciary and the police. In an example of such collusion, recent corruption scandals have uncovered a number of cases where current and former government, CCP, security and state-owned enterprise officials have used forged and false identity and hukou documents, often with assistance from other state officials including police, to amass large property portfolios.\textsuperscript{45} Corruption is also present in the military, although its effects appear to have less day-to-day impact on ordinary citizens.

3.1. Local government officials

The US Department of State \textit{2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices} for China reports that corruption at the local level is widespread.\textsuperscript{46} According to a 2008 Stratfor\textsuperscript{47} report, conditions at the township level encourage corruption – local government officials are poorly paid and under pressure to meet economic and social growth targets set by the central government.\textsuperscript{48} To meet these targets, fund local services and supplement their salaries, local government officials rely on other sources of income, such as embezzlement and taking bribes.\textsuperscript{49} The Stratfor report also states that local government officials and politicians often rely on ‘shadow governments’ of local powerbrokers, which are ‘not necessarily tied to the CCP’, and may be associated with organised crime to ‘make ends meet’.\textsuperscript{50} More broadly, a February 2013 report from the Economist Intelligence Unit states that corruption is entrenched in the CCP as ‘elevation within the CCP requires, at the minimum, tacit acceptance of corrupt practices, while a significant number of officials consider such activities essential to advancement’.\textsuperscript{51}

There are disincentives for Chinese civilians to report local government corruption. Whistle-blowing on corrupt local officials is done at considerable personal risk, especially in rural China, where corruption often involves ‘powerful, far-reaching local officials who also

\textsuperscript{51} Economist Intelligence Unit 2013, \textit{China Politics: The party is not yet over for corrupt officials}, 12 February
control the channels for reporting injustices’.\(^{52}\) Freedom House reports that there are poor whistle-blower protections in China and that ‘local authorities often retaliate against individuals who raise the curtain on corrupt dealings, leading some whistle-blowers to flee their hometowns and move overseas or to Beijing’.\(^{53}\)

### 3.2. Business and state-owned enterprise

Corruption permeates nearly all types and levels of industry in China – it is most commonly reported in the mining sector, the construction sector, banking and finance, land expropriation cases and in areas which attract migrant workers, who are vulnerable to exploitation.\(^{54}\) The World Economic Forum \textit{Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013} ranks corruption as one of the most problematic factors for doing business in China.\(^{55}\) According to a March 2012 news article from state-owned \textit{Xinhua}, the people’s procuratorates investigated over 10,000 cases of commercial bribery in 2011, involving assets worth USD530 million (AUD515 million).\(^{56}\) Most of the cases were related to the engineering, construction and real estate sectors.\(^{58}\) The USDOS \textit{2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices} for China states that there were numerous cases over 2011 where public officials and leaders of high profile state-owned enterprises were investigated for corruption, including several very senior executives who were found guilty of embezzling funds and accepting bribes.\(^{59}\) The USDOS reports that ‘many cases of corruption involved areas that were heavily regulated by the government and therefore susceptible to fraud, bribery, and kickbacks’.\(^{60}\) According to the Business Anti-Corruption Portal, ‘corrupt officials appropriate public funds for their own benefit and many companies engage in corruption and pay bribes in order to maintain their place in the market’.\(^{61}\) Although corruption, bribery, abuse of power and conflict of interest rules are proscribed under \textit{The Civil Servant Law of the PRC 2006}, Global


\(^{56}\) According to the Chinese government’s website, ‘the people’s procuratorates are the legal supervision organs of the state. The prosecution system consists of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, local people’s procuratorates and special people’s procuratorates such as the military procuratorate’. The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China 2011, \textit{The Supreme People’s Procuratorate}, 16 March <http://english.gov.cn/2008-03/16/content_921795.htm> Accessed 5 March 2013


Integrity reports that incidents of conflict of interest often occur due to weak enforcement of this law. In addition, there is no legal mechanism to monitor the assets, incomes and spending habits of public procurement officials.

In the face of widespread corrupt activities, the Chinese government has sought to improve transparency and accountability in state-owned enterprises. The abovementioned March 2012 Xinhua article reports that procuratorates across China have been encouraged to contribute to a national online database of individuals and companies who have been found guilty of bribery. In July 2010, the central government announced that a new collective decision-making process would be introduced in state-owned enterprises, requiring all important decisions to be jointly decided by collective leadership to ensure improved oversight. No further information was located on whether this process has been implemented. Also in July 2010, officials in state-owned enterprises at the county level or above were ordered to report their personal and family property and investments portfolios. However, The Washington Post reported in June 2012 that this order had been largely ignored or proven ineffective.

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3.3. Official involvement in organised crime

A number of sources point to links between organised crime groups and local government public servants, criminal justice officials and police in China.70 Australian National University academic Rod Broadhurst explains that ‘Corruption in government facilitates organized crime and flourishes as a consequence of a lack of transparency and weak regulatory practices inherent in a state where CCP and government are intertwined’.71 Organised crime groups use local politicians and officials who have sway over the police to provide them with a protective ‘umbrella’72. In a March 2011 book chapter on organised crime in China, Broadhurst cites a 2000 judicial interpretation from the People’s Supreme Court which explains the dynamics of a protective umbrella:

They [criminal groups] use bribery or threats to lure or compel government officials to participate in syndicate activities or to obtain protection from them in order to take control of a particular trade or industry or seriously damage the economic order or way of life in an area.73

According to Broadhurst, ‘The collusion between the protective umbrella and the crime group constitutes a ‘political-criminal nexus’ that can threaten revenues and the legitimacy of the State’.74 A 2008 Stratfor report notes that organised crime that occurs in China does so largely with the cooperation of corrupt local politicians, and in 2005 the Economist reported that this has led to the ‘gangsterisation’ of Chinese villages.75 The 2008 Stratfor report judges that organised crime groups in China tend to be made up of fewer than 200 people who operate in localised areas, such as a township.76 Broadhurst cites a 2010 study published in the Chinese-language Social Scientist of 76 organised crime cases in central China, which found that only one case had

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connections outside of China. For Broadhurst, this finding ‘confirmed’ the local nature of these groups. In an indication of the recent growth in criminal groups in China, the study found that most of the organised crime groups were formed after 2000, with 21 groups established in 2005 and 2006.

The central government launched a long-term campaign against organised crime in 2006. Broadhurst reports that this national campaign regarded ‘eradicating protective umbrellas’ as an important measure of campaign success. In September 2011, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued a statement detailing the successes of its most recent crackdown on organised crime. According to the article, between 2006 and September 2011, police ‘disrupted more than 2,100 triad gangs and imprisoned approximately 520 ring leaders or key members’. Of note, the MPS wrote that it had ordered police to remove gangs’ ‘protective umbrellas’.

However, conditions at township level, namely poor pay and the requirement to fulfil economic and social growth targets set by the central government, continues to encourage local government officials to cooperate with organised crime groups.

3.4. Judiciary

Corruption is common in China’s judicial system and safeguards against judicial corruption are ‘vague and poorly enforced’. A number of reports judge that the CCP exerts strong control over the judiciary. The Human Rights Watch World Report 2013 for China states that the CCP ‘maintains authority over all judicial institutions and mechanisms, and coordinates the work of the judiciary through its political and legal committees’. 2 A 2 November 2012 Amnesty International media briefing on human rights in China judges that ‘political influence over, and

81 ‘China vows “zero tolerance” on criminal gangs’ 2011, Xinhua, 16 September
82 ‘China arrests nearly 2,220 in latest gang crackdown’ 2011, Xinhua, 16 September, China Daily
83 ‘China arrests nearly 2,220 in latest gang crackdown’ 2011, Xinhua, 16 September, China Daily
84 ‘China arrests nearly 2,220 in latest gang crackdown’ 2011, Xinhua, 16 September, China Daily
corruption within, the judiciary remains endemic'.

Additionally, the 2012 USCECC Annual Report states that ‘China’s judiciary continues to be subject to a variety of internal and external controls—from political-legal committees to official interference—that significantly limit its ability to engage in independent decision-making’. Local governments appoint and pay local court judges, allowing local officials undue influence over the rulings of judges in their districts.

According to the USDOS, court judgements often cannot be enforced ‘against powerful special entities, including government departments, state-owned enterprises, military personnel and some members of the CCP’.

Sources indicate that the central government has taken some steps to address corruption in the judiciary. A 2 March 2013 Xinhua article reports that in an effort to address public concerns about judge-lawyer collusion and bribery, 1,087 court officials and judges who were working in the same jurisdiction as with their lawyer family members have been relocated. The relocations are in line with a February 2011 regulation that requires judges to change their locality if their spouse or children work as lawyers in the same jurisdiction. The government has also arrested and sentenced corrupt members of the judiciary in recent years. According to a 12 March 2012 Shanghai Daily article, 77 judges and court staff were prosecuted in 2011 for corrupt activities, including embezzlement and bribery. In July 2010, former Director of the Chongqing Municipal Judicial Bureau Wen Qiang was executed for his role in ‘accepting bribes, shielding criminal gangs, rape, and failing to account for his cash and assets’. Further, in January 2010, Former Vice President of China’s Supreme People’s Court in Beijing, Huang Songyou, was sentenced to life imprisonment for embezzlement and accepting more than 3.9 million Yuan (about AUD574,000) in bribes from 2005 to 2008.

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88 Amnesty International 2012, Human Rights in China, 2 November, p.2
89 US Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2012, Annual Report, 10 October, p.141
92 ‘1,087 judges relocated to avoid conflicts of interest’ 2013, Xinhua, 2 March
93 ‘1,087 judges relocated to avoid conflicts of interest’ 2013, Xinhua, 2 March
94 The Shanghai Daily is Shanghai’s only daily English-language newspaper. According to the Shanghai Daily website, the newspaper has a strong business focus but also reports on social, cultural and diplomatic developments in Shanghai and the surrounding region. Shanghai Daily n.d., About Shanghai Daily
95 ‘Top judge: courts need more reform’ 2012, Shanghai Daily, 12 March, People’s Daily
96 Areddy, J 2010, ‘China executes Chongqing’s former justice chief’, The Wall Street Journal, 8 July
Corruption is rife in the Chinese military (officially referred to as the People’s Liberation Army or PLA). A 14 November 2012 New York Times article states that ‘the depth of graft and brazen profiteering in the People’s Liberation Army poses a delicate problem’ for the new Chinese leadership. According to a 16 April 2012 Foreign Policy article by Fairfax media’s China correspondent John Garnaut, the PLA is ‘riddled with corruption and professional decay, compromised by ties of patronage, and asphyxiated by the ever-greater effort required to impose political control’. In a scathing assessment of PLA corruption, General Liu Yuan, the Political Commissar for the PLA’s General Logistics Department, reportedly said in a February 2012 speech that:

[Citation]

On 29 December 2011, General Liu reportedly also said that ‘Only our own corruption can destroy us and cause our armed forces to be defeated without fighting’. Echoing this sentiment, Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Peking University, judges military corruption to be a more ‘imminent’ threat to the PLA than the United States military.

Garnaut further reports that all Chinese observers interviewed for his article ‘agreed that the PLA’s corruption and discipline problems are growing worse’. Business people reportedly ‘gravitate towards PLA officers because of the access and protection they bring’. The practice of buying promotions in the military is reportedly widespread. Citing retired military officers, Garnaut reports that ‘promotions have become so valuable that it has become routine to pay the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes to even be considered for many senior positions’.

[Citation]

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101 Foreign Policy is an independent US-based magazine that provides analysis on international economic, political, security, social and other topical trends and issues. Foreign Policy Group n.d., Foreign Policy Solutions, p.3 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/FP_Solutions.pdf> Accessed 5 March 2013
In an attempt to stem corruption in the military, China state media reported on 22 June 2012 that all military officers were being directed to declare their personal incomes, investments and property. The website of the People’s Liberation Army Daily newspaper reportedly stated that the officers’ information will be checked under strengthened verification procedures to stop officers from using their special status to advance their financial interests.  

However, it is unclear if these measures will prove effective – The Washington Post reports that similar initiatives directed at CCP officials have largely been ignored.

3.6. Police

Corruption is reportedly endemic in China’s police force and sources report police involvement in cases of fraud, extortion, bribery, organised crime and payment of illegal fees. In a recent case of alleged police corruption, a former deputy police chief of Lufeng city, Guangdong province, was accused of buying 192 houses with fake identity papers, leading him to be dubbed internet users as ‘China’s most corrupt official’, according to BBC News. Although the former police chief admitted to having a fake identity card, he was cleared of any wrongdoing after he claimed that he only managed houses for his brother and has since retained his senior position in the Lufeng branch of the CCP.

Police integrity is broadly considered to be low among the Chinese public. The 2010-2011 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer report, cited by the Business Anti-Corruption Portal, found that 48 per cent of surveyed households in China considered the police to be ‘corrupt’ or ‘extremely corrupt’. According to 2009 and 2011 reports from Global Integrity, a formal process exists for citizens to file complaints against police corruption, but investigations of law enforcement are not common. Acknowledging the public’s concern about police corruption, in May 2011, former Chinese Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu called for greater efforts to fight corruption among the police by targeting the root causes of corruption.

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strengthening education and improving supervisory systems. However, no information was found on whether any reform efforts have been implemented by the government.

4. OFFICIAL AVENUES FOR COMPLAINT

Individuals seeking justice in the face of corruption have two options for redress: to lodge a complaint with one of the three national anti-corruption agencies or to petition or appeal directly to local or national Xinfang (Letters and Visits) offices. Xinfang offices are designed to receive complaints, including allegations of corruption. Neither avenue for complaint is independent from the state, which leaves these avenues susceptible to political influence. Public frustration with the ineffectiveness of these complaints mechanisms has manifested in protests and demonstrations against corruption. For more information on protests in China, please see the August 2012 Laws governing the treatment of protestors in China issues paper.

4.1. Anti-corruption agencies

China does not have any independent anti-corruption agencies. There are four key state anti-corruption agencies: The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Supervision and the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention.

4.1.1. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) is the CCP’s anti-corruption body and is empowered to investigate CCP officials suspected of violating party rules in each province, city and county. According to CCDI figures cited in a 10 January 2012 Xinhua article, 4,843 Chinese officials above county head level were punished for discipline violations in 2011. A June 2010 Asia Times Online article reports that in a process known as shuan’gui, CCDI staff can summon ‘any party or government official under its jurisdiction for questioning


120 Asia Times Online is an internet-based publication incorporated in Hong Kong that reports on geopolitical, political, economic and business issues from an Asian perspective. The Asia Times Online is the successor of Asia Times, a Hong Kong/ Bangkok-based daily print newspaper founded in 1995 which ceased publication in 1997 as a result of the Asian financial crisis. Asia Times Online n.d., About Us – Bridging East and West <http://www.atimes.com/mediakit/aboutus.html> Accessed 5 March 2013
and have him or her immediately put under house arrest for investigation.' However, the Business Anti-Corruption portal points out that the investigative powers of the CCDI may be limited in practice because:

A major paradox of internal investigation in China’s highly stratified and hierarchical government structures is that internal investigators must investigate top party officials who are either responsible for having appointed the members of the CCDI or who are simply higher-ranking than the investigators themselves, thereby preventing access.122

The CCDI is a key agency supporting the new Chinese leadership’s anti-corruption campaign. The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that the November 2012 appointment of ‘well-regarded figure’ Wang Qishan as the new head of the CCDI was ‘intended as a signal of the new leadership’s seriousness about tackling graft’.123 As part of the new government’s anti-corruption campaign, the CCDI has developed a 2013 anti-graft plan that aims to reduce CCP members’ ‘extravagance, bureaucratic behaviours and abuse of power’.124 The CCDI is also responsible for implementing a system for CCP officials to report their personal assets.125 On 19 November 2012, Xinhua reported that the CCDI had ‘vowed heavier supervision of all its Party members and a crackdown on corruption during the next five years’ in its work report, which was approved on 14 November 2012 by the 18th CCP National Congress.126 The Xinhua article provides further information on the CCDI report:

The CPC has promised severe punishment to corrupt officials, saying major efforts will be made on cases involving power abuse, bribery, depraved conduct, dereliction of duty, and severe infringement upon the people’s economic, political and personal rights and interests, according to the report.

The document advocated supervision and education as powerful weapons against corruption. “Intensifying constraint and supervision of power is key for effective prevention of corruption,” it said.

The CCDI will explore and innovate ways to improve supervision on leading cadres, power-concentration departments and funds and resources intensive sectors, the report said.

The CCDI will also try to find ways for disciplinary organs at various levels to effectively supervise leading officials of Party committees.127

A 4 October 2011 Asahi Shimbun news article reports that the CCDI has led a number of government anti-corruption initiatives in the past.128 For example, in a move to increase

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123 Economist Intelligence Unit 2013, China Politics: The party is not yet over for corrupt officials, 12 February
government transparency and eradicate collusive relationships between local government officials and company executives, in 2009 the CCDI directed local governments to use an online tender management system for almost all public works and other projects. Also in 2009, the CCDI in conjunction with the Ministry of Supervision established a hotline to accept citizen’s tips and complaints about corruption.

4.1.2. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate

The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) is the sole judicial organ that investigates and prosecutes corruption cases concerning public servants and public functionaries in China. The SPP and the Ministry of Supervision both investigate alleged wrongdoing by public servants and public functionaries, but only the SPP has the power to initiate public prosecution. According to China’s 2010 corruption white paper, ‘the people’s procuratorates can, in accordance with the law, directly file cases of job-related crimes committed by state functionaries for investigation…and initiate public prosecution’. The SPP is responsible for investigating embezzlement of state property and bribery of public servants and public functionaries through its General Bureau of Anti-Embezzlement and Bribery (also referred to as the Anti-Corruption and Bribery Bureau), which also investigates high-profile corruption cases involving top-ranking CCP officials. According to a 30 June 2012 Xinhua article, the SPP brought lawsuits against 18,856 suspects accused of embezzlement and bribery between January and May 2012.

4.1.3. The Ministry of Supervision

The Ministry of Supervision is similar to the SPP in that it also investigates corruption allegations against public servants and public functionaries, but such investigations concern violations of administrative regulations. If there is sufficient evidence of wrongdoing, the case is transferred to the SPP to initiate public prosecution.

129 Isogawa, T 2011, ‘In China, an online solution to rampant corruption?’, Asahi Shim bun, 4 October
130 Isogawa, T 2011, ‘In China, an online solution to rampant corruption?’, Asahi Shim bun, 4 October
132 International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities 2012, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, 9 February
133 The FCPA Blog 2012, China Anti-Corruption Handbook, Ethixbase
134 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2010, ‘China’s Efforts to Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government’, 29 December, Xinhua, Section IV
135 International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities 2012, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, 9 February
136 ‘Chinese prosecutors bring 18,856 bribery suspects into lawsuits from Jan. to May’ 2012, Xinhua, 30 June
137 The FCPA Blog 2012, China Anti-Corruption Handbook, Ethixbase
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4.1.4. The National Bureau of Corruption Prevention

The National Bureau of Corruption Prevention (NBCP) is focused on corruption prevention and is primarily responsible for researching corruption prevention measures and both orchestrating and overseeing nationwide anti-corruption work.139 The NBCP coordinates corruption prevention systems for government agencies, private businesses, non-government organisations and other civil society groups.140 The NBCP is also responsible for ‘international cooperation and international aid with regard to corruption prevention’, according to the NBCP website.141 The NBCP does not have the power to investigate individual corruption cases. 

4.2. Petitioning

Citizens wishing to appeal government, court or CCP decisions outside of formal legal channels commonly present their grievances by petitioning through the Xinfang system, which translates to Letters and Visits.143 The Xinfang system is a network of complaints offices found across all levels of the Chinese government.144 Citizens may write letters of complaint or appear in person to present their petition.145 According to the USCECC 2012 Annual Report, ‘Petitioning cases often involve a range of complaints about local corruption, alleged abuses of power, and unfair land compensation’.146

The Xinfang system is supposed to function as a general complaints clearing house for any government wrong-doing, ranging from bureaucratic misdeeds to serious malfeasance. According to the USCECC 2012 Annual Report, ‘China’s Constitution and the 2005 People’s Republic of China National Regulations on Letters and Visits, in theory, provide that Chinese citizens have the right to petition without retribution’.147 Petitions are supposed to be reviewed and investigated and a report is meant to be produced for every case. However, sources report that the chances of

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actually winning redress or compensation are small as the system is frequently overwhelmed by filings. Moreover, officials often have no incentive to process complaints about their misdeeds or those of their colleagues or refer them for further investigation, leaving many citizens frustrated by a lack of results.  

Human Rights Watch reports that if a citizen is dissatisfied with the response to their petition, they are free to continue petitions at the next level from township, county, provincial, and on to the national level. However, there are risks associated with continuing petitions to the national level. A key problem with the Xinfang system is that the central government partially assesses local government performance on the number of petitions that are resolved at the local level, which the government believes helps to maintain social stability. Freedom House reports that since local officials receive career and salary sanctions when petitioners leave their jurisdictions and complain to higher authorities ‘they have significant incentives to suppress citizen petitioning’. The USCECC reports that in 2011, ‘Chinese authorities and private company “interceptors” continued to intimidate and retaliate against petitioners by detaining them in “black jails” (hei jianyu), psychiatric hospitals, and re-education through labor centers’. Human Rights Watch and Freedom House also report that the Chinese authorities use ‘black jails’ – extra-legal detention facilities established by local and provincial officials – and forcible psychiatric detentions to detain, imprison, and punish petitioners who bring their appeals to Beijing. Freedom House judges that ‘such practices have become increasingly common in recent years as central government authorities have strengthened pressure on local officials to maintain social stability and prevent instances of citizen petitioning’. After a period of administrative detention, some petitioners are forcibly returned to their home towns to face unpredictable consequences from local authorities accused of corruption.

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For further information on the *Xinfang* system and treatment of petitioners in land confiscation cases please see the July 2012 China land expropriation and compensation issues paper.
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