PART II
MILITARY JURISDICTION
AND NATIONAL LAW
1. Introduction

It is often said that ‘military justice’ has existed ever since armies came into being. Some authors believe that “what constitutes military criminal law today came into flower” in Rome while others go back to Ancient Greece, citing the example of the military court which condemned General Filotas to death for conspiring against Alexander the Great in 330 BC. In the time of the Roman Empire, troop discipline was maintained by enforcing the principle of ‘he who gives the orders sits in judgment’, the predominant figure being the *Magister Militari*. It was also during that period that the famous Ciceronian phrase ‘silent leges inter arma’ (‘the laws are silent amidst arms’) was coined to describe the *sui generis* relationship that existed between law and military matters. Nevertheless, that eurocentric view of the world, which fails to take account of the reality of the situation and historical events in other parts of the world, is nowadays contested. For example, in 1979 at the VIII International Congress of the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War, Belgian judge advocate and university professor John Gilissen concluded that “it seems that it is not possible to talk about military justice existing before the 15th and 16th centuries”.

The well-known phrase “where there is an army, there is military justice”⁴, which sought to claim that military courts existed as a natural consequence of the existence of the military apparatus and were therefore a matter of indisputable historical fact, has been widely discredited. Historically, the fact that armies existed did not always mean that they were accompanied by organs of military justice, an example being Imperial China. At the present time, several countries with armies do not have a system of military criminal justice operating in peacetime. In those countries, responsibility for punishing any wrongdoing within the ranks of the military falls to the ordinary courts and/or disciplinary bodies.

2. The difficulties in classifying military courts

While there are a number of common denominators within national legal systems as far as ordinary jurisdiction is concerned, this is not the case for military jurisdiction. That is what Francisco Fernández Segado has found as far as European systems of military justice are concerned.⁵ There have been various attempts to classify types of military jurisdiction. For example, in 1979, John Gilissen suggested a means of classification based on the three main existing systems of law: the common law system, the Roman law system and the socialist law system.⁶ John Stuart-Smith, Francis Clair and Klaus suggested a classification based on the jurisdictional powers of military courts. They distinguished four different systems as follows: one in which military courts have general jurisdiction; one in which they have general jurisdiction on a temporary basis; one in which jurisdiction is limited to military offences; and one in which they have jurisdiction solely in time of war.⁷ Another method of classification, which takes as its starting point the aims and objectives of a State based on the rule of law, proposes three types of military jurisdiction: firstly, the traditional kind, based on the principle of ‘he who gives the orders sits in judgment’, made up of members of the military and endowed with broad jurisdictional powers; secondly, one in which military justice is incorporated into ordinary jurisdiction as a specialized branch of the latter; and,

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⁴ Ibid., p.39. [French original, free translation.]
⁶ John Gilissen, op. cit., p.46 and following.
⁷ Ibid., p. 43 and following.
thirdly, one in which military justice is abolished in peacetime. But this typology corresponds more to the ways in which military courts have evolved historically rather than to models of military justice. Some authors have opted for thematic classifications or typologies, based on the specific features of military courts, or for an approach based on 'national models'. These attempts at classification and methods of approach have helped in understanding different aspects of military courts from the perspective of comparative law. However, their usefulness is relative and, in some cases, the proposed typologies are debatable.

If, as well as considering factors related to jurisdiction (ratione personae, loci, materiae and tempore), account is also taken of structure, composition and operation, position within the state structure, relationship with the judiciary, sources of law, etc., it is difficult to come up with a model for classifying military courts. The fact is that, when these elements are taken into account, military courts are extremely diverse and heterogeneous and features from several of the models put forward by the theorists are present in every national system.

The position occupied by military criminal jurisdiction within the state structure differs from one country to another. In several legislations, military courts are formally part of the judiciary. In such cases, they are sometimes incorporated into ordinary jurisdiction and sometimes constitute a special jurisdiction. For example, in Suriname, the Constitution specifies that military justice is separate from ordinary jurisdiction. In some countries, different stages of jurisdiction are provided by different jurisdictional organs, some military and some from the judiciary. Conversely, in many countries, military courts fall outside of the scope of the judiciary and, in terms of organization and function, are often, when not responsible to the Ministry of Defence, attached to the executive. In some countries, the judiciary retains the authority to confirm and review verdicts handed down by military courts. In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the power to appoint and remove presiding judges, judges and prosecutors in military courts lays with the President of the Republic and military justice is an autonomous system consisting of three levels of jurisdiction, with the Supreme Military Court at the summit.

9 See, among others, Francisco Fernández Segado, op. cit., and Fundación Myrna Mack, op.cit. [Spanish original, free translation.]
The composition of military courts varies from country to country. In many countries, they are made up solely of active members of the armed forces or police. For example, in Israel, judges and prosecutors in military courts are officers on active service or in the Defence Forces reserve. Judges are appointed by the regional commander of the Defence Forces. There is frequently no legal requirement for these military judges to have undergone any legal training. There is also often no distinction between military criminal jurisdiction and the operational command structure of the armed forces, with the commander of the military operating unit himself being a military judge. In many countries it can be seen that military criminal jurisdiction is structured along the same lines as the armed forces in terms of rank, hierarchy and chain of command. In other countries, military criminal jurisdiction is separate from the operational command structure of the armed forces.

Similarly, the jurisdictional powers of military courts - whether *rationae materiae, rationae loci, rationae personae* (passive or active) or *rationae temporis* - are regulated in different ways in different national legal systems. In a large number of countries, military courts simultaneously exercise judicial functions and disciplinary authority and are competent to try criminal offences as well as breaches of discipline committed by armed forces personnel. The dividing line between breaches of discipline and criminal offences is not clear. Therefore, what for one country is a disciplinary matter, for another is a military offence. As Manlio Lo Casio has pointed out, “it is not possible to determine a scientific basis for clearly distinguishing between the one and the other”.

In several countries, military systems of criminal justice and discipline coexist. Other systems of military law simply make no distinction in law between a criminal offence and a breach of discipline. They are based on the concept of the ‘service offence’, which encompasses both military offences and breaches of discipline, as opposed to the ‘civil offence’, which equates to criminal offences and misdemeanours. For example, in the United States of America, military courts try any infraction, be it a criminal offence or breach of discipline, committed by those under their jurisdiction. In some countries, disciplinary procedures constitute a phase that precedes trial before a military

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12 The system of military jurisdiction is established in the Military Law Act and consists of a trial court and an appeal court. Military appeal court decisions can be reviewed by the Israeli Supreme Court. The courts have jurisdiction over offences committed by military personnel, whether they are of a military nature or not.


14 As quoted in Francisco Jiménez y Jiménez, op. cit., p.63. [Spanish original, free translation]
court. In other countries which have abolished military courts in peacetime, such as Austria, Germany and Japan, wrongdoing is punished through the use of disciplinary or administrative courts, with action sometimes also being taken simultaneously in the ordinary criminal courts. For example, in Denmark, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are dealt with by applying military disciplinary law (article 25.1) as well as enforcing the ordinary Criminal Code in the civilian courts.

Different systems of military criminal law criminalize different kinds of unlawful behaviour and there is no consistency about what is meant by a ‘military offence’. Under many military codes of justice, all of the following are criminalized: military offences stricto sensu, military offences lato sensu, ordinary criminal offences that are treated as military offences due to the circumstances in which they were committed, and ordinary offences that have been ‘militarized’. In some systems, these distinctions have been formalized while in others any criminal infraction specified in the military code of justice is classified as a military offence. In addition, some systems which still cling on to the old idea of military jurisdiction being a class privilege consider any criminal infraction committed by or against a member of the military to be a military offence. In a similar vein, several codes of military justice consider any offence committed in a military establishment or on a military site, regardless of the nature of the act and whether or not the perpetrator or the victim are members of the military, to be subject to military jurisdiction. In quite a large number of countries, military courts have jurisdiction over any offence committed by military personnel while in service. National laws therefore use formulas such as ‘delito de función’ [an offence committed in the line of duty], ‘acto de servicio’ [a service-related act or offence], ‘delito cometido con ocasión al servicio’ [an offence committed due to service], ‘delito de misión’ [a mission offence], ‘delito de ámbito castrense’ [an offence within the military sphere], etc. It is through the use of such labels that military courts are able to try human rights violations against civilians that amount to crimes, such as torture, extrajudicial execution and enforced disappearance.

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15 Offences which are a breach of both ordinary and military juridical rights but in which the military juridical right has greater weight.

16 This covers a variety of situations: ordinary offences in which there is a military element but it is insufficient for it to be called a military offence, ordinary offences which are subject to military jurisdiction because punishment is more severe under military law and ordinary offences which have nothing to do with the military but which have been made subject to military jurisdiction solely at the whim of the legislator.
3. Developing trends

Military jurisdiction and ‘military justice’ exist as institutions in many countries. It also remains common practice in many parts of the world for military personnel who have committed human rights violations to be tried in military courts. Nevertheless, as John Gilissen has pointed out, since the 1950s and 1960s, there has been an increasing tendency to curb the jurisdiction of military courts, both *ratione tempore* and *ratione materiae*, and their structures have begun to undergo a process of ‘civilization’, “in other words, [to move towards a situation] in which civilians, and in particular civilian judges, have an increased role in the composition of military courts”.17 Likewise, the question of ensuring that the human rights of military personnel facing trial in military courts are respected gradually began to emerge and to be translated into legal reforms in several countries. After the Second World War, some countries abolished military criminal courts altogether. With the adoption of the Japanese Constitution on 18 May 1946, the Military Criminal Codes for the Land and Sea Armies of 1921 and 1922 were repealed. The 1946 Constitution effectively abolished the armed forces as a “potential for war”.18 The Japanese Armed Forces continued to exist but only as a national defence force and their personnel were subject to ordinary criminal law and the ordinary courts. In the case of Costa Rica, technically it cannot be said that military justice as such has been abolished. Its disappearance resulted from the abolition of the Costa Rican army. Several other countries, including Germany, Austria, Norway and Sweden, have also abolished military courts in peacetime.

Nevertheless, while John Gilissen’s observations are true for a large number of countries, especially in Europe, they do not tell the whole story and must be put into perspective. Decolonization processes, national liberation struggles, conflicts over territory and the redrawing of frontiers inherited from former powers, the ‘cold war’ which characterized the post-war period, the adoption in several parts of the world, especially Latin America, of the Doctrine of National Security and the emergence of military dictatorships and authoritarian governments in many countries of Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East set the stage for the expansion of ‘military justice’ in many countries. Military courts became an important component of military strategy, not as a tool for disciplining the troops but as a weapon with which to fight the adversary. The Doctrine of National Security, in particular, turned

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17 Francisco Jiménez y Jiménez, op. cit., p.46. [Spanish original, free translation.]
military courts into an instrument for combatting the so-called “enemy within”. Thus, as pointed out by one of its critics, the late President of the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice, Dr. Alfonso Reyes Echandía, the practice of trying civilians in military courts was to become an extension of the Doctrine of National Security. From a different standpoint, US General and Judge Advocate, Georges S. Prugh, said, “Is the goal to insure discipline in the forces? Most codes go far beyond that and allow jurisdiction over some civilians in certain circumstances, oftentimes for offences which are considered to be against national security. So one might consider that the purpose is broader than insuring forces discipline; it is also to insure national security”.

Despite these realities, the trends pointed to by John Gilissen in 1979 continued in the 1980s and beyond. In his 2002 report, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals noted a deepening of these trends. In fact, during the 1980s and 1990s, military courts in peacetime were abolished in many countries, for example, Denmark, Slovenia, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Senegal. The Constitution of Guinea, adopted on 23 December 1990, abolished military courts at a stroke. In Portugal military criminal jurisdiction began to undergo a process of reform. The legislative reform that is under way at the time of writing is attempting, among other things, to bring military justice into line with the terms of the Constitution as amended in 1997. In this connection, the Government has drafted three bills and a new Code of

19 The Doctrine of National Security, in vogue from the 1960s in military academies in the USA, gave rise to authoritarian and dictatorial governments and serious human rights violations in several parts of the world. The Doctrine of National Security played a key role in the organization and development of the military dictatorships which were installed in several countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s: in Brazil from 1964, in Argentina from 1966 and again later from 1975, in Chile from 1973, as well as in Uruguay. Other countries of the region which did not have military governments were nonetheless strongly influenced by the doctrine, especially where public order, the armed forces and military criminal jurisdiction were concerned. It is interesting to note that in the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of Latin American countries, whether or not they had de facto governments, adopted similar national security laws.


23 Article 126 of the 1991 Constitution.
Military Justice. The Constitution confines the jurisdiction *ratione materiae* of military courts to “strictly military crimes” and the jurisdiction *ratione temporis* to wartime, thereby abolishing permanent peacetime military courts and bringing military personnel under ordinary jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it does not rule out the involvement of military personnel in the trial of members of the military in peacetime. In determining the powers and jurisdiction of the courts, the Constitution stipulates that “one or more military judges must be included in the composition of courts belonging to any authority which adjudicates on crimes of a strictly military nature, in accordance with the law.” Other countries, for example, Finland and Hungary, have reformed their military courts either through strengthening the role of civilian judges or bringing their procedures into line with the rules of procedure used in ordinary courts.

One of the issues which has gradually taken on greater significance, especially since the 1990s, has been the question of respect for human rights by military courts. In many countries this has resulted in the introduction of constitutional and legal reforms as well as developments in the jurisprudence propounded by national courts. The human rights dimension of ‘military justice’ encompasses three main areas: the question of the rights and judicial guarantees afforded to military and police personnel who are brought to trial in military courts, the question of civilians being tried by military judges and the question of military and police personnel who have committed human rights violations being tried by their peers.

In many countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, reforms have been introduced to ensure that judicial guarantees are afforded to military personnel facing trial in military courts. In other countries, such as Ireland, similar reforms are on the way. The Irish authorities have embarked on a comprehensive reform of the system of military criminal jurisdiction and have announced that one of the purposes of the reform is to incorporate the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. A more radical position has been taken by the High Court of South Africa which, in March 2001, ordered application of the Code of Military Justice to be suspended.

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24 The first bill authorizes the government to approve a new code of military justice, the second amends the law governing the organization and operation of the courts of justice and the third creates a code for military judges and military advisers working in the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Lastly, the government has also published a bill containing a new Code of Military Justice.

25 Portuguese Constitution, arts. 211, 213 and 219.

26 Constitution of Portugal, art. 211. [Spanish original, free translation.]

27 This is based on the 1954 Defence Act. Since its adoption, the Defence Act has undergone some minor amendments, mainly in 1998.
The High Court took the view *prima facie* that military criminal jurisdiction was incompatible with the principle of equality before the law and the right to judicial protection guaranteed in the Constitution. In the opinion of the High Court, “[t]he military is not immunized from the democratic change. Maintaining discipline in the defence force does not justify the infringement of the rights of soldiers, by enforcing such military discipline through an unconstitutional prosecuting structure”.

There is a growing trend towards abolition of the use of military courts for the trial of civilians. In several countries a ban on such practices has been incorporated into the constitution. In some countries, such as Mexico, the ban is long-established. Article 96 (4) of the Greek Constitution of 1975 states that military courts cannot try private individuals. The Honduran Constitution of 1982 states that “No one shall be judged other than by a judge and competent tribunal adhering to the formalities established by law. [...] Under no circumstances shall military tribunals extend their jurisdiction to include persons who are not on active service in the Armed Forces”. Over the last ten years, this trend has grown even stronger. For example, it is worth highlighting the bans incorporated into the constitutions of Colombia, Haiti, Guatemala and Nicaragua. The Paraguayan Constitution only authorizes military courts to try civilians in the event of an international armed conflict.

During the 1990s, the issue of impunity for human rights violations and the use of military courts became extremely significant for the way in which military courts were to evolve. As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals has said, more and more countries are adopting national legislation that removes serious human rights violations committed by members of the armed forces and police from the jurisdiction of military courts. These changes have come about through the adoption of new constitutions or amendments to existing ones, amendments

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29 Article 13 of the Constitution of the United States of Mexico, adopted in 1917 and still in force today.
30 Article 90 of the Constitution. Article 91 also states that: “When a civilian or discharged member of the military is implicated in an offence or breach of military order, the case shall be heard by the competent authority under ordinary jurisdiction.” [Spanish original, free translation.]
31 Article 213 of the 1991 Constitution.
32 Article 219 of the Constitution states that “No civilian shall be judged by military tribunals.”
33 Article 93 of the Constitution.
34 Article 174 of the 1992 Constitution.
Military Jurisdiction and International Law

to military criminal legislation and/or the ordinary codes of criminal procedure, the monitoring of constitutionality carried out by the courts and interpretations of law made by judges in specific cases, especially when ruling on conflicts of jurisdiction. For example, it is worth mentioning the Bolivian Constitution, as amended in 1993, 1994 and 1995, which restricted military jurisdiction over conduct that involves violation of human rights. Article 34 of the Constitution states that “those who violate constitutional rights and guarantees shall be subject to ordinary jurisdiction”. The Haitian Constitution of 1987 expressly prohibits members of the armed forces responsible for human rights violations from being entitled to the privilege of military jurisdiction. Article 42 (3) states that “[c]ases of conflicts between civilians and military personnel, abuses, violence and crimes perpetrated against a civilian by a member of the military in the performance of his duties are under the jurisdiction of courts of ordinary law”. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that Haiti was ruled by a military government between September 1991 and February 1994 and that the provisions of the constitution were disregarded. When democracy was restored, the 1987 Constitution was fully reinstated and, once the Haitian Armed Forces had been abolished, the provisions relating to military jurisdiction became irrelevant. Article 29 of the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 states that “The State shall be obliged to investigate and lawfully punish any offences against human rights committed by its authorities. Legal action taken to punish crimes against humanity, serious human rights violations and war crimes shall not be subject to the statute of limitations. Human rights violations and crimes against humanity shall be investigated and judged by the ordinary courts. Such offences shall be exempt from any benefits that might ensue if they were not punished, including pardon and amnesty”.

Other countries have introduced similar restrictions at the level of the law. For example, in 1996, amendments were made to the Guatemalan Military Code limiting the jurisdiction of military tribunals to strictly military offences and granting the ordinary courts jurisdiction over ordinary offences committed by military personnel. Article 1 of Decree 41-96, which amended article 2 of the Military Code, stated that “[j]urisdiction over offences or breaches of an essentially military nature is the sole responsibility of the tribunals designated in this law. In the case of ordinary or associated offences or breaches

36 Bolivian law establishes military jurisdiction both in peacetime and wartime. It is regulated under the Law on Military Judicial Organization (Ley de Organización Judicial Militar) as well as the Military Criminal Code and the Code of Military Criminal Procedure. [Spanish original, free translation.]
37 Spanish original, free translation.
38 Decree Nº 41-96 of 1996.
committed by members of the military, the Criminal Procedural Code shall apply and they shall be judged by the ordinary courts referred to in the Law on the Judiciary (Ley del Organismo Judicial)".\textsuperscript{39} The Human Rights Procurator pointed out that the curbs on military jurisdiction which were introduced as a result of the 1996 reforms also required an amendment to the Constitution, in particular to article 219\textsuperscript{40}, since it was not sufficient to merely amend the Law on the Judiciary. On 26 October 1998, in compliance with the Peace Accords signed between the Guatemalan Government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemalteca (URNG), Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, in 1996\textsuperscript{41}, Congress approved the amendments to the Constitution. Article 30 of the draft constitutional reform bill amending article 219 was therefore adopted and reads as follows: “Military courts are an integral part of the judiciary and shall be responsible for trying any offences and misdemeanours of a strictly military nature, as specified in the Military Code, that are committed by members of the military on active service. Ordinary offences and misdemeanours committed by members of the military shall be tried and judged by judges under ordinary jurisdiction. No civilian shall be tried by military tribunals”.\textsuperscript{42} When the proposed amendments to the Constitution were put to a referendum on 16 May 1999, they were rejected. In the Philippines, Law N° 7055 of 1989 authorized the ordinary courts to try certain offences committed by members the Philippines Armed Forces and other people subject to military law.\textsuperscript{43} Nevertheless, as far as human rights violations are concerned, the scope of the law is not clear because jurisdiction is retained by the military courts when an offence is service-related. Presidential Decree N° 1850 also states that “uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offence cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial”.\textsuperscript{44} This measure also applies to the Armed Forces.

\textsuperscript{39} Spanish original, free translation.
\textsuperscript{40} Article 219 of the Guatemalan Constitution states as follows: “Military tribunals: Military tribunals shall try offences or breaches committed by members of the Guatemalan Army. No civilian shall be judged by military tribunals.”
\textsuperscript{41} In the framework of the negotiations which culminated in the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (Acuerdo de Paz Firme y Duradera), signed on 29 December 1996, several thematic agreements were agreed between the parties, including the Agreement on constitutional and electoral reforms (Acuerdo sobre reformas constitucionales y régimen electoral), signed on 7 December 1996.
\textsuperscript{42} Spanish original, free translation.
\textsuperscript{43} Republic Act No. 7055: An Act strengthening civilian supremacy over the military by returning to the civil courts the jurisdiction over certain offenses involving members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, other persons subject to military law, and the members of the Philippine National Office, repealing for the purpose certain presidential decrees.
\textsuperscript{44} E/CN.4/1991/20/Add.1, paragraph 78.
In many countries, the jurisprudence developed by national courts, both in the context of monitoring constitutionality as well as when ruling on conflicts of jurisdiction, has been of great assistance in curbing military jurisdiction as far as human rights violations against civilians are concerned. There has been a move towards a more restrictive interpretation of the scope of military jurisdiction and, in particular, of the meaning of terms such as ‘delito de función’ [an offence committed in the line of duty], ‘acto de servicio’ [a service-related act or offence], ‘delito cometido con ocasión al servicio’ [an offence committed due to service], ‘delito de misión’ [a mission offence], ‘delito de ámbito castrense’ [an offence within the military sphere], etc. For example, in a recent ruling on a conflict of jurisdiction in the case of the alleged murder of a civilian by two noncommissioned police officers, the Supreme Court of the Dominican Republic took the view that in peacetime the jurisdiction of police courts was restricted to offences defined in the Code of Police Justice that are specifically of a police nature and did not apply to all the offences stipulated in the code. The Supreme Court therefore referred the case to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.45 In the opinion of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, gross violations of human rights and crimes against humanity could not be deemed to be service-related acts (‘actos del servicio’) and jurisdiction over such offences fell to the ordinary criminal courts.46

4. Constitutions and Military Justice

With very few exceptions, almost all States have a constitution or a series of constitutional laws. The constitution has a key role to play in protecting human rights as well as in regulating the administration of justice. This has been emphasized on many occasions by the United Nations Human Rights Committee.47 It is absolutely essential for there to be clear constitutional provisions with regard to fundamental rights as well as the powers of the ordinary courts to punish human rights violations and the provision of safeguards against impunity. Shortcomings in this area, together with broad-ranging or ambiguous constitutional regulations on the subject of military jurisdiction, are largely responsible for military courts being a contributory factor to the persistence of human rights violations and impunity. Another contributory factor is the absence of constitutional provisions on military jurisdiction or

45 Supreme Court Judgment dated 26 December 2001 in the case of the murder of Pedro M. Contreras.
47 See, among others, General Comment N° 13 by the Human Rights Committee.
the use of the generic mechanism of simply deferring to the law. It is true that such shortcomings and gaps, as well as ambiguous constitutional provisions on the subject of military jurisdiction, are often resolved in a positive manner, be it as a result of legal measures or the action of the courts or in the context of monitoring constitutionality or resolving conflicts of jurisdiction. However, that is not always the case.

Virtually all countries of the world which have written constitutional legislation use those constitutions or constitutional laws to regulate the ordinary legal system. Nevertheless, that is not the case for military jurisdiction and many countries with military courts do not regulate military jurisdiction in their constitutional legislation. So, for example, even though their legal systems provide for military courts, the Constitutions of Cambodia, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania contain no clauses on the question of military justice. The Constitution of the Dominican Republic makes no reference to military courts, even though both military and police courts exist. Such courts exist by virtue of specific laws and, pursuant to the provisions of such laws, it is customary for military and police courts to try cases of human rights violations involving members of the country’s security forces. There are no clauses on military jurisdiction in the Constitution of Tunisia and those relating to the administration of justice and the definition of human rights are weak, especially with regard to judicial safeguards. Military courts in that country have extensive jurisdiction. Among others, they can try any offence committed in a military establishment or on a military site, any ordinary offence committed by or against military personnel in the course of service or due to it and any ordinary offence committed by a soldier against another soldier when not on duty.

Other countries have clauses on military jurisdiction in their constitutions. These can vary in their scope. Some simply defer to the law. For example, article 94 of the 1868 Constitution of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg defers to the law to regulate matters related to military courts. The Constitutions of

48 For example, the Police Justice Code and Law N° 285 of 29 June 1966 regulate police criminal jurisdiction.
49 The Constitution of Tunisia was adopted in 1959 and has been amended on several occasions, the most recent being in 2002.
50 Article 5 of the Code of Military Justice.
51 The Military Criminal Code of 1 November 1892, which remains in force with a number of amendments, has many similarities to the Belgian Military Criminal Code. According to Francisco Jiménez y Jiménez, the Military Criminal Code has only been "rarely applied" (Francisco Jiménez y Jiménez, op. cit., p.134). [Spanish original, free translation.]
Latvia (1922)\textsuperscript{52}, Egypt\textsuperscript{53}, Mali\textsuperscript{54} and Niger\textsuperscript{55} resort to the same solution. The Bulgarian Constitution simply stipulates that “jurisdiction is exercised by [...] the military tribunals [...]”.\textsuperscript{56} The Constitutions of Laos\textsuperscript{57} and Vietnam\textsuperscript{58} confine themselves to establishing military courts as a part of the judiciary and under the supervision of their respective Supreme Courts. This means of constitutional regulation, namely, deferring to national laws, has obvious shortcomings and can lead to the existence of military jurisdictions that fail to meet international human rights standards. For example, in Equatorial Guinea, the constitutional law that establishes military courts states that the “applicable legal system” shall be determined by law.\textsuperscript{59} As a result of a 1980 decree law that allows the subsidiary enforcement of earlier laws, military jurisdiction in Equatorial Guinea is governed by the Spanish Code of Military Justice of 1945. Military jurisdiction is all-embracing and applies to all ordinary offences committed by members of the military when not on duty as well as to civilians. There are no standing courts and military justice operates by means of courts martial made up of military officials with no legal qualifications and against whose verdicts there is no right of appeal. It is interesting to examine this form of regulation from an historical perspective. For example, in the Netherlands, military jurisdiction has not been regulated in the Constitution since 1887. The last Constitution, which was adopted in 1983 and is still in force today, simply states that criminal law in wartime shall be regulated by law.\textsuperscript{60} Although military jurisdiction was abolished in 1982 and replaced by military divisions within the ordinary court system, prior to that the Netherlands had operated a form of ‘military justice’ which came under frequent criticism.

A significant number of States have military jurisdiction established in their constitutions, together with regulations relating to their composition, operation and powers. The scope of such regulations varies from country to country. Some allow military courts to have extensive powers. For example, the Irish Constitution of 1937 gives military courts broad-ranging jurisdiction. Article 38 (4.1) stipulates that military tribunals can be established “for the

\textsuperscript{52} Article 86 of the Constitution. The 1922 Constitution remains in force pursuant to the Constitutional Law of 1991.
\textsuperscript{53} Article 183 of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt of 1971.
\textsuperscript{54} Article 70 of the 1992 Constitution.
\textsuperscript{55} Article 80 of the Constitution of Niger of 1999.
\textsuperscript{56} Article 119 of the Constitution of Bulgaria of 1991. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{57} Articles 65 and 66 of the Constitution of Laos of 1991.
\textsuperscript{58} Articles 127 and 134 of the Constitution of Vietnam.
\textsuperscript{59} The Constitutional Law, article 88, chapter VI, “The Judiciary”.
\textsuperscript{60} Article 113 of the Constitution.
trial of offences against military law alleged to have been committed by persons while subject to military law and also to deal with a state of war or armed rebellion”. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil\(^{61}\) probably has more articles on military jurisdiction than any other. For example, article 92 states that “the military tribunals and judges […] are part of the judiciary […]”;\(^{62}\) Article 24 of the Constitution gives a general definition of the scope of Brazilian military criminal jurisdiction: “It is the responsibility of the military justice system to try and judge military crimes defined as such in law”;\(^{63}\) In addition, article 109 states that “[i]t is the responsibility of the federal judges to try and judge […] [among others] political offences and criminal infractions against the assets, services or interests of the Union or of independent bodies and public sector companies, except for minor offences and offences for which military justice is competent […] [except for those for which military justice is competent […]’”;\(^{64}\) The Constitution also stipulates that military criminal jurisdiction encompasses offences committed both in peacetime and wartime.\(^{65}\)

When constitutions seek to regulate the subject matter to be covered by military jurisdiction, they often simply confine themselves to the notion of a ‘military offence’. Some try to be more specific by describing the offence as ‘essentially military’, ‘strictly military’ or ‘purely military’. However, such constitutional regulations are usually not accompanied by safeguards to

\(^{61}\) Adopted on 5 October 1988. The text of the constitution has been amended on several occasions, the last being in 2001.

\(^{62}\) Spanish original, free translation.

\(^{63}\) Spanish original, free translation.

\(^{64}\) Spanish original, free translation.

\(^{65}\) Article 142, paragraph 3 (VI), “Concerning the Armed Forces”, as amended in 1998. It is worth mentioning that the Constitution also regulates other aspects of military jurisdiction. For example, article 122 states that: “The following are the bodies of military justice: 1. The Superior Military Court; 2. The military courts and judges instituted by law”. At the same time, article 123 establishes that the Superior Military Court shall be composed of fifteen life tenured Justices appointed by the President of the Republic following approval by the Senate. Three of the judges must be general officers from the Navy, four must be general officers from the Army, and three must be Air Force officers. All must be on active service. The other five judges must be civilians appointed by the President of the Republic, of whom three must be lawyers and two must be judge advocates or members of the Military Prosecution Service. Article 128 stipulates that the Military Prosecution Service is part of the Office of the Attorney-General. The Constitution also provides for the existence of military courts at the state level (article 125.4). Within each State, ‘state military justice’ consists of Councils of Justice, which act as trial courts, and the Court of Military Justice, which acts as the appellate court when the number of staff in the Military Police is over 20,000. ‘State military justice’ has jurisdiction over military offences committed by the Military Police and military fire brigades, both in peacetime and wartime (1998 amendment to article 42 of the Constitution).
ensure that human rights violations are kept in the province of the ordinary courts. The Constitution of Cape Verde states that military courts “are responsible for judging crimes which, due to their subject matter, are defined in law as being essentially military in nature”.66 Article 216 of the Constitution of El Salvador, as amended in 2000, states that: “Military jurisdiction is established. For the adjudication of purely military offences and breaches, there shall be special proceedings and tribunals in compliance with the law. Military jurisdiction, as an extraordinary procedure within the overall justice system, shall be limited to the trying of purely military offences and breaches of duty, meaning solely those which are damaging to any strictly military juridical interest. Members of the Armed Forces on active service enjoy military privilege as far as purely military offences and breaches are concerned”.67 The Constitution of Honduras states that “[w]artime jurisdiction is recognized for offences and breaches of a military nature”.68 Under the Military Criminal Code of 22 January 1906, which is still in force today, military courts are permitted to try military personnel who are involved in violating human rights.

66 Article 240 (1) of the Constitution of Cape Verde of 1992. [Spanish original, free translation.]
67 Spanish original, free translation.
68 Article 90 of the 1982 Constitution. [Spanish original, free translation.]
Section II
Military Jurisdiction and Domestic Legislation

1. Argentina

History
Like most Latin American countries, when Argentina gained its independence from Spanish rule in 1810, it continued to enforce colonial military criminal legislation.\(^1\) In 1815, 1816 and 1817, Argentinian laws expressly gave force of law to colonial legislation, as long as it was not incompatible with the new system of government, by clearly remitting to the authority of the Spanish sovereign with regard to matters relating to military justice.\(^2\) In particular, it is worth mentioning the Spanish military ordinances (ordenanzas) promulgated by Carlos III in 1768, which, with some amendments, remained in force “in the new country for 85 years, including after the National Constitution of 1853 had been approved”.\(^3\) They stayed in force until 1895 when military criminal and procedural law was first codified. Nevertheless, from very early on, the emancipating army was provided with regulations for the punishment of any wrongdoing perpetrated by the troops. These included the Special Military Ordinances for the Cuyo Army (Ordenanzas Militares Especiales del Ejército de Cuyo) issued by General San Martín and approved by the Argentinian Government. They were known for their “severity and roughness in the punishment of offences”.\(^4\) Similarly, New Disciplinary Rules for the

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1 The Ordinances of Felipe II of 1587, the Ordinances of Felipe IV of 1632, the Ordinances of Felipe V of 1771, the Military Ordinances of Carlos III of 1768, the Naval Ordinances of Carlos IV of 1793, the Royal Order of 1800 and the Shipping Registration Ordinances (Ordenanzas de Matrículas de Mar) of 1802.

2 The Provisional Statute of 1815, the Decree of 12 November 1816 and the Temporary Regulations of 1817.

3 Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni and Ricardo Juan Cavallero, Derecho Penal Militar, Ediciones jurídicas Ariel, Buenos Aires, 1980, p.171. [Spanish original, free translation.]

Army and the Squadron (Nuevas Reglas de Disciplina Para el Ejército y la Escuadra) and Penalties for Military Offences on Land and Sea (Penas para los Delitos Militares en tierra y agua) were issued by General Belgrano. In the first few decades of existence of the newly-formed Argentinian nation, several fruitless attempts were made to draw up and adopt a military criminal code and so, in 1924, a commission was set up to draft a Code of Military Justice.

The National Constitution of Argentina had been adopted by the General Constituent Congress in 1853. This was later amended by the 1860 ad hoc National Convention and again in 1866 and 1898. The Constitution made no reference to military jurisdiction. In 1875, a commission was set up to draw up a Code of Military Justice and in 1881 a draft Naval Code was submitted to the parliament. On 7 September 1881, President Roca submitted the “Draft Military Criminal Code” to Congress for its consideration. In 1894 the “Military Codes for the Army and the Navy”\(^5\) were adopted. The entry into force of these Codes meant that the colonial military criminal legislation ceased to apply once and for all. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Zaffaroni and Cavallero, the new legislation was “seen as precipitate and premature to the extent that work immediately began on a replacement”.\(^6\) And so, at the end of the 19th century, further new military criminal legislation was adopted and remained in force until 1951, namely, the Code of Military Justice or Bustillo Code, named in honour of its author José María Bustillo. The latter was appointed Judge Advocate General for the Army and Navy (Auditor General de Guerra y Marina), with the rank of Brigadier General (General de Brigada).\(^7\)

The Code of Military Justice was not adopted as a single set of provisions: in January 1898, regulations relating to the organization and jurisdiction of military courts (Agreement I) and military criminal procedure (Agreement II)\(^8\) were adopted, to be followed in November of the same year by regulations relating to substantive criminal law (Agreement III).\(^9\) In 1905, several amendments were introduced as a result of Law N° 4708. The Bustillo Code distinguished between peacetime and wartime, both for the purposes of how military courts were to be organized and in terms of jurisdiction, procedures

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\(^{5}\) Law N° 3190 of 6 December 1894.

\(^{6}\) Zaffaroni and Cavallero, op. cit, p.181. [Spanish original, free translation.]


\(^{8}\) Law N° 3679 of 1898.

\(^{9}\) Law N° 3737 of 1898.
and the types of punishment applicable. In this way, the Bustillo Code laid the foundations for current military criminal jurisdiction in Argentina. During the first half of the 20th century, several unsuccessful attempts were made to reform the Bustillo Code.10

The Bustillo Code remained in force until 1951 when a new Code of Military Justice11 was issued. The 1951 Code was drafted by the Armed Forces, under the leadership of the Judge Advocate General for the Armed Forces, Colonel Oscar Ricardo Sacheri. It is important to point out that the new Code of Military Justice was adopted in the wake of the substantive reforms made to the National Constitution in 1949. The 1949 Constitution included a reference to military courts and so the Code of Military Justice of 1951 states in article 1 that “Military jurisdiction, as established under article 29 of the National Constitution, is exercised by the military tribunals and authorities determined by this Code”.12 Following the “Liberating Revolution” (“Revolución Libertadora”) of 1955, the 1949 constitutional reform ceased to apply. In 1956, the new government repealed the 1949 reform and reinstated the National Constitution of 1853, together with its 1860, 1866 and 1898 amendments. In 1957, the 1853 Constitution was amended once again.13 Despite the fact that, when it came back into effect, the 1853 Constitution contained no specific reference to military courts, the Code of Military Justice of 1951, and article 1 in particular, remained in force and still applies today, a state of affairs which remains rather anachronistic.

In about 1974, armed opposition groups became increasingly active in Argentina. The death squad known as the Alianza Anticomunista Americana (AAA), American Anti-Communist Alliance, also appeared. On 6 November that year, the government of María Estela Martínez de Perón decreed a state of siege.14 In 1975, the Argentinian Government ordered the launching of a major military operation in the province of Tucumán.15 A few months later, the military operation was extended to the whole country.16 It is worth highlighting Directive N° 404/75 issued in the course of these operations by the Commander in Chief of the Army. It stated that since the intervention of the Armed Forces had been authorized by the country’s executive authority, such

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10 In 1915, 1917, 1923, 1932 and 1946.
11 Law N° 14,029 of 4 July 1951
12 Spanish original, free translation.
15 Decree N° 261 of 1975.
16 Decree N° 270 of 1975.
“operations constitute the carrying out of an act of military service [and] consequently, military personnel are subject to military jurisdiction”.17

On 24 March 1976, the Argentinian Armed Forces carried out a coup d'état and a Military Junta, made up of the Commanders in Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force, assumed power. The National Congress and the Provincial Congresses were dissolved and the state of siege which had been imposed by the previous government was extended. Public freedoms and judicial guarantees were suppressed and the press was censored. As documented by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights18, extrajudicial executions, torture, forced disappearances and arbitrary detentions were systematically carried out. The National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas), set up by the Argentinian Government when democracy was restored in 1983, compiled 8,960 cases of forced disappearance and indicated that the true figure may have been even higher.19 Under the Argentinian military dictatorship, military criminal jurisdiction underwent an extraordinary process of expansion. Through the use of emergency powers, military courts were given broad-ranging jurisdiction, especially over civilians.20 In 1976 the first Military Junta issued a decree that created new offences - some of which criminalized use of the right to strike, increased the penalties for others and granted jurisdiction to the military courts.21 The use of military courts to try civilians in times of public disorder or emergency was repeatedly endorsed by the Argentinian Supreme Court.22

With the return to institutional normality which began at the end of 1983, the question arose of whether or not members of the military responsible for the gross human rights violations committed under the dictatorship should be brought to trial. Shortly before leaving power, the de facto military government had issued a Self-Amnesty Law (Ley de autoamnistía)23 but it was set

17 Spanish original, free translation.
22 Bidart Campos, op. cit., p.462.
aside by the National Congress. The new civilian government ordered the former Commanders of the first three Military Juntas to be subjected to a summary trial (juicio sumario) by the Supreme Armed Forces Council (Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas), the senior court within the military justice system. In 1984, Law Nº 23,049, which amended several articles of the Code of Military Justice, was issued. This reform stipulated that any offences committed by the Armed Forces and police and state security personnel between 24 March 1976 and 26 September 1983 were to come under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Armed Forces Council and to be dealt with by means of the summary procedure applicable in peacetime. Nevertheless, the Supreme Armed Forces Council refused to try its peers. The Federal Chamber (Cámara Federal) took over responsibility for trying the former Commanders of the Military Juntas. On 9 December 1985, the Federal Chamber sentenced four of the nine former Commanders on some of the charges laid against them by the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía). The verdict, which was challenged by the prosecution, was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Justice on 30 December 1986.

Under pressure from the Armed Forces, the “Full Stop” Law (“Ley de Punto Final”) was passed. Later, following the military uprising by the so-called “carapintadas” (“painted faces”), the “Due Obedience” Law (“Ley de Obediencia Debida”) was passed. Both laws granted a general amnesty to members of the military and state security bodies for human rights violations committed under the dictatorship. In 1989 and 1990, President Carlos Menem pardoned over one hundred members of the military - including the former Commanders of the Military Juntas - who had not benefitted from either of the two amnesty laws. On 25 March 1998, the “Full Stop” and “Due Obedience” Laws were repealed as a result of Law Nº 24,952. The reference to them being null and void which had appeared in the original draft was removed, giving rise to the interpretation that it was only possible for legal proceedings to be re-opened for humanitarian purposes (in order to clarify the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared) but not in order to prosecute the crimes which had been committed. Nevertheless, in March 2001, the Fourth National Court for Criminal and Correctional Matters (Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y Correccional Federal Nro. 4) declared the “Full Stop” and

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29 Decrees Nos. 1002 and 1004 of 7 October 1989 and Decrees Nos. 2741 and 2743 of 30 December 1990.
“Due Obedience” Laws to be null and void. In a momentous ruling at the end of 2001, the National Chamber for Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters (Cámara Nacional en lo Criminal y Correccional Federal) confirmed the decision of the Fourth National Court.

In 1994, a new Constitution was adopted. Like the previous one, it contains no specific reference to military jurisdiction. However, it is important to note that article 75 (22) of the new Constitution gives several human rights treaties “higher ranking than the laws”. Although the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons was not originally among the treaties listed in the Constitution, it was later added. It is worth recalling that article IX of the Convention says that following: “Persons alleged to be responsible for the acts constituting the offence of forced disappearance of persons may be tried only in the competent jurisdictions of ordinary law in each state, to the exclusion of all other special jurisdictions, particularly military jurisdictions. The acts constituting forced disappearance shall not be deemed to have been committed in the course of military duties”. Nevertheless, the new Constitution did not lead to a restructuring of the military justice system and the 1951 Code of Military Justice remained in force.

The current situation

Argentinian military criminal legislation consists of the 1951 Code of Military Justice together with subsequent amendments and additions. The military courts are answerable to the executive and, in particular, the Ministry of National Defence. All members of military courts are members of the Armed Forces. The different bodies within the military court system, such as the Supreme Armed Forces Council, the permanent courts martial, the Office of the Judge Advocate and the Office of the Armed Forces Attorney-General (Fiscalía General de las Fuerzas Armadas) form part of the Ministry of Defence. The Code of Military Justice authorizes “military personnel from the general services or their equivalent” and retired members of the military to hold posts within the military justice system.

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30 Judgment dated 6 March 2001, case N° 8686/2000, entitled “Simón, Julio, Del Cerro, Juan - abduction of 10-year-old juveniles”.
31 1994 Constitution, article 75 (22). [Spanish original, free translation.]
34 See the web page of the Ministry of Defence: http://www.mindf.gov.ar/Principal.htm
35 Article 7 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
the military justice secretariat are members of the military. Their rank and grade varies according to which court they are attached.

For the purposes of the structure of military criminal jurisdiction, the Code of Military Justice distinguishes between peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, military jurisdiction is exercised by the Supreme Armed Forces Council, the permanent courts martial, special courts and military examining magistrates (*jueces de instrucción*).

The Supreme Armed Forces Council has nine members who are appointed by the President of the Republic for a six-year period. Six of them must be from combatant or commando corps and hold the rank of general or its equivalent, with two being from the army, two from the navy and two from the air force. The other three must be lawyers from the various judge advocate corps attached to each branch of the armed services. The Council is presided by the officer who is highest in rank and the longest serving. There is a specific provision stipulating that it is accountable to the Ministry of National Defence. It is the appellate court for cases within the military justice system as well as the trial court, from which there is no right of appeal, for senior officers, lawyers on the Supreme Council, members of courts martial and lawyers working within the military justice system. It is also responsible for settling any conflicts of jurisdiction which may arise within the military justice system.

There are two types of permanent courts martial: one for commanders and junior officers and one for non-commissioned officers and the rank and file. Depending on whether they have jurisdiction over one or more branches of the armed services, they are answerable to the Commander of the service in question or the Ministry of National Defence. The panel for permanent courts martial dealing with commanders and junior officers consists of a major general (*general de división*) or brigadier general (*general de brigada*), who presides over it, and six other officers with the rank of colonel. All must be officers from combatant or commando corps. The panels for courts martial dealing with noncommissioned officers and the rank and file are made up of officers from the combatant or commando corps. Each one must be presided by a colonel or lieutenant colonel and consist of six other officers with the rank of lieutenant colonel or major. The presidents and members of these types of courts are appointed by the President of the Republic for a four-year period. Courts martial are the trial courts or courts of first instance within the military system.

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36 Article 16 of the Code of Military Justice.
Special peacetime courts (*tribunales especiales en tiempo de paz*) can be instituted on the orders of the President of the Republic for troops who are on manoeuvres outside of their base or abroad. They are governed by the same rules as the permanent courts martial in peacetime.

The military examining magistrates are members of the military who have been appointed to the post by the President of the Republic. The rank required depends on the rank of the accused since the examining magistrate cannot be lower in rank than the latter.

In wartime, it is possible for military peacetime courts to carry on operating at the same time as military wartime courts. In wartime, military criminal jurisdiction is exercised by the commanders in chief; the commanding officers of each force, if they are operating independently or are incommunicado; special courts martial; and the armed forces police superintendents (*comisarios de policía*).

The special courts martial are not permanent bodies. They consist of a president and four or six members, depending on the circumstances. The president, prosecutor, judge advocate and clerk of each court are appointed by the relevant military commander from among the troops under his command. There are three kinds of special courts martial, depending on the rank of the accused (one for superior commissioned officers and commanders, one for lower-ranking commissioned officers and one for noncommissioned officers and the rank and file). Members of the courts martial must be officers of a rank not lower than that of the accused and the one with the highest rank and longest period of service is responsible for presiding.

Armed forces police superintendents are appointed by the commanders in chief of the army in the field or the officers in charge of divisions, corps or units of the armed forces that are operating independently.

The prosecutorial function (*Ministerio Fiscal*) is discharged by the Armed Forces Attorney-General in the case of the Supreme Armed Forces Council and by military prosecutors in the case of courts martial. The Armed Forces Attorney-General and other military prosecutors are appointed by the President of the Republic. The Attorney-General is accountable to the Ministry of National Defence. The prosecutors acting before permanent courts martial are military officers of the same rank as the members of the court in question. The Office of the Armed Forces Attorney-General is responsible for bringing legal action, is a party to all military criminal proceedings and is entitled to appeal. In wartime, the prosecutorial role is discharged by *ad hoc* prosecutors.
The Permanent Judge Advocate’s Office (Auditoría Permanente de Guerra) is made up of a Judge Advocate General, who serves all branches of the armed services, various judge advocates who are assigned to courts martial and those who are attached to the high command of the different armed forces corps and units. The Judge Advocate General and the judge advocates assigned to permanent courts martial are appointed by the President of the Republic. In principle, but with some exceptions, the judge advocates come from the armed forces. The Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces, who has the same rank, rights and privileges as the lawyer members (vocales letrados) and the Attorney-General, is answerable to the Ministry of National Defence. It is the responsibility of the Permanent Judge Advocate’s Office to oversee the legality of investigating procedures and trials within the military justice system, to advise examining magistrates and trial judges and to assist military courts in drafting judgments. In wartime, the judge advocate function is exercised by field judge advocates or ad hoc judge advocates.

As far as the jurisdiction of military courts is concerned, the Code of Military Justice distinguishes between peacetime and wartime. However, military courts essentially have jurisdiction ratione personae at all times over any offences committed by “enlisted men” (los “alistados”) in the armed services (this includes those on active service as well as, in some circumstances, those in retirement), those doing compulsory military service, students in military institutions and colleges and retired members of the military, when in uniform or undertaking operational work.

In peacetime, military courts are responsible for trying “essentially military offences and breaches, these being deemed to be all infractions which, due to the fact that they may affect the existence of the military institution, are exclusively established and punishable under military law”. Members of the National Gendarmerie (Gendarmería Nacional) are treated as members of the military for the purposes of military criminal jurisdiction.

In wartime, military courts are responsible for trying the following offences: those directly affecting the rights and interests of the State or of individuals, if they are committed by members of the military or military employees in the line of duty or in places which are under the exclusive authority of the military; those committed by members of the military in the course of carrying out a duty they have been ordered to undertake by their superior officers or at the request of the civilian authorities or when coming to the aid of the latter; and those committed by retired members of the military or civilians, as specified in the Code of Military Justice or in special laws. From the ratione personae perspective, in wartime military tribunals have jurisdiction over the

37 Article 108 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
following people: employees and operatives who do not have military status and have not been incorporated into the military but who are supplying services to military establishments or military facilities and who commit any offence in such places or in connection with their work; prisoners of war; civilians who are accompanying troops; and civilians who commit certain offences laid down in the Code of Military Justice in areas where military operations or war are taking place. Any citizens, employees or workers from official or private establishments which have been militarized by the executive during a state of war or in the event of “imminent danger” of war are also subject to military criminal jurisdiction.

In addition, military criminal jurisdiction in wartime can be extended to cover other offences and civilians by means of military edicts (*bandos militares*) issued by military commanders.

The Code of Military Justice defines a military offence as “any breach of military duty which is punishable under the code or other military laws and which is not classed as a breach of discipline, as well as any act made punishable as a result of edicts issued by the military authorities authorized to do so in wartime”. A broad range of infractions are listed in the Code: offences against the loyalty of the Nation, offences against the authorities and constitutional order, offences against discipline, “political or subversive activities”, typically military offences and ordinary criminal offences which have been ‘militarized’, and other ordinary criminal offences. The Code also allows for ordinary criminal offences committed in the line of duty to be subject to military jurisdiction. Article 878 defines a service-related act (*acto de servicio*) as: “anything concerning or connected with the specific duties incumbent on each member of the military as a result of belonging to the armed forces”.

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38 Article 873 of the Code of Military Justice.
39 Article 508 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
40 Articles 621 to 641 of the Code of Military Justice. The following, among others, are classed as offences in this chapter: treason, incitement to commit hostile acts, and espionage or the revelation of national defence secrets.
41 Articles 642 to 655 of the Code of Military Justice. Among other offences, this chapter includes rebellion.
42 Articles 656 to 701, such as assaulting a superior, disrespect, insubordination, and insulting the sentinel.
43 Articles 700 to 702 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
44 Articles 708 to 757 of the Code of Military Justice, such as desertion, offences against the service, abandonment of service and abandonment of one’s post or quarters.
45 Offences against property, perverting the course of justice, denial or obstruction of justice, bribery, administrative fraud or embezzlement.
46 Articles 870 to 871 of the Code of Military Justice. This chapter includes robbery and larceny.
47 Article 878 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
es any act carried out when undertaking duties related to combat, security (for example, standing guard, manning checkpoints and going out on patrol), operating equipment, undergoing instruction (for example, going on exercises and manoeuvres and attending academies) or training as a service-related act.48

For peacetime the Code of Military Justice provides for an ordinary procedure, a procedure for special courts martial and a summary trial (juicio sumario). The power to order an investigation lies with the military commanders. In the ordinary procedure, once the investigative stage (fase sumarial), for which the military examining magistrate is responsible, has been completed and if the case has not been dismissed at that stage, charges are laid against the accused by the military prosecutor at a permanent court martial. After hearings have taken place, the court reaches its verdict and specifies what forms of appeal are available. In the case of special courts martial, the Code establishes another shorter procedure. The summary trial in peacetime can be used “when it is necessary to punish an offence immediately in order to keep up the morale, discipline and military spirit of the armed forces and when serious offences, such as treason, revolt, mutiny, looting, assault on a superior, an attack on the guard or the murder of a sentinel, are involved”.49 For some kinds of offences, the verdicts reached by military courts can be appealed before the Federal Chamber of Appeal (Cámara Federal de Apelaciones) with territorial jurisdiction over the place where the act that gave rise to the proceedings was carried out. The competent court in the case of other types of appeal is the Supreme Armed Forces Council. For wartime, an extraordinary procedure with similar features to the summary trial is established in the Code of Military Justice. Verdicts reached as a result of summary trials, whether in peacetime or wartime, can only be appealed before the Supreme Armed Forces Council.

The counsel for the defence in military courts must always be an officer on active service or in retirement. Retired officers who act as defence counsel are, for those purposes, subject to the Armed Forces disciplinary system.

Law No. 23,049 of 1984, which amended several features of the Code of Military Justice, was introduced specifically to regulate the involvement of the “individual victim” (“particular damnificado”) in military criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, such involvement is limited since it is confined to indicating measures of proof, requesting notification of the verdict and appealing against it. The involvement of the successors (causahabientes) of the victims in proceedings is also limited in that it is only possible in the case

48 Article 879 of the Code of Military Justice.
49 Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
of murder or “unlawful imprisonment which has not come to an end” (“privación ilegítima de libertad no concluida”).\(^\text{50}\) The legal status and powers granted to the victim and his or her successors in military criminal proceedings cannot be said to compare to those available to someone wishing to bring a civil action for damages (parte civil) in the ordinary courts.

2. Austria

The Military Criminal Code of 1855 governed military criminal jurisdiction until the beginning of the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century. The Code included both typically military offences and ordinary offences which had been ‘militarized’ as well as “any provision of a penal nature concerning military personnel”.\(^\text{51}\) It is important to point out that in 1862 the Personal Liberty Law, which was later incorporated into the 1867 Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals, was passed, article 1 of which stated that no one could be removed from his or her competent or ‘natural’ judge. After the First World War, significant changes were made to military criminal jurisdiction. In 1920, the ordinary Code of Criminal Procedure was passed. This stipulated that in peacetime members of the army were subject to ordinary criminal jurisdiction. The ordinary procedural code only provided for military criminal jurisdiction in the case of war, adding that it should be governed by a new military criminal code which was not in fact promulgated until 1970.

In 1929 the Austrian Constitution was adopted and remains in force today with some amendments. Article 84 only allowed for military courts in wartime and abolished them in peacetime. In 1945, the ordinary Criminal Code\(^\text{52}\), which incorporated military offences into its list of offences under the heading of “Special Provisions for the Military”, was introduced. Under it, typical military offences\(^\text{53}\) and some ‘militarized’ ordinary offences\(^\text{54}\) were classed as “professional offences” which were only applicable to members of the Armed Forces.\(^\text{55}\)

\(^{50}\) Article 100 bis of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\(^{52}\) Law of 3 November 1945.
\(^{53}\) For example, the offences of insubordination (art. 548 and following), mutiny, attacking or insulting a sentinel (art. 575 and following), desertion (art. 583), etc…
\(^{54}\) For example, some types of larceny.
\(^{55}\) Oskar Zlamala, op. cit., p.171.
A new Military Criminal Code was issued in 1970 and was later amended on several occasions, particularly in 1974. However, it is still based on the principle that military criminal jurisdiction does not exist in peacetime.

3. Belgium

History

With the creation of the Kingdom of Belgium in 1831, the Constitution of the new sovereign state, which is still in force today, was adopted. The Belgian Constitution made provision for military courts but left it to the legislators to determine how they should be organized and what powers they should have. According to article 105, title III, chapter III, concerning “The Judiciary”, “[s]pecific laws cover the organization of military courts, their attributions, the rights and the obligations of the members of these courts, in addition to the duration of their assignments”. Although the Constitution was amended in 1994, no substantial changes were made to the regulations governing military courts. In the amended version of the Constitution, the provisions relating to military jurisdiction were moved to article 157, chapter VI, concerning “The Judiciary”, but the content remained the same.

The Procedural Code for the Land Army, which had been adopted in 1814, and the Military Criminal Code of 1815 remained in force in the newly-established Kingdom of Belgium. Under the military criminal legislation of 1814 and 1815, the jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione personae of military courts was confined to any offence (military or ordinary) committed by a soldier while on active service, including while on leave, offences against superiors committed by retired soldiers within 18 months of the date of their retirement, certain offences committed by civilians working for the Army and offences committed by civilians accompanying troops in wartime.

But it was at the end of the 19th century that the military criminal legislation which is still in force today, albeit with many amendments, was introduced. The Code of Military Justice was promulgated in 1870 and the Code of Military Criminal Procedure in 1899. The two Codes were strongly inspired by the military criminal legislation of 1814 and 1815. The Code of Military Justice has undergone many changes, one of the most important being the

56 The exact date of the Constitution is 7 February 1831.
58 Jacques Maes, op.cit., p.368.
reform introduced as a result of the Law of 24 July 1923.\(^\text{59}\) It is also worth mentioning that, as a result of an 1899 law, it became possible to join a civil action for damages to proceedings before military courts, something which prior to that had been forbidden under military criminal procedure. Several further changes were made to military criminal legislation between the two World Wars.

The development of military justice in Belgium is notable for the way in which its powers were extended. As Jacques Maes points out, “from 1831, the number of citizens who were totally or partially removed from the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal courts and subjected to the military courts gradually increased”\(^\text{60}\). Nevertheless, between 1836 and 1978, several initiatives were presented to parliament in an attempt to restrict the jurisdiction of military courts or simply calling for their total abolition. None were successful\(^\text{61}\). Although in 1958 the authority to try offences committed by soldiers while on indefinite leave was removed from military courts, this limitation on the jurisdiction of military courts seems to have been merely an exception. Among the parliamentary initiatives to restrict military jurisdiction, it is worth mentioning the one introduced in 1972 by Senator Bouwens who, for the first time, raised the issue of the ‘corporativist philosophy’ of military justice.

In 1991, the statute governing the National Gendarmerie of Belgium was amended to allow the corps to be demilitarized\(^\text{62}\). In a law dated 24 July 1992, it was determined that military criminal legislation would no longer apply to members of that institution.

In 1992, several provisions of the 1870 Military Criminal Code were repealed. In 1996, changes were made to the system of punishment used by the military justice system and the death penalty was abolished for military offences, including in wartime\(^\text{63}\). Lastly, it is important to point out that since 1999 there have been several parliamentary initiatives seeking to abolish military justice in peacetime. Some have also called for it to be abolished in wartime. The initiatives currently on the table propose amendments to article 157 of the Constitution which deals with military courts\(^\text{64}\).


\(^{60}\) Jacques Maes, op. cit., p.370 [French original, free translation.]


\(^{63}\) Law dated 10 July 1996.

\(^{64}\) Bill N° 1491-99/00 and proposal dated 23 June 2000 by Members of Parliament Vanhoutte, Tahaoui, Dardenne and Minne.
The current situation

Belgian military criminal legislation consists of many different sets of regulations: the Military Criminal Code of 1815,\textsuperscript{65} the Code of Military Justice of 1870, the Code of Military Criminal Procedure of 1899, the ordinary Criminal Code of 1867 and many supplementary laws and amendments.

The Belgian military court system consists of courts martial and the Military Court. The Cour de Cassation, the highest court within the civilian justice system, provides the third level of jurisdiction for military matters. Military Judicial Commissions and the Office of the Military Judge Advocate General complete the military justice system.

In peacetime, there are two types of court martial: permanent ones and field courts martial which accompany troops stationed or operating outside of Belgian territory. Each permanent court martial is made up of a superior officer, who acts as president, a civilian magistrate and three officers who must be no lower in rank than the accused. Courts- martial are courts of first instance and are responsible for trying members of the Armed Forces up to the rank of captain. In wartime, the King can authorize field courts martial to be set up, both on Belgian territory and abroad. Such courts are attached to each of the main armed services.

The Military Court constitutes the second level of jurisdiction. It is presided by a professional military judge and also consists of an officer with the rank of general and three superior officers. The Military Court acts as a court of appeal. Nevertheless, depending on the rank of the accused, it is also the court of original jurisdiction for offences involving generals and superior officers and its decisions in such cases are unappealable.

The Office of the Military Judge Advocate General is a hierarchical body made up of professional military judges. It has three main functions: it is the representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministère Publique), it is responsible for the Judicial Police and it carries out military criminal investigations. On behalf of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Office of the Military Judge Advocate General brings charges before the military courts and must ensure that all decisions and verdicts issued by the latter are properly enforced. Its director is the Judge Advocate General. Military judge advocates act before courts martial and the Judge Advocate General acts before the Military Court.

The Military Judicial Commissions are responsible for the investigative stage of military criminal proceedings. They are attached to each court martial and

\textsuperscript{65} Although only articles 8, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of this Code are still in force.
the Military Court. At the level of courts martial, each Military Judicial Commission consists of a military judge advocate, who acts as president, and two armed forces officers with the rank of captain and lieutenant. In the case of the Military Court, the Commission is made up of the Judge Advocate General and two officers whose rank is no lower than that of the accused. In the case of conduct which simultaneously constitutes a minor criminal offence and a breach of discipline, the Commissions can refer the case to the military commander of the accused so that he can exercise his disciplinary powers.

From the point of view of composition, three types of official exercise jurisdictional functions on the Commissions: professional military judges, civilian judges and officers from the armed services. Professional military judges must have a law degree and must be lawyers by profession or have held a post within the judiciary. They are appointed for life by the King and are answerable to the Ministry of Justice. However, they wear uniform and are due the same respect as military officers in the same post. Military judges belong to the judge advocate corps which is headed by the Judge Advocate General. The President of the Military Court and the military judge advocates are military judges. Civilian judges can, in certain circumstances and on a temporary basis, perform duties within the military justice system. They are appointed by the King and, in exceptional cases, by the commander of the military unit to which the court martial on which they are going to sit is attached. Armed forces officers who sit on courts martial or in the Military Court retain their military status while they are performing their legal functions.

In both peacetime and wartime, the Belgian military criminal courts try any criminal infraction committed by members of the military, be it a military offence or an ordinary offence, even when it is not service-related. Therefore, from the point of view of jurisdiction *ratione personae* and as far as members of the military are concerned, military courts have extensive jurisdiction, encompassing any ordinary or military criminal offence. However, there are a few exceptions to this general principle. Some offences, such as tax violations and breaches of the hunting and fishing regulations, etc., even though committed by military personnel, do not fall to the jurisdiction of military courts. The military courts also try offences committed by civilians who are working for the armed forces and officials who have parity of status with armed forces officers. Military jurisdiction also applies to military personnel on leave for a limited period and some categories of civilians who have a specific link with the Army.66 In addition, in wartime, the jurisdiction of the

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military courts extends to prisoners of war, foreigners who have taken refuge in Belgium, journalists and war correspondents who have been authorized to accompany military operations, the perpetrators of and accessories to offences against State security or espionage, whether those concerned are members of the military or civilians. In wartime, the military courts also try any offence committed - whether by members of the military or civilians - on territory under their jurisdiction where no ordinary criminal courts are in operation.

Military courts also have the power to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction (in this case universal) with regard to grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols of 1977. In wartime, within Belgium itself, the military courts have sole jurisdiction in such cases.

From the point of view of procedure, the military courts are governed by the 1899 Code of Military Criminal Procedure and its supplementary provisions. The Cour de Cassation has stated on several occasions that, as far as procedures are concerned, the military courts are governed by special laws and that the regulations followed in the ordinary criminal courts are not applicable, except where specifically provided by law.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that victims and their successors can seek damages within the context of military criminal proceedings. However, their ability to do so depends on whether a criminal action has been brought, something for which the Office of the Judge Advocate General has sole responsibility. If this does not occur, the victims and their successors are unable to obtain compensation through the military courts.

4. Cameroon

Once independence had been proclaimed, Cameroon adopted its first Constitution on 4 March 1960. It contained no specific provisions on military criminal jurisdiction or any type of special jurisdiction for members of the armed forces. However, at the end of 1959, military criminal jurisdiction had

67 Law dated 16 June 1993 on the penalties applicable to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 additional to those Conventions (article 9). Although this law was amended in 1999, the jurisdiction of the military courts was not affected.

been introduced. The ordinance under which military criminal jurisdiction was established referred back to the French Code of Military Justice of 1928, which by that time had been repealed.

The 1972 Ordinance

In 1972, a new Constitution was promulgated and, with some amendments, it is still in force today. The Constitution contained no clauses specifically relating to the question of military criminal jurisdiction or any type of special jurisdiction for members of the armed forces. That same year changes were made to the system of military criminal jurisdiction. Ordinance 72/5 of August 1972, concerning the organization of military justice, which was later amended by Ordinance N° 74/4 of July 1974, was to form the basis in law for the new system. According to the new legislation, military criminal jurisdiction was to be exercised by a single court, the Military Tribunal. One of the main features of the form of military criminal jurisdiction established under Ordinance 72/5 was its total subjugation to the executive. The Military Tribunal and the Military Prosecutor’s Office were attached to the Ministry responsible for the Armed Forces which had broad powers with regard to military jurisdiction.

The composition of the Military Tribunal varied depending on whether it was peacetime or wartime and/or a state of emergency was in force. In peacetime, the Military Tribunal consisted of a president and one or more vice-presidents and two advisers. The president and vice-presidents had to be members of the military or judges from the judiciary. The advisers could be commissioned officers or noncommissioned officers from the armed forces or judges from the judiciary. In all cases, one of the two assessors had to be a member of the military. In practice, all were from the military. One or more military examining magistrates were attached to the Military Tribunal. In wartime or in the event of a state of emergency, the Military Tribunal consisted of officers from the armed forces, with the highest-ranking officer acting as president. In all cases, whether in peacetime, wartime or under a state of emergency, the rank held by the members of the Military Tribunal had to be the same as, or higher than, that of the defendant.

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69  Ordinance of 31 December 1959. Successive amendments were made to it in 1961, 1963 and 1964.
71  In 1996, Law N° 96-06 of 18 January introduced some amendments into the 1972 Constitution.
The prosecutorial function in military courts was fulfilled by the *Commissaire de Gouvernement*, a senior civilian justice official, who could be assisted by one or more alternates who could be either armed forces officers or civilian or military judges. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that, rather than being responsible for bringing criminal actions, the military prosecutor could only really encourage such action to be taken. It was the Minister for the Armed Forces who had responsibility for bringing criminal actions. He had broad decision-making powers with regard to whether a specific unlawful act warranted the opening of criminal proceedings or whether it should be treated as a disciplinary matter. This meant that conduct which in fact constituted a criminal offence could be punished by the Minister for the Armed Forces as a disciplinary matter, thereby ruling out the possibility of criminal prosecution.\(^{72}\)

There were differences in the jurisdiction *ratione materiae* and *ratione personae* of the Military Tribunal depending on whether it was peacetime or wartime and/or whether a state of emergency was in force. In peacetime, the Military Tribunal had jurisdiction to try offences specified in the Code of Military Justice that were committed by members of the military or persons treated as such; civilians who were jointly responsible for, or accessories to, an offence committed by a member of the military or a person treated as such in a military installation or in the line of duty; and political offences contained in the ordinary Criminal Code and breaches of the laws on armaments, regardless of whether the perpetrator was a member of the military, a person treated as a member of the military or a civilian. The jurisdiction of the Military Tribunal could also be extended on the orders of the Minister for the Armed Forces to include other offences such as murder, bodily harm and armed robbery. In wartime or under a total or partial state of emergency, the Military Tribunal had the authority to try any criminal offence, whether military or ordinary, committed by a member of the military or person treated as such, whether in the line of duty or not. In wartime or under a state of emergency, the Military Tribunal was given broad jurisdiction to try civilians for various types of offence.

It is important to point out that, for the purposes of military criminal jurisdiction, members of the military and persons treated as such included members of the armed forces, civilians working for the armed forces and members of the National Gendarmerie.

At first, the principle of two-tier jurisdiction did not exist within the military justice system and the Military Tribunal was the court of first and sole instance for all matters. Nevertheless, appeals against some judgments handed down by the Military Tribunal could be referred to the Military Division of the Court of Appeal. However, this possibility existed on paper rather than in practice. Military criminal law itself ruled that there could be no appeal of any kind against verdicts in the case of offences against state security, “subversion” or breaches of the legislation on the possession of weapons. Several other laws which gave the Military Tribunal the power to try certain offences also expressly stated that it was not possible to appeal on any grounds against the verdicts handed down in such cases.

Conflicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary courts and the Military Tribunal were settled by the Supreme Court.73 Nevertheless, the Military Tribunal had sole responsibility for trying members of the military. Furthermore, in the event that criminal action was brought simultaneously in the ordinary courts and the Military Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the latter took precedence.74

As far as the rights of the victims and their successors were concerned, they could only join an action for damages to military criminal proceedings in the case of offences committed in peacetime, as long as they had not been committed in “emergency zones”. In wartime or under a state of emergency or in the case of offences committed in an “emergency zone”, there was no possibility for them to introduce an action for damages into the proceedings. In such circumstances, the victims or their successors could seek compensation through the ordinary courts once the Military Tribunal had reached its verdict.

The 1983 Reform

In 1983, the military court system underwent reform so that it no longer consisted of a single body, the Military Tribunal. In Yaoundé, the capital of Cameroon, a military court (the Yaoundé Military Tribunal) was set up with jurisdiction over the whole country and several other military courts with specific territorial jurisdiction were established: the Buea Military Tribunal, with jurisdiction over the south-western province75, the Bafoussam Military Tribunal, with jurisdiction over the western and north-western provinces76,

74 M. Ndeby Pondy, op. cit., pp. 642 and 643.
75 Decree N° 76-468 of 3 October 1983.
76 Decree N° 76-468 of 3 October 1983.
and the Garoua Military Tribunal, with jurisdiction over the northern and extreme northern provinces and the province of Adamaua.\(^77\) There was also the Douala Military Tribunal, whose jurisdiction covered the coastal province and which had already existed since 1976.\(^78\) In 1984, the Yaoundé Military Tribunal was given special jurisdiction over the central, southern and eastern provinces.\(^79\) Otherwise, the 1983 reforms did not affect the substantive or procedural norms that applied to military justice. In terms of powers and procedures, the military courts continued to be governed by the provisions of Ordinance 72/5 and the Code of Military Justice.

**The 1990 Reform**

In 1990, the political system began to undergo an important reform process. Many laws and restrictions on public liberties were abolished or amended and changes were made to the legal system. A multiparty system was introduced and political life became more liberalized.\(^80\) This reform process culminated in 1996 when numerous amendments were made to the 1972 Constitution.\(^81\) Among other things, more human rights were recognized and several changes were made to the provisions concerning the justice system. The revised Constitution did not contain any specific provisions on military jurisdiction.

The 1990 reforms included changes to military criminal legislation. For example, Law N° 90/058 of December 1990 partially amended Ordinance N° 72/5 of 1972. It should be noted that at the same time amendments were also made to the structure of the judiciary by means of Law N° 90/058.

Among the changes introduced in 1990, it is worth highlighting the introduction of the principle of two-tier jurisdiction which has meant that since then it has been possible to appeal against decisions handed down by military courts. Defence rights in military proceedings were also extended. As far as other aspects of military criminal jurisdiction were concerned - the way in which military courts were organized, the powers granted to them, the procedures to be followed and the fact that the authority to start criminal action lay with the Ministry of Defence - the provisions of Ordinance N° 72/5 of 1972 continued to apply, together with the amendments made to it in 1983 and 1984.

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\(^77\) Decreto N° 83-469 of 3 October 1983.
\(^78\) Decree N° 76-346 of 14 August 1976.
\(^79\) Decision N° 9 of 25 April 1984.
\(^81\) Law N° 96-06 of 18 January 1996.
The powers of the military courts were extended in 1997 as the result of a presidential decree which gave them the authority to prosecute and judge offences committed in military establishments, offences involving firearms and weapons of war and acts of gangsterism and organized crime.

5. Canada

History

Given that Canada was a former British colony, the development of its military justice system throughout its history has been influenced by the British system, especially in the years immediately after independence. These days, British military law is still a constant in the Canadian system of military justice. Before Canada achieved independence in 1867, the only armed forces in the country were the British armed forces. British armed forces serving abroad were governed by the Articles of War which, among other things, regulated the military justice system. In Great Britain, the Sovereign was Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Regulation of the Armed Forces, including issues relating to justice, was a matter of royal prerogative. Until 1689 when the British Parliament passed the Mutiny Act, the military justice system only applied to armed forces serving abroad in wartime while offences committed within Great Britain fell to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. The Mutiny Act established military jurisdiction in peacetime within Great Britain itself.82

In 1867, Canada gained its independence and its Constitution, the British North America Act, was promulgated. The British provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were organized into a single federal entity under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and given the name of Canada.83 Each one of the provinces of the newly-established Canadian state was supposed to set up its own voluntary militia, a process which was to be supervised by the British. However, in reality, the Canadian militia was “largely unarmed, untrained and unorganized”.84 The Canadian political and legal system remained under the charge of the British Crown to a certain extent and in many spheres British law still applied.

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82 See the section on the system of military justice in the United Kingdom.
83 Preamble to the 1867 constitution. In subsequent years, other provinces would be incorporated into the new State of Canada.
Nevertheless, under the constitution, the Canadian Parliament had sole responsibility for legislating on matters relating to the “militia, military and naval service, and defence”. In 1868, Canada passed its first Militia Act and British forces were subsequently withdrawn and replaced by Canadian forces. This first Militia Act was essentially inspired by British military law and so Canada came to adopt the British military justice system, which was mainly characterized by its use of summary trials and courts martial, both in peacetime and wartime. The Canadian system would also reproduce another feature of British military law, namely, the fact that no distinction was made between a criminal offence and a breach of discipline. The Canadian system, like the British one, was based on the concept of the ‘offence’, with ‘service offences’, which encompassed both military offences and breaches of discipline, being distinct from ‘civil offences’, which were equivalent to offences and misdemeanours under ordinary criminal law. The Canadian military justice system therefore covered both criminal and disciplinary matters, with aspects of discipline falling into both categories. This is why Canadian legislation uses the term ‘discipline’ when referring to military justice.

The Royal Canadian Navy was established in 1910 through the Naval Services Act. In 1944, a new Naval Services Act was passed, including the first real military justice code, the Code of Naval Discipline. This was the first time that a Canadian act had created its own military justice system rather than simply emulating the British system. The 1944 Naval Services Act set the foundations for the military justice system which was later established in the National Defence Act. Nevertheless, it still relied heavily on the British system. In 1924, the Order in Council which set up the Canadian Air Force stipulated that, as far as justice matters were concerned, the regulations contained in the British Air Force Act, which were based on British Army legislation, should be followed.

Regulations governing the Office of the Judge Advocate General were introduced at the beginning of the 20th century. The Office’s basic function was to advise the military authorities on legal matters. The Judge Advocate General acted as legal adviser to the Governor General, the Minister of National Defence, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

In 1929, after the First World War, together with the summary trials and the courts- martial, a new type of summary trial was introduced for minor
offences committed by army officers up to the rank of captain. Until then, summary trials could only be used for members of the rank and file and non-commissioned officers.

During and immediately after the Second World War, military justice legislation applicable to the army and air force consisted of a mixture of British and Canadian norms. This state of affairs, as well as several cases which had been brought before the military courts, was widely criticized, particularly because a large number of civilians had served in the armed forces during the war. As a result, a review of Canadian military legislation was begun. Given the similarities of their military justice systems, similar processes of legislative review also took place in Great Britain and the United States of America. The Canadian review culminated in the passing of the National Defence Act in 1950. This was to be the last major development in Canadian military justice until the wholesale review of the political and legal system which took place in 1982. The latter resulted in adoption of the 1982 Constitution Act and the coming into force in the same year of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

A single statute in the form of the 1950 National Defence Act was created to govern all three branches of the armed services under the Department of National Defence. Any connection with the British statutes was abolished and as any remaining British influence was removed, so the control exercised by the Canadian authorities grew. It was the first time that military justice legislation for the three branches of the armed services, in the form of the Code of Service Discipline, was provided by a Canadian statute. However, in this process of standardization of the Canadian military justice system, as in the British system, separate military jurisdictions were retained for each branch of the armed services. The National Defence Act established the right of appeal against judgments handed down by courts martial.

The Code of Service Discipline granted the Ministry of National Defence broad discretionary powers by conferring on it a quasi-judicial role within the system in the form of service tribunals. Several types of summary trial to be conducted by service tribunals were established under the Code. Such tribunals were presided by the appropriate superior officer in the chain of command. Service tribunals conducted summary trials for minor offences and

91 The Canadian Armed Forces are made up of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
92 These were the commanding officer, the delegated officer or the superior commander.
the maximum punishment they could impose was detention for a maximum of 90 days.

Based on the previous system of courts martial, the Code established the General Court Martial, the Disciplinary Court Martial and the Standing Court Martial. The first two were panels composed of armed forces officers on active service while the latter consisted of a single member who also had to be an officer on active service. It was not necessary to have any legal qualifications to sit on a court martial but legal advice was provided by a judge advocate. Courts martial were not permanent courts but they could be convened to hear a specific case by the “senior military authority”, namely the superior or commanding officer of the accused. The “senior military authority” determined what type of court was appropriate, appointed its members and designated the prosecutor from among the officers in the Judge Advocate General’s Office. As the prosecutor was the direct agent of the senior military authority, the chain of command was closely involved in the supervision of any particular case. An officer from the Judge Advocate General’s Office acted as defence counsel for the alleged offender.

In the Code of Service Discipline, the Judge Advocate General was retained as legal adviser to the military high command. Officers from the Judge Advocate General’s Office were responsible for performing the functions of judge advocate, prosecutor and defence counsel in courts martial.

The system of military justice established under the Code of Service Discipline had wide-ranging jurisdiction. As well as members of the armed forces, any person, whether civilian or military, who was implicated in an offence specified in the code as well as any civilians connected to the armed forces, either through work or a family relationship, came under the jurisdiction of the military courts.

Some amendments were made to the National Defence Act after it was passed. In 1952, changes were made to one of the types of summary trial. In 1959, an amendment was introduced to allow a member of the military who had committed an act deemed to be an offence under both military and ordinary criminal law to elect trial by court martial. Also in 1959, the Court Martial Appeal Court, made up of civilian judges from the Federal Court of Appeal, was set up to hear appeals against sentences passed by courts martial. Appeals against the verdicts handed down by courts martial could be heard by the Court Martial Appeal Court, consisting of three civilian judges from the Federal Court of Appeal. The Act also established that the last tier of jurisdiction was to be exercised by the Supreme Court of Canada.

In 1968, the Army, Navy and Air Force were brought together to form the Canadian Armed Forces or Canadian Forces. This did not have a significant
impact on the military justice system since the Code of Service Discipline already applied equally to the Army, Navy and Air Force. In 1969, a fourth type of court martial was created: the Special General Court Martial. The new court was granted sole jurisdiction over civilians who were subject to military justice under the terms of the Code of Service Discipline.

Reforms during the 1990s

Until 1982, when the new Constitution Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were introduced, there had been very few changes to Canadian military justice. The new Constitution Act stipulated, among other things, that acts of the United Kingdom Parliament adopted after the entry into force of the new Canadian Constitution should not form part of Canadian law. The need to bring the military justice system into line with the Constitution and, in particular, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, led to reform of the Code of Service Discipline. An examination of the Code and system in place at that time was started and has continued over the past twenty years as different aspects of the military justice system have been found to violate the rights enshrined in the Charter. As a result, many amendments have been made to the Code of Service Discipline. Among others, it is worth highlighting the changes made to the review and appeal processes for judgments handed down by courts martial, the introduction of provisions regarding the rights of defendants who have mental health problems and changes to the system for selecting personnel to sit on courts martial.

In the 1990s, two developments had a significant impact on the Canadian military justice system: the decision by the Supreme Court in the Généreux case93 and the involvement of the Canadian Forces in the Joint Task Force in Somalia.94

In the verdict on the Généreux case, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the way in which the General Court Martial was structured was incompatible with the requirements of article 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.95 Writing on behalf of the majority, Judge Lamer held that three essential conditions were required to guarantee judicial independence: security of tenure, financial security and “institutional independence with regard to matters of administration that relate directly to the exercise of

95 Art. 11 (d) of the Charter states that “Any person charged with an offence has the right: [...] to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.”
the tribunal’s judicial function”. With respect to the third criterion, the Court held that the system had many features which might prompt speculation as to whether the military justice system was separate from the military hierarchy. Many military officers answerable to the Department of Defence were involved in the proceedings. In addition, the executive appointed both the prosecutor for the case and the panel of the court martial who served as triers of fact. The judge advocate was also appointed by the Judge Advocate General who was himself appointed by the executive. Judge Lamer held that the test for independence and impartiality was an objective one, in other words, whether an “informed and reasonable person” would “perceive” the tribunal to be independent, based on this criterion, which was not the same thing as determining whether or not the particular judge or panel could be deemed to be independent on an individual basis. The Supreme Court concluded that, given the close interdependence that existed between the judge advocate and the executive, the General Court Martial could not have been viewed, from an objective standpoint, as possessing all the essential requisites of independence. However, although the Supreme Court held that the structure of the General Court Martial had to be changed, it also upheld the need for a military justice system. Nevertheless, it suggested that a military criminal system which was distinct from the disciplinary system should be set up. Thus, in the words of Judge Lamer, “To maintain the Armed Forces in a state of readiness, the military must be in a position to enforce internal discipline effectively and efficiently. […] Recourse to the ordinary criminal courts would, as a general rule, be inadequate to serve the particular disciplinary needs of the military. There is thus a need for separate tribunals to enforce special disciplinary standards in the military.”

The disastrous outcome of the Joint Task Force in Somalia and the gross human rights violations committed by soldiers from the Canadian Forces who participated in the mission put military justice at the heart of public debate. It was in these circumstances that the Canadian Government set up the Somalia Commission of Inquiry to investigate the human rights violations committed by Canadian soldiers and to draft recommendations. At the same time, a Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services, known as the Dickson Group from the name of the Canadian Supreme Court judge who headed it, was set up. The report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry and the conclusions of the Dickson Group led to extensive changes to the National Defence Act and reform of the Canadian military justice system.

97 Ibid., at 293.
The Special Advisory Group submitted its first report to the government on 14 March 1997. It included 35 recommendations and measures for improving the effectiveness and independence of the justice systems used by both the military and military police. All of the recommendations were supported by the government in a follow-up report published by the Ministry of National Defence. The Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, gave his personal backing to the Dickson Group report and implementation began. A second report was submitted by the Dickson Group on 25 July 1997 and contained a further 18 recommendations, mainly related to the quasi-judicial role played by the Minister of National Defence within the military justice system. These recommendations were also supported by the government. While agreeing that “the need for a separate and distinct military justice system is inescapable”, the Dickson Group was concerned that such a system should be “consistent with the primacy of the Rule of Law”. The Dickson Group stated that “[n]otwithstanding the requirement for a separate Code of Service Discipline and for a special court system to deal with breaches of that Code, it does not follow that the military justice system can be divorced completely from the rules of government and society as a whole. In particular, this system must be compatible with our Constitution, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”.

For its part, in its report entitled “Dishonoured Legacy” which was presented on 30 June 1997, the Somalia Commission of Inquiry concluded that, “It is abundantly clear that the military justice system is replete with systemic deficiencies that contributed to the problems we investigated. Without substantial change to the system, it will continue to demonstrate shortcomings in promoting discipline, efficiency, high morale and justice”. The Commission found “the military justice system to be inadequate in handling such cases and recommended that military judges be replaced by civilian judges”. In particular, the Commission went into detail about the central role and extensive discretionary powers enjoyed by the commanding officer in the military justice system as well as about its procedures. In its report, the Commission

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100 Ibidem.

101 Ibidem.


made 160 recommendations, including the need “[t]o reform the military justice system by, *inter alia*, excluding military police from the chain of command and substituting civilian judges for military judges”. Of the 160 recommendations, the Government accepted 132 and committed itself to their implementation. Of the 48 specific recommendations made by the Commission on the question of military justice, the Government accepted 37 in whole or in part.

Against this background, in 1997 the government instituted a large-scale review of the military justice system. The government stated that it had five main goals in seeking to amend the system, namely, 1) to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the different actors; 2) to make a clear separation between the investigative, prosecutorial, defence and judicial functions; 3) to reform the summary trial process; 4) to improve oversight and review of the system; and 5) to eliminate the death penalty as a form of punishment. The military justice system was restructured and the National Defence Act and the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces were amended in 1998.

*The Canadian military justice system today*

The Canadian military justice system is a special jurisdiction distinct from ordinary criminal jurisdiction. In contrast to the latter, the military justice system comes under the charge of the Department of National Defence. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, as a result of the reforms made to the National Defence Act, the quasi-judicial role and discretionary powers previously enjoyed by the Minister of Defence have been substantially curbed.

The military justice system is regulated through the National Defence Act, the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces and other supplementary regulations. The military justice statute, the Code of Service Discipline, forms part of the National Defence Act. In addition to these

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104 Ibid., paragraph 115.
106 Ibidem.
107 Canada, Department of National Defence, Amendments to the National Defence Act, November 1997 (http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/1997/dec97/ammend_b_e.htm).
108 The National Defence Act, R.S. 1985 was amended in 1998 as a result of the Act to Amend the National Defence Act, R.S.C: 1998, which entered into force on 1 September 1999.
specific laws, the military justice system must comply with the requirements and standards set out in Canadian law, especially the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.\footnote{Office of the Judge Advocate General, “Canadian military law, including the military justice system, is a component of Canadian law and is subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”, web page \url{http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/dyk_3_f.html}. [French original, free translation.]}

The military justice system applies in peacetime as well as in time of war or armed conflict and encompasses offences committed both within Canada and abroad. The system is based on two main pillars: the summary trial and the court martial. This is a consequence of the lack of clear differentiation between an offence and a breach of discipline and the fact that Canadian military law is based on the concept of the ‘service offence’, which includes both military offences and breaches of discipline, as opposed to that of the ‘civil offence’ on which ordinary criminal law is based. The military justice system therefore encompasses both the criminal and disciplinary spheres. Summary trials are used to deal with minor service offences that are tantamount to breaches of discipline while courts martial deal with more serious offences that are on a par with what are known as ‘military offences’ in other systems. In this sense, doctrine sees the Canadian justice system as having two distinct types of jurisdiction: one of a disciplinary and administrative nature (as characterized by the summary trial) and the other of a judicial nature (as characterized by the court martial). Nevertheless, the National Defence Act expressly defines a ‘service tribunal’ as a “court martial or a person presiding at a summary trial”\footnote{Article 2 (definitions) of the National Defence Act.}.

From the point of view of structure, the military justice system consists of the authorities responsible for conducting summary trials, courts martial, the Court Martial Administrator, the Court Martial Appeal Court, the Office of the Judge Advocate General, the Canadian Military Prosecution Service, the Defence Counsel Services and the National Investigation Service of the Military Police.

It is the commanding officer, delegated officer or superior commander who is responsible for conducting summary trials and presiding over the proceedings. They must be officers on active service within the military unit to which the accused is attached. The commanding officer or superior commander determines whether the offence should go to summary trial or court martial. In the event of the latter, the case must be referred to the Military Prosecution Service. Nevertheless, the defendant has the right to elect which type of procedure (a summary trial or court martial) is to be used. However, whether this
principle applies depends on the seriousness and nature of the offence as well as the rank of the defendant since officers with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or higher can only be tried by courts martial. Minor service offences go to summary trial. The procedures differ from those of a court martial: the proceedings are brief, the accused has no right to defence counsel and the Military Rules of Evidence do not apply. The punishment which can be imposed varies according to who has the authority to do so (the commanding officer, delegated officer or superior commander). The commanding officer has the power to impose the most serious punishments, these being detention for a period of not more than 30 days, a fine of not more than basic pay for 60 days or demotion. Decisions may be reviewed by the superior officer who presided over the summary trial.

There are four types of court martial: the General Court Martial, the Disciplinary Court Martial, the Standing Court Martial and the Special General Court Martial. They are the first tier of jurisdiction for serious infractions which are tantamount to ‘military offences’. The type of court martial depends on the nature of the offence and the rank or status of the accused. Courts martial are presided over by a military judge, who must be an officer with ten years’ standing as a lawyer. Judges are appointed for a five-year period which can be renewed. The Chief Military Judge is responsible for assigning military judges to preside over courts martial. In the case of Disciplinary and General Courts Martial, there is also a panel of members which is the equivalent to a jury in ordinary criminal proceedings. The panel is made up of members of the military on active service as appointed by the Court Martial Administrator who works under the supervision of the Chief Military Judge. If the accused is an officer, the panel must be made up solely of officers. However, neither the commanding officer of the accused or anyone who has participated in the investigation can be a member of the panel.

The rules and procedures for courts martial are similar to those applicable to ordinary criminal trials. In the case of Disciplinary and General Courts Martial, the military judge determines questions of law and the panel decides, by means of a vote, whether the accused is guilty or not. Nevertheless, it is the military judge who fixes the sentence. The authority to send a case to court martial lies with the commanding officer, the superior commander, the director of the Military Prosecution Service or, under certain circumstances

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112 Some offences can only be dealt with in a summary trial while others may not go to summary trial. For example, acts classified as ordinary criminal offences under the ordinary Criminal Code but which have been ‘militarized’ in accordance with article 130 of the Code of Service Discipline.

and following the chain of command, the National Investigation Service. Cases involving serious offences which cannot go to a summary trial must be passed through the chain of command to the director of the Military Prosecution Service.

The Court Martial Appeal Court constitutes the second tier of jurisdiction and hears appeals against sentences handed down by courts martial. It comprises a panel of three civilian judges from the Federal Court of Canada. The third tier of jurisdiction is provided by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Office of the Judge Advocate General is directed by the latter who must be an officer on active service with the rank of at least Brigadier General and a lawyer of at least ten years’ standing. The Office of the Judge Advocate General is attached to the Ministry of National Defence and the Judge Advocate General is responsible to the Minister. The Judge Advocate General still acts as legal adviser to the government, the Minister of Defence and the Canadian Forces on matters relating to military law. As a result of the 1998 reforms, the Judge Advocate General has the power to monitor and review the military justice system. He is also responsible for supervising the work of the Military Prosecution Service, the National Investigation Service and the Defence Counsel Services.

The Military Prosecution Service, under the leadership of a director, is responsible for presenting charges and conducting prosecutions at courts martial. It is made up of military lawyers. As well as acting as the prosecuting authority, it also represents the Canadian Forces at the Court Martial Appeal Court and the Supreme Court. The Defence Counsel Services, under the leadership of a director and made up of military lawyers, is responsible for overseeing and providing legal advice to those facing trial. However, the accused may elect to appoint a civilian lawyer as defence counsel. The directors of both these services must be lawyers of at least ten years’ standing.

The National Investigation Service is a Military Police unit. It has extensive powers of detention and, in certain circumstances, can make arrests without a warrant. Members of the Military Police working with the National Investigation Service have the power to investigate and bring charges before the competent military courts. These powers also extend to offenders not normally triable by military courts, if they are on premises belonging to the national defence system.

In terms of jurisdiction *ratione personae*, military justice applies to members of the Canadian Forces on active service, members of the Canadian Forces reserve in certain circumstances, retired personnel who have committed offences while in service and some categories of civilian. The latter include
civilians working for the Canadian Forces, civilians accompanying a military unit and spies. According to the Code, civilians accompanying a military unit include persons who participate with a military unit in its movements or duties, persons who are given accommodation or rations by a military unit, the dependants outside Canada of Canadian Forces officers and persons embarked on military ships or aircraft.

In principle, the military justice system only tries service offences which are tantamount to ‘military offences’ and breaches of discipline committed by members of the Canadian Forces. However, under the National Defence Act, any act or omission which is classified as an offence in the ordinary Criminal Code or in federal laws is deemed to be a service offence. Military justice therefore has jurisdiction over ordinary offences committed by military personnel or persons treated as such as well as by certain categories of civilians. Nevertheless, if committed in Canada, murder, manslaughter and abduction must be tried in a civil court. However, if such offences are committed outside of Canada, it is worth noting that the military justice system retains jurisdiction. In the past, the ordinary courts had sole jurisdiction over the offence of sexual assault when committed in Canada but, under the amended National Defence Act, jurisdiction has been restored to the military courts.

6. Central African Republic

At the end of 1958, the move towards independence that had begun in the preceding years started coming to fruition and the territory of Ubangui-Shari became the Central African Republic. On 16 February 1959, the Central African Republic adopted its first Constitution which “gave France broad powers in matters forming part of State sovereignty, such as currency, foreign affairs, the army, justice and energy resources”.114 Some time later, on 13 August 1960, the country achieved full independence and national sovereignty. On 25 November 1960 a new Constitution of the Central African Republic was introduced. It remained in force until 1964 when yet another was adopted. A little later, in 1965, as a result of a military coup led by Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, several constitutional acts were published and eventually, on 4 December 1976, an “Imperial Constitution” granting the coup leader the title of Emperor Bokassa I was introduced. After the reign of Emperor Bokassa I, two further constitutions were adopted in 1981 and 1986. Lastly, after a tortuous process of transition, in 1995 the current Constitution of the Central African Republic was adopted. The new constitution called for the creation of a Constitutional Court as well as the establishment of a judicial

system since the existing one had been inadequate. However, the new constitution did not specifically refer to the regulation of military courts.

Military criminal jurisdiction in the Central African Republic came into being as a result of Order N° 85-013 of 19 April 1985 which established the Permanent Military Court and the Code of Military Justice. Order N° 85-013 regulates the organizational and procedural aspects of the military justice system which appears to consist of a single body, the Permanent Military Court. It should be noted in this regard that the Central African authorities, in the core document forming part of its State party report to the United Nations, classified this court as a “special court”.115

In peacetime, the Permanent Military Court is competent to try all military crimes and offences (crimes et délits) contained in the Code of Military Justice and committed by members of the military or people who are treated as such, all ordinary or military crimes and offences committed by members of the military or people who are treated as such in a military establishment (of either a temporary or permanent nature) or military ship or aircraft, and all crimes and offences - be they ordinary or military - committed in the course of service by members of the military or people who are treated as such.116

In wartime or under a state of emergency, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Military Court is considerably extended. At such times, and regardless of whether the accused is a member of the military or a civilian, the Permanent Military Court has sole jurisdiction for crimes and offences against state security; crimes and offences, infractions and hostile acts against any member of the military, the Armed Forces or military installations and establishments; attacks on the Head of State or national symbols; and any crimes or offences related to the aforementioned crimes and offences.117 In addition, under a state of emergency, the Permanent Military Court has jurisdiction - though not exclusively - to try any offence specified in the Criminal Code and special laws. This means that, in wartime and under a state of emergency, only a few offences are left to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.

In terms of jurisdiction ratione personae and for the purposes of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the Permanent Military Court, Order N° 85-013 stipulates that a member of the military or a person treated as such means any member of the military or person who is a part of the Armed Forces and who is on active service or available for posting; anyone who, though not employed by the Armed Forces, is at the disposal of the authorities and

115 United Nations document HRI/CORE/1/Add.100, 19 March 1999, paragraph 35 and 42.
receives a fee; any member of a captured crew; and prisoners of war. Members of other state security bodies of a military nature or which undertake military duties are also treated as members of the military for such purposes.

The Permanent Military Court consists of two judges who act as president and vice-president and three officers from the Armed Forces, all of whom are appointed by executive decree. The position of military examining magistrate does not exist and the investigation of cases is carried out by one of the members of the court under the supervision of the presiding judge.

The prosecuting authority (*Ministère public*) is the Government Commissioner (*Commissaire de Gouvernement*) who is accountable to the Ministry of National Defence.

The prosecuting authority is responsible for bringing actions. However, under a state of emergency, the Permanent Military Court cannot start to hear a case without the prior authorization of the President of the Republic or his delegate. In terms of procedures, the provisions of Order N° 85-013 and any provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which are not incompatible with them apply. However, many of the provisions of Order N° 85-013 invalidate the ordinary rules of criminal procedure. It is not possible to appeal against the decisions of the Permanent Military Court in the case of crimes or offences committed in wartime or under a state of emergency. Appeals against other decisions handed down by the Permanent Military Court can, with a few exceptions, be brought before the Court of Cassation (*Cour de Cassation*) which is a civil court.

Under the terms of Order N° 85-013, it is expressly forbidden, for the victims of a crime or offence to join an action for damages to criminal prosecutions brought before the Permanent Military Court.\textsuperscript{118}

7. Chad

*History*

Chad achieved independence on 11 August 1960 and on 28 November its first constitution was enacted. The constitution made no reference to military courts. However, a military justice system, complete with a Code of Military Justice, was established within the first few years. The system comprised

\textsuperscript{118} Article 30 of Order N° 85-013.
military courts and military examining magistrates who were assisted in their investigations and the enforcement of judgments by the National Gendarmerie, a military body with judicial police functions. After a few years of relative stability, the newly-established Republic of Chad became bogged down in a series of civil wars which lasted over 30 years. Three years after independence, the then government abolished the multi-party system and opted for a single party, thus prompting the first outbreaks of armed opposition which were put down by the Chadian Army and the French Foreign Legion. The first civil war broke out in 1965 and most of the post-independence governments were overthrown *manu militari* (in 1975, 1979, 1980, 1982 and 1990).

When Hissène Habré (who was Prime Minister in 1978 and President from 1982 until 1990) was in power, a new Code of Military Justice was issued. Although the Code envisaged the establishment of military courts, they were not set up or did not function and, on 24 April 1990, under Ordinance N° 90-012 of 24 April, ordinary courts were authorized to try “offences committed by members of the military and persons treated as such”. In December 1990, Hissène Habré was overthrown by the Army Chief of Staff, Idriss Déby, who took over the Presidency.

In 1991, against a background of heavy militarization and conflict, a process of transition and stabilization got under way. On 28 February of that year a National Transitional Charter (or Constitution) was promulgated. Two years later, a Sovereign National Conference was held to try to put an end to the long period of political instability and, as a result, a transitional government was set up. The National Charter of 1991 contained no specific provisions on military criminal jurisdiction. But a few months after adoption of the National Charter, a Court Martial was set up under Ordinance N° 91-001 of 2 April 1991. This Court Martial, which was the only military court, had national jurisdiction and was made up of a president (a member of the military), four advisers (of which two had to be judges), two alternate advisers, the Public Prosecutor (*Commissaire de gouvernement*) and his deputy. All were appointed by the President of the Republic on the basis of proposals put forward by the Ministers of Justice and National Defence. Its jurisdiction *ratione materiae* encompassed a wide range of offences while its jurisdic-

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120 Ordinance N° 90-012 of 24 April 1990. [Spanish original, free translation.]
122 They included military offences and other criminal offences such as: culpable homicide, kidnapping, robbery, rape, conspiracy, the illegal carrying of weapons or munitions, and the illegal wearing of military uniform.
ratione personae comprised military personnel, paramilitaries and combatants who had committed culpable homicide and any civilians who were accomplices or accessories. The *Commissaire de gouvernement* was responsible for bringing criminal proceedings and the procedures to be followed were those set out in the ordinary Code of Criminal Procedure of 1967 for offences detected *in flagrante delicto*. There were no grounds for appeal against sentences handed down by the Court Martial. It is important to point out that in 1993 a Special Criminal Court was set up to try a series of crimes, including murder, kidnapping, unlawful detention and bodily harm, committed between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990 by the deposed government of Hissène Habré. This Special Court which was responsible for trying human rights violations committed under the previous government was not a military court and, with a few exceptions, the procedures followed were those laid down in ordinary criminal legislation for offences detected *in flagrante delicto*.

**The 1996 Constitution**

The Constitution of the Republic of Chad, which is still in force today, was adopted by referendum on 31 March 1996. The new constitution stipulated that the armed forces and security forces consisted of the Army, the National Gendarmerie, the National Police and the National Nomad Guard. However, it did not expressly regulate the question of military criminal jurisdiction or grant members of the armed forces any type of special court. As well as determining that the judiciary should be independent from the executive and the legislature, the Constitution specified that the judiciary should comprise a single court system consisting of the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, ordinary courts and magistrates’ courts (*juges de paix*). Later, in 1998, it was made explicit in the law on the organization of the judiciary that “justice is dispensed in the Republic of Chad by a system of jurisdiction that comprises the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, ordinary courts, courts of first instance, labour courts, commercial courts and magistrates’ courts”.

**The current situation**

At the moment it is not clear whether the military criminal legislation, and in particular the 1991 Court Martial, which was adopted before the introduction of the new Constitution, is still in force. According to information supplied to

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124 Ibidem.
125 Article 189 of the Constitution.
126 Article 148 of the Constitution.
127 Article 1 of Law N° 004/PR/98 of 28 May 1998. [French original, free translation.]
the United Nations in 1997 by the Chadian authorities, “[t]he courts of general jurisdiction hear cases of human rights violations through criminal indemnification actions coupled with criminal actions against the perpetrators… Any person who is a victim of a human rights violation may bring his case before the national courts which have jurisdiction. The courts also have jurisdiction to order offenders to provide redress for their offence. In the event of failure to act on the part of the courts of general jurisdiction, the victim may take his case to the National Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with Decree No. 163/PR/96 of 2 February 1996, which established the Commission’s rules of procedure”.128

In a recent ruling handed down in 2001 in which the Special Criminal Court set up in 1993 was declared to be unconstitutional, the Constitutional Council took the view that a court which had been set up before the new Constitution came into force and whose continued existence had not been specified under article 148 of the Constitution or the 1998 law on the organization of the judiciary could not be deemed to exist.129 The Council considered that any criminal acts which had come under the jurisdiction of the 1993 Special Criminal Court prior to the coming into force of the new Constitution should in future be referred to the ordinary examining magistrate.

8. Chile

History

In the colonial period, Chile, like the other former Spanish colonies, was governed by the laws of the motherland. From the start, “men-at-arms always had special legislation”.130 Although at first military criminal legislation was spread over several different texts (the Fuero Juzgo, Fuero Viejo de Castilla, etc.), in the middle of the 16th century, the first corpora of laws on the subject - known as military ordinances (Ordenanzas militares) - were issued. The first military ordinance was issued by Carlos I in 1551 and the last by Carlos III in 1768.

Military jurisdiction was broad-ranging and encompassed criminal offences and breaches of discipline as well as civil matters. It did not only apply to the military; it also applied to the widows of members of the military, their

128 Core Document forming Part of the Reports of States Parties : Chad, United Nations document HRI/CORE/1/Add.88, 12 December 1997, paragraphs 41 and 45.
130 Carlos López Dawson, Justicia Militar, una nueva mirada, Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos, Santiago 1995, p.23. [Spanish original, free translation.]
children under the age of 16 and even their adult daughters if they were unmarried or had become nuns. Different military courts served the different army corps. Military criminal legislation from the colonial period remained in force after Chile achieved independence although some procedural amendments had to be made owing to the disappearance of the colonial institutions.

No republican legislation on military justice was issued until 1839. On 25 April of that year, the General Army Ordinance (Ordenanza General del Ejército), which regulated various aspects of military life, was promulgated. In contrast with the colonial legislation, the new statute distinguished between peacetime and wartime for the purposes of both jurisdiction and procedure. The General Army Ordinance limited jurisdiction to those “individuals who serve the army from the general down to the soldier, those who have retired as long as they have authorization from the government” and “non-members of the military working for the army”. As far as jurisdiction ratione materiae was concerned, the 1839 legislation removed several offences, such as pimping, the manufacture of fake currency and the submission of fraudulent tax returns not related to the Army, from military jurisdiction. Nevertheless, as a general rule, both ordinary criminal offences and military offences fell to the jurisdiction of the military courts.

A new military criminal statute, Decree Law 806 or the Code of Military Justice, was issued on 23 December 1925. The Code, which was introduced by a de facto government, underwent a series of amendments in 1932, 1967 and 1970. Like the 1839 Ordinance, it distinguished between peacetime and wartime, both with regard to the military court structure and in terms of jurisdiction, as well as, in many cases, with regard to the types of punishment which could be applied.

On 11 September 1973, a Military Junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte overthrew the constitutional President, Salvador Allende. The de facto government decreed a state of siege, constitutional guarantees were in practice rendered invalid as a result of over 3,500 decree laws issued over a period of several years as well as four “constitutional laws” (“actas constitucionales”), and the Congress was dissolved. As described by the Chilean authorities, “[f]rom 11 September 1973 to August 1988 the country lived under one or more states of exception, a context that left the way open - during that period - to a situation of systematic violation of human rights”. As far as military criminal jurisdiction was concerned, the 1925 legislation remained in force during the dictatorship (1973-1989) but several amend-

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131 General Army Ordinance, 25 April 1839. [Spanish original, free translation.]
132 Core Document which Forms Part of the Reports of the States Parties : Chile, United Nations document HRI/CORE/1/Add.103, 17 March 1999, paragraph 18.
ments, designed, among other things, to “establish privileges for military personnel facing judicial proceedings and use the jurisdiction for political repression”\(^{133}\), were introduced. The \textit{de facto} government issued a decree which put a state of siege on a par with a state of war for the purposes of military justice.\(^{134}\) As a result, military courts were given inordinate jurisdictional powers that allowed them to try the vast majority of offences and to subject civilians to summary trials. Another consequence was that General Pinochet, as General in Chief of the Army, was granted the status of supreme military judge. Using these powers, he set up military justice commissions (\textit{comisiones de justicia militar}), the most well-known being the one known as the “Caravan of Death” (“la Caravana de la Muerte”). This commission, consisting of senior officers under the direct orders of General Pinochet, were charged with carrying out “work relating to the coordination of institutional matters, internal government affairs and legal proceedings”, which included reviewing and speeding up court martial proceedings against political opponents in detention. As pointed out by Alejandro Artucio, “[a]s a direct consequence of the ‘coordination’ work and ‘speeding up of trials’ carried out by the mission in October 1973, 72 people lost their lives”.\(^{135}\) In 1978, with the intention of ensuring that the human rights violations committed during the first five years of the \textit{de facto} government would go completely unpunished, the dictatorship decreed an amnesty for members of the Armed Forces and the other security services.\(^{136}\)

\textit{The 1980 Constitution and the return to democracy}

Drafted by the \textit{de facto} government of General Pinochet Ugarte, the Constitution of the Republic of Chile was adopted as the result of a plebiscite on 11 September 1980. Still in force today, it underwent some amendments in 1989, 1997 and 2000. The return to democracy in 1990 did not lead to a review of the military or the redefining or restructuring of military criminal jurisdiction in Chile. In 1991 and 1992, the administration of President Andrés Aylwin introduced two proposals for reforming military justice. The 1991 proposal sought to confine the jurisdiction of the military courts to the trial and judgment of military offences, thereby preventing civilians from being prosecuted by them. In 1992, the President submitted a bill to the

\(^{133}\) Carlos López Dawson, op. cit., p.31. [Spanish original, free translation.]

\(^{134}\) Decree Law No 5 of 12 September 1973, article 1 of which stipulated that, when interpreting article 418 of the Code of Military Justice, a state of siege should be treated in the same way as a state of war.

\(^{135}\) Alejandro Artucio, “Augusto Pinochet Ugarte ante la Justicia Chilena”, in Revista de la Comisión Internacional de Juristas - Impunidad, crimen de lesa humanidad y desaparición forzada, No 62-63, July 2001, p.51. [Spanish original, free translation.]

\(^{136}\) Decree Law No 2191 of 1978.
Chamber of Deputies which was designed to ensure that the military justice system “would under no circumstances try civilians or military personnel for acts detrimental to civilians or directed against democratic institutions”. At the same time, a group of members of parliament tabled a motion to restrict the jurisdiction of military courts solely to offences under the Code of Military Justice committed by military personnel and granting the ordinary courts jurisdiction over both ordinary offences committed by military personnel and military offences committed by civilians. Neither of these initiatives prospered.

Chapter VI of the 1980 Constitution, entitled “The Judiciary”, contains no provisions which expressly regulate the scope of military jurisdiction. Nevertheless, article 79 removes “military courts in wartime” from the “executive, correctional and economic supervision” of the Supreme Court. In addition, article 80 A concerning the “Office of the Public Prosecutor” (Ministerio Público) stipulates that “[…] [r]esponsibility for bringing public criminal prosecutions and conducting investigations of the acts that make up the offence, determining those which show the punishable involvement and those which demonstrate the innocence of the accused in cases which fall to the jurisdiction of military courts, as well as for taking steps to protect the victims of and witnesses to such acts shall lie, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Military Justice and the relevant laws, with the bodies and persons specified in that Code and in those laws”.  

Chilean military criminal jurisdiction today

The Code of Military Justice was adopted in 1925 and entered into force on 1 March 1926. It was last amended in 2000. Among the numerous amendments made to it, it is worth highlighting those that made in 1991 and 1995. In 1991, terrorist offences against members of the police as well as offences involving contempt for the Armed Forces or police were removed from the jurisdiction of the military courts. In 1995, article 137 of the Code of Military Justice was amended so that military personnel facing prosecution for ordinary offences lost the privilege of being held in military facilities. Despite the reforms that have been introduced, as Professor Jorge Mera

137 Fourth Periodic Report: Chile, United Nations document CCPR/C/95/Add.11, 2 December 1998, paragraph 186.
138 Article 79, Chapter VI of the 1980 Constitution. [Spanish original, free translation.]
139 Ibid., Article 80 A. [Spanish original, free translation.]
140 Law N° 19,683, June 2000.
Figueroa points out, military criminal jurisdiction “has not so far been the object of structural change”.\footnote{142}{Jorge Mera Figueroa, \textit{La modernización de la justicia militar: un desafío pendiente}, Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas, Diego Portales University - Faculty of Law, Santiago de Chile, on web page: http://derecho.udp.cl/inf_invest.htm. [Spanish original, free translation.]} The Code of Military Justice regulates the military court structure and matters relating to substantive military criminal law and procedure. Article 1 of the Code stipulates that, “[t]he authority to try civil and criminal cases that are subject to military jurisdiction, judge them and enforce the sentence rests solely with the courts specified in this Code”.\footnote{143}{Article 1 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]}

The structure, organization and extent of jurisdiction of the military courts varies according to whether it is peacetime or wartime. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the Chilean military justice system, both in peacetime and wartime, is built on the old military principle that ‘he who gives the orders sits in judgment’ (‘el que manda juzga’). It should be pointed out, however, that, for the purposes of military justice, the Code stipulates that a ‘time of war’ should not only be understood to exist when a state of war has been officially declared but also when a state of siege has been declared. Similarly, ‘time of war’ encompasses situations in which, even though such declarations may not have been made, “there is an actual war or a general call-up for war has been decreed”.\footnote{144}{Article 418 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]} This provision of the Code of Military Justice has been widely criticized in legal writings as creating a kind of \textit{de facto} state of war or emergency.\footnote{145}{Hernán Montealegre, \textit{La seguridad del Estado y los Derechos Humanos}, Edición Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, Chile 1979, p.29 and following.}

In peacetime, military justice comprises the Institutional Courts (\textit{Juzgados Institucionales}), Courts Martial and the Supreme Court. This structure is supplemented by the Office of the Military Attorney-General (\textit{Fiscalía Militar General}) and the offices of the military judge advocates (\textit{Auditorías Militares}).

Institutional Courts exist in each corps and unit of the Armed Forces. Thus, there is a Naval Court (\textit{Juzgado Naval}) in each Naval Zone and a permanent Military Court (\textit{Juzgado Militar}) in each division or brigade of the Army. As for the Air Force, there is just one Air Force Court (\textit{Juzgado de Aviación}) but the President of the Republic has the authority to set up others. The commander in chief of each military unit has jurisdictional power and acts as institutional judge (\textit{juez institucional}). However, this role can be delegated to
another general officer. The commander or institutional judge is assisted by a military judge advocate.

Institutional Courts are courts of first instance for “all civil and criminal matters that constitute military jurisdiction”. They also exercise “disciplinary jurisdiction over all those involved in administering military justice in the first instance”.[146] In the case of offences committed outside Chilean territory, the Institutional Courts are as follows: the Santiago Military Court, the Court for Naval Zone 1 and the Air Force Court, which has its headquarters in Santiago.

There are two Military Courts of Appeal (Cortes Marciales), the Military Court of Appeal for the Army, Air Force and Police and the Military Court of Appeal for the Navy. The first is made up of two judges (ministros) from the Santiago Court of Appeal, the Judge Advocates General for the Air Force and Police and a colonel from the Army legal corps on active service. The Military Court of Appeal for the Navy is made up of two judges (ministros) from the Valparaíso Court of Appeal, the Judge Advocate General for the Navy and a general officer from the navy on active service. Military Courts of Appeal are the appellate courts for Institutional Courts and they are also responsible for settling conflicts of jurisdiction involving courts within their jurisdiction and hearing applications for the enforcement of rights (recursos de amparo) submitted on behalf of individuals who have been detained or arrested on the orders of military courts.

For the purposes of military criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court comprises the General Judge Advocate of the Army who hears applications for the quashing of judgments (recursos de casación) handed down by the Military Courts of Appeal, applications for review (recursos de revisión) with regard to final judgments handed down by military courts in peacetime, and petitions in error (recursos de queja) concerning decisions made by the Military Courts of Appeal. The Supreme Court also has responsibility for settling conflicts of jurisdiction between military courts and the ordinary courts.

The military prosecutorial function (Ministerio Público Militar) is discharged by the Military Attorney-General (Fiscal General Militar) whose role is to “ensure that the social interest involved in offences for which military courts in peacetime have jurisdiction and the interests of the National Defence institutions are safeguarded in those courts”.[147] The Military Attorney-General is appointed by the President and must be a justice official with the rank of colonel or captain. Each Institutional Court also has a military prosecutor.

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146 Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
147 Article 69 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
(Fiscal Militar) assigned to it who is responsible for carrying out investigations and has the power to order the arrest of defendants. Military prosecutors are initially appointed by the President but, in some circumstances, they can be appointed by the respective Institutional Judge (Juez Institucional) from among his subordinates. Police prosecutors (Fiscales de Carabineros) can be appointed by the Military Judge (Juez Militar), on the basis of proposals put forward by the Office of the Chief of Police (Dirección General de Carabineros) and endorsed by the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army. Prosecutors do not give up their operational duties as officers of the Armed Forces.148

Each armed forces and police corps has a judge advocate general (Auditor General) and each Institutional Court has a judge advocate assigned to it. Judge advocates are appointed by the President and their function is to provide advice to the administrative and judicial officials of the armed services.

In wartime or under a state of siege, military jurisdiction is exercised by the Generals in Chief or Superior Commanders of garrisons or fortresses that are under siege or being blockaded or of divisions or corps which are operating alone and their counterparts in the Navy, courts martial, prosecutors and judge advocates. The jurisdiction of the peacetime military courts ceases automatically and is replaced by that of the wartime military courts. From the point of view of jurisdiction ratione loci, in such circumstances military criminal jurisdiction applies to any national territory which has been declared to be under a state of alert or siege, whether as the result of an attack from abroad or internal disturbances, and any foreign territory that is under armed occupation by Chile.

The General in Chief of the Army performs the functions of military judge for all the troops under his command throughout the territory under his jurisdiction. He also has the power to order courts martial to be convened to prosecute those troops, confirm, revoke or change any sentences handed down by such courts and order such sentences to be enforced. His jurisdiction encompasses criminal and civil cases as well as the exercise of discipline. The General in Chief can delegate his military judge functions to divisional or brigade commanders under his command. The General in Chief of the Army or any general in command of an army division or corps operating on its own who is acting as military judge has the authority to issue military edicts.

Courts martial have the authority to try all offences which fall to the jurisdiction of the military court system and there is no right of appeal against their

decisions.\textsuperscript{149} They are set up on the orders of the General in Chief of the Army or the general or commanding officer responsible for the unit in question. Courts martial are presided over by the commanding officer or, if he is not available, the longest-serving and highest-ranking officer available and made up of officers from the military unit in question, their number varying according to the rank of the accused. When the defendants are “ordinary civilians without ties to the military”\textsuperscript{150}, the court martial must have six members. Judge advocates also serve on courts martial. The proceedings are swift and of a summary nature.

Military prosecutors in wartime are appointed by the President or the General in Chief or Superior Commander of the forces. Only military personnel can be appointed to these posts. They can be officers on active service or lawyers who are officers in the reserve forces who have been called up for service. Their duties are the same as in peacetime.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that, in principle, both in peacetime and wartime, lawyers who are authorized to exercise their profession in an ordinary court and officers belonging to the Armed Forces and Police - who must be no higher in rank than the panel members of the military court in question - can act as defence counsel.

The Code of Military Justice establishes several types of procedure depending on whether it is peacetime or wartime or whether a state of emergency is in force. In peacetime, the provisions of the Code of Military Justice, together with some of the regulations from the ordinary Code of Criminal Procedure (\textit{Código de Procedimiento Penal}), are to be applied. It is the Institutional Judge who is responsible for ordering the preliminary investigatory phase of proceedings (\textit{el sumario}) to be opened and the investigation must be carried out by the military prosecutor. Article 113 of the Code of Military Justice states that “the \textit{sumario} shall ensue solely at the initiative of the authorities and, therefore, it is not possible for a private party to bring an action in these trials”.\textsuperscript{151} Nevertheless, in the case of certain offences\textsuperscript{152}, the victim of the offence must first of all give consent for prosecution to go ahead. It is important to point out that during the investigation, “secret documents belonging to the Armed Forces or the Chilean Police Force”\textsuperscript{153} can be introduced into the proceedings but this must be authorized in advance by the commander in chief of the institution concerned or by the Chief of Police who can refuse on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{149} Article 81 of the Code of Military Justice.
\item \textsuperscript{150} Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\item \textsuperscript{151} Article 113 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\item \textsuperscript{152} They are: rape, abduction, adultery and sexual intercourse with a minor (\textit{estupro}).
\item \textsuperscript{153} Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\end{itemize}
the grounds of state security, national defence, internal public order or public safety. Anonymous or secret evidence can also be introduced into the proceedings. Access to such documents or testimony is restricted and can be made available to “the lawyers of the parties only to the extent that they form the basis of the charges, dismissal or the final judgment”. Once the military prosecutor has completed the investigatory phase, the Institutional Judge can order a temporary stay of proceedings, close the case once and for all or order a full trial (plenario) to go ahead. Decisions to temporarily stay proceedings or dismiss the case can be the subject of appeal and, in the case of offences carrying a heavy sentence (“pena aflictiva”), can be referred for consultation to the Military Court of Appeal. Appeals against the final sentence can be lodged by the accused, the Military Attorney-General and the victim of the offence. If there is no appeal, the Military Court of Appeal must be consulted about the sentence. Once the sentence is final and the appeal and consultation procedures have been exhausted, an application for review may be submitted to the Supreme Court. In the case of offences detected in flagrante delicto, a summary procedure, under the charge of the commander of the unit in question or the officer in “direct command of the force or place where the deed was committed”, is used. The commander or officer in question has the power to arrest the suspects and carry out an investigation. Once this has been completed, the case is referred to the appropriate Institutional Court.

In wartime, a swift procedure of a summary nature is conducted by a court martial. The relevant senior military authority orders the appropriate military prosecutor to prepare the groundwork for prosecution. The military prosecutor carries out a swift summary investigation which must take no more than 48 hours. Once the investigation is complete, the military commander, on the advice of the relevant judge advocate, either dismisses the case or convenes a court martial. In the case of offences detected in flagrante delicto, the proceedings are even more summary.

The Code of Military Justice treats the victims, their successors or anyone else affected by the offence differently depending on whether it is peacetime or wartime. In peacetime, the victims, their successors and anyone else affected by the offence can join a civil action for damages to a criminal action being brought in a military court. However, the Code does not allow more than one civil action to be brought in the same case since it stipulates that, if

154 Ibidem. [Spanish original, free translation.]
155 They are: military imprisonment (presidio militar) or maximum military imprisonment (reclusión militar máxima).
156 Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
there is more than one, those concerned must “bring a joint action”. In wartime, the Code of Military Justice does not allow the victims, their successors or anyone else affected by the offence to bring a civil action.

It is important to stress that the Chilean authorities themselves made the following comment to the United Nations Human Rights Committee: “The impartiality of the military courts is questioned whenever military personnel are put on trial for ordinary offences, since the members of military courts are not irremovable and are subject to disciplinary action by higher-ranking officers, while an esprit de corps predominates in their decisions. Furthermore, the competence of the judges to conduct proceedings in keeping with the rules of due process, while ensured in the ordinary courts by the requirement that judges should be lawyers, is not guaranteed in the military justice system”.

From the point of view of jurisdiction ratione personae, the military courts can try Chileans and foreigners, military personnel and civilians, as well as juveniles under 16 years of age. For the purposes of military justice, military personnel are defined in the Code as being members of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police, as well as ordinary students at Armed Forces and Police Colleges, civilians employed by the Armed Forces and Police, conscripts, members of the Armed Forces from the time of their call-up, people who accompany the Armed Forces in the field in wartime and prisoners of war.

As far as jurisdiction ratione loci is concerned, the military courts try offences committed on Chilean territory as well as offences committed abroad in the following circumstances: offences committed on territory under military occupation by Chilean troops, offences committed by military personnel in the line of duty or when on secondment and offences against the sovereignty of the state or its external or internal security.

From the point of view of jurisdiction ratione materiae, the military courts are authorized to try any offences specified in the Code of Military Justice that are committed by military personnel or civilians, any offences assigned to military courts as a result of special laws, any breaches of the Air Force Code (Código Aeronáutico) or the regulations on recruitment and mobilization committed by military personnel or civilians and any ordinary offences committed by military personnel when at war, whether in the field, in the line of military duty or because of it, in any type of military facility or on military

157 Article 133 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
159 Article 3 of the Code of Military Justice.
territory, whether on a permanent or temporary basis. Quite a wide variety of offences are specified in the Code of Military Justice, ranging from typically military offences to ordinary criminal offences.\textsuperscript{160} At the same time, some offences only apply in wartime or, in those circumstances, are deemed more serious, both in terms of their description and the type of punishment applicable.\textsuperscript{161} The Code also contains a section on special offences applicable to the Navy\textsuperscript{162} and the Police\textsuperscript{163}, whether or not the perpetrators are members of those institutions. In addition, as a result of other laws, the military courts have jurisdiction over other offences, in particular, political offences committed by civilians. In the event that the main perpetrator of an offence is subject to military jurisdiction, the Code gives military courts the authority to try people who are not normally subject to their jurisdiction. Military courts can also try any associated offences (\textit{delitos conexos}), even in cases where the offence in question would normally fall under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. If there is any doubt about whether the offences are connected, the Code gives preferential jurisdiction to the military courts. Lastly, military courts are responsible for handling any civil actions arising from these offences.

All in all, military courts have jurisdiction over any ordinary offences committed by military personnel in the line of duty or arising from it, which means that they can try “human rights violations carried out by those in uniform”.\textsuperscript{164} Nevertheless, it should be stressed that, despite this general provision on the jurisdiction of ordinary offences, the ordinary courts are responsible for trying “ordinary offences committed while performing duties whose purpose is normally of a civil public nature”.\textsuperscript{165} However, at the same time the Code defines an act carried out in the line of duty as being “any act which relates to or is connected with the functions of any member of the military as a result of membership of the armed forces”.\textsuperscript{166} It is a fact that military courts have been an active source of impunity as far as cases of human

\textsuperscript{160} For example, the following offences are specified in the Code of Military Justice: treason, espionage, offences against the sovereignty and external security of the state, offences against the internal security of the state (an attack on a sentinel, etc.), offences against military duties and honour (service offences, sentinel offences, abandonment of service, desertion, etc.), insubordination (disobedience, attacking or insulting a superior), offences against the interests of the Army, offences against Army property and offences involving misrepresentation (\textit{falsedad}).

\textsuperscript{161} Article 372 and following of the Code of Military Justice.

\textsuperscript{162} Articles 378 to 404 of the Code of Military Justice.

\textsuperscript{163} Articles 405 and following of the Code of Military Justice.

\textsuperscript{164} Jorge Mera Figueroa, op. cit. [Spanish original, free translation.]

\textsuperscript{165} Article 9 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]

\textsuperscript{166} Article 421 of the Code of Military Justice, as cited in Fourth Periodic Report: Chile, United Nations document CCPR/C/95/Add.11, 2 December 1998, paragraph 101.
rights violation are concerned. Roberto Garretón said the following: “As far as trials for human rights violations are concerned, in other words, the prosecution of members of the military, the picture is diametrically opposed: presumption of innocence becomes certainty of innocence, the accused enjoy privileges which are not available to any other defendants [and] diligence is replaced by inaction”.167

Traditionally, when settling conflicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary courts and the military courts in cases of human rights violations committed by military or police personnel, “[t]he majority on the Supreme Court decided to award jurisdiction to the military courts, in accordance with a broad interpretation of the concept of a ‘service-related act’ […]”.168 For example, in the case of Rodolfo González, a victim of forced disappearance, the Court maintained that since those allegedly responsible for the offence were members of the military on active service, authority for handling the proceedings lay with the military courts.169 Nevertheless, over the past few years, the Supreme Court has gradually though timidly begun to change its position. For example, in 1994, in the case of the forced disappearance of David Silbermann, the Court took the view that the ordinary courts should be responsible for prosecuting the case.170 However, the Supreme Court still tends to refer most cases to the military courts.171

9. China

History

The Chinese Army has traditionally held a privileged position within society and the State. In Imperial China, the Army was the main pillar of power on which the dynasties were built. According to Professor Tsien Tche-hao, even though there was an Army Ministry, for the purposes of justice, the Imperial Army was subject to the courts attached to the Ministry of Punishment and

167 Roberto Garretón Merino, in the prologue to Justicia Militar, una nueva mirada, Carlos López Dawson, Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos, Santiago 1995, p.11. [Spanish original, free translation.]
170 Ibid., p.213.
171 See, among others, Informe de la Vicaría de Solidaridad, Chile, Appendix entitled “Proceso por detenidos desaparecidos o ejecutados que han tenido movimiento entre el 1º de enero 96 al 30 de junio 96”, on web page: http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/vicaria/proceso.html.
there were specific chapters on the Army in the imperial codes describing the possible offences.\(^\text{172}\) There was no special system of justice for the Army. Nevertheless, if someone was sentenced to exile or banishment to the frontier, the Army Ministry was consulted.

When the Republic of China was created following the national revolution led by Sun Yat-sen in 1911, a system of military justice was set up. In 1929, the military law concerning the three armies was passed. A code of criminal procedure for the military courts was supposed to be introduced but this did not happen until 1954, after the triumph of the 1949 Revolution. As a consequence, the 1929 military law concerning the three armies and the 1954 law of military procedure remained in force in Taiwan but not in the People’s Republic of China.

Before taking power, the Chinese Communist Party had set up a type of ‘military justice’ system. In fact, ‘supreme commissions for military trials’, attached to the Revolutionary Military Commission set up by the future government, had been established when the Republic of Chinese Soviets had been created in the province of Chiangxi in 1931.\(^\text{173}\)

In 1949, with the creation of the People’s Republic of China, the beginnings of a military court system came into being. Chinese military courts were constantly active during the period of the Cultural Revolution. Under the 1954 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, military courts were set up as a form of special people’s court as well as courts of appeal under the supervision of the Supreme People’s Court. At the same time, military prosecutors’ offices were set up as part of the special people’s prosecutors’ offices responsible to the Office of the Supreme People’s Prosecutor. In 1979, a new ordinary Criminal Code was introduced and many typically military offences, such as desertion and abandonment of service, were added to the list of punishable offences.\(^\text{174}\) The ordinary Code of Criminal Procedure was also amended in the same year. Military courts apparently applied the ordinary Criminal Code as well as a military law.\(^\text{175}\) From the point of view of jurisdiction \textit{ratione personae}, military courts only tried offences committed by


members of the Army, with reservists, members of the militia and civilians remaining outside their jurisdiction in peacetime as well as in wartime.

The military justice system consisted of military courts and military prosecutors’ offices which were attached to each branch of the People’s Liberation Army. According to Tsien Tche-hao, military criminal jurisdiction was incorporated into the organizational structure of the judiciary and, as far as the right to legal representation, appeals and the work of the prosecutors were concerned, was subject, in general terms, to the same procedures and norms as the ordinary courts or people’s courts.176 Military courts were made up of a panel of three judges, one a military judge and the other two advisers. Military judges had to be members of the military with legal training and were appointed by the Ministry of National Defence. Military prosecutors were responsible for performing the prosecutorial function as well as for ensuring the legality of proceedings, investigating cases and bringing charges as appropriate in the military courts.

The current situation

In 1982, a new Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was adopted. With a few amendments made in 1988 and 1993, it remains in force. According to article 124 of the Constitution177, the Chinese judicial system is made up of the Supreme People’s Court, local people’s courts, military courts and other special people’s courts. Military courts are therefore special people’s courts.178 Like all people’s courts, whether ordinary or special, military courts come under the judicial supervision of the Supreme People’s Court. Similarly, the military prosecutors’ offices are still classified as a form of special people’s prosecutors’ office under the authority of the Office of the Supreme People’s Prosecutor and a “part of the State judicial machinery”.179

The Chinese judicial structure does not set military criminal jurisdiction apart as a separate jurisdiction within the general justice system. In all cases, ‘military justice’ is dispensed by the Military Court of the People’s Liberation Army, the military courts of the regions, the local military courts and the naval courts. The military prosecutors’ offices complete the system of military justice.

177 This constitutional provision is developed in the Law on the People’s Courts.
The Military Court of the People’s Liberation Army is the highest level military court. It is the trial court for offences committed by senior officers above the rank of Division Commander, offences involving foreigners and any criminal prosecutions referred to it by the Supreme People’s Court.\(^{180}\) It is also the court of appeal for death sentences imposed by other military courts. Appeals against its decisions can be made to the Supreme People’s Court. The president of the Military Court is appointed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.\(^{181}\)

The military courts for the main military regions are attached to the main branches of the People’s Liberation Army (army, navy and air force). They are authorized to try offences committed by members of the military with the rank of Deputy Divisional Commander or Regiment Commander. They also try offences which carry the death penalty as well as cases assigned to it by the Military Court. In addition, they hear appeals against sentences handed down by the local military courts.

The local military courts are attached to the units which make up the three branches of the People’s Liberation Army. They try offences committed by military personnel below the rank of Regiment or Battalion Commander as well as offences which do not carry the death penalty. In addition, as delegated by the military courts for the respective main military regions, they can try other cases that are assigned to them.

The navy courts are the trial courts for cases from the navy, including those involving foreigners. Navy courts do not only deal with criminal matters and their jurisdiction extends to all matters concerning the merchant navy. Although they perform jurisdictional functions with regard to military criminal matters, they are not military courts in the true sense.

The prosecutorial function in military courts is exercised by the Chief Prosecutor from the Military Prosecutors’ Office, who is appointed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.\(^{182}\) It is important to point out that the examining magistrate (juge d’instruction) does not exist in the Chinese system and it is the prosecutors, including military prosecutors, who carry out the investigations during the preliminary stage of the proceedings. In practice, this is done by the police under the supervision of the prosecutor’s office.

\(^{181}\) Article 67 of the Constitution.
\(^{182}\) Article 67 of the Constitution.
10. Colombia

History

In Colombia, as in many other Latin American countries, many laws relating to military justice which had been introduced by the Spanish Crown during the colonial period remained in force following independence from Spain until the end of the 19th century. For example, a decree dated 14 October 1821 allowed the authorities to enforce certain regulations from the colonial period concerning desertion and military discipline. Similarly, a decree dated 27 June 1831 stipulated that, in cases of desertion, military officials should continue to enforce the forms of punishment that had been applicable under Spanish legislation prior to 18 May 1808. Another law passed on 16 June 1853 declared that several ordinances on military matters dating from the colonial period were still valid. On 27 November 1861, a decree was issued stating that, together with the general laws of the Republic of New Granada and the Confederation of Granada which had been in effect until 1859, “the Spanish ordinances and Royal Charters (Reales Cédulas) which were and are in force in the country” (article 1) in relation to military business carried out by the Army and Navy continued to apply. The same decree declared that these norms formed the basis of the Military Code of the United States of Colombia and ruled that, as far as military trials were concerned, the procedure established in the Royal Charters that had been in force prior to March 1808 should be observed. At the same time, several regulations relating to military criminal matters were issued. For example, Law N° 11 of 1825 laid down the rules on jurisdiction that applied to military trials for military and ordinary offences. A law dated 2 June 1842 regulated courts martial and authorized the Bogotá Supreme Court to hear appeals arising from such proceedings. It should not be forgotten that, throughout the 19th century and well into the 20th century, Colombia endured numerous civil wars and many federal governments. Throughout that century, a host of regulations relating to military justice were issued, both at the national and state level. Some of the federated states had military codes. Every time civil war broke out, it became an opportunity to issue new regulations on military justice matters. This means that for several decades norms dating from the colonial period coexisted with a vast array of national regulations.

However, it seems that the first Military Code was promulgated in 1881 as a result of Law N° 35 passed by the Congress of the United States of Colombia

184 Article 1, decree of 27 November 1861. [Spanish original, free translation.]
on 20 May 1881. It was not just a military criminal code. The 1881 Military Code regulated the security forces (Fuerza Pública)\textsuperscript{185} and the rules applicable to military operations and situations of insurrection and rebellion\textsuperscript{186} as well as matters relating to ‘military justice’.\textsuperscript{187} Book 5 of the 1881 Military Code established how military courts were to be organized, defined military offences and set out judicial procedures. Article 1360 stipulated that “there is no military jurisdiction in peacetime. All individuals from the army are therefore triable by the ordinary judges and courts of the Union for any ordinary offences and wrongful acts (culpas) they may commit”.\textsuperscript{188} Nevertheless, the Code allowed military courts to have jurisdiction over ordinary offences in certain circumstances but it was restrictive and expressly stated that if a military court acted without the necessary jurisdiction, it would be “grounds for a motion to quash (recurso de nulidad)”\textsuperscript{189} and that if military judges or courts exercised “powers belonging to the legislative or administrative authorities […] [it would constitute an] abuse of power”.\textsuperscript{190}

Later on, in 1931, a Code of Military Justice (Código de Justicia Militar) was introduced.\textsuperscript{191} Fourteen years later, in 1945, the 1931 Code was replaced by the Code of Military Criminal Justice (Código de Justicia Penal Militar).\textsuperscript{192} However, five years later, in 1950, yet another Military Criminal Code (Código Penal Militar) was issued.\textsuperscript{193} The new code was later amended and supplemented through a vast array of emergency legislation. Among the changes made to the military court structure at that time, it is worth mentioning the creation in 1953 by the de facto government of General Rojas Pinilla of the Military Court of Cassation and Review (Corte Militar de Casación y Revisión) as the highest court within the military justice system. There was no precedent for this move because the military criminal statutes in force up until 1953 had recognized the Supreme Court of Justice as the highest court with regard to military criminal matters.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., Book Four, “Regulations related to the law of nations which must be observed by the heads of military operations”.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., Book Five, “Military Justice”.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., article 1360. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., article 1363. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., article 1364. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{191} Law N° 84 of 23 June 1931.
\textsuperscript{192} Law N° 3 of 19 February 1945.
\textsuperscript{193} Decree N° 1125 of 31 March 1950.
\textsuperscript{194} For example, see articles 1381, 1385, 1386 and 1387 of the 1881 Military Code, articles 25, 27 and 28 of the 1931 Code of Military Justice and articles 5 and 24 of the 1945 Code of Military Criminal Justice.
and Review ceased to exist in 1958 when a new Code of Military Criminal Justice was introduced.

The 1958 Code of Military Criminal Justice was issued by decree by the de facto government of General Rojas Pinilla and made permanent by means of a 1961 law. The new code retained many of the emergency provisions introduced in previous years. The 1958 Code remained in force until June 1989 when a new military justice statute, the Military Criminal Code, which had been promulgated in 1988, came into effect. In 1999, that Code was in turn repealed and replaced by a new Military Criminal Code which entered into force in August 2000. Article 608 of the new law stipulated that the Code “shall come into effect one (1) year after its date of issue, providing that the respective Statutory Law which determines the structure of the Administration of Military Criminal Justice is in force”.

It is important to stress that, throughout the 20th century, Colombia experienced several civil wars and numerous states of siege. The powers of the military courts were considerably extended following the enactment of a myriad of laws, mainly of an emergency nature, one of the first being Law N° 28 of 1905 which authorized the military courts to try ordinary offences committed by military personnel and members of the rebel forces during the ‘Thousand Day War’ (‘Guerra de los Mil Días’). A large number of provisions giving the military courts the power to try civilians were promulgated.

The subjection to military jurisdiction of members of the Colombian National Police, an institution which, despite its civilian nature, had long been incorporated into the Armed Forces and attached to the Ministry of Defence, has been a constant feature in the history of military criminal jurisdiction, as established in decrees Nos. 2900 of 1952, 1814 of 1953 and 1426 of 1954. Article 1 of Decree N° 1426 of 1954 expressly stipulated that “all offences committed by members of the Police Forces on active service” were subject to the jurisdiction of the military courts. Subsequent provisions reiterated this and treated members of the Police as military personnel for judicial pur-

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196 Law N° 141 of 1961 as a result of which Decree N° 250 of 11 July 1958 was adopted as a permanent law of the Republic.
199 Military Criminal Code of 2000, article 608. [Spanish original, free translation.]
200 Decree 1953 of 1814.
201 Decree 1426 of 1954, article 1. [Spanish original, free translation.]
poses. Military criminal codes in force until 1958 did not specifically state that members of the Police were to be tried by military courts. However, the 1958 Code of Military Justice and, later on, the Military Criminal Codes of 1988 and 1999 did specifically grant military privilege to members of the National Police. The Supreme Court of Justice ruled on several occasions that members of the Military Police benefitted from military privilege.

The 1958 Code of Military Criminal Justice

The 1958 Code of Military Criminal Justice brought the regulations on the organization and structure of the military justice system, the classification of offences and the rules of procedure together into a single document.

As a result of the new code, military criminal jurisdiction was completely incorporated into the hierarchical command structure of the Armed Forces.204 This was expressly stated in article 2 of the Code: “the exercise of military jurisdiction is inherent to the military hierarchy”.205 Thus the following were to be part of the military court structure: the Supreme Military Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Militar), military trial judges (Jueces de Primera Instancia Penal Militar), presidents of oral courts martial (Presidentes de los Consejos Verbales de Guerra) and military examining magistrates (Jueces de Instrucción Instancia Penal Militar). The Code also gave jurisdictional powers to the Minister of War in certain circumstances.206 The Criminal Appeals Division (Sala de Casación Penal) of the Supreme Court of Justice was to have powers with regard to military criminal jurisdiction as the court of cassation and review (tribunal de casación y revisión) for second instance judgments handed down by the Supreme Military Tribunal and as the appellate court (tribunal de apelación) for first instance judgments handed down by the Supreme Military Tribunal as well as for ruling on conflicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary criminal courts and the military courts. However, later on, in 1972, the power to rule on conflicts of jurisdiction was removed and given to the Disciplinary Tribunal (Tribunal Disciplinario)207,

203 For example, see the decisions handed down on 29 September 1973, 22 February 1979 and 4 October 1979.
204 The term Fuerzas Armadas (Armed Forces) applied to the Military Forces (Army, National Navy and Air Force) and the National Police. These days the equivalent term is Fuerza Pública.
205 1958 Code of Military Justice, article 2. [Spanish original, free translation.]
206 Ibid., article 319. The name of the Ministry of War was later changed to Ministry of National Defence.
207 Law N° 20 of 1972.
which exercised it until July 1987 when it was restored to the Supreme Court of Justice.\footnote{208} The fact that the Supreme Court of Justice had developed restrictive jurisprudence on matters relating to military jurisdiction and service-related acts (\textit{actos del servicio}) was not unconnected with this transfer of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Military Tribunal was made up of the General Commander of the Armed Forces and fifteen judges appointed by the executive. The latter had to be Armed Forces officers who were qualified lawyers and had held the position of judge or prosecutor within the military justice system. The Supreme Military Tribunal was responsible for hearing applications for appeal or review of judgments rendered in the first instance by other military courts and was the court of original jurisdiction for proceedings against military examining magistrates and judge advocates. Nevertheless, in 1984, the Supreme Court of Justice ruled that this latter role was unconstitutional.\footnote{209}

The position of military trial judge was carried out by the highest-ranking official within the chain of command of each of the armed services (the Army, National Navy, Air Force and National Police) and, in turn, within each unit, however big or small, belonging to each of those bodies. For example, in the case of the Army, the Commander of the Army and the commanders of each division, brigade and battalion were military trial judges. Jurisdiction was allocated on the basis of several criteria: the rank of the soldier or police officer facing trial, which military or police unit he belonged to, which unit had territorial jurisdiction in the place where the offence was committed, etc. However, in the case of civilians facing trial by military courts, the role of military trial judge was placed on the shoulders of the Brigade Commanders. Since it was not necessary to have any legal qualifications to be a military trial judge, legal advice was provided to them by the judge advocate assigned to the military or police unit in question.

Rather than being a military court as such, the concept of president of an oral court martial refers to a procedure established by the Code for trying certain offences in the form of an oral court martial. The role of president of an oral court martial was to be performed by an Armed Forces officer appointed by the Commander of the armed force or military or police unit in question.\footnote{210}

\footnote{208} This power were restored to the Supreme Court of Justice in the new Code of Criminal Procedure (Decree N° 50 of 1987).  
\footnote{209} Judgment handed down on 1 November 1984.  
In practice, it was the commanders themselves who did so. Apart from the President, an oral court martial was made up of a panel of members and a prosecutor, all of whom had to be officers of the Armed Forces who were either on active service or in retirement. The duties of the president of an oral court martial were similar to those of a military trial judge.

The position of military examining magistrate could be held by any officer from the military forces or National Police who had been appointed by a military trial judge or by the Supreme Military Tribunal. In some special cases, the following were able to carry out the duties of military examining magistrate: civilians working for the Armed Forces who had been authorized to do so by the General Commander of the Armed Forces, judge advocates designated by the Minister of War or a military trial judge, officials from the ordinary criminal justice system who had been designated by the Minister of Justice following a request from the General Commander of the Armed Forces or the Armed Forces Prosecutor (Procurador General de las Fuerzas Armadas). To be a military examining magistrate, it was necessary to be a lawyer and to have been a judge or prosecutor within the ordinary criminal justice system, a judge advocate, a professor of law at a university or to have completed a special course of study in military law.

While the Supreme Military Tribunal and the military trial courts (Juzgados de Instrucción Penal Militar) were permanent courts within the military justice system, this was not the case for the other bodies. The commander of a particular military or police unit could take on the role of military trial judge or convene an oral court martial as the need arose.

The structure was supplemented by the Judge Advocate’s Office (Auditoría de Guerra) and the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público). The Judge Advocate’s Office provided legal advice to the courts within the military justice system. Each Armed Forces institution had a Senior Judge Advocate’s Office (Auditoría Superior de Guerra) and senior, principal and auxiliary judge advocates, who were employed by the Ministry of War by whom they were “freely appointed or removed”.211 The Office of the Armed Forces Prosecutor (Procuraduría General de las Fuerzas Armadas)212 represented the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) within the military court system. To be Armed Forces Prosecutor, it was necessary to be an officer on active service with the rank of general who could be “freely appointed

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211 Ibid., article 374. [Spanish original, free translation.]
212 This later became the Office of the Prosecutor’s Delegate for the Armed Forces (Procuraduría delegada para las Fuerzas Armadas) attached to the Procuraduría General de la Nación. It was later split between two delegates: one for the military forces and one for the National Police.
or removed” by the Government. These requirements were retained following the 1971 reform of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Procuraduría General de la Nación) and, although the Supreme Court of Justice had declared them to be unconstitutional in 1983, it was not until 1987 that the first civilian would be appointed to the post. Within the various courts that made up the military justice system, the Public Prosecutor’s Office was represented by prosecutors (fiscales), the vast majority of whom were Armed Forces officers on active service.

Almost all officials working in the military justice system (prosecutors, tribunal members, court-appointed defence counsel, court clerks and legal advisers) are military or police personnel who are subordinate to the trial judge who is at the same time carrying out the duties of military or police commander and therefore responsible for freely removing or appointing them. This gives rise to a relationship of total dependence on the military or police command. The late President of the Supreme Court of Justice, Dr. Alfonso Reyes Echandía, was quite right when he said the following about the military justice system: “It is therefore the most senior-ranking military officers who investigate and rule on criminal proceedings concerning offences committed by members of the armed forces in the ordinary exercise of their military activities […] with such a pyramidal system of hierarchy it is impossible to expect a balanced and fair trial”.

The Code of Military Criminal Justice established several types of proceedings: a court martial under the charge of a military trial judge, an oral court martial (a summary trial) and a special procedure (Procedimiento Especial),

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213 1958 Code of Military Criminal Justice, article 378. [Spanish original, free translation.]
214 Article 36 (a) of Decree Law 521 of 1971. The Procuraduría General de la Nación has a dual function: in criminal matters it represents the interest of the Nation and supervise the legality of the proceedings; and it is also the highest authority in matters relating to the official conduct of persons in public service, to the exception of judges and magistrates. It exercises disciplinary authority, conducts the appropriate investigations and imposes the appropriate sanctions (art. 277 of the Constitution). It therefore exercises external disciplinary authority over government institutions, independently of the internal disciplinary authority of each institution. It may refer any evidence it collects to the prosecutors and judges for the purposes of the relevant criminal proceedings. Before the establishment of the Fiscalía General de la Nación (Office of the General Public Prosecutor), the Procuraduría General de la Nación has been in charge, partially or entirely, of the criminal investigation.
an extremely summary form of trial which, in some cases, lasted less than 48 hours.217

As a result of the 1958 Code of Military Criminal Justice, the jurisdiction of the military courts was extended by comparison with earlier military legislation, in particular, the rules on military jurisdiction contained in the 1886 Constitution which had been in force up until then. In fact, article 170 of the 1886 Constitution stipulated that “offences committed by military personnel on active service or in relation to it shall be heard by the courts martial (Cortes Marciales) or military tribunals (Tribunales Militares), in accordance with the provisions of the Military Criminal Code”218

Under the Code of Military Criminal Justice, the jurisdiction ratione personae of military courts encompassed all military and police personnel on active service, civilians working with the Armed Forces, foreign military personnel serving with the Colombian Armed Forces, prisoners of war and spies. As far as jurisdiction ratione materiae was concerned, military courts were responsible for trying all offences defined in the Code of Military Criminal Justice (including strictly military offences and ordinary criminal offences which had been ‘militarized’) as well as ordinary criminal offences committed by military or police personnel in the course of duty or connected with it. In wartime or under a state of emergency, their jurisdiction was extended to cover any military or ordinary criminal offence committed by members of the military or police or civilians working for the Armed Forces.

In addition to the regulations contained in the Code of Military Criminal Justice, under a state of siege emergency measures could be adopted. These drastically extended the scope of jurisdiction of the military courts. Under the emergency powers, military courts were systematically granted the authority to try civilians, usually by means of an oral court martial or the special procedure. It is worth remembering that, between November 1958 and June 1982 and from May 1984 until July 1991, Colombia was under a permanent state of siege219 and that, for example, between 1965 and 1986, 42 decrees authorizing military courts to try civilians were issued.220 This practice carried on until 5 March 1987 when the Supreme Court of Justice declared the trying of civilians by military courts to be unconstitutional.

217 For example, see Gustavo Gallón and Federico Andreu, Sistema judicial y derechos humanos en Colombia, Comisión Andina de Juristas - Sección Colombiana, Ed. ECOE, Bogotá 1990, pp.24 to 26.
218 Constitution of 1886, article 170. [Spanish original, free translation.]
219 Gustavo Gallón and Federico Andreu, op. cit., pp.21 and 22.
The Code of Military Criminal Justice allowed the victims and their successors to bring a civil action for damages (*parte civil*) in the case of ordinary criminal offences. The only instance in which this was not permitted was in the case of strictly military offences. However, the jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Military Tribunal and other military courts did not allow a civil action to be brought in the case of ordinary criminal offences committed in the course of duty.\(^\text{221}\)

**The Military Criminal Code of 1988**

In 1988, as a result of a request for extraordinary powers made to Congress in December 1987 by the Minister of Defence, the executive issued a new Military Criminal Code which entered into effect in June 1989.\(^\text{222}\)

In general, the new code reproduced most of the provisions of the 1958 Code of Military Criminal Justice together with the various changes and amendments it had undergone. In that sense, it was in reality a reform of the 1958 code rather than a new one. In terms of changes to the structure of the military courts, the following are worth noting: as well as the powers originally attributed to it in the 1958 Code, the Supreme Court of Justice was to be the trial court for proceedings against judges from the Supreme Military Tribunal and the high command of the armed forces; the Supreme Military Tribunal once again became the trial court for proceedings against military examining magistrates and judge advocates; the power to act as a military trial judge was extended to include the Joint Chief of Staff of the Military Forces, directors of military or police training colleges and other senior officers in a position of leadership; and the role of president of oral courts martial disappeared, with their duties being reassigned to military trial judges. The role of representative of the Public Prosecutor’s Office remained in the hands of Attorney-General’s Delegates for the Military Forces and National Police and the prosecutors acting before the Supreme Military Tribunal, the military trial courts and the oral courts martial. Paradoxically, even though it was possible for the Attorney-General’s Delegates for the Armed Forces and National Police to be civilians, the Code stipulated that: “under no circumstances shall the Public Prosecutor’s Office be represented by officers of lower rank or seniority than the accused”.\(^\text{223}\)

Under the new Military Criminal Code, the following procedures were specified: an oral court martial, an oral court martial without a panel (*sin interven-
ción de vocales) and a special procedure (Procedimiento Especial). In general terms, these were similar to the procedures contained in the 1958 Code.

But the most sensitive changes introduced as a result of the new Military Criminal Code undoubtedly concerned the scope of jurisdiction of the military courts and the question of being able to bring a civil action for damages (parte civil). The new code extended military jurisdiction. Firstly, article 14 stipulated that its provisions would apply to “military personnel on active service who commit a punishable military or ordinary act related to the service itself, inside or outside national territory […] They shall also apply to [senior] officers, non-commissioned officers and [ordinary] officers of the National Police”.\(^\text{224}\) According to article 291 of the Code, “military personnel on active service and members of the National Police, when they commit offences envisaged in this Code or other offences in the course of duty or in connection with it, shall only be tried by [military] judges and courts”.\(^\text{225}\) Secondly, among the offences defined in the Code were some which are typically viewed as political, such as rebellion, sedition and riot, thereby once again paving the way for civilians to be tried by military courts under emergency legislation.

Thirdly, under article 291 of the Code, typical gross human rights violations committed against civilians were classed as offences for which the military courts were to have sole jurisdiction. Thus, under the Code, the following were defined as military offences: torture (article 256), extrajudicial execution (article 259) and, according to statements by the then Minister of Defence, the forced disappearance of persons (article 253 concerning “special arbitrary detention”). The aim was clear: to settle once and for all, and in favour of the military courts, the question of which courts were authorised to try typical gross human rights violations committed by members of the security forces. Prior to that, these had been treated as ordinary criminal offences committed in the course of duty, thereby meaning that on some occasions ordinary judges could try such offences since they were not considered to be service-related.

As far as the possibility of bringing a civil action for damages (parte civil) was concerned, the new Code simply failed to make any reference to the issue in the section on “Parties to the proceedings”.\(^\text{226}\) This legal vacuum was frequently invoked by military courts to deny requests from the victims of human rights violations or their relatives to be parties to the proceedings. Nevertheless, later on, the Constitutional Court affirmed in several of its rul-

\(^\text{224}\) 1988 Military Criminal Code, article 14. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\(^\text{225}\) Ibid., article 291. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\(^\text{226}\) Ibid., articles 362 to 382.
ings that there was nothing to prevent victims and/or their successors from joining a civil action to criminal proceedings in military courts and that access to the administration of justice is an integral part of due process.227

Lastly, it is important to point out although the 1988 Military Criminal Code restored the authority to settle conflicts of jurisdiction between military and ordinary courts to the Supreme Court of Justice, a few months later it was taken away again and given back to the Disciplinary Tribunal. This was done through Decree Law N° 1861 of 1989 and “the progress which had been made through jurisprudence [in terms of interpreting military jurisdiction in a restrictive manner] was wiped out at a stroke”.228

The system of military justice established in the 1988 Code was severely criticized by the Procuraduría General de la Nación. In his Third Report, the Procurador General said the following: “Military criminal justice has been very ineffective in bringing to trial and sentencing violators of human rights from among the ranks of the State defence and security bodies. [...] It is noticeable, as has happened on previous occasions, that a misconceived ‘esprit de corps’ has led to concealment, made investigation difficult, planted obstacles throughout the proceedings and ended up preventing justice from being done. In addition, in many cases, the decisions reached by the military courts openly contradict rulings by the Procuraduría General de la Nación [on disciplinary matters], [...] What is needed is a thorough re-thinking of the way in which members of the Armed Forces should be tried”.229 The Procuraduría General de la Nación concluded that “concepts such as military privilege, a service-related act and due obedience must be rethought in the light of the principles and values contained in the Colombian Constitution, the fundamental basis of which is respect for human rights. It should be made perfectly clear that such classifications should only protect members of the Armed Forces as an exception. To interpret them by extension as analogous to conduct that is not directly related to military or police duties in the strict sense is mistaken”.230

230 Ibid., p.73. [Spanish original, free translation.]
The 1991 Constitution and the process of military criminal reform

In 1991, a new Colombian Constitution was promulgated and, with several amendments, remains in force today. Members of the military and police are granted their own special jurisdiction in the new Colombia. For example, article 22 of the chapter entitled “On the Security Forces” (“De la Fuerza Pública”) states: “Offences committed by members of the security forces on active service, or in relation to it, shall be tried by courts martials (Cortes Marciales) or military tribunals (Tribunales Militares), in accordance with the provisions of the Military Criminal Code”. In 1995, this article was the subject of an amendment to the Constitution that resulted in the addition of the following sentence: “Such Courts or Tribunals shall be made up of members of the security forces on active service or in retirement”. This amendment was introduced in clear and direct response to several judgments and rulings on the protection of rights adopted by the Constitutional Court during 1995. In one such judgment, the Court had declared a provision of the 1988 Military Criminal Code stating that military courts should be made up of members of the Armed Forces on active service to be unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court took the view that members of the Armed Forces on active service, as officials answerable to the executive and subject to military or police structures and hierarchy, could not guarantee the principle of impartiality that is intrinsic to justice. The Court ruled that only civilians and retired members of the Armed Forces could sit on military courts. The proposed amendment to the Constitution was described as “classic retaliation against the Judiciary”.

Issues relating to military jurisdiction were addressed in other provisions of the 1991 Constitution. Military courts were specifically prohibited, even in times of internal upheaval, from investigating and prosecuting civilians. At the same time, a new jurisdictional body, the Supreme Judicial Council (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura) was set up and given responsibility for settling conflicts of jurisdiction between different courts. This clearly implied conflicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary criminal courts and military courts. This body eventually replaced the Disciplinary Tribunal. Lastly, the Constitution created the National General Prosecutor’s Office.

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232 Legislative Act No 02 of 1995.
233 Ruling No C-141/95 by the Constitutional Court.
236 Article 256 (6) of the 1991 Constitution.
(Fiscalía General de la Nación) with responsibility for instituting criminal proceedings, investigating offences and bringing charges against those responsible. As a result, the Colombian criminal justice system, which until then had been inquisitorial in nature, became accusatorial. However, “offences committed by members of the security forces on active service or in connection with that service” were removed from the sphere of competence of the General Prosecutor’s Office. The creation of the General Prosecutor’s Office was to have a significant impact on the powers which, prior to that, had been held by the Procuraduría General de la Nación. Although the latter would continue to perform prosecutorial functions, its role in judicial proceedings would be reduced.

Throughout the 1990s, criticism of the military justice system, and especially the practice of military and police personnel being tried by their peers for human rights violations, gradually increased at both the national and international level. The Procuraduría General de la Nación and the Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría del Pueblo), together with the United Nations Human Rights Committee and Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial executions and Torture, as well as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, repeatedly criticized the phenomenon. In a statement on the situation of human rights in Colombia, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, reiterated its appeal to the Colombian authorities to amend military criminal legislation in order to ensure that members of the security forces who had committed human rights violations could only be tried in the ordinary criminal courts.

On 11 October 1995, the Colombian Government submitted a draft bill to Congress on reform of the Military Criminal Code. However, the proposed reform did not remove torture and other human rights violations from the jurisdiction of the military courts. The Colombian Government presented a summary of the contents of the bill. The main intention was to bring military jurisdiction into line with the 1991 Constitution through adoption of the accusatorial system of criminal justice. Several other changes were included in the bill, such as a definition of what was meant by a service-related act

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237 Articles 249, 250 and 251 of the 1991 Constitution.
238 Article 250 of the 1991 Constitution. [Spanish original, free translation.]
(acto de servicio), the “inclusion of new offences, such as torture, the forced disappearance of persons and genocide, together with severe penalties”\textsuperscript{240} and the setting up of “military legal apparatus [which is] independent from the operational command structure”.\textsuperscript{241}

The bill was widely criticized both inside the country and by the United Nations. At the same time as the proposal was under discussion, far-reaching rulings on the issue of military jurisdiction were being handed down by the Constitutional Court. Those worth highlighting include the 1996 judgment in which it considered that, given that military examining magistrates were employed by the executive, their “degree of independence and impartiality is practically non-existent”;\textsuperscript{242} the 1997 judgment in which it ruled that under no circumstances could crimes against humanity be considered to be offences committed in the course of duty and that they could only be tried in the ordinary criminal courts;\textsuperscript{243} and the 1998 judgment in which several provisions of the 1988 Military Criminal Code were declared unconstitutional. In the latter ruling, the Court took the view that participation of members of the armed forces on active service as panel members on oral courts martial was “irreconcilable with the right to due process and the right to have access to justice”.\textsuperscript{244} In 1996, a parliamentary proposal calling for the forced disappearance of persons, as well as torture, genocide and the unlawful displacement of populations, to be made specific crimes was reactivated. It was finally adopted in 2000 and expressly stated that military courts could not try such offences.\textsuperscript{245} In 1999, in the midst of all this and following an unexpected and hasty debate in the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives, Law N° 522, namely the Military Criminal Code, was rushed through.\textsuperscript{246} Despite the initial draft, significant changes had been made to the new military statute.

\textsuperscript{240} “Política del Gobierno...”, February 1995, op. cit., p.12. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{241} Ibidem. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{242} Ruling N° C-037 of 1996 by the Constitutional Court. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{243} Ruling N° C-358/97 (Ref: File N° D-1445) of 5 August 1997.
\textsuperscript{244} Ruling N° D-145/98 (Ref: File N° D-1772) of 22 April 1998. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{245} Law N° 589 of 6 July 2000. Although in the end the clause prohibiting military courts from having jurisdiction for these offences was thrown out, jurisdiction was in fact attributed to the ordinary criminal courts.
\textsuperscript{246} Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, Panorama de los derechos humanos y del derecho humanitario en Colombia: 1999 - Informe de Avance, Bogotá, September 1999, p.35.
The new Military Criminal Code\textsuperscript{247} came into force in August 2000. Originally, a condition for its entry into force was that a statutory law, which would determine the administrative structure of the military justice system, should be issued.\textsuperscript{248} However, this requirement was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.\textsuperscript{249} When the Code came into effect and given that there was no such statutory law, the government introduced a whole raft of legislation on the subject.\textsuperscript{250}

The basis of the new system of military justice, as established in the Military Criminal Code, was the removal of operational command duties within the Armed Forces from members of military courts, the partial abandonment of the concept of “judge-commander” that existed in earlier legislation and the establishment of standing military courts. Thus, article 214 of the Code stipulated that “[u]nder no circumstances shall members of the security forces perform command functions at the same time as carrying out the duties of investigator, prosecutor or judge”.\textsuperscript{251} This resulted in the military court structure being completely changed so that it consisted of the Supreme Military Tribunal and the military trial judges and military examining magistrates assigned to each body and unit of the armed forces, all of whom were military or police officers with no operational command. For example, the General Inspectorate of the General Command of the Military Forces (\textit{Inspección General del Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares}) is a military trial court. The following are also military trial courts for the Army: the General Army Inspectorate (\textit{Inspección General del Ejército}) and the military courts at the level of division and brigade. For the Navy, the trial courts are the General Navy Inspectorate (\textit{Inspección General de la Armada Nacional}), the military courts for the naval forces, the military courts for the Naval Infantry Brigade (\textit{Brigada de Infantería de Marina}) and the courts for the Specific Command of San Andrés and Providencia (\textit{Comando Específico de San Andrés y Providencia}). For the Air Force, the following are military trial courts: the General Air Force Inspectorate (\textit{Inspección General de la Fuerza Aérea}) and the respective military courts for the air force command, air force bases, air force groups and training and technical colleges. As far as the National Police is concerned, the following are military trial courts: the National Police Headquarters Court (\textit{Juzgado de la Dirección General de la Policía Nacional}), the General Inspectorate of the National Police (\textit{Inspección General de la Policía Nacional}), the Metropolitan Police Courts

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{247} Law N° 522 of 1999.
\item \textsuperscript{248} Article 608 of the Military Criminal Code.
\item \textsuperscript{249} Ruling N° C-368 (Ref.: File No D-2546) of 29 March 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{250} Decrees Nos.1512, 1513, 1514, 1790, 1791, 1797, 1798, 1800 and 1972 of 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{251} 1999 Military Criminal Code, article 214. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\end{itemize}
(Juzgados de Policías Metropolitanas) and the Police Department Courts (Juzgados de Departamento de Policía). Lastly, the Military Court for the Joint Command (Juzgado Militar de Comando Unificado) is the trial court for all military criminal proceedings against officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers from the Joint Command General Headquarters (Cuartel General del Comando Unificado). Military examining magistrates are attached to each trial court. Article 266 of the Code authorizes the General Commander of the Military Forces and the Director General of the National Police to set up investigation units (unidades de instrucción) consisting of several examining magistrates. In certain special cases, judge advocates can also act as military examining magistrates.

The Supreme Military Tribunal consists of the General Commander of the Military Forces, who presides over it, and fifteen judges. It is the court of original jurisdiction for military criminal proceedings against any military trial judges, military examining magistrates, prosecutors from trial courts and judge advocates who are serving members of the armed forces and who have committed offences while discharging their court responsibilities; it hears applications for the review of judgments handed down by trial judges; it provides advice and hears appeals (recursos de apelación) and applications for a review of the facts as well as of law (recursos de hecho), arising from military criminal proceedings; and it settles conflicts of jurisdiction within the military justice system. Conflicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary courts and the military courts are dealt with by the Supreme Judicial Council.

The Supreme Court of Justice has certain powers in connection with military justice both as an appellate court (tribunal de alzada) and a court of original jurisdiction (tribunal de instancia). Its Criminal Appeals Division (Sala de Casación Penal) is responsible for hearing applications for the quashing of verdicts that have already been enforced (recurso extraordinario de casación) as well as for reviewing appeal rulings handed down by the Supreme Military Tribunal. Once charges have been brought by the General Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación), it is responsible for conducting criminal proceedings against senior officers of the Armed Forces252 as well as senior judges and prosecutors from the Supreme Military Tribunal, from which there is no right of appeal. The Criminal Appeals Division also hears appeals arising from cases for which the Supreme Military Tribunal is the court of original jurisdiction.

The military prosecutors’ offices (Fiscalías Penales Militares), the Office of the Judge Advocate and the Ministerio Público complete the new military

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252 Senior officers are those with the rank of General, Admiral, Major General, Vice-Admiral, Brigadier General and Rear Admiral.
The military prosecutors’ offices are responsible for preferring charges in military criminal proceedings brought before the Supreme Military Tribunal and the trial courts. In addition, the military prosecutors at the Supreme Military Tribunal rule on appeals (recursos de apelación) and applications for a review of the facts as well as of law (recursos de hecho) arising from decisions made by military prosecutors in trial courts. It also rules on impediments or objections raised with regard to the military prosecutors acting in trial courts. Judge advocates act as legal advisers to the trial courts. The Ministerio Público’s function with regard to military justice is performed by the Procuraduría General de la Nación and his delegates or agents. Their duties include ensuring that military criminal proceedings respect human rights, the law and judicial guarantees as well as participating in the proceedings by arguing for the acquittal or conviction of the accused.

Although the new military court structure has been presented by the Colombian government authorities as being “an even more impartial, objective […] [and] transparent [system of] administration of military criminal justice […] [in which] the military prosecutors and judges […] are freed from the chain of command”\textsuperscript{253}, the reality is quite the opposite. By order of article 221 of the Constitution and as reiterated in article 1 of the Military Criminal Code, only members of the armed forces on active service or in retirement can be military judges. Furthermore, it is established in law that judges from the Supreme Military Tribunal, trial judges and examining magistrates, prosecutors, judge advocates and other officials are “public employees of the Ministry of National Defence”\textsuperscript{254} who, when on active service, are subject to the rules for career advancement that apply to the Military Forces\textsuperscript{255} or National Police\textsuperscript{256}, as the case may be. It is also important to point out that officers and non-commissioned officers hold posts within the system of ‘military criminal justice’ and are subject to the disciplinary rules applicable to the Military Forces\textsuperscript{257} or the disciplinary rules and ethics that apply to the National Police.\textsuperscript{258} In the event that disciplinary proceedings are brought against these military justice officials, they are conducted by the Executive Director of Military Criminal Justice (Director Ejecutivo de la Justicia Penal Militar). Appeals in such cases are heard by the Minister of Defence. The

\textsuperscript{253} Ministry of National Defence, La nueva Justicia Penal Militar en Colombia, Ed. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Bogotá, October 2000, pp.3 and 10. [Spanish original, free translation.]

\textsuperscript{254} Article 3 of Decree N° 1415 of 11 August 2000. [Spanish original, free translation.]

\textsuperscript{255} Decree N° 1790 of 14 September 2000.

\textsuperscript{256} Decree N° 1971 of 14 September 2000.

\textsuperscript{257} Decree N° 1797 of 14 September 2000, article 77.

\textsuperscript{258} Decree N° 1798 of 14 September 2000, article 125.
Military Criminal Justice Corps (Cuerpo de Justicia Penal Militar), which is attached to the Ministry of Defence, is also made up of military judges and prosecutors. Lastly, a new institution, the Supreme Council of Military Criminal Justice (Consejo Superior de Justicia Penal Militar), which is attached to the Ministry of Defence, was set up, together with the Head Office of the Supreme Council of Military Criminal Justice (Dirección Ejecutiva del Consejo Superior de Justicia Penal Militar), which is attached to the Office for the Coordination of Decentralized Bodies (Dirección para la Coordinación de Entidades Descentralizadas) within the Ministry of Defence.\(^\text{259}\) The members of the Supreme Council of Military Criminal Justice are the Minister of Defence, the General Commander of the Military Forces, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Director of the National Police, the Vice-President of the Supreme Military Tribunal and the Executive Director of Military Criminal Justice. Given all this, one is forced to the conclusion that the new military criminal structure has not been divorced from the chain of command. It has only been relieved of operational command duties over the troops. Meanwhile, its components - the judges and prosecutors, who are either active or retired members of the Armed Forces as well as employees of the Ministry of Defence - remain under the command of the Minister of Defence and the relevant commanders of the main bodies which go to make up the security forces (Fuerza Pública).

Broadly speaking, the definition of the scope of military jurisdiction contained in the new Military Criminal Code is identical to that contained in amended article 221 of the Constitution.\(^\text{260}\) Article 2 of the Code states that: “Service-related offences are offences committed by members of the security forces (Fuerza Pública) as a result of performing the military or police function that is appropriate for them [to carry out] [...].”\(^\text{261}\) The principle that military courts have sole jurisdiction is firmly established in the Code. For example, article 16 also states that “[m]embers of the security forces (Fuerza Pública) on active service, when they commit offences envisaged in this Code or others that are service-related, shall only be tried by judges and courts established in this Code which had been instituted prior to commission of the punishable act”.\(^\text{262}\)

The military courts therefore have jurisdiction *ratione materiae* over all typically military offences and ‘militarized’ ordinary offences designated in the Military Criminal Code as well as any ordinary offences specified under ordinary criminal law and committed by members of the Military Forces or National Police in the course of duty. A long list of offences

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\(^{259}\) Decrees Nos 1512 and 1514 of 11 August 2000.

\(^{260}\) 1999 Military Criminal Code, article 1.

\(^{261}\) Ibid., article 2. [Spanish original, free translation.]

\(^{262}\) Ibid., article 16. [Spanish original, free translation.]
is given in the code, ranging from typically military offences\footnote{Such as offences against discipline (insubordination, disobedience, attacking a superior or subordinate), offences against the Service (abandonment of post or command, abandonment of service, sentinel offences, etc.), offences against the interests of the Armed Forces, offences against honour (cowardice, trading with the enemy, contempt and calumny), and offences against the security of the Armed Forces (attacking a sentinel, false alarm, revelation of secrets, improper use of Armed Forces uniforms and insignias, sabotage, manufacture or possession of explosive and munitions, causing panic).} to ‘militarized’ ordinary offences\footnote{Injuries to the person, robbery, fraud, the unlawful issue or transfer of cheques, etc.} and including offences against public administration.\footnote{Embezzlement, influence peddling, etc.} In contrast to the 1988 Code, the new code includes political offences.

But the main innovation in the new code is that some types of gross human rights violation have been expressly removed from the jurisdiction of the military courts. Thus, article 3 stipulates that “[i]n spite of the provisions of the previous article, under no circumstances shall the crimes of torture, genocide and forced disappearance, as defined in the conventions and treaties ratified by Colombia, be considered to be service-related offences”.\footnote{1999 Military Criminal Code, article 3. [Spanish original, free translation.]} On declaring this to be constitutional, the Constitutional Court stated the following: “The offences specified in article 3 as being unrelated to service […], therefore set the limits of the operative benchmark, as derived from \textit{ius cogens}, beyond which military jurisdiction cannot be extended without violating the Constitution and international humanitarian law”.\footnote{Ruling N° C-368 (Ref.: File D-2546) of 29 March 2000. [Spanish original, free translation.]} Another significant prohibition contained in the Constitution has also been incorporated into the code: “Under no circumstances shall civilians be investigated or tried by military criminal justice”.\footnote{1999 Military Criminal Code, article 5. [Spanish original, free translation.]} Despite this progress, many gaps remained. Other types of serious human rights violations, such as extrajudicial executions, rape and sexual abuse, and unlawful searches (\textit{allanamiento ilegal})\footnote{Ibid., article 174. [Spanish original, free translation.]} were not excluded from the jurisdiction of military courts. The Military Criminal Code also categorized offences such as devastation, plundering and pillage as “offences against the civilian population”.\footnote{Ibid., article 187.} Furthermore, it retained the notion of due obedience.\footnote{Ibid., article 34.} In practice, in order to seize jurisdiction over serious human rights violations, the military courts have continued to rely on the idea of a service-
related act (*acto de servicio*) and, in the case of the offences over which article 3 of the Code states that they do not have jurisdiction, they have begun to assign different legal names to the unlawful acts in question. An example of this is the Mapiripán massacre: a General, against whom evidence existed that he was involved either as the mastermind (*autor intelectual*) or accessory (*cómplice*), was tried in a military court for having falsified a document. When ruling on the conflict of jurisdiction raised by the case, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary considered that the conduct of which the General was accused was “directly related to service”.272

The Military Criminal Code established the rules of procedures for courts martial (*Corte Marcial*) and the special procedure. Although in principle two tiers of jurisdiction are involved in criminal proceedings conducted by military courts, there are several exceptions.273 The court-martial procedure, which is conducted by a trial judge assisted by a clerk, is used for offences committed by persons who are unfit to plead and offences which are not appropriate for submission to the special procedure. The special procedure is reserved for offences against the service (*delitos contra el servicio*), the escape of prisoners and the improper use of armed forces uniforms and insignias, as well as for “breaking into the home of another” (“*violación de habitación ajena*”), bodily harm, larceny, robbery, fraud, the unlawful issuing or transfer of cheques and damaging the property of another. The special procedure is swift and of a summary nature. It should be noted that, in all trials conducted by military courts, it is the military criminal authorities who have sole responsibility for bringing prosecutions.

Another positive innovation contained in the new Military Criminal Code was the reintroduction of the concept of the civil party (*parte civil*).274 However, it was to be regulated *sui generis* since, by contrast with the role of the civil party under ordinary criminal legislation, the purpose of allowing civilians to be parties to criminal proceedings in military courts was not so that the damage caused as a result of the offence could be repaired or compensated. Article 305 of the Military Criminal Code states that “[t]he sole object of allowing the participation of a civil party in a military criminal trial is as a procedural stimulus to help discover the truth about the events in question”.275 Contrary to this professed aim, the Code specifically states that the civil party shall not have access to “classified or confidential documents belonging to the security forces (*Fuerza Pública*) which may be called for in a military criminal trial”.276

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272 Embezzlement, influence peddling, etc.
273 1999 Military Criminal Code, article 207.
274 Ibid., article 305 and following.
275 Ibid., article 305. [Spanish original, free translation.]
276 Ibid., article 310. [Spanish original, free translation.]
damage caused as a result of such offences, the victims or their successors have to bring a claim against the State under administrative law.\(^\text{277}\)

*Jurisprudence on military jurisdiction and human rights violations*

In the absence of any clear legal provisions limiting military jurisdiction over human rights violations, with the exception of the partial limitation contained in article 3 of the 1999 Military Criminal Code, the jurisprudence developed by the courts when ruling on conflicts of jurisdiction between ordinary and military courts has played a key role in this area. Judges have construed the scope of military jurisdiction to be closely bound up with the concept of a ‘service-related act’ (*acto del servicio*) since both the 1986 and 1991 Constitutions and the military criminal codes issued in 1958, 1988 and 1999 state that military courts have jurisdiction over ordinary criminal offences committed as a result of service. Successive courts - the Disciplinary Tribunal (1972-1987), the Supreme Court of Justice (1987-1989), the Disciplinary Tribunal (1989-1991) and, most recently, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (1991 to date) - have been responsible for settling conflicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary courts and military courts. However, the Constitutional Court, which was set up under the 1991 Constitution, has also played a crucial role in terms of its monitoring of constitutionality as well as the judgments it has handed down in response to requests for protection of rights (*recursos de tutela*). Historically speaking, it is possible to identify two distinct interpretations of the scope of military jurisdiction: a broad interpretation, as typified by the rulings of the Disciplinary Tribunal and the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and a restrictive interpretation, as embodied in the findings of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court.

Until 1983, as far as ordinary offences committed by police or military personnel were concerned, the Disciplinary Tribunal held two different interpretations of the scope of military jurisdiction, depending on whether or not a state of siege was in place at the time. It took the view that, in peacetime, such offences should be tried in ordinary courts. However, it believed that, under a state of siege, any offence committed by police or military personnel, be it ordinary or military, fell to the jurisdiction of the military justice system. In several of its decisions, the Court based its view on the assumption that, when the country was under a state of siege, all offences could be considered to have been committed as a result of service. Bringing military or police personnel to trial in ordinary courts was only ever hypothetical since an almost continuous state of siege was in place from 1958 onwards.

\(^{277}\) Ibid., article 320.
However, it was in 1983, after complaints had been filed by the Procuraduría General de la Nación against 59 officers and non-commissioned officers from the Army and Police involved in the paramilitary group known as “Muerte a secuestradores” (MAS), “Death to Kidnappers”, and several proceedings had been opened by examining magistrates in the ordinary courts, that the Disciplinary Tribunal, in addressing the issue, came to establish an extremely broad interpretation of military jurisdiction. The offences under investigation by the ordinary courts included, among others, murder, torture (bodily harm), forced disappearance (kidnapping) and paramilitary activities (conspiracy). In all cases, the Disciplinary Tribunal decided that the military courts were the only ones competent to try the offences of which those concerned were accused. It took the view that, given that they spent 24 hours a day serving their country, any offence committed by them could be deemed to be ‘service-related’. Thus, in a decision concerning an officer and a non-commissioned officer from the Army charged with belonging to MAS as well as attempted murder and bodily harm, the Court ruled that, “[e]ven though at the time the infractions were committed the two [soldiers] were not carrying out any task in particular”, the military courts were competent to hear the case “given that, in the opinion of this court, soldiers on active service are rendering permanent service”.278 All subsequent criminal proceedings against military personnel were dismissed by the military courts. Although there had been some precedents in the jurisprudence of the Disciplinary Tribunal279, the decisions it made in the case of the soldiers from MAS became the touchstone for its doctrine on ordinary offences committed by military personnel.

With regard to members of the National Police, the Disciplinary Tribunal took a more nuanced position. It did not consider police personnel to be serving their country on a permanent basis. Therefore, any ordinary offences committed by them outside of working hours or when on leave should be tried by the ordinary courts. However, the Court also maintained that there was still the possibility that an ordinary offence committed outside of working hours or when on leave might be service-related, in which case the military courts had sole jurisdiction. As a consequence, the idea of a service-related act gradually came to include any kind of unlawful conduct.

Upon reacquiring responsibility for settling conflicts of jurisdiction in 1987, the Supreme Court of Justice adopted a diametrically opposed position and


279 A month earlier, the court had given the military courts jurisdiction in a case involving the alleged theft of fuel by a soldier (Ruling dated 29 April 1983).
established a restrictive interpretation of the scope of military jurisdiction. It stated that “for soldiers who commit offences in situations that are unconnected with service, trial by an ordinary court of justice is the proper course of action” and limited military jurisdiction over ordinary offences to occasions when such offences were committed in the course of performing service-related acts. However, the Court went on to establish objective legal criteria for determining whether an act could be considered to be service-related. These were clearly spelled out in the “Armed Forces Garrison Regulations” ("Reglamento de Guarnición de las Fuerzas Armadas") and the disciplinary procedures used by the Military Forces and National Police. In some cases submitted to it, the Court consequently ruled that soldiers or police involved in forced disappearances should not be tried by military courts because forced disappearance could not be deemed to be a service-related act. Similarly, in the case of extrajudicial executions committed by members of the military or police, the Court considered that such acts could not be deemed to have been committed “within the sphere of service” and that jurisdiction over such offences fell to the ordinary courts.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in some cases, the Court did rule that military courts were competent to try human rights violations. For example, in the case of the arrest and subsequent forced disappearance of a civilian at the hands of soldiers, the Court took the view that the events had taken place within the framework of a military investigation and that therefore the military courts were competent. Similarly, in a case related to a massacre of civilians perpetrated by a paramilitary group acting in complicity with military and police commanders, the Court referred the proceedings to a military court on the grounds that the acts of which the local Army and Police commanders were accused constituted a “breach of the legal duty to come to the aid of the population” and were acts which were an intrinsic part of service.

In 1989, upon regaining responsibility for settling conflicts between different courts, the Disciplinary Tribunal continued to systematically reiterate its broad interpretation of the scope of military jurisdiction.

The Supreme Council of the Judiciary, when justifying the grounds for military jurisdiction, abandoned the Disciplinary Tribunal’s argument that

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280 Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia, Criminal Division, ruling dated 11 October 1988. [Spanish original, free translation.]
281 Ruling dated 3 May 1988 (Judge Rapporteur Carreño Lenguas).
282 Rulings dated 13 March 1989 (Judge Rapporteur E. Saavedra Rojas) and 20 April 1989 (Judge Rapporteur G. Gómez Velásquez). [Spanish original, free translation.]
283 Ruling dated 27 April 1989 (Judge Rapporteur Dávila Muñoz).
284 Ruling dated 15 February 1989 (Judge Rapporteur Dávila Muñoz). [Spanish original, free translation.]
military personnel were serving on a permanent basis. Instead, it focused its interpretation of the scope of military jurisdiction on the establishment of a “circumstantial link of a modal, temporal and spatial nature” between the offence and military or police duties so that whether or not military jurisdiction was appropriate depended on whether there was a direct or indirect link between the offence and those duties.285 This resulted in a broad interpretation of the reach of military jurisdiction, especially in cases where senior officers were facing prosecution. Nevertheless, in some cases of serious human rights violations, especially those involving lower-ranking and non-commissioned officers, the Supreme Council granted jurisdiction to the ordinary courts. One of the most controversial cases in which it ruled in favour of military jurisdiction was that of the rape of a female police officer by the Commander of a Police Department.286 The grounds it gave for the decision were that, given that the victim had been raped in a police facility and during working hours, it fell into the category of ordinary offences committed as a result of service. Similarly, in 1995, the Supreme Council ruled that the military courts were competent to try a case of forced disappearance involving members of the Police on the grounds that they were carrying out “acts befitting their function”.287 What was paradoxical about both these cases was that the military courts had previously declared themselves incompetent to try them on the grounds that they were ordinary offences which were not in any way related to police service. In 1997, when ruling on the conflict of jurisdiction arising from the case of the forced disappearance, torture and murder of Isidro Caballero and María del Carmen Santana, the first case in which Colombia was convicted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Council found in favour of the military courts as far as the offences attributed to an Army General were concerned and in favour of the ordinary courts as far as the offences attributed to the other commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers involved in the case were concerned.288 Even though the ordinary courts had been investigating the General for his possible involvement in the offence as the mastermind (autor intelectual) or accessory (cómplice), the Council took the view that the events under investigation fell within the service sphere. In its reasoning, the Council dismissed several pieces of evidence, in particular, the testimony of a well-known paramilitary leader. Another case of double standards was that of the massacre at Los Uvos, in which the Council at first assigned jurisdiction

285 Rulings dated 11 November 1993 (file Nº 806/141) and 15 June 1995 (file Nº 4943A). [Spanish original, free translation.]
288 Ruling dated 10 April 1997 (file Nº 13362 A), Judge Rapporteur Miryan Donato de Montoya.
to the ordinary courts but, when some officers became involved in the proceedings, transferred it to the military courts.

The Constitutional Court has ruled on the bounds of military jurisdiction on several different occasions. In a 1995 ruling, it took the view that “[a] service order is an order whose objective aim is to carry out the purposes for which the institution has been created. An order which ostensibly goes against those purposes or against the overriding interests of society cannot legitimately elicit obedience. The order to sexually assault or inflict torture on another person under no circumstances deserves to be called a service order. Such actions, which are given by way of illustration, are completely extraneous to the object of the public role entrusted to the military and their legal duties as a whole”. But it was in 1997, when it delivered its momentous ruling on the lack of constitutionality of several articles of the 1988 Military Criminal Code, that the Constitutional Court would unequivocally set the limits of military jurisdiction with regard to human rights and the concept of the ‘service-related act’. The Constitutional Court recalled that “the law indicating which offences it is appropriate to try under [military criminal] jurisdiction must respect the constitutional law under which both the fundamental content of military jurisdictional authority as well as its restrictive and special nature are determined. [...] The extension [of military jurisdiction] beyond the limits envisaged in the Constitution would undermine ordinary [criminal] jurisdiction which, by order of the same Constitution, has been established as the jurisdiction with general competence (‘juez natural general’) and, as a final blow, would also be in breach of the principle of equality which can only be achieved through a restrictive interpretation of the exceptions to standard judicial protection”. The Court specified that the term ‘servicio’ (‘service’), used in article 221 of the 1991 Constitution, “alludes to the specific activities which are directed towards carrying out or achieving the rightful aims of the military forces - to defend the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the national territory and the constitutional order - and the national police - to maintain the conditions necessary for rights and public freedoms to be exercised and for peaceful coexistence”. The Court also stated that article 221 of the Constitution “starts from the premise that a member of the security forces (Fuerza Pública), while fulfilling that role, also has a role as a person and a citizen. As is also the case with anyone else, the duties of a

291 Ruling C-578 of 1995. [Spanish original, free translation.]
293 Ibidem. [Spanish original, free translation.]
member of the security forces are not entirely directed at or bound up with public service. As a consequence, not all acts or omissions on the part of a member of the security forces should be covered by military jurisdiction. As well as laying down the objective legal criteria to be applied when determining whether or not an ordinary offence should be considered to have been committed “in connection with service itself”, the Court concluded that “the types of conduct which constitute crimes against humanity are clearly contrary to human dignity and the rights of the person and therefore have no connection with the constitutional role of the security forces (Fuerza Pública) to the extent that an order to commit an act of that kind does not deserve to be obeyed in any way. […] a crime against humanity is so foreign to the constitutional role of the security forces (Fuerza Pública) that it can never be related to acts that are properly connected with service, since the very commission of such criminal acts severs whatever link there may have been between the conduct of the agent and discipline and the rightful role of the military or police, as a result of which responsibility for trying such offences lies with the ordinary courts”. Lastly, the Court ruled that: “Given that military criminal jurisdiction is an exception to the general rule, military courts shall have jurisdiction only in cases in which it is abundantly clear that the exception to the principle of general competence (juez natural general) should be applied. This means that in situations in which there is any doubt about which court is competent to conduct a particular trial, the decision must go the way of ordinary jurisdiction on the grounds that it has not been possible to fully demonstrate that the case in question was an exception”.

However, the 1997 ruling by the Constitutional Court was disregarded by the Supreme Council of the Judiciary and the military courts failed to comply with it. In 1998, for example, when ruling on the conflict of jurisdiction arising from the case of a General and Lieutenant Colonel facing prosecution for paramilitary activities, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary considered that the conduct attributed to the two officers had taken place within the framework of the performance of their duties - namely, “to preserve national sovereignty and independence, the security of the territory and constitutional order” - and that therefore authority to try the case lay with the military courts.

Nevertheless, in July 2000, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary completely reversed its position on military jurisdiction and fully complied with the 1997
ruling by the Constitutional Court. In the case of the forced disappearance, torture and murder of Nydia Erika Bautista de Arrellana, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary granted jurisdiction to the ordinary courts by invoking the ruling handed down by the Constitutional Court.298

Lastly, in a 2001 ruling, the Constitutional Court, as well as reaffirming its 1997 jurisprudence, stated that “the types of conduct which openly disregard the principle of human dignity and flagrantly entail violation of the constitutional rights of citizens shall never be considered to be service-related acts”.299 In this ruling in response to an application for protection of rights (recurso de tutela), the Constitutional Court ordered the proceedings against the General in connection with events that had taken place during the Mapiripán massacre to be returned to the ordinary courts and overturned the decision by the Supreme Council of the Judiciary in which jurisdiction had been assigned to the military courts. The Court took the view that the conduct attributed to the General could not be considered to be a “service-related” act, as the Supreme Council of the Judiciary had found. The Court made the following comment on this issue: “The military forces have an absolute obligation to prevent ignorance of international humanitarian law ([which is] an absolute constraint, even under a state of emergency, according to the provisions of article 214 of the Constitution) and the rights which, under the international treaties ratified by Colombia, cannot be suspended during such periods […]. To allow them to occur, either because they are actively involved in them or because they have neglected their state duty to protect the rights of citizens, constitutes a flagrant violation of their position as guarantor of the minimum basic conditions of social organization and they can therefore never be considered to be service-related acts”.300 The Court also said the following: “The fact that [the security forces (Fuerza Pública)] are in this position of guarantor means that, regardless of the type of involvement in the offence (as principal or accessory), how far advanced the offence was in its execution (attempted or completed) or what the motivation was (intent or negligence), the nature of the liability concerns crimes against humanity or gross human rights violations in general. The nature of the offence is not affected by the internal construction of the liability; the latter does not change because the person involved (or, as the case may be, the person who was negligent) simply facilitated commission of one of the main acts involved or because the act in question was not completed”.301

298 Ruling dated 21 July 2000 (File N° 10443 B).
300 Ibidem. [Spanish original, free translation.]
301 Ibidem. [Spanish original, free translation.]
11. Congo (The Republic of the)

**History**

After a tortuous journey, the Republic of the Congo finally achieved independence on 15 August 1960. Although a constitution had already been adopted in 1958, the first Constitution of the Republic of the Congo as a fully independent state was adopted on 2 March 1961. The 1961 Constitution made no reference at all to military courts. Between 1964 and 1989, five successive constitutions and two basic laws were adopted. Eventually, in 1992, another new Constitution was adopted and remains in effect today. It too contained no mention whatsoever of military courts. In 1992, the Congolese authorities launched a process of institutional reform, particularly focusing on legal matters, which is yet to be completed.

**The current situation**

Military criminal jurisdiction is regulated under the Code of Military Justice and the Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, both of which were introduced in 1992 and amended in 1999. It consists of military tribunals, military examining magistrates and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. However, it should be noted that other courts from the ordinary criminal justice system also play a role in military justice matters. For example, the Courts of Appeal hear appeals against judgments handed down by the Military Tribunals. Each Court of Appeal has a special division to deal with such matters. The Courts of Appeal can also be turned into ‘criminal courts’ to try misdemeanours and offences committed by military personnel. However, for these purposes, according to the Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, the ‘criminal courts’ within the Courts of Appeal must be composed in a special way so that the judges who try military personnel in ‘military courts’ and the judge representing the Public Prosecutor’s Office are members of the military. Lastly, the Supreme Court of Justice is responsible for settling conflicts of jurisdiction between military tribunals and ordinary courts and for hearing applications for annulment.

The Law on the Organization of the Judiciary stipulated that a military tribunal should be set up for each military region or each garrison. However,

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302 Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, article 48.
303 Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, article 56.
304 Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, article 144.
305 Article 4 of Law N° 17-99 of 15 April 1999, which amends Laws N° 025-92 and N° 30-94 on the organization and operation of the Supreme Court.
military tribunals can have jurisdiction over several military regions or garrisons. Military tribunals are made up of either civilian or military judges who are appointed by the President of the Republic on the basis of proposals put forward by the Supreme Council of the Judiciary and with the prior consent of the Ministry of Defence. Under the Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, military courts must be presided by a civilian judge assisted by two military judges. In certain circumstances, the court can be presided by a military judge. In wartime, the presiding judge must be a member of the military.

Military examining magistrates are military judges appointed by the President of the Republic on the basis of names put forward by the Higher Council of the Magistracy and with the prior consent of the Ministry of Defence.

Prosecutorial duties in military courts come under the charge of the Attorney-General and are performed by prosecutors acting on his behalf who must be military judges.

Clerks to military tribunals are members of the military who are appointed to the post by the Ministry of Defence.

Military tribunals have jurisdiction over misdemeanours and disciplinary matters as well as criminal matters. Their jurisdiction encompasses the offences listed in the Code of Military Justice, offences against the laws and customs of war committed on Congolese territory, ordinary offences committed as a result of service and ordinary offences committed inside military installations. In the case of disciplinary matters, military courts are also competent to hear cases of criminal infractions committed by juveniles under 18 years of age or students at military training colleges.

In times of war and emergency, the jurisdiction of military courts is extended. When a state of siege is in place, military courts are competent to try any offences committed during the emergency period which are related to it. In wartime, military courts have sole jurisdiction for trying all ordinary criminal offences.

12. Costa Rica

The Republic of Costa Rica has had no armed forces since the enactment of the Constitution of 1 December 1948, which is still in force today. Article 12 of the Constitution bans the Army as a standing institution and states that “military forces shall be organized solely by continental agreement or for

307 The Constitution has been amended several times, notably in 1968, 1975, 1989 and 2001.
national defence”. Consequently, there is no system of military justice. As Daniel González Álvarez has pointed out, “[w]ith the abolition of the army on 1 December 1948, military criminal justice ceased to have any real, effective or true force in [Costa Rica].”

However, if the hypothesis raised by article 12 of the Costa Rican Constitution was to come to pass, it is possible that the 1898 Code of Military Justice and the ‘Ordinance for the Republican Army’ (‘Ordenanza para el Ejército de la República’), which were the last military justice laws in force before the new Constitution came into effect, would once more become officially applicable. González Álvarez points out that the “Code of Military Justice from that period is ‘self-sufficient’ from a legal perspective in that it possesses the three basic elements that are required to ensure that military criminal justice works properly. In fact, Book One could be equated to a Basic Law on Military Justice, Book Two to a Criminal Code, with a general part and a special part, and Book Three to a Code of Criminal Procedure.”

González Álvarez believes that the 1898 Code of Military Justice would be officially applicable because “[t]he four ordinary Criminal Codes promulgated during this century have repealed all the criminal laws relating to offences specified in those codes except, in the case of all four codes, the provisions that are of a military criminal nature”. He therefore concludes that “none of the ordinary Criminal Codes issued after the Code of Military Justice was introduced sought to repeal it”.

13. Cuba

History

Compared with other Latin American countries, the Cuban movement seeking emancipation from Spain was one of the last to get under way, beginning

308 Constitution of 1 December 1948, article 12. [Spanish original, free translation.]
310 Law N° 23 of 23 June 1898.
311 Law N° 18 of 10 June 1898.
312 “La Vigencia Formal de la Justicia Penal Militar en Costa Rica”, op. cit. [Spanish original, free translation.]
313 Ibidem. They are the Criminal Codes of 1918 (art. 438), 1924 (art. 561), 1941 (art. 434) and 1970 (art. 414), which is currently in effect. [Spanish original, free translation.]
314 Ibidem. [Spanish original, free translation.]
only in 1868. The war of independence lasted several years and, in 1878, a peace treaty, which did not include independence, was signed in El Zanjón. The Cuban pro-independence troops were not unanimous in their support for the agreement and a group led by General Antonio Maceo carried on fighting. It should be pointed out that, in 1869, the first Cuban Constitution, known as the Constitution of the Republic in Arms, had been approved but it ceased to have effect once the Treaty of Zanjón had been signed.315

In May 1895, the struggle for independence was relaunched under the leadership of José Martí. On 15 February 1898, the sinking of the US battleship Maine, which was anchored in the port of Havana, led to war between the United States of America and Spain. In 1898, the United States and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris. As a result of the treaty, Cuba ceased to be a colony of Spain but became a kind of protectorate of the United States. On 1 January 1899, the United States took official possession of Cuba and the country was administered by a US military governor. In 1902, Cuba went from having an administration run by a US military governor to being a republic under the protection of the United States. The following year saw the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba to which the Platt Amendment was appended.316 Between 1900 and 1933 Cuba was occupied by United States troops on four occasions. In 1933 a new Constitution was enacted only to be repealed a few months later and replaced once again by the 1901 Constitution.

During the Spanish colonial period as well as under the US military occupation and even during the 1930s, Spanish legislation, including laws promulgated by the Crown as well as by Spanish republican governments, remained in force. Similarly, some regulations issued under the US military administration were still in effect.317 But in about 1930 national laws began to emerge. For example, in 1936 a Military Code318 was promulgated and remained in force for several decades. In 1938, a criminal statute known as the Code of Social Defence (Código de Defensa Social) replaced the Spanish Criminal Code of 1870 which had been in force in Cuba until then. In 1940, a new Constitution that included significant advances in the field of social rights

316 Through the so-called Platt Amendment, the United States arrogated to itself many rights and powers over Cuban territory.
317 For example, the Postal Service Code (Código Postal) promulgated under Order N° 115 of 21 July 1899 remained in force until 1987 when it was expressly repealed in the penultimate article of the Criminal Code (Law N° 62 of 1987).
was adopted. In the area of military jurisdiction, the Constitution removed responsibility for trying military offences from the ordinary criminal courts.

In 1952, General Fulgencio Batista led a military coup. In 1959, General Batista was overthrown by the rebel forces led by Fidel Castro. It is important to point out that, prior to achieving power, the rebel movement had equipped itself with an embryonic system of military criminal law, namely, Regulation N° 1 of the Rebel Army, issued by the High Command in the Sierra Maestra on 21 February 1958. This specified several military offences and stipulated how they were to be punished. Regulation N° 1 of 1958 was to lay the foundations for the system of military criminal law later established by the Cuban Government.

The 1959 revolution and Cuba’s subsequent transformation into a socialist state would also have far-reaching consequences for military justice. However, two clear stages can be distinguished: the first, lasting from 1959 until 1976, and the second, which began with the 1976 Constitution. In 1959 the new government introduced a Constitutional Law which retained many features of the 1940 Constitution. From 1959 onwards, a process of institution-building and legal reform got under way. Nevertheless, during the first stage, many norms which existed before the new government came to power remained in force and many new rules and regulations were adopted in an ad hoc way. As pointed out by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “[t]he legislation promulgated by the Revolutionary Government in the first few months after its installation recognized Regulation N° 1 issued by the High Command in the Sierra Maestra on 21 February 1958 as the main penal law and treated the substantive and procedural laws issued by the Republic of Cuba in Arms which had been in force during the war of independence from Spain as supplementary to it while, at the same time, giving similar supplementary though lesser status to the Code of Social Defence and the Law on Criminal Proceedings (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal). Apart from the legislation already mentioned, the Cuban Government has promulgated other laws of a penal nature which have extended and changed the list of recognized offences contained in the laws in force before the revolution”.

During this first stage of its life, the new government set up the Revolutionary Tribunals (Tribunales Revolucionarios). This was done despite the fact that articles 174 and 175 of the Constitutional Law granted the ordinary courts jurisdiction over all offences except for military ones and prohibited the setting up of special courts to try matters which fell to ordinary

criminal jurisdiction. The Constitutional Law itself, under additional transitory provision No 3, allowed for the Constitutional Law to be suspended in cases that were subject to the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Tribunals. To start with, the tribunals were authorized to try offences established under Regulation No. 1 of the Rebel Army and committed by military personnel or civilians working for the government of General Batista. Within a few months responsibility for trying such offences was transferred from the Revolutionary Tribunals to the ordinary courts. However, the Constitutional Reform Law (Ley de Reforma Constitucional) of 29 October 1959 amended article 174 of the Constitutional Law and reintroduced the Revolutionary Tribunals to conduct “trials and cases which had been or may be opened for offences defined in law as counter-revolutionary, whether committed by civilians or members of the military”\(^\text{320}\). A supplementary law was passed stating that the Revolutionary Tribunals had sole jurisdiction for trying such offences.\(^\text{321}\)

In 1976, the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba, which remains in force today, was adopted.\(^\text{322}\) The Revolutionary Tribunals were abolished. A main feature of this second stage was the passing of numerous domestic laws. That same year saw the adoption of the Law on the Military Prosecutor’s Office (Ley de la Fiscalía Militar).\(^\text{323}\) In 1977, the Law on the Organization of the Judicial System (Ley de Organización del Sistema Judicial)\(^\text{324}\) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código de Procedimiento Penal) were issued.\(^\text{325}\) As far as military justice was concerned, that same year saw the adoption of the Law on Military Courts (Ley de los Tribunales Militares) and the Law on Military Criminal Procedure (Ley Procesal Penal Militar).\(^\text{326}\) In 1978, the regulations governing the operation of the Attorney-General’s Office (Reglamento de la Fiscalía General de la República) were adopted.\(^\text{327}\) Lastly, in 1979, the Law on Military Offences (Ley de los Delitos Militares) and the Criminal Code (Código Penal) were introduced.\(^\text{328}\) It should be

\(^{320}\) Constitutional Reform Law of 29 October 1959. [Spanish original, free translation.]

\(^{321}\) Law No. 634 of 20 November 1959.

\(^{322}\) The Constitution was amended in 1992.

\(^{323}\) Law N° 1310 of 21 August 1976.

\(^{324}\) Law N° 4 of 1977. Although a law on this matter had already been issued in 1973 (Law N° 1250 of 1973). In 1997, the 1977 law was partially replaced by the Law on the People’s Courts (Ley de los Tribunales Populares).

\(^{325}\) Law N° 5 of 1977. The Code was later amended by Decree-Law N° 151 of 1994.

\(^{326}\) Law N° 6 of 8 August 1977.

\(^{327}\) This was replaced in 1997 by the Law on the Attorney-General’s Office (Ley de la Fiscalía General de la República) (Law N° 83 of 1997).

noted that the ordinary Criminal Code also contained some military offences.329

The current situation

The Cuban Constitution of 1976 makes no mention of military courts. Article 120 of the Constitution states that “[t]he duty to dispense justice stems from the people and is performed on their behalf by the People’s Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo Popular) and any other courts established by law. The law stipulates the main objectives of the work of the judiciary and regulates the organization of the courts, the scope of their jurisdiction and competence, their powers and the way in which they must be exercised, the requirements which judges must fulfill, the way in which judges are to be elected and the grounds and procedures for their removal or dismissal from duty”.

In addition, article 121 states that “[t]he courts are a system of state bodies, the structure of which is operationally independent of any other and hierarchically subordinate to the National Assembly of Popular Power (Asamblea Nacional de Poder Popular) and the Council of State (Consejo de Estado) [which is part of the executive]”. Under current law, the justice system consists of: the People’s Supreme Court, Provincial People’s Courts (Tribunales Provinciales Populares), Municipal People’s Courts (Tribunales Municipales Populares) and Military Courts (Tribunales Militares). Thus Cuban military justice has its basis in law and, like the rest of the justice system, is dependent on the executive and the legislature.


The military court system is made up of the People’s Supreme Court, the Territorial Military Courts (Tribunales Militares Territoriales) and the

330 Constitution of 1976, article 120. [Spanish original, free translation.]
331 Ibid., article 121. [Spanish original, free translation.]
332 This was amended in 1997 by the Law on the Attorney-General’s Office.
335 Law N° 62 of 1987. Some amendments were made to the Code in 1999.
Military Prosecutor’s Office. The first level of jurisdiction is provided by the Territorial Military Courts. The prosecutorial function in military courts is discharged by the Military Prosecutor’s Office. Although it forms part of the structure of the Attorney-General’s Office, its organization, structure and functioning is determined by the Law on the Military Prosecutor’s Office.\textsuperscript{337} The latter is directed by the Deputy General Prosecutor (Vicefiscal General) and is made up of a number of military prosecutors who are responsible for monitoring and protecting legality as well as instigating and conducting public criminal action on behalf of the State.

The People’s Supreme Court is responsible for scrutinizing the work of the military courts and for settling conflicts of jurisdiction between the People’s Courts and the Military Courts. The People’s Supreme Court, sitting in full session, is authorized to conduct criminal proceedings against Ministers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Minister of the Interior, from which there is no right of appeal. The Military Division of the People’s Supreme Court is the trial court for cases involving deputy ministers and senior officials from the Ministries of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and Interior and the commanders of the main branches and corps of the Armed Forces. In these cases, appeals can be brought before the Special Division of the People’s Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{338} The Military Division also hears applications for annulment and review and other types of appeal with regard to judgments handed down by military courts. The President and the other members of the Military Division are elected by the National Assembly on the basis of proposals put forward by the Ministers of Defence and Interior. The members of the Military Division, including the President, can be professional or lay judges but in all cases they must be members of the military on active service.\textsuperscript{339}

Military criminal jurisdiction is wide-ranging. For example, article 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the scope of the jurisdiction \textit{ratione materiae} and \textit{ratione personae} of military courts in the following terms: “It falls to the military courts to conduct criminal proceedings resulting from the commission of any punishable act imputed to a member of the military, even when some of those involved or the victim are civilians”.\textsuperscript{340} Similarly, from the perspective of jurisdiction \textit{ratione loci}, military courts are competent to try any offence committed in a military zone, regardless of whether the perpetrator is a civilian or a member of the military. The military courts therefore

\textsuperscript{337} Article 9 of the Law on the Attorney-General’s Office.

\textsuperscript{338} Article 24 of the Law on the People’s Courts.

\textsuperscript{339} Article 74 of the Law on the Organization of the Judicial System. See also articles 20, 42, 45 and 66 of Law N° 82 of 1997, Law on the People’s Courts.

\textsuperscript{340} Code of Criminal Procedure, article 5. [Spanish original, free translation.]
have jurisdiction over offences under both military criminal law and ordinary criminal law on the grounds that the perpetrator is a member of the military or because the place where the offence has been committed is of a military nature. Absolute military jurisdiction is therefore built into the system.

Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, jurisdiction is the prerogative of the military courts. Cases that fall to their jurisdiction can only be tried by the People’s Courts if a military prosecutor or a military court withdraws in their favour.341

14. Ecuador

History

Article 160 of the Ecuadorian Constitution of 1948, as amended in 1960, stated that “military jurisdiction applies to members of the Armed Forces on active service”.342 In the section devoted to the judiciary, no reference was made to military or police jurisdiction. The vast majority of the laws concerning military and police criminal jurisdiction date from that period. For example, the Military Criminal Code, the Code of Military Criminal Procedure and the Basic Law on the Armed Forces Justice Service (Ley Orgánica de Servicio de Justicia en las Fuerzas Armadas) were adopted in 1961. The Criminal Code343 and Code of Criminal Procedure for the National Civil Police (Policía Civil Nacional) both date from 1960. With some amendments, these laws on military and police jurisdiction remain in force today.

In 1979, a new Ecuadorian Constitution came into effect. The new Constitution, which was amended in 1984, included specific provisions on military and police jurisdiction. For example, article 131 expressly states that “[m]embers of the Fuerza Pública [the Armed Forces and National Police] enjoy special jurisdiction, they can only be prosecuted or deprived of their rank, honors and pensions for the reasons and in the manner specified by law, except for ordinary infractions which shall be tried under ordinary jurisdiction”.344 In addition, article 132 states that “[m]ilitary and police leadership and jurisdiction shall be exercised in accordance with the law”.345 Article 165 of the 1996 amended version of the Constitution reproduced the provisions of article 131 in identical terms. The rules concerning the special jurisdiction

341 Ibidem.
342 Constitution of 1948, as amended in 1960, article 160. [Spanish original, free translation.]
343 Although the whole of Book 3 was repealed in 1998 as a result of Law N° 109.
344 Constitution of 1979, article 131. [Spanish original, free translation.]
345 Ibid., article 132. [Spanish original, free translation.]
enjoyed by members of the Armed Forces and National Police were contained in section VI on the *Fuerza Pública*. Both were special jurisdictions which lay outside of the structures of the judiciary and formed part of the Ecuadorian State executive. These constitutional provisions were supplemented by Law N° 275 of 1979 or the ‘Law on National Security’ (*Ley de Seguridad Nacional*), which extended the jurisdiction of the military courts.346

Despite the constitutional provisions on military and police jurisdiction, members of the military and police were tried in military or police courts, as the case may be, for human rights violations that constituted criminal offences.347 This was established by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights during its on-site visit to Ecuador. The Commission pointed out that “[i]ndividuals seeking judicial recourse against a member of the security forces of the State may be impeded by the misuse of tribunals of special jurisdiction. The exercise of such jurisdiction on the part of police and military courts is not limited to cases involving conduct in the line of duty of the members of those institutions. Police and military defendants are frequently tried in special courts in relation to charges concerning common crimes. The Commission was told that these processes are not made public, hearings before these instances are closed, and the results are not easily accessible. […] In fact, a November 1995 accounting from the Subsecretary of the Police to the President of the Human Rights Commission of the Congress of actions within the jurisdiction of the police courts indicated that almost none had resulted in the issuance of a sentence. Of the 4,568 cases initiated since 1985, only 46 had resulted in provisional sentences, and only 5 had resulted in final sentences. The majority remained in process or had been archived. More than 50 had been declared prescribed”.348

The Ecuadorian authorities themselves recognized this problem in their report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee: “The majority of the cases of arbitrary deprivation of life committed by members of the police or the armed forces have been brought before regional human rights protection bodies. The most serious difficulty the State has encountered in the punishment of some cases of criminal liability has been the existence of the ‘police jurisdiction’ or the ‘military jurisdiction’, under which public officials who commit offences in the performance of their respective duties must be brought before their own courts and under their own criminal procedures. The

346 Especially articles 144 and 145.
347 In August 1990, the *Centro Ecuménico de Derechos Humanos, CEDHU*, and the *Frente Ecuatoriano de Derechos Humanos, FEDHU*, told the Permanent People’s Tribunal that military jurisdiction for members of the Army and Police was one of the main mechanisms of impunity.
problem lies in the fact that representatives of public order have committed crimes of deprivation of life and forced disappearance, not only in the performance of their respective duties, but also outside that framework. Many of the criminal courts of the police force and the armed forces claim competence even when the crimes in question have not been committed in the performance of the specific duties of their members. The most serious problem which has arisen in practice is that the majority of these special courts, notwithstanding the existence of weighty evidence of guilt, have dismissed the charges, protecting or covering the accused; this situation has given rise to total impunity”. 349 “Complaints of torture brought against police officers and members of the armed forces, like those relating to arbitrary deprivation of life and forced disappearances, have encountered the same obstacles as those mentioned earlier on account of the existence of special police and military jurisdictions. In some of those cases punishment could not be inflicted because the proceedings and penalties were extinguished by prescription on account of the protection given by those courts”. 350

On 5 June 1998, a new Constitution was adopted in Ecuador. As in the previous constitutions, matters relating to military and police jurisdiction were dealt with in Chapter 5, entitled “On the Fuerza Pública”, under Section VII, entitled “On the Role of the Executive”. Article 187 establishes that “[m]embers of the Fuerza Pública shall be subject to special jurisdiction for the trial of offences committed in the exercise of their professional work. In the case of ordinary offences, they shall be subject to ordinary jurisdiction”. 351 However, an important change was introduced into the new Constitution. Article 19 of Section VIII, entitled “On the Role of the Judiciary”, stated that “[responsibility for] the exercise of judicial power shall fall to the organs of the judiciary. Jurisdictional unity shall be established”. 352 Transitional provision 26 also stated that “[a]ll judges and magistrates who are answerable to the executive shall move to the judiciary and, as long as not otherwise provided by law, shall be subject to their own basic laws. This provision includes military judges, police judges […] Administrative staff who at present work in military, police and juvenile tribunals and courts and whose posts are secure shall move to become part of the judiciary. The assets and budgets of those offices shall also be transferred to the judiciary”. 353

Despite the new constitutional provisions restricting military and police jurisdiction and incorporating them into the judiciary, no fundamental changes

351 Constitution of 1998, Chapter V, Section VII, article 187. [Spanish original, free translation.]
352 Ibid., Chapter V, Section VIII, article 19. [Spanish original, free translation.]
353 Ibid., transitional provision 26. [Spanish original, free translation.]
have been made to the situation of military and police courts. They still try human rights violations committed by military or police personnel that constitute criminal offences. The organs of military and police justice are still governed by, and continue to apply, the legislation that was in force prior to the introduction of the new Constitution. They are still in fact special jurisdictions subject to a different legal system from that which applies to the judiciary.

At the beginning of the 1990s, public administration in Ecuador began a process of modernization and in 1995 reform of the country’s justice system got under way. In that context, ProJusticia, the National Program to Support Reform of the Administration of Justice in Ecuador (Programa Nacional de Apoyo a la Reforma de la Administración de Justicia del Ecuador), was set up and as a result important changes have been made to the legal system. Within the context of this program, as well as that of the National Human Rights Plan and the 1998 Constitution, the Ecuadorian authorities announced the adoption of measures to limit the jurisdiction of military and police courts. Among other things, the aim was to tackle the problem of impunity for human rights violations caused by the military and police courts. However, no substantial changes have been made to military and police criminal legislation and military and police courts are still de facto organs of the Executive. In April 2002, the National Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura) called on Congress to expedite the draft bills that sought to reform “military and police justice”.

The Current Situation

So far, in terms of the organization, structure, scope of jurisdiction and procedures which existed prior to the introduction of the 1998 Constitution, no substantial changes have been made to military criminal jurisdiction in Ecuador. Military jurisdiction is therefore regulated through the Military Criminal Code, the Code of Military Criminal Procedure, the Basic Law on the Armed Forces Justice Service, the Law on Military Rank and Promotion (Ley de Situación Militar y Ascenso) and the Armed Forces Personnel Law (Ley de Personal de las Fuerzas Armadas).

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354 The Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank were partners in this program from the start.
355 On 13 January 2000 a new Code of Criminal Procedure was issued, a new Basic Law on the Role of the Judiciary was enacted, etc.
356 See, for example, United Nations document CCPR/C/84/Add.8, 17 December 1998, paragraphs 69 and 82.
358 From 1961.
The following are organs of military jurisdiction: the Court of Military Justice (Corte de Justicia Militar), courts martial, Area Chiefs (Jefes de Zona) and military examining magistrates. There is also the Judge Advocate’s Office (Auditoría de Guerra) and the Military Justice Service or Judge Advocate Corps (Servicio de Justicia Militar).

The highest court within the military justice system is the Court of Military Justice. It is made up jointly of judges (Ministros) from the Third Division of the Supreme Court of Justice and three serving or retired Armed Forces officers, who are appointed by the President of the Republic for a two-year period. The Court also has a prosecutor (Ministro Fiscal). The clerk of the Court is a captain on active service attached to the Military Justice Service who is appointed by the Court on the basis of proposals put forward by the Minister of National Defence. The Court of Military Justice acts as an appellate court and also settles conflicts of jurisdiction between different military courts or between the military courts and the ordinary criminal courts.

Courts martial and Area Commanders (Comandantes de Zona) hear cases in the first instance, depending on the grade and rank of the accused and the type of criminal offence involved. Courts martial are made up of panel members chosen by lot from a list of 20 officers drawn up each year by the Minister of National Defence and have jurisdiction throughout Ecuadorian territory. Area Commanders, who are officers from the operational military corps and are not attached to the Military Justice Service, have authority in the territory or military unit under their command and jurisdiction. They perform both an operational and a jurisdictional role.

In order to be a military examining magistrate, it is necessary to be a practising lawyer or have a degree in law and be a justice official on active service. Military examining magistrates are responsible for the investigative stage of the proceedings, the terms of which vary depending on whether it is peacetime or wartime.

The Judge Advocate’s Office comes under the direction of the Judge Advocate General (Auditor General de Guerra), who has to be a general or superior officer on active service and a lawyer.

The Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) comes under the charge of a superior or general officer attached to the Military Justice Service. It is made up of: the Prosecutor (Ministro Fiscal), who is appointed by the Court of Military Justice and must be a retired or serving superior or general officer who has worked for at least ten years in the Military Justice Service; the Military Attorney-General (Fiscal General Militar), who must be a lawyer and officer on active service; and the military prosecutors for each area (fiscales de zona). The latter represent the Prosecutor’s Office in each of
the military trial courts (*juzgados de instrucción penal militar*) and must be practicing lawyers or law graduates as well as officers on active service.

Military courts in Ecuador have wide-ranging jurisdiction. In the case of military offences or ordinary criminal offences committed in the line of duty, it encompasses military personnel who are on active service or in the active reserve of the Armed Forces and civilian personnel working with the Armed Forces or bodies attached or answerable to the latter. So, despite what is stipulated in the Constitution and the fact that article 81 of the Military Criminal Code states that “acts punishable under ordinary [criminal] laws which are not laid down in this Code shall be tried and punished according to those same laws”, the military courts claim jurisdiction over ordinary criminal offences committed by military personnel by asserting the concept of the ‘service-related act’ (*‘acto del servicio’*). Article 81 of the Military Criminal Code makes an exception to the principle of restricted jurisdiction by stating that “if the said acts are also listed in this Code, they shall be judged under military laws if they have been carried out in the line of military duty or as a result of performing such duties.” It should also be remembered that the National Security Law remains in force. Under its provisions, civilians can be tried by military courts, as happened during the state of emergency in July 1999, even though no provision for this is made in the Code of Military Criminal Procedure. In this regard, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights considered that “the provisions of the National Security Law are particularly incompatible with, and in breach of, the American Convention in that they denote suspension of rights which are non-derogable in all circumstances, such as the judicial guarantees enshrined in articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention. This is the case in that, when direct jurisdiction is given to military criminal justice for a large number of situations involving civilians, the right to be judged by an independent and impartial court is affected because the armed forces take on a dual role: on the one hand, they are active actors during the state of emergency and, on the other hand, military courts become responsible for dispensing justice with regard to acts affecting civilians which have no connection with military duty.” During the state of emergency in July 1999, police and civilian judges refused to try the cases of demonstrators who had been arrested and referred them to the military judge who in turn refused to handle them.

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361 Military Criminal Code, article 81. [Spanish original, free translation.]

362 Ibidem. [Spanish original, free translation.]

gave rise to a conflict of jurisdiction in which the Court of Military Justice, basing its decision on the National Security Law, found in favour of the military courts.  

Police jurisdiction is regulated under the 1960 National Civil Police Criminal Code and the National Police Code of Criminal Procedure. It covers both the criminal and disciplinary spheres. Its organs of ‘justice’ form part of the National Civil Police.

Article 4 of the National Civil Police Criminal Code states that “the jurisdiction covering members of the National Civil Police applies solely to offences committed when carrying out duties which are specifically incumbent on them as members of that institution and constitute offences under this Code or the rules of discipline. Ordinary judges shall be competent to try any other offences committed by members of any branch of the National Civil Police through application of the ordinary Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure”. The list of offences specified in the National Civil Police Criminal Code is quite long. It includes typically military offences, ‘offences against international law’, offences against public administration, ‘police’ offences, etc. It is important to note that the National Civil Police Criminal Code includes ‘offences against political rights and constitutional guarantees’ which means that human rights violations fall within the remit of police courts. Several ordinary criminal offences committed against civilians, such as murder, bodily harm, offences against property and sexual offences are also categorized as ‘police’ offences in the Code. Offences committed against police personnel in the course of duty are also subject to police jurisdiction. For example, in a ruling handed down in...
September 1998 after the new Constitution had entered into force, the Second Division of the Constitutional Court considered that a case in which a civilian had been tortured and killed by members of the Police should be tried in a police court rather than in an ordinary criminal court.374

15. France

History

The Montdidier order issued by Philippe VI of Valois on 1 May 1347 is perhaps the oldest known document on the subject of military jurisdiction in France.375 It stipulated that sergeants and soldiers of the castle guard could be tried by the feudal lords. The first document to establish the principle that jurisdiction should be shared between ordinary courts and special courts appeared a century later in 1467. It was known as the “Montil-les-Tours Ordonnance (l’ordonnance de Montil-les-Tours”) and was issued by Louis XI. It decreed that ordinary courts should try infringements committed by ‘men-at-war’ (‘gens de guerre’) when they were off duty while any ‘acts of war’ (‘faits de guerre’) committed by them should fall to the remit of the special courts. Nevertheless, the concept of what constituted an ‘act of war’ was somewhat vague. An ordinance issued by François I in 1540 attempted to clarify what was meant by it.

Military jurisdiction, as it is generally understood, came into being in the reign of Louis XIV. The concept of the court martial first appeared in 1661 and a procedure was established in 1665. Up until then, military jurisdiction had been exercised by the ‘war lord’ (‘chef de guerre’) but, with the advent of the court martial, a bench of judges made up of military officers was introduced. A court martial could be convened by the commanding officer or the governor of a military garrison who was responsible for appointing members to the bench. Responsibility for conducting the proceedings fell to a regimental major and no officer could be tried without the King’s prior consent. Several other ordinances and regulations were later incorporated into the system.376 The organs of military jurisdiction consisted of the Tribunal de la Connétable (Constabulary Court), the courts martial (conseils de guerre), the

374 Constitutional Court of Ecuador, Ruling dated 28 September 1998, Case N° 154-97-RA.
376 The Ordinance of 1666, the 1720 Declaration by Louis XV and the regulations of 1740 and 1753.
provosts (prévôts) and the officers of the military troop. The way jurisdiction was distributed between the different bodies was complicated and was often imposed from above and, therefore, frequently changed. The Constabulary Court was responsible for trying military and ordinary offences committed by military personnel. The courts martial had jurisdiction over officers and military offences which were committed ‘soldier on soldier’. The Provost Courts tried any “oppression, excesses or other crimes” committed by the troop (‘gens de guerre’) but they did not have jurisdiction over officers. Officers of the military troop tried ‘soldier on soldier’ offences as well as other offences committed by the troop, such as desertion. Although the concept of civil party already existed in ordinary criminal justice, there was no provision for it in military court proceedings. Furthermore, it was not possible to appeal against sentences handed down by the courts martial or the Provost Courts.377

Throughout this period of history, although a distinction was made between military offences and ordinary offences in order to determine whether jurisdiction should go to the military courts or the ordinary courts, there were no legal texts in which military offences as such were clearly defined. The law of 1790 which established courts martial simply defined military offences as ‘breaches of military law’. In any case, the notion of the military offence was linked to the notion of military discipline: “once a breach of military duty appeared to be sufficiently serious to be brought before a court martial, it became an offence”.378

Military courts were also in operation during the French Revolution. The years following the taking of the Bastille saw a succession of different courts, including ‘military tribunals’ (‘tribunaux criminelles militaires’), courts martial (‘cours martiales’) and, lastly, ‘military commissions’ (‘commissions militaires’). All these types of military jurisdiction replaced the courts martial (conseils de guerre) which existed under the Ancien Régime and were, in fact, special courts. From the very start, military jurisdiction had operated on the basis of the principle of hierarchy implicit in military structure which meant that a subordinate could not stand in judgment over a superior. However, during the revolutionary period, this principle was temporarily set aside after a law was passed to permit the creation of ‘military councils’ (‘conseils militaires’), made up, “whatever the rank of the accused, of three officers, three non-commissioned officers and three soldiers”. These councils were later abolished and the principle of hierarchy was reintroduced. However, it was not until 1857 that it was specifically incorporated into the wording of the law.

377 Jean Pariselle, op. cit., p.297.
Article 13 of the Constitution of 3 September 1791, under Title IV entitled “Concerning the Security Forces”, stated that “the army of the land and sea, and the troops devoted to internal security, are subject to special laws, whether it be to maintain discipline or to determine the type of proceedings or nature of the penalties applicable where military offences are concerned”. During the revolutionary period, several attempts were made to change the law in order to separate military offences from those which, strictly speaking, were ordinary criminal offences. After a series of rather inadequate attempts to draft such legislation, a list of military offences was eventually established for the first time in a law dated 19 October 1791. Shortly afterwards, the ordinary criminal courts were granted jurisdiction to try ordinary offences committed by military personnel. However, the unrest and turbulent events during that period resulted in something quite different: military and special courts came to prevail over all other types of judicial bodies. It was also during that period that it became possible to lodge appeals in military cases but the principle of two-tier jurisdiction did not remain in place for long. The Constitution of 24 June 1793 did not enter into the question of military jurisdiction but article 31 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which was incorporated into it, stated that “[c]rimes committed by those appointed by the people or their agents must never go unpunished. No one has the right to claim to have greater right to immunity than other citizens”. Under article 290, Title IX, entitled “Concerning the Armed Forces”, of the Constitution of 22 August 1795, also known as the Constitution of the 5 fructidor Year III, military jurisdiction was regulated in a similar way to the Constitution of 3 September 1791. Article 85 of the Constitution of 13 December 1799, also known as the Constitution of the 22 frimaire Year VIII, stipulated that “military offences are subject to special courts and particular forms of trial”. While, historically speaking, as François Breurec points out, military jurisdiction had developed as an “extension of disciplinary authority”, with the corollary that the competence of military courts was limited, the French Revolution created an ambiguous situation. During the revolutionary period, due to incessant and untimely changes to the law, the distinction between military offences and ordinary criminal offences became blurred and military courts ended up with jurisdiction over all kinds of offences as a result of the widespread application of the
principle of personal jurisdiction, in other words, jurisdiction based on the status of the person concerned.

With the advent of the Napoleonic Empire, circumstances within France and the wars of territorial expansion meant that the scope of military jurisdiction remained ambiguous. The distinction between strictly military offences and ordinary offences was maintained. The former fell to the jurisdiction of the courts martial while the latter, which were known in law as ‘civil offences’ (‘délits civils’), came under the remit of the ordinary courts. The fact that there was a state of war until 1815, as well as a vast array of different laws, meant that during the Napoleonic era military courts tried all offences committed by members of the military, regardless of whether the offence in question was military or ordinary in nature.

During the First Napoleonic Empire, a widespread process of codification was begun in all spheres. Article 63 of the 1814 Constitution abolished “extraordinary commissions and courts”, whatever name they had been given. The distinction between strictly military offences and ordinary criminal offences was given constitutional status by means of a rider to the 1815 Constitution. Article 55 of the rider stipulated that “only military offences shall fall to the jurisdiction of the military courts”385 and “all other offences, even when committed by military personnel, shall come under the jurisdiction of the civilian courts”.386

In the course of drafting the ordinary Criminal Code of 1810, attempts were made to limit the jurisdiction of the military courts. However, the proposed reform and codification of military jurisdiction launched by Napoleon never materialized. It was based on the principle that the Imperial Courts, namely, the ordinary courts, would try all offences committed within the territory belonging to the Empire and, in the event that the offence was considered to be of a military nature, once the investigative stage of the proceedings had been completed, it would be referred to the military courts. “There is only one justice [system] in France; one is a French citizen before being a soldier”, Napoleon argued. “If, within the country, one soldier murders another, he has undoubtedly committed a military offence but he has also committed a civil offence. All offences must therefore first be subject to ordinary jurisdiction...”387

The re-establishment of the Republic did not lead to any major changes as far as military criminal matters were concerned. The 1848 Constitution expressly

385 See Maurice Duverger, op.cit., p.131. [French original, free translation.]
386 Ibidem. [French original, free translation.]
387 Jean Pariselle, op.cit., p. 300. [French original, free translation.]
retained the military courts, together with their existing forms of organization and attributes. Restoration of the monarchy in 1851 also did not lead to changes in the regulations on military jurisdiction.

The Code of Military Justice and the Code of Maritime Justice

It would not be until the middle of the 19th century that military jurisdiction would first have its own corpus of regulations. The first Code of Military Justice for the Army was issued on 9 June 1857 followed by the Code of Maritime Justice for the Navy in 1858.

In the description of the reasoning behind the Code of Military Justice for the Army, it was asserted that the sole purpose of military jurisdiction was to maintain discipline. As one commentator pointed out at the time, “The certain, swift, calm, reasonable but firm repression of the most minor offence involves the question of obedience, in other words discipline, in other words the entire strength of armies”. The idea that discipline was at the heart of military jurisdiction was retained in *La Grande Encyclopédie*, which described military justice, plainly and simply, as an adjunct to disciplinary action and the military courts as the “guardians of discipline”. Nonetheless, despite this, the 1857 Code of Military Justice did not retain the distinction between military offences and ‘civil offences’ when attributing jurisdiction to the military courts. The Code gave formal recognition to the principle of personal jurisdiction. The military courts were granted general jurisdiction *ratione personae*, thus enabling them to try any criminal offence committed by a member of the military, regardless of whether or not it was an ordinary or military offence and whether or not it had been committed in the line of duty.

The 1857 Code of Military Justice established a system of courts martial in which senior officers with no legal training sat in judgment. The functions of prosecuting authority (*ministère public*) and examining magistrate were carried out by officers with no legal qualifications. The Code of Maritime Justice (*Code de Justice Maritime*) established councils of justice (*conseils de justice*) for minor offences and courts martial (*conseils de guerre*) for serious offences. Ship captains were also granted extensive punitive powers. The fact that military jurisdiction was seen as a disciplinary tool of the military leadership and was at the same time endowed with extremely broad powers placed military courts in a contradictory situation.

388 Article 88 of the 1848 Constitution.
390 François Breurec, op.cit., p. 327.
ment for the use of military commanders, was being called on to play the role of the judiciary in respect of the troops but, as pointed out by François Breurec, without one of the crucial features of the judiciary: independence.

**The Codes of 1928 and 1938**

At the end of the 19th century, strong anti-militarist sentiment developed in connection with several different situations, especially the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus. Military jurisdiction came in for fierce criticism. Some changes were introduced, such as the 1897 and 1899 amendments on safeguards for defendants, but the system essentially remained the same. The actions of the military criminal courts during the First World War incurred heavy criticism, especially from former combatants. Several proposals were put forward calling for the abolition of military courts. In this context, work got under way in 1921 to reform the Code of Military Justice, culminating with the issuing of the Code of Military Justice for the Land Army on 9 March 1928. In 1938, the second Code of Military Justice for the Navy was also issued.

The new codes restored jurisdiction for ordinary offences committed by military personnel to the ordinary criminal courts and restricted the jurisdiction of the military courts to military offences. Although the criterion of jurisdiction *ratione materiae* was reintroduced, the Code of Military Justice also established the criterion of jurisdiction *ratione loci* which meant that the military courts could try any offence committed in a military installation. In 1939 the jurisdiction of the military courts was extended to include any ordinary offences committed by military personnel within the context of service. In the case of the army, the courts martial were replaced by Permanent Armed Forces Courts (*Tribunaux Permanents des Forces Armées* - TPFA), presided by civilian judges. Additional judicial safeguards were provided for military personnel facing prosecution. The new Code also sought to separate the function of commander from that of judge by creating an autonomous body within the armed forces for military magistrates. These military magistrates, who were responsible for the investigative phase of proceedings, came under the authority of the Government Commissioner (*Commissaire du Gouvernement*), who was responsible for discharging the prosecutorial function and directly answerable to the Minister of Defence. However, those sitting on the TPFA, including the presiding judges, remained under the hierarchical authority of military officers with operational command. Despite the fact that the presidents of the TPFA were civilian judges, they were incorporated into the ranks of the military and subject to the military hierarchy. These changes to military jurisdiction could not disguise the role played by the executive in the ‘justice’ system.
In the context of the colonial wars, the French military courts underwent a vast process of expansion under “a raft of special laws which would noticeably change the face of the military jurisdictional organs [and] lead to the creation of a range of different types of special military jurisdiction”.391 The main feature of the work undertaken by the military courts was its incorporation into the war effort, both as a means of punishing those fighting for independence and in order to ensure that the excesses committed by the colonial troops, which provoked widespread criticism in France itself, would go unpunished. In Indochina, the conduct of the Saigon Temporary Maritime Court, which was presided over by a lieutenant commander and consisted of French naval officers with no legal training whatsoever, was widely criticized, including by their own peers. For example, Jean Pariselle, a former Government Commissioner responsible for bringing prosecutions before the naval courts, said that “the absurd judgments [handed down by that court] seriously damaged the reputation of the military courts”.392 The death sentences handed down against members of the pro-independence movement in Madagascar by the French military courts in that country also provoked fierce criticism back in the mother country.

However, it was the struggle for national independence in Algeria (1954-1962) which probably demonstrated most blatantly the way in which French military criminal jurisdiction had expanded. In Algeria, from 1954 onwards, military jurisdiction was increasingly used to put down the struggle for Algerian independence, mainly by resorting to emergency powers and legislation. The military justice system was structured around the TPFAs but it also had its own military court of review (Cour de cassation militaire), which was set up in 1955, and a military prosecution service, which was established in 1960. The work of the French military courts was gradually geared towards achieving three objectives: subduing the Algerian national movement by prosecuting its members in military courts; supporting - in other words, legalizing - the methods used by the French army intelligence services to gather information, including the systematic use of torture; and maintaining the operational capacity and morale of the French troops by ensuring that a significant number of the abuses committed went unpunished. Although, in the early stages, both the ordinary courts and the military courts were involved in the crackdown on the independence movements, the military courts gradually took over the whole area of criminal justice. As the historian Sylvie Thénault has pointed out, “justice gradually [became] subject to a war logic [that was]

392 Jean Pariselle, op. cit., p.314. [French original, free translation.]
mobilized in the fight against the enemy [and] remodelled, shaped and altered according to the wishes of the military command [...]”. In the context of an intensification of the conflict in 1957, General Salan, the head of the French troops in Algeria talked about “the failure of the juridical and legislative apparatus to adapt to a form of war which had not been anticipated in legal texts [and the need] for an effective counter-revolutionary war tool”. Within that framework, the military courts were endowed with even broader powers as well as additional human and material resources. The main focus of their work was to put down the independence movements. In 1960, the figure of military prosecutor, responsible for the investigative stage of proceedings, was introduced. A 1961 directive from the Military Attorney-General instructed the military prosecutors not to interfere in the work of the military intelligence services. The directive specifically stated that “an operational investigation [by the military intelligence services] takes precedence over a judicial investigation [by the military prosecutors]”.

The military courts operated as a mechanism to achieve impunity as far as human rights violations committed by French troops were concerned. The vast majority of complaints lodged with the military courts concerning the torture, execution and disappearance of civilians were either dismissed or simply not processed by the TPFAs. Only in a few cases that had been picked up by the media in the motherland was any punishment meted out but most of the penalties imposed were derisory compared to the seriousness of the offences involved. Impunity was not the natural consequence of the inherent esprit de corps of military justice but the result of clear political intent as evidenced by the numerous directives and instructions issued to military justice officials. For example, military commanders issued instructions stating that cases should be dealt with at the disciplinary level so that the military courts would not be overloaded in their counter-insurgency work. In a 1961 circular to military prosecutors, Military Attorney-General Malaval stated that no excesses should be tolerated but he also reminded them that “they were officers subject to the principle of hierarchical subordination to the Commander [and that] [i]t would be a mistake on the part [of the military

394 Cited in Sylvie Thénault, Une drôle de justice - Les magistrats dans la guerre d’Algérie, op. cit., p.68. [French original, free translation.]
395 Paragraph 7 of the general instruction concerning the general service of military attorneys-general and prosecutors, 2 June 1961, cited in Sylvie Thénault, Une drôle de justice - Les magistrats dans la guerre d’Algérie, op. cit. [French original, free translation.]
396 Sylvie Thénault, Une drôle de justice - Les magistrats dans la guerre d’Algérie, op. cit., p.70.
prosecutors] to see themselves as members of a parallel hierarchy that was placed alongside the Army to watch over it and monitor its work”. 397

**The 1965 Code of Military Justice**

In 1965 a new uniform Code of Military Justice applicable to all the armed forces was issued. 398 The process of unifying the military justice system had gradually got under way in the years prior to that. Already in 1949, the judicial functions of the Secretary of State for the Navy had been transferred to the Armies Ministry (Ministère des Armées) and the Directorate of Maritime Justice (Direction de la justice maritime) had been incorporated into the Joint Armed Forces Military Justice Service (Service commun des justices militaires des forces armées). In 1953, the offices of the respective attorneys-general, the investigation offices and the secretariats of the naval and military courts had been amalgamated and in 1956, a single corps of military justice officials was created.

The main changes to the military justice system that came about as a result of the new law concerned the composition and operation of the military courts. The most significant feature was the increase in the number of civilian judges working in the military courts. This was reinforced in 1966 as a result of Law N° 66-1037 which stipulated that the duties of examining magistrate and prosecutor should be carried out by judges from the judiciary on assignment to the Ministry of Defence. The 1966 law meant the demise of the single corps of military justice officials which had been set up in 1956.

The new Code of Military Justice entered into force on 1 January 1966. The two legal corps, one attached to the Army and the other to the Navy, ceased to exist. Four organs of military jurisdiction were established under the new code: the Permanent High Court of the Armed Forces (Haut tribunal permanent des Forces armées), the Permanent Armed Forces Courts (Tribunaux permanents des Forces armées - TPFA), the Military Army Courts (Tribunaux militaires aux armées - TME) and the Provost Courts (tribunaux prévôtaux). The TMEs replaced the courts that had previously been convened on board ship under the naval justice system. The Permanent High Court of the Armed Forces, which was responsible for trying Marshals of France

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397 Paragraph 7 of the general instruction concerning the general service of military attorneys-general and prosecutors, 2 June 1961, cited in Sylvie Thénault, Une drôle de justice - Les magistrats dans la guerre d’Algérie, op.cit., p.213. [French original, free translation.]

(maréchaux de France), admirals and generals, was never convened.\textsuperscript{399} Examining magistrates and prosecutors completed the system.

The Permanent Armed Forces Courts (TPFAs) were divided into two chambers, one responsible for trials and the other responsible for supervising the pre-trial investigation phase. The former consisted of a civilian judge from the Court of Appeal, appointed by the Ministry of Justice, together with three members of the military.\textsuperscript{400} Another civilian judge from a first instance court within ordinary jurisdiction, appointed by the president of the Court of Appeal, also acted as judge advocate to the TPFAs. The chamber responsible for supervising pre-trial investigations consisted of the civilian judge advocate and a superior military officer. Nevertheless, towards the end of the 1970s, a TPFA made up solely of civilian judges was set up in Bordeaux.\textsuperscript{401} TPFAs had jurisdiction within French territory in peacetime. In wartime, their jurisdiction was extended and changes were made to their composition so that they were presided by a military judge and the civilian judge advocate was replaced by a member of the military.

The Military Army Courts (TMEs) and the Provost Courts had jurisdiction outside of French territory in peacetime. In wartime, both had jurisdiction within French territory. Their powers were not clearly defined in the 1965 Code of Military Justice and were only clarified in the subsequent code.

The examining magistrates and prosecutors were civilian judges who had been assigned to the Ministry of Defence.\textsuperscript{402} Depending on their position on the judicial ladder, they were assigned a particular military rank, usually that of major.\textsuperscript{403} Though with some special conditions attached, they remained subject to the disciplinary rules applicable to the judiciary. The prosecutors came under the direction of the Government Commissioner, who was in turn answerable to the Ministry of Defence.

The Code of Military Justice did not substantially alter the scope of jurisdiction that had been established in the 1928 and 1938 codes. When troops were outside French territory or if war had been declared, military jurisdiction was extended to include all kinds of offences, regardless of whether they were of


\textsuperscript{400} A superior officer, a lower-ranking officer and a non-commissioned officer.

\textsuperscript{401} Jean Pariselle, op. cit., p.311.

\textsuperscript{402} Article 1 of Law N° 66-1037 of 29 December 1966.

\textsuperscript{403} Law of 29 September 1966.
a military or ordinary nature. In peacetime, military courts had jurisdiction over military offences, ordinary offences committed on military sites and any criminal offence committed while on duty.

Following tradition, the 1965 Code of Military Justice still failed to allow a civil action (action civile) to be brought or the right of appeal. Although it did not use the words ‘action civile’, article 55 stipulated that the military courts could only rule on criminal proceedings. The military authorities had sole responsibility for instituting criminal proceedings. However, a 1979 case in which a female student in a military college was murdered by one of her peers gave rise to a widespread debate about the non-existence of the right to bring a civil action in military criminal proceedings. The Code still did not allow applications for appeal against sentences but it did allow appeals against decisions made during the investigative phase. This meant that judgments on the merits of a case could only be challenged by submitting applications for annulment or review (recours en cassation ou révision) or opposition appeals (recours en opposition).

The 1982 Code of Military Justice

In 1980 a major reform of military criminal jurisdiction was launched. The question of whether or not military justice should be retained was at the heart of the parliamentary debates. The process culminated on 21 July 1982 with the adoption of Law N° 82-621, which amended the Code of Military Justice and the ordinary Code of Criminal Procedure. It is worth recalling that in 1981 the death penalty had been abolished for all offences, including those contained in the Code of Military Justice. The amended Code of Military Justice, like the 1965 version, regulated both the structure and operation of the military justice system as well as matters relating to offences and military criminal proceedings.

Although in general terms Law N° 82-621 reproduced the contents of the 1965 code, it also introduced significant changes to the system of military justice. For example, the following innovations are worth highlighting: military courts were abolished within French territory in peacetime; outside of French territory, in peacetime, the organs responsible for conducting trials, carrying out pre-trial investigations and discharging prosecutorial functions were to be composed of civilian judges; it became possible to bring a civil action in the course of military criminal proceedings; the rules of procedure

405 Law N° 81-908 of 9 October 1981.
for military proceedings were brought into line with those used in the ordinary courts; and the power of military courts to try juveniles was restricted. Even though military jurisdiction no longer existed on French territory in peacetime, the ordinary Code of Criminal Procedure\textsuperscript{407} allowed military courts to be set up under a state of siege, emergency or alert (\textit{mise en garde}) or when there was a general call-up of troops. In 1992, victims and their successors were allowed to have greater involvement in military trials. As well as being able to bring a civil action, both in peacetime and wartime, as had been established in Law N° 82-621, in 1992 they were granted the power to start a criminal action in cases of death, mutilation or permanent invalidity.\textsuperscript{408}

In peacetime, outside of French territory, military jurisdiction consisted of the Army Courts (\textit{tribunaux aux armées}) and the Provost Courts (\textit{tribunaux prévôtaux}). In wartime, it consisted of the Armed Forces Territorial Courts (\textit{tribunaux territoriaux des forces armées}) and the High Court of the Armed Forces (\textit{Haut tribunal des forces armées}) and, outside of French territory, the Military Army Courts (\textit{tribunaux militaire aux armées}) and a type of provost court ("\textit{tribunal prévôtal}"). The \textit{Cour de Cassation}, the highest court within ordinary jurisdiction, was responsible for hearing applications for military court judgments to be quashed.

The Army Courts, which replaced the TPFAs, consisted of a presiding judge and six other judges from the judiciary, all of whom were civilians. Like the TPFAs, the Army Courts were made up of two chambers, one of which was responsible for conducting trials and the other for supervising the pre-trial investigation phase. The prosecutorial function (\textit{Ministère Public}) was discharged by the Government Commissioner (\textit{Commissaire de Gouvernement}), who was answerable to the Ministry of Defence. The existence of military courts in peacetime outside of French territory is not hypothetical. France has signed numerous treaties with eight African countries\textsuperscript{409}, giving French military courts the authority to try offences committed by French troops on those territories. For these purposes, Law N° 82-621 established an Armed Forces Court in Paris (\textit{tribunal des forces armées à Paris}). An army court was also set up in Baden-Baden in Germany on the basis of treaties agreed through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).\textsuperscript{410}

\textsuperscript{407} Articles 699-1 and 700 of the ordinary Code of Criminal Procedure.

\textsuperscript{408} Law N° 92-1336 of 16 December 1992.

\textsuperscript{409} Burkina-Faso, Ivory Coast, Djibuti, Gabon, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Senegal and Togo.

\textsuperscript{410} The London Convention of 19 July 1951 and the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their Forces with respect to Foreign Forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany of 3 August 1959.
Under the 1982 law, the army courts were to have virtually total jurisdiction outside of French territory in peacetime. In terms of jurisdiction *ratione materiae*, they were empowered to try all offences committed by military personnel or civilians accompanying the troops and any offence committed by a civilian against the armed forces or against military equipment or installations.\(^{411}\) As far as jurisdiction *ratione personae* was concerned, they had the authority to try career service personnel, members of the military “who are serving under contract”, members of the National Gendarmerie, personnel who have been conscripted under certain conditions, crew members of military ships or aircraft, juveniles of under 18 years of age who are members of the armed forces or nationals of an occupied or enemy state, and, in the case of certain offences, civilians. However, in the cases of the eight African countries and the Baden-Baden Army Court, they had even greater powers under the provisions of the respective international agreements in question.

Provost courts were to consist of a single person, a captain of the gendarmerie, who had the authority to try police offences as well as minor offences and breaches of discipline committed by civilians and prisoners of war who belonged to the rank and file. They followed a simplified procedure in which it was possible for the victim to pursue a civil action. The powers of judge, investigator and prosecutor were concentrated in the captain of gendarmerie. Several legal commentators consider the provost courts to be an anachronism left over from the Middle Ages.\(^{412}\)

Each Armed Forces Territorial Court was to consist of a president, an advisor who was a judge and member of the judiciary and three military judges from the branch of the services in question. For defendants with the rank of colonel, captain or higher, the 1982 law called for an Armed Forces High Court to be set up in Paris. Their composition was to be based on the same principle as that of the territorial courts but the members had to be higher in rank than the accused. The Army Military Courts were to be made up of a president, who had to be a judge, and four military judges chosen from among the injured or the combatants.

**The 1999 reforms**

Military criminal law and the ordinary procedural code were once again amended as a result of Law N° 99-929 of 10 November 1999. The reforms, which began in 1997, marked a boost for the change in direction for military justice initiated in 1982. As pointed out in the parliamentary report on the draft legislation, the main purpose was “to bring general criminal law and

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\(^{411}\) Articles 59, 64 and 65 of the Code of Military Justice.
\(^{412}\) See, among others, Charles-Edouard de Fresart, op. cit., p.476.
military criminal law closer together […] in response to] a trend, which can be called historic, towards reducing the differences between the specific attributes of military law and those of ordinary law […]”.

The reforms mainly concerned military jurisdiction in peacetime and outside of French territory. Some of the most significant innovations made to the military justice system included the application of the rules of procedure used in the ordinary courts to the military courts operating in peacetime outside of French territory, the establishment of a second tier of jurisdiction under the responsibility of the ordinary criminal courts and the fact that the Prosecutor’s Office (Ministère Public) was no longer dependent on the Ministry of Defence.

As a result of the 1999 reforms, in the case of offences committed outside of French territory, military jurisdiction in peacetime consisted of the Paris army court (tribunal aux armées de Paris), the Paris Appeal Court (cour d’appel de Paris) and the Cour de Cassation, the supreme court of review within the ordinary justice system. The three tiers of jurisdiction were therefore cut loose from military auspices: the first tier was to consist of civilian judges while the other two tiers were courts which already existed within ordinary justice system. Nevertheless, the scope of military jurisdiction did not fundamentally change. With a few exceptions, the procedures to be followed were those stipulated in the ordinary Code of Criminal Procedure. The Procureur de la République, a civilian judge who is subordinate to the Minister of Justice, carries out the prosecutorial function (Ministère Public) before the Paris army courts, thus making the post of Government Commissioner (Commissaire de Gouvernement), who was answerable to the Ministry of Defence, redundant. As well as allowing the victims and their successors to pursue a civil action, the 1999 law also enabled them to instigate criminal proceedings.

The delay in disbanding the French Forces based in Germany, which was originally due to happen on 1 July 1999, meant that the 1999 law temporarily continued to apply to the Baden-Baden Army Court. But the law itself authorized dissolution of the court to be implemented by means of a decree, subject to a report from the Ministries of Justice and Defence. As far as the agreements with various African countries were concerned, responsibility for trying the offences referred to in such international agreements was entrusted to the Paris Army Courts.

The regulations applicable in wartime under the Code of Military Justice were not substantially changed. The provisions allowing military courts to be

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set up in emergency situations or when there is a general military call-up were also retained. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in wartime, the **Procureur de la République** carries out the duties previously undertaken by the **Commissaire de Gouvernement**. Lastly, under the 1999 law, operation of the provost courts was restricted to war situations.

As a result of the reforms of 1988 and 1999, military offences, ordinary offences committed as a result of service and any criminal offence committed by members of the military in peacetime on French territory come under the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal courts.

Reform of the French military criminal system has not come to an end with Law N° 99-929 of 1999, article 66 of which specifically states that the Code of Military Justice must be amended before 31 December 2002.

16. Germany

**History**

The predominant feature of the German Empire of the 18th and 19th centuries was the militarized nature of the State and society. Mirabeau’s well-known comment that Prussia was not a country with an army but an army with a country is often quoted.415 With the coming to power of Emperor Friedrich Wilhelm IV, the combined authority of the monarchy and the military became the pivot around which the Prussian State system revolved.416 The Prussian Code of Military Criminal Procedure of 1845 was introduced into the Armed Forces of the Northern German Confederation in 1867 and, in 1871, into the Imperial Forces, under the name of Imperial Military Law (*Reichsmilitargesetz*). The Code was characterized by the extensive powers given to military commanders, the excessive jurisdiction granted to military courts, the lack of separation between the military courts and the public prosecutors and the arbitrary nature of its procedures. In 1862, the Code was roundly criticized by the Congress of German Jurists which called for the jurisdiction of the military courts to be curbed, especially as far as ordinary criminal offences were concerned.417 At the end of the 19th century, military

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417 Ibid., p.382.
criminal legislation was the subject of much heated debate and several attempts were made to reform it.

Following Germany’s defeat in the First World War, the Imperial Army was dissolved and the Weimar Republic emerged. The Constitution of the Weimar Republic of 1919 abolished military criminal jurisdiction in peacetime. It was only permitted in wartime. In 1920, a law was passed authorizing military courts to try offences committed on board warships in peacetime.

With the advent of Nazism and the creation of the Third Reich in 1933, “military justice” was re-established. The system for dispensing justice set up by the Nazi government was complex and varied depending on the nationality of the accused and the victim, the nature of the offence and the territory on which the offence was committed (whether on German soil or in the occupied territories, and, in the case of the latter, whether in the East or the West). All criminal cases “which referred to German citizens or ‘State members’, ethnic Germans or persons of German origin” fell to the jurisdiction of the German courts and German law was to be enforced. In the occupied territories, the local judicial authorities continued to exercise jurisdiction in principle. However, they did not have jurisdiction over German subjects, serious offences or offences committed against the German State, the National Socialist Party or its affiliated organizations, regardless of the nationality of the accused. In such cases, the German courts had exclusive jurisdiction. In some cases, the local courts had jurisdiction over serious offences but, in all cases, their decisions were subject to review by the German courts. Nevertheless, for a certain period, there were parts of the occupied territories which were not subject to the jurisdiction of the German courts. However, in general a “Germanization of the local justice system” existed in the occupied territories.

According to Arnold Toynbee, whether or not German military courts took precedence over the other ordinary German courts in the occupied territories depended in large measure on how the latter were administered, namely, whether they formed part of a Protectorate, whether they were subject to the Reich Commissioners, the German civilian administration, or whether they were under the military command of the German army (the Wehrmacht). However, it also hinged on other factors such as the extent of resistance with-
in those territories. In Norway, it seems that at first only an ordinary German court was set up whereas in France and Belgium it was the German military courts which played the predominant role and special legal powers were conferred on military commanders. Nevertheless, whatever the case, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht military courts. Toynbee also points out that “a distinct feature of the German administration of justice in the occupied territories was the use of the so-called ‘state of civil emergency’” to transfer responsibility for trying many offences from the ordinary German courts to the German military courts or special courts.421 In particular, these measures were applied to the Standgerichte, a “civilian equivalent of the military courts” of the Wehrmacht, which were made up of SS or police officers and conducted summary proceedings with no right of appeal and in which the accused had no right to legal representation. Special Courts (Sondergericht), Special Army Courts and Police Courts Martial were also set up to deal with certain offences connected with forms of resistance to the Nazi occupation. In some countries in the East, both Standgerichte and Sondergerichte were established without resorting to the introduction of a “state of civil emergency”.

The system used to dispense military justice in the Third Reich was complex. It included not only the traditional military courts (Wehrmachtgericht) used by the army and established under the German Military Criminal Code but also a wide range of other military or special courts: the Special Army Courts, which were set up by decree, the SS and Police Courts (SS-Und Polizeigerichte), the Sondergericht and the Standgerichte. These tribunals had extensive jurisdiction including, as the case may be, even offences such as stealing crops, spreading information ‘hostile’ to the Third Reich, inciting others to strike and holding unlawful meetings. As the Nazis came to occupy more and more territory and the world conflict intensified, these courts proliferated and their jurisdiction was extended to all kinds of offences.

The splitting of Germany into two sovereign States, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic Republic of Germany, also affected matters relating to military criminal jurisdiction. In the Federal Republic of Germany, major changes were made to military criminal jurisdiction as a result of the “dismantling of the military organization imposed under the peace treaties” after the Second World War.422 Until it was amended in 1956, the German Constitution banned the existence of armed forces. That year saw the begin-

421 Ibid., p.112. [Spanish original, free translation.]
ning of a series of legal reforms which culminated in the adoption in 1957 of the Military Criminal Law to replace the Military Criminal Code of 1871. The 1957 law was the subject of a succession of amendments and, in 1974, a new Military Criminal Law was adopted and, with some changes, remains in force today. In the Democratic Republic of Germany, the 1957 Military Criminal Law was replaced by the 1968 Criminal Code in which military offences were listed as punishable crimes. It was amended in 1974, 1977 and 1979. As in most socialist countries, German military courts were incorporated into the “ordinary judicial apparatus”, so that, in terms of subject matter and procedures, military and civilian judges shared the same legislation and were subject to the authority of the same supreme court. On 3 October 1990, the Treaty of Reunification uniting the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) entered into force. Under article 3 of the treaty, the Constitution of the FRG would in future apply to the whole of the former territory of the GDR, except with regard to some financial matters.

The current situation

Military courts are regulated under section IX of the Basic Law on the judiciary. According to article 96 of the Basic Law, the Federation can establish military courts. Nevertheless, the same article states that such courts, which have the status of federal courts, can only exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of the armed forces who have been sent abroad or who are on board warships or while a state of defence exists. In such circumstances, the military courts come under the authority of the Federal Ministry of Justice, the judges who preside over such courts must meet the usual requirements to be able to sit as a judge and the Federal Court of Justice acts as the military supreme court. There are therefore no military criminal courts in peacetime.

423 The law dated 19 March 1956, known as the “Soldiers’ Law”, and the law dated 21 July 1956, known as the “Military Service Law”.
428 The Basic Law was enacted in 1949 and has been amended on several occasions, especially as a result of the 1990 Treaty of Reunification. In July 2002, article 96, which governs military courts, was amended in view of the establishment of the International Criminal Court.
In the event that either military or ordinary criminal offences are committed by military personnel in peacetime, they are dealt with by the ordinary courts.

Nevertheless, despite the limitation imposed under article 96 of the Basic Law, the 1974 Military Criminal Law applies to both career and conscripted military personnel, and, in a limited way, in the case of certain offences\(^{429}\), to civilians. However, in peacetime, the offences contained in the Military Criminal Law come under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and are subject to ordinary criminal procedure, since there is no provision for the existence of military courts.

17. Iran

*History*

Iran’s pursuit of military power goes back a long way. During the reign of Shah Nadir (1736-1747), Iranian army rule stretched as far as India.\(^{430}\) The 18\(^{\text{th}}\) and 19\(^{\text{th}}\) centuries were marked by wars and the development of militarism in the region. The legal system was essentially based on customary law. As the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century dawned, the first written laws appeared. In 1905, under the Ghadjar dynasty, the first Iranian Constitution was adopted. The original Constitution did not envisage the existence of military courts. However, in 1906, some supplementary principles were appended to the Constitution. Principle N° 87 allowed military courts to be created throughout Iranian territory through the enactment of special laws.

In 1921, the Army Commander, General Reza Pahlavi, led a *coup d’état*. That same year, a Criminal Code and a Code of Criminal Procedure were issued. As far as military justice was concerned, two laws were passed, one concerning the organization of military courts and the other describing the principles to be applied to military trials. A year later, in 1922, a Military Criminal Law was enacted. In 1925, a parliamentary monarchy was established under the new Shah Reza Pahlavi and was to last until 1979. A host of laws were introduced under the government of Shah Reza Pahlavi.\(^{431}\) In 1940, a Code of Military Justice was issued to replace the laws on military criminal jurisdiction that had been adopted in 1921 and 1922 as well as various legal provisions that had been introduced during the 1930s.

\(^{429}\) For example, aiding or abetting the commission of a military criminal offence.

\(^{430}\) Core document forming part of the reports of States parties : Islamic Republic of Iran, United Nations document HRI/CORE/1/Add.106, 1 July 1999.

\(^{431}\) The Penal Code in 1925, the Civil Code in 1928 and 1935 and the Code of Civil Procedure in 1939.
The 1940 Code of Military Justice, which remained in force until 1979, underwent numerous changes and many supplementary provisions were added to it. The Code regulated the organizational and structural aspects of military criminal jurisdiction as well as the substantive and procedural laws applicable to military courts. It distinguished between military criminal jurisdiction in peacetime, emergency situations and wartime so that there were separate military courts and procedures for each of those situations. A Military Court of Review and a Military Prosecutor’s Office completed the structure. Applications for a judgment to be quashed were not permitted in the case of military offences, only for ordinary criminal offences. Furthermore, the Shah, as Commander of the Armed Forces, had extensive powers where military criminal matters were concerned. The Code also determined how discipline was to be imposed within the Army and created disciplinary courts together with rules of procedure. The Judicial Organization for the Armed Forces was created to operate in parallel with the military justice structures set up under the Code of Military Justice. Later, another similar organization was created for the Gendarmerie. Military jurisdiction was broad. It not only applied to members of the Armed Forces, Gendarmerie and Police who had committed military or ordinary offences but also to civilians, especially where political or other related offences were concerned.

On 11 February 1979, the government of the Pahlavi monarchy was overthrown by the movement headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. That same year the Islamic Republic of Iran was established. In December, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, an amended version of which is still in force today, was adopted. Article 4 of the new Constitution declared that all civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, military and political laws and regulations should be based on Islamic law. Article 61 also stipulated that judicial power should be exercised by courts of justice which must act in accordance with Islamic precepts and implement Hodoud (punishments applicable under Islamic law). According to the Constitution, the head of the judiciary is appointed by the Leader who has the responsibility and authority to determine the general policies to be followed by the country, supervise the proper implementation of those policies, issue decrees and pardon condemned persons or commute their sentence. It is the head of the judiciary who appoints judges. As far as military justice was concerned, article 172 established military courts and stated that they should have jurisdiction to

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433 Core document forming part of the reports of States parties : Islamic Republic of Iran, United Nations document HRI/CORE/1/Add.106, 1 July 1999.

434 Ibidem.
try offences committed by members of the Army, Police, Gendarmerie and
Islamic Revolution Guard Corps “specifically in connection with military
duties”.\footnote{Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, article 172. [Spanish original, free translation.]}

With the arrival of the new Islamic government in Iran, the Code of Military
Justice of 1940 ceased to apply. There was a wave of reaction against military
justice which, in the time of Shah Pahlavi, epitomized repression of the oppo-
sition. One of the first acts by the new authorities was therefore to quash con-
victions for political offences handed down by military courts between 1953
and 1979.\footnote{Decree dated 27 March 1979 amended by a decree dated 30 January 1980.} A decree issued on 1 May 1979 restored responsibility for try-
ing ordinary offences to the ordinary criminal courts.\footnote{Decree dated 1 May 1979.} Broadly speaking, the offences concerned were political offences and offences related to drugs
trafficking. The same decree stated that the jurisdiction of the military courts
was to be limited solely to “specifically military cases” and also ordered that
offences committed by members of the Police and Gendarmerie should
remain subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.\footnote{A. Azmayesh, “Le droit pénal militaire en Iran”, op. cit., pp. 37 and 67.} A later decree
clarified that “specifically military cases” meant service-related acts.\footnote{Decree dated 23 November 1979.} In
August 1979, a Military Criminal Code was issued.\footnote{Decree dated 23 August 1979.} In reality, it was an
amended version of the 1940 Code of Military Justice: the references to the
King were removed from the text, the Military Prosecutor became answerable
to the Prosecutor General before the Supreme Court and the military rank
required to be a judge or prosecutor was changed. In 1981, the Judicial
Organization for the Armed Forces, the courts and the military prosecutors
were all incorporated into the judiciary.\footnote{Law dated 20 November 1981.} In 1985, the Law of Procedure of
the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran,\footnote{Law dated 12 May 1985.} which was amended in
1990, was adopted. Under it, a new system of military justice was
established.\footnote{Law dated 12 May 1985.}

It is important to point out that responsibility for dealing with political
offences, as well as with other ordinary criminal offences, was given to the
Revolutionary Courts which had been established when the new government
first came to power. As Professor Azmayesh has written, “the revolutionary
courts […] took over from the military courts as far as political offences were

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435 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, article 172. [Spanish original, free translation.]
437 Decree dated 1 May 1979.
441 Law dated 20 November 1981.
In addition, at the end of 1979, a Special Revolutionary Court for the Army was set up. This special court, which operates outside of the military criminal structure, is empowered to try cases involving military plots and offences against state security committed by members of the Army, Police and Gendarmerie. It follows the same rules of procedure as the Revolutionary Courts and is a court of sole instance whose decisions cannot be the subject of any kind of appeal. It is made up of a cleric, a military officer and a civilian. It is assisted by a Special Prosecutor who is appointed by the Minister of Defence and has full authority to carry out investigations, bring charges and make arrests.

The Situation of Military Justice in 1991

As Professor Azmayesh has written, Iranian military criminal law is “a mixture of constitutional provisions and provisions of ordinary law”. The main sources of law for matters concerning military justice are article 172 of the Constitution, Koranic law (Charia), the Law of Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces, the Law of Procedure of the Armed Forces and the Law of Military Justice. As far as procedures are concerned, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply. As far as substantive law and forms of punishment are concerned, many of the provisions of the 1940 Code of Military Justice still apply. The main feature of the military justice system is that it is a uniform system which makes no distinction between peacetime, emergency situations and wartime.

The military justice system is run by the Organization of Military Justice (OMJ). The OMJ is part of the general system of justice under the direction of the Head of the Judiciary and has no ties with the army command. The creation of military courts and military prosecutor’s offices, the appointment and removal of military judges and prosecutors and the OMJ budget all depend on the Head of the Judiciary. The president of the OMJ is appointed

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444 A. Azmayesh, “Le droit pénal militaire en Iran”, op. cit., p.38 [French original, free translation.]
445 No information from after 1991 is available.
446 A. Azmayesh, “Le droit pénal militaire en Iran”, op. cit., p.42 [French original, free translation.]
447 “Hodoud”, “ta’zirat”, “gesas” and “diyat”.
451 This organization has changed its name several times. Initially it was called the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces, then it became the Organization of Military Justice and later the Organization of Armed Forces Procedures.
by the Supreme Council of the Judiciary. It is staffed by both military and civilian personnel but the system gives a certain degree of precedence to military officials, especially military jurists. In any event, military officials who work with the OMJ are subject to the regulations that apply to civilian officials as well as those that apply to the military.

The OMJ has its headquarters in Teheran as well as branches in each administrative division of the country. The military justice system is made up of first degree and second degree military tribunals and the Office of the Military Prosecutor. The distinction between the first and second degree military tribunals is not the same as that which exists between different tiers of jurisdiction in other systems (first and second instance). The concept of degree refers to the nature of the offence and the respective penalties to be applied. For example, the first degree military tribunals try all offences that are considered to be serious and punishable under Charia (hodoud) and which incur the harshest penalties. 452 The second degree military tribunals try all other crimes and minor offences. There are also autonomous second degree military tribunals in areas where, due to the low number of cases, there is no branch of the OMJ. In such cases, the autonomous military tribunals have broader jurisdiction that the ordinary second degree military tribunals. In any event, the jurisdiction of the first degree military tribunals takes precedence over that of the second degree ones. It should be noted that, despite their name, first and second degree military tribunals do not consist of a panel of judges but of a single judge. In the case of first degree military tribunals, the judge can be assisted by a legal adviser. In practice, the Teheran First Degree Military Tribunal is the highest authority since it is presided by the President of the OMJ who has extensive powers with regard to military criminal matters and is responsible for supervising the work of the military courts.

The prosecutorial function is discharged by the military prosecutor’s offices which are attached to each branch of the OMJ and to each military court. They are responsible for carrying out pre-trial investigations and bringing charges and also represent the public interest at trial. They are directed by the Prosecutor before the Supreme Court and are preferably made up of military jurists.

Military jurisdiction is limited to “specifically military offences”. 453 Nevertheless, this concept goes beyond that of “typically military offences”

452 For example, execution, stoning, hanging, mutilation or 10 years’ imprisonment.
since it has been defined as “those offences which members of the Armed Forces commit when carrying out military orders or duties”. Military courts therefore have jurisdiction over both military offences and ordinary offences committed as a result of service. Ordinary criminal offences which are not service- or duty-related and offences committed by justice officials fall to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. From the point of view of jurisdiction *ratione personae*, the following come under the jurisdiction of the military courts: members of the Army, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, Gendarmerie, Police, Judicial Police and Committees of the Islamic Revolution, as well as any member of a “legal armed force”. Civilians who are employed by these bodies are also subject to the jurisdiction of the military courts.

In terms of procedures, the provisions of the ordinary Code of Criminal Procedure apply. Judgments handed down by the military courts can be reviewed under certain conditions. First degree military tribunals are responsible for reviewing the decisions of second degree military tribunals. The Supreme Court is responsible for reviewing the decisions of the first degree military tribunals.

18. Italy

*History*

Italian military justice dates back to the Roman Empire. Some authors believe that a good deal of military criminal law originated in that period. While such an eurocentric view of human history is now most definitely a thing of the past, it is nevertheless true that, given Rome’s military expansionism, methods of dispensing justice within its various armies were in existence from very early on.

Most legal scholars believe that it was in the 19th century, when the Italian peninsula was undergoing a process of unification and the nation state was being built, that the contemporary model of Italian military justice began to emerge. In the early 19th century, military justice in the peninsula had come in for strong criticism. For example, the report on the draft Military Criminal Code of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies of 1816 stated that “it was important to emphasize that a military justice [system] with a class-based
jurisdiction for men at arms had been transformed into a special jurisdiction for trying purely military offences committed by the military”.457

With the advent of the Kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia in the 19th century and its gradual territorial expansion throughout the Italian peninsula, the administrative machinery and the military forces began to evolve and become more uniform. The Sardinian Military Criminal Code of 1859 was to have a major influence on that process. A system of military criminal jurisdiction which was separate from that of ordinary criminal jurisdiction was established. The powers of the military courts gradually grew.458 They were authorized to try cases of banditry (brigantaggio) as well as to crack down, usually under emergency powers (stato di assedio interno), on the popular protest movements that were emerging as a result of the serious political and economic crisis that existed at the time. The military justice system was characterized by the fact that it was an integral part of the military hierarchy and provided few judicial guarantees for those who were subject to its jurisdiction.459

During the fascist régime of Benito Mussolini (1922-1945), Peacetime and Wartime Military Criminal Codes460, which regulated substantive as well as procedural aspects of military justice, were adopted. Both Codes, which have been amended or supplemented on several occasions, are still in force today. One of the main organs of military justice in the fascist period seems to have been the Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State, which was later abolished.

In 1945, at the end of the Second World War, Extraordinary Military Tribunals were set up with the power to try cases of armed robbery in which the perpetrator had been caught in flagrante delicto. They were abolished shortly afterwards.

The system of military criminal jurisdiction established in the 1941 Codes was made up of territorial military tribunals, military tribunals on board ship and the Military Supreme Court. It was a special jurisdiction with the Supreme Military Court at its apex as the final court of review. Military crim-

460 Royal decrees Nos. 303 and 1022 of 1941.
inal jurisdiction was not only totally separate from the judiciary but in a position of primacy and privilege vis-à-vis ordinary criminal jurisdiction. For example, article 264 of the Peacetime Military Criminal Code gave special dispensation to the military courts when there was a conflict of jurisdiction with an ordinary court. The territorial military tribunals were made up of a president (an officer with the rank of Brigadier-General), three military judges, two of whom had to be superior officers, and a judge rapporteur (an officer with the rank of colonel). Only the judge rapporteur, being the only proper ‘military judge’ involved in such courts, had to have any legal training. The military tribunals on board ship were not permanent organs and were set up whenever circumstances required it. They were made up of a president (an officer with the rank of captain or lieutenant commander, as appropriate) and four panel members, two of whom had to be superior officers. The jurisdiction *ratione personae* of military courts was extensive and encompassed military personnel, people attached to the armed forces, members of civilian bodies of a military nature and civilians. The Peacetime Military Criminal Code authorized the military courts to try ordinary offences committed by military personnel.461 Lastly, there were only two tiers of jurisdiction in the military court system.

**The 1947 Constitution**

The Italian Constitution of 1947 deals with military jurisdiction under Title IV on the Judiciary, article 103 of which states that, in peacetime, military courts shall have jurisdiction solely over military offences committed by members of the Armed Forces. The Constitution does not set the limits of military jurisdiction in wartime but article 103 defers to law. As Fernández Segado points out, that article of the Constitution sets clear subjective and objective limits on military criminal jurisdiction in peacetime. “As a consequence, from the day that the current Constitution entered into force, the military courts could not try civilians in peacetime or members of the military charged with ordinary offences”.462

The Constitution also banned extraordinary and special jurisdictions and stipulated that performance of the judicial function should be governed by the principle of jurisdictional unity.463 Although it is implicit in that principle that the jurisdictional function should only be exercised by ordinary judges, the Constitution left the door open to military justice by stating in article 102

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461 Article 21 of the Peacetime Military Criminal Code.
463 Article 102 of the Constitution.
that special departments, made up of citizens who were not on the bench, could be set up as courts within the justice system to deal with specific issues. Despite the constitutional bar on special jurisdiction and the fact that in peacetime military justice came under the supervision of the Supreme Court (Corte Suprema di Cassazione), wartime military courts escaped the control of the latter as a result of article 111 of the Constitution which stated that the Supreme Court could hear applications for the quashing of any judgment or court ruling on personal liberty issued by the courts, including peacetime military courts, but not of judgments handed down by wartime military courts. Several authors have pointed out that, given this provision with regard to wartime, military justice in fact constitutes a special jurisdiction.

It should be remembered that the Peacetime and Wartime Military Criminal Codes then in force predated the Constitution. This state of affairs meant that there were numerous inconsistencies between what was laid down in the Constitution and the 1941 military criminal structure and legislation. This problem has been gradually resolved both by introducing a series of amendments to military criminal legislation, in particular those of 1956\(^{464}\) and 1985\(^{465}\) as well as by means of jurisprudence\(^ {466}\) and the monitoring of constitutionality.\(^ {467}\)

From the structural point of view, the territorial military tribunals, military tribunals on board ship and the Supreme Military Court were abolished in 1981\(^ {468}\) and a new military justice structure was introduced. Despite the fact that abolition of the Supreme Military Court and the transfer of its powers to the Supreme Court had been determined in the 1947 Constitution, it was only as a result of the 1981 reforms that it became a reality. It was also in 1981 that military judges ceased to come under the authority of the Military Attorney-General. In 1988, the structures of military justice were supplemented by the Council of Military Judges (Consiglio della Magistratura Militare)\(^ {469}\).

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\(^{464}\) Law N° 167 dated 23 March 1956.
\(^{466}\) Antonio Intelisano, op. cit., pp. 422 and 423.
\(^{467}\) The Constitutional Court has declared a considerable number of the articles of the Peacetime Military Criminal Code to be unconstitutional. The monitoring role played by the Constitutional Court is exercised by means of a plea of unconstitutionality that can be triggered *ex officio* or through an *ex parte* application made in the course of judicial proceedings.
\(^{468}\) Law N° 180 dated 7 May 1981.
\(^{469}\) Law N° 561 dated 30 December 1988. It was later supplemented by Decree N° 158 of 24 March 1989.
As far as jurisdiction *ratione personae* and *ratione materiae* and the classification of offences were concerned, Laws N° 167 of 1956 and N° 689 of 1985 amended many of the provisions of the Peacetime Military Criminal Code. In particular, Law N° 167 of 1967 abolished military jurisdiction for ordinary offences committed by military personnel. In 1994, the death penalty for offences specified in both the Peacetime and Wartime Military Criminal Codes was abolished by law and replaced with life imprisonment.470

Curbs were first placed on the law giving military jurisdiction primacy and privilege over ordinary jurisdiction471 via the jurisprudential route. The Supreme Court settled the problem of the inconsistencies between the provisions of law and the requirements of the Constitution by ruling that the ordinary courts should have preferential jurisdiction. It considered that “the jurisdiction of the military courts must now be seen as confined solely to cases which fulfill both the objective and subjective requirement that a military offence has been committed by a member of the military, with there being no possibility of extending such jurisdiction to cases connected with people outside of the military or ordinary offences”.472 Law N° 167 of 1956 went on to amend the relevant article of the Peacetime Military Criminal Code by establishing the primacy of ordinary criminal jurisdiction as a principle.

Lastly, in 1989, with the entry into force of a new ordinary Code of Criminal Procedure that abolished the position of examining magistrate, the equivalent position within military justice was also abolished and peacetime military procedures were brought into line with the ordinary rules of procedure although there is still an abundance of procedural regulations within the military justice system.

*The Current Situation*

The distinguishing features of Italian military criminal legislation are the fact that it provides for two distinct systems (one for peacetime and another for wartime) and that military criminal jurisdiction in peacetime has gradually

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471 Article 264 of the Peacetime Military Criminal Code.

been brought into line with - indeed been incorporated into - ordinary jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it should be appreciated that the Ministry of Defence has extensive powers as far as the organization, geographical distribution and operation of military courts are concerned.

In peacetime, military criminal jurisdiction comprises the Military Tribunals (Tribunali Militari), the Military Court of Appeal (Corti Militari di Appello) and the Military Supervisory Courts (Tribunali Militari di Sorveglianza). The Supreme Court (Corte Suprema di Cassazione), the highest organ within ordinary jurisdiction, is the highest military court in peacetime and constitutes the third tier of jurisdiction. The military justice system is completed by the Military Attorney-General’s Office. It is made up of the military prosecutors at the Military Tribunals, the general military prosecutors (Procura Generale Militare) at the Military Court of Appeal (Corte Militare di Appello) and the general military prosecutors at the Supreme Court.473 There are also the Council of Military Judges (Consiglio della Magistratura Militare), the Office of the Military Judge advocate (l’Ufficio del Pubblico Ministero Militare) and the Military Judicial Police, who assist the military judges and courts in the investigation of crimes.

Military Tribunals are courts of first instance or trial courts. They consist of a military appellate judge (magistrato militare d’appello), who presides, and two other members. One of the two must be a military judge while the other must be a member of the military of the same rank or higher than the accused. He must be an officer and, having been chosen by lot, must sit as a judge for a two-month period. There are nine military tribunals and their jurisdiction is determined by where the offence was committed. The Military Tribunal for Rome is also the trial court for military offences committed abroad. Each military tribunal has a military prosecutor who must be a military judge and is responsible for bringing charges. Offences are investigated by military judges assigned to each military tribunal with responsibility for carrying out preliminary investigations.

The Military Court of Appeal constitutes the second tier of jurisdiction and hears appeals against rulings and verdicts handed down by the military tribunals. It is the only court which has jurisdiction throughout Italian territory. It has five members, three of whom must be military judges (one of whom presides) and two of whom must be members of the military of the same rank

or higher than the accused and in any event not lower than that of lieutenant colonel. However, the court is split into two sections, one located in Verona and the other in Naples, each made up of a military appellate judge, who presides, and two military judges. The prosecutorial function is performed by the general military prosecutors at the Military Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court constitutes the third level of jurisdiction and hears appeals against verdicts handed down by the military tribunals. The prosecutorial function is discharged by the General Military Prosecutor before the Supreme Court. The latter directs the work of the Office of the General Military Prosecutor, which is made up of military prosecutors who are qualified military appeal judges. As Fernández Segado points out, “when the Supreme Court hears appeals against rulings made by military judges, the opinion of the Attorney-General’s Office is voiced by an independent representative who is part of the military justice structure”.474

The Military Supervisory Courts are responsible for ensuring that sentences are properly enforced.

Lastly, it should be noted that the Council of Military Judges is the disciplinary organ for military judges. It also advises the Ministry of Defence on questions relating to the organization, geographical distribution and operation of the military courts.475 It consists of the President of the Supreme Court, the General Military Prosecutor at the Supreme Court, five military judges and two jurists who do not sit on the bench of military judges.

In terms of composition, Italian military criminal jurisdiction is made up of professional soldiers and military judges. The latter are recruited through a selection process and must hold a degree in law. Military judge-advocates and military judges from the trial courts and appeal courts as well as military appeal judges all fit into this category. Depending on whether they are assigned to a court or a military prosecutor’s office, military judges come under the authority either of the President of the Military Court of Appeals or the General Military Prosecutor at the Military Court of Appeals. The General Military Prosecutors at the Supreme Court come under the supervision of the Military Attorney-General. Professional military judges are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Council of Military Judges while military judges who are professional soldiers are subject to the disciplinary authority of the military hierarchy.

474 Fernando Fernández Segados “La justicia militar en el Derecho comparado”, op.cit, p.68. [Spanish original, free translation.]
475 Decree N° 158 of 1989, article 2.
In wartime, military criminal jurisdiction is exercised by Wartime Military Courts which replace Peacetime Military Courts and the third level of jurisdiction is no longer provided by the Supreme Court. Wartime Military Courts can be regular or extraordinary courts.

The jurisdiction _ratione personae_ and _ratione materiae_ of military criminal courts varies depending on whether it is peacetime or wartime. In peacetime, military courts only have jurisdiction over offences contained in the Peacetime Military Criminal Code that are committed by military personnel. The interpretation of who constitutes a member of the military is broad and includes both members of the army, navy and air force and members of the _Carabinieri_. It also includes members of the military on active service, members of the military on weapons duty, _de facto_ members of the military, people attached to the military (for example, military chaplains), members of civilian bodies run on a military basis and military personnel on indefinite leave.476 Within the category of “civilian bodies organized on a military basis” is the Finance Police (_Guardia di Finanza_), which is attached to the Ministry of Finance and has judicial police powers. The Peacetime Military Criminal Code contains both typically military offences and ordinary offences that have been ‘militarized’. It should be remembered that the military courts are not empowered to try ordinary offences committed by members of the military. In wartime, however, military courts have far broader jurisdiction.

19. The Netherlands

Dutch military justice is several centuries old, its salient feature being that it was originally a jurisdiction based on class privilege. During the 20th century, military criminal jurisdiction in the Netherlands was regulated under the Military Criminal Code of 1923, several provisions of which were amended in 1972 and 1978.477 In 1982, substantial changes were made to the ‘military justice’ system. A law dated 2 July 1982 determined that ‘military justice’ should be dispensed by special military divisions within the ordinary court system. Such divisions were to be made up of a military jurist and two

476 Articles 3 and following of the Peacetime Military Criminal Code. Law N° 167 of 1956 clarified and defined the rule on who constituted a member of the military on indefinite leave for the purposes of military justice.

members of the legal profession. As far as military justice within Europe was concerned, the Dutch reform marked an important milestone in the trend towards incorporation into the ordinary criminal system or indeed complete abolition.

The Dutch Constitution of 1983 makes no reference whatsoever to military courts. The Military Criminal Code Amendment Act, which was passed on 1 January 1991, reformed military law and abolished the death penalty for offences under military criminal law. According to the Dutch authorities, this law formed part of a package of legislation which had been the outcome of a 20-year review process looking at the criminal law, criminal procedure and disciplinary procedures applicable to members of the armed forces.

According to information supplied to the United Nations Human Rights Committee by the Dutch Government, as a result of this new legislation, “separate military criminal courts, and therefore the court martial system and Supreme Military Court, have been abolished. Military personnel will now be tried by civilian courts. In principle, the general rules of civilian criminal procedure apply. However, a number of specific rules have been introduced. For instance, in appropriate cases the armed forces will send a representative to sit on Full Bench Divisions, both at district courts and at courts of appeal. This will ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on the case. The normal rules governing appeal apply. The Military Full Bench Division of the district court will also act as a court of appeal for disciplinary cases. […] The Military Prosecutions Department has also been abolished. Its duties have been taken over by the public prosecutors at the district courts and courts of appeal. […] [and] [p]rovisions have been made for the establishment of mobile courts, which can operate in areas where war is being waged or a state of emergency has been declared”.

The new legislation also did away with “the so-called ‘open standards’ system, governing disciplinary offences… All such offences are defined. Both substantive and procedural provisions have been laid down to restrict the use of disciplinary procedures for offences which are not strictly speaking of a disciplinary nature - actually minor criminal offences”.

482 Ibid., paragraph 104.
20. Norway

In Norway, there is no military criminal jurisdiction in peacetime. Military courts are only permitted in wartime. However, in peacetime the military criminal regulations relating to both substance and procedure are applied by the ordinary courts. Until 1996 when it was repealed, article 89 of the Norwegian Constitution stipulated that in peacetime the Supreme Court, consisting of two officials appointed by the King, constituted the court of second and last resort for “all military matters related to life or honour” or which entailed a prison sentence of over three months.483

As pointed out by Ivar Follestad, “criminal jurisdiction is military in wartime and civilian in peacetime but discipline is always military”.484 In peacetime, therefore, military criminal law is applied by ordinary judges on all military personnel in active service, civilians employed by the armed forces and passengers on board ships on military expeditions. In wartime, military criminal legislation is applied by military courts. In addition to the categories covered in peacetime, military jurisdiction extends to anyone in the service of the armed forces, anyone accompanying the troops, prisoners of war and anyone who commits acts of treason in war or crimes against state security or the independence and Constitution of Norway, as well as certain offences committed in the theatre of military operations.

The regulations governing military jurisdiction consist of the Military Criminal Code of 22 May 1902, the Law of Military Criminal Procedure in Peacetime of 1921 which amended the Code of Ordinary Criminal Procedure of 1887 and the Code Military Criminal Procedure of 1900. The law distinguishes between military offences committed in peacetime and those committed in wartime.

Military criminal jurisdiction only operates in wartime and has three tiers of jurisdiction. The military court of first instance or trial court provides the first tier. It consists of a professional judge and two members of the military. The second tier is provided by the Military Courts of Appeal, which are presided by a professional judge and consist of two professional judges and four members of the military. They are also the trial courts for certain serious offences. Lastly, at the apex is the Supreme Court which has the authority to resolve issues relating to the interpretation of law, review sentences and act as an

483 Constitution, article 89. [Spanish original, free translation.]
appeal court for judgments handed down in the first instance by the military courts of appeal.

The system of military criminal jurisdiction in wartime is completed by the Judge Advocate’s Office which is run by military lawyers. In principle, they are civilian judges attached to the Ministry of Justice who take up the post in the event of a military call-up.

In wartime, the military commander or military judge advocate is responsible for initiating criminal proceedings. The military courts have sole jurisdiction for offences envisaged in military criminal legislation. Ordinary offences can go either to the ordinary courts or to the military courts, depending on the decision made by whoever is responsible for bringing the action. The official concerned may also decide that the behaviour in question should not be handled by the criminal courts but should be treated as a disciplinary matter.

In certain extreme cases in wartime, it was possible to establish a summary military court (standrett) for capital offences in which the perpetrator had been caught in the act. It was made up of a ‘war judge’, five military officers, two non-commissioned military officers and three soldiers. The death sentence could only be imposed if the verdict was unanimous. If that was not the case, the defendant had to be acquitted. The procedure was extremely swift, lasting a maximum of 24 hours, and no investigative phase was permitted beforehand.

21. Paraguay

History

Even though Paraguay achieved independence in 1811, the Military Ordinances issued by King Carlos III in 1768 were enforced in independent Paraguay until 1887. It was not until then, following the ‘War of the Triple Alliance’ (1865-1870) against Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, that the first Military Criminal Code and Military Code of Criminal Procedure were issued. They were both strongly influenced by Italian legislation. In 1917, the Code of Military Criminal Procedure was amended as a result of Law N° 270. Following the adoption of a new Paraguayan Constitution in 1940, legislation was enacted to allow Special Military Courts (Tribunales Militares Extraordinarios) to be set up in the event of internal upheaval, with

the power to try civilians and impose considerably heavier sentences.\textsuperscript{486} The fact was that since 1939 the country had been living under a state of siege. It should be remembered that, apart from a few short periods in 1946 and 1947, Paraguay was under an almost permanent state of siege until February 1989 when the \textit{de facto} government of General Alfredo Stroessner was overthrown.

In 1967, the \textit{de facto} government of General Stroessner (1954-1989) promulgated a new Paraguayan Constitution, article 43 of which established that “(a) Military Courts shall be set up to judge offences and disciplinary breaches of a military nature that are defined as such in law. (b) In the event that an offence has been established and is punishable under both ordinary criminal law and military criminal law, it shall not be treated as a military offence unless it has been committed by a soldier on active service and is of a military nature. (c) If there is any doubt as to whether it is a military offence or an ordinary one, it shall be treated as an ordinary offence”.\textsuperscript{487} However, as a result of the state of seige legislation, this clause of the Constitution and the provisions on \textit{habeas corpus} and human rights had become dead letters. In December 1980, a new Military Criminal Code, a new Code of Military Criminal Procedure and a Basic Law on Military Courts (\textit{Ley Orgánica de los Tribunales Militares}) were introduced.\textsuperscript{488} A particular feature of the new legislation was the creation of the Supreme Court of Military Justice. Under the \textit{de facto} government, the jurisdiction of the military courts underwent a significant process of expansion.

In 1992, following the return to democratic rule, a new Paraguayan Constitution was adopted. Article 174 of the new constitution, entitled “Concerning Military Courts”, specifies that “[m]ilitary courts shall only try offences or disciplinary breaches of a military nature that are defined as such in law and which have been committed by military personnel on active service. Appeals against their decisions shall be brought before the ordinary courts. […] In the event that an offence has been established and is punishable under both ordinary criminal law and military criminal law, it shall not be treated as a military offence unless it has been committed by a soldier on active service while carrying out military duties. If there is any doubt as to whether it is an ordinary offence or a military one, it shall be treated as an ordinary offence. Such courts shall only have jurisdiction over civilians and retired military personnel in the event of international armed conflict and in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{486} Decree-Law N° 2,379.  
\item \textsuperscript{487} Spanish original, free translation.  
\item \textsuperscript{488} Law N° 840/80.
\end{itemize}
As a result of the introduction of the new constitution, reform of the justice system got under way. A new Criminal Code was issued in 1997 and a new Code of Criminal Procedure in 1998. An important feature of the new Criminal Code is that torture and forced disappearance have been classified as offences. However, no fundamental changes were made to the military justice system and the 1980 military criminal legislation remains in force.

The Current Situation

The Paraguayan system of ‘military justice’ performs two distinct functions. On the one hand, it performs an administrative role in the shape of the Directorate of the Military Justice Service (Dirección del Servicio de Justicia Militar). This consists of undertaking academic study, providing legal advice and running military secure units and prisons. On the other hand, it performs a more strictly jurisdictional function in the shape of the military courts. This involves both prosecuting offences and punishing breaches of discipline. The ‘military justice’ system, in both its forms, is an integral part of the high command of the armed forces and its members are military personnel. For this reason, the Supreme Court of Justice has stated that the system of military criminal jurisdiction is both an “administrative and jurisdictional organ”.

There is provision for military courts both in peacetime and wartime. However, their composition varies according to the situation. Thus, in peacetime, Paraguayan military criminal jurisdiction consists of the Supreme Court of Military Justice, military trial judges (jueces de primera instancia militar), military examining magistrates (jueces de instrucción militar) and the prosecution service (Ministerio Público) for which the Military Attorney-General (Fiscal Militar General) and military prosecuting officers (Agentes Fiscales Militares) are responsible. In wartime, in addition to the organs of military justice which operate in peacetime, military criminal jurisdiction consists of Special Military Courts for the Trial of Generals (Tribunales Militares extra-
ordinarios para juzgar a Generales)\textsuperscript{492}, Wartime Military Courts (Tribunales Militares en tiempo de guerra)\textsuperscript{493} and Special Wartime Military Courts (Tribunales Militares extraordinarios en tiempo de guerra).\textsuperscript{494}

The Supreme Court of Military Justice is made up of three general or superior officers who are appointed by the executive. It has jurisdictional as well as governmental and administrative functions. In its jurisdictional role, it is responsible for settling conflicts of jurisdiction between military judges (trial judges and/or examining magistrates) and hearing appeals against final and interlocutory judgments handed down by the trial courts (juzgados de primera instancia). As far as governmental matters are concerned, the Supreme Court of Military Justice puts forward recommendations to the executive in connection with the appointment and removal of military judges, the Military Attorney-General and other military prosecutors, as well as other ‘military justice’ officials. The Supreme Court of Military Justice plays a supervisory role with regard to the managerial, disciplinary, consultative and financial aspects of all the functions performed by the organs of military justice.

Although the Special Military Courts for the Trial of Generals were designed to be set up in situations of war, the Supreme Court of Justice has taken the view that it would not be unconstitutional or unlawful for them to be set up in peacetime. It considered it to be incorrect to claim that “for the purposes of trying general officers in peacetime, special military courts constitute ex post facto courts”.\textsuperscript{495}

Article 31 of the Code of Military Criminal Procedure stipulates that military courts have jurisdiction \textit{ratione materiae} over “offences and disciplinary breaches of a military nature which affect the Armed Forces of the Nation” and “offences and disciplinary breaches which affect the law and interests of the Armed Forces of the Nation [...] committed by serving military personnel or military employees on duty during disembarkation, periods spent abroad

\textsuperscript{492} Made up of five general officers appointed by the executive, using a brief summary proceeding whose decisions cannot be appealed (Code of Military Criminal Procedure, arts. 290 to 295).

\textsuperscript{493} To be set up by the Commander in Chief in the Theatre of Operations, either inside or outside the country, who is responsible for appointing the trial judge, the examining magistrate, the prosecutors, defence counsel and clerks.

\textsuperscript{494} This is an expedited proceeding to be used in cases in which those responsible have been caught in the act or where there has been a public outcry or the facts are well-known.

\textsuperscript{495} Supreme Court of Justice, Decision and Verdict N° 84, 17 April 1998, Hearing regarding the “Record of the Preliminary Investigation conducted against Major General (Mr) Lino César Oviedo Silva, and others”. [Spanish original, free translation.]
[and] on aircraft or ships belonging to the military or to a private company but which have been leased to military institutions”.\textsuperscript{496} According to article 174 of the Constitution and the Code of Military Criminal Procedure, civilians can only be tried by military courts “in the event of an international armed conflict”.\textsuperscript{497}

Ordinary offences committed by members of the armed forces fall to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. It is important to highlight that, in an obiter dictum related to one of its rulings, the Supreme Court of Justice specifically stated that the existence of military justice “does not imply the existence of an exclusive personal jurisdiction for military personnel, in violation of the principle of equality before the law and the courts, since they are subject to such jurisdiction by virtue of the special nature of the matter, namely, solely in the case of military misdemeanours and offences; as far as other matters to be judged in which they are involved are concerned, responsibility for dealing with them lies with the ordinary courts”.\textsuperscript{498}

\section*{22. Peru}

\textit{History}

Like most former colonies, upon freeing itself from the Spanish Crown, the newly-established Republic of Peru continued to enforce the military criminal legislation which had been introduced by the mother country. This state of affairs was expressly acknowledged in the first Peruvian Constitution adopted in 1823. Article 121 stated that “[a]ll laws introduced prior to the Constitution of 1823 which are not contrary to the system of independence and the principles established herein, remain valid and in force until Civil, Criminal, Military and Commercial Codes have been organized”.\textsuperscript{499} Military courts were established very early on by the liberating army of Simón Bolívar, especially to deal with “the proliferation of bands of delinquents and robbers”.\textsuperscript{500}

\textsuperscript{496} Code of Military Criminal Procedure, article 31. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{497} Article 174 of the Constitution. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{498} Supreme Court of Justice, Agreement and Ruling N° 84, 17 April 1998, Hearing regarding the “Record of the Preliminary Investigation conducted against Major General (Mr) Lino César Oviedo Silva, and others”. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{499} Constitution of 1823, article 121. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{500} Web page of the Supreme Court of Military Justice: http://www.mindef.gob.pe/consejo.htm. [Spanish original, free translation.]
In 1834, with the enactment of a fresh Constitution, the foundations for a Peruvian system of military criminal jurisdiction were set through the establishment of the Supreme Council of War (Consejo Supremo de Guerra) as the highest organ of military justice with the power to appoint the members of military courts. The 1839 Constitution abolished the Supreme Council of War and jurisdictional authority over military criminal matters passed to the President of the Republic. However, legislative steps to provide Peru with its own military criminal legislation only began in 1863 when a commission was set up “in order to codify military laws and ordinances, ensuring that they were in line with the Constitution and criminal legislation”. As a result of this initiative, a Peruvian Code of Military Justice was drafted. However, due to a change of government, it never entered into force.

At the end of the 19th century, under the government of President Nicolás de Piérola and with the aid of the French Military Mission, a process of army reorganization began and a commission was set up to draft a Code of Military Justice. The code was approved by Congress on 10 December 1898 and entered into force on 20 January 1899. The main feature of the 1898 Code of Military Justice was that it gave broad powers to the military courts. Their jurisdiction was expanded even further as a result of legislation passed by the de facto governments of General Benavides and General Oría. Military courts were not only responsible for trying military and ordinary offences committed by members of the armed forces but also several offences committed by civilians. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in 1917, with the enactment of Law N° 2442, military jurisdiction in peacetime was restricted to “infractions committed [by military personnel] in acts of service as established in the Code of Military Justice”.

The restrictive interpretation of military jurisdiction established in Law N° 2442 of 1917 was reiterated in the Constitution of 1920, article 156 of which stipulated that “military justice shall not on any grounds extend its jurisdiction to people who are not serving in the Army, except in the event of National War”. But in 1927, this article was amended through Law N° 5862 which granted the military courts the authority to try National Police personnel. In 1930, under Law N° 6881, the broad military jurisdiction that had been established in the 1898 Code of Military Justice was reinstated and remained in force until 1939 when new laws on military justice were enacted. Later, in 1950 and 1963, further legislation on military justice was intro-

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501 Web page of the Supreme Court of Military Justice: http://www.mindef.gob.pe/consejo.htm. [Spanish original, free translation.]
502 Law 2442 of 1917. [Spanish original, free translation.]
503 Constitution of 1920, article 156. [Spanish original, free translation.]
duced. In 1950, the Judge Advocate Corps (Cuerpo Jurídico Militar) was created. 504

The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada - GRAF) which overthrew President Fernando Belaúnde Terry in 1968 convened a Constituent Assembly in 1978. The Assembly drafted a new Constitution and called a presidential election for 1980 which resulted in the re-election of Belaúnde Terry. The new constitution was promulgated in 1979 and fully entered into force in 1980. 505 In 1980, “the present cycle of armed political violence in Peru began” 506 with the eruption of military action by the Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path (Partido Comunista del Perú - Sendero Luminoso) and later, in 1984, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru - MRTA). One of the darkest pages of Peruvian history was beginning. As well as the violence and forms of terrorism used by the armed opposition groups, the period was characterized by the permanent existence of states of emergency and the trial of civilians in military courts as well as the waging of a “dirty war” (‘guerra sucia’). 507 According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “[f]rom 1980 to 1992, a period that saw a sharp rise in the violence, 24,250 people died due to political violence in Peru; of these, 2,044 were members of the security forces, 10,171 were civilians, 11,773 were persons alleged to be members of armed dissident groups and 262 were allegedly linked to drug-trafficking”. 508

The 1979 Constitution

The new Constitution established that military courts were to be independent from the judiciary. Article 233 stated that “[t]he following are guarantees for

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the administration of justice: [...] 1. The uniform nature and exclusivity of the jurisdictional function. No independent jurisdiction exists nor can such be established other than for arbitral or military matters”. Carlos Serquen Jiménez justified this provision of the constitution by arguing that “[t]he Armed Force is maintained through discipline, for which the President of the Republic has, as a fundamental tool, the Code of Military Justice [...] and delegates that power to the military courts. [...] The President of the Republic does not exercise judicial functions because these have been entrusted to the Judiciary; what he exercises is a form of administrative justice which cannot be shared with that body [...] The purpose of military justice is not to guarantee rights but to secure discipline”.

Article 282 of the 1979 Constitution also extended military jurisdiction by establishing that 'delitos de función' (offences committed in the line of duty) by members of the armed forces and police fell within the remit of military courts. In addition, it stipulated that those who failed to comply with the regulations on compulsory military service were subject to military criminal legislation. The jurisdiction of military courts was to be even more drastically extended through the enactment of new military criminal legislation as well as numerous measures introduced under emergency powers. In 1980, the Code of Military Justice and the Basic Law on Military Justice (Ley Orgánica de Justicia Militar) were issued and are still in force today with some amendments.

The Supreme Court developed and maintained an extremely broad interpretation of what constituted a 'delito de función'. As Professor Kai Ambos points out, the interpretation went far beyond the causal relationship between an unlawful act and a specific military duty. The Court considered that such offences “[...] were not solely confined to offences committed by a soldier in the course of doing his job [...] but also all those related to it or which affected the duties or activities incumbent on each soldier as a result of belonging to the armed institutions” and that “consequently it should not be necessary for there to be [...] causality between the offence and the job, it is sufficient for there to be simply opportunity (ocasionalidad)”.

509 Constitution of 1979, article 233. [Spanish original, free translation.]
510 Carlos Serquen Jiménez in Revista Peruana de Derecho Militar, No 1, Year 1, Lima, 1986, pp.13 and 14. [Spanish original, free translation.]
514 Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of Justice, Jurisdiction Dispute 5-85, Judgment dated 10 April 1985.
But it was mainly under the emergency legislation adopted during the 1980s that the jurisdiction of military courts underwent unrestrained growth.\footnote{Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman’s Office), Lineamientos para la reforma de la justicia militar en Perú, Lima, July 1997, p.24 (PDF version).} Law No 24150 of 1985 on emergency zones and political-military commands marked a milestone in the expansion of military jurisdiction. Under article 10, members of the armed forces and police serving in an area in which a state of emergency had been declared were to come under exclusive military jurisdiction except in the case of conduct which had no “link with service”.\footnote{Law 24150 of 1985, article 10. [Spanish original, free translation.]} This extension of military jurisdiction was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Justice. In 1985, in the case of an army lieutenant-commander accused of killing 50 people, the Court considered that “the armed force, when operating in an emergency zone, does so on a round-the-clock basis and therefore the concept of the service-related offence applies to the alleged act since it has been brought about because of, or in the course of, performing military duty”.

The tragic events that occurred at several prisons in Lima and Callao in 1986 were also used to justify a further swingeing expansion of military jurisdiction on the same grounds. On 18 June 1986, simultaneous riots led by inmates who were awaiting trial or serving sentences for terrorism broke out in El Frontón, Santa Barbara and Lurigancho Prisons. As a result of the military operations to put down the riots, approximately 300 inmates died, most of them the victims of extrajudicial execution, and many others disappeared.\footnote{See the “Report to Congress of the events that took place on 18 and 19 June 1986 in the prisons of Lurigancho, El Frontón and Santa Barbara” compiled by the Peruvian Congress Commission of Inquiry (Comisión Investigadora del Congreso de Perú), presided by Senator Rolando Ames, Lima, December 1987, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Judgment of 16 August 2000, Durand and Ugarte Case (Peru).} When the military operations were over, the government of President Alan García, using emergency powers, declared the prisons to be a “restricted military area”\footnote{Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of Justice, Jurisdiction Dispute 5-85, Judgment dated 10 April 1985. [Spanish original, free translation.]} under the exclusive jurisdiction of the armed forces and to which the judicial authorities were not allowed access. The military courts took over the case and “military judges authorized bodies to be exhumed and reburied secretly, with no regard for the proper legal procedures and usurping the powers of the judiciary”.\footnote{A challenge was made to the authority of the military courts, provoking a conflict of jurisdiction with the ordinary courts. On 27 August 1986, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the military courts.}
The 1993 Constitution and the Fujimori era

In 1990, Alberto Fujimori assumed the Peruvian presidency and what was described by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as a gradual process of “impairment of the rule of law in Peru” began. In 1992, the Fujimori government carried out a virtual coup d’état from inside the State. By means of Decree Law N° 25418, it set up a Government of Emergency and National Reconstruction (Gobierno de Emergencia y Reconstrucción Nacional). The judiciary was taken over, there was no longer any separation of the State powers and the political system became one in which the leading role was played by the executive and the armed forces. In 1993 a new Constitution was introduced.

The 1993 Constitution, which is still in force today, kept military justice as a special jurisdiction outside of the judiciary and further extended its powers. Article 139 states that “[t]he principles and rights of the jurisdictional function are: […] 1. The uniform nature and exclusivity of the jurisdictional function. No independent jurisdiction exists nor can such be established, other than for military or arbitral matters”. Article 173 of the Constitution described military jurisdiction as follows: “In the case of service-related offences, members of the Armed Forces and National Police are subject to the appropriate jurisdiction and the Code of Military Justice. […] Those who fail to comply with the regulations on Compulsory Military Service are also subject to the Code of Military Justice”. Article 173 extended military jurisdiction to include the trial of civilians for “offences of treason against the motherland” and terrorism. With regard to appeals, article 141 of the Constitution established that the Supreme Court of Justice would hear applications “to quash judgments handed down under military jurisdiction”. However, it expressly stated that applications for a judgment to be quashed could only be lodged in cases in which the military courts had imposed the death penalty.

519 Supreme Decree N° 006-86-JUS dated 19 June 1986. [Spanish original, free translation.]
522 Constitution of 1993, article 139. [Spanish original, free translation.]
523 Ibid., article 173. [Spanish original, free translation.]
524 Ibidem. [Spanish original, free translation.]
525 Ibid., article 141. [Spanish original, free translation.]
But it was the anti-terrorist legislation which further expanded the jurisdiction of the military courts. Under emergency legislation they were empowered to try civilians. One measure it is particularly worth mentioning was Decree Law No 25659 of 1992 which allowed a system of ‘faceless’ military courts (tribunales militares ‘sin rostro’) to be set up to try civilians accused of ‘betraying the motherland’. Another decree law, Nº 25708 of 1992, stipulated that, in such cases, the summary procedure established under the Code of Military Justice for trials held in the theatre of operations should apply. It also ruled that it was not possible to apply for a writ of habeas corpus in connection with such proceedings.

The anti-terrorist legislation was extended so that types of behaviour normally seen as related to common crime or ‘public safety’ (‘seguridad ciudadana’) issues were treated as terrorist conduct that threatened ‘national security’. As a result of a series of decrees issued in 1998, the military courts were therefore given the authority to try civilians, including juveniles. Legislative Decree Nº 895 of 1998, also known as the “Law against Aggravated Terrorism” (“Ley contra el Terrorismo Agravado”), together with other supplementary measures,526 therefore militarized the fight against organized crime and gave the military courts responsibility for bringing suspects to trial through the use of a special type of procedure, which was swift and summary in nature and characterized by a substantial reduction in judicial guarantees and a draconian punishment régime (consisting of compulsory ‘continuous cell isolation’). Legislative Decree Nº 895 also lowered the qualifying age for prosecution from 18 to 16 years of age, thereby permitting juveniles to be tried by military courts and making them subject to the same rules of procedure and prison regulations as adults. Although in 1999 Legislative Decree Nº 895 was amended as a result of Law Nº 27235 so that the authority to try those suspected of ‘aggravated terrorism’ was transferred to the ordinary courts, proceedings which were already under way or being reviewed within the military justice system remained in the hands of the military courts.

Human rights violations committed by military or police personnel continued to come under the jurisdiction of the military courts on the grounds that they were service-related acts or offences committed in the line of duty (‘delitos de función’) and/or, as in the 1980s, through the use of emergency legislation. While it is true that, in a few cases, the perpetrators of human rights violations were tried and sentenced by military courts, it is also the case that those involved were members of the rank and file or non-commissioned officers whereas any officers involved in such illegal acts remained immune to military criminal prosecution. As the Inter-American Commission on Human

Rights has stated, the actions of the military courts in this area resulted in impunity.527

As far as human rights violations were concerned, the Supreme Court of Justice persisted in its broad interpretation of what constituted a ‘delito de función’, thereby favouring military jurisdiction.528 In some cases where there was a conflict of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the military courts because of where the offence had been committed or because the perpetrators and victims were members of the military. For example, in the case of Leonor La Rosa Bustamente, a sub officer from the National Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional - SIN), who was tortured by SIN personnel in a military barracks, leaving her quadriplegic, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the military courts. It based its decision on the fact that both the victim and the perpetrators of the offence were members of the military on active service and that the place where the offence was committed was of a military nature.529

Nevertheless, given that it was possible to give a variety of legal interpretations to the term ‘delito de función’, some judges from the Supreme Court of Justice tried to argue that the ordinary courts should have jurisdiction for trying military and police personnel who had been accused of serious human rights violations. However, their efforts were stymied by the enactment of legislation that was designed to ensure that such cases would remain within the remit of military justice. The case of the massacre at ‘La Cantuta’ is a case in point. It involved the kidnap and murder of nine university students and one lecturer in 1992 by a covert operations group working on behalf of the army and the National Intelligence Service. Both the Supreme Council of Military Justice (Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militar) and the ordinary courts took cognizance of the case, thereby triggering a conflict of jurisdiction. On 3 February 1994, the dispute reached the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of Justice. However, the Criminal Division did not obtain the necessary number of votes for the case to be referred to military jurisdiction. Two of the five judges took the view that such offences could not be deemed to be service-related acts or ‘delitos de función’ and that jurisdiction therefore


529 Supreme Court of Justice, Criminal Division “C”, Dispute over Jurisdiction Nº 12-97, 18 July 1997.
lay with the ordinary courts. The two judges said that “such unlawful acts
neither concern strictly military juridical rights nor have any connection with
the operational realm of the military institutions since they constitute
infringements of such fundamental juridical rights as life, personal security
and liberty, [and] personal safety and, as such, should always be tried in the
ordinary courts because they are indispensable pre-requisites for the communal
life of society as a whole and not that of a particular class or institution”.530
Given this state of affairs, in a marathon session which began on the
night of 7 February and ended in the early hours of 8 February, Congress
passed Law N° 26291, which changed the number of votes required by the
court to settle conflicts of jurisdiction from four to three. On 11 February, the
Supreme Court of Justice settled the conflict of jurisdiction in favour of the
military courts.531

Impunity became institutionalized on 16 June 1995 when a general amnesty
was granted to members of the armed forces and police for violations of
human rights committed between 1980 and 1995.532 However, the legality of
the measure was contested. Judge Antonia Saquicuray at the 16th Criminal
Court in Lima, who was handling the case of the Barrios Altos massacre carried
out in 1991 by a covert operations force (‘the Colina group’) from the
National Intelligence Service, ruled that, under the terms of the Peruvian
Constitution and Peru’s international commitments under the American
Convention on Human Rights, the amnesty did not apply and ordered the
criminal proceedings to go ahead.533 This ruling by a judge from the ordinary
court system was challenged by the Attorney-General’s Office in the
Supreme Court of Justice. On 28 June, before the latter had ruled on the
appeal, Congress issued Decree Law N° 26492, otherwise known as the
‘amnesty law interpretation law’ (Ley de interpretación de la ley de amnistía)
making it “obligatory for the courts of justice to apply” the amnesty law.534
Decree Law N° 26492 also deprived people of the right to challenge the
legality of the Amnesty Law in the courts. Decree Law N° 26,618 later

530 Dissenting vote of Judges Almenara Bryson and Sivina Hurtado, Criminal Division of
the Supreme Court, Conflict of Jurisdiction N° 07/94. [Spanish original, free transla-
tion.]

531 See Supreme Court of Justice, Criminal Division, Conflict of Jurisdiction N° 07-94,
between the Supreme Council of Military Justice and the Sixteenth Criminal Court of
Lima, 11 February 1994. See also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Report N° 42/99, Case N° 11,045 (La Cantuta - Peru), 11 March 1999, paragraphs 20,
21 and 22, and the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,
graph 133.

532 Decree-Law N° 26479 concerning amnesty.


534 Article 3 of Decree Law N° 26492. [Spanish original, free translation.]
extended the amnesty to perpetrators of human rights violations who had not yet been the subject of complaints or legal proceedings.

It should be pointed out that during this period virtually the whole of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) of 1991 was suspended. Article 14 of the Code restricted the jurisdiction of the military courts to “offences directly linked to military or police functions, to the extent that they concern exclusively military juridical rights and the disciplinary order of the Armed Forces or National Police”. The Code should have applied from 1 May 1992 but its entry into force was delayed until 1 May 1994. However, on 30 April 1994, under Law No 26299, its application was halted and the Code, including article 14, never entered into force.

In 1998, Congress passed Law No 26926 which made genocide, torture and forced disappearance offences under the Criminal Code, under the heading of ‘Crimes against humanity’. Article 5 of the law specified that such offences should be prosecuted “in the ordinary way and under ordinary jurisdiction”. In 1987, a previous attempt had been made to legislate on the issue and a bill on torture, murder, secret detention and rape had been brought before Congress but to no avail. However, Law No 26926 has not been fully complied with by the military courts and some cases of torture have continued to be dealt with under military jurisdiction.

**The return to democratic institutions**

After over eight years of disruption of the rule of law in Peru, the Fujimori government came to a spectacular end in November 2000 and in December a transitional government was set up with Valentín Paniagua Corazao as President. The new transitional government as well as the subsequent government of Alejandro Toledo introduced a series of measures that sought to re-establish the rule of law in Peru. Among the most significant were the establishment of a Truth Commission to examine the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law which had taken place over the previous two decades and a variety of initiatives on judicial reform.

Nonetheless, reform of the military justice system is still pending. Many anti-terrorist laws from the Fujimori era also remain in force. However, it should

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535 Legislative Decree No 638 dated 27 April 1991.
536 Code of Criminal Procedure of 1991, article 14. [Spanish original, free translation.]
537 Legislative Decree No 25461 date 29 April 1992.
538 Law 26926 of 1998, article 5. [Spanish original, free translation.]
539 Bill introduced by Senator César Delgado Barreto. The bill was approved by the Senate in 1987 but it never got taken up by the Chamber of Deputies.
be noted that since the end of 2001 several bills to amend military criminal legislation have been under scrutiny.\textsuperscript{540} In addition, in 2001, the Constitutional Court declared the anti-terrorist provisions that permit the military courts to try civilians, including juveniles, to be unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{541}

\textit{The current system of military criminal jurisdiction}

Military criminal jurisdiction in Peru is regulated under articles 173, 141 and 139 of the 1993 Constitution as well as the 1980 Code of Military Justice\textsuperscript{542} and the Basic Law on Military Justice\textsuperscript{543} from the same year. The two latter have since undergone several amendments.\textsuperscript{544}

Peruvian military justice is separate from the judiciary and is a special jurisdiction accountable to the executive. According to the Basic Law on Military Justice, “[t]he military courts of Military Justice constitute a high-level body within the Armed Institutions”.\textsuperscript{545} The President of the Republic can order military criminal proceedings to be opened.\textsuperscript{546} As far as the composition of military courts is concerned, military criminal legislation distinguishes between peacetime and wartime.

Military criminal jurisdiction in peacetime consists of the Supreme Council of Military Justice, Armed Forces Courts Martial, Higher Councils of Justice of the National Police (Consejos Superiores de Justicia de la Policía Nacional), examining magistrates, the Office of the Military Judge Advocate (Auditoría de la Justicia Militar), military prosecutors and the Judge Advocate Corps (Cuerpo Jurídico Militar). The Supreme Court of Justice also has some duties with regard to military criminal matters: it is the third tier of jurisdiction as far as applications for annulment are concerned and it is responsible for settling conflicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary courts and the military courts. As an auxiliary body of military justice, the Military Police have certain duties: they act as judicial police with regard to the investigation of offences and are also in charge of military prisons and detention

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{540} Draft bills Nos 0163, 0209, 1107, 1108, 1203, 1204 and 1245 of 2001 and Nos 1006, 1666, 2111 and 2550 of 2002.\textsuperscript{541} Constitutional Court, Ruling dated November 2001, Case N° 005-2001-AI/TC, declaring several articles of legislative decrees Nos 895 and 897 and Law N° 27235 to be unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{542} Decree Law N° 23214 of 24 July 1980.\textsuperscript{543} Decree Law N° 23201 of 19 July 1980.\textsuperscript{544} Noteworthy among these is Law N° 26677 of 1996.\textsuperscript{545} Article 1 of Decree Law N° 23201 of 1980. See also the web page of the Supreme Council of Military Justice: http://www.mindef.gob.pe/consejo.htm. [Spanish original, free translation.]\textsuperscript{546} Articles 378 and 427 of the Code of Military Justice.}
Lastly, the Ministry of Defence has a Public Prosecutor’s Office (Procuraduría Pública) with the authority to institute legal proceedings.

The Supreme Council of Military Justice is “the highest court within the military system and exercises jurisdiction over the Armed Forces and National Police throughout the territory of the Republic”. It consists of ten general officers and admirals on active service in the Armed Forces and National Police, eight of whom sit on the Council and at least three of whom must belong to the Judge Advocate Corps. The members of the Supreme Council of Military Justice are appointed by the President of the Republic on the basis of proposals put forward by the Ministries of Defence and the Interior and are subject to the approval of the Supreme Court of Justice. The Supreme Council is the court of original and sole jurisdiction for trials involving general officers and admirals of the Armed Forces and National Police and other superior officers, it hears appeals against judgments handed down by other military courts and it settles conflicts of jurisdiction within the military court system. It is also responsible for managing and maintaining discipline within the military justice system. In its managerial role, among other things, it draws up and administers the budget and funding allocated to military justice. In its disciplinary role, it has disciplinary jurisdiction “of a judicial nature over all military justice officials and staff”.

Armed forces courts martial are permanent bodies. Each branch of the services has its own courts martial: six for the Army, one for the Navy and one for the Air Force. The naval and air force courts martial have jurisdiction throughout the country but the army ones are restricted to a particular geographical area or ‘judicial area’. These courts martial are subordinate in the hierarchy to the Supreme Council of Military Justice. Each one consists of three officers on active service in the branch of the services in question: a colonel or captain, who presides, and two other members with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, naval commander or air force commander, one of whom must belong to the Judge Advocate Corps. Court martial members are appointed by means of a supreme resolution which must be endorsed by the Ministry of Defence. Courts martial are the court of original jurisdiction for the Armed Forces. However, they are also the appeal court for offences of

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547 Articles 42 and following of Decree Law N° 23201 of 1980.
549 Article 6 of Decree Law N° 23201 of 1980.
550 Namely, officers with the rank of colonel and captain. But also the members, judge-advocates and prosecutors on courts martial and Higher Councils as well as examining magistrates.
551 Article 12 (19) of Decree Law N° 23201 of 1980. [Spanish original, free translation.]
simple desertion, offences against the national heritage, offences which harm the military service or discipline of the armed institutions and offences involving betrayal of public trust (delitos contra la fè pública).

The Higher Councils of Justice of the National Police are permanent courts made up of officers on active service in the National Police. There are five Higher Councils set up on a territorial basis to cover a particular ‘judicial area’. They are also subordinate to the Supreme Council of Military Justice in the hierarchy. Each Council consists of three officers: a colonel, who presides, and two members with the rank of commander, one of whom must belong to the Judge Advocate Corps. Members are appointed by means of a supreme resolution which must be endorsed by the Ministry of Defence. The Higher Councils are the courts of original jurisdiction for police personnel. However, they are also the appeal court for offences of simple desertion, offences against the national heritage, offences which harm the military service or discipline of the armed institutions and offences involving betrayal of public trust.

The examining magistrates (jueces instructores) are officers on active service in the Armed Forces and National Police who are attached and subordinate to the courts martial and higher councils. They have jurisdiction within the judicial area over which the court to which they are attached has authority. There are two types of examining magistrate, permanent ones and substitutes. The permanent ones are officers with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, lieutenant-commander or commander who are members of the Judge Advocate Corps and appointed by the executive.552 The post of substitute exists in case one is needed. Substitutes are appointed by the President of the Council in which they work. Although they must meet the same conditions as the permanent ones, officers who do not belong to the Judge Advocate Corps can be appointed as substitutes. Examining magistrates are responsible for investigating cases and preparing them for trial. However, they can also try and judge certain offences in the first instance. Permanent examining magistrates may try the following offences: simple desertion, offences against the national heritage, offences which harm the military service or discipline of the armed institutions and offences involving betrayal of public trust. The jurisdictional power of substitute examining magistrates is confined to offences of simple desertion.

The Office of the Judge Advocate for Military Justice is made up of the Judge Advocate General at the Supreme Council of Military Justice and by the judge advocates at the War Division of the Supreme Council and those attached to the court martials and higher councils. Both the Judge Advocate

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552 Article 31 of Decree Law N° 23201 of 1980.
General and the other judge advocates are officers on active service who are qualified lawyers and belong to the Judge Advocate Corps. The Judge Advocate General must be a General or Admiral and the other judge advocates must be colonels or captains. It is the role of the Office of the Judge Advocate for Military Justice to provide legal advice to the Supreme Council, the courts martial and the higher councils. The Judge Advocate General and the other judge advocates can participate in, but not vote on, the deliberations of those courts and they have the same prerogatives as the members of such courts.

The military prosecutors fulfill the prosecutorial role (Ministerio Público) in the military courts. The Attorney-General (Fiscal General) does so before the Supreme Council of Military Justice and the military prosecutors do so before the War Division of the Supreme Council, the courts martial, higher councils and examining magistrates. Both the Attorney-General and the other prosecutors must be officers on active service who are qualified lawyers and belong to the Judge Advocate Corps. The Attorney-General must be a General or Admiral, the prosecutor at the War Division of the Supreme Council must be a colonel or captain, prosecutors at the other courts must be lieutenant-colonels, lieutenant-commanders or commanders and those prosecuting cases heard by examining magistrates must be majors or lieutenant-commanders. It is the responsibility of the prosecutors to set criminal proceedings in motion, put the case for the prosecution in military criminal trials and monitor the legality of proceedings and the enforcement of sentences. Military prosecutors participate in all military criminal proceedings.

The Judge Advocate Corps is made up of officers on active service in the Armed Forces and National Police who are qualified lawyers and subject to the Law on Military Status (Ley de Situación Militar) or the Police Statute.553 All those who work within the military court system are officers on active service in the Armed Forces or National Police. As such, they are subject to the principle of hierarchy. With the exception of those working in the Judge Advocate Corps, military law does not require those sitting in judgment on a case to have any legal training.

In wartime, the military courts established for peacetime continue to operate but the following also have jurisdictional functions: the commanders of theatres of operation, the commanders of regions, divisions, corps, ships and aircraft who have independent authority, the Review Boards (Consejos de Revisión), special courts martial, examining magistrates and the provosts (Prebostes).

553 Articles 62 and following of Decree Law N° 23201 of 1980.
The commanders of theatres of operation and the commanders of regions, divisions, corps, ships and aircraft who have independent authority can act as trial judges, convene special courts martial and review boards, appoint their members and designate examining magistrates.

Special courts martial must be made up of the three longest-serving officers on active service. Their rank depends on the rank of the accused. For example, if the accused is a colonel, the court martial must be made up of one general officer and two colonels. Special courts martial only have the authority to try military and police personnel whose rank is no higher than that of colonel or captain.

A second tier of jurisdiction is provided by the Review Boards. These are attached to each theatre of operations and are made up of “the five most distinguished commanding officers”. It is not necessary for the prosecutor on a review board to be a lawyer. Although in principle they should receive advice from a judge advocate, they can decide to dispense with such advice.

The provosts are responsible for trying offences committed by civilian personnel working with the Armed Forces and the National Police in operational areas and “have jurisdiction over anyone who has been detained” in those areas. Any sentence imposed by the provosts which exceeds five days’ detention can be appealed to the military or police commanding officer in the place in question. With regard to military offenders, provosts only have the powers of capture and arrest.

Military courts in Peru have extensive jurisdiction. From the point of view of jurisdiction ratione personae, they have authority over the whole of the Armed Forces and National Police; civilians suspected of ‘betraying the motherland’, terrorism or offences against the Military Service Law; reservists when in service; prisoners of war; and people who are treated as members of the military (asimilados a militar). For the purposes of military justice, the Code of Military Justice considers the following to be asimilados a militar: any member of an armed force working on behalf of the State, civilian personnel working for the Armed Forces or National Police and students at military or police colleges. In terms of jurisdiction ratione loci, the military courts are authorized to try any offence committed by members of the Armed Forces or National Police in military or police installations, areas, establishments or sites. In addition, in wartime, the jurisdiction of the military courts can be extended by means of orders from the executive or the military commanders and, in particular, military edicts issued by the commanders of theatres of operation.

554 Article 51 of Decree Law N° 23201 of 1980. [Spanish original, free translation.]
555 Article 59 of Decree Law N° 23201 of 1980. [Spanish original, free translation.]
In terms of jurisdiction *ratione materiae*, many types of conduct, ranging from typically military offences through ‘militarized’ offences to ordinary offences, are classified as offences under military criminal jurisdiction.\footnote{556}{The following offences are defined in the Code of Military Justice: offences against the security and honour of the nation (treason, espionage, disloyalty, violations of the law of nations and insults against the nation, arts. 78 to 1000), offences against constitutional order and state security (rebellion, sedition, mutiny, attacking the sentry, illegal organization of armed groups, looting, devastation, sabotage and kidnapping, arts. 101 to 141), offences which affect the discipline of the armed institutions (insulting a superior, insubordination, disobedience, arts. 142 to 178), offences against the duties inherent to one’s post (abusing and usurping authority, arts. 179 to 205), offences which affect military service (arts. 206 to 275), offences against the national heritage (arts. 276 to 293) and offences involving a breach of public trust (arts. 294 to 306).}

The military courts also try any ordinary offence committed in the line of duty in which members of the military are involved, either as the victim (*sujeto pasivo*) or the perpetrator or accessory (*sujeto activo*) of an unlawful act.\footnote{557}{Article 324 of the Code of Military Justice.}

The Code of Military Justice therefore gives a broad interpretation to the term ‘*delito de función*’. This has meant that serious human rights violations committed by military or police personnel against civilians have been left to the jurisdiction of the military courts. Several human rights violations have also been categorized as military offences or treated as military offences (*delitos asimilados a militares*) in the Code of Military Justice. For example, the unnecessary use of violence (art. 180), the unlawful prolongation of prison terms, the unlawful holding of detainees in incommunicado detention and the unlawful search of a home (art. 181) are all treated as abuses of authority.

Despite the fact that Law N° 26926 of 1998 incorporated genocide, forced disappearance and torture into the ordinary Criminal Code, with the stipulation that they should be handled “in the ordinary way and under ordinary jurisdiction”, by relying on the notion of ‘*delito de función*’ and, in particular, the offence of ‘abuse of authority’, the military courts have continued to try cases of torture.\footnote{558}{Law 26926 of 1998. [Spanish original, free translation.]}

Until June 2001, torture was classified in the Code of Military Justice as a form of abuse of power, under the label of ‘*imposición de tormentos*’ (‘infliction of torments’) (art. 180.1). It was removed from the Code of Military Justice a result of Law N° 27760 of 2001.

Several types of proceedings are specified in the Code of Military Justice: an ordinary procedure, a special procedure (a hearing held in cases of simple desertion), a summary criminal procedure, an extraordinary procedure to be used in the case of flagrant offences and a trial in the theatre of operations.
In some proceedings, the Code of Military Justice permits the injured party to join a civil action to the criminal action.\(^{559}\) He or she is only allowed to seek payment of damages ("resarcimiento del daño"). It is not possible for them to "specify the offence or request the penalty".\(^{560}\)

### 23. Poland

Poland had a system of military justice during the socialist period and still has one today. Although it has been amended, the system does not appear to have changed substantially.

In terms of substantive law, military criminal law was a special part of ordinary criminal law in the socialist era. Military crimes and misdemeanours were specified in the ordinary Criminal Code of 1969. However, prior to that, just as in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, military offences in Poland had been regulated under military criminal legislation - the Military Criminal Code of 21 October 1932 - which was distinct from the ordinary criminal justice system. The incorporation of military offences into the ordinary criminal codes was something which took place in several socialist countries with Poland being one of the last to introduce such a change.\(^{561}\) According to Teofil Lesko, "the basic reason for this incorporation was the more broadly accepted principle that in the socialist system soldiers are not isolated from society […] and that there is no valid separation between them and civil society; and therefore it was not necessary to establish a special penal system".\(^{562}\) Despite this, members of the military were subject to special rules of procedure in that they were subject to the jurisdiction of the military courts. Military criminal jurisdiction was regulated by means of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, both from 1969, the 1972 law on the organization of the military courts and a law dated 28 May 1975.

Military offences in peacetime were defined in the 1969 Criminal Code.\(^{563}\) For offences committed in war time, other norms applied. In parallel to the Criminal Code, a law dated 21 November 1967 on the general duty to defend the People’s Republic of Poland gave military courts jurisdiction over a series

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559 Article 382 of the Code of Military Justice.
560 Article 605 of the Code of Military Justice. [Spanish original, free translation.]
561 A similar process took place in Czechoslovakia (1950), Bulgaria (1951), Yugoslavia (1951), Albania (1952), Hungary (1961), Roumania (1968) and the German Democratic Republic (1968).
563 Articles 289 to 331.
of criminal offences committed in peacetime and wartime. In wartime and in the event of a general mobilization, they had the authority to try several offences committed by civilians.

The Code of Criminal Procedure\textsuperscript{564} authorized the military courts to try any offences committed by civilians which constituted an attack on the fundamental interests of the People’s Republic of Poland.

Until 1975, military jurisdiction was made up of the military courts, the Military Supreme Court and the Military Prosecutor who was attached to the office of the Attorney-General (\textit{Prokuratura}). As a result of the reforms introduced on 28 May 1975, it consists of garrison military courts, regional military courts and the Military Division of the Supreme Court of Justice.\textsuperscript{565} All members of the court system, both judges and magistrates, were career service personnel on active service. The garrison military courts and regional military courts were administratively accountable to the Ministry of Defence while the Military Division of the Supreme Court of Justice answered to the President of that court.\textsuperscript{566} For its part, the Office of the Military Prosecutor answered to both the Office of the Attorney-General and the Ministry of Defence due to the fact that its staff were members of the military on active service.

In terms of jurisdiction \textit{ratione personae}, the military courts were authorized to try all armed forces personnel, civilian employees of the armed forces and prisoners of war. They were also empowered to try civilians in cases of incitement or assistance in the commission of military offences, espionage and refusal to do military service. In the event of a conflict of jurisdiction, the military courts themselves decided whether they were the competent court or whether the case should be heard by an ordinary court.

As far as procedures were concerned, it was a condition of the Criminal Code that criminal proceedings for certain offences could only be instituted at the request of the commander of the military unit to which the accused was attached. This meant that the military commander could choose whether to

\textsuperscript{564} Law of 19 April 1969.
\textsuperscript{565} Marian Cieslak, “\textit{Procédure pénale}”, in Igor Andreyev, op. cit., p.139.
exercise his disciplinary powers or pass the matter to the military courts.\textsuperscript{567}

The rules contained in the Code regarding the circumstances in which a case against military personnel could be dismissed were more generous than those applicable to civilians and a special - even privileged - set of rules existed with regard to arrest and detention. The investigative phase of proceedings involved organs from the Militia, the Domestic Military Service or Military Gendarmerie, and other state security bodies, as well as the Office of the Military Prosecutor. Military prosecutors were responsible for investigating cases and starting criminal proceedings. In certain cases, delegates from soldiers’ collectives or organizations founded on military discipline could be involved in proceedings. The victim of an offence could also prefer charges jointly with the military prosecutor or join a civil action to the criminal proceedings.

In 1997, a new Constitution of the Republic of Poland was adopted by the Polish National Assembly and subsequently approved by referendum. That same year also saw the introduction of a new Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure which entered into force on 1 September 1998. Under the new constitution, justice in Poland is dispensed by the Supreme Court, ordinary criminal courts, administrative courts and military courts. Thus, “[m]ilitary courts administer justice within the armed forces of the Republic, in penal cases, as well as in other cases, reserved for them by statute. The lower military courts are called garrison courts and the higher ones are district courts. Their modes of action are laid down in the statute on military courts”.\textsuperscript{568} The Supreme Court, the highest jurisdictional body, monitors judgments handed down by military courts. Military prosecutors are responsible for bringing charges before the military courts. The military courts still have the authority to try civilians who have been involved in any way in offences committed by members of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{569}

24. Romania

Although there are no specific provisions concerning military criminal jurisdiction in the 1991 Romanian Constitution, they are contained in a series of laws. The three laws that determine how the military justice system is to operate are Law N° 92 of 1992 on judicial organization, Law N° 56 of 1993 on the Supreme Court of Justice and Law N° 160 of 1993 on the organization of the military courts and prosecuting authorities.

\textsuperscript{568} United Nations document HRI/CORE/1/Add.25/Rev.1, 7 April 1999, paragraph 46.

\textsuperscript{569} Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations - Poland”, CCPR/C/79/Add.110, 29 July 1999, paragraph 21.
The military justice system is made up of military courts, the Territorial Military Court, the Military Court of Appeal and the Military Division of the Supreme Court of Justice.

The military courts try offences committed by members of the military up to and including the rank of captain, offences committed by civilians working with the military forces and offences committed by civilians. The latter include failure to enlist, refusal to do military service and offences against military goods and property.

The Territorial Military Court is the court of original jurisdiction for offences committed by superior officers and serious offences (such as manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, banditry and corruption) committed by military personnel up to and including the rank of captain, and civilians working with the military forces. It also hears certain types of appeal against decisions handed down by the military courts.

The Military Court of Appeal hears appeals against the decisions of the military courts and the Territorial Military Court. It is also the court of original jurisdiction for offences against national security and offences against peace and humanity (advocating war or genocide) committed by members of the military or civilians working with the military forces.

Both military judges and military prosecutors must be professional judges as well as members of the military on active service. Their salaries are paid by the Ministry of Defence and they are promoted according to Ministry rules. In addition, as expressly stated in Law 160 of 1993, they are subject to the obligations incumbent on them due to their rank. Military judges cannot be investigated, detained or arrested without prior authorization from the Ministry of Justice.

The Supreme Court of Justice has a Military Division which has the authority to hear and rule on appeals against decisions handed down by the military courts. The president, judges and assistant judges sitting in that court must be members of the military on active service. The president must hold the rank of general, the judges that of colonel and the assistant judges that of major. Their salaries are paid by the Ministry of Defence. The Military Division is the court of original jurisdiction for criminal proceedings brought against admirals and generals as well as against judges from the military courts and the Military Court of Appeal.

570 Law No 160 of 1993, article 2.
571 Law No 56 of 1993, article 21.
The prosecutorial function within the military justice system is performed by military prosecutors assigned to each military court.

In their fourth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, the Romanian authorities acknowledged that the investigation of allegations of torture and ill-treatment inflicted on civilians by police or prison staff came under the jurisdiction of the military prosecuting authorities and that it was the military courts which were responsible for trying the perpetrators of such offences.575

25. Spain

History

The first “glimpses of a primitive form of military law”574 are to be found in the Siete Partidas (Seven Parts) of Alfonso El Sabio. The first corpus iuris of military criminal law consisted of the Ordenanzas del Rey En Pere (Ordinances of King En Pere) of 1340, the Royal Order of Navigation in the Indies (Orden Real de la Navegación en Indias) and the Ordinances and Instructions issued by the Duke of Parma and Plasencia in 1567 for the States of Flanders. This was the first system of military justice that existed specifically as a service provided by the army and it was headed by the Supreme Chief of the Forces who was assisted by a Judge Advocate General.

In the eighteenth century, military jurisdiction was organized into a proper structure as a result of the first General Ordinances issued by Felipe V, the provisions of which replicated the rules on military justice used by the French king, Louis XIV. The concept of the court martial (Consejo de Guerra) came into being at this time575. The Royal Decree of 27 April 1714 established the Supreme Council (Consejo Supremo)576 as the highest court of justice within the military and naval jurisdictions. The Supreme Council, presided by the Sovereign, was made up of military advisers and jurists. The military justice system therefore had an hierarchical structure made up of the Supreme Council, the courts martial and the military courts (juzgados militares). The Supreme Council ruled on disagreements and motions arising from the courts martial and acted as the appeal court for cases tried in the military courts, which consisted of the military officer in authority and a judge advocate. The

574 Benito E Trillo Figueroa., “Competencia, organización y atribuciones de los tribunales militares españoles - estudio histórico”, in Revue de droit militaire et de droit de la guerre, XIX-3-4, Brussels 1980, p.390. [Spanish original, free translation.]
575 The so-called Flanders Ordinances of 28 December 1701.
576 The Supreme Council was established by the Royal Charter of 21 May 1594.
scope of military jurisdiction was at that time extremely broad and covered both criminal and civil matters.

During the reign of Carlos III, the military justice system underwent several fundamental changes, especially with regard to the powers of the military courts. As a result of the establishment of the principles of jurisdiction *ratione personae* and *ratione materiae*, the military courts were empowered to try civilians. In terms of jurisdiction based on personal attributes, all troops as well as, in certain circumstances, retired members of the military came under military jurisdiction, as did members of the Civil Guard and the Police (*Carabineros*) and even people working in military administration. At that time military jurisdiction was seen as a privilege and military courts alone therefore had exclusive responsibility for hearing all cases, whether civil or criminal, in which members of the army were defendants or suspects. In criminal matters, their jurisdiction also extended to retired personnel and the children, wives, widows and servants of those covered by military privilege.

In parallel with these broad privileges, there were grounds on which such privileges could be withdrawn. Furthermore, it was not possible to assert privilege in the case of capital crimes committed by the accused prior to entering the armed forces. Similarly, members of the army did not enjoy special privilege with regard to matters handled by the ecclesiastical tribunals of the Holy Office (*Tribunal del Santo Oficio*) or the Inquisition (*Tribunal de la Inquisición*).

Under the 1768 Army Ordinances and subsequent provisions, jurisdiction based on the nature of the offence in question was granted to the military courts without taking into account whether or not the perpetrator of the offence was a member of the military. This meant that military courts had the power to try offences committed by civilians. For example, even when committed by civilians, offences such as encouraging or helping someone to desert, attacking military property or facilities, insulting a member of the military and threatening state security or the life of the King all fell to the remit of the military courts.

From the point of view of structure, there were two types of jurisdiction: ordinary military jurisdiction (*jurisdicción ordinaria de guerra*) and extraordinary military jurisdiction (*jurisdicción extraordinaria de guerra*). The former was exercised by the military courts within which there was a regular form of jurisdiction as well as several special types. The regular jurisdiction applied to both civil and criminal matters. Special ordinary military jurisdiction referred to a variety of privileges enjoyed by members of specific arms or

577 This had its legal basis in the Army Ordinances of 22 October 1768.
The 1812 Constitution of Cádiz was a victory for liberal ideas and brought about a fundamental change. It introduced the modern idea that there should be a single jurisdiction for all, namely, the principle of jurisdictional unity. As a result, the idea of military jurisdiction as a privilege was strongly called into question. However, the principle of jurisdictional unity was not really translated into a new body of law which would lead to the abolition of military privilege. Nevertheless, several issues came to the fore during the debate about military jurisdiction. They included the problems caused by the separation of powers between the administration and the judiciary, the need to substantially curb the jurisdiction of military courts, the need to distinguish between what could properly be seen to be their judicial functions and their disciplinary functions, etc. It was along these lines that the first attempts were made to rein in military jurisdiction and make it simply a tool for the armed service. For example, the 1821 law establishing the Army (Ley Constitutiva del Ejército) considered “[m]ilitary jurisdiction [to be] an onerous exception and not a privilege […] it shall be reduced to the narrowest limits and to cases in which it is absolutely essential for the proper discharge of obligations”.

578 Decree of 16 April 1869.

579 It is important to point out that one special type of court martial, used for offences that were particularly damaging to the army, was the oral court martial (consejo de guerra verbal) which had to be completed within 24 hours.

580 1821 law establishing the Army. [Spanish original, free translation.]
Several decades later, on 6 December 1868, a decree bringing all jurisdictions together into a single unit (el Decreto de Unificación de Fueros) was adopted, followed by the Royal Decree of 19 July 1875 which took jurisdiction over civil matters away from the military courts.\(^{581}\) In describing the reasoning behind the former, emphasis was placed on the fact that military jurisdiction is not granted for the benefit of the military but of society and that, “the more liberal a state’s constitution is, the more effective and severe its methods of punishing excesses must be, excesses which are all the more serious when perpetrated by members of the military”.\(^{582}\) The power of the military courts to conduct criminal proceedings against retired military personnel and the children, wives, widows and servants of those covered by military privilege was also removed.

The special jurisdictions for the artillery and engineering arms were also abolished, as were ordinary military jurisdiction and the type of courts martial which operated as a sole instance military court.\(^{583}\)

In the last two decades of the 19\(^{th}\) century, reforms were made to military jurisdiction on several occasions, mainly in an attempt to bring military criminal legislation together into a single corpus. Among these were the Law on the Organization and Powers of the Military Courts (Ley de Organización y Atribuciones de los Tribunales Militares) of 10 March 1884 and the Military Trial Law (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Militar) of 29 November 1886. These laws gave extensive jurisdiction to the military courts enabling them to try any offence committed by a member of the military. Nevertheless, their jurisdiction was slightly reduced in as much as some offences, such as the forgery of currency and adultery, which had until then fallen to the remit of military courts, were transferred to the ordinary courts. The military courts retained jurisdiction over certain offences regardless of whether the perpetrators were members of the military or civilians. Several procedural innovations were also introduced.

In 1890, the regulations on military jurisdiction were again revised. This reform, which was followed by further additional provisions in 1905 and 1919, constituted a conservative response on the part of the Army to the different initiatives that had been introduced in the wake of the Cádiz Constitution. In the words of the Minister of War, the justification for adopting the new 1890 Code was “[t]o restore prestige to the military classes and

\(^{581}\) Except for civil matters relating to troops based in military garrisons in North Africa and in specific cases involving military wills.


\(^{583}\) Royal Decree of 19 July 1875.
guarantees, which are the strongest means of supporting military jurisdiction, to the armed institution". The new Code reasserted broad jurisdiction for military courts based both on the personal attributes of the accused and the place where the offence was committed. Their jurisdiction was extended to include offences involving insults or slander directed at members of the military or military authorities and institutions. It was a reaction to the enormous wave of anti-militarist sentiment that was sweeping through the Iberian peninsula at that time.

In contrast to earlier laws, the new legislation defined the criteria to be applied in settling conflicts of jurisdiction. For example, in the event that the perpetrators included both members of the military and civilians, the competent courts of jurisdiction were the ordinary courts as long as a state of war had not been declared, in which case the competent courts were the military courts. In fact, during this period, given that declarations of war were frequent and that war edicts (Bandos de Guerra) tended to give the military courts jurisdiction over any new offences, their powers increased enormously.

They grew even further under the government of Primo de Rivera. Military courts were authorized to try ‘crimes against the security and unity of the motherland’, armed robbery committed against business establishments and banks and all offences involving the use of explosives.

With the proclamation of the Spanish Republic, military jurisdiction was totally transformed. Before the new Constitution was adopted, and as a kind of foretaste, fundamental reforms were made to military jurisdiction. On 11 May 1931, a decree was issued declaring that the jurisdiction of the military courts (Tribunales de Guerra) was limited to acts or offences which were essentially military in nature and abolishing all forms of jurisdictions based on considerations related to the attributes of the person or place where the offence was committed. Shortly afterwards, article 95 of the new Constitution established that “military jurisdiction shall be limited to military offences, the armed services and the discipline of all the armed institutions. No type of jurisdiction shall be established on the grounds of person or place. The case of war is exempt, in accordance with the Public Order Law”.

Fundamental changes were made to the structure of military jurisdiction. The military authorities no longer had anything to do with legal proceedings.

584 Minister of War. [Spanish original, free translation.]
585 Law of Jurisdictions of 23 March 1905.
586 Royal Decrees of 18 September 1923, 13 April 1924 and 25 December 1925.
587 Draft Constitution, article 95. [Spanish original, free translation.]
588 Decrees of 11 May 1931 and 2 June 1931, law of 12 September 1932.
These became the responsibility of the Judge Advocate, a position which had no kind of military connection or standing. The process of change later intensified when the Supreme Council of Military Justice (Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militar) was abolished to be replaced by the Military Division of the High Court of Justice (Tribunal Superior de Justicia). Substantial changes were also made to the procedures in force up until then. For example, it became possible to bring a private action. However, in 1935 military jurisdiction was reformed once again. Private actions were abolished, jurisdiction was returned to the military authorities, both in peacetime and wartime, and it became a specific requirement for members of the Judge Advocate Corps (Cuerpo Jurídico) to be military officials. A few months later the Civil War broke out. Following the victory of the troops of General Francisco Franco, the military legislation in place prior to 1931 was reinstated.

On 17 June 1945, a new Code of Military Justice was issued by the government of General Franco. In many respects, the new law took its inspiration from the 1890 Code. It granted extensive jurisdiction to the military courts. For example, they were the competent courts for all offences committed by military personnel, whether or not they were committed while on duty, and all military and ordinary offences and misdemeanours committed in military places or on territory where a “state of war” had been declared. Later on, the military courts were given jurisdiction over civilians in cases concerning public order and terrorism.

The Current Situation

In the Spanish Constitution of 1978, military courts are established in Section VI entitled “Concerning the Judiciary”. Article 117 (5) states that “[t]he principle of jurisdictional unity is the basis for the organization and operation of the Courts. The law shall regulate the exercise of military jurisdiction within the strictly military sphere and in the event that there is a state of siege, in accordance with the principles of the Constitution”. This was further developed in Basic Law 6/1985 on the Judiciary, dated 1 July 1985, article 3 (2) of which states that “[t]he authority of military jurisdiction shall remain limited to the strictly military sphere in respect of offences which are classified as military in the Military Criminal Code and in the event that there is a state of siege, in accordance with the declaration announcing such a state [of siege] and the Basic Law regulating it, without prejudice to the provisions of article 9, paragraph 2, of this law”. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 9 go on to

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589 Laws of 30 January and 17 July 1935.
590 Laws of 12 July 1940 and 29 March 1941.
591 Constitution of 1978, Section VI, article 117 (5). [Spanish original, free translation.]
592 Basic Law 6/1985 on the Judiciary, article 3 (2). [Spanish original, free translation.]
say that: “2. The civilian tribunals and courts shall try, apart from the matters that pertain to them, all those [matters] which have not been attributed to another jurisdiction. [...] 3. The [courts] from the system of criminal jurisdiction shall be granted cognizance of criminal proceedings and trials, with the exception of those which fall to military jurisdiction”.

It should be noted that Basic Law 2/86, which expressly authorized the ordinary criminal courts to try all offences committed by members of security forces and bodies, was passed in 1986. However, it was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 1990. It is also worth noting that, under a recent law, responsibility for trying individuals over 18 and under 21 years of age for offences and misdemeanours provided for under military criminal legislation was taken away from the jurisdiction of the military courts. In such cases, the competent courts of jurisdiction are the Juvenile Courts (Jueces de Menores).

Spanish military criminal jurisdiction is governed by Basic Law 4/1987 on the Jurisdiction and Organization of Military Courts, the Military Criminal Code and several other norms. It exercises both penal and disciplinary functions. Military courts therefore deal with criminal offences as well as breaches of discipline.

From the point of view of jurisdiction ratione temporis, Miguel Alía Plana points out that the Constitution “envisages the involvement of military jurisdiction from two different perspectives, depending on whether the State is in a period of constitutional normality or undergoing a state of emergency”. However, there are three types of jurisdiction ratione temporis, namely: peacetime, a state of emergency or siege and wartime. In addition to the dichotomy brought about by article 117, paragraph 5, of the Constitution, one also arises from articles 12 and 13 of Basic Law 4/1987.

In peacetime, Spanish military criminal jurisdiction is limited “to the strictly military sphere” and “in respect of offences which are classified as military in

593 Ibid., article 9 (2) and (3). [Spanish original, free translation.]
594 Constitutional Court, ruling dated 28 March 1990.
599 Miguel Alía Plana, “Aproximaciones a la jurisdicción militar española”, on web page: http://www.derechomilitar.info/artidoc/aprox05.htm. [Spanish original, free translation.]
the Military Criminal Code”. Article 12 of Basic Law 4/1987 sets out the limits of military criminal jurisdiction in peacetime. As Fernández Segado points out, “the first notable feature is the bringing back of jurisdiction to the sphere of subject matter, with the resultant exclusion of the personal sphere (ratione personae) and the territorial sphere (ratione loci)”. However, apart from the fact that there are “quite a few exceptions” to this rule, as Fernández Segado acknowledges, it should not be forgotten that when Spanish troops are abroad and no treaty on the subject exists, the criteria used to determine whether the military courts are competent concern jurisdiction ratione personae (the nationality of the accused) and ratione loci (whether the site where the offence is committed is of a military nature).

Article 12 (1) of Basic Law 4/1987 stipulates that, in peacetime, the military courts have jurisdiction over any offence or breach of discipline defined in the Military Criminal Code. For its part, article 20 of the Military Criminal Code succinctly describes military offences as those “deliberate or negligent acts and omissions punishable under this Code”. It is a “purely formal” definition and, in the technical sense, as Captain Alía Plana points out, very few of the offences defined in the Code are strictly military in nature. From the point of view of the juridical right protected, many of the types of conduct specified in the Military Criminal Code constitute more than one offence in that they are an attack on juridical rights protected under ordinary criminal law as well as juridical rights of a military nature. From that perspective, Rodríguez-Villasante y Prieto points out that six types of offence are criminalized in the Military Criminal Code: offences that are strictly military; offences which violate both ordinary and military juridical rights but in which the military juridical right is deemed to be the overriding one; ‘assimilated’ ordinary offences (delitos comunes asimilados), that is to say, ordinary offences which are treated as military offences due to the circumstances in which they have been committed; ordinary offences in which there are insufficient military circumstances for them to be characterized as military offences but which have nevertheless been included in the Code; ordinary offences which have been ‘militarized’ (delitos comunes militarizados) on the grounds that punishment is more severe under military law, and ordinary offences which have nothing to do with the military but which have been ‘militarized’ and included in the Military Criminal Code solely at the discre-

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601 Ibid., p.21. [Spanish original, free translation.]
602 Military Criminal Code, article 20. [Spanish original, free translation.]
603 Ibid., p.19. [Spanish original, free translation.]
604 Miguel Alía Plana, op.cit.
tion of the legislators. In the view of Captain Miguel Alía Plana, however, military jurisdiction in Spain in peacetime encompasses all offences specified in the Military Criminal Code, even when, if they are also offences under the ordinary criminal code, the latter calls for a more severe punishment in which case the ordinary code is the one which should be applied. Although other forms of classifying Spanish military criminal jurisdiction exist, the fact is that it applies to a wide range of offences and is not confined solely to offences which can properly be described as military. The concept of the service-related act (acto de servicio) figures in several definitions of offences contained in the Military Criminal Code and is used to justify giving the military courts the power to try certain ordinary offences. In peacetime, civilians can also be treated as the perpetrators (sujetos activos) of certain offences from the Military Criminal Code and can therefore be tried in military courts.

The wide range of offences over which the military courts have jurisdiction, the fact that the ordinary criminal code and the military criminal code can both be applied to the same acts and the existence of ‘assimilated’ and ‘militarized’ offences, as well as those which have been committed in the course of carrying out an “act related to armed service” (“acto del servicio de armas”), have given rise to many conflicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary courts and military courts. This has led jurisprudence to try to interpret what is meant in the Constitution when it states that military criminal jurisdiction is limited to the “strictly military sphere”. According to several authors, it should be interpreted as applying solely to “typically military offences and those associated with them, [and] those committed in a military place, in the protection of the interests of the Armies and anything which is detrimental to service or the [Armies’] effectiveness”. Others, such as

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605 José Luis Rodríguez-Villasante y Prieto, “El principio de especialidad - Comentario al artículo 5º del CPM”, in Ramón Blecua Fraga and José Luis Rodríguez-Villasante y Prieto, Comentarios al Código Penal Militar, Ed. Civitas, 1988, pp.136 and 137.

606 For example, the offences of: breaking into a military facility (art. 61), “disobeying military edicts in wartime or during a state of siege” (art. 63), “offences against the sentinel, the Armed Forces or Military Police” (art. 85), inciting another to abandon his post or desert (art. 129) and “offences against the administration of military justice” (arts. 180 and 182 to 188).

607 Miguel Alía Plana, op. cit. [Spanish original, free translation.]
Millán Garrido, believe that, in the case of ordinary offences committed in the line of duty or in a military place, such offences, even though they may be detrimental to the effective operation of the armed forces, go beyond just the military sphere and should be left to the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal courts.\(^{608}\)

The Constitutional Court believes that the phrase ‘strictly military sphere’, contained in article 117 (5) of the Constitution, should be interpreted restrictively.\(^{609}\) In one of its rulings, the Constitutional Court said the following: “As a special [type of] criminal jurisdiction, military jurisdiction must be limited in scope to the hearing of offences which can be deemed to be strictly military, a concept which must, by necessity, be tied to the nature of the offence committed [and] the juridical right or interests protected under criminal law, which, in keeping with the constitutionally-established aims of the Armed Forces and the means placed at its disposal to carry them out, must be strictly military, [as well as] to the military nature of the obligations and duties which, if breached, would constitute an offence and, in general, to whether or not the perpetrator of the offence is considered *uti miles*, as a result of which the fact that the perpetrator of the offence is a member of the military must also be a relevant factor in defining the concept of what is strictly military”\(^{610}\)

The Conflicts of Jurisdiction Division of the Supreme Court, when settling one particular case in which there was a conflict of jurisdiction between the ordinary and military courts, took the following view: “To solve the conflicts of jurisdiction which have arisen in connection with military jurisdiction it is not sufficient just to give a grammatical or systematic interpretation of the substantive and procedural precepts that may be at odds with each other. It is necessary to go deeper into the conflicting juridical situations in order to examine whether strictly military interests have been damaged or, on the other hand, whether there are other juridicial rights which may be found to be worthy of preferential protection under ordinary jurisdiction […]. In this case, the juridical right under attack is of an essentially military nature and jurisdiction should therefore be granted to the military courts”.\(^{611}\)

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\(^{609}\) See, among others, ruling N° 75/1982 by the Constitutional Court dated 13 December 1982.

\(^{610}\) Ruling N° 60/91 of 14 March 1991, Question of unconstitutionality N° 545/1990.[Spanish original, free translation]

\(^{611}\) Ruling of 2 April 1990 handed down when settling conflict N° 9/1989. [Spanish original, free translation.]
However, the Constitutional Court has asserted that the ‘strictly military sphere’ is a vague constitutional concept. It has repeatedly called on the legislature to adopt a law, as called for in article 117 of the Constitution, which would define the ‘strictly military sphere’.

When a state of siege is in place, military criminal jurisdiction can be extended. Basic Law 4/1981, which regulates states of alert, emergency and siege, and, in particular, article 35 of that law, as well as article 12 of Basic Law 4/1987 stipulate that any expansion of the jurisdiction of military courts is to be done in the state of siege declaration itself. Thus, in the event of a state of siege, the Chamber of Deputies must determine, in the declaration itself, which offences are to be subject to military jurisdiction while it is in force. As several other authors have pointed out, a state of siege declaration can transfer ordinary criminal offences that are committed while the state of emergency is in place to the jurisdiction of the military courts. Nevertheless, “the widening of the jurisdictional powers of the military courts shall only take place within the framework of an officially declared state of siege and under the terms of a declaration which has been sanctioned by the Congress of Deputies […] [and any such widening must be] established in accordance with the principles of the Constitution”. Even though it is a temporary measure to be applied only for a limited period in keeping with the temporary nature of the state of emergency, once the state of siege has been lifted and institutional normality has been restored, the military courts retain jurisdiction over any offences committed while the state of emergency was in force until a verdict has been reached with regard to the proceedings in question.

In wartime, the jurisdiction of the Spanish military courts is substantially expanded. Article 13 of Basic Law N° 4/1987 specifies that in wartime, in addition to the offences for which they have jurisdiction in peacetime, the military courts shall have the power to try any offences specified in treaties that are entered into with an allied power or organization, any ordinary criminal offences for which jurisdiction has been legally assigned to them by the courts or the government, any offences under Spanish law which are committed outside of national territory by members of the Spanish military or persons accompanying Spanish forces or units, and any offences committed by prisoners of war. Together with the “significant increase in the penalties”, Fernández Segado notes that types of conduct which constitute offences

613 Miguel Alía Plana, op.cit. [Spanish original, free translation.]
614 Francisco Fernández Segado, op. cit, p.29.
under ordinary criminal law when committed by a civilian “become military offences classified as such in the Military Criminal Code”.

In wartime, the jurisdiction of military courts should also remain within the ‘strictly military sphere’. Nevertheless, the nature and limits of this sphere seem to be different from those that apply in peacetime and under a state of siege. This was confirmed by the Military Division of the Supreme Court when it took the view that “in wartime military jurisdiction can be strengthened […] [as a] logical consequence of article 117.5 of the Constitution itself, since what is ‘strictly military’ also increases”.

It is important to point out that, in terms of jurisdiction ratione personae, the military justice system in Spain has jurisdiction over members of the Civil Guard. This body, which carries out police functions, is answerable to both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior. Basic Law N° 2/1986 on the Security Force and Corps states that the Civil Guard is “an armed institution of a military nature”, subject to the Armed Forces penal system and rules of discipline. The subjection of Civil Guard personnel to the jurisdiction of the military courts has been specified in law and confirmed by the Military Division of the Supreme Court.

Spanish military criminal jurisdiction is considered to be “a specialist jurisdiction due to the sphere in which it operates and the specific law it applies […] [and] military justice is an integral part of the single State Judiciary, in accordance with the principle of jurisdictional unity enshrined in article 117 of the Constitution”. Although military criminal jurisdiction has been set up as a specialist jurisdiction, its highest organ is the Supreme Court, the senior body within ordinary criminal jurisdiction, which acts as the court of appeal (tribunal de casación) for military matters. In ruling 115/2001 of 10 May 2001, the Spanish Constitutional Court stated that military criminal jurisdiction “is exercised at present by military courts and tribunals (juzgados

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615 Francisco Fernández Segado, op.cit., p.16. [Spanish original, free translation.]
616 Supreme Court, Military Division, ruling dated 24 June 1991. [Spanish original, free translation.]
619 Supreme Court. Military Division, ruling dated 10 February 1989.
which carry out of their jurisdictional function independently and are completely divorced from the military command”. 621

However, many authors have questioned whether Spanish military criminal jurisdiction can be considered to be an integral part of the judiciary and some believe that it is really a type of administrative ‘justice’ system attached to the executive. 622 The following are some of the main points that have been made. All members of the military courts, whether they be judges or prosecutors, are military personnel on active service and are therefore subject to the principles of military discipline and obedience. Those acting as judges, tribunal members and prosecutors in military courts are members of the Judge Advocate Corps. The latter is a department within the Ministry Defence, “whose members devote themselves, depending on the post they hold, either to jurisdictional responsibilities or to tasks involving the provision of legal advice within the sphere of the Ministry of Defence and the autonomous bodies attached to it, [functions] which should never be performed simultaneously, since they are subject to the military system of promotion and the rules of discipline of the Armed Forces”. 623 It should also be stressed that not all members of military courts, for example, tribunal members (vocales), have legal training.

Basic Law 4/1987 of 15 July on the Powers and Organization of Military Jurisdiction regulates the military court system in Spain. The following are organs of military justice: the Fifth Chamber of the Supreme Court, the Central Military Tribunal (Tribunal Militar Central), the Territorial Military Tribunals (Tribunales Militares Territoriales) and the Military Courts (Juzgados Togados Militares).

The Fifth Chamber of the Supreme Court, or Military Division, is made up of senior judges from both ordinary and military jurisdiction. It hears applica-

621 Spanish Constitutional Court, ruling Nº 115/2001, 10 May 2001, paragraph 10. [Spanish original, free translation.]
623 Miguel Alía Plana, op. cit. [Spanish original, free translation.]
tions for review and annulment and is the trial court for those subject to its special jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{624}

The Central Military Tribunal, based in Madrid, has jurisdiction throughout the whole country as well as outside of it. It is assisted by two Central Military Courts (\textit{Juzgados Togados Militares Centrales}) which prepare the cases that fall within its jurisdiction. The Central Military Tribunal is made up of a presiding judge advocate (\textit{Auditor Presidente}) with the rank of Counsellor General (\textit{General Consejero Togado}), four members with legal training (\textit{Vocales Togados}), who are judge advocates with the rank of general (\textit{Generales Auditores}) and military members (\textit{Vocales Militares}) with the rank of Brigadier-General or Rear-Admiral. It is divided into two Chambers, the Chamber of Justice (\textit{Sala de Justicia}) and the Chamber of Government (\textit{Sala de Gobierno}). The Territorial Military Tribunals are attached to each of the five territorial jurisdictions into which Spanish territory is divided. Among other things, they try any offences committed within their territory which are subject to military jurisdiction but which do not fall to the remit of the Military Division of the Supreme Court or the Central Military Tribunal. Each Territorial Military Tribunal is made up of a presiding judge advocate, with the rank of Colonel Judge Advocate, four members with legal training (\textit{Vocales Togados}), one with the rank of lieutenant-colonel and the others with the rank of commander judge advocate (\textit{Comandante Auditor}), and military members (\textit{Vocales Militares}) with the rank of commander or lieutenant commander.

The Military Courts (\textit{Juzgados Togados Militares}) act as trial courts. There are military courts attached to the Central Military Tribunal and territorial military courts (\textit{juzgados togados militares territoriales}) attached to the Territorial Military Tribunals.

The prosecutorial function (\textit{Ministerio Público}) within the military justice system is ensured by the Military Prosecutor’s Office (\textit{Fiscalía Jurídico Militar}), which is answerable to the Attorney-General (\textit{Fiscal General del Estado}). The Military Prosecutor’s Office is responsible for bringing prosecutions before the military courts as well as for taking the necessary action to defend legality and the rights and interests protected by law, either as a matter of course or at the request of those concerned, and ensuring that the organs of military justice are independent. The Military Prosecutor’s Office has prose-

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\textsuperscript{624} They are: field marshals (\textit{Capitanes Generales}), lieutenant generals, admirals, members of the Central Military Tribunal, military prosecutors (\textit{Fiscal Togado}), prosecutors from the Fifth Chamber of the Supreme Court and the prosecutor at the Central Military Tribunal.
cuting offices within each organ of military criminal jurisdiction. They are staffed by military personnel.

The victims of offences that are subject to military jurisdiction, or their successors, can in principle bring a private prosecution or a civil action for damages in the course of military criminal proceedings. However, this is expressly prohibited “when the victim and the accused are members of the military and there is an hierarchical relationship of subordination between them”.

26. Switzerland

History

One of the earliest records of Swiss military criminal legislation dates from the 14th century. Wars against foreign armies led the Swiss authorities to adopt a type of military procedural code in order to maintain discipline within the ranks of the Swiss troops on the battlefield. Thus, in 1393, the first war decree, known as the “ordonnance de Sempach”, was issued. As Professor Eric David points out, from the 15th and 16th centuries onwards, with the consolidation of the European states and the gradual disappearance of “private wars” waged by feudal lords, there emerged a “new type of mercenary force”, consisting of the temporary provision of military conscripts from one sovereign to another in exchange for remuneration, usually financial. The troops were not only provided to fight wars but also for security purposes. This practice was translated into a system of licenses and contracts, in other words, “pacts through which one state committed itself to supplying a certain number of soldiers to another state for a specific period of time in return for

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625 The Office of the Military Prosecutor at the Fifth Chamber of the Supreme Court, the Military Prosecutor’s Office at the Central Military Tribunal and the Military Prosecutor’s Office at the Territorial Military Tribunals.

626 The role of military prosecutor is performed by a Counsellor General (General Consejero Togado). The role of prosecutor at the Central Military Tribunal is performed by a General Judge Advocate (General Auditor). The role of prosecutor at each Territorial Military Tribunal is performed by a Colonel Judge Advocate (Coronel Auditor).


629 Eric David, Mercenaires et volontaires internationaux en droits des gens, Centre de droit international, Ed. Université de Bruxelles, Belgium 1978, p.10. [French original, free translation.]
payment.” The Swiss cantons turned this practice into a veritable industry by putting their cantonal troops at the service of foreign kings and queens from the 15th until the 19th century. Even though the Swiss Confederation claimed to be neutral from the 16th century onwards and the 1815 Vienna Conference had recognized its neutrality, the contracts system was not questioned. By 1816, E. Nys points out, 23,000 Swiss soldiers were in the service of France, the Netherlands and Prussia.

Although they were working for a foreign country, Swiss soldiers marched under their own flag, wore Swiss uniforms and were under the command of Swiss officers. Such soldiers were commonly known as *Reisslaüfer*, meaning mercenary. The Swiss Guard at the Vatican is a vestige of that practice. In the 17th century, an edict aimed at regulating the situation of such soldiers was proclaimed. It stipulated that they should be tried by their own judges and in accordance with Swiss law or, more specifically, the law of the particular canton they came from. The *Reisslaüfer* were therefore under the penal authority of their commander, who was a Swiss military officer, and not that of the State or the Lord for whom they were fighting. The 1663 military covenant between the Confederation and King Louis XIV of France contained a specific clause on this issue. The accepted principle was that Swiss judges had sole jurisdiction over any troops serving a foreign army.

Internally, the situation was more complex. Alongside the Confederation Army, there were cantonal armies which were subject to their own organs of military criminal jurisdiction. The restructuring of the State, which involved the adoption in 1874 of the Federal Constitution of Switzerland, resulted in the centralization of the army. Although, under certain circumstances, the Constitution allowed cantons to have their own military force, it also gave the federal authorities responsibility for all matters relating to the Army and military affairs and stipulated that the cantonal troops should be incorporated into the Federal Army. Military jurisdiction is not regulated in the Constitution. However, despite this, it is important to highlight that article 112 stipulates that the Federal Court, the highest court in the ordinary crimi-

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630 Ibidem. [French original, free translation.]
631 Cited by Eric David, *Mercenaires et volontaires internationaux en droits des gens*, op. cit. p.34.
632 The Swiss Guards, or Papal Guard, were put at the disposal of the Pope at the end of the 14th century. Later, a contract was signed between Pope Leo XII and the Canton of Lucerne in 1825 and confirmed in 1850 by Pope Pius IX.
633 A new constitution has been adopted in 1998.
634 Article 19 of the Constitution.
635 Articles 18 to 22, 85 (6 and 9) and 102 (11) of the Constitution.
nal justice system, is responsible for trying crimes and offences against the law of nations and offences committed by officials at the federal level.

As far as military criminal jurisdiction was concerned, the process of restructuring and unifying the Swiss Army was completed with the issuing in 1889 of the Law on Judicial Organization and the Code of Military Criminal Procedure for the Federal Army. 636 This was how the Swiss system of military justice came into being. Like the old French system, the Swiss system made no provision for a second tier of jurisdiction. Military criminal jurisdiction consisted of Divisional Courts, the Special Military Court (for trying superior officers) and the Military Supreme Court.

During the First World War, there was a great deal of criticism of Swiss military justice. At the end of the war, a process of review was launched. In the course of it, a first attempt was made to abolish military criminal jurisdiction but the initiative was rejected by referendum in 1922. 637 Later on, in 1973 and again in 1990, there were further unsuccessful moves to abolish military justice in peacetime.

The process of review culminated in 1927 with the publication of a Military Criminal Code which entered into force in 1928. 638 That Code and the 1889 law would form the basis in law for military criminal jurisdiction. The system established in the 1889 law was amended in 1979 with the adoption of the Law on Military Criminal Procedure 639 and the Military Criminal Justice Order, 640 which came into force in 1980. The 1927 Military Criminal Code underwent several amendments. 641 It is worth mentioning the 1950 and 1967 amendments which empowered the Swiss military courts to punish grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions as well as the 1995 amendments on cooperation with the International Ad hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Several of the amendments introduced between 1992 and 1996 related to the situation of conscientious objectors to military service.

As a result of the 1967 amendments, the military courts acquired the authority to try and judge those responsible for war crimes committed both in wartime and peacetime, whether they be civilians or members of the military

636 Law of 28 June 1889.
638 Federal law of 13 June 1927.
and regardless of nationality. In such cases, the exercise of jurisdiction by the military courts is conditional on the presence in Switzerland of the suspects. In 1994, the first trial for war crimes began. It involved a Serbian citizen accused of committing grave breaches of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols against prisoners of war. Although the defendant was acquitted, for the first time a Swiss military court had recognized that it had jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.642 In a second trial, involving the former mayor of Nyionteze (Rwanda) accused of organizing massacres of Tutsis, the court convicted the defendant for breaching the Geneva Conventions.643

**The Current Situation**

At present, Swiss military criminal jurisdiction is governed by the 1927 Military Criminal Code and its respective amendments, the Law on Military Criminal Procedure and the Military Criminal Justice Order as well as other rules concerning military matters.644

Swiss military justice operates outside of the ordinary criminal justice system. Some authors consider it to be a specialized jurisdiction. However, it should be stressed that the military justice system is made up solely of career members of the military or those doing military service. The so-called ‘specialist’ functions such as court clerk, examining magistrate, judge advocate and presiding judge are performed by military personnel who have served in operational units of the Army and who have a certain amount of legal experience. The positions of examining magistrate, judge advocate and presiding judge can only be held by officers. The position of court clerk can only be held by non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The other judges are chosen from amongst the staff of the operational military units. Military criminal jurisdiction comes under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence through the Military Attorney-General, who has disciplinary authority over all military justice officials. The Military Attorney-General assigns responsibilities to the staff working in the military justice system. With the exception of the Military Attorney-General, no member of the military justice system holds his or her post as their main job. Some authors therefore believe that military criminal jurisdiction constitutes a specialized branch of the Federal Army.

From the structural point of view, military criminal jurisdiction makes no distinction between peacetime and wartime. The military justice system consists of the Divisional Courts, Military Courts of Appeal, the Military Supreme Court, the Military Attorney-General, military examining magistrates and military judge advocates. The Military Police and the cantonal Judicial Police help the examining magistrates from the military courts with their investigations. The Federal Court settles conflicts of jurisdiction between military justice and the ordinary courts.

Each of the Divisional Courts, which provide the first tier of jurisdiction, are attached to a military unit and have jurisdiction over any member of the military belonging to the unit who is facing prosecution, regardless of where the offence was committed. Each is made up of a presiding judge, who must be a colonel or lieutenant colonel, and four other judges (two officers and two non-commissioned officers). All members of the court are appointed by the Federal Council, the highest organ of executive government, and must belong to the military units over which the court in question has jurisdiction.

The Military Courts of Appeal provide the second tier of jurisdiction. There are three Military Courts of Appeal, one for each of the languages spoken in Switzerland (German, French and Italian). The composition of these courts is similar to that of the Divisional Courts, except that to hold the position of judge, a person “must, as a general, rule, have legal knowledge”.645

The Military Supreme Court provides the third tier of jurisdiction and is at the same level in the hierarchy as the Federal Court. It also rules on conflicts of jurisdiction between military courts.646 It consists of a presiding judge with the rank of colonel and four other judges (two officers and two non-commissioned officers), all of whom are appointed by the Federal Assembly. Unlike the other courts, to sit as a judge on the Military Supreme Courts, it is necessary to have a cantonal lawyer’s licence or to have fully completed a course in law.647

The Military Attorney-General, who is the head of the military justice system, is appointed for a four-year period by the Federal Council and must have the rank of brigadier. He is directly answerable to the Ministry of Defence. As well as having a managerial role within the military justice system, the Military Attorney-General performs the prosecutorial role in military court proceedings and has extensive powers with regard to procedural matters. The

645 Article 12 of the Law on Military Criminal Procedure. [Spanish original, free translation.]
646 Article 32 of the Law on Military Criminal Procedure and article 26 of the Military Criminal Justice Order.
647 Article 13 of the Law on Military Criminal Procedure.
Military Attorney-General can assign cases which in principle should fall to the jurisdiction of another court to a Divisional Court\textsuperscript{648} and can also take decisions on certain kinds of conflicts of jurisdiction between military courts.\textsuperscript{649} He can also close cases and, as a party to the proceedings, can make applications for appeal, annulment and review. The Military Attorney-General is responsible for hearing and settling complaints against decisions handed down by the examining magistrates, except for those relating to the holding in custody of the defendant.

Examining magistrates, military judge advocates and military court clerks come under the authority of the Military Attorney-General. Examining magistrates are attached to each military court and are responsible for investigating offences. They also act as advisers to the troop commanders on points of military law. The position of examining magistrate must be held by an officer with the rank of captain. The judge advocates are responsible for bringing charges before the military courts. They also have jurisdictional powers and act as sole judge in the case of offences punishable with a maximum of one month’s imprisonment or a fine of up to 1000 Swiss francs. The position of judge advocate must be held by an officer with the rank of major.

Although, unlike other countries, the Swiss system does not have a judge advocate corps as such, it has “military justice officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers”, who are said to have “specialist duties”. To be a military justice officer it is necessary to have a cantonal lawyer’s license, to have fully completed a course of law or to have an appropriate level of legal knowledge, as well as to have served as an officer in the Federal Army.\textsuperscript{650} Military justice non-commissioned officers and soldiers act as court clerks in the military courts. It is necessary to be a “military justice officer” to be an examining magistrate or a judge advocate.

The Swiss military justice system provides for an ordinary military criminal procedure which takes place in two stages: an investigation stage followed by a trial. The investigation is the responsibility of a military examining magistrate under the supervision of the Military Attorney-General. In the case of an offence committed in the course of service, the commander of the operational unit to which the suspect belongs has the power to order an investigation. If he does not do so and the examining magistrate believes it is necessary, the Military Attorney-General can order an investigation to be opened. The military commander can also order the suspect to be taken into custody and

\textsuperscript{648} 648 Article 31 of the Law of Military Criminal Procedure.
\textsuperscript{649} 649 Article 26 of the Military Criminal Justice Order.
\textsuperscript{650} 650 Article 2 of the Law of Military Criminal Procedure. [Spanish original, free translation.]
take steps to ensure that any evidence is preserved. If an offence is committed by someone who is off duty, it is the Military Attorney-General who is responsible for ordering an investigation to be opened. Once the investigation has been completed, it is up to the judge advocate to bring the charges before the appropriate military court or to send the case to the Military Attorney-General for dismissal. Where it is decided that charges should be brought, a hearing is opened, culminating in a judgment. Some changes have been made to the ordinary military criminal procedure in the case of defendants who are tried in absentia.

Under Swiss military criminal law, it is possible for the victims or their successors to add a civil action for damages to the criminal proceedings in the case of offences listed in the Military Criminal Code. They must do so at the beginning of the investigation stage. At that time, they can submit documentation supporting their claims and stating the amount of compensation expected and participate in the court hearing. However, they only have limited access to the trial dossier.651

As far as jurisdiction is concerned, the Swiss military justice system distinguishes between peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, the military courts are competent to try offences committed by military personnel both on and off duty as long as they are committed within the framework of their military duties. It is important to stress that the Military Criminal Code contains a long list of offences, including standard military offences652 as well as offences against the law of nations.653 However, the Code also contains a wide variety of ordinary offences such as manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual violence, fraud, the falsification of documents, offences against the administration of justice and offences against the national heritage. In certain circumstances, it also allows the military courts to prosecute and pass sentence on civilians who have committed certain offences654, civilian officials, staff and others carrying out work for the army who are suspected of committing acts against national defence, civilians who have been enlisted into the army and civilians employed by a military troop.

In wartime, the jurisdiction of the military courts is extended to include civilians accompanying troops; civilians suspected of treason, espionage, looting, carrying out attacks with explosives or incendiary devices on military property or committing offences against the law of nations; prisoners of war;

651 Article 164 of the Law on Military Criminal Procedure.
652 For example, insubordination (art. 61 and following) and abuse of service authority (art. 66 and following).
653 Articles 108 to 114 of the Military Criminal Code.
654 See articles 2 and 3 of the Military Criminal Code.
“enemy members of parliament”; and civilians interned in areas where war is taking place or which are under occupation. The Military Criminal Code interprets war as including situations in which there is an “imminent danger of war”.

27. United Kingdom

History

Historically, the British system of military justice was associated with war situations or armed forces stationed abroad. The British codes of military justice or Articles of War were issued by royal prerogative and did not apply to British territory in peacetime. In principle, offences committed by the military within Great Britain were tried under the ordinary criminal law system. In 1689, the English Parliament passed the Mutiny Act which established military criminal jurisdiction in peacetime. It introduced the concept of the court martial which was authorized to try cases of mutiny, sedition and desertion. As Fernández Segado points out, “the organization of courts martial was based on the idea of judgment by one’s peers.” Each court martial was made up of 13 members and at least nine votes in favour were required when the death penalty was imposed. It is the commonly-held view among legal scholars that the 1689 Mutiny Act was the starting point for the system of military justice currently in operation in Great Britain. But it was to be in the 18th century that the system would take shape when, given the particular characteristics of common law, the role of manuals of military law was brought to the fore.

Thus there were two distinct sets of military criminal legislation in existence: one for the armed forces based abroad for use in wartime, which was regulated under the Code of Military Justice, and another for the armed forces based on British territory in peacetime and regulated under the Mutiny Act. In 1881, steps were taken to start standardizing military criminal legislation. In that

655 Article 4 of the Military Criminal Code.
656 Article 5 of the Military Criminal Code. [Spanish original, free translation.]
658 Ibidem. [Spanish original, free translation.]
660 Ibidem and see also Fernando Fernández Segado, op. cit., p.51.
661 One of the most important being Military Law and Practice of Courts Martial, by Judge Advocate General Tyler, published in 1806.
year, the Army Act was passed. Later, in 1886, the Naval Discipline Act was enacted and followed, in 1917, by the Air Force Act. The intention of these laws was to regulate the system of military justice within each of the three branches of the Armed Forces. The provisions of each of them were broadly similar.

After the Second World War further legislation on military justice was gradually introduced. In 1951, the Courts Martial (Appeals) Act was passed. Prior to that, the system for challenging the decisions handed down by courts martial had been completely inadequate. Their decisions could only be challenged through an application to the Crown who, through the exercise of royal prerogative, could review and quash the judgments rendered by such courts. The 1951 law established a mechanism by which appeals could be made to a higher court for use by the whole military justice system. The law was amended in 1968. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Crown’s royal prerogative to review and quash court martial judgments was not fundamentally affected. The 1968 law restricted itself to stating that the prerogative should be exercised before an appeal could be submitted to, and accepted by, the Courts Martial Appeal Court.

In 1955, the Army Act and Air Force Act came into force, to be followed by the Naval Discipline Act in 1957. Although the latter contains some specific features, the three acts are broadly similar as far as military justice is concerned. They are jointly known as the Service Discipline Acts. They have to be renewed by Parliament every five years by means of amendments, known as Armed Forces Acts, which incorporate changes and update them. Of these, the 1971 and 1976 Armed Forces Acts and the 1975 Queen’s Regulations are worth mentioning. The 1976 Armed Forces Act set up the Standing Civilian Court, a trial court with jurisdiction over civilians connected with the Services, including dependants and British civilians working for the Ministry of Defence or otherwise under the command of an officer outside the United Kingdom. Together with these laws, there are specific procedural codes for each branch of the armed forces. However, despite these changes, and as some authors have pointed out, the British military justice system is known for being one of the most traditional and enduring.

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664 Explanatory Notes to Armed Forces Discipline Act, 2000, chapter 4, paragraph 4.
Historically, a main feature of British military justice has been the existence of the system of courts martial and judge advocates, in which the executive, through the convening officer and confirming officer, among others, has a key role. It should be pointed out that British courts martial were, and continue to be, of an *ad hoc* nature in that they are convened and set up on a temporary basis to try each particular case. They were made up exclusively of military personnel on active service. There were different types of courts martial depending on the rank of the accused (soldier, non-commissioned officer or officer), the nature and seriousness of the offence and where it was committed.

The power to convene a court martial lay with the ‘convening officer’. A convening officer was any senior officer with the necessary authorization to order a trial by court martial. The power to do so was delegated to the commanders of the main military units or forces by means of a warrant from the Crown. The commanders could in turn delegate this authority to other armed forces officers. The role of convening officer was performed by different authorities, depending on which type of court martial was being convened. In all cases, the convening officer had to be an officer on active service who was in command of a body of regular forces and of the same rank or higher than the accused.668 As well as having the power to convene a court martial, the convening officer personally appointed the president and the rest of the panel members, as well as the prosecuting officer, and could also order the court martial to be dissolved at any stage of the proceedings if justice so required.669 It was also the responsibility of the convening officer to check that the Judge Advocate General’s Office had appointed a judge advocate for trial. If this had not already been done, he could appoint one himself. As far as procedures were concerned, the convening officer had extensive powers: he was responsible for deciding the charges to be laid and the type of court martial required, ordering the accused to be taken into custody, checking that the accused had proper legal representation and ensuring that the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defence attended the hearing.

Any court martial decision had to be confirmed by a confirming officer for it to be legally binding. This role was usually also played by the convening officer. It allowed the confirming officer to confirm or change the sentence handed down by the court martial, substitute a new sentence or convene a new court martial. Only once it had been confirmed or amended could the sentence be appealed by petitioning the ‘reviewing authorities’. This function


669 Article 95 of the 1955 Army Act.
could be carried out by the Crown, the Defence Council for each branch of the services, *ad hoc* commissions or any officer of a higher rank than the confirming officer. The identities of the confirming officer and the reviewing authorities were not communicated to the person requesting the review. No reasons had to be given for the decisions of the reviewing authorities. It should be noted that the decisions of navy court martials did not need to go through the confirmation process. However, it was possible to lodge an appeal against them with the Court Martial Appeal Court.

The Office of the Judge Advocate General for the Army and Air Force was, and still is, under the charge of the Judge Advocate General. The latter had to be a lawyer of ten years’ standing and was responsible for running the Judge Advocate General Service. The Judge Advocate General was appointed by the Queen for a five-year period on the basis of names put forward by the Lord Chancellor. The Judge Advocate General could be removed from office by the Crown. The Office of the Judge Advocate General was made up of an administrative division, a division of military affairs and a military justice division. Unlike other legal systems, the Office of the Judge Advocate General played no part in the prosecution of offenders. Its function was to provide legal advice on military justice issues to the Ministry of Defence, courts martial, the convening officer, the confirming officer and the reviewing authorities. While the Judge Advocate General himself was responsible for advising the Ministry of Defence, responsibility for advising the other bodies was in the hands of the judge advocates. In court martial proceedings, judge advocates acted as legal advisers and recorders. Initially, judge advocates did not need to have any specific legal qualifications but later on this did become a requirement. The Navy has its own Judge Advocate General’s Office which is broadly similar to the one which services the Army and Air Force. Some authors believe that the British Office of the Judge Advocate General is a cross between a judicial and an administrative system.670

In that context it is clear that the British military justice system was subordinate to the military hierarchy, all the more so if we bear in mind that many members of courts martial were usually under the command of the convening officer and that, in any event, all were subordinate to him due to their rank and the principle of due obedience.

*The 1996 and 2000 reforms*

In 1996, in the context of several cases relating to the operation of military justice that had been referred to the European Court of Human

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Rights, the British authorities set about significantly reforming the system of military justice. The Armed Forces Act that was passed that year and entered into force on 1 April 1997 made substantial amendments to the role of convening officer, so much so that it in fact ceased to exist, as well as to the role of the Judge Advocate General. The functions of the convening officer were distributed between three bodies, one for each branch of the services: the higher authorities, the prosecuting authorities attached to each branch’s Legal Services and the court administration officers attached to the Defence Council for each branch. However, in the case of Field General Courts Martial, the position of convening officer was retained, though with some changes in powers and authority.

The higher authorities, who are the highest-ranking and longest-serving officers, decide how a case should be treated: whether it should be dealt with summarily or by a court martial, in which case it must be referred to the prosecuting authority or dropped altogether. Upon receipt of a case, it is the responsibility of the prosecuting authority for the branch of the services in question to decide whether or not court martial proceedings should be opened and, if so, which type of court martial should be used and what charges should be brought. Each branch of the services has its own Director of Legal Services who acts as the prosecuting authority and is appointed by the Queen. The officers who work under him or her are known as prosecuting officers and must be lawyers. Both the Director of Legal Services and the prosecuting officers are responsible for investigating a case and bringing charges but they do not give legal advice to the chain of command. It is now the responsibility of Court Administration Officers, who are appointed by the Defence Council for each Service, to convene courts martial. They are civil servants who are independent both of the chain of command and the higher authorities and prosecuting authorities. Lastly, the 1996 Act abolished the role of confirming officer and it is no longer necessary for a sentence handed down by a court martial to be confirmed in order for it to be legally binding. However, the right of appeal rests solely with the accused.

The 1996 Act also substantially changed the functions of the Office of the Judge Advocate General. The Judge Advocate General no longer advises the Ministry of Defence on military justice matters. The role of the judge

671 The most well-known case was that of Findlay v. The United Kingdom (Judgment dated 25 February 1997, Case N° 110/1995/616/706). But also worth noting are the cases of Coyne v. The United Kingdom (Judgment dated 24 September 1997, Case N° 124/1996/734/942), Hood v. The United Kingdom (Judgment dated 18 February 1999, Communication N° 27267/95), and Cable and others v. The United Kingdom (Judgment dated 18 February 1999, Communications 24436/1994 and others).

672 Aspals Legal Pages, “Changes to the UK Court Martial System”, op. cit.
advocates in courts martial has also substantially changed. Rather than providing legal advice and acting as recorder, the judge advocate now sits on the court martial. However, the degree of his or her involvement as a member of the court martial is limited.

Further changes were later made to the military justice system as a result of the 1998 Human Rights Act673, the purpose of which was to “give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights”.674 The Human Rights Act abolished the death penalty for all offences, including military ones, and replaced it with life imprisonment or any other punishment permitted under the Service Acts. The military justice system was therefore obliged to comply with the rights contained in the Human Rights Act as well as all the military laws. Thus in 2000 the Armed Forces Discipline Act was passed and entered into force on 2 October of the same year. As a result of the Act, significant amendments were made to the disciplinary system, particularly with regard to custody issues and the way in which members of courts martial are appointed. It also established a new appeals system for summary trials: the Summary Appeal Court. In the same year, several supplementary provisions to the Armed Forces Discipline Act were also adopted.

The Current System

The current British military justice system has several distinguishing features. Firstly, it is separate from the ordinary criminal justice system. Secondly, it is a fragmented network. There is no single military court system providing the first tier of jurisdiction. Each branch of the Armed Forces has its own legislation and courts martial. Nevertheless, at the second tier, the system becomes unified. From the point of view of composition, the courts are different at each level. At the first level, composition is mixed and both armed forces officers on active service and professional judges sit on courts martial. By contrast, the second tier of jurisdiction is made up solely of professional civilian judges. Thirdly, with a few exceptions, the courts are ad hoc in nature and are convened and assembled for each particular occasion and have no permanent status.

Lastly, the most salient feature of British military justice is that no clear distinction exists between criminal and disciplinary offences.675 The system is

674 Preamble to the Human Rights Act.
based on the concept of the offence. However, it differentiates between two sets of offences according to their nature. Thus, there are military offences and civil offences. Military offences are defined under various laws and, in particular, under the acts relating to each branch of the armed services. For example, as far as the Army is concerned, military offences are often known as ‘offences against the Army Act’. In any event, the concept of a military offence in the British system encompasses both military offences, as they are generally understood, and disciplinary offences or breaches. Which category an offence falls into hinges on its gravity (minor or serious) and, in principle, a different procedure applies to each: minor offences are dealt with by means of a summary trial while serious ones go to a court martial. Minor offences seem to equate to what other legal systems call breaches of discipline while serious offences are on a par with military offences. Nevertheless, this distinction is not clear because whether a summary trial is applicable not only depends on the offence being of a minor nature but also on the rank of the accused (whether he or she is a soldier or non-commissioned officer) and whether or not the latter has elected trial by court martial. Some authors believe that the consequence of this type of system is the creation of two forms of military jurisdiction, one for disciplinary matters and another for criminal matters. Nevertheless, it may be misleading to view the British system by extrapolating from “continental” systems.

In terms of structure, the British military justice system consists of court martial, a Court Martial Appeal Court, judge-advocates, prosecuting authorities and a Court Administration Office for each of the armed services. The House of Lords also plays a role in military justice matters as the third and final tier of jurisdiction. The military justice system is completed by the Standing Civilian Court and the organs responsible for summary trials, namely the “higher authorities” and the Summary Appeal Court.

The courts martial provide the first tier of jurisdiction. It should be noted that, although the system is generally homogeneous, there are specific rules on courts martial for each of the three services, namely, the Army, Air Force and Navy. There are several types of courts martial: General Courts Martial, District Courts Martial and Field General Courts Martial. It should be remembered that courts martial are not permanent courts but are convened by the Court Administration Office attached to the Defence Council for each branch of the services.

676 Prior to that, the summary trial referred to the Summary Court, namely, the hierarchical superior of the accused. Today the “Summary Court” has disappeared but the mechanism remains the same with a few modifications: it is the superior officer of the accused who is responsible for trying and punishing him or her by means of a summary trial.
Army and Air Force courts martial are regulated along similar lines. General Courts Martial consist of a president and four officers belonging to the branch of the forces in question, together with a judge advocate. Apart from the latter, who must be a professional judge, the other members of the court do not have to have any legal qualifications. The president must be an officer with the rank of general or colonel while the other four officers must hold the rank of captain or above. All must be on active service. General Courts Martial are authorized to try any officer, regardless of his or her rank, as well as members of the rank and file and non-commissioned officers, for offences punishable with two years’ imprisonment or more.

The District Courts Martial are made up of a president, at least two officers on active service and a judge advocate. The members of the court do not need to have any legal qualifications, except for the judge advocate who must be a professional judge. District Courts Martial have the authority to try members of the rank and file and non-commissioned officers and can only impose sentences of up to two years’ imprisonment.

Although the British system makes no distinction between peacetime and wartime for the purposes of the structure of military justice, in certain circumstances, Field General Courts Martial can be convened in theatres of operation. They are made up of a president and at least two officers on active service. In contrast to the other forms of court martial, they are established by the convening authority, namely, the Commander of the military unit in question.

Naval courts martial have some specific features. They must be made up of at least five, and not more than nine, naval officers who must hold the rank of at least lieutenant (equivalent to the rank of captain in the Army and Air Force) and belong to different ships or naval establishments. When the accused is a senior officer, the members of the naval court martial must be one grade higher. For example, in the case of an admiral, the president of the court martial must be an admiral and the other members captains (equivalent to the rank of colonel in the Army). A judge advocate must also participate in naval courts martial.

The Court Martial Appeal Court provides the second tier of jurisdiction and, as such, hears appeals against sentences handed down by courts martial. It is made up of an uneven number of senior professional judges and not less than three. They come from the ordinary justice system and are appointed by the President of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal, the Lord Chief Justice, with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor. A minimum of three judges hear the case and the panel must always have an odd number of judges. The panel normally consists of one Appeal Court judge or the Lord
Chief Justice and two judges from the High Court of Justice of England, although judges from Scotland and Northern Ireland may also sit on the court. The Courts Martial Appeal Court usually sits in London although it has the power to sit anywhere, both inside and outside the United Kingdom. It has the power to penalize courts or their representatives for contempt, non-appearance and disobedience.

Judge advocates on District or General Courts Martial are professional civil judges appointed by the Lord Chancellor. Since the 1996 reform, judge advocates participate in courts martial as members rather than as legal advisers and recorders. However, their participation is limited in that they do not take part in deliberations on the guilt or innocence of the accused but they can vote on the type of sentence to be imposed. Nevertheless, the advice given by the judge advocate is now binding and must be heeded by the panel.

As far as summary trials are concerned, there are two tiers of jurisdiction, the first being the higher authority and the second the Summary Appeal Court. The former role is performed by the commander of the military unit to which the accused is attached. The British system allows any accused member of the Army or Air Force to elect the means of trial. Thus, he or she can request the case to go to court martial or a summary trial. The higher authority decides which of the two procedures to apply. In the case of a court martial, the higher authority refers the case to the Army Prosecuting Authority, which decides the type of court martial to be convened. Summary trials are reserved for minor offences committed by soldiers or non-commissioned officers and punishable with a maximum of 60 days’ custody or a fine amounting to no more than 28 days’ wages. In any event, the fact that the case has been assigned to a summary trial does not affect the right of the accused to opt for trial by court martial. A sentence imposed as a result of a summary trial can be appealed to the Summary Appeal Court. The latter is made up of a judge advocate, who presides, and two other officers. Any decision by the Summary Appeal Court can in turn be the subject of an appeal on points of law to the District Court.

Lastly, civilians working for the Armed Forces have their own court. It is called the Standing Civilian Court and was set up under the 1976 Armed Forces Act. It has jurisdiction only over civilians working for the Armed Forces and their dependants and British civilians who work for the Ministry of Defence or are under the command of a commanding officer outside the

677 Aspals Legal Pages, “Changes to the UK Court Martial System”, op. cit.
United Kingdom. The Standing Civilian Court is made up of a senior judge advocate who usually sits alone without a panel. However, in cases involving juveniles, assessors also attend the hearing. Unlike the court martial system, the Standing Civilian Court, as its name indicates, is a permanent court. The maximum sentence it can impose is twelve months’ imprisonment. Appeals against the decisions of the Standing Civilian Court go to a court martial.

In terms of jurisdiction *ratione loci*, under the British system, the question of military competence is determined by the place where the offence is committed. In the case of military or civil offences committed outside of Great Britain, it is the military courts which have jurisdiction. In principle, in the case of offences committed within Great Britain, civil offences fall to the remit of the ordinary courts while military offences come under the jurisdiction of the military justice system. However, this principle is not absolute because although it is up to the ordinary courts to decide where jurisdiction lies with regard to ordinary offences, they can waive that right and refer the case to the military courts. In practice, it is the military authorities who try military personnel for civil offences. It is also important to remember that ordinary criminal offences are considered to be military offences if the perpetrator is a member of the military. Nevertheless, some serious offences, including treason, murder, manslaughter, rape and genocide, as well as those in which the victim is a civilian, are tried by the ordinary criminal courts. It should also be stressed that, under the Army Act and identical sections of the other two Services Acts, “a court martial cannot be convened in the United Kingdom to try a person for having committed a grave breach of one of the Geneva Conventions of 1949”.

In terms of jurisdiction *ratione personae*, the military justice system encompasses both members of the Armed Forces and civilians working with them even though the two categories of defendant are tried by different courts. For the purposes of military justice, members of the Armed Forces are deemed to include all troops, non-commissioned officers and officers on active service in the Armed Forces as well as, in certain circumstances, reservists and retired officers.

681 Article 70 (1) of the 1955 Army Act.
28. United States of America

History

Military criminal jurisdiction in the United States of America has its origins in English law. During the first century and a half of its life as an independent nation, the United States continued to enforce English military criminal regulations. In 1789, the United States Congress adopted the principles and norms which had applied to British troops in the 17th and 18th centuries and which were known as the “Articles of War”. According to Major L.K. Hemperley and Captain K.L. Davies, the pro-independence rebel troops had already adopted the first “Articles of War” in 1775. These were amended by Congress one year later. To start with, the “Articles of War” applied solely to the Army and only in 1800 to the Navy. They remained in force, without any significant amendments, until 1920 when, as a result of the First World War, they were reviewed in order to incorporate important procedural changes. Later, in 1921, a Manual for Army Courts Martial and, in 1923, rules for naval courts and boards in the US Navy were published. After the Second World War, significant reforms were made to the military institution. The reform package included a review of the military justice system which had been severely criticized in several sections of the US press. In 1947, Congress adopted the National Security Act as a result of which the Ministry of War became the Department of Defence and the Air Force was separated from the Army. That same year, before the National Security Act had been adopted, the Army and Navy had submitted two bills to Congress containing regulations on military criminal jurisdiction. As a result of the changes made to the armed forces through the National Security Act, the Department of Defence decided to review the system of military justice and put forward a single set of laws to apply to all military bodies. As a consequence, in 1950, the Uniform Code of Military Justice came into force and in 1951 the Department of Defence issued a new Manual for Courts Martial.

Today the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts Martial form the touchstone for military criminal jurisdiction in the United

683 The Manual was revised in 1928.
684 The rules of procedure for the Navy were revised in 1937.
685 Several amendments have been made to the Manual since then.
States. Nevertheless, for the United States, technically speaking, it is more appropriate to talk about a system of military jurisdiction rather than a system of military criminal jurisdiction since what is known as US ‘military justice’ covers both the criminal sphere and the disciplinary sphere, in other words, non-judicial punishment. Several authors have correctly pointed out that in this system no clear distinction is made between criminal offences and breaches of discipline.686

‘Military Justice’

Even though the United States Constitution makes no reference to military courts, it is the source of law for the system of military jurisdiction. The legal basis for military courts is article I (section VIII) of the Constitution, which regulates the powers of Congress. Under this provision, the US Congress has the authority to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court of Justice. This authority, which also includes the power to issue both substantive and procedural norms, is distinct from the powers conferred under article III of the Constitution.687 Given that, with regard to justice, military courts have their basis in article I of the Constitution and not article III, some legal experts have argued that, in contrast to the ordinary courts, which are known as “constitutional courts”, they are “legislative courts”.688

The system of military criminal justice in the United States has two main distinguishing features: the role played by the executive and the temporary status of military courts. The degree to which the system is subordinate to the executive - whether to the military commanders, the Department of Defence or the President - is excessive. Professor Robert Kogod Goldman has quite rightly pointed out that the military justice system in the United States is not part of the judiciary but of the executive.689 There are no permanent military courts in the United States, except for the Court of Military Appeals. Courts martial are established whenever an offence has been committed and pro-

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687 Supreme Court, Case of Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65,79 (1858).

688 For example, see Alain Levasseur, Droit des Etats Unis, Ed. Dalloz, 2nd edition, Paris 1994, p.33.

ceedings have been opened following an investigation. They are convened on the orders of the military commanding officer of the alleged offender.

**Scope of jurisdiction**

The scope of jurisdiction of the US military justice system is determined by two basic criteria: the status of the individual offender and the nature of the offence. As Hemperley and Davies point out, “[b]efore charges can be brought in a criminal trial, a prosecutor (either civilian or military) must demonstrate both aspects of jurisdiction or the case cannot proceed. […] in order to punish or discipline an individual under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the military must have jurisdiction over the individual and the offence that has been committed”.

The jurisdiction *ratione personae* of military courts varies depending on whether it is peacetime or wartime. In peacetime, military courts are competent to try members of the Armed Forces. For the purposes of military jurisdiction, those considered to be members of the Armed Forces are military personnel on active duty, people who are accountable to a regular component of the Armed Forces, members of the National Guard who are in federal service, cadets studying at military academies, retired members of the military in receipt of pay and members of reserve components who are undergoing training. In principle, in peacetime, civilians cannot be subjected to military jurisdiction. Traditionally, the US Supreme Court has maintained that in peacetime a civilian cannot be removed from his natural judge, namely, a judge in an ordinary criminal court. In wartime, military jurisdiction is extended to civilians serving with the Armed Forces or accompanying the troops in the field, prisoners of war and, in the case of certain offences, civilians. Thus, the Uniform Code of Military Justice contains some offences which can be applied to civilians who therefore can be tried by military courts. Such offences include aiding the enemy (article 104) and espionage (article 106).

The jurisdiction *ratione materiae* of military courts is defined in the Uniform Code of Military Justice itself. Apart from the traditional military offences, according to the classification drawn up by Hemperley and Davies, it con-

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690 Lauren K. Hemperley and Kirk L. Davies, op. cit. [Spanish original, free translation.]
691 Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
692 Such as, for example, desertion, failure to obey orders, insubordinate conduct, etc…
693 A doctrinal classification which does not exist as such in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
tains various other categories of offence, such as ‘offences against law enforcement’, ‘conventional offences’ and offences described under General Article 134 of the Code. Under ‘offences against law enforcement’, they group “any type of conduct which directly contravenes law enforcement. This includes resisting arrest and escaping from custody. […] it also prohibits more deceitful attempts to subvert the law, such as obstructing justice, giving false testimony and refusing to testify without legitimate reason”.694 The so-called ‘conventional offences’ are “those [offences] which are normally found in civilian criminal codes: murder, offensive behaviour, robbery, wrongful use of controlled substances, etc”.695 Also included in this category are sodomy, extortion and arson. They constitute, therefore, what in certain doctrinal circles, are known as “‘militarized’ ordinary offences”. Lastly, article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, known as the General Article, contains a general provision declaring “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces” and “all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces” to be offences. Article 134 is open-ended and general but the Manual for Courts Martial lists the types of conduct that are punishable under the General Article. They include adultery, indecent assault, gambling with a subordinate, etc.696 However, the list is not exhaustive and other types of conduct can be punished by the military courts under General Article 134. For example, federal laws697 allow acts committed in military installations and classified as offences under the criminal legislation applicable in federal states to be punished within the military justice system under the general article, even when they not classified as offences in federal law or in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

It is important to point out that jurisprudence has traditionally demanded that, apart from the question of the status of the accused (namely, whether he or she is a member of the military or is treated as such) and the stipulation that the offence should be triable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, there should be some kind of link between the unlawful act and the service. Having originated in the field of law, this requirement does not appear in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This meant that, in one case in 1969, for example, the US Supreme Court held that the offences for which the individual in question was facing trial were not service-related and that therefore he should not be tried by a court martial but by the ordinary courts.698 However,

694 Lauren K. Hemperley and Kirk L. Davies, op. cit. [Spanish original, free translation.]
695 Ibidem. [Spanish original, free translation.]
this requirement has been overruled in recent years by the Supreme Court itself.\textsuperscript{699}

\textit{The Structure of the ‘Military Justice’ System}

Responsibility for organizing and operating the US military justice system lies with two bodies: the ‘convening authority’ and the military courts or courts martial.

The commanding officer or officer in charge of the alleged offender is the ‘convening authority’. This means that, given the temporary nature of US military courts, the authority has the authority to convene a military court to criminally prosecute the alleged offender. This authority can be exercised by the President of the United States of America, the Defence Secretary and the commander of the appropriate branch of the army, as well as other members of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{700} Proceedings conducted by special courts martial can also be convened on the orders of the commanding officer of the particular unit to which the alleged offender belongs or on the orders of any military officer to whom he or she is subordinate. The ‘convening authority’ plays a key role throughout the process of dispensing military justice. He or she has to decide whether an act of wrongdoing should be tried by a court martial or whether he or she, as the hierarchical superior of the offender, should treat it as a disciplinary matter. As well as ordering and conducting investigations, the convening authority also appoints the investigators. He or she also has the power to grant immunity to witnesses and pursue a pre-trial agreement. The convening authority also appoints the members who will sit on the court martial (whether it be a general, special or summary court martial). As Humperley points out, “the process for selecting members of the court can be unlawfully influenced by those in command (for example, attempts by the commanding officer or someone acting on his behalf to influence the course of the trial)”.\textsuperscript{701} Lastly, the convening authority can, either at his or her own discretion or at the request of one of the parties, reconsider or change the decision reached by the court martial and can even grant clemency. The convening authority is assisted by the Judge Advocate General for the branch of the services concerned.

Military criminal legislation provides for three categories of court martial: summary, special and general. The second tier of jurisdiction is ensured by the Court of Military Review and/or the Court of Military Appeals, depending on the nature of the sentence and the rank of the accused.

\textsuperscript{700} Articles 22, 23 and 24 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
\textsuperscript{701} Humperley and Davies, op. cit. [Spanish original, free translation.]
Responsibility for conducting summary courts martial lies with any commissioned officer who is a member of the military on active service with a higher rank than the accused. He or she does not have to have any legal qualifications. The jurisdiction of summary courts martial is limited to so-called ‘minor offences’, which are tantamount to what are known as ‘breaches of discipline’ in other systems of military justice. Commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and cadets cannot be tried by this kind of court. Summary courts martial can be convened by any officer who is higher in rank than the accused. Rather than being a criminal court, it is a disciplinary tribunal for the rank and file.

Special courts martial must be made up of at least three military officials, the highest-ranking of whom assumes the presidency. They are authorized to conduct proceedings related to any offence specified in the Uniform Code of Military Justice as long as it not punishable by death, dishonourable discharge, confinement for more than six months, hard labour without confinement for more than three months, among others. In practice, they have jurisdiction over any act which is considered sufficiently serious to be dealt with as a military criminal offence and not as a breach of discipline, such as one-off use of marijuana, being drunk on duty, abandoning one’s post and going absent without leave.

The general courts martial form the backbone of the US military court system. Each one is made up of at least five military officers and also has a legal officer who provides legal advice to the court and assists its members. The legal officer, who must be a qualified lawyer practising before the Supreme Court or the federal courts, must be appointed by the Judge Advocate General. General courts martial have jurisdiction over “any offence listed in the [Uniform Code of Military Justice]”. In practice, they try ‘serious offences’, leaving ‘minor offences’ to the jurisdiction of the special courts martial.

Judgments handed down by courts martial against a general or admiral or which carry a certain type of sentence are reviewed by the Court of Military Review which is made up of at least three military officers or civilians appointed by the Judge Advocate General. Decisions made by the Court of Military Review can in turn be challenged before the Court of Military Review.

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702 Article 19 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
703 Hemperley and Davies, op. cit. [Spanish original, free translation.]
705 They are: the death penalty, dismissal, dishonourable discharge and confinement for over one year.
Appeals. The latter is made up of three civilian judges appointed for a 15-year period by the President of the United States with the prior consent of the Senate. It has a status all of its own: it is the only court within military criminal jurisdiction that consists of non-military personnel, it is permanent in nature and, as pointed out by Francisco Rodríguez Segado, it is “the only civilian organ created under federal law whose decisions are not appealable before the United States Supreme Court”. Nevertheless, even though it is not possible to appeal decisions handed down by the Court of Military Appeals, an application for review can be made to the Supreme Court of Justice by writ of certiorari.

The President of the United States has a significant role within the ‘military justice’ system. Apart from having the ability to act as ‘convening authority’, no death sentence involving a general or an admiral can be implemented without his prior authorization. Sentences calling for the defendant to be discharged from the services have to be authorized in advance by the Department of Defence. The Uniform Code of Military Justice also gives extensive powers to the President with regard to the issuing of regulations on procedural matters and rules of evidence as well as those relating to proceedings conducted against military judges for any offences they may commit in the course of their work.

Military Commissions

In parallel to the system of military justice established through the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the President of the United States can, in time of emergency or war, order ‘military commissions’ to be set up to try certain offences. The composition and operation of such commissions, as well as the rules of procedure and evidence, penalties and principles of substantive law to be applied by them, are determined by the President or, as delegated by him, the Secretary for Defence. Such military commissions vary in terms of characteristics, composition, operation, ‘jurisdiction’, principles of substantive law and rules of procedure according to the provisions of the presidential order by which they are created.

Although such commissions are frequently called military courts, in reality they are a kind of commission of the executive with judicial functions. Their ‘jurisdiction’ can extend to civilians. There are few precedents for the use of

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706 Francisco Fernández Segado, “La justicia militar en el Derecho comparado”, op. cit., p.60. [Spanish original, free translation.]
707 Article 67a of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
708 Articles 6.a, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
military commissions in the recent history of the United States. One of the most well-known cases is that of the commando group\textsuperscript{709} which set out to enter US territory from a German submarine in order to sabotage factories, equipment and military installations in 1942. The incident took place at the height of the Second World War and, in the midst of declaring war, President Franklin D. Roosevelt set up a military commission to try the members of the commando for war crimes, in particular, for not displaying the necessary emblems to show that they were combatants. Those involved applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of \textit{habeas corpus}. The Court concluded that the persons involved were unlawful combatants and that, therefore, it was appropriate for them to be tried by a military commission.\textsuperscript{710} During the Second World War and later on, within the framework of the trials conducted against commanders of Axis troops for war crimes and crimes against humanity, several military commissions were set up in Germany and Asian countries. In the Yamashita case, the Supreme Court dismissed the applications for \textit{habeas corpus} and review of the decisions handed down by a military commission based in the Philippines and stated that the commission had not violated any law, treaty or military order in asserting its competence and that its decisions could not be reviewed on procedural grounds.\textsuperscript{711}

It would appear that the existence of an emergency situation should not suffice for such military commissions to be set up. For example, in the Milligan case\textsuperscript{712}, the Supreme Court quashed an order issued by President Lincoln in September 1883, followed by an order suspending \textit{habeas corpus}, which authorized alleged spies and collaborators to be tried by military commissions. The Court considered that martial rule could not be established when the ordinary courts were functioning in an adequate manner and their jurisdiction had not been obstructed. Four members of the Court took the view that it was Congress which should decide whether the civilian courts should be replaced by military courts, noting that such a prerogative should only exist in wartime. The Supreme Court also held that the trial by a ‘military commission’ of a civilian accused of disloyalty, an offence allegedly committed outside the theatre of military operations and in a place in which the ordinary courts were functioning normally, was contrary to the 5\textsuperscript{th} and 6\textsuperscript{th} amendments to the Constitution.\textsuperscript{713} Furthermore, the Court maintained that it was for the courts to decide what territory could be deemed to constitute the theatre of operations.\textsuperscript{714} In its ruling on the replacement of ordinary courts by

\textsuperscript{709} The commando group consisted of 7 Germans and one US citizen.
\textsuperscript{710} 317 U.S. 1, 29-30, 35 (1942)
\textsuperscript{711} 327 U.S.1 (1946)
\textsuperscript{712} 4 Wall 2.
\textsuperscript{713} 4 Wall. 2 (1866)
\textsuperscript{714} Ibid., 127
military courts in Hawaii in 1941, which was declared unconstitutional, the Court concluded that martial law had not sought to authorize the replacement of the ordinary courts by military courts.\textsuperscript{715}

On 13 November 2001, as a result of the 11 September attacks and within the framework of the Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks, which had been proclaimed on 14 September, President G.W. Bush approved an executive order allowing military commissions to be set up to try those responsible for the attacks as well as others. Without going into detail, since the subject goes beyond the remit of this study, it is worth citing what Robert Kogod Goldman said in this connection: “The Military Order issued by the President, as it stands, does not provide those basic procedural guarantees [namely, the right to an independent and impartial tribunal, the presumption of innocence, the right to defence counsel, the right to bring witnesses and to question the witnesses for the prosecution, the principle that criminal law cannot be applied retrospectively] and therefore does not comply with minimum international standards”.\textsuperscript{716}

29. Uruguay

History

Until 1943, when the Military Criminal Code was introduced, military criminal jurisdiction was governed by a law dating from 15 January 1919. Prior to that, the Military Code of 1884 had applied. During the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay had four successive constitutions: those of 1934, 1942, 1952 and 1967.

In the mid-1970’s, constitutional order began to break down and eventually a \textit{de facto} ‘military-civilian’ government was installed (1973-1985). On 15 April 1972, a ‘state of internal war’ was proclaimed and several laws were passed to allow the temporary suspension of various constitutional guarantees. On 10 July of the same year, the Law on State Security and Public Order (\textit{Ley de Seguridad del Estado y el Orden Público}), otherwise known as the ‘National Security Law’ (‘\textit{Ley de Seguridad Nacional}’), which replaced the declaration of a ‘state of internal war’, came into force. The new law suspended various rights for people accused of offences against state security and gave the military courts the authority to try civilians charged with those offences.

\textsuperscript{715} 31 Stat. 141, 153
\textsuperscript{716} Robert Kogod Goldman, op. cit. [Spanish original, free translation.]
In 1973, the state structures were reorganized and the National Security Council (Consejo de Seguridad Nacional - COSENA) was established.\(^{717}\) That same year, several constitutional guarantees were suspended indefinitely and authorization was given for people who were considered to be a threat to state security and public order to be detained indefinitely and for people suspected of being involved in ‘subversive activities’ to be kept in ‘preventive custody’.\(^{718}\) A few days later, the parliament was dissolved and the Armed Forces assumed de facto power, even though the President of the Republic remained in place. From 1976 onwards, a series of “Institutional Laws” (“Actos Institucionales”) changing the state structures and limiting or suspending fundamental rights and liberties were passed.

In 1979, in an attempt to legitimize the break-up of the existing institutions that had been started in 1976, the military government introduced a draft bill calling for a Constituent Assembly to be convened to adopt a new Uruguayan Constitution. Under the proposal, the Constitution was to be adopted by 25 generals and 26 civilians chosen by the Armed Forces. The Political Affairs Committee of the Armed Forces drafted the Constitution and in June, the ‘Council of State’ (‘Consejo de Estado’), the body which had replaced the Parliament and which was made up of 25 people appointed by the Armed Forces, voted in favour of the draft bill. The bill was adopted in July by the Council of the Nation (Consejo de la Nación), a body made up of 27 senior Armed Forces officers. Lastly, it was intended that the draft Constitution should be adopted by referendum in November of the same year. The text was published for the first time on 30 October. Despite the many laws preventing different categories of people and political sectors from exercising their right to vote, the majority of those who did vote rejected the document. That Constitution was therefore never adopted. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning the provisions it contained with regard to military courts because they are a good illustration of how military justice was conceived at that time, not only in Uruguay and the Southern Cone but also in most countries of Latin America. For example, article 151 of the draft stated that “military jurisdiction shall cover military offences, offences against the State and any offences which are used as a means of action or are connected or linked in any way at all with subversion or are related to war. Such offences shall fall to the jurisdiction of the military criminal courts even when the perpetrator is a civilian.

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\(^{717}\) This new body, which had not been established in the Constitution, was made up of the President of the Republic, the Ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, National Defence and Economy and Finance, the Director of the Office of Planning and the Budget, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Their responsibilities included security issues (Decree N° 163/973 of 23 February 1973).

\(^{718}\) Decree N° 393 of 1 June 1973.
Ordinary offences committed in peacetime shall remain subject to the provisions of law”.719

Under the de facto government, military jurisdiction was drastically expanded. In 1972, the so-called ‘offences against the State’ (‘delitos de lesa Nación’) were incorporated into the Military Criminal Code.720 The military courts had jurisdiction over such offences even if the perpetrators were civilians. Several offences contained in the ordinary Criminal Code were also transferred to the jurisdiction of the military courts721 and, in addition, any civilians who committed ‘offences that affect the morale of the Army and Navy’ (‘delitos que afectan la fuerza moral del Ejército y la Marina’), as specified in article 58 of the Military Criminal Code, were to be tried by them. The legal rights of the accused were drastically reduced or even suspended.722 In 1975, the military courts were granted sole and retroactive jurisdiction over all ‘offences against the State’ specified in the Military Criminal Code.723 The legal right of the Supreme Court of Justice to visit prisons was suspended. Lastly, in 1977, the Constitution was amended under Institutional Law No. 8 of 1 July 1977 in order to abolish the organizational autonomy of the judiciary and make all organs of ordinary and administrative justice answerable to the executive. The ordinary justice system ceased to be an independent authority.

In 1985, with the return to democratic institutions, the 1967 Constitution was fully reinstated. In 1986 the ‘Expiry Law of the Punitive Powers of the State’ (‘Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado’) was passed.724 It declared all criminal action for offences committed by members of the armed forces and police prior to 1 March 1985, either for political reasons or in the course of duty, to be lapsed, thereby ensuring that the gross violations of human rights committed under the de facto government would go unpunished. In 1988, the Supreme Court of Justice declared the law to be constitutional and reaffirmed that it constituted an amnesty law.725

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719 Draft Constitution of 1979, article 151. [Spanish original, free translation.]
720 Law 14,068 of 10 July 1972. ‘Offences against the State’ encompassed several different types of conduct, such as ‘attacking the Constitution’, ‘subversive association’ and ‘conspiring to usurp public authority’.
721 ‘Public incitement to commit an offence’, ‘defending conduct that is considered to be an offence’ and ‘conspiring to commit an offence’.
723 Law 14,493 of 29 December 1975 and Chapter VI bis of the Military Criminal Code.
725 Judgment N° 184 by the Supreme Court of Justice dated 2 May 1988.
Military Jurisdiction and International Law

The Current Situation

Military jurisdiction is regulated in the 1967 Uruguayan Constitution, article 253 of which states as follows: “Military jurisdiction is confined to military offences and to situations in which there is a state of war. Ordinary offences committed by members of the military in peacetime, wherever they are committed, shall be subject to ordinary jurisdiction”. In peacetime, on the other hand, military offences come under the jurisdiction of military courts.

Uruguayan military criminal jurisdiction is regulated through the 1943 Military Criminal Code, the Code of Military Criminal Procedure and the Military Court Organization Code. These three codes have been brought together into a single corpus of law, with Book I corresponding to the Military Criminal Code (articles 1 to 65), Book II to the Military Court Organization Code (articles 66 to 129) and Book III to the Code of Military Criminal Procedure (articles 130 to 514).

In terms of organization, military criminal jurisdiction, which is also called ‘military, naval or war jurisdiction’, varies depending on whether it is peacetime or wartime. In principle, all senior judges, judges and prosecutors within the military justice system must be members of the military on active service. However, retired military personnel and also, to a lesser extent, civilians can perform functions within the system. According to article 71 of the Military Court Organization Code, retired military personnel can undertake legal duties in the Supreme Court of Justice and the Supreme Military Court and can also hold the position of trial judge (juez de primera instancia), examining magistrate (juez militar de instrucción), court-appointed defence counsel and military prosecutor. In such circumstances, while they are carrying out legal duties and only for those purposes, retired military personnel are considered to be on active service, although they cannot be promoted. The military courts are also aided by legal advisers (‘asesores letrados’). These are military officers with the rank of major who have been appointed by the executive and who have been practising as a lawyer or judge for at least four years. With some clear-cut exceptions, all employees of the military justice system are members of the military. This means that, even though article 12 of the Military Criminal Code asserts that military criminal jurisdiction “is part […] of the country’s judicial body and its decisions are considered to have emanated from national justice”, as some experts on military law have admitted, it is in fact “an Armed Forces service whose fundamental objective is to

726 The Constitution has undergone several amendments, the most recent being in 1996.
727 Constitution of 1967, article 253. [Spanish original, free translation.]
maintain discipline and the material and moral strength of the armed institution.\textsuperscript{728}

In peacetime, military criminal jurisdiction consists of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Supreme Military Court, military trial judges, military examining magistrates, military prosecutors and investigating judges (\textit{jueces sumaríones}).\textsuperscript{729}

The Supreme Court of Justice, for the purposes of military criminal jurisdiction, hears motions to quash [\textit{recursos de casación}] and applications for the review [\textit{recursos de revisión}] of judgments handed down by the military courts and rules on conflicts of jurisdiction between the civilian courts and the military courts. For these purposes, the Supreme Court of Justice consists of two superior officers from the Armed Forces who are appointed by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Senate.\textsuperscript{730}

The Supreme Military Court, which has jurisdiction throughout the country, is made up of five judges (\textit{Ministros}), of whom three are superior officers from the Army, one is a superior officer from the Navy and the other is either a civilian lawyer, who is assigned the rank and salary of a colonel, or a military lawyer who is a superior officer. They are appointed by the executive with the consent of the Senate for a period of four years. The highest-ranking and/or longest-serving judge presides over the court. The Supreme Military Court hears appeals against judgments handed down by the trial courts, gives its opinion on all orders for proceedings to be stayed and all trial court judgments which have not been the subject of appeal, deals with requests and enquiries from the Minister of Defence about military justice matters and rules on conflicts of jurisdiction between different military courts. The Supreme Military Court is also the governing authority of the military justice system in that it is responsible for “the managerial, disciplinary, consultative and financial oversight of the functions of military justice”.\textsuperscript{731} The Supreme Military Court has “sole and exclusive” authority for conducting trials relating to the judicial responsibility of military judges, including the pre-trial

\textsuperscript{728} Néstor J. Bolentini, Código Penal Militar, Ley de Seguridad del Estado, Código de Organización de los Tribunales Militares, Código de Procedimiento Penal Militar, Centro Militar - Biblioteca General Artigas, Volume N° 57, Montevideo, 1976, p.15 (commentary on article 12 of the Military Criminal Code). [Spanish original, free translation.]

\textsuperscript{729} Article 72 of the Military Courts Organization Code.

\textsuperscript{730} Article 508 of the Code of Military Criminal Procedure.

\textsuperscript{731} Article 76, paragraph 4 of the Military Courts Organizational Code. [Spanish original, free translation.]
impeachment proceedings (antejuicio),\textsuperscript{732} and is the disciplinary body for judges who sit in the military justice system.

Trial judges are appointed by the executive for a four-year period. The post can be held by military lawyers with the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander as well as by colonels or captains who are not qualified as lawyers. In either case, the rank of the accused must not be higher than that of the judge. Trial judges are responsible for trying cases on the basis of indictments (sumarios) compiled by examining magistrates.

Military examining magistrates are appointed for a four-year period by the Military Supreme Court. They must be officers and lawyers with the rank of major or lieutenant commander or, if they are not lawyers, they must hold the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander. According to article 82, their task is to “prepare indictments against non-commissioned officers, officers and commanding officers from the Army and Navy accused of military offences to the point where it is possible to bring charges. They are also responsible for continuing and completing indictments relating to military offences committed by non-commissioned officers from the unit in question or officers which, in cases of obvious emergency, have been commenced by investigating judges”.\textsuperscript{733} Military examining magistrates draw up indictments at the request of the Ministry of National Defence.

The commander of each army or naval unit may appoint an officer as an investigating judge if a military offence is committed and it is not possible for an examining magistrate to attend or he or she is delayed. Investigating judges can only become involved on receipt of a written order from the unit commander and their role is confined to “gathering basic details about the offence so that the investigation does not go wrong and shall cease upon the arrival of the examining magistrate to whom he shall hand over the records of the proceedings”.\textsuperscript{734} The investigating judge is in fact a kind of “ad hoc examining magistrate”.

The prosecutorial role (Ministerio público) in military trials is performed by military prosecutors who are appointed by the executive. They must hold the rank of at least colonel or lieutenant colonel or their equivalent in the navy and they are attached to the Ministry of National Defence, which has responsibility for trying and punishing any breaches of discipline committed by military prosecutors in the course of their work. Military prosecutors bring criminal actions and participate in investigations. They can request custody

\textsuperscript{732} Ibidem, article 121.
\textsuperscript{733} Ibid., article 82. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{734} Ibidem. [Spanish original, free translation.]
measures with regard to suspects and are responsible for ensuring “strict compliance with criminal laws and procedure” and “the proper administration of military justice”.735

The Code of Military Criminal Procedure establishes four stages of proceedings to be followed in peacetime: preliminary judicial interrogation of the person under arrest \((\text{procedimiento ‘presumarial’})\), an investigative phase \((\text{instrucción})\), a trial hearing and an appeal procedure. However, in the case of persons caught in the act of committing certain offences\(^{736}\) as well as “essentially military offences”\(^{737}\) punishable with 30 years’ imprisonment, the peacetime military courts can expedite the summary procedure that is available to the special wartime courts \((\text{tribunales extraordinarios en tiempo de guerra})\). It should be noted that included among such offences are “crimes and offences committed in the line of duty and when carrying out assignments”.\(^{738}\) The sentences passed as a result of such expedited proceedings, when conducted in peacetime, are reviewed by the Supreme Military Court and communicated to the Ministry of Defence.

In time of war, military criminal jurisdiction consists of special courts \((\text{Tribunales Extraordinarios})\). These can be convened by the Army in the field, by the Navy on board ship and “in any military garrison or militarized area under siege where there are no ordinary military courts and they shall function as such”.\(^{739}\) Special courts consist of court martial judges, an examining magistrate and a military prosecutor. The court martial judges, as well as the examining magistrate and the prosecutor, must all be members of the military. Special courts are competent to try “all cases of indictment for military offences which are submitted to military jurisdiction”.\(^{740}\) Courts martial are made up of three judges appointed by the commander of the military or naval unit, militarized area or naval ship in question. The commander of that unit also appoints the prosecutor. The Code of Military Criminal Procedure establishes an expedited summary procedure to be used by special courts, the decisions of which are reviewed \(\text{ex officio}\) by a review board \((\text{Consejo de Revisión})\). The Board is appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, who also presides over it.

\(^{735}\) Ibid., article 90. [Spanish original, free translation.]

\(^{736}\) These are: serious insubordination, treason, rebellion, sedition, mutiny, crimes and offences committed in the line of duty, and other criminal offences.

\(^{737}\) Article 310 of the Code of Military Criminal Procedure.

\(^{738}\) Ibid., article 311. [Spanish original, free translation.]

\(^{739}\) Article 91 of the Military Courts Organization Code. [Spanish original, free translation.]

\(^{740}\) Ibid., article 94. [Spanish original, free translation.]
The Military Criminal Code gives a broad definition of what constitutes a military offence, stating that they are “acts which are punishable under this Code, military laws, military wartime edicts and the Army and Navy Regulations.”  As Colonel Bolentini has recognized, “rather than defining a military offence, the article points to the official sources for military offences in peacetime and wartime.”

In terms of jurisdiction *ratione personae*, the military courts are competent to try military personnel and civilians employed by the Armed Forces (*los 'equiparados'*) who commit military offences, military personnel who commit ordinary offences in the line of duty or while on duty, civilians who are involved in the commission of a military offence perpetrated by a member of the military, and any civilian or member of the military who commits an ‘offence against the State’ or various other offences specified in the Military Criminal Code.

To those should be added the jurisdictional powers conferred on them through military laws issued in peacetime or wartime and military edicts issued in wartime. In addition, when a member of the military commits an act which is both a military offence and an ordinary offence, it is the military courts which have jurisdiction.

While in principle ordinary offences committed by military personnel come under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, in reality, by invoking the concept of the “offence […] committed for the purpose of, or on account of, [Spanish original, free translation.]

741 Article 1 of the Military Criminal Code.


743 As a result of Law N° 14068 of 10 July 1972 which amended the Military Criminal Code, jurisdiction for trying ‘offences against the State’ was transferred to the military courts. Such offences, which are established under article 330 of the Constitution, relate to attacks on the Constitution. They had not been defined as offences under ordinary law although they could have been seen as similar to what the Criminal Code calls ‘offences against the motherland’ (‘Delitos contra la Patria’). Under the military government, the notion of ‘offences against the State’ became one of the fundamental tools of repression used by the Armed Forces to put down any kind of political opposition, whether peaceful or armed. Offences against the State are defined in article 60 of the Military Criminal Code.

744 The Military Criminal Code lists several offences in which the perpetrator or principal can be a civilian. They include “violent action against or by those who perform military guard duties” (‘desafuero contra los que ejercen y por los que ejercen vigilancia militar’) (article 46), “attacks on material strength” (‘ataques a la fuerza material’) (article 51), “espionage” (article 54) and “attacks on moral strength” (‘ataques a la fuerza moral’) (article 58).

745 Article 253 of the Constitution and article 4 of the Military Criminal Code.
service” 746, the military courts seize jurisdiction over such offences. The Supreme Court of Justice had, on many occasions, found reliance on this concept to be unconstitutional. 747 However, in 1970, it took the view that the norm on which it was based was constitutional because, in its opinion, military offences also encompassed ordinary offences committed by serving military personnel that were detrimental to military duties. 748 This means that, from the perspective of jurisdiction ratione materiae, the military courts can try both standard military offences and ordinary offences which have been ‘militarized’. 749

Criminal action with regard to military matters is public and responsibility for bringing such action lays with the Office of the Military Prosecutor (Fiscalía Militar). The Code of Military Criminal Procedure does not allow the victim or aggrieved party to introduce a civil action to the proceedings in the case of an “offence of a military nature” in his or her own right. However, they can participate as an auxiliary party but “their involvement shall always be subordinate to that of the [Military] Prosecutor”. 750 Consequently, it is not possible for them to appeal against the dismissal of cases, court rulings on procedural matters or judgments on the merits of a case.

30. Venezuela

History

Following the invasion of Spain by Napoleon’s troops in 1808, the move towards independence accelerated. In 1810, the dignitaries of Caracas set up the Supreme Government Council to Protect the Rights of King Fernando VII (Junta Suprema de Gobierno Defensora de los Derechos del Rey Fernando VII), who was being held by the French. The Council convened a meeting of delegates from all the provinces of Venezuela. The Congress, which was held in 1811, declared independence and adopted the first Constitution of Venezuela. The 1811 Constitution implicitly recognized military jurisdiction.

746 Article 59, paragraph 3, of the Military Criminal Code. [Spanish original, free translation.]
749 The Military Criminal Code has a chapter entitled “Ordinary criminal offences which constitute military offences” (Chapter VI of the Special Part of the Code entitled “Concerning Offences”).
750 Article 133 of the Code of Military Criminal Procedure. [Spanish original, free translation.]
Article 176 stipulated that “No citizen of the provinces of the State, other than those employed in the Army, Navy or the Militia and who are in service at the time, shall be bound by military laws or suffer punishments stemming from such laws”.\textsuperscript{751} Article 181 went on to state that: “There shall be no personal jurisdiction of any kind, the nature of the subject matter shall be determined solely by the judges who are competent to hear cases and, in cases relating to matters that are not relevant to their profession or career, the employees of any of the branches shall be subject to trial by the ordinary judges and courts in the same way as other citizens”.\textsuperscript{752} The 1811 Constitution never really entered into force because, once the monarchy had been restored and Napoleon’s troops had been expelled, the Spanish Crown, whose armies in the General Captaincy of Venezuela, as it was then known, were headed by General Morillo, set about winning back the territory. In the case of Venezuela, the ‘reconquest’ lasted ten years.

In 1819, Venezuela’s independence was finally sealed and the Angostura Constitution, which was intended to govern both Venezuela and Colombia, was adopted. The 1819 Constitution established military jurisdiction. Article 11, under “General Provisions”, stated that, “Members of the military as well as the clergy have their special courts, their particular types of trial and orders which are binding only on them”.\textsuperscript{753} A special jurisdiction was also established for the Admiralty.\textsuperscript{754} Article 13 of the Constitution stipulated that “[a]ll jurisdiction is personal and can under no circumstances be extended to or encompass other individuals, however close their connections may be”.\textsuperscript{755} The Cúcuta Constitution, which unified Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia, was adopted in 1821. However, in-fighting between the different factions and leaders eventually led to the three territories, which had once been amalgamated as the Viceroyalty of New Granada, breaking apart once and for all, thereby putting an end to Simón Bolívar’s dream of creating a single large South American state. In 1830, Venezuela finally became a sovereign republic under the leadership of General José Antonio Paëz. The Constitution adopted that year made no explicit reference to military jurisdiction. Venezuelan history during the 19th century was characterized by conservative or military governments and repeated coups d’état.\textsuperscript{756}

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\textsuperscript{751} Constitution of 1811, article 176. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{752} Ibid., article 181. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{753} Constitution of 1819, “General Provisions”, article 11. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{754} Ibid., article 12.
\textsuperscript{755} Ibid., article 13. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\textsuperscript{756} Tulio Halperin Donghi, Historia contemporánea de América Latina, Alianza editorial, Madrid 1972, p.254 and following.
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In 1933 the Code of Military and Naval Justice (Código de Justicia Militar y Naval) was issued but it did not apply for long because in 1938 the Code of Military Justice (Código de Justicia Militar) was introduced and remained in force, with some amendments757, until 1999. In 1947, a new constitution was adopted but, one year later, General Marcos Pérez Jiménez led a coup that resulted in the establishment of a military government which was to last until 1958. Once institutional normality had been restored, a new constitution was adopted in 1961 and remained in force until 1999. The 1961 Constitution made no reference to military courts but Title VII, entitled “Concerning the Judiciary and the Prosecuting Authority (Ministerio Público)”, implicitly allowed them.758 Military courts were instituted through the Code of Military Justice. They had broad jurisdiction which, through the concept of the service-related act (acto de servicio), encompassed any human rights violations committed by military personnel that constituted offences. As a result of the armed activities of rebel groups, between 1961 and 1971, emergency decrees were issued giving the military courts extensive jurisdiction over civilians.759 In 1976, the Basic Law on Security and Defence (Ley Orgánica de Seguridad y Defensa), granting the military courts the authority to try various offences in the event of a state of emergency, was passed.760

Under the 1961 Constitution, military criminal jurisdiction continued to be regulated through the 1938 Code of Military Justice. One of the most controversial aspects of the Code, apart from the fact that it was not possible to bring a civil action for damages and that military courts had jurisdiction over serious human rights violations perpetrated by military personnel, were the extensive powers conferred on the President of the Republic in his capacity as a military justice official. According to article 54 of the Code, the President of the Republic could suspend investigations and trials and order cases to be dismissed on grounds of public order or to suit “the interests of the Nation”. On several occasions these powers were used by the President of the Republic to halt proceedings which had been brought in connection with serious human

757 Especially those of 1958 and 1959.
758 Article 204: “Judicial authority is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice and by the other Courts specified in the basic law”. [Spanish original, free translation.]
760 The offences were: going on strike or stopping work in the public services or sectors of ‘socio-economic life’, revealing security or national defence information, undertaking construction work in security zones without the prior authorization of the Ministry of Defence, and refusing to enlist in the military or civil defence force in the event of a call-up (articles 33 to 39 of the Basic Law on Security and Defence).
rights violations. For example, in March 1992, the President of Venezuela issued decree No. 2166 ordering a stay of proceedings in the military trial of those allegedly responsible for the death of a civilian in January 1990 in San Cristóbal (Táchira State) and the release of nine members of the military who had been found guilty of murdering another civilian who had died on 10 November 1988. 761

As a result of a case that was submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in connection with the massacre at El Amparo 762, a major debate began about that particular provision of the Code of Military Justice as well as about the fact that it was not possible to bring an action for damages in military trials and that human rights violations committed by military personnel were subject to military jurisdiction. On 10 February 1994, the Venezuelan State made a commitment in writing to the Inter-American Commission stating that it would take steps to amend the Code of Military Justice.

In 1998, the 1938 Code of Military Justice was replaced by the Basic Code of Military Justice (Código Orgánico de Justicia Militar) 763. However, the new military statute was a virtual reproduction of the 1938 code in almost every respect. Rather than being a new code, it partially amended some of the provisions relating to the role of the military prosecutor’s office (Fiscalía) and the principle of orality in trial proceedings. Despite the commitment that had been made to the Inter-American Commission in 1994, no amendments were made to any of the fundamental aspects of military jurisdiction. The powers conferred on the President under article 54 of the 1938 Code, the impossibility of bringing a civil action for damages and the ability of the military courts to try serious human rights violations all remained in place under the “new” military criminal legislation.

At the end of 1998, a new constitution was introduced: the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. It put limits on military jurisdiction as far as human rights violations committed by members of the Armed Forces were concerned. Article 261 states that: “Military criminal jurisdiction is an integral part of the Judiciary and its judges shall be selected through competition. The extent of their powers, their organization and working methods shall be regulated under the accusatorial system and in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Code of Military Justice. Ordinary offences, human rights viola-

762 This involved the extrajudicial execution of 14 people by members of the security forces on 29 October 1988 in the state of Apure.
tions and crimes against humanity shall be tried by the ordinary courts. The jurisdiction of the military courts is confined to offences of a military nature”.764 Article 29 of the Constitution also states that “[…] human rights violations and crimes against humanity shall be investigated and tried by the military courts. Such offences are exempt from any benefits that might ensue from their impunity, including pardon and amnesty”.765

Despite these clear constitutional provisions, the necessary legal changes have not been made to the military justice system and the 1998 Basic Code of Military Justice remains in force. Nevertheless, in an obiter dictum relating to a 2002 judgment, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia), sitting in full session, took the view that “any proceedings conducted by the military courts, to the extent that they may not comply with the constitutional and legal provisions relating to the procedure to be followed in such courts, can be challenged by those concerned by making use of the remedies and actions the legal system provides for such purposes”.766

The Current Situation

For the most part, military justice is currently regulated under the Basic Code of Military Justice of 1998767 which entered into force on 1 July 1999.

Venezuelan military justice is fully incorporated into the executive branch of government. Under article 28 of the Basic Code of Military Justice, the following are military justice officials: the President of the Republic, the Minister of Defence, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army or the Navy in the field, the commanders of military or naval jurisdictions and other Armed Forces officials. The powers of the President of the Republic in his capacity as a military justice official are extremely broad. According to article 54 of the Code, he has the power to order the trial of generals and admirals; order military proceedings not to be opened in specific cases if he believes that doing so would be damaging to national interests; order military proceedings to be stayed at any stage, if he believes it to be necessary; grant pardons; and commute sentences. For his part, the Minister of Defence, in his capacity as a military justice official, has the power to order the trial of all other members of the military and is responsible for monitoring the administration of military justice.768 However, the Constitutional Division of the Supreme Tribunal of

764 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, article 261. [Spanish original, free translation.]
765 Ibid., article 29. [Spanish original, free translation.]
766 2002 Judgment, Judge Rapporteur Dr. Rafael Pérez Perdomo. Case Nº 2002-00018. [Spanish original, free translation.]
767 Gaceta Oficial Nº 5263 Extraordinario, 17 September 1998
768 Basic Code of Military Justice of 1998, article 54.
Justice has challenged these powers. In a 2001 judgment on an application for enforcement of rights (*recurso de amparo*), it took the view that, in accordance with article 266, point 3, of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, “only [this Supreme Tribunal of Justice sitting in] full session and no other body, not even the President of the Republic or the military authorities, can determine which officials or general officers or admirals from the National Armed Forces deserve to be brought to trial […].”

The military courts have jurisdiction *ratione personae* and *ratione materiae* over: military offences committed by members of the military or civilians, jointly or separately; ordinary offences committed by military personnel in military units or installations while undertaking military duties or service-related acts or on assignment or because of them; and associated offences (*delitos conexos*) when the military offence carries the same or a heavier penalty than the equivalent ordinary offence. Ordinary offences committed by military personnel which are not linked to service come under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, except when the ordinary offence in question carries the same or a heavier penalty. As for associated offences, the Basic Code of Military Justice stipulates that these are to be understood to mean offences committed simultaneously by two or more people working together; offences committed by two or more people in different places but planned together in advance; offences committed as a means of perpetrating other offences or in order to facilitate doing so; offences committed to ensure that other offences go unpunished; and any other offences that may have been committed by a defendant who is facing trial for any of the offences already mentioned. However, in the case of associated offences, proceedings can only be started on the orders of the Minister of Defence or the commander of the military or naval jurisdiction where the offence carrying the highest sentence was committed. Lastly, it should be pointed out that the military courts are also authorized to try several offences specified in the ordinary Criminal Code and in the Basic Law on Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances (*Ley Orgánica sobre Sustancias Estupefacientes y Psicotrópicas*).

The Basic Code of Military Justice contains a long list of offences: offences against the integrity, independence and liberty of the Nation; offences against the independence and security of the Nation, armed uprising against the lawful authorities and piracy (articles 128 to 135, 138, 139, 144 and 153 of the Criminal Code).

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769 Judgment N° 151 of 9 February 2001. [Spanish original, free translation.]
770 Basic Code of Military Justice of 1998, article 123.
771 Ibid., article 21.
772 Ibid., article 133.
773 These are: offences against the independence and security of the Nation, armed uprising against the lawful authorities and piracy (articles 128 to 135, 138, 139, 144 and 153 of the Criminal Code).
774 The following offences come under this heading: betrayal of the motherland and espionage (articles 464 to 473 of the Code).
against international law;\(^775\) rebellion;\(^776\) offences against the order and security of the Armed Forces;\(^777\) offences against military duty and honour;\(^778\) offences against military decorum;\(^779\) offences against the military oath (\textit{delitos contra la fé militar});\(^780\) offences against military administration; and offences against the administration of military justice. It should be noted that the Code has a chapter entitled “Offences against People and Property”. Included under this heading are ordinary offences committed as a result of service. For example, article 573 calls for the punishment of any member of the military “who, while performing service-related acts or carrying out a service-related assignment, makes unnecessary use of weapons or any other form of violence against any person”.\(^781\)

In terms of the jurisdiction of military courts, the Basic Code of Military Justice distinguishes between peacetime and wartime or a state of emergency. It states that in all cases, at all times, the following shall come under military criminal jurisdiction: officers, specialists and individual members of the troop or ship’s company, whatever their position in the hierarchy and whatever the circumstances; students at the country’s military and naval colleges who commit offences which are not established or punishable under the rules of the college in question but are punishable under the Code or other military laws and regulations; persons treated as members of the military (\textit{los asimilados a militar}); imprisoned military personnel; and employees and workers who are not formally attached to the military but who are working in military establishments or facilities and who commit an offence or misdemeanour on those premises.\(^782\) In wartime or when guarantees have been suspended, the jurisdiction of the military courts shall be extended to include prisoners of war; anyone who for any reason or purpose is accompanying the troops and who commits an offence or misdemeanour on territory covered by the security

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\(^775\) These consist of various grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the uses of war (articles 474 and 475 of the Code).
\(^776\) Basic Code of Military Justice of 1998. articles 476 to 487.
\(^777\) The following offences come under this heading: mutiny, uprising, false alarm, insulting a sentinel, the flag or the Armed Forces (articles 488 to 506 of the Code) and allowing prisoners to escape.
\(^778\) Usurping and abusing authority, insubordination, disobedience, desertion, abandonment of service, negligence, wilfully rendering oneself unfit for service (\textit{inutilización voluntaria para el servicio}) and failure to offer assistance (articles 507 to 549 of the Code).
\(^779\) This includes cowardice.
\(^780\) These are forgery and misrepresentation (articles 567 to 569 of the Code).
\(^781\) Basic Code of Military Justice of 1998, article 573. [Spanish original, free translation.]
\(^782\) Ibid., article 124.
services; and persons not known to the army who commit certain offences in the area of operations.  

The jurisdiction *ratione loci* of the military courts encompasses “Venezuelan territory and territorial waters, ships and aircraft belonging to the National Armed Forces and any foreign territory occupied by national forces”. In occupied enemy territory, the military courts have the authority to try any offence committed by any person.

In terms of the organization and powers of the military courts, the Basic Code of Military Justice distinguishes between peacetime, a state of war and periods when guarantees have been suspended. In peacetime, military justice consists of the Supreme Court of Justice (*Corte Suprema de Justicia*) - rechristened Supreme Tribunal of Justice (*Tribunal Supremo de Justicia*) in the new Constitution, the Martial Court (*Corte Marcial*), permanent courts martial (*consejos de guerra permanentes*), temporary courts martial (*consejos de guerra accidentales*), permanent military first instance judges (*jueces militares de primera instancia permanentes*) and temporary examining magistrates (*jueces accidentales de instrucción*).

The Supreme Tribunal of Justice (formerly the Supreme Court of Justice) hears applications for annulment on various grounds (*recursos de casación y de nulidad*) in connection with verdicts handed down by the military courts. The Supreme Tribunal also conducts pre-trial impeachment proceedings (*antejuicio*) against generals or admirals from the Armed Forces who are facing prosecution.

The Martial Court is made up of five main members and ten substitute members who are appointed by the Supreme Court of Justice on the basis of proposals submitted by the Minister of Defence. Members of the Martial Court must be superior officers of the Armed Forces or lawyers who have been practising professionally for three years. Four of the main members must be superior officers of the Armed Forces and the one who is most senior in rank and service presides over the court. The Martial Court is the court of original

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783 These include, among others, betrayal of the motherland, espionage, offences against international law, rebellion and offences against the order and security of the Armed Forces, as well as any offences stipulated in military edicts issued by military commanders.

784 Basic Code of Military Justice of 1998, article 123. [Spanish original, free translation.]

785 Ibid., article 126.

786 Article 266 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. It should be noted that this type of procedure was established under the 1961 Constitution (article 215) but did not apply to generals and admirals.
jurisdiction for trials against army generals and naval admirals as well as for members of courts martial and judge advocates who have committed offences in the course of carrying out their duties. It is also the court of review and appeal for judgments handed down by the courts martial.

Permanent courts martial are made up of three panel members, two of whom must be officers with the rank of at least major. The third member can be a lawyer who is formally attached to the military. The highest-ranking and longest-serving officer presides over the court martial. The panel members are appointed by the Martial Court on the basis of names put forward by the Minister of Defence. Courts martial are the courts of original jurisdiction for all cases brought against superior and subordinate officers of the Armed Forces, members of the troop and civilians who are subject to military jurisdiction. They also hear appeals relating to proceedings conducted initially by the permanent military first instance judges. The permanent courts martial also perform the functions of sentencing tribunals (tribunales de ejecución de sentencia).

Permanent military trial judges must be members of the military on active service or lawyers who have been incorporated into the military and hold the rank of at least captain or, in the case of the navy, lieutenant. They are appointed by the respective court martial from a list of three officers and three lawyers submitted by the Minister of Defence for each court. Permanent military first instance judges have a dual role: they act as examining magistrate (juez de instrucción) for all offences for which courts martial are the competent court of original jurisdiction and the trial judge (juez de la causa) in cases of desertion, disobedience and types of insubordination which do not involve insulting or physically assaulting a superior. Permanent military courts of first instance (juzgados militares permanentes de primera instancia) also act as courts of preliminary investigation (tribunales de control).

The post of temporary examining magistrate is provided for in the event that no permanent military first instance judge is available for the jurisdictional territory in question. In such circumstances, the commander of the garrison concerned may appoint officers under his command to act as temporary examining magistrate and temporary prosecutor and swear them in.

For the purposes of military criminal jurisdiction, the Code interprets ‘wartime’ to mean when war has been declared as well as when it exists de facto. The suspension of constitutional guarantees through presidential decree is also treated in the same way as wartime. Under military criminal jurisdiction in wartime, the permanent peacetime military courts can carry on operating but only by implementing the extraordinary wartime procedures. Military criminal jurisdiction in wartime consists of the commanders-in-chief of the
main corps and units of the Armed Forces, the commanders of military units that are operating independently or are unable to communicate with central command, garrison commanders, the temporary courts martial and the Supreme Court Martial (Consejo Supremo de Guerra).

Temporary courts martial are set up for each specific case and are made up of three main members who are appointed by the commander of the military unit in question. There are three types of temporary court martial: one for the rank and file in the army or navy, one for noncommissioned officers and one for superior officers of the Armed Forces and generals and admirals. The main difference between them is the military rank which the members of the court martial and other military justice officials must hold.

The Supreme Court Martial is convened on a case-by-case basis and is made up of the five officers in the military unit in question who are most senior in rank and authority, all of whom are appointed by the head of the army. The Supreme Court Martial hears appeals against the verdicts of the temporary courts martial. Its decisions are not normally open to appeal but it is possible to request annulment on certain grounds (recursos de casación y de nulidad) as well as review (recursos de revisión). Amnesties and pardons can also apply to them.

The prosecutorial function within military criminal jurisdiction (Ministerio Público) is performed by the Office of the Attorney-General of the National Armed Force (Fiscalía General de la Fuerza Armada Nacional). The Military Attorney-General (Fiscal General Militar) fulfills this role in the Martial Court and the military prosecutors (fiscales militares) do so in the permanent courts martial. Military prosecutors are appointed by the President of the Republic. Military prosecutors in military courts, whether in the Martial Court or courts martial, must hold the same rank as the presiding judge of the court in question. In the case of temporary courts martial, the military prosecutor is appointed by the commander of the military unit in question. The Military Attorney-General and the military prosecutors represent military justice in all military criminal proceedings, are a party to such proceedings and can challenge the decisions taken by military courts. It is important to point out that, under a 2002 law, military prosecutors “are obliged to abide by the instructions and guidelines dispensed by the Attorney-General of the Republic and shall inform him, whenever requested to do so, about the current situation of any military trial”.787

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787 Article 5 of the Basic Law on the Office of the Public Prosecutor (Ministerio Público), May 2002. [Spanish original, free translation.]
Military criminal jurisdiction has an Armed Forces Judge Advocates’ Service (Servicio de la Auditoría de las Fuerzas Armadas). This consists of a Judge Advocate General (Auditor General), an Assistant Judge Advocate (Auditor auxiliar) and the judge-advocates attached to permanent courts martial and permanent military first instance courts. The President of the Republic is free to appoint and remove the Judge Advocate General and other judge advocates, all of whom must be lawyers who are formally attached to the military. In the case of temporary courts martial, the judge advocate is appointed by the commander of the military unit in question. The Armed Forces Judge Advocates’ Service advises the President of the Republic, Ministry of Defence and military courts on military justice matters. The Judge Advocate General is also responsible for supervising the work of the courts, prosecuting authorities and defence counsel.

Lastly, the military justice system has its own Military Law School (Escuela de la Judicatura Militar) and, in terms of investigations, is supported by the Military Intelligence Directorate (Dirección de Inteligencia Militar) and the Military Police. The Military Intelligence Directorate was restructured following the introduction of the Basic Code of Military Justice to include an office of military criminal investigation, which is in turn made up of a crime investigation division, a criminology division and a forensic medicine division. The Military Police perform the functions of judicial police. The Military Law School provides legal training for Armed Forces officers so that they can carry out their military justice work.

Several types of proceedings are established in the Code: an ordinary procedure (procedimiento ordinario) (consisting of a preliminary investigation followed by a court hearing); a special procedure (procedimiento especial) for cases in which the accused has been caught in the act; a trial before the Martial Court with no right of appeal (procedimiento en única instancia ante la Corte Marcial) except to seek annulment (recurso de casación); and the extraordinary procedures (procedimientos extraordinarios) used by the temporary courts martial and the Supreme Court Martial which apply in wartime or when constitutional guarantees have been suspended. The latter are characterized by their speed and summariness. Several provisions of the ordinary Basic Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Orgánico Procesal Penal) also apply to military criminal jurisdiction where procedural matters are concerned.788

788 They are: Book Two, Book Three (except for Titles IV, VI and VII), Book Four and Book Five of the Basic Code of Criminal Procedure (Article 592 of the Basic Code of Military Justice).
The bringing of military criminal actions is public and undertaken at the initiative of the authorities except in cases where it is necessary for the action to be brought by a private party. However, in military criminal proceedings the investigative phase can only be opened on the orders of the competent authority which, as the case may be, could be the President of the Republic, the Minister of Defence, the heads of military regions, garrison commanders, the commanders of theatres of operations or the heads of military units in the field.

Conflicts of authority between military courts are resolved by the commander of the respective jurisdiction. In the case of conflicts between military courts attached to different military or naval jurisdictions, it is the Martial Court which decides. If there is a conflict between a military court and a civilian court, it is the Supreme Court of Justice which must rule. Under the Basic Code of Military Justice, military courts are given a kind of privileged position so that, in the case of ordinary offences for which punishment is the same or more severe under the Basic Code of Military Justice, all those implicated, whether military personnel or civilians, are subject to the military justice system.789 Military courts are also permitted to take certain procedural steps in cases which fall within the jurisdiction of the civilian courts.790

According to the Basic Code of Military Justice, any Venezuelan, whether civilian or military, can bring charges in cases of treason, espionage or ordinary offences committed by military personnel who are subject to military jurisdiction. The accuser is a party to the proceedings, must attend all sessions of the trial, can submit and rebut evidence and bring and question witnesses. However, the ‘accuser’ cannot claim any kind of compensation. Paradoxically, and contrary to the situation under ordinary criminal law, the Code does not recognize the concept of civil action (parte civil). It is therefore not possible to bring a civil action for the payment of damages caused by offences subject to the jurisdiction of the military courts, whether they be military or ordinary. This can only be done in the civilian courts, once the military courts have reached a verdict on the case in question.791

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789 Basic Code of Military Justice, article 128.
790 Ibid., article 127.
791 Ibid., articles 3 and 12.
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