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THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- 10 NGO incidents this period
- NGO staff fatality in Kandahar
- Increase in criminality within Jalalabad City
- Recurrent mass abduction events in Farah

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The assassination of a key Uruzgan powerbroker, and advisor to the president, in a coordinated attack occurred in Kabul City of CENTRAL this period. As is typical in these cases, the reasons behind such attacks are not always clear as they represent a convergence of numerous motivations, both from the conflict and political spheres. In addition, the reporting of 2 IMF ‘escalation of force’ shootings in Kapisa that resulted in numerous civilian casualties represent the after-effects of a lethal suicide attack last period. Lastly, the theft of demining equipment from an NGO in Logar marks 1 of the 10 NGO incidents recorded countrywide this period (see graph on p. 17 for monthly volumes).

The reporting of 2 NGO abductions from Faryab in the NORTH this period provides echoes of a trend well established last year, though not necessarily representing a return to previous levels of frequency. The third NGO incident for this region appears to be a case of intimidation by weapons fire against an NGO vehicle with no casualties resulting. While Kunduz recorded a significant drop in incident volumes this period Baghlan and Takhar in return marked

sharp increases in theirs.

The SOUTH was characterised this period by two rather rare occurrences, multiple NGO incidents and a large scale complex attack within the provincial capital of Uruzgan. The first NGO incident, from Ghazni, was reflective of the numerous mass abductions involving demining staff recorded this year. This case differs however in that it involved only a temporary detention (under 1 hour) and all were released unharmed. The second incident ended more tragically when an NGO national staff member was killed by small arms fire in Kandahar City under circumstances that are still unclear. This marks the 19th NGO staff death recorded this year. The extended coordinated assault on multiple targets within Tirin Kot is reminiscent of similar efforts noted in Kandahar recently and is the first attack of its type to occur there.

The WEST once again accounted for numerous NGO incidents this period, with 2 from Ghor and a third in Herat. In Herat NGO staff in transit had a direct encounter with an AOG element, apparently the result of the groups

leadership’s efforts to expand its area of influence. In Ghor, the apparent migration of AOG elements beyond its usual areas in the south into the central areas of the province has led to an increasing frequency of incident reporting, a fact reflected in the 2 NGO incidents reported from this area. The first, an NGO staff encounter with an AOG (similar to Herat) was less concerning than the apparent case of mistaken targeting of an IED against an NGO vehicle. Fortunately there was minimal damage and no casualties resulting.

The EAST recorded the period’s final NGO incident in what appears to be a clear case of criminal robbery of a money transfer. Due to the intervention of locals, the funds were recovered, a fact that speaks volumes to the effects of solid local acceptance strategies, though the case also reflects the challenges of cash for work type programming. Indirect fire events continue to plague the border areas and while conflict related incidents have decreased in Jalalabad, there has been a concomitant increase in criminality within the city.

CENTRAL REGION

KABUL


Although the majority of reported incidents continue to be initiated by ANSF/IMF, sporadic attacks against high profile and security targets remain a distinctive feature of the security paradigm in Kabul. Whereas early July had not witnessed significant incidents, this reporting period a coordinated attack involving several armed operatives took place on July 17th (Karte Char area, District 3). During the night, three attackers armed with AK-47s, RPGs and hand grenades, assaulted the residence of Jan Mohammad Khan - an aide to the President and a prominent power-broker in Uruzgan. The ensuing fire fight claimed the lives of the official and another Uruzgan MP, as well as all three attackers (in addition to several ANSF casualties). The attack occurred five days after the killing of the Head of the Kandahar Provincial Council-Ahmad Wali Karzai. Whereas these two killings do not appear to be linked, and the modus operandi as well as circumstances of both incidents are distinct, it is noteworthy that both victims were very close to the President and both were playing an important role in the Southern Region. While similar to the killing of AWK the latest at-

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 5 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

tack was apparently sanctioned by AOG though the exact motivation for the killing, given the victim's profile as a power-broker in Uruzgan, remains unclear. Nonetheless, the assault appears to fit within the pattern of attacks on high profile targets that are relatively easily accessed and offer the possibility to conduct prior reconnaissance (as at least one of the attackers was known to the family and was allowed inside the house prior to the assault).

In regards to the province as a whole, ANSF/IMF were behind more than 60% of all reported incidents, while AOG activity decreased in comparison to the previous period (with only 5 corroborated events). In the last fortnight, Surobi District bore the brunt of AOG activity with three direct attacks (one of them initiated with an IED strike) and an IDF assault. In the last two weeks there were no recorded attacks on IMF-contracted fuel tankers in Surobi, however Tangi Abreshum remained a 'hotspot' along the highway, with an AOG attack on an ANA check post that occurred in the early morning hours of July 18th.

Another notable incident oc-



curred on July 15th in Uzbin Valley when an IED detonated against an ANA vehicle traveling along the highway at around 7AM. The explosion was followed by a SAF attack which injured one ANA soldier. The later incident is worth noting, as IED related incidents along the highway are extremely rare, with the last occurring on May 1st when an IED was located in the Puli Khaki area.

ANSF/IMF came to the fore in Musayi this cycle, where in addition to the discovery of an RCIED on the main district road in Qalai Abdul Raouf area, security forces conducted operations on five separate occasions, mainly in Gumbaza, Qeshlaq and Alam Khan.

Lastly, tensions between locals and Kuchis were reported from Qarabagh, wounding 2 locals, and in Paghman, where a demonstration over a land dispute blocked the Kabul-Wardak Highway for several hours in Chawki Arghandi (July 26). This incident turned violent and resulted in one Kuchi being killed with another wounded, but there have been no further incidents (despite the issue not being settled).

LOGAR


| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 5 |
| This Report Period | 1 |

This reporting period Logar recorded its 5th NGO direct incident this year. On July 23rd, in the late morning hours, two gunmen riding on a motorcycle approached the work site of an NGO de-mining agency in Mazgin village of Muhammad Agha District. The individuals took one mine detector from the team by force before leaving the area, but did not harm the NGO staff. It is worth noting that the incident marks the third armed robbery targeting an NGO de-mining agency to be reported in the province this year. The previous incidents were recorded in Puli Alam and Muhammad Agha (Zarghun Shar area), and both consisted of the stealing of various equipment, including VHF radios. In all these recorded robberies, the attackers did not express any objections to the NGO programs in the areas, but were more likely attracted by the NGO's equipment, which could be perceived as valuable in remote areas.

In the last two weeks the overall

level of security incidents remained relatively consistent with the previous cycle. A total of 25 incidents were recorded across the province with 14 attributed to AOGs. This reporting period AOG activity were focused on Baraki Barak, Charkh, Muhammad Agha and, in particular, on Puli Alam. This activity mainly took the form of direct attacks and IED strikes. As has frequently been the case in the province, the core of AOG attacks focused on close-range assaults on ANSF/IMF static and moving targets, and occurred on seven separate occasions respectively in Puli Alam (4), Baraki Barak (2) and Azra (1).

In addition, Logar saw six IED strikes which accounted for the majority of casualties reported this period. For instance, on July 17th, in Shash Qala area of Puli Alam, an RCIED detonated against an ANA convoy travelling on the Kabul-Logar highway, killing one civilian. Another note-



worthy incident occurred two days later in Muhammad Agha (Qalai Wazir area) where an IED detonation injured three IMF soldier along the Puli Alam-Khushi main road. Excepting one IED which exploded at around 1000hrs on a district road in Charkh, the timing of all other IED strikes occurred before 0900hrs, indicating the risk of early morning road missions (as IED emplacement usually occurs overnight).

ANSF/IMF operations continued in Charkh, Muhammad Agha, Khushi and Azra.

In the latter district, Osmankhel area, ANP and ALP clashed with an AOG during an operation on July 15th, killing 15 AOG members (including a prominent AOG commander) and injuring an additional 5 fighters. The casualty account on ANP/ALP side was also important, as 1 ALP was killed and 5 ANP received injuries.

GRAPH INFORMATION:

The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the **27th of July 2011**. In addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not captured in this data.

KAPISA


After an ‘active’ and deadly (specifically for the IMF) previous cycle, the overall volume of incidents in Kapisa decreased. This cycle witnessed 8 recorded incidents—2 AOG-initiated—while civilians bore the brunt of the casualties. Whereas last reporting period saw 7 AOG attacks (1BBIED, 2 IED strikes and 5 close-range attacks), the past two weeks recorded 1 AOG direct attack and 3 IED related incidents. Consistent with previously observed patterns, Tagab District remained the focal area for AOG activities.

Disregarding the overall low level of incidents, in kinetic provinces such as Kapisa, the risk of collateral exposure from the ongoing conflict remained important for the local population. In addition, safe passage for civilians in the province is often compromised as clashes revolve around main access roads and populated areas. This was highlighted during an

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 1 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

incident that occurred in Manokhel area of Tagab. On July 18th, an AOG attacked an IMF convoy with SAF as it was traveling on the main Tagab-Alasay Road. In the ensuing fire fight, two AOG members were killed, and two civilian fatalities were reported along with six other civilians who sustained injuries. Four days later, on the 22nd, Sherkhel area of Tagab saw further civilian casualties when, at around 0700hrs, a pressure plate IED detonated against an ANA vehicle on the main Tagab-Nijran Road. This latter incident resulted in the killing of two local civilians and wounds to one ANA soldier.

Another element that contributed to the high number of civilian casualties this period were two “escalation of force” incidents. The first occurred on July 22nd (also in Tagab, Sherkhel area) when an IMF convoy opened fire on a civilian vehicle after the driv-



er, for unknown reasons, did not stop upon receiving warning signals. As a result of the shooting, the car’s driver was killed and the remaining five occupants were injured. The second incident also involved the IMF, however it resulted in even more civilian casualties. In Nijrab District, on the 27th, the IMF opened fire on a private vehicle in Afghanya village, killing 3 occupants (including a woman and a child) and wounding seven others.

Although reports of similar incidents have, so far, been rare in Kapisa, such incidents are unfortunately a part of the security environment in kinetic areas. In addition, regarding past practices, periods that follow a significant and lethal attack against ANSF/IMF (as it was recently a case in Kapisa) are particularly prone to an increased likelihood in the use of force escalation shootings.

ANSO STAFF EMAIL CHANGES:

Please note that all ANSO staff email addresses have been changed. The previous domain of ‘@afgnso.org’ is no longer functioning and has been changed to ‘@ngosafety.org’. There has also been other changes to the email addresses so please refer to the last page of this report for a listing of the new email addresses of key ANSO staff.


WARDAK

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 1 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

AOG activity in Wardak has decreased with 22 AOG authored incidents in comparison to the 27 which were recorded previously. Despite this drop, the overall incident volume has remained relatively consistent. In line with the previous reports, AOGs focused on Saydabad (which experienced 50 % of all AOG initiated incidents), followed by Jalrez, Maydan Shahr and Nirkh districts. This period witnessed 10 AOG close range assaults reported throughout the province, with Saydabad experiencing 6 of them.

In the said district, AOG continued their efforts to disturb ANSF/IMF vehicular movement along the Kabul-Ghazni Highway, where the majority of close range attacks (as well as IEDs) took place. These attacks were conducted against IMF-contracted supply convoys on 2 separate occasions (during one of them 3 fuel tankers were burned in Sheikhabad area). The remaining close range assaults were carried out against other typical AOG targets along the highway such as ANP checkpoints and ANA/PSC convoys.

In addition to these direct attacks, 10 IED related incidents were recorded in the province. Apart from one premature detonation, AOGs conducted 9 effective IED strikes with a focus again on the highway which saw 4 of these though one of these strikes was particularly lethal. On July 26th at around 8AM, a PSC vehicle struck an IED in Shashgow area. The detonation killed 4 PSC guards and injured 3. Besides the highway, another area of concern related to IED emplacement was Jalrez District, which experienced 3 incidents. In addition to a premature detonation on the main road in Puli Mehrab, an IED detonated against an ALP vehicle in Ismail Khel area (Maydan-Jalrez road). Another device (an RCIED) struck an ANA vehicle in Kharwalang area, along Kabul-Bamyan Highway, in the afternoon (at 1300hrs) injuring 4 ANA. An interesting diversification of IED deployment was observed in the bazaar area of Day Mirard District, where an RCIED being carried by a donkey detonated while an ANP vehicle was passing by (killing the animal and injuring 1 ANP).



Similar to the incidents reported in Kapisa, this reporting period Wardak saw an “escalation of force” incident which resulted in civilian fatalities. On July 22nd in the afternoon, IMF elements opened fire on a private car after the driver failed to heed the IMF warnings to stop in Zarnay area of Saydabad. As a result, three occupants, including a woman and a child were killed, and another two were wounded. Another civilian (a minibus driver) was killed at an ALP check post in Jalrez, Zawalat area. Reportedly, ALP personnel mistakenly opened fire while the victim approached the check post seeking assistance because his vehicle had broken down.

On a different note, tensions persist in Nirkh between HIG and the IEA. During the first week of this reporting period, IEA operatives attacked the residence of a local HIG commander in Sadmorda area. The commander escaped unharmed while 3 IEA attackers were killed. Hostility between IEA and HIG is a recurring theme in Nirkh, and has already led to numerous open confrontations beyond this latest event.


BAMYAN

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 0 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

Typically Bamyān experiences a very low level of incidents, with this period being no exception. The province continues to be one of the most secure environments in the country for NGO activities, with AOG presence in the province extremely limited. Nonetheless, on July 18th of this reporting period the province witnessed the second IED detonation recorded this year. The detonation occurred around 1800hrs in Do Ab Mikh Zarin area of Kahmard District. Although, the detonation took place on the main district road, frequently used by security forces or GOA vehicles, the absence of any potential target in the vicinity and the timing of the incident indicates that the device detonated prematurely. It is worth noting that the first IED strike reported this year was the result of a small device that detonated on the 28th of April targeting an

IMF patrol in the same area. The latest incident will certainly reinforce the reputation of Do Ab Mikh Zarin as the area of AOG presence/operations (albeit sporadic) within the province. At this time, IED detonations such as this one remain outliers to the existing security paradigm in Bamyān, and do not represent any notable shift.

On July 17th of the reporting period, an official ceremony took place indicating the transition of security in the province to ANSF, which as expected passed without incident. In Bamyān the transition process remained largely a political gesture, as AOG initiated incidents are minimal and the IMF continues its limited presence in the area. A concrete result of the process is the development of local ANP/NDS forces in Kahmard, Shibar, and Sayghan



districts (with the development of the QRF in Kahmard and Shibar being noteworthy). The transition process raised more questions for the local population than providing answers, as IMF are widely considered the main deterrent against AOG expansion in the province. It is yet to be seen whether the ANSF—with their recently increased capacities—will be able to alleviate the public’s uncertainty linked to recent developments in the Ghorband Valley and the anticipated (yet postponed) departure of IMF. As has been underlined previously, the main concern for NGOs in the area remains road access to Bamyān from Kabul, with AOG activity in the Ghorband Valley of Parwan and along the road in Jalrez, Wardak.

PANJSHIR

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 1 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

On July 24th, during a high-profile ceremony, Panjshir became the sixth location where the responsibility of security was officially handed over to ANSF. In Panjshir (frequently cited as the model area for transition) the event was even more symbolic than in other areas chosen for transition, as in fact the ANSF had never ceded control of the province. Moreover, unlike in other provinces, the security role of IMF was mainly limited to enabling the activities of the PRT. Although the transition has re-

vealed some fears amongst the local population, who worry about the future of the province and its’ ability to preserve the current quiet environment, there is no indications that the process will have any actual change on the existent security paradigm. In addition to the aforementioned reasons, the province remains under the control of local power-circles who are strongly opposed to the AOG agenda.

On the security side, the sole incident recorded this period was

linked to a criminal activity. In Paryan District, an unknown individual threw a hand grenade inside a Toyota Corolla vehicle parked in the vicinity of a private residence in Nawardakan area. The owner of the car and the residence indicated that the likely motive is related to a vendetta between his and another family. Following this incident, ANP arrested one member of the rival family for investigation. These types of incidents, in particular involving interpersonal or family disputes, are a common feature of the security environment in the province, and although they may go mostly unnoticed elsewhere, they stand out in the usually quiet province of Panjshir. Such incidents rarely impact NGO activities and the organizations operating in the area have thus far rarely been affected by such dynamics.

PARWAN

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 1 |
| This Report Period | 0 |


Incident levels in Parwan have generally remained consistently low, and this reporting cycle followed the same pattern. Only 9 security incidents were reported throughout the province, with 3 of them initiated by AOGs.

After two AOG attacks were recorded in Ghorband Valley during the previous cycle, an RCIED was discovered in Shinwari, Kajakan Payeen area (a locality on the Bamyar Road). The device (constructed of a 120mm mortar) was eventually defused by an IMF EOD team, but the road was blocked for almost 6 hours. Regional trends have demonstrated that an increase in AOG activity, especially around strategic areas (such as the Ghorband Valley), often leads to sporadic military operations. This was underlined on July 26th when ANA/ANP launched an operation in Qoli Hir area and clashed with an AOG. It is likely that following this operation (which was still ongoing at the time of this report), a decrease in AOG activities will be observed. Nonetheless, as long as

ANSF/IMF do not deploy troops into the area on a permanent basis, this decrease will be only temporary and AOGs are likely to follow established patterns and return to the 'cleared areas' after the troops withdraw.

Despite a decrease in AOG direct attacks the pattern of IDF assaults continued across the province. On 24 July, a rocket (BM-1) was fired towards the ANP HQ in the DAC area of Kohi Safi. The projectile missed the target and detonated in an open area. However, the most notable incident occurred in Chaharikar (DAC area), where AOG fired (allegedly from the Jangal Bagh mountain) two BM1 rockets towards the compound of the Provincial Governor's Office. The projectiles impacted in a residential area and injured 3 civilians.

As observed in previous reports, IDF strikes have become an essential part of the security paradigm in Parwan, particularly in locations which host IMF and ANSF bases. The Jangal Bagh



mountains are often used as a staging point for IDF attacks against the PRT base. Statistics reveal that so far this year, 13 such attacks have been recorded in Chaharikar, accounting for 80% of all incidents attributed to AOGs in the district. It should be noted that the records for 2006-2010 display only 1-2 rocket/mortar attacks province-wide each year. This increase in the rate of IDF attacks is quite likely a reflection of the maturing AOG structures in Parwan (the IEA in particular), as attested by the recent appointment of the IEA Shadow Provincial Governor (alongside new Shadow District Governors in Kohi Safi, Shinwari, Ghorband-Siyagerd and in Baraki Barak). On the other hand, attacks in Jangal Bagh are sometimes attributed to local power networks, which do not necessarily question the legitimacy of the GOA, but are intent on pressuring their rivals inside the ANSF and GOA leadership.

NORTHERN REGION

BALKH

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 9 |
| This Report Period | 0 |


An IED detonation in the northern part of Mazar City (Dashti Shor area) that killed 5 and injured 12 was the most notable incident to occur in Balkh this reporting period. It marked the 3rd IED detonation to occur in Mazar over the last 2 months, and the 4th this year. The relative spike in IED related incidents inside the city is a notable departure from the single IED detonation that occurred over the entire previous year. When analyzing the level of activity over this 2 month period, it is worth noting that a grenade rigged to explode was also found in the city on July 13th, and on the evening of the 29th, a man was arrested with a large amount of explosives as he tried to enter Mazar city through the western gate. Although the shift in day-to-day security is not severe, it appears that despite the fact that the 23rd of July—the date of the ceremonial transition of security in Mazar—came and past without incident (other than traffic issues due to the noted boost in security around the city), Mazar and Balkh are witnessing subtle shifts to their overall security paradigms.

The IED detonation in Mazar appears to represent the further development of a trend. The 2 IED detonations in Mazar just prior to this one were mostly minor and targeted obvious GOA targets (an ANA shuttle and an ANP Ranger). The most recent—

which appears to have detonated prematurely—was being carried by a man riding a bicycle when it detonated. The detonation took place with no obvious target in the vicinity, and was far more deadly than the prior two, although the increased number of casualties may be partially due to the locality of the detonation rather than the strength of the explosives. Multiple reports suggest that this IED carrier was traced back to the AOG stronghold of Chahar Bolak District.

Of further note, the incident occurred on the 20th of July, which was the same day as the trial for the 20 individuals who had been arrested during the April 1st demonstration violence against UNAMA, as well as just 3 days prior to the transition. Although no direct correlation can be proven between these 3 events, it is likely that the IED detonation was an attempt to make a statement against one of the other 2 incidents (or both). Tangential to this, 3 of the individuals tried on the 20th were given maximum sentences, while the other 17 received between 6 months and 16 years. In a twist, 3 of the sentenced individuals had come through the APRP process.

Although the IED detonation and the transition received the most attention, other districts demonstrated significant insecurity or



saw other notable changes. The hold phase has begun along the main Mazar-Shibirghan road, with ANSF forces supplying most of the hold forces as IMF seeks to embrace a mentoring role. In the 2 districts in Balkh that have seen the most insecurity along this road, Chahar Bolak saw little activity outside of an IMF operation which took place on the last day of the PRP (the 15th) and the ANSF arrest of an AOG commander, while Chimaltal saw 2 ambushes on ANSF patrols, an attack on an ANP checkpoint, a joint IMF/ANSF operation, and an IED discovery. Insecurity along the Mazar-Shibirghan road has decreased significantly with the onset of Operation Ebtekar 2, but has historically resurfaced after the completion of ANSF/IMF hold phases.

Another district that continues to show increased insecurity is Nahri Shahi, where in Sharak Turkmania, an IED detonated near a mosque and—in a separate incident—an AOG attacked the private residence of a village representative. Nahri Shahi witnessed 4 incidents this reporting period and 7 over the course of July. This total stands in stark contrast to the 12 which had taken place all year prior to July (with none in June). Completing the 4 in Nahri Shahi, unknown armed men opened fire on a taxi, and 4 members of an ACG wearing ANA uniforms stopped and robbed civilian vehicles along the Nahri Shahi- Chahar Kint road.

KUNDUZ

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 1 |
| This Report Period | 0 |


Kunduz witnessed 38 security incidents this month. This represents a significant decrease in the usual level of reporting volume. It amounts to a little more than half of the 71 incidents that were recorded in June or the 69 in May. Although 1 month does not denote a sustained shift, this is a significant development in the most volatile province in the North, taking place during what has historically been one of the more active months of the year. The shift may be partially due to heavy IMF operations, which could potentially be forcing AOGs to temporarily relocate (perhaps to Takhar or Baghlan, both of which saw notable increases in security reporting this month).

Although Kunduz still witnessed 5 IED detonations this reporting period, 8 of the 21 total security incidents were IMF operations, with 2 of those taking place in Chahar Dara, and 1 in Khanabad. This volume was consistent over the month, which saw IMF operations account for 16 of the 38 total incidents.

Khanabad continues to host a

significant percentage of the insecurity in the province, accounting for 8 of the incidents this month, and 4 this period. In light of recent inter-Pro Government Militia (PGM) issues, a security Jurga was called in the district on the 13th. It has been postured that after the Jurga, the District Governor asked various PGMs to turn in their heavy weapons (which only 1 of them did, for which it was strongly financially compensated). Despite this failure to acquiesce, further GOA/PGM issues have not yet surfaced, although anecdotal reports suggest that the GOA met with 10 PGMs again on the 31st to further discuss their displeasure with the PGMs activities in the district.

Amongst the 4 incidents that occurred in Khanabad this reporting period, the most notable was an IED detonation on an ANP convoy which included the Deputy Provincial Governor. Although 3 ANP were wounded the Deputy Governor escaped unharmed. While externally it appeared possible that this incident could have been PGM-initiated—in light of the recent PGM/GOA ten-



sions—multiple sources confirm that this was a legitimate AOG-initiated attack. As noted above, 1 of the 8 IMF operations conducted this reporting period also took place in Khanabad, and resulted in injuries to 1 AOG member and the arrest of 12 others—including an AOG commander.

Chahar Dara was also a focal point this reporting period, notching 5 of the recorded incidents, including 2 IMF operations, an IED detonation, an IED discovery, and an AOG attack on an ANP CP that went awry when an RPG round impacted and detonated on a civilian residence. The RPG round resulted in the deaths of 3 children and injuries to 4 others. This was the most civilian casualties in a non-IED related, AOG-attributed incident in Kunduz Province this year. Sources from the community claim that the area where this happened does not support AOG activity, but that there is unlikely to be any follow up civil unrest, as the community remains largely intimidated. It should be noted that ANSO considers this information subjective and subject to change.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

FARYAB

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 4 |
| This Report Period | 2 |


In an exceptional deviation to the existing security paradigm in the North this year, two separate NGO abductions took place this reporting period in Faryab, 1 on the 28th in Almar, and 1 on the 31st in Pashtun Kot.

In the first incident, two staff members of a national demining NGO were abducted along the Maymana –Almar road at 1100 hours. Initial reports suggest that armed men stopped and abducted the two while they were travelling in a rented black Toyota Surf, headed to survey an area in Almar District. The 2 remained at large for only 2 days, as on the 30th, 1 of them managed to escape during the confusion caused by a nearby security operation, while the other was subsequently rescued by an IMF mission mandated to find the 2 abductees. The rescue mission took place in Khwaja Namusa area of Pashtun Kot district, where they had been moved and were being held. At the time of this report, it was still unconfirmed as to whether the 2 had been abducted by an AOG or an ACG.

In the second occurrence, which also took place during daytime hours, but in Kaarez area along the Maymana- Sorkh Ab road (Pashtun Kot), 4 NGO staff members in a GOA ambulance were stopped and abducted by

armed individuals—believed to be members of an AOG. 1 of the 4, a female staff member, was immediately released to the care of a religious elder in Baloch Village of the same district, but the other 3 remain at large. It is likely that in this latter incident, the AOG believed the NGO staff members were GOA employees due to the nature of their vehicle.

To put these incidents in context, they mark only the second and third NGO abductions for the Northern Region this year, a significant decrease from the 6 that took place over the first 7 months of 2010. All 3 incidents took place in Faryab in districts directly adjacent of Maymana, and all 3 involved Pashtun Kot District (where the first abduction took place in early June, with the NGO staff member released approximately 10 days later with no ransom demands). Looking back at 2010, out of 19 NGO-related abductions that took place in the North, only 2 of them were ACG driven and involved the payment of ransoms, while the other 17 were AOG attributed. In Faryab (where 6 of these took place, 5 AOG attributed, and 1 ACG attributed), that resulted in 5 incidents where the NGO staff were released without ransom payments after being questioned



about their organizations activities and having local elders negotiate on their behalf, and 1 incident (Almar) where a ransom was paid. In all 6 incidents, the NGO staff members were released in under 3 weeks.

It is noteworthy that the first of these 2 abductions (in Almar) came in the midst of high volume security reporting in Qaysar and Almar Districts. The 2 districts combined for 9 security incidents this reporting period, and 25 this month. This represents the highest total-per-month for the 2 districts this year. Aside from the NGO abduction, the Almar District Governor and District Chief of Police had their convoy ambushed by AOGs as they returned from Qaraee village, where they had travelled to try and solve a dispute between 2 local communities. Like the abduction, the ambush occurred in the middle of the day (1100 hours), but resulted in injuries to neither official. Of note in Qaysar District, in 2 separate occasions IEDs detonated with no known GOA/IMF target in the vicinity. 1 of these detonated on a private vehicle (killing 3 civilians and injuring 2 others) while the other injured a civilian. This—in conjunction with 2 illegal checkpoints that occurred at the end of the previous reporting period, but were not recorded till this one—demonstrates the strong existent threat to civilians that continues in these 2 contested districts.

BAGHLAN

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 1 |
| This Report Period | 0 |


A total of 39 security incidents were recorded in Baghlan this July, with 19 of them occurring this reporting period. This volume marks not only a significant increase over the 21 recorded in June, but accounts for a greater sum than the total of the last 2 months combined (36). Although Balkh, Faryab, and—uncharacteristically—Takhar all recorded higher volumes than this, Baghlan recorded more incidents than Kunduz, and had a significantly higher total than any other month this year, with January being the only other to accumulate more than 30 (34).

While it remains to be seen whether this volume will continue for any sustained period, the change was not just cosmetic. Incident recording was marked by IED detonations and attacks on fuel tankers. Especially significant was the notable increase in the volume of IED detonations and discoveries, with 11 such incidents in July—4 this reporting period—including an IED detonation just outside of the District Center (DAC) in Burka and an RCIED detonation on a construction company vehicle along the Tala Wa Barak – Dushi road. Consistent with the month’s spike in general insecurity, the total number of IED related incidents in July nearly doubled that of the

past 2 months combined (4 in June and 2 in May).

July also witnessed an increase in the targeting of fuel tankers, with 2 of the 4 incidents to occur this month taking place this reporting period (a SAF attack on a fuel tanker at night along the main Kabul – Puli Khumri road, and the discovery of an IED in the cabin of a fuel tanker in Puli Khumri City).

In fact, the increased volume of insecurity has manifested in a number of ways. Setting aside incident type trending, the majority of incidents transpired in traditionally insecure districts such as Baghlani Jadid, Burka, and Puli Khumri, which together combined for 25 of the 38 incidents this month. Baghlani Jadid, a contested district with a historically strong AOG presence, saw an exceptional percentage of these (11 of 38, with 6 this reporting period). Baghlan has often been considered the stronghold of AOGs in the Northeast—although operations have often focused on Kunduz—with Baghlani Jadid and Puli Khumri historically witnessing the highest volume of incident reporting (for instance, these 2 districts combined for 253 of the 364 recorded in 2010, and have already accounted for 104 of the 188 recorded



this year), whereas the mountainous district of Burka often records less activity, but is widely considered one of the primary AOG safe havens of the North.

The insecurity in the province is further notable because it is manifesting in such a way where it could potentially affect NGOs and/or civilians. This is noticeable in incidents such as the IED detonation around the DAC in Burka (mentioned above), the discovery of an IED along the often travelled Puli Khumri – Kunduz main road in Charshanab Tepa area (Baghlani Jadid), and most obviously, in an incident in Baghlan New City (Baghlani Jadid) where individuals opened fire on a wedding party, killing 3 and injuring 7.

Outside of the IED and fuel tanker trends noted above, IMF operations accounted for 5 incidents this month, with 3 them taking place this reporting period. 2 of those from this cycle occurred in Baghlani Jadid, while all the others in July were conducted in Burka. After a significant level of sustained IMF operations earlier in the year (including 9 in May), it appears AOGs in the province are making a concerted effort to re-establish their presence—especially in areas which they have previously maintained a strong influence—and it is likely that a similar level of activity will continue for the foreseeable future.


JAWZJAN

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 3 |
| This Report Period | 1 |

Shotgun rounds that shattered the rear windows of an NGO vehicle just north of Shibirghan City marked the third NGO related security incident in Jawzjan Province this year. The incident, which took place in the vicinity of Boba Ali village, originally appeared to be the work of an ACG trying to stop and potentially rob the vehicle, but upon further investigation is likely attributed to a well known AOG commander from the district. This AOG usually conducts operations south of Shibirghan City, but anecdotal reports suggest that the commander may have been in the vicinity and wanted to intimidate—but not injure—the national NGO, which was working as an implementing partner for an IO. Witnesses from the area claim that 2 AOG members on motorcycles came to the area and made a conscious decision to intimidate the NGO, which they accomplished by shooting out the back window of the Toyota corolla with a shotgun, but not injuring anyone. These same reports suggest that the commander is rarely in Shibirghan these days, and that while the NGO was directly targeted—perhaps for their affiliation with the IO—it may have been more incidental than anything resembling a planned operation. In terms of the security paradigm, multiple sources attest that the

area remains mostly devoid of AOG activity, and that this was an outlier rather than a new trend or escalation.

Further information also arose concerning the last NGO incident to take place in the province. On June 16th an INGO vehicle—a red Toyota pick-up—was blown up by an RCIED in Aqcha in what appeared to be the active targeting of the NGO. This incident was previously discussed in the late June biweekly. However, the reason for the active targeting of an NGO with strong ties to the province remained unknown. Recent information has surfaced suggesting that NDS had conducted operations in that area just prior to this incident operating in similar multi-colored low profile vehicles. This suggests—in claims supported by locals from the area—that perhaps the NGO vehicle was mistakenly identified as belonging to NDS. Although this hasn't been confirmed, it is concurrent with the assessment of multiple sources and would denote a better fit within known AOG targeting patterns. This reporting period also saw a targeted killing occur in the same district (Aqcha), when armed men stopped a rickshaw carrying 7 civilians, pulled one man out and executed him, letting the others go, in what appears to have been



the playing out off an interpersonal dispute. The incident occurred along the Mardyan – Aqcha road.

In the Tri-Provincial Area, Qush Tepa saw 3 incidents, with 2 notable ones that play into developing trends. On the 24th in Gardan Village, members of a Pro-Government Militia (PGM) deserted their checkpoint after not being paid. Although this was the only recorded incident of this in the Northern Region this month, anecdotal reports from multiple sources suggest it may be taking place in multiple locations elsewhere as well. Should this become a trend, it has the potential to destabilize the areas where it is happening (mostly in Sar-e Pul and Jawzjan currently). While PGMs have not always successfully stabilized their areas of operation (and often accomplish the exact opposite), if they are antagonized they could potentially seek to actively destabilize areas even further, or attempt to get the payments they believe they are owed through illegal means (taxation, intimidation, robbery, etc.). Adding to this, PGMs continue to be targeted region wide. In Beksar Village (also in Qush Tepa) 2 of the family members of a PGM member were killed when the PGM member refused to quit his job. Following the attacks, he quit the position and joined an AOG. As mentioned in previous reports, attacks on civilians who are related to PGMs/GOA or accused of working with or spying for them, are becoming continually more frequent.


SAR-E PUL

Sar-e Pul has seen a gradual rise in incident reporting over the last 4 months. A total of 24 security incidents were recorded in July, which marks a significant (although not dramatic) increase over the 18 recorded in April (with incremental steps each month between). While the most relevant incidents to NGOs have been the illegal checkpoints and abductions along the Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan road thus far (along with an attack that took place in Zaka Village just off this road when an NGO was present), none of these took place this reporting period. However, the further development of other noteworthy trends included the targeting of civilians in different capacities, and 2 attacks on IMF units at—or around—the main Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan road. Of the 10 incidents recorded in the district this period, 3 of them took place in Sayyad and 3 in Sar-e Pul. This is

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 4 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

not irregular, as these 2 districts consistently account for the majority of incident reporting in the province.

In regards to civilian targeting, the most notable occurred in Ganda Village and Qara Khawal Village (both in Sayyad), where civilians were accused of working or spying for ANSF and subsequently tortured by AOGs. The relationship between AOGs and the communities in Sayyad remains complicated, as AOGs are focused on maintaining control over much of the district and its’ population. While it is likely that much of the population does support the AOGs residing there (either by choice or necessity), AOGs have shown a fierce drive to intimidate or injure civilians who contemplate working with the GOA. In another incident related to Sayyad, an IED was discovered along the main road leading from Sar-e Pul



City to the Sayyad District Center (technically in Sar-e Pul). The road between the city and District Center of Sayyad is relatively short and rarely sees activity, but it must be assumed that AOGs operating deeper in the district regularly use and monitor traffic along this important road.

Anecdotal reports suggest that GOA reinforcements have been routed to Sar-e Pul City to help maintain security in the province. This information has been confirmed by a number of sources, but the exact number and arrival date of these varies widely. Security in Sar-e Pul has been assessed as strongly deteriorating, despite a volume of incident reporting below that witnessed in more kinetic provinces. How this influx of security forces may shift this remains to be seen.

TAKHAR

26 incidents this reporting period—with 44 over the entire month of July—denote a significant spike in security reporting, and a trend similar to that which is occurring in Takhar’s north-eastern neighbour Baghlan. Takhar had been witnessing a consistent, albeit gradual, increase in security reporting for the last 5 months; however this month’s jump was exceptional. Between March and June, incident reporting jumped exactly 5 incidents each month though this month marks a 50% increase over the previous month’s. However, unlike in Baghlan, incident reporting hasn’t seen an equal jump in IED attacks.


Of note, there was an IMF operation in Taluqan on the 30th/31st,

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 1 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

where 3 individuals—reportedly of some standing within AOGs—were arrested. This is consistent with the majority of incidents in Taloqan, which mostly involved ACGs or IMF/GOA forces. These also include 2 incidents where civilians were harmed by the ANP, 1 escalation of force incident and another where an ANP accidentally shot a civilian while clearing his weapon.

Similar to this, no significant criminal or AOG based trends arose in Baharak District, despite the fact that it recorded 5 incidents—one of which was demonstration related to a local issue.

Although not showing the IED related numbers that Baghlan did, Takhar did witness notable IED



detonations, including a detonation in Ishkamish that killed an NDS officer who was on his way to the Mosque after work, and a premature IED detonation on an ANBP vehicle in Darqad District. Also of note, in Ishkamish, a previous AOG member who had surrendered to the GOA was shot and killed in Tarsak village. This keeps with ongoing trends concerning the targeting of those individuals who leave AOGs or agree to work with Pro-Government Militias (PGMs) and the GOA though it should be noted that in this instance the individual shot was not in fact working with a PGM.

BADAKHSHAN


| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 7 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

Badakhshan recorded a relatively quiet 8 security incidents this reporting period, and 19 total for the month. Although this number is likely to marginally increase due to late reporting, it represents a relatively low volume of insecurity. This is a decrease of approximately 17% from the previous month (23 in June), and slightly less than the 21 that occurred the previous July.

Although no new trends surfaced this period, 4 AOG incidents occurred in 4 different districts, accounting for exactly half of the manifested insecurity. Unsurprisingly, 2 of these occurred in the eastern portion of the province within districts that lay along the often discussed drug trafficking route to Tajikistan. These included an RPG fired towards the Dasht Farhad area in Baharak

District, and an AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint in Warduj. The third incident was a conflict in Darayim District between an AOG that had surrendered to the GOA and an AOG from that surrendered group's previous area of operations, and the last was an armed clash between the ANP and an AOG in Kham Mirzar of Kishim. Putting these 4 incidents in context, Kishim has a known AOG presence, Warduj continues to see AOG influence despite the large scale ANSF operation that took place in Bashund area last cycle, Baharak has seen consistent insecurity throughout the year, and out of the 16 incidents that have occurred in Darayim this year, 9 of them have been attributed to or related to AOGs.

Warduj and Baharak in particular remain relative hot spots in Ba-



dakhshan. Warduj has seen significant increases to incident reporting since the drug harvesting season began, and Baharak has been—and remains—the most volatile district in the province, particularly around the district center (DAC), where an ACG led by a former ANP officer has continued to destabilize the district with random violence in a bid for greater influence. However, reporting suggests that the most recent attack in Dasht Farhad was not the actions of the mentioned ACG, but rather the work of AOGs loyal to a commander that had been arrested during an attack on the Provincial Governor's convoy that took place in Warduj June 20th.


SAMANGAN

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 0 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

Only 4 security incidents were recorded in Samangan this reporting period—a characteristically low volume of insecurity—with the most notable being the ambush of an ANP patrol by 3 armed men (believed to be members of an AOG) in Langar Village of Khuram Wa Sarbagh District. Although ambushes on ANP patrols are a common AOG tactic region wide, Khuram Wa Sarbagh had seen only 2 security incidents this year prior to this one, and neither of them were attributed to an AOG. In fact, ANSO has only recorded 6 incidents in this district since 2006,

with none of the previous ones directly—or indirectly—attributed to AOG activities.

Looking more closely at this attack, anecdotal reports from the area tell a slightly different story. It has been suggested that these are the actions of a local ACG, commanded by a criminal who spent time in jail for assaulting a girl, and then got out and started an ACG (which currently consists of less than 10 people, and fosters unconfirmed claims of allegiance to AOG politics). The same sources suggest that the ANP are aware of exactly who the individu-



al is, and know—in a general manner—where he is hiding. Under this interpretation, this appears to fall somewhere between an ACG and an AOG attributed incident, but does not indicate that a new AOG is conducting operations in the district, and the general security paradigm for the district—and Samangan Province—remains largely unchanged.

WESTERN REGION


HERAT

Herat City’s security transition took place on the 21st of July, in what was a largely ceremonial event, as the GOA security forces have held the primary responsibility for security within the city for an extended period already. There was only one AOG, and no ACG, incident recorded since the ceremony was held, and it is likely that the security transition from ISAF to the GOA will not cause a significant change in the security context of the city in the short term.

At the provincial level, AOG concentrated their activity in the eastern districts (Pashtun Zarghun & Obe) during this reporting period. Among the 6 AOG incidents that happened in both districts (30% of total AOG incidents in the province), it is important to note that two NGO incidents (one direct and the other indirect) occurred in Pashtun Zarghun. In the first case, an AOG unit under

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 5 |
| This Report Period | 1 |

a prominent commander that has been increasing its sphere of influence in the eastern part of the district, temporarily stopped and detained an NGO staff member due to a personal dispute while in transit (he was released unharmed following negotiations held by elders). In the second incident, an AOG unit under the same commander attacked a local transportation company’s convoy of 13 commercial trucks under ANP escort, one of which was transporting commodities for an NGO, before escaping the scene upon the arrival of ANP reinforcements. The profile of these two incidents suggests that the NGOs involved were not explicitly targeted, and were rather affected by the AOG’s broader efforts at exerting its presence in the area. The concentration of AOG activity in the northern districts (Kushk, Gulran, and Kushki Kuh-



na) is another noteworthy security trend this reporting period. Of note, the number of AOG incidents in Gulran District has increased (from 1 to 4) in comparison with the first two weeks of the July. In Kushk and Kushki Kuhna, by contrast, the volume of AOG incidents and the tactics employed (SAF/RPGs or IEDs against convoys and ANSF/IMF patrols) have remained consistent with longer term trends. Reportedly, an IEA member originating from Gulran has recently pushed AOG to be more active and may have caused some disputes with members of the local community, as an armed clash between AOG and villagers and the abduction of several locals were registered during the period.


FARAH

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 3 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

During this month alone, three mass abduction events were reported in Farah, 2 of which affected NGO staff. The most significant of them was the mass abduction of 31 demining NGO staff members which occurred in Bala Buluk District on the 6th of July 2011. The AOG killed 4 abductees (targeting the leadership of the group for this treatment), while the remaining ones were released in Bakwa District a few days later. While the exact motives behind this case are unclear at this moment, the responsible are thought to have been dissatisfied with some element of the organization’s activity; this is a relatively common feature of the AOG-demining sector relationship. In the second case, the mass abduction of 35 locals, which involved an NGO staff member (he was released after AOG confirmed that he does not work with the GOA). After 7 were killed,

including 4 beheaded, the situation was finally concluded with the remaining 12 abductees being released after negotiations held by local elders. According to the statement made by the AOG, all abductees killed were associated with the GOA. Anecdotal reports indicated that 5 of the murdered abductees previously worked for a PSC, and that the other 2 were a teacher and an ANP officer’s son. Furthermore, it appears that the commander who was involved in the first case was also responsible for this incident, demonstrating a particular propensity by this group to use abduction tactics as part of their opposition activities.

The third mass abduction event occurred in Pur Chaman District on the 28th of July and involved 15 locals. AOG members beheaded two abductees and 13 abductees still remain in captivity at the time of writing. Reportedly,



the AOG claimed that the abductees are collaborators with the GOA, and alleged association with the GOA thus appears to be the main motive behind this incident.

The geographical pattern of AOG presence in the province may shed some light on these abduction cases. The number of AOG incidents in both Bala Buluk (9 AOG incidents recorded) and Bakwa districts (8 AOG incident recorded) remain highest in the province during this month. In the case of Gulistan and Pur Chaman, AOG has reportedly maintained a strong presence due to the weak government presence and a little or no presence of IMF/ANSF operations. While these three events alone are not sufficient to establish security trends, it does suggest that risk of abduction in these districts will remain an important consideration in the short term.


BADGHIS

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 0 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

During this reporting period the volume of AOG incidents, largely concentrated in four districts (Murghab, Ghormach, Muqur, and Qadis), has remained consistent with longer term trends. While Qadis has hosted a sharp increase in AOG activity this year, in part because increases in IMF/ANSF operations this year in Muqur pushed AOGs into Qadis, the effect of ALP and APRP on security trends remains uncertain. Apart from 2 major incidents related to ALP and APRP that occurred this June – AOG with SAF/RPGs attacked an ALP CP, and later attacked a group of 20

AOG members who intended to join the GOA – there has been no incident related to ALP and APRP since the initiation of these programs this April. Of note, though 30 AOG members and three commanders surrendered their weapons and joined the GOA this month, no AOG efforts to target former AOG members was reported this period.

In contrast, Murghab registered three incidents related to ALP this July, and the number of total ALP-related incidents has been increasing since the initiation of these programs at the end of this



May (though ALP has not been officially announced in this district). Reportedly, ALP belonging to one of the sub-tribes in Murghab has been involved in offensive operations supported by IMF/ANSF, while ALP belonging to one major tribe in Qadis remains mainly in a defensive role; this may help explain their differing positions in their respective districts’ security environments recently.


GHOR

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 9 |
| This Report Period | 2 |

During this reporting period there were 2 incidents directly involving NGOs in Ghor Province. In the first case, an AOG detonated an RCIED in front of an NGO vehicle (causing minor damage to the car) when two on duty NGO national staff members were in transit in Du Layna District. Unconfirmed information indicated that a high profile GOA official intended to travel along this same route in a vehicle of similar make and colour around the time of the incident, suggesting that this was the likely target of the attack leading to the assessment that this incident was a case of mistaken identity. In the second case, approx. 20 AOG members stopped an NGO vehicle while an NGO staff member was in transit in Shahrak District to transport equipment to their office in Shahrak City. The AOG let him continue his journey after he stated he was transporting equipment belonging to a businessman in Chaghcharan City. Both incidents

caused no casualties or losses and indicate that there was no direct intent on the part of the AOG to target NGOs, but rather they were incidentally involved.


At the provincial level, these two NGO incidents appear to reflect, and partially be a result of, the reported migration of AOG elements from the southern areas into those more central as both occurred in central districts (Du Layna & Shahrak). These AOG elements were previously located further south (Taywara & Passaband) and are expressing this new presence through recent actions. Among the 15 total AOG incidents in these two central districts recorded up to this point in 2011, 93% (6 incidents in Du Layna and 8 incidents in Shahrak) have occurred in June and July alone while in contrast, the number of incidents in other districts has remained constantly low during the same period (between 1 and 3 incidents per district).



However, it is not certain whether or not the recent movement of AOG elements expanding northwards could also have a link with the incident of night letter distribution in Chaghcharan City that occurred during this reporting period. Night letters are often used by AOG in communities where they have not gained sufficient local support and use them as a tool for gaining influence and examining the reaction of the population. However, the authenticity of the letter has been brought into question from various observers due to its lack of standard AOG 'signatures'. While AOG have gradually been expanding a sphere of influence from the southern districts (Passaband and Taywara) into the central districts (Shahrak and Du Layna) of the province this year, their presence in the northern districts are still limited, and it is possible that this night letter distribution could be the manifestation of a local dispute instead.

COMBINED (AOG/Criminal) NGO INCIDENTS : 2006-2011

(the numbers provided on the graph indicate yearly peaks)



EASTERN REGION

NANGARHAR


| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 9 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

The security environment in Nangarhar in the second half of July was again characterised by a decreased number of AOG operations, but also by a further growth in the number of serious incidents of armed criminality, focused on Jalalabad city. After a number of robberies of private residences in the city by groups of 6-8 gunmen in the past 2 months, this period saw 5 separate armed abductions in the capital, with 2 occurring in the money exchange market in Zone 1. Worryingly, in at least one case the armed men responsible for the abductions were dressed in NDS uniforms, and executed their kidnapping during daylight hours in the centre of the city. Furthermore, on the outskirts of the city, in the Muqam Khan area, gunmen robbed a private residence of almost \$100,000, and killed the owner of the house. The profile of these robberies and abductions, which all appear solely financially motivated, indicates that one or more local powerbrokers that enjoy provincial political protection from arrest and prosecution are likely responsible, making it difficult for the security forces to combat. As a result of these recent kidnappings, the money exchange market was closed by its merchants on July 30th, and is expected to remain closed for at least 5 days.

However, the city again saw an almost complete absence of AOG incidents, with the only one of significance being the small, short

attack on the main gate of JAF on the 25th, which itself only involved 2 AOG fighters. A number of possibilities exist for why such an ineffectual attack may have been carried out, but one important option to consider is that it represents an attempt to draw attention towards expectations of further targeting of such large facilities, thereby allowing AOGs to unexpectedly attack another target in the coming weeks.

Beyond the capital area, the only mass-casualty conflict event was the IMF assault on a unit of AOG fighters sheltering in a school near to the Kuz Kunar DAC. The commander of the group, a former ANP commander (previously in charge of security on the JAA-ASD highway) who flipped to the AOG side and became the chief commander in charge of generating insecurity on the highway, was also present when IMF engaged the group during the night of the 17th. He and 14 other fighters, of a total of roughly 60, were killed in the airstrikes and exchanges of fire. The incidents was an unusual one, as the commander's AO was Nurgal and the highway and he was therefore considerably out of area, and while it is thought they were planning a large attack on the DAC, after briefly attacking it the previous day, it remains unclear why they were doing so given their primary focus on attacking IMF convoys.



In the southwestern districts, while Sherzad was quiet and Khogyani played home to just 1 IED and 1 direct attack on IMF, significant numbers of fresh AOG units were reported to have arrived in Pachir wa Agam from Kurram Agency, although the only AOG incident recorded there was the shooting dead of two civilians in a private vehicle, and neighbouring Chaparhar did not register a single incident. In Hesarak, the only AOG incident was a firefight between two rival AOG commanders, killing one of them.

Achin saw further inter-tribal hostilities, although in 4 separate exchanges of fire between the two sides only one led to a casualty, namely that of a child accidentally injured. While further efforts have been made at the provincial level to resolve it recently, these have again failed and it remains an outstanding political issue, with clear security implications. However, at present, there is a certain status quo present, and while firefights have again broken out, it has been more than a month since these led to fatalities.

As such, relative calm continued to prevail in Nangarhar with regard to opposition activities, but the increasingly serious criminal activity in Jalalabad city is a cause for concern, though it may quieten during Ramazan. However, the end of Ramazan may see the resumption of major AOG activities in Nangarhar as they start this year's winter push.

KUNAR

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 8 |
| This Report Period | 0 |


While the first half of July saw a notable decrease in Kunar’s conflict intensity, this period saw a substantial AOG operational re-escalation, thus making July overall a more violent month than June, although still down on the 3 months from March to May. Offensive AOG operations remained overwhelmingly defined by direct SAF and RPG attacks on security forces, with slightly more than 50 such incidents recorded across the province in all the traditional areas. Security force and AOG casualties were relatively low from these direct kinetic engagements, with no mass-casualty events recorded; in all, 3 ANSF were killed and 6 injured, and 4 AOG killed and 2 arrested. As is common in Kunar, civilians bore the brunt of the casualties, with 1 killed and a total of 22 collaterally injured in these attacks. Standout incidents included a large ambush of a convoy of container trucks in Nari, in which 10 were damaged and a driver killed, and ambushes of ANSF convoys in Manogai and Shegal that killed or wounded national security force members.

IDF incidents registered an above-average level of casualties during the period, with ANA facilities in Manogai and Wata Pur in particular coming under repeated attack

by AOGs, on one occasion killing two ANA soldiers. In one notable instance, AOG fighters attacked an IMF helicopter with rocket fire as it was landing at the Nangalam ANA facility and claimed to have brought it down also though this was not confirmed from the IMF side. What is known is that in the consequent firefight, 3 AOG fighters were killed, including an important field commander in the area.

Also in Manogai, two separate but similar instances were registered of local community firefights with local AOG units. In the first, in Barkundi Bazaar, local residents attacked and disarmed 3 AOG fighters as they were physically assaulting a young child. The second instance occurred in Kolak, where local residents came to the rescue of a local man that AOG fighters were attempting to abduct, shooting one dead and injuring two others. This comes as it appears that elements within the diverse mix of AOGs operating in the Wata Pur-Manogai corridor are becoming more predatory with regard to local communities, with other reports registered of abductions of locals in the area.

In Dangam, Shegal and Khas Kunar, cross-border shelling con-



tinued to impact Afghan territory, with unconfirmed reports that IMF had engaged in counter mortar fire on at least one occasion; if true, this implies an important escalation in cross-border tension similar to that registered in Khost during this fortnight. In Khas Kunar also, another noteworthy development occurred. On the 30th, a BBIED operative was shot dead by ANP as he was transiting out of the district towards the western bank of the Kunar river. This is interesting as it indicates that the district’s dominant AOG, an anti-Pakistan branch of the TTP based in Mohmand Agency, may be increasing their offensive operations in Kunar, rather than focusing on criminal activity and localised attacks on IMF and ANSF in Khas Kunar.

Finally, IMF continued to abstain from major clearing operations, with just two airstrikes against AOG locations in Wata Pur recorded – one of which killed 3 AOG fighters and the other 2 civilians. As such, the overall dynamic in Kunar during for the second half of July was one of a re-intensification of AOG efforts to target ANSF in the key contested districts, with little concomitant pushback from either the ANSF or the IMF.


NURISTAN

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 0 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

With Waygal held by the IEA and Parun enjoying an uneasy quiet, eastern Nuristan continued to play home to the province’s most dynamic political and security developments. First, the reconciled Kamdesh District Governor, HIG strongman Mullah Sadeq, called for more forces and resources to allow him to effectively defend the district centre and surrounding villages under his authority from attacks and pressure from the IEA and allied AOGs. After last period’s major assault on ANBP positions in the key infiltration valley of Gawardesh by the IEA and their allies, in which some of Sadeq’s civilian relatives were killed, the IEA-HIG agreement to leave each other alone is reported to have ended. As such, Sadeq now appears to be seeking support in defending his position from potential assault in the near

future, indications of which exist in the significant infiltration of Arab and Pakistani AOG fighters into the district and neighbouring Bargi Matal in the past 2 weeks.

However, it appears that the most immediate target in the sights of these newly arrived AOG cadres is Bargi Matal, which has already come very close to falling into their hands this year. On July 18th, AOG fighters attacked an ANP CP in the district centre area in which one policeman was killed, and it is likely that further such attacks will be recorded in the coming weeks. Moreover, an important mullah was also abducted and executed by AOG fighters from the Pategal area on the 16th, his body being found a few days later. He had been critical in assisting the local government in



recent AOG attacks, including the sheltering of important local government officials, and as such his assassination represents the elimination of an important obstacle to AOG consolidation in the district.

In Nurgaram, to the west of the province, one multiple rocket attack against the DAC was recorded, with two projectiles hitting the bazaar, two landing outside the PRT compound – absent a permanent IMF presence now – and one inside it. For the moment, however, Nurgaram remains relatively permissive; it is the Alingar road that represents the primary concern.

KHOST

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 4 |
| This Report Period | 1 |


The only NGO incident recorded during this period in Khost was an indirect one, in which a moneychanger was transporting roughly \$45,000 in cash through Tani, on behalf of an NGO to pay a local community for one of its cash-for-work projects, was stopped by 3 gunmen. The money was stolen, but the moneychanger and an associate were left unharmed, and within a week the money had been recovered by community intervention. Khost remains a highly hostile environment for NGO operations generally, because of the intensity of the armed conflict there and the consequent vulnerability to collateral involvement in NGO incidents. Yet this incident is a positive reminder that non-state armed actors, who may interfere with NGO operations out of either principled or predatory motives, can often be reasoned by through local stakeholder communities. However, it is also important to be sensitive to the different positions that various AOGs maintain on this subject, with the province’s main AOG, the HQN, much less well-disposed to the presence of NGOs than other opposition groups.

More broadly, after the relative calm of the first half of July AOG-initiated conflict incidents rose considerably during this period, up by 100% and mirroring developments in Paktya. However, this still signifies a one third drop in overall AOG-initiated conflict

incidents from June, and moreover continues the downward trend recorded with relative consistent since March. One noteworthy aspect of this period’s development was the partial re-emergence of the conflict in Sabari, with 5 direct attacks on security forces, and 9 recorded IMF operations, in which a total of 26 AOG members were detained – although none were killed, indicating the ongoing lower level of blood-letting from IMF operations there. There was, however, a BBIED attack on the ANA in Sabari towards the end of the period, which killed 1 ANA officer and a civilian alongside the bomber. In other rural districts, the most significant events were an IED against an ANBP vehicle in Gurbuz, killing 2 policemen, and an IED against an ANA vehicle in Shamal, killing 2 soldiers and wounding another.

Khost city remained relatively quiet, with just 4 IDF attacks on Camp Salerno comprising the extent of the kinetic incidents recorded. There were also 9 IED discoveries, but the absence of any detonations continues to demonstrate the relative effectiveness of ANP capabilities in this direction. Finally in the city, NDS detained 3 Pakistani AOG suspects after an operation at the Gurbuz bus station area.

The ongoing issue of cross-border IDF incidents along the length of



the Afghanistan-Pakistan border saw an escalation in Khost province this period. In other border provinces in which this conflict pattern has been registered (such as Kunar) the PakMil have asserted that their objective is anti-AOG in nature, although this is not entirely clear. However, in Khost, the 5 such incidents that were recorded, in Tani and Tere Zayi, involved the clear and direct targeting of IMF, ANSF and the SOF-run “campaign forces,” – although it remains unconfirmed if the IDF did indeed come from PakMil forces. However, most significant is that in all incidents, IMF, ANSF and the campaign forces responded with IDF fire of their own. While many of the details of and motivations behind this conflict dynamic along the border region are opaque and open to interpretation, one thing is clear from what has happened in Khost this period: we have seen an increase in clear, recorded cross-border exchanges of fire.


However, some of these attacks may have been initiated by AOGs instead, exploiting the operational restrictions IMF fall under with regard to cross-border actions. Such a tactic was confirmed to have occurred in Spera, where IMF and ANSF came under mortar fire from AOG fighters positioned across the border to which the security forces responded with machine gun fire. As such, it may well also be true that AOGs are exploiting tensions between security forces on either side of the border for their own purposes.

LAGHMAN

Laghman’s most significant development during the second half of July was the ‘transition’ to ANSF authority in Mehtarlam City on the 19th, which led to the closure of all vehicular access to the city 36 hours, as the security forces ensured a smooth handover without incident. Prior to this handover, the NDS had been particularly active rounding up and arresting local AOG members in the city and its environs, in many cases doing so after having been alerted to their presence months before by concerned locals communities. After the handover, escalated numbers of ANSF were deployed to the streets of the city, and remain in place at the time of writing. However, while ANSF are officially in charge, the ‘transition’ remains academic in some respects. Firstly, although it is expected to be shut by 2014, the PRT in Metharlam remains in place, and IMF vehicle and foot patrols have continued to operate through the city, thus not giving the impression that IMF presence has diminished or changed in a significant way. Secondly, in an emergency such as a major attack in the provincial capital, an IMF response is highly likely even were the ANSF response deemed to be sufficient. Indeed this may also be a point that locally active AOGs are considering in an attempt to demonstrate the continued ‘reality’ of IMF authority.

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 1 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

Still, the formal handover is a significant step, as IMF in Laghman now turned their attention towards the much more challenging problems of a wider provincial transition. This is of particular relevance now, given that it comes at a time when Alingar continues to be home to a growing AOG presence, and in some ways slipping further from GOA and IMF grasp. Salafi AOG fighters, considered by locals the most dangerous of armed actors, have newly arrived from Kunar in the past month, and significant IEA and HIG cadres continue to operate and strengthen their presence in the district, particularly in Sangar and Parwayi, but also in the Nuralam Sahib area. A primary focus of the activities of these groups is to warn locals away from working with the GOA or IMF, and then to target them for killing if they refuse: the killing of the NDS official in Kandai Rajae in an IED blast was believed to be his second warning. Similarly, AOG fighters attacked an ANP officer with SAF in Parwayi, killing him and two other civilians with him, with one AOG fighter also dying in the firefight after local community came to the officer’s assistance. In another incident in the same area, a firefight broke out between AOG members and the local community after the latter refused to hand over their weap-



ons to the former, leading to the death of one AOG and two of the community’s cattle. From both of these incidents, it can also be seen that many in the local community in Alingar are broadly unsympathetic to the AOG cause, even if they also maintain little willingness to overtly side with the GOA. As such, the extent of AOG authority in the district will depend primarily on their numbers and powers of coercion, but it is clear they are actively vying for it at present. The final incident of note in Alingar was the successful escape of the Do Ab Police Chief, kidnapped there in early June, who did so after killing a captor while on a toilet trip. However, his brother, who had also been detained with him, was executed in response.

Elsewhere, Qarghayi was the other location recording significant conflict. While Torghar remained quiet, attacks in the Tangi Abrisham area resumed after a brief period of absence, with 3 attacks in that area occurred during the period. Moreover, some concerns were seen in the Charbagh area, with a small AOG cell operating locally and likely responsible for the IED that struck an IMF vehicle in the area on the 26th. However, the previous night, IMF and ANSF raided a residence in the Pacha village, near Charbagh, in which a man, his wife and son were killed, and three others wounded. It remains a matter of debate whether the man killed was an AOG member.

PAKTYA


| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 6 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

After the precipitous drop in AOG-initiated incidents last period, levels rose again by about 100% during the second half of the month, with most of the province's districts recording significant incidences of violence. However, this level remained a third lower than the June peak, similar to the pattern registered in Khost over the same 2 month period.

Starting on the northern border with Kurram Agency, in which Pakistani military operations are ongoing, conflict incidents remained characteristically focused on ANSF and IMF. Chamkanay recorded two IED blasts causing fatalities – the first against an ALP vehicle killing 1 and injuring 3 of the Local Police onboard, with the second striking an ANP vehicle killing 1 and injuring 2 more and 2 civilians in addition. In its northern neighbour Jaji, the IMF base there was attacked three times to no effect, while in Dand wa Patan, two ANBP CPs were targeted by rockets from across the border, in a tactic often seen before. In Jani Khel, where the weak GOA presence is concentrated in the DAC area, all incidents were recorded there, with six assaults on the DAC, and one IED striking an ANP vehicle killing one police-

man.

Further south, the recently noted effort to target GOA officials in Sayid Karam continued, with an assault on the house of the head of the district council, leading to the injury of him and four other members of his household, including women and children. In Gardez district, insecurity was focused on roadways, with the city itself quiet except for a small number of IED discoveries and ANP arrests. The AOG cell operating in Ibrahim Khel continued to be active, conducting two attacks on the main secondary road in the area, against a fuel tanker and then an IMF convoy. On the main Gardez-Khost road, one IED detonated injuring a civilian, while in the Tandan area, AOG fighters established an illegal CP and searched for those working with the GOA or IMF, not reportedly finding anyone. Of note, however, this occurred the day after an NDS operation in the same area arrested an AOG commander and 6 of his men. Finally, on the Gardez-Kabul highway in Ghafor Khel, AOG fighters burned a truck carrying IMF supplies; however, the highway continues to be relatively safe for na-



tional NGO staff during the daytime, with the Logar section providing the greatest risk.

In southern Paktya, the Zurmat conflict picked up from last period, with a dozen AOG-initiated incidents, mostly in the form of IED and direct attacks on IMF and ANP. Most significantly, in one IED attack on the 29th, 2 IMF and 5 ANA soldiers were killed, a particularly high death toll for a single incident. This district continues to be highly insecure. And in Shwak, an AOG fighter shot at an IMF helicopter with an RPG, a relatively rare tactic in the conflict but one seen in two other provinces this period. In this instance, a subsequent IMF search of the area led to the death of a civilian, although 7 suspected AOG fighters were also detained.

As such, while the conflict in Paktya generally re-intensified in the second half of July, no significant developments were recorded – particularly as the IMF have substantially reduced the intensity and frequency of their operations recently – and the balance of power between security forces and the opposition did not change in any significant way.

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the **27th of July 2011.**

SOUTHERN REGION

KANDAHAR

Following the previous reporting period, which had seen significant incidents including the killing of the Head of the Provincial Council, Ahmed Wali Karzai, and the aftermath BBIED attack against the Red Mosque, the targeted killing of high profile personalities appears to continue. In addition, the killing of an NGO staff member was also reported.


On the 27th of July, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, the Mayor of Kandahar City, was killed in his office in the Municipality compound by a BBIED attacker, who carried the device under his turban. It seems that the attacker infiltrated into the Municipality office within a group of people who wanted to discuss and solve a dispute over the destruction of houses in District 9. Two days before, the Mayor had ordered to tear down old houses in that district on the basis that they were illegal. Efforts to demolish these houses resulted in deaths to 2 children and 1 woman, but it is not clear whether both events—the mentioned dispute and the killing of the mayor—are in any way linked as AOG quickly claimed responsibility for the killing of the mayor. Potential explanations include the high profile of the casualty and his close relations to Ahmad Wali Karzai, who picked Hamidi 2006 for the post as mayor. Having said this, assassins had already targeted the mayor in March 2009 in an RCIED strike, although in that instance he managed to escape

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 2 |
| This Report Period | 1 |

unharmd, an incident that had the hallmarks of an AOG attack.

As remarked in the last report, the death of Ahmad Wali Karzai marks a significant change in the political landscape of Kandahar due to the resultant power vacuum. At this stage it is too early to evaluate whether the subsequent appointment of Shah Wali Khan Karzai as a replacement Head of Provincial Council will avert any follow up issues. As already stated in the last reporting cycle, NGOs should be vigilant to the possible changes in security dynamics in their areas of operations.

In the NGO sphere, a significant incident was reported on July 24th in Kandahar City, District 4. Two unknown armed individuals riding on a motorbike shot and killed a female NGO national staff member in the vicinity of her house. While the motivation remains unknown, it appears possible that the shooting may be the consequence of a family or personal dispute, though further assessment is required to complete the analysis. The last reported incident in 2011 involving an NGO in Kandahar was reported in March, when 3 NGO staff members from the same organization were killed while at an NGO supported road construction site in Arghandab District. It would appear that in this latter case the type of program the organisation was implementing played a role in the targeting of this event as road construction efforts are a com-



mon target of AOG efforts throughout the region.

The province also saw 2 other (non NGO-related) targeted killings by AOGs this period, when two separate AOG “Hit Teams” on motorcycles killed an ANP in Shah Wali Kot district on the 21st and a tribal elder and a member of the local shura in Arghandab District the following day.

Generally speaking, AOG initiated incidents remained consistent with the prior reporting cycle. In the present period, 53 AOG initiated incidents occurred across the province, with RCIEDs and IEDs deployed extensively, resulting in a total of 20 effective strikes. Within Kandahar City, District 2, 3, 9 and 4 were host to IED detonations, resulting in injuries to 7 civilians and 2 ANA. It was further reported that a child died when a motorcycle-mounted RCIED detonated against a passing ANP vehicle. However, province wide it was Zhari and Panjwayi that bore the majority of AOG activities. These consisted primarily of IEDs and direct AOG attacks, mainly against ANP CPs.

Finally, ANSF carried out a nightraid on a local house in District 9 of the capital on the 19th. After surrounding the house a fire fight broke out that lasted through the night, killing 5 including 2 AOG members, 1 of whom was reportedly a prominent AOG commander. This incident represents efforts by ANSF to prevent AOGs conducting operations in Kandahar City, as both ANSF/ IMF operations and AOG activities remain relatively common there.

PAKTIKA


The stand-out incident in Paktika in the second half of July was undoubtedly the protracted and violent IMF operation against a large HQN complex of bunkers and caves in Sar Hawza. During a combined air and ground operation, which began in the early hours of July 21st and lasted for roughly 40 hours, 80-100 AOG fighters were killed, with roughly 35 local Afghans recognised and the remaining 45-65 a mixture of Pakistani Pashtuns and Punjabis, as well as an unconfirmed small number of Arabs. One IMF service member, an SOF operative, was also killed in the protracted fighting, which started with the clearing of a compound and then continued as the IMF were attacked from other, concealed facilities. It is extremely rare for such a large number of AOG fighters to be located in just one compound, even in a province such as Paktika where the GOA presence is functionally non-existent in a number of districts. Its presence, only 25 kilometres from the provincial capital, therefore opens up a number of significant questions and potential implications about the nature of the conflict in the southeastern region. Perhaps mostly importantly, local governmental sources suggest that the intention of the amassed fighters was to seize Sharana after decapitating the provincial government there, in a more extreme example of what happened in Uruzgan during this period, and what has been attempted

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 0 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

(and partially achieved) at the district level in Nuristan earlier in the year.

It may also indicate that, alternatively, in recent weeks and months at least the HQN has come to consider certain locations in Afghanistan to be safer than its so-called 'safe havens' in the FATA, due to the intensive drone campaign there and the PakMil's ongoing operations in Kurram Agency, into which HQN recently expanded its presence. That this may be the case was reinforced by another incident a week prior to the above incident, this time in Urgan, where 20 AOG fighters were killed in an IMF airstrike in the Pirkoti area. However, after the large casualty figures from these incidents, it is likely that AOG leadership will prevent such large numbers of men from congregating in one place at one time in the near term.

In the wider conflict, the number of AOG-initiated conflict incidents rose by a third over last period, with a near doubling in IDF attacks, almost entirely concentrated in the northeastern districts of Ziruk, Nika, Gayan and Barmal, the last of which accounted for half of all incidents – exclusively focused on the Shkin, Margha and Malik Shay areas. Notable IDF incidents included an unsuccessful attempt to bring down an IMF helicopter in Sar Hawza, and two occasions where IMF counterfire managed to kill some of the AOG fighters re-



sponsible for initiating the attack. In contrast to IDF incidents, direct fire incidents fell slightly, with just 4 of the 16 total incidents leading to security force casualties (in all, 4 AOG deaths, 2 ANA deaths and 12 ANA injuries).

There was a slight increase in total IED incidents (detonations and discoveries), again remaining concentrated in DAC areas where the GOA and IMF concentrate their presence. Just two of these led to casualties, the first killing an IMF soldier and wounding another in Sharan's Kari Khel area, and the second wounding an IMF soldier in Khushamand DAC. In the western district of Yahya Khel, ANP discovered two VBIEDs in storage in a bazaar and arrested one suspect – the third VBIED incident this year, after a premature detonation in Barmal in April and the massive VBIED complex attack against a Barmal PSC compound before that, which killed 24.

Finally, in Gomal IMF and ANA disarmed the entire district ANP force for allegedly selling their weapons to AOGs, adding to the view that Paktika remains the most dangerous and lawless province in the eastern and southeastern border region. While such mass-casualty events as seen during the period are rare and unlikely to be seen again soon, the overall picture strongly suggests that the situation in the province will remain characterised by a confident and extensive AOG presence across the province and a high level of AOG-IMF conflict for the foreseeable future.


URUZGAN

| | NGO Incidents |
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| Year to Date | 0 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

This reporting period, the geographical distribution of AOG related incidents in Uruzgan focused on 3 districts: Tirin Kot, Dihrawud and Khas Uruzgan. AOG initiated incidents remained relatively consistent with the previous reporting cycle, with 42% of the incidents initiated by AOGs related to effective IED explosions (mainly in the abovementioned districts). The volume of direct attacks also remained consistent with the previous reporting period. Direct attacks were carried out on 6 occasions, with a noteworthy incident occurring on July 19th in Khas Uruzgan, when AOG attacked an ALP post. In that incident, 3 ALPs were killed and 2 wounded.

The burial ceremony of Jan Mohammad Khan, the close advisor to the Afghan president who was killed on July 17th in Kabul, took place on July 18th in Tirin Kot. While the ceremony passed without incident, 2 significant events occurred at other times demonstrating the determination of AOGs to make a strong impact in the province. The more deadly of these was recorded on July 28th in Tirin Kot City, in the area of the Governor’s office, the Highway Police station and the Radio/TV station. A total of 7 VBIED and

BBIED devices were utilized in the attack, as attackers (veiled under burqas) entered the radio station and the highway police station to detonate their devices. In addition to this, 1 VBIED detonated at the entrance of the governor’s office, followed by 3 individuals—equipped with BBIEDs and firearms—who engaged the compound’s security forces. The fight lasted for approximately 5 hours, resulting in 24 (including the attackers) killed—with 13 civilians and an Afghan journalist amongst them—and 37 wounded (including 25 civilians and the Governor’s speaker). The targets were clearly the governor’s office, the police station and also a third office beside the radio station which was used by the commander of a large provincial militia. AOG members apparently attempted to access the latter office through the radio station, during which several staff from the radio station were killed, along with the mentioned Afghan reporter. Although the militia commander and the Governor were the main targets, reports indicate that both escaped unharmed. This marked the first large-scale attack of this nature, targeting multiple high profile targets, in Tirin Kot. However, the targeting of high



profile personalities by AOGs is consistent with trends occurring in other parts of the southern region.

A second noteworthy incident occurred on July 27th when 2 unidentified men on a motor bike shot and wounded the Head of the Haj and Religious Affairs Department in Tirin Kot City, in Kalacha Bazaar area. The motivation behind the attempted killing remains unknown, but the incident marks the third attack of this nature over the month. In two separate attacks conducted by AOG mobile “hit teams,” a GOA employee was shot and wounded on the 28th of June and in a second attack, 2 ANP were wounded on July 1st by another AOG mobile team on a motorbike. Targeted killings in this fashion have become a striking feature of the security environment in the southern region.

On a final note, IMF conducted at least 4 documented operations—occurring in Tirin Kot, Khas Uruzgan and Chora—resulting in 6 AOG killed, 2 wounded and 17 arrested, and elsewhere, numerous ALPs surrendered with their weapons to AOGs on 2 separate occasions in Khas Uruzgan.

HELMAND

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 2 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

Helmand hosted a large number of AOG initiated incidents this reporting period, with the geographical distribution of AOG activities remaining similar to that of the previous reporting cycle. The majority of these took place in the consistently most affected districts; Nahri Sarraj, Sangin, Marja, Musa Qala and Nad Ali. The province saw AOGs conduct a large number of attacks and IED strikes (at least 50, not counting IED discoveries) against IMF/ANSF/ANP security targets.


It is worth noting that in several of these IED strikes, civilians were hit causing a large number of casualties. Helmand witnessed 3 exceptional incidents of this nature. In Naw Zad, a roadside IED detonated against a civilian vehicle, resulting in the deaths of 4 civilians. On July 14th in Sangin District, another roadside IED hit a civilian car, resulting in the deaths of 6 civilians, and in the most deadly and significant IED strike involving civilians, on July 29th a mini bus was hit by an RCIED in Nahri Sarraj District (Sarakala area). This blast killed 16 civilians, including at least 2 women and 2 children. In terms of targeting, it was reported that in the latter, an ANP vehicle had passed through the same area just prior to the IED detonation, suggesting that the bus was not the primary target. However, the risk related to IED detonations remains one of the highest risk factors for civilians, especially when travelling along heavily contested roads.

In Lashkar Gah City, the ability of AOGs to strike within the city has typically been limited, and AOGs have generally resorted to emplac-

ing IEDs along the outskirts, occasional IDF attacks, and some attacks against police checkpoints. However, 2 noteworthy incidents were reported from the city this reporting period. The first was reported on the 18th of July, when 7 ANP were poisoned and subsequently shot and killed. The perpetrator, an ANP official, managed to evade capture by fleeing the scene in an ANP vehicle (with some equipment stolen from the ANP post). In this incident, the motivation remains unclear; however, reports suggest that the perpetrator may have links with AOGs.

In the second significant incident in Lashkar Gah City (July 31st), a SVBIED detonated against a joint ANP/ANA patrol. As a result, 9 ANP/ANA and 1 civilian were killed, and 6 ANP and 3 civilians were wounded. Such suicide attacks are quite rare in Lashkar Gah City, and initial assessments indicate that this attack should not be seen as relating specifically to the recent transition in Lashkar Gah but should be viewed as part of the broader AOG campaign. In fact, an incident of similar nature occurred once prior to this in 2011, when in April an attempt at a two-fold suicide attack was carried out against the Governor's compound. In that incident, one of the BBIED attackers was shot and killed by ANSF before he could enter the office of the Governor, and the second detonated his device before he could gain entry to the Supreme Court (wounding 3).

Of note, the transition ceremony for Lashkar Gah took place on the 20th of July. The official transition remained a mostly political handover to ANSF and does not



result in any major structural changes within the composition of forces assigned to the city. Considering the fact that ANSF had long held the responsibility for security within the city, it is unlikely to create any serious changes in the overall security paradigm there. The transition was carried out with a large number of officials and VIPs in the Governor's compound, which corresponded with significantly heightened security measures throughout the city. No relevant security incident occurred during the ceremony.

IMF/ANSF carried out a large number of operations outside of Lashkar Gah against AOG over the past 2 weeks, launching a total of at least 22 operations which were centred on Nahri Sarraj, Sangin, Nad Ali, Musa Qala, Garmser and Baghran District. These were reported to result in a high number of AOG killed (35), and a large volume of detentions. However, the biggest strike was carried out in a night raid in Baghran, where 16 AOG members were reportedly killed, and the seizure of a huge drug cache long with IED making materials, took place. Incidents in Baghran are quite rare, with 3 IMF operations having been reported there thus far this year. The last noteworthy incident was reported on June 18th when IMF engaged an AOG, resulting in 25 AOG members killed (and no reported IMF casualties). In June 2011, IMF/ANP seized 70 AP mines, an unknown number of RPG launchers, IED detonators and assorted ammunition during a joint operation. However, despite these outliers, Baghran District is a relatively calm district in Helmand that rarely witnesses insecurity. The one addendum to this is that the district is often assessed as a gathering place for AOGs from the province, who occasionally infiltrate into Ghor or Daykundi.


ZABUL

37 AOG initiated incidents were recorded this reporting period. This marks a slight increase when compared to the previous reporting cycle. The main threats in the area are identified as IED deployments and direct attacks, mainly targeting IMF or the ANP. 40% of the AOG initiated incidents this period were related to IED's—including 15 effective IED related events across the province—with incidents occurring mainly in Qalat, Shinkay and Shahjoy. Amongst these, noteworthy incidents were reported in Arghandab District, when on July 25th an IED detonated on a group of civilians out walking, killing 2 women and wounding 2 children. In a second incident, an RCIED detonated against the car

| | NGO Incidents |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Year to Date | 0 |
| This Report Period | 0 |

of the director of a local construction company, who escaped unharmed, with the car only slightly damaged. Of further note—in Tarnak Wa Jaldak on the 24th—a roadside IED hit an ANA vehicle, causing the deaths of 2 ANA soldiers, and injuries to an additional one.

Along with the IED incidents, 19 direct attacks were reported over the past two weeks. 15 of these direct attacks were carried out against ANP posts across the province, with the majority in Qalat and Shajoy Districts. AOGs attacked IMF logistical convoys 3 times in Qalat, Shinkay and Tarnak Wa Jaldak, and IMF/ANA bases came twice under



AOG attack in Daychopan and Athgar Districts.

It should be noted that IMF/ANSF units maintained their tempo of operations during this reporting period as well. Their activities were concentrated on Shahjoy and Qalat Districts, and consisted of the seizure of weapons, ammunition and material, as well as several detentions of suspected AOG members. It was also reported that IMF/ANSF had several operations—specifically in Shahjoy—which resulted in the killing of numerous AOG members.


NIMROZ

The overall volume of incident reporting in Nimroz has been limited, both this period and historically, with this cycle remaining relatively consistent with the previous reporting period. During the present reporting period 10 incidents were reported, with Khash Rod District hosting all 10 of them. This is not unexpected, due to the district's proximity to Helmand Province. AOG elements, active in Helmand, have been known to use Khash Rod as a safe haven in order to reorganize when necessary, and the security situation in the district is usually directly linked to develop-

| | NGO Incidents |
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| This Report Period | 0 |

ments in Helmand Province.

IED strikes were recorded in 3 occurrences over the last two weeks. Despite the limited presence of IMF in Nimroz, 2 of the IEDs detonated against patrolling IMF vehicles, with the third occurred while the IED was in the process of being emplaced. This last resulted in the deaths of 2 AOG members, including a mid-level commander. Other AOG initiated activities included an assault—which included the involvement of heavy weapons—on an ANP post in Delaram area and



an attack on an ANA convoy, which lasted 30 minutes.

Lastly, ANP activities remained limited over the present reporting cycle, however, ANP carried out one search operation, where they discovered and seized 2,000 parcels of poppy seeds and 50 kg of drugs in a truck. 2 suspects were arrested in connection with the event.

GHAZNI


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The first NGO incident reported for Ghazni this year (and one of the most significant for the region) occurred this period involved the temporary detention of 40 staff members from a local demining NGO by an AOG, though all 40 were released unharmed just 1 hour later following negotiations by local community representatives. The demining NGO is reported to enjoy a high level of acceptance among the local community and did not report receiving any prior threats. These were crucial elements, as it appears that this local acceptance and the involvement of the community were the main factors involved in their safe release. Putting this incident in context, the mass abduction of NGO demining staff has been previously reported twice in the Eastern Region, both times in May, with 1 incident in Paktya and another in Khost. A third mass abduction of demining NGO workers was reported in the Western Region in Farah (July) when 31 demining NGO staff members were abducted by an AOG (with 4 of them subsequently killed). While the profile and relative exposure of demining efforts are likely contributing factors it should be noted that the very nature of demining activities (in certain areas) may be perceived by AOGs as contrary to their efforts.

Ghazni Province remains one of the most kinetic in the South, second only to Helmand. While IMF and ANSF maintained their pace of operations as a large num-

ber of AOG were reportedly killed or detained, with a variety of weapons and explosives seized AOG activities also showed no signs of decline over the current cycle, with the number of AOG attributed incidents (83) largely consistent with that of the previous reporting period. AOG activities in Ghazni continue to follow relatively standard established trends, including IED detonations and direct attacks against logistical supply convoys on Highway 1 and secondary routes. In these latter instances, PSC escorts have borne the brunt of attacks (with 6 assaults on PSCs, 4 of them against convoys moving IMF contracted goods). The past two weeks also witnessed a concentration of attacks against ANP check posts; with a notable 6 reported assaults in Ghazni District, 1 each in Qarabagh and Ajristan Districts, and 1 against an ANP convoy in Jaghatu District. Further AOG direct attacks were carried out against district centers (DACs) across the province, some of them receiving multiple attacks, such as in Ajristan DAC (4 direct attacks) and Waghaz DAC (2).

Other noteworthy incidents reported included AOG efforts to intimidate and/or targeted killings. These included the killing of a civilian on July 25th in Waghaz District. In this incident, an AOG shot and killed a civilian whom was accused of spying for IMF and ANSF, while in another incident in Arzo Village (Ghazni) on the 23rd, an AOG killed a local



religious elder while he was teaching girls in the local mosque. In this latter attack, 3 of the girls were also wounded. Although the motivations behind these incidents are not clear, it appears likely that both were attempts to set an example to the local community in order to intimidate them.

A double explosion in Ghazni City, Mandi Gor area, was reported on the 19th, which is consistent with existent trends towards AOG assassination attempts against GoA officials. In this incident, a handbag with an explosive device inside (most likely an RCIED) was placed near the entrance of the Head of Ghazni City Court's personal living compound. The subsequent detonation wounded the official, his son and an ANP. When locals had gathered to transport the victims, a second device went off that killed 4 civilians and wounded 15 others. The incident marks the first attack targeting a GOA official in Ghazni City since June 26th, when an RCIED attached to a bicycle detonated in Qala-e-Sabz area while the vehicle of the former District Governor of Khwaja Umari was passing by.

The risk linked to AOG direct attacks against DAC's and subject villages, the positioning of IEDs and the inaccuracy of indirect fire targeting the DAC's and the military bases—which are installed mainly in urban centres—remain the highest risk factors in Ghazni to the civilian population, along with those NGO's operating or living there. Attempts to intimidate and/or target locals suspected of supporting the Government represent an additional—but



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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition
Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public
Protection Forces (local depu-
tised militias) / **DC**-District
Centre / **GOA**-Government of
Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire
(ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised
Explosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device / **PDO**-
Private Development Organisa-
tion / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police
/ **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative /
IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani-
stan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial
Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-
District Shadow Governor (IEA)
/ **PGM**-Pro-Government Militia

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Daykundi

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

Placement of New RSAs

As many of you are already aware we now have new RSAs in place for our West and South offices. Mr Taro Yamagata recently took over the West and will be based in Herat (responsible for Ghor, Farah, Badghis and Herat Provinces) and Mr Volker Lankow will be managing the South. He will be based in Kandahar and will be responsible for the provinces of Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Ghazni and Paktika.

We encourage members of the community to actively engage them in regards to both ANSO service delivery as well as to meet with them and share your impressions and analysis of the operational contexts you are operating in. We are sure they would welcome any such inputs.

Their contact details are provided above.

Regards,

The ANSO Management Team