



Police Perception Survey - 2011



The Afghan Perspective

Police Perception Survey - 2011: The Afghan Perspective



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Project Design & Direction
UNDP- LOTFA

Designed & printed by:
Aina Media

Field Work

Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) Surveys, Kabul
Langer Research Associates

@ 2011, UNDP-Afghanistan

About UNDP-Afghanistan

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the UN's global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. In Afghanistan, UNDP-Afghanistan has been providing efficient, impactful and responsive assistance in support of the international community effort towards peace and development since 2002. Its focus is on state institutions, democratic governance, poverty reduction, peace and security initiatives based on national solutions to development challenges.

About LOTFA

Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) is a multilateral trust fund set up in 2002 and administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Afghanistan. The Trust Fund has provided a mechanism for coordinating contributions from international partners as part of the latter's support to rebuild and professionalize the Afghan National Police (ANP). The principle priorities cover police salaries, infrastructure, capacity development, gender enhancement and community policing towards accountable service delivery. The Afghan Ministry of Interior is the nodal government implementing partner. Current international contributors to the Fund are: Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America.

The opinions expressed in the survey do not reflect the views of the UNDP

Preface

The Police Perception Survey - 2011 is the third in a series of annual public opinion surveys commissioned by the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) which is administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Afghanistan, to evaluate the perceptions of the Afghan public on the role and performance of the Afghan National Police (ANP).

Conducted via face-to-face interviews with large, randomly selected national samples of the Afghan public, these surveys give a representative view of public opinion on police issues both nationally and in all regions of the country. The use of continued measures across surveys has allowed for the establishment of baseline information that subsequently has been tracked over time, showing the course of the development of attitudes toward the ANP in areas of progress and challenges alike.

As previously, field work for this year's survey was carried out by the Afghan Centre for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) in Kabul, a major provider of quantitative and qualitative research in Afghanistan. ACSOR's partner, Langer Research Associates of New York, analysed the results and produced this report.

ACSOR interviewed 7,278 Afghans (4,111 men and 3,167 women), age 18 or older, across all 34 provinces of the country. The 40-minute questionnaire explored a wide range of attitudes and experiences related directly or indirectly to assessments of the Afghan police. The report on these results is enriched both by statistical modelling and by a review of the relevant international literature on public assessments of police performance.

The survey offers strategic guidance to the leadership of the Afghan Interior Ministry in its policies on police professionalization, as well as unique insight for all those concerned with the performance and public perceptions of the ANP.

UNDP - Afghanistan
December, 2011

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A. Executive Summary

The Afghan National Police (ANP) is making significant¹ strides in public support, gaining greater confidence, respect and regard from Afghan citizens during the past year. But sharp regional differences mark the challenges ahead, as do reports of police corruption, misbehaviour and mistreatment of ordinary Afghans – although progress has been recorded in these areas as well.

Overall trends are positive in the nationwide Police Perception Survey - 2011, the third in an annual series of public opinion surveys commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (UNDP-LOTFA). Many key gauges of views of the police have advanced from 2010 and 2009; others that have been broadly supportive remain so.

Sizable majorities, ranging from 74 to 81 percent of Afghans, see the ANP favourably, express confidence in its abilities, respect it personally and regard police work as prestigious. These views, however, remain more broad than deep, as well as varied across the country's regions. One of these key metrics – favourable opinions of the ANP overall – has held basically steady in the two years, but “very” favourable views of the force have slipped somewhat.

Detailed statistical analyses² and a review of international academic literature on attitudes toward the police³ lend additional context to this year's report. Statistical modelling finds that favourable views of the ANP rely largely on two factors: positive ratings of the Afghan government more broadly, and a sense that the force has a strong local presence. But a third factor also has come to the fore – the ANP's perceived effectiveness in performing its duties. This suggests the police force increasingly is being viewed on the basis of its own performance, a positive trend.

The survey's findings comport in many ways with the more than 30 academic studies and other reports that were reviewed in the preparation of this report. They indicate that public confidence in the police is the cornerstone of their legitimacy, and that confidence in turn is informed by views that a police force is accountable, seeks community involvement, avoids corruption and abuse and treats citizens fairly and with respect. The ANP will be well-served by a focus on each of those areas.

Key findings:

- There's been an 8-point increase since last year in the number of Afghans expressing personal respect for the ANP, to 81 percent; a 6-point gain in the number who see it as a prestigious occupation, to 75 percent; and a slight 3-point gain in overall confidence in the force, now expressed by 74 percent. But there's much room for improvement in the intensity of this sentiment; many fewer, approximately three in 10, express “a

¹ Statistical significance indicates a high probability (more than 99 percent) that the observed differences between two samples could not have occurred by chance alone. The use of the word “significant” in this report refers to statistical significance at the 99 percent confidence level. All differences that are characterized as meaningful have been tested for statistical significance.

² See Section XIX.

³ See Section XX.

great deal” of respect for the ANP, see its work as highly prestigious or have a great deal of confidence in its abilities. Still, its highly prestigious rating has increased by 7 points from last year.

- In further evidence of positive momentum, 39 percent say their respect for the ANP has increased in the past year, while just 12 percent say it’s decreased. And 46 percent say their confidence in the police has gone up – a 12-point increase over the number who said so last year. Far fewer, 22 percent, say their confidence in the ANP has declined.
- Seventy-seven percent express a favourable opinion of the ANP overall, little changed from 79 percent the past two years. As noted, the number who sees the police “very” favourably has slipped, by 6 points from 2009 and by 4 points from 2010, to 34 percent.
- There are sharp regional differences in these results. Ratings of the ANP have improved markedly in the South West, where enormous effort has been expended in the past year in security and development alike. There also have been advances in the Central/Hazarjat region, and to a lesser extent in the North. But some views of the police have worsened elsewhere, notably in Central Kabul, the East, and especially in the West, where reported crime victimization is up.
- Most Afghans view ANP officers as knowledgeable about their jobs, well-trained and well-equipped to perform their duties. Eighty-one percent say ANP officers in their area understand the law well and 75 percent say they understand what their duties are. Seven in 10 say they are trained well to perform their duties and are knowledgeable about the needs of the community, 66 percent say they are knowledgeable about human rights and 63 percent say they are well-provided with the equipment they need.
- In a fundamental performance measure, nearly half of Afghans say crime in their area has declined in the past year, up by 6 points from a year ago, and 52 percent say they live in a “low crime” area. Another measure, though, which relates more directly to police performance, remains fairly weak: Among crime victims who reported the offense, 59 percent say the police addressed the issue adequately – a majority, but nonetheless, a suboptimal level of satisfaction on such a basic metric.
- There is, nonetheless, broad agreement among Afghans that a stronger police presence would make them feel more secure. Seventy-four percent say so, up 6 points from last year, including 66 percent in the South West, up by a remarkable 26 points. Further, 45 percent of Afghans overall say the performance of the police in their area has improved in the past year, up 13 points from 2010; just 8 percent say it’s worsened. Again, views that the ANP is performing better have advanced most strongly in the South West, from 28 percent a year ago to 55 percent now.
- The ANP has broadened its reach: Fifty-nine percent of Afghans now say there is a police station within 30 minutes of their location, up by 7 points from last year and 17 points higher than in 2009. There is an indication, however, that while being spread more broadly, the force may be stretched a bit more thinly: There’s been a 5-point dip overall in the number who say the ANP has a “strong” presence in their area, including just 36 percent who say it’s “very” strong locally, down by 6 points.

- Acceptance of female police officers is on the rise in Afghanistan, although still well short of optimum levels. Fifty-three percent think it's a good idea to have female officers in their community, up 8 points from last year; 42 percent think it's a bad idea, unchanged.
- There also are increased reports of community outreach. Twenty-two percent of Afghans say public meetings with the ANP have been held in their community in the past year; and 27 percent say community watch groups have been established, up by 8 points. Where they have occurred, moreover, eight in 10 say community watch groups have in fact improved local security – up by a wide 19 points from last year.
- Community involvement also is evident in the development of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), in which local citizens are supported by the provincial or national government in community self-defence activities. Three in 10 Afghans say ALP forces are active in their area, jumping to nearly half in the South West and about four in 10 in the South Central and Northern regions. Encouragingly, among those who report ALP in their area, nearly seven in 10 say it's helped to improve security.
- Similar to its more general ratings, sizable majorities of Afghans – 70 to 88 percent – rate the ANP as effective in handling a range of responsibilities, from crime prevention to bringing criminals to justice. But while 88 percent see it as capable of coping with small crimes, confidence is much lower, 67 percent, in the ability of the force to deal with large, organized crime; and lower still, 57 percent, in its ability to deal with corruption – two areas in which increased focus is merited. (Both results are little changed from 2009 and 2010 alike.)
- There are some signs of progress in the area of corruption. The number of Afghans who perceive some or a lot of corruption within the ANP has declined by 7 points from last year, to 53 percent; these perceptions are down extremely sharply in the South West (from 63 percent to 38 percent) and in the South Central region (from 72 to 45 percent). While 53 percent is still a large number to see the police as corrupt, it's substantially lower than views of corruption among government employees in general (79 percent) or in the court system (73 percent).
- In terms of personal experience, 18 percent of Afghans say they or a household member have been asked by a police officer⁴ for money or other payment in order to avoid arrest or a fine, essentially unchanged in the past year. Other police misdeeds also are reported: Seventeen percent say they or a household member were subjected to excessive physical force by an ANP member in the past year, and about as many report a false accusation of criminality. These have risen slightly, driven by sharp increases in the West. Two in 10 also say they've been addressed by an ANP officer with insulting language. Although comparatively rare, bad experiences are memorable and negatively related to positive perceptions of the ANP.
- A troubling number of Afghans, three in 10, report that they or a household member have seen a member of the ANP using drugs, up 5 points from last year, with such reports peaking, at 41 percent, in Central Kabul, where they've more than doubled. Moreover, 18 percent nationally say they're aware of officers participating in the narcotics trade, unchanged since last year.

- In other potentially corrosive perceptions, more than half of Afghans think ANP members are partial to their clan, and more than a quarter personally have experienced a situation in which an officer dropped an investigation or charge because of the subject's connections. Relatively few see any recourse: Just 37 percent think filing a complaint against an ANP officer would make things better, down 4 points from last year. Each of these raises the spectre of alienation from the force.
- It should be noted that these negatives are balanced to some extent by other, broadly positive views of police performance. Nearly eight in 10 Afghans say the police in their area mainly deal with people fairly; seven in 10 say the ANP treat women with respect at least most of the time; and nearly two-thirds say the police share the values of most people in the community, shown by studies as an important factor in perceived legitimacy. Fewer, 56 to 60 percent, say the police often respond to community concerns, explain their actions and admit their mistakes; given their importance to police-community relations, each of these would benefit from renewed commitment to improvement.
- Nearly four in 10 Afghans also say an ANP officer has offered to help them or someone in their household in a legal and positive way when they needed assistance – up by 7 points since last year. This reaches 69 percent in the South West, 56 percent in the East and 41 percent in the West, up since last year by 20, 20 again and 18 points.
- Sixty-five percent of Afghans feel informed about the overall activities of the ANP in their area, and three in 10 say they have more information now than they did a year ago. It matters: Confidence in the force is vastly higher among Afghans who feel better-informed about the ANP's activities – another result that underscores the critical value of community outreach.
- Looking to the future, two in 10 Afghans think the ANP is ready now to take over all policing responsibilities from international forces. An additional 26 percent see readiness within the next year. Forty-six percent of Afghans think it'll take more than a year – but very few, 4 percent, don't think the force ever will be ready to operate without international assistance.
- Beyond the ANP, views of the International Assistance Security Force (ISAF) remain essentially unchanged, at 43 percent positive, but with regional shifts. Given vast efforts at improving security and development in the South West, views of ISAF are now more positive in this region (52 percent) than in any other. Sixty-four percent in the South West now say that international forces and international aid organizations alike have a strong presence in their community, by far the highest presence reported in any of Afghanistan's regions, and up by 10 and 30 points, respectively.
- Given four options for the future deployment of ISAF forces, Afghans divide roughly into quarters: Twenty-four percent think international military forces should leave now, 21 percent think this withdrawal should occur in 2014 as planned, 23 percent think they shouldn't leave until the Taliban have been defeated and 24 percent think they should remain until the ANA and ANP have been trained to fight the insurgency independently.

Statistical modelling

As noted, statistical modelling was employed to identify key predictors of views of the ANP. The fact that the perceived effectiveness of the police has taken a larger role in predicting overall favourable views of the force suggests that it's being judged more on its individual merits, rather than simply as an appendage of the broader government or as a preferable, indigenous alternative to international forces. That gives the ANP greater say over its destiny as an independent national institution – reflecting an opportunity, and a responsibility, alike.

Modelling also finds that perceptions of the effectiveness of the ANP are informed by other variables – chief among them, how well-trained the police are seen to be; additionally, the extent to which they are seen as actively involved in performing their various duties, and the extent to which they respond to community concerns and engage in other positive police behaviours.

Another desired outcome – confidence in the police – is informed by other crucial predictors: Afghans' respect for the ANP, their belief that being a police officer is prestigious work, and how well-informed they feel about ANP activities in the area.

Recommendations

The findings of the UNDP-LOTFA Police Perception Survey - 2011 are well in accord with the literature on public views of policing, explored in detail in Section XX and Appendix E of this report. Confidence in the police is the basis for police legitimacy and the cornerstone of citizens' cooperation with police efforts. To gain that confidence, the police must be perceived as sharing the values of the broader community; as acting effectively, but also fairly, honestly, respectfully and without bias; and as being both accountable and transparent in their operations.

The value of those goals is reflected in the results outlined above and explored in greater detail in the full report that follows this summary. They suggest clear steps for the ANP to continue along the path toward achieving its full potential as a valued and critical institution of Afghan society. Among them:

- Redouble efforts at community outreach. Expand police-community information sessions well beyond the approximately one-fifth of Afghans who currently report such interactions. Institutionalize responsiveness to community concerns. Continue and expand upon additional outreach efforts to increase community knowledge of and involvement in police activities, including community watch groups.
- Adopt and publicize zero-tolerance standards on corruption, bias and favouritism, excessive physical force, drug-taking, drug trafficking and other forms of police wrongdoing.
- Recognize that any effort to strengthen police development by decreasing corruption among the ANP will be largely ineffective without a complimentary focus on reform of the court system. Improvements in both linked institutions will contribute to the effective rule of law in the country.
- Improve training in areas including general civilian policing skills, anti-corruption and anti-drug-trafficking. Ensure that training is not academic, but relevant to the realistic context police officers will face when they leave the academy.

- Improve responses to large, organized crime, an area in which the ANP is more weakly rated compared with its perceived ability to handle small offenses.
- Given sharp regional differences, create an on-going review effort to identify and address challenges in specific geographic areas where ratings of police performance are sub-par or deteriorating.
- Improve service through measures that better demonstrate to crime victims that their complaints of crime victimization are seriously and effectively investigated. Likewise institute a process by which citizens are assured that their complaints against the police themselves will be investigated fairly and without retribution.
- Develop expertise within the force in areas in which its performance is not now highly rated, for example in fighting corruption and in dealing with large, organized criminal enterprises.
- Retain the goal of transitioning the ANP from an insurgent-fighting force to a crime-fighting force, as possible. While the ANP's work against anti-government elements is popular, it will benefit in the long-term by clarifying its fundamental role in civil society as policing the rule of law.
- Increase recruitment efforts of women into the ANP. Views on this topic are mixed, but moving in a positive direction, even though female officers remain very low. And majorities say they'd be more likely to report crimes to a woman officer, and think they're more apt to be treated fairly by one.
- Increase the ANP's presence, visibility and cooperative interactions with the community. Focus the force on the principles of honesty, professionalism, community service and respect for individuals. Publicize the ANP's commitment to these principles from its highest levels to its street patrols. They are crucial elements of positive public perceptions of the ANP.

The efforts recommended here demand a complex effort across many fronts, from community relations to training, monitoring and improving police performance. As evidenced from the progress made by the ANP to date, such measures, effectively undertaken, offer the prospect of a profoundly positive impact on the future of Afghanistan.

Methods Summary

This survey was conducted for the UNDP in Afghanistan from Oct. 10-27, 2011, via face-to-face interviews, averaging 40 minutes in length, among a national probability sample of 7,278 Afghan adults selected at random in all 34 of the country's provinces. Sampling, field work and data processing were carried out by the Afghan Centre for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) in Kabul. Langer Research Associates of New York, N.Y. consulted on questionnaire design, conducted the data analysis and wrote this report.


Findings are presented in the main section of the report. Appendices include a detailed description of the sampling methodology and field work procedures, a trended topline data report, details of the statistical modelling used in data analysis, the full questionnaire, a review of relevant literature and a full list of reference sources.

B. Main Report (Analysis)

I. Favourability, Confidence and Respect for the Police


Afghans' views of the ANP are broadly positive, and on almost every metric show continued improvement, with particularly notable gains in the conflict-zone provinces in the South West. Eighty-one percent of Afghans express personal respect for the ANP in their area; roughly three-quarters view the force favourably, express confidence in it and call it a prestigious occupation.

Overall respect for the ANP has increased by 8 percentage points since last year; this includes 33 percent with “a great deal of respect” for the force, up by 4 points since last year, and 48 percent with “quite a lot” of respect, up slightly, by 3 points. While there’s continued room for improvement at the high end of the scale, the direction is positive. In another measure, moreover, four in 10 say their respect for the ANP in the last year has grown while just 12 percent say it has declined. (The rest say their respect for the ANP hasn’t changed.)




Seventy-five percent say that being a member of the ANP is a prestigious occupation, up by 6 points in the past year. The number saying that being an ANP officer commands a “great deal” of prestige has risen from 25 percent in 2010 to 32 percent now.

Confidence is up more modestly – 74 percent are confident in the ANP in their area, up 3 points. In line with other top-end measures, three in 10, say they’re “very” confident, in this case unchanged since last year. Still, as with respect, another question underscores the ANP’s positive momentum: More than twice as many say their confidence in the ANP has grown in the past year than declined, 46 to 22 percent – a jump of 12 points since last year in the number of Afghans saying their confidence in the force has grown.




At the same time, these increases in respect and confidence in the ANP are not uniform across the country. Higher respect for the force is driven by sharp gains in the Central/Hazarjat region (up by 20 points), the South West (up by 17 points) and to a lesser extent the North (up 9 points).⁵ Confidence in the police has increased in the same areas – by 10 points in the South West, 8 points in the Hazarjat and 6 points in the North. Confidence and respect have grown more modestly or held steady in most other regions, but respect has lost 6 points – amid other deterioration in experience and perceptions alike – in the West.



⁵ Regional definitions are as follows:

- Central Kabul: Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Panjshir
- East: Laghman, Kunar, Nangarhar, Nuristan
- South Central: Ghazni, Logar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Wardak
- South West: Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul
- West: Badghis, Farah, Herat, Nimroz
- North: Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sari Pul, Takhar
- Central/Hazarjat: Bamiyan, Daykundi, Ghor, Uruzgan


These increases in confidence, respect and prestige ratings have not translated into a change for the ANP's overall favourability, the most basic measure of popularity. It is high: Seventy-seven percent of Afghans report a somewhat or very favourable view of the ANP overall, but this is about the same as it's been the last two years, 79 percent. "Very" favourable views of the ANP, moreover, have actually declined by 6 points since 2009 and by 4 points since last year, to 34 percent.



Again there are regional differences. Notably, after a steep decline from 2009 to 2010, favourable views of the ANP in the South West have rebounded, jumping by 19 points to 67 percent favourable (including a 9-point rise in "very" favourable views). This improvement in views in the South West, however, has been offset by 9-, 8- and 6- point declines in favourable views of the ANP in the East, West and Central Kabul, respectively. "Very" favourable views of the ANP are likewise down sharply in the East and Central Kabul, by 13 and 15 points, respectively.

II. Police Performance

Forty-five percent of Afghans say the performance of the ANP in their area has gotten better in the past year, while just 8 percent say it has gotten worse. That's a 13-point rise in the number seeing improvements, up from 32 percent last year, and one that has occurred across all regions. The greatest gain occurred in the South West, where last year just 28 percent saw improvement, vs. 55 percent now, another sign of positive strides in this region.



Among those who see improvements in police performance, 23 percent attribute this to an increase in the number of police, while 20 percent cite heightened security. The few Afghans who say ANP performance has deteriorated (8 percent of the population) mainly blame bribe-taking (33 percent) or poor treatment of citizens (22 percent).

Perceived improvements in police performance are 13 points higher (49 vs. 36 percent) among those who are informed about ANP activities compared to those who are not informed. (See Section IV, Community Outreach). It’s also higher where people say conditions and security are good compared to bad, especially in terms of security from crime and violence, where there’s a 17-point gap (51 vs. 34 percent) in perceptions that local policing has improved.

For the second year in a row, when asked in an open-ended question who or what ensures security in their area, almost half mention the ANP first, by far the top mention. And when asked what the police do best, four in 10 cite their maintenance of security, 31 points higher than the next most-cited answer. Both of these mark unusual levels of agreement on open-ended questions.


In terms of specific duties, 88 percent say the ANP are somewhat or very effective at preventing crime, three-quarters say it’s effective at responding to complaints of crime, 72 percent say it’s effective at maintaining law and order and seven in 10 believe the ANP is effective at bringing criminals to justice – all unchanged since last year. Fewer, 28 to 46 percent, call the ANP “very” effective at these tasks, but this strong praise has risen since last year in each domain tested.

| Changes in Perception of ANP Effectiveness | | | | | | |
|---|------|------|------|------|------------|-----------|
| | 2011 | | 2010 | | Difference | |
| | NET | Very | NET | Very | NET | Very |
| Fighting insurgents | 75% | 36% | 70% | 30% | +5 | +6 |
| Preventing crime | 88% | 46% | 89% | 40% | -1 | +6 |
| Bringing to justice those responsible for crimes that have been committed | 70% | 30% | 70% | 26% | 0 | +4 |
| Responding to complaints of crime | 75% | 28% | 74% | 25% | +1 | +3 |
| Maintaining law and order | 72% | 30% | 71% | 27% | +1 | +3 |

Note. Bold font indicates a statistically significant difference at $p < .01$.

A new question delved further into the ANP's handling of different types of incidents. Eighty-five percent see the ANP as effective at resolving local crimes; fewer, but still more than seven in 10, say it's effective at resolving traffic accidents. Fewer still, six in 10, say police are effective at resolving land disputes, an area that many Afghans view as in the purview of the government or local leaders rather than the police.

In another measure of ANP capabilities, 88 percent of Afghans see ANP officers in their area as capable of dealing with small crimes, basically unchanged in the past two years. But half now say the ANP are "very" capable of dealing with small offences; after dropping from 2009 to 2010, that's rebounded by 6 points from last year. Fewer, but still two-thirds of Afghans, see the ANP in their area as capable of dealing with big, organized crime, also unchanged. But once again, strength of sentiment has shifted a bit more positively, after a drop last year. Twenty-four percent now say the ANP are "very" capable of dealing with big, organized crime, up from 21 percent in 2010. It was 26 percent in 2009.




Seventy-five percent say the ANP is at least somewhat effective at fighting insurgents, up 5 points since last year. Similarly, nearly seven in 10 view it as effective at keeping the Taliban out of their area and at preventing terrorist attacks. (Sixty-four percent say the ANP is capable of "coping with" the insurgency, basically unchanged overall since last year, but up by 7 points vs. 2009.)

Both measures of the ANP's ability to handle insurgents have improved sharply in the South West and the Central/Hazarjat alike – e.g., views that the police are capable of dealing with the insurgents are up by 19 points in the South West and 10 points in the Hazarjat. However, such views have dropped by 7 points in the West.

Afghans rate the ANP lowest in its ability to deal with corruption – 57 percent say it's capable in this area, similar to the levels in 2009 and 2010. As with other performance metrics, ratings of the ANP's capabilities in handling corruption have advanced in the past year in the South West and the Central/Hazarjat region, up by 8 and 12 points, respectively. But these gains have been offset by 7- and 11-point declines in the West and East.

III. Police Presence

Fifty-nine percent now say an ANP station is less than 30 minutes away from their location, up by 7 points from last year and 17 points since 2009. But while the ANP's footprint has grown, the reported strength of the ANP's presence has declined somewhat in the past year.



More than three-quarters of Afghans now report that the ANP has a strong presence in their area, including 36 percent who say it's "very" strong locally, down by 5 and 6 points, respectively, in the past year. Drops were sharpest in the East, West and North, while ratings of the ANP's presence rose in the South West, where international forces have concentrated their efforts – and where ANP community outreach far outstrips its levels in other regions.

One possibility for the differential findings on proximity of an ANP station and strength is that the force may be more thinly deployed in areas in which it has newly expanded, so while it's gained greater proximity to the population, this presence is less apt to be seen as a strong one. The fact that more in the North and West report having an ANP station within 30 minutes of their home this year, but fewer report that the ANP has a strong presence in their area, aligns with this possibility.

Moreover, a regression analysis predicting Afghans' views of the ANP's local strength finds that while the distance to a police station is a significant predictor, another factor has twice as much predictive power: how involved the ANP is perceived to be locally in a variety of police activities, e.g., investigating routine crime and fighting insurgents. Other significant predictors include whether or not the ANP has held public meetings in the area in the past year, whether ANP performance has improved or deteriorated, and how safe the respondent feels. In other words, perceived strength of the ANP has more to do with police activities, performance and community outreach than it does with how close the nearest ANP station is located. (See Appendix C for details of this and other regression analyses).

A measurement change may also have some role in the shift in “strong presence” ratings. The 2010 survey asked about the strength of the presence of “the police in this area.” The 2011 study, seeking greater granularity, asked separately about the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area and the Afghan Local Police (ALP). So in 2010, police presence could mean ALP or ANP presence, but the 2011 survey separated these two entities. Eighty-six percent of Afghans report that either the ANP, the ALP or both have a strong presence in their area – which is 5 points more than the number who reported a strong police presence last year.


There is broad agreement that a stronger ANP presence would be a good thing. Three-quarters of Afghans say they’d feel more secure if there were more ANP in their area, up 6 points since last year. Notably, the belief that more ANP would enhance security in the area is up by a dramatic 26 points in the South West (from 40 percent to 66 percent), as well as by 11 points in and around Kabul (from 75 to 86 percent) and by 9 points in the East (from 74 to 83 percent).

IV. Community Outreach

The UNDP has focused on efforts to develop and strengthen community-police partnerships, improve information sharing and promote accountable follow-up on complaints. This includes holding meetings where community members, men and women alike, can voice their questions and concerns to the ANP; and establishing police-community institutional platforms to enhance security and police service delivery.

Afghans largely are in favour of these efforts; two-thirds, for example, believe that regular public meetings with the police will help to improve security in their community, a 12-point increase since last year, bringing optimism about public meetings back to its 2009 level. Anticipated improvement in security as a result of public meetings reaches 82 percent among residents of Central Kabul. Nationally, a majority, 54 percent, also feels that ANP-supported community groups would improve security in their area, up by a slight 3 points overall, but by a vast 23 points in the South West.

There are increased reports of ANP-community partnerships taking place, with many Afghans reporting that these efforts are helping to improve the security situation in their area. Twenty-two percent say public meetings with the ANP have occurred in their community in the past year, and 27 percent say community groups have been established. The latter is up by 8 points since last year.



Residents of the South West report a disproportionately higher rate of ANP-community partnerships and public meetings with the ANP – 48 percent say ANP-supported community groups have been established and 45 percent report having been to public meetings with the police in the past year.


Nationally, among those who say they’ve occurred, eight in 10 say police-community groups have in fact improved security – up by a wide 19 points since last year. Just 15 percent report no impact on security (down by 13 points) and just 4 percent say they’ve made it worse (down by 5 points).

V. Afghan Local Police

Beyond volunteer watch groups and meetings with the ANP, in some regions of Afghanistan local citizens are armed, trained, and paid by either the local or national government to police and defend their community. While this force, the Afghan Local Police (ALP), does not fall under the UNDP mandate, an analysis of attitudes toward the ALP has been included to conform to the inclusive approach of the perception survey.

Overall, three in 10 Afghans say the ALP is active in their area, though there is great variation by region. In the South West nearly half say ALP forces are active in the area. The reported ALP presence also is higher than average in the South Central region and the North, where 40 and 37 percent, respectively, say they’re present locally. Roughly three in 10 report local police in their area in East Afghanistan and the Central/Hazarajat region, vs. just 10 percent in and around Kabul.

Reports of the strength of the ALP presence follow a similar pattern - 64 percent in the South West say the ALP has at least a somewhat strong presence in their area (29 percent say it’s very strong), declining to 47 percent in the Kabul area.



Among those who report an ALP presence in their community, nearly seven in 10 say the ALP has helped to improve security in their area, vs. 23 percent who see no impact and 7 percent who say it's made security worse. Reports of ALP effectiveness in improving security range from a high in Kabul of 86 percent to a low of 54 percent in the Central/Hazarjat region.


Overall, fewer Afghans have a favourable view of the ALP than of the ANP – 64 vs. 77 percent – but this is at least partially due to the fact that the ALP is less prevalent throughout the country. Among those reporting that the ALP has no significant presence at all in their area, just a third have a favourable view of it, but among those who say the ALP presence is very strong, nearly nine in 10 see the organization favourably.

Similarly, while three-quarters of Afghans say they'd feel more secure if there were more ANP in their area, only slightly more than half say the same about the ALP. However, in areas where the ALP presence already is seen as very strong, two-thirds say they'd feel more secure if there were more ALP there.

VI. Police Corruption

While a majority of Afghans – 57 percent – think paying a government representative in exchange for favourable treatment should be regarded as corruption, that's down by 8 points since last year. Instead, a third says that whether or not this constitutes corruption depends on the circumstances, up by 5 points. Very few, 7 percent, see this behaviour as always acceptable.

Views of Payment in Exchange for Favorable Treatment




Reducing corruption within Afghan institutions, then, is made more challenging by the fact that four in 10 Afghans view bribery as at least sometimes acceptable behaviour. One exception to this pattern is urban men, among whom 77 percent regard bribery as corruption in all cases, and only 22 percent say it is at least sometimes acceptable.

This survey finds at least some signs of progress in reducing corruption. Just over half, 53 percent, say there is a lot or some corruption in the ANP, down from 60 percent in 2010. Perceptions of ANP corruption are down very sharply in the South West (from 63 to 38 percent) and the South Central regions (from 72 to 45 percent); elsewhere in the country, reports of ANP corruption have declined more modestly (East and North), or held steady (Central Kabul, West and Central/Hazarjat regions).

An open question, however, is whether corruption actually is down, or whether this result is an artefact of more Afghans classifying payment for favours as acceptable in some cases. A regression analysis predicting perceived corruption within the ANP suggests it is mainly the former. How a respondent defines bribery is a significant predictor of perceived corruption. However, there are far stronger predictors of perceived corruption. These include how well the ANP is perceived to be trained and equipped to perform its duties; how frequently the police engage in positive behaviours, such as responding to community concerns and treating people equally; and how often they are seen engaging in misconduct, such as using insulting language, using drugs and falsely accusing people of crimes.

In comparison with other government institutions, fewer perceive at least some corruption within the ANP (53 percent, as noted) than among government employees in general (79 percent) or in the government courts (73 percent) or prison system (66 percent). But more corruption is perceived in the ANP than in the ALP (49 percent), the National Directorate of Security (NDS; 49 percent), the Afghan National Army (ANA; 34 percent) and among teachers (29 percent). As with the ANP, the numbers of Afghans who view corruption among government employees, the ANA and teachers have declined since last year.



In a separate question, three-quarters see the ANP as entirely or mostly honest rather than entirely or mostly corrupt, about the same as last year. Three in 10 feel ANP honesty has improved in the past year while just 11 percent think the force has become more corrupt. Both of these views are up a slight 3 points since last year, with regional differences. The ANP is seen as growing more honest in the South West, South Central and Northern regions, but corruption is seen as on the rise in the West, Central/Hazarjat and Central Kabul regions.

Many fewer, just 57 percent, say the court system is mostly or entirely honest; four in 10 instead see it as mostly or entirely corrupt. And in contrast to views of the ANP, about the same number of Afghans feel the court system has become more corrupt in the past year as think it has become more honest, 21 vs. 22 percent.

Testing these institutions head-to-head, nearly twice as many Afghans view corruption in their area as more an issue among the courts that enforce justice (62 percent) than it is among the ANP (34 percent). As with last year's results, this suggests that any effort to strengthen the justice system within Afghanistan by decreasing corruption among the ANP will be largely ineffective without a complimentary focus on reducing unethical behaviour in the government court system.

In terms of personal experience of corruption, 18 percent of Afghans say they or someone in their household have been asked by a police officer for money or other payment in order to avoid arrest or a fine, basically unchanged since last year. And 15 percent say a member of their household has been asked for payment in exchange for police protection for their business or home, up by 3 points. Both forms of bribery are far down in the South West, by 19 and 17 points, respectively, but have jumped in the West.


VII. Other Misconduct

Corruption is not the only ANP misdeed reported by Afghans; a variety of other police misconduct is reported throughout Afghanistan, with several on the rise.

Seventeen percent nationwide say someone in their household has been subjected to excessive physical force by an ANP member in the past year, up three points since 2010, driven mostly by a steep, 19-point jump in the West, from 7 to 26 percent. About as many overall, 16 percent, say they or a member of their household have been falsely accused of a major crime by the ANP in the past year; the same number say they've been falsely accused of minor wrongdoing.

Reports of both types of accusations are up by 5 and 4 points, respectively. As with physical abuse, the sharpest increase in reports of ANP false accusations has occurred in the West, from 10 to 28 percent for minor crimes and from 8 to 26 percent for major crimes. (Such reports, however, remain highest in the South West, where they're unchanged from last year.)

Among other complaints, nearly a quarter of Afghans say they or a member of their household have been stopped by an ANP officer without good reason in the past year,



ranging from a high of 43 percent in the South West to a low of 13 percent in Central Kabul. About two in 10 say they or a member of their household have been addressed by an ANP officer with insulting language, or that someone in their household has been asked by an ANP member for food. And 11 percent say they or a household member have been forced by an ANP officer to participate in a crime against their will. All these are essentially unchanged since last year.

An index of such misconduct (see Appendix C), calculated by counting how many of these actions each respondent reports, shows a slight overall increase in misdeeds by the ANP in the past year. Last year respondents reported having experienced 1.35 incidents (*SD* 1.95) over the course of the year. This year that has risen slightly higher to 1.51 (*SD* 1.92), a statistically significant difference.

The index confirms that reports of ANP misconduct has risen the most in the West – from 1.07 police misdeeds on average in 2010 (*SD* 1.57) to 2.33 now (*SD* 2.14). The index has also risen significantly in South Central Afghanistan and in the North. In contrast, fewer ANP misdeeds were reported in the South West and Central/Hazarjat regions this year compared with last year. While the South West still has the highest incidence of police misdeeds, the decline in these reports there aligns with the improvement in attitudes towards the police in this region. In a separate question, a troubling number of Afghans, more than three in 10, report that they or a member of their household have seen a member of the ANP using drugs or

| Index of ANP Misconduct | | | | | |
|-------------------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|------------------------|
| | 2011 | | 2010 | | Difference '11- '10 |
| | <i>M</i> | <i>S.D.</i> | <i>M</i> | <i>S.D.</i> | |
| Overall | 1.51 | 1.92 | 1.35 | 1.95 | +0.16 |
| West | 2.33 | 2.14 | 1.07 | 1.57 | +1.26 |
| South Central | 2.02 | 2.02 | 1.69 | 1.88 | +0.33 |
| North | 1.06 | 1.67 | .84 | 1.41 | +0.22 |
| Central Kabul | .76 | 1.41 | .70 | 1.35 | +0.06 |
| East | 1.45 | 2.03 | 1.56 | 2.00 | -.11 |
| Central/Hazarjat | 1.31 | 1.64 | 1.73 | 2.28 | -.42 |
| South West | 2.88 | 1.92 | 3.61 | 2.67 | -.73 |

Note. Bold font indicates a statistically significant difference at $p < .01$. *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation, for more details see Appendix C

narcotics, up five points since last year; 18 percent say they are personally aware of an ANP officer participating in the drug or narcotics trade. Unlike other police misdeeds, an increase in drug abuse primarily is reported in Central Kabul, where 41 percent now say they've seen an ANP officer use drugs and 19 percent report police involvement in drug trafficking – up by 21 points and 9 points, respectively, in and around the capital area.

Still more Afghans, more than half, think ANP members are partial in favour of their clan when performing their duties, and 27 percent have personally experienced a situation in which an ANP officer has refused to investigate, arrest, charge or prosecute someone because of their familial connections; both are basically unchanged since last year. Thirty-five percent think high-ranking ANP officers are partial to tribe members when recruiting new ANP cadets, down slightly since last year, by just three percentage points.

Few see any recourse when the ANP in their area behave badly. Nearly six in 10 say that filing a complaint about an ANP officer would have either no effect (45 percent) or make things


worse (14 percent). Just 37 percent think filing a complaint would make things better, down four points since last year – a small decline, but a disturbing one, especially given the increase in reports of ANP misdeeds.

There are some ethnic differences here. Fifty-seven percent of Pashtun and Tajik Afghans think there is clan favouritism by the ANP in performing its duties, significantly higher than the 45 percent of Uzbeks, Turkmen and Hazaras who say so. And 34 percent of Pashtuns have personally experienced favouritism based on familial connections in the application of the law, compared with 23 percent of all others. Despite these differences, there is little variation among ethnic groups in the anticipated effects of filing a complaint.

VIII. Positive Police Behaviours

While police misdeeds certainly occur, many Afghans also report that the ANP in their area engage in positive, helpful behaviours. Nearly eight in 10 think the ANP in their area mainly deal with people in a way that is fair overall; about as many, three-quarters, say the police treat everyone equally all or most of the time. Also, while just three in 10 say the police deal with people in a way that is “very” fair, that’s six times as many as see the force as very unfair.

People who have had a satisfactory visit to a police station or a positive interaction with the police are much more apt than those who have not had such an experience to say the ANP deal with people fairly – 86 vs. 43 percent for satisfied vs. unsatisfied visits, and 88 vs. 39 percent for positive vs. negative interactions.



Among other positive behaviours, seven in 10 Afghans say the ANP treat women with proper respect at least most of the time (men and women equally say so). Two-thirds say the police often respect people’s rights and 63 percent say they share the values of most people in the community – both important aspects of perceived legitimacy. Anywhere from 56 to 60 percent say they often respond to community concerns, explain the reasons for their actions and admit their mistakes and correct them. About half of these positive behaviours are reported to a greater extent in urban compared with rural areas.


Positive perceptions are up significantly in the South West, and views that the police treat everyone equally and respect people's rights are up by 17 and 21 points, respectively, in Central/Hazarjat – but down by 14 and 10 points in Central Kabul and by 7 and 8 points in the East. In particular, views that the police share the values of most people in the community are up only in the South West, and down in the East, Central Kabul and the West.

Finally, nearly four in 10 Afghans say an ANP officer has offered to help them or someone in their household in a legal and positive way when they needed assistance – up by 7 points since last year. Now 69 percent of Afghans living in the South West, 56 percent of Afghans in the East and 41 percent of Afghans in the West say they've been helped in this way by an ANP officer – up by 20, 20 again, and 18 points since last year, respectively.

IX. Experience of Crime

Eighteen percent of Afghans report that they or a member of their household have been a victim of a crime in the past year, up slightly from 15 percent last year. Nonetheless, ratings of crime prevalence have improved. Nearly half say crime in their area has decreased in the past year, up 6 points since last year, and 52 percent now call the area where they live a “low crime” area, a slight improvement. Just 7 percent call their area “high crime,” vs. 10 percent in 2010.

Personal reports of victimization are up in the South West, where 31 percent report crime victimization (up from 25 percent last year); in South Central Afghanistan, where 27 percent report being that they or a household member have been the victim of a crime (up from 21 percent last year); and in the West, where 20 percent have experienced crime, up from 12 percent. These reports are lowest in Central Kabul, where 11 percent report crime victimization in the past year.




Among all those who have experienced crime in the past year, the most frequently cited offences are traffic accidents (26 percent), offences related to land ownership and rights (17

percent) and thefts, robberies or burglaries (14 percent).

Fifty-eight percent of those who have been a victim of a crime have reported it to the police, steady for the past two years. However, satisfaction among those who have reported a crime has increased slightly – 59 percent say the police addressed the issue adequately, up by 3 points.

Among victims who did not report the crime to the police, three in 10 say the offence was not serious enough and 16 percent cite a lack of evidence. However, 19 percent of crime victims who didn't report the offense say it was because they don't trust the police. An additional 15 percent said they feared retaliation.

Crime victimization interacts with perceptions of security and views of the ANP. People who report crime victimization are 14 points less apt than non-victims to think that more ANP officers would increase security. They are about 10 points less apt to be confident in the ANP; to view it favourably or respect it; to feel safe alone at home at night; or to rate general security conditions, freedom of movement and security from the Taliban positively.



People who've experienced crime in their household are more likely than others to have interacted with the police – a double-edged sword given that it exposes them more to both good and bad police behaviours. Crime victims are more likely to have been given assistance in a positive way, but are also more likely to have been subject to a wide variety of police misdeeds, including attempted bribery and excessive physical force. The literature, and this survey alike, suggest that police misconduct far outweighs positive behaviour in influencing overall perceptions of the force (See Section XIII.)

X. Reporting Crime


In cases of robbery, theft, or burglary, 59 percent of Afghans say they would turn to the ANP first. Fewer, 43 percent, also say they'd go to the ANP first to report a traffic accident, and fewer still see the police as their resource of first preference for other concerns.

Specifically, 38 percent would go to the ANP first to report a kidnapping. Fewer than three in 10 would go to the ANP first to report sexual offences or assault; two in 10 to report land ownership disputes. Fewer than two in 10 would turn to the ANP first to report violence against women, an unpaid loan or a problem with an employer.

The tendency to turn to the ANP in reporting crimes differs by gender and metro status. Men and urbanites are more likely to say they'll report an offence to the ANP, making urban men the most likely candidates to do so.

There is no general consensus on alternative resources of preference. For example, 16 percent of Afghans say they would report assault or threat to the provincial or district government office, 11 percent would report it to local elders, 10 percent to the ANA and 8 percent to a clan leader.

In a separate question, just half say that if there were a matter to report to the ANP, they would be willing to do this by themselves; 47 percent would bring someone else along. Willingness to report something to the police alone is down by 9 points since last year. This is down equally among men and women, but the decrease is most dramatic in the East and South Central regions, where willingness to report a matter alone has dropped by 18 and 13 points, respectively.



Slightly fewer, 46 percent, would be willing to report a matter to local elders alone – also down since last year, by 5 points. Again, willingness to report to elders alone has dropped

similarly among men and women. Across regions, it's down by 8 to 10 points in the North, East and South West.


Not surprisingly, women remain less willing to report a matter to the ANP alone than men, 37 to 62 percent. However, most Afghans think that if a woman does go alone to report a crime to the ANP it would have no impact on the police's likelihood of investigating that crime fully (39 percent) or would make the police even more likely to investigate the crime fully (37 percent). Twenty-one percent think the ANP would be less likely to investigate a crime reported by a woman alone, down 3 points since last year.

XI. Security

While many Afghans view crime to be declining where they live, ratings of security from violence in general, and the Taliban in particular, have slipped in the past year, a troubling sign as international forces work to reduce their presence in Afghanistan.

Sixty-four percent rate their security from crime and violence positively overall; fewer, 53 percent, say their security from the Taliban and other armed groups is good. Both of these ratings have declined since last year, by 3 and 4 points, respectively. Moreover, the number saying their security from the Taliban is "very bad" is up by 5 points, to 20 percent.

Security ratings show sharp regional differences – in Central Kabul, for example, 82 percent rate their security from violence positively and three-quarters say their security from the Taliban is good, stable since last year. On the other hand, just 25 percent in the South West say their security from the Taliban is good, a sharp 24-point drop since last year. Ratings of security from crime and violence overall, however, are up by 10 points in this region).



Nine out of 10 Afghans nationally report feeling safe walking alone in their neighbourhood during the day, and nearly seven in 10 feel safe alone at home after dark, both unchanged


since last year but up modestly from 2009. Far fewer, however, feel safe from the risk of roadside bombs (49 percent) and suicide attacks (45 percent), underscoring the psychological toll of this kind of unpredictable violence.

Feelings of safety walking alone are high across the board, but safety being alone at home after dark is higher in urban vs. rural areas (77 vs. 65 percent), reaching 82 percent in Central Kabul. But this increased feeling of safety in urban areas does not extend to the risk of bombs and suicide attacks – perhaps not surprising given the high-profile attacks in Kabul in the past year.

Afghans do not solely blame armed groups for security problems in their community. When asked who or what brings insecurity to their area, the top mention is unemployment (36 percent), followed by the Taliban (27 percent). Just 46 percent rate the availability of jobs and economic opportunities in their area positively, and two in 10 say economic conditions are “very” bad, up 5 points since last year.

XII. Police Activities

Afghans’ views of whether the ANP is engaged primarily in law enforcement or counter-insurgency have fluctuated during the past three years. In 2009 more saw the force as involved in law enforcement, by 38-24 percent (with the rest saying both equally). In 2010 there was an even division. In 2011, perceptions have moved back toward an emphasis on law enforcement over counter-insurgency, by 40-32 percent.



The 8-point increase since last year in views that the ANP is taking on a greater law-enforcement role comports with efforts to strengthen civilian policing and transition the

force into a more traditional, crime-fighting role. The fact that more Afghans view crime as declining in their area suggests success in this transition. However, the decrease in feelings of security from armed groups may indicate a potential drawback from this reduced focus on counter-insurgency efforts.


The perception that the police are primarily enforcing the law, rather than fighting insurgents or doing both equally, has increased sharply in the Central/Hazarjat region (by 21 points) and in Central Kabul (by 17 points). In these regions, more than half say that the ANP in their area are primarily taking on a crime-fighting role. There also is a general 15-point difference between urban and rural areas (52 vs. 37 percent) in this view.

Views again have shifted sharply in the South West. Last year nearly six in 10 there said the ANP in their area was primarily fighting insurgents, but that's now dropped to fewer than four in 10. Instead, most in this region now say the ANP primarily is acting as a law-enforcing institution (29 percent, up 7 points) or fulfilling both roles (32 percent, up 16 points).

In a separate question evaluating ANP involvement in a variety of activities, three quarters of Afghans overall report that the ANP in their area is involved in fighting insurgents “a great deal” or “somewhat,” unchanged for the past two years. Raising the possibility of public resistance to a move toward more traditional policing, 55 percent think police should be spending more time fighting insurgents, also unchanged, while just one in 10 thinks the ANP should devote less time to counter-insurgency efforts.

Among other activities, 62 to 64 percent of Afghans report that the police in their area are involved in fighting organized crime, fighting the narcotics trade, investigating routine crime and poppy eradication. Slightly fewer than six in 10 report ANP involvement in preventing inter-tribal or inter-ethnic violence (59 percent), preventing violence against women (58 percent) and fighting corruption (56 percent). Perceptions of ANP involvement in investigating routine crime, preventing inter-tribal violence and fighting corruption have decreased by 6, 4 and 3 points, respectively since last year; the rest have not changed.

An index of police activity, created by averaging respondents' ratings of the degree of ANP involvement in each of these tasks (see Appendix C for details), shows that in the South West and Central/Hazarjat regions the ANP is perceived to be more actively involved in performing these duties, on average, than it was last year. Ratings of involvement in the West and Central Kabul, however, have declined.



As mentioned above, views of the ANP's effectiveness have improved greatly in the South West but declined in the West. Regression analysis shows that this can be at least partially attributed to perceptions of ANP training and activity in these regions (see Appendix C). The better trained the ANP are perceived to be, and the more they are seen to be actively engaged in performing their duties (e.g., investigating and preventing crime and violence), the more effective they are viewed by the Afghan public.


For every activity mentioned, more Afghans believe the ANP should be spending more time on the activity rather than less. This ranges from a 45-point differential for fighting insurgents (55 percent think the police should be spending more time, 10 percent less) to a 12-point gap for preventing violence against women (32 percent want the ANP to spend more time on this, 20 percent less).

| ANP Activities | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | Perceived Involvement | | Desired Involvement | | |
| | Great deal/ Somewhat | Just a little/ hardly at all | More time | Right amount | Less time |
| Fighting insurgents | 76% | 23% | 55% | 34% | 10% |
| Fighting organized crime | 64% | 35% | 43% | 39% | 17% |
| Fighting narcotics trade | 63% | 35% | 44% | 38% | 16% |
| Investigating routine crime | 63% | 35% | 34% | 46% | 18% |
| Poppy eradication | 62% | 37% | 42% | 40% | 17% |
| Building community partnerships | 62% | 36% | 36% | 45% | 17% |
| Preventing inter-ethnic violence | 59% | 40% | 35% | 44% | 21% |
| Preventing violence against women | 58% | 41% | 32% | 46% | 20% |
| Fighting corruption | 56% | 42% | 48% | 34% | 16% |

XIII: Access, Information and Interactions with the Police

As noted, nearly six in 10 Afghans now report having an ANP station within a half-hour of their home, a 17-point increase since 2009. However, many Afghans feel relatively uninformed about police activities in their area – a potential impediment to favourable views of this core Afghan institution.

Sixty-five percent of Afghans overall feel informed about the activities of the ANP in their area. But far fewer – 22 percent – say they have a “great deal” of information about it, and that leaves a third of Afghans who have just some (19 percent) or little to no (14 percent) information about the ANP. Three in 10 say they have more information about ANP activities now than they did a year ago, but 19 percent say the reverse. (The rest, 50 percent, say their level of information has remained the same.)



It makes a difference. Among those who feel well informed about police activities, 84 percent report having confidence in the ANP in their area, but among those who don't feel well informed, confidence is a vast 30 percentage points lower. Likewise, among those who feel that more information about the ANP in their area is available, 91 percent report confidence in the ANP, but among those who feel they have less information, fewer than half are confident.


In terms of individual experience, about one in four Afghans, 23 percent, has personally interacted with the ANP; as many have visited a police station. Among those who have had contact with a member of the ANP, the majority has done so just once (27 percent) or twice (30 percent).

Nearly eight in 10 of those who have interacted with the ANP describe their interaction as somewhat (45 percent) or very (35 percent) positive. Moreover, of the 23 percent of Afghans who visited an ANP station to conduct business or obtain information, 78 percent

say they were satisfied with the service they received overall. “Very” negative experiences with the ANP are relatively rare – just 4 percent would describe their interaction with the ANP as very negative and just 6 percent were very dissatisfied with the service they received at the police station.

In terms of influencing attitudes, the important factor is not simply exposure to the ANP (interacting vs. not interacting), but rather whether the interaction was positive or negative. Most have had a positive interaction, but for the few who haven’t, it matters a great deal.

Afghans who have had a positive experience with the ANP are a vast 33 points more apt than those who have had a negative experience to say they have a favourable view of the ANP (83 vs. 50 percent) and are even more broadly likely to say they have confidence in the ANP (83 vs. 37 percent). They’re also more apt to see the ANP as less corrupt, to have respect for the ANP, to think ANP officers are knowledgeable, to say it is a prestigious profession and to think the ANP is effective and capable at a wide variety of tasks.



XIV. Training, Preparedness and Compensation


Most Afghans view ANP officers as knowledgeable about their jobs, well-trained and well-equipped to perform their duties. Far fewer, however, view them as “very” knowledgeable or well-trained, and few see the ANP as currently ready to take over all policing duties from international forces.

Three-quarters say officers are knowledgeable about their duties to enforce the law; just three in 10, however, view them as “very” knowledgeable, in line with other top-end ratings of the force.

Encouragingly, 35 percent say ANP officers have become more knowledgeable in the past year, vs. 13 percent who see a less knowledgeable force.

Similarly, 81 percent say ANP officers in their area understand the law well and 75 percent say they understand what their duties are. Seven in 10 say they are trained well to perform

their duties and are knowledgeable about the needs of the community, 66 percent say they are knowledgeable about human rights and 63 percent say they are well-provided with the equipment they need and are able to perform their duties without international assistance.



Again, though, far fewer think the police are “very” well prepared in each of these domains. At the high end, 35 percent of Afghans think ANP officers understand the law very well, up 5 points since last year. But at the low end, just two in 10 think the police are very able to perform their duties without international assistance, basically unchanged since last year.


Afghans in the South West are particularly likely to see improvements in the knowledge of ANP officers – 46 percent say the police in their area are more knowledgeable now than they were a year ago, 30 points higher than the number who say the reverse. In contrast, just 28 percent in the South Central and Western regions see improvements in police knowledge about their duties, while 19 and 18 percent, respectively, see declines.

Views of ANP training and preparedness also have improved dramatically in the South West. There 70 percent now say the ANP in their area understand what their duties are well, and 63 percent say the ANP in their area are well-trained – up by 15 and 11 points, respectively, over last year’s ratings. In the Central/Hazarjat region, likewise, views of how well ANP police understand the law, understand their duties, are trained to perform their duties and are provided with the equipment they need all are up by double-digit margins, 10 to 20 points.

In contrast, these views have declined most steadily in the West, with an 11-point drop in the view that ANP officers understand the law, a 9-point drop in the sense that they understand their duties and an 8-point decline in the view that they’re well-equipped. These are among several indications from this year’s survey that conditions on the ground in Western Afghanistan have deteriorated during the past year.

Asked to recommend one area in which the ANP should receive more training, the top mention is for training in general police skills, cited by 42 percent, followed by anti-corruption


training, 22 percent; anti-drug trafficking skills, 14 percent; and help with basic skills such as reading and math, 13 percent. The type of equipment that Afghans feel the ANP needs most include weapons (40 percent), vehicles (34 percent) and communication equipment (12 percent).



Just two in 10 Afghans think the ANP is ready now to take over all policing responsibilities from international forces. An additional 26 percent see readiness within the next year. Forty-six percent of Afghans think it'll take more than a year – but very few, 4 percent, don't think the force ever will be ready to operate without international assistance.

In order to improve the leadership of the ANP, most Afghans, 88 percent, say it is important that leaders be rotated from region to region frequently. Eight in 10 also think ANP leaders should be subject to performance evaluations and that they should be made more accessible to the public. About three-quarters, 77 percent, think training outside of Afghanistan is important to improve ANP leadership. Appointing more female leaders is seen as the least important of the items tested for improving ANP leadership, but still 63 percent view it as important.

In terms of compensation, 55 percent of Afghans think that ANP officers should be paid more than teachers, but that's down from 63 percent a year ago. Fewer, 44 and 43 percent, respectively, think the police should be paid more than other government workers or doctors, and fewer still, 28 percent, think the salaries of the ANP should be higher than those of ANA soldiers, down sharply from 36 percent a year ago. Now more Afghans feel ANP personnel should be paid less rather than more than those in the ANA, by 34 to 28 percent.



Notably, however, more than three-quarters think that corruption within the ranks of the ANP would be reduced if officers were better paid by the government, up a slight 3 points since last year.


Again, experiences matter. Those who are satisfied with their visit to a police station, or who have had a positive experience with the ANP, are about 30 points more apt than those who were not satisfied or had a negative experience to think better pay would reduce corruption. In addition, 51 percent of urban Afghans think better pay would reduce corruption a “great deal,” compared with only 36 percent of those in rural areas.

XV. Women in the Police Force

Acceptance of female police officers is on the rise in Afghanistan, although still well short of international levels. More than half overall think it’s a good idea to have female police officers in their community, and as many would support a female family member if she wished to join the ANP, both up since last year.

Fifty-three percent think it’s a good idea to have female officers in their community, up 8 points from last year; 42 percent think it’s a bad idea, unchanged. Fewer are undecided, suggesting that Afghans who have formed an opinion in the past year have decided in favour of female ANP members in their community.

Support for female officers is up particularly in the East and Central/Hazarjat regions, where it was notably low last year. In 2010 just more than a third in these regions were in favour of female police officers in their community; it’s now more than half. Support also has risen in the Central Kabul (from 59 percent positive last year to 67 percent now, the highest by far) and South Central regions (from 40 to 46 percent). Afghans in the South West are still the most opposed to female officers; just 37 percent there think it’s a good idea, basically unchanged since last year.



Among those who support the idea, the chief reason given is a practical one – to search female suspects, cited by 41 percent. Twenty percent more generally say female officers fulfil a need of society. Among opponents, most, 57 percent, say women should not work.

As noted, support for a female family member joining the ANP has also improved a bit since last year – 55 percent say they’d support such a decision, up from 51 percent. But just 20 percent would “strongly” support a female family member pursuing a police career, and support still lags well behind that of a male family member joining the ANP. Eight in 10 Afghans say they’d support a male family member joining the force, 40 percent strongly so.

Views of male and female family members joining the ANP do not differ greatly by respondents’ sex, age, or urban/rural residence; support for male participation is higher across all these groups. However, support for both male and female family members joining the force is lowest in the South West.


Despite mixed support for female police, seven in 10 Afghans say they’d be more likely to report a crime if the police officer were female (including 67 percent of men, as well as 72 percent of women), vs. three in 10 who are less likely to report a crime to a female officer. Moreover, nearly six in 10 say they’d be more likely to trust a female officer to resolve a crime fairly.

Majorities in every region say they would be more likely to report a crime to a female police officer. The same holds true for fair treatment, except in the West, where it slips to 47 percent. On both counts, affirmative responses are highest in Central Kabul.

XVI. Other Afghan Institutions

Favourable views of other Afghan institutions have held relatively steady in the past two years. The central government tops the list, viewed favourably by 83 percent. Eight in 10 Afghans also have a positive opinion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 73 percent view the provincial/district government positively – all unchanged since last year.

Only views of the courts have changed in the past year, taking a turn for the worse. After a 10-point jump in favourable views of the courts from 2009 to 2010, they have slipped back to 52 percent now. As noted, many Afghans perceive widespread corruption within the court system.



An index of favourable views of government institutions (see Appendix C) shows that while there is no overall change in views of Afghan institutions in the past year, regional variations largely follow the same pattern as views of the ANP. Specifically, the index shows that views of government institutions have improved significantly in the South West and Central/Hazarjat regions, but declined in Central Kabul, the West and, to a lesser extent, the East.

Specifically, in the South West, favourable views of the central government, the provincial government and even the courts all are up by double-digit margins. This completely erases the sharp decline in favourable views of these Afghan institutions that occurred in this region from 2009 to 2010, suggesting that it's not just the ANP that has benefited from international efforts in the past year. In the Hazarjat, views of the central and provincial government have improved significantly in the past year, but not views of the courts or the ANA. (The latter actually has declined by 8 points.)

In the West, favourable views of each of the four government institutions included in the index have dropped significantly in the past year. In Central Kabul all but the ANA have lost favour, and in the East the drop is caused mainly by 11- and 9-point declines in favourable views of the provincial or district government and the court, respectively.

Views of the strength of the government's presence follow a similar pattern. Overall, there has been no change in ratings of the local strength of three of four government institutions – 76 percent say the central government has a strong presence in their area, 73 percent say

the same about the provincial government and 55 percent about the courts. Ratings of the strength of the ANA's presence, however, has declined – 63 percent now say the ANA has a strong presence in their area, down 4 points since last year.

| Government Favorability and Presence Indices | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------------------|------|--------------|---------------------------|------|--------------|
| | Government Favorability Index | | | Government Presence Index | | |
| | 2011 | 2010 | '11-' 10 | 2011 | 2010 | '11-' 10 |
| Overall | 2.98 | 3.00 | -0.02 | 2.87 | 2.87 | +0.00 |
| Central Kabul | 2.96 | 3.17 | -0.21 | 3.15 | 3.09 | +0.06 |
| West | 2.74 | 2.93 | -0.19 | 2.68 | 2.75 | -0.07 |
| East | 2.93 | 3.04 | -0.11 | 2.83 | 3.02 | -0.19 |
| South Central | 2.86 | 2.86 | +0.00 | 2.74 | 2.76 | -0.02 |
| North | 3.16 | 3.11 | +0.05 | 2.87 | 2.91 | -0.04 |
| Central/Hazarjat | 3.05 | 2.86 | +0.19 | 2.65 | 2.54 | +0.11 |
| South West | 2.97 | 2.71 | +0.26 | 3.02 | 2.76 | +0.26 |

Note. Bold font indicates a statistically significant difference at $p < .01$, for more details see Appendix C.


An index of these views shows broad regional variation. Afghans in the South West and Central/Hazarjat regions rate the government institutions in their area as stronger than last year. As with favourable views, ratings of the strength of the presence of all government institutions have increased in the South West, whereas in the Hazarjat just the central and provincial government are viewed as having a stronger presence.

In the East, the government presence index has declined significantly in the past year. Fewer Afghans in this region say that the central government, the provincial government and the ANA have a strong presence in their area, by 9-, 13- and 15-point margins, respectively.

XVII. International Organizations, the Taliban and Local Commanders

Views of international aid organizations and international forces have held relatively steady overall in the past year, with 58 and 43 percent, respectively, viewing these favourably. But while last year views of these international entities were much lower in the South West, that has changed dramatically. Sixty-two percent in the South West now express favourable views of international aid organizations and 52 percent express a favourable opinion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), up by 20 and 15 points, respectively.

Remarkably, views of ISAF in the South West are now more positive than in any other region, and views of international aid groups are as high or higher than anywhere else. ISAF and foreign aid groups have focused vast efforts on improving security and living conditions in the South West. Sixty-four percent in this region now say that international forces and international aid organizations alike have a strong presence in their community, by far the highest presence reported in any of Afghanistan's regions, and up by 10 and 30 points, respectively.



Opinions of international forces and aid organizations have not changed in other regions in the country in the past year, with the exception of a 6-point gain in favourable opinions of international aid groups in the South Central region.


Given four options for the future deployment of ISAF forces, Afghans divide roughly into quarters. Twenty-four percent think international military forces should leave now, 21 percent think this withdrawal should occur in 2014 as is planned, 23 percent think they shouldn't leave until the Taliban have been defeated and 24 percent think they should remain until the ANA and ANP have been trained to fight the insurgency independently.

Regional differences on this topic are stark. Thirty-nine percent of Afghans in the South West say ISAF forces should leave now, followed by 32 percent in the East and 31 percent in the North. This compares to as few as 15 percent in the West and 13 percent in Central Kabul. In contrast, 41 percent in Central Kabul say they should stay until the ANA and ANP have been trained, far more than in other regions. In the Central Hazarjat region, 43 percent think international forces should leave once the Taliban are defeated, by far the largest number to say so in any region.

In addition, men are more apt than women to say the ISAF should leave now (29 vs. 20 percent) and less likely to think they should wait to leave until the Taliban have been defeated (19 vs. 26 percent).

The Taliban and other warlords/militias, for their part, continue to be widely unpopular in Afghanistan. Overall just 13 percent have a favourable opinion of the Taliban; that rises to 23 percent for other irregular commanders and groups. The former has held basically steady the past three years; the latter, is up by 4 points since last year and by 11 points since 2009.

Seventeen percent say the Taliban presence in their area is very or somewhat strong, basically unchanged overall. That has dropped by 20 points in the South West, from 43 percent last year (the highest of all regions), to 23 percent now. Favourable views of the Taliban likewise have dropped in the South West, from 40 percent in 2010 to 22 percent favourable now.



The strength of the Taliban presence in the Central/Hazarjat region also has dropped in the past year; 17 percent now say it has a strong presence, down by 10 points. On the other hand, 36 percent now report a strong Taliban presence in the South Central region – up 10 points to overtake the South West as the region of heaviest Taliban presence. Troublingly for the government and its Western allies, favourable views of the Taliban are also up in this region (by 7 points to 22 percent favourable), as well as in the West (by 7 points to 17 percent favourable), where security conditions have declined dramatically.

Favourable views of other warlords and militia groups are up by 10, 12 and 14 points, respectively, in the West, East and South Central regions, to 21, 25 and 30 percent. These groups also have strengthened their foothold in these regions – the number who report that warlords and other militia have a strong presence is up by 14 points to 34 percent in the South Central region, and by 8 points to 30 percent in the East. Still, favourable views remain

highest, at 35 percent, in the South West, where the presence of warlords and other militia groups is also reported to be the strongest, unchanged since last year.

XVIII. Nation's Direction, Local Conditions and the Economy

The Afghan public's more general attitudes are remarkably positive, given the challenges the country faces. Seventy-nine percent rate their overall living conditions positively, essentially the same as last year (but with a 4-point increase in "very good" ratings). Fifty-three percent say the country is headed in the right direction, unchanged since last year (although there's been a 4-point shift from "mixed" to "wrong direction"), and slightly up from 2009, 50 percent.

Development and governance efforts – not just security improvements – are largely responsible. Among Afghans who say the country is headed in the right direction, 44 percent mention construction projects as the main reason; 21 percent cite better security, while about as many, 20 percent, cite good government. Insecurity, by contrast, is cited as the main reason by a plurality of those who say the country is going in the wrong direction, 43 percent, followed by corruption and unemployment at 21 percent apiece.

Optimism about the country's direction, while steady overall, has declined sharply in Central Kabul and the East. In and around Kabul, now just 45 percent say the country is headed in the right direction, down 13 points since last year. In the East, slightly more than half say the country is on the right track, but that's down from 61 percent. On the other hand, as with other ratings, optimism has rebounded sharply in the South West and the Central/Hazarjat region, by 21 and 10 points, respectively.

Not surprisingly, general optimism for the country is 25 points higher where living conditions are good than where they are bad (58 vs. 33 percent), and 17 points higher where security from crime and violence is good rather than bad (59 vs. 42 percent). It's also 16 and 17 points higher where the central government and ANP, respectively, are seen as strong, compared with where they are weak.

Separately, 47 percent give negative ratings to their local infrastructure – roads, bridges and the like – up by 4 points from last year. And while 67 rate their freedom of movement positively (essentially unchanged), again this leaves a third of the public reporting negatively on another fundamental right.

XIX. Statistical Modelling

Regression analyses were conducted to identify the key elements in public attitudes toward the police in Afghanistan (see Appendix C). A regression model measures the independent strength of the relationship between a predictor variable and an outcome variable – in this case favourable views of the police, confidence in their abilities and perceptions of their effectiveness – while other potential predictors are held constant. This allows for the comparison of the strength of various predictors to determine what best explains differences in outcomes.

Some results replicate those found in a similar analysis of last year's UNDP-LOFTA Police Perception Survey. The two strongest independent predictors of overall favourable views of the ANP are favourable views of the Afghan government more broadly, and the perceived strength of the ANP's presence in the respondent's community. All else equal, Afghans who view their government more positively or who perceive the ANP to have a strong presence in their area, also are more likely to have a favourable view of the police.

The perceived effectiveness and capability of the ANP also emerged as a strong predictor of favourable views of the police this year, much more so than last year. In other words, those who perceive the ANP to be effective at performing their duties, such as fighting insurgents and maintaining law and order, tend to hold more favourable views of the ANP forces in their area.

While a similar variable was a statistically significant predictor in last year's model, ANP effectiveness is a far stronger predictor in this year's data. As noted in last year's report, positive views of the ANP seemed at least partially to derive from its favourite-son status as a native national entity in a country hosting a large number of international forces. The fact that ratings of ANP effectiveness are now a more substantial predictor of ANP favourability may indicate that positive views of the ANP are starting to be earned rather than given.

Confidence in the ANP, as opposed to favourability, has little to do with how other government institutions are perceived, and is not independently related to the strength of the ANP's local presence. Instead, the belief that being a member of the force is a prestigious occupation is a key predictor, similar to last year's model, as is respondents' respect for the ANP. How well informed a respondent feels about ANP activities in the area, a new survey question this year, also is a substantial predictor of confidence – suggesting that community outreach and information campaigns may be an effective means of improving confidence in this critical Afghan institution.

In terms of predicting perceptions of ANP effectiveness and capability – as noted, a key element in overall favourability – an entirely different set of predictors emerges as important, one that again mirrors last year's results. How well-trained the police are perceived to be is far and away the strongest predictor of their effectiveness. Additional strong predictors of ANP effectiveness include how actively involved the police are seen to be in performing their various duties, such as investigating crime and fighting corruption; and the extent to which they engage in positive police behaviours, such as responding to community concerns and treating people with respect.

Other regression analyses were conducted to answer questions that emerged in the course of analysing and interpreting this year's UNDP-LOFTA survey results. For example, this year's results found a decrease in the number of Afghans perceiving high levels of corruption within the ANP, but also an increase in views that bribery by a government official could be acceptable in some cases. These results raise the possibility that any decrease in perceptions of corruption may be due to shifts in how Afghans define corruption, rather than actual improvements in the behaviour of the ANP.

This is not the case. A regression analysis finds that how a respondent defines bribery (i.e., as corruption or acceptable) is a significant predictor of ratings of the level of corruption within the ANP – but that there are other, far more important factors informing these views. Specifically, how well-trained the police in the area are perceived to be, and in what kind of behaviours they engage, have more than twice the predictive power of how the respondent defines bribery.

Among other influential predictors, respondents who personally have witnessed police taking drugs or engaging in other misbehaviours are more likely to perceive high levels of corruption within the force. Those who view the ANP as frequently engaging in positive behaviours are less likely to view it as corrupt.

An additional regression analysis was used to explore another result: an increase in the number of Afghans reporting an ANP station within a half hour of their house, but a decrease in the number reporting that the ANP has a strong presence in their area. One possibility is that while the ANP may be spread more widely throughout the country, it also is spread more thinly. In other words, simple proximity to an ANP station does not necessarily mean that the ANP has a strong presence.

This hypothesis is supported by the model. Distance to an ANP station is a significant predictor of ratings of the ANP presence, but not the strongest one. Instead, how active the local ANP are perceived to be in performing their duties, and how safe respondents feel in their community, both are stronger predictors of views of the strength of the ANP presence. In addition, the level of crime in the area, whether the ANP has held meetings in the area, and whether police performance has improved in the past year all also are significant factors influencing ratings of the strength of the ANP's presence.

XX. Findings in the Context of the Literature

Many of the results of this survey are congruent with the existing international literature on attitudes toward the police and judgments of police performance, as well as with reports on police reform specific to Afghanistan. The most important points are covered below, and the literature is explored in greater detail in Appendix E.

Police Behaviour

One of the most consistent and strongest moderators of perceptions of police in this study is the effect of negative encounters with police, mirroring a common finding in the literature that such interactions are associated with negative perceptions of the police (Cheurprakobkit & Bartsch, 2001; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Wortley, Hagan & Macmillan, 1997). Most Afghans have had positive experiences with the police, but for those who have had bad interactions, it matters a great deal.

For example, Afghans who've had a positive experience with the ANP are vastly more likely to have favourable views of the ANP, to be more confident in it and to have more positive perceptions of the police on a host of other measures. In regression modelling, judgments of police behaviour are related strongly to perceptions of effectiveness and capability.

Strength, Presence and Visibility

The literature on the effects of police presence (SEESAC, 2003; Peak, Bradshaw & Glensor, 1992) suggests that increasing police strength and visibility positively effect on views police performance. In this survey, the strength of the police presence strongly predicts favourable views of the ANP overall, and independently (but not strongly) predicts perceived effectiveness of the ANP. The strength of the presence of the police, however, does not independently predict confidence in the force.

Training

Judgments of the level of knowledge and training of police officers are by far the strongest predictor of perceptions of police effectiveness in this study. Griffiths, Dandurand & Chin (2005), Marenin (2005) and Murray (2007) have suggested that training efforts in Afghanistan should focus less on raw numbers and more on training quality. This survey confirms that quality of training (as perceived by Afghans), not just quantity, is essential.

The Role of the ANP

Afghans roughly divide on whether the ANP is mainly tasked with counter-insurgency or with civil policing. Perhaps unsurprisingly given current conditions, most Afghans would like to see the ANP's counter-insurgency role expanded. Nonetheless Marenin (2005) and Murray (2007) and have described the ANP's role confusion as problematic, and have suggested that police involvement in fighting anti-government forces deters the ANP from its appropriate focus on enforcing the rule of law.

Presence of the ALP and Community Outreach

Peake (2004) contends that police reform efforts may meet with greater success when they focus on local solutions that increase the involvement of civil society. In this survey, 80 percent of citizens where community watch groups have been organized report increased security, as do 68 percent of those with ALP in their area. In regions where the ALP presence already is very strong, two-thirds say they'd feel more secure if there were more ALP present.

Conditions and Experiences with Crime

This study also finds that ratings of general living conditions and security, including crime rates, affect attitudes toward the ANP and perceptions of its performance. Poorer conditions are related to more negative evaluations, which fits with findings in the literature that public evaluations of conditions inform police ratings. (Bridenball & Jesilow, 2008; Reisig & Parks, 2000; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).

History of Corruption

Corruption is nothing new to developing and post-authoritarian countries. In this study, four in 10 Afghans view bribery as at least sometimes acceptable behaviour. This comports with Gerber and Mendelson's (2008) evaluation of post-communist Russia, which suggests that historical experience with corruption makes it an unremarkable experience, even while diminishing confidence and trust in the police.

C. Recommendations

The results of this survey lend themselves to a robust set of recommendations to accomplish further improvements in policing in Afghanistan. As noted in the Executive Summary and recapitulated below, these include both external outreach and internal measures to improve the performance and public perceptions of the ANP alike. Among them:

- The ANP should seek to develop a culture founded on professionalism, service, fair treatment of individuals and respect for community values. Information sessions, community watch groups and other community outreach measures should be significantly expanded.
- The ANP should adopt training and self-enforcement protocols that effectively root out corruption, favouritism, bias, mistreatment of suspects and substance abuse by officers. Once in place these standards should be communicated effectively to the public.
- The court system, even more urgently, should address corruption and bias in its operations. Given their close relationship, decreases in policy corruption will likely be insufficient without concurrent reductions in corruption in the courts. Improvements in both linked institutions will contribute to the accountable rule of law in the country.
- Service delivery to individuals should be improved. More crime victims should feel that their complaints of victimization are seriously and effectively investigated.
- The ANP should institute an effective citizen-complaint process that assures citizens that their reports of police misconduct will be fully and fairly investigated and acted upon. In this context, the information desks at police HQs and emergency response centres should be publicized more widely. Effective follow-up by the police on the calls will build trust of the populace that their calls will effect a change in their situation.
- Given unequal ratings across regions, the ANP should create a process to monitor and improve police performance in specific geographic areas where it is found to be lacking.
- Internally, the ANP should improve training in areas including general civilian policing skills, anti-corruption, anti-drug-trafficking and combatting organized crime. It should be ensured that training is not academic, but relevant to the realistic context police officers will face when they leave the academy.
- The ANP should be supported to improve responses to large, organized crime, an area in which the ANP is more weakly rated compared with its perceived ability to handle small offenses.

- Noting the positive perceptions of female police officers in some areas, in particular related to family issues and domestic violence, enhanced efforts to expand female membership of the police will have positive benefits relating to female police service delivery for all members of the populace.
- The goal of transitioning from insurgent fighting to crime fighting should be reinforced, as possible. While the ANP's work against anti-government elements is popular, it will benefit in the long-term by clarifying its fundamental role in civil society as policing the rule of law.

D. Conclusions

The ANP is advancing in its efforts to extend and enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan public. Its ratings as an institution and views of its overall performance are broadly positive, and in most cases have risen. Its image has been bolstered by on-going efforts to extend the presence of the force, increase its effectiveness and enhance its community outreach.

The trends noted in the third annual UNDP-LOTFA Police Perception Survey are well-grounded in the literature on public attitudes toward policing. Views of the police as honest, effective, respectful and representative of community values all produce confidence, which in turn establishes the legitimacy of the police as a key institution of civil society.

Considerable work remains. Progress, notably in the South West, has been countered by retrenchment in other regions, especially the West. Despite some signs of improvement, corruption remains a significant concern; so do a range of other forms of police misconduct, including excessive physical force, drug-taking, perceived bias and disrespectful treatment. While positive police behaviours are widely noted, negative experiences carry greater clout in shaping public attitudes.

Views of recourse are limited, given the Afghan public's broad sense that pursuing a complaint against the police would do no good. The absence of perceived accountability of the police can detract heavily from their acceptance and support by the community.

There also is clear room for improvement in the level of public satisfaction with police handling of crime reports. Improvement here could enhance public beliefs that officers are well-trained, a necessary element in views of their effectiveness.

As our recommendations suggest, the ANP will be well served to the extent which it can increase community involvement, institutionalize responsiveness to local concerns, enhance positive interactions with Afghan citizens, adopt strong anti-corruption measures, prevent other police misconduct, establish an effective complaint review system and improve performance across its varied responsibilities. While the tasks are not simple, their implementation will move the ANP further toward the goal of a police force that enjoys the broad and lasting support of the Afghan people.

Appendix A: Methodology

This survey was conducted for the United Nations Development Programme - Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (UNDP-LOTFA) with sampling, field work and data processing by the Afghan Centre for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) in Kabul, a subsidiary of D3 Systems Inc. of Vienna, Va. Questionnaire consultation, data analysis and report writing were carried out by Langer Research Associates LLC of New York, N.Y.

Interviews were conducted in person, in Dari or Pashto, among a random national sample of 7,278 Afghan adults Oct. 10-27, 2011.

In sampling, 938 sampling points were distributed proportional to population size in each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, stratified by urban/nonurban status. Sampling points then were distributed to randomly selected districts within provinces, also proportionate to population size; and lastly to randomly selected villages or neighbourhoods within those districts, by simple random sampling. Population parameters were based on projections from the Afghan Central Statistics Office.

Half the sampling points were designated for male interviews, half for female interviews. Male respondents were interviewed only by male interviewers, female respondents only by female interviewers. Residences were selected within each settlement by random route/random interval and respondents were selected within residence by Kish grid.

Of the country's total of 398 administrative districts, 55 were inaccessible for security reasons at the time of field work, and female interviewers could not work in an additional 103 districts, including all of Paktika province, which comprises 1.7 per cent of the Afghan population. This inaccessibility produced noncoverage of 8 per cent of men and 25 per cent of women (17 per cent of the national population overall).

One hundred three of the 938 randomly selected districts were replaced due to inaccessibility for security reasons. These districts were randomly redrawn from within the same provinces. At the settlement level, 129 sampling points were replaced for reasons including security, village names not found and inaccessibility by vehicle. These were randomly substituted with settlements within the same districts.

Interviews, which averaged 40 minutes, were conducted by 679 interviewers (299 female and 380 male) in 34 supervised teams. All interviewers were trained, and the vast majority (657) of these interviewers had experience on previous ACSOR field projects. Of the 7,278 completed questionnaires, 156 (2.1 per cent) were controlled with direct supervision during the interview, 1,185 (16.3 per cent) with in-person or telephone back-checks by the supervisory team and 31 (0.4 per cent) with back-checks from the central office.

All questionnaires were subjected to logical controls conducted at ACSOR offices in Kabul, with 226 of the initial 7,504 interviews rejected for quality-control reasons.

The survey had a contact rate of 74 per cent and a cooperation rate of 94 per cent, for a net response rate of 70 per cent. The sampling procedures have an estimated design effect of 2.0, and the overall results have a margin of sampling error of 1.6 percentage points at the 95 per cent confidence level.

Overview of Field Implementation

The target population for the survey was all Afghans age 18+. The sample was drawn with a multi-stage random stratification process using the settlement-level stratum as the primary sampling unit.

The sample, as noted, was distributed in proportion to population distribution and stratified by urban/rural status, so that the share of interviews in urban areas matched the proportion of urban residents in that province. The *Sheharmali* (municipal administration) defines the urban population as individuals living within municipal limits. By default, rural areas are defined as those outside municipal limits, regardless of their remoteness or population density.

Sampling, household selection and respondent selection were carried out as follows:

Region. Sampling points, with eight interviews designated per point (four each for male and female respondents), were distributed across the country's seven regions in proportion to population estimates from the Afghan CSO.

Province. Sampling points were further distributed by province within each region, also in proportion to CSO estimates.

District. The sample next was distributed across districts in each province in proportion to CSO estimates.

Settlement. These are nahias, or neighbourhoods, in cities and towns, and villages in rural areas. In the absence of population data on settlement sizes, sampling points at the settlement level were distributed via simple random selection of all known settlements.

Random walk. The field director assigned each sampling point a starting point using a recognizable location such as a mosque, school or bazaar. In urban areas, from this starting point, the interviewer headed in an assigned direction, selected the second street or lane on the right, then selected the third inhabitable house on the right from the beginning of that street. Additional interviews were attempted at each next third inhabitable house on the right. In blocksofflats, each fifth apartment was selected. In buildings with more than one household, no more than two households were selected. Compounds containing two or more houses behind a common wall were treated like detached houses, counting counter-clockwise from the gate to the compound.

In rural areas, the interviewer headed to the east, selecting each third inhabitable house.

Within-household selection. Selection of individual respondents was done via Kish grid. Members

of the household were listed with their names and ages in descending order. The Kish grid provides a random-selection criteria based on this information.

Respondent substitution. Interviewers are not allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent declined to participate or was not available after call-backs, the interviewer moved on to the next household according to the random-walk routine. There were 94 household substitutions in this survey.

Callbacks. Typically interviewers are required to attempt two call-backs at different times of the same day or on different days of the field period. However security concerns in rural areas often interfere with this call-back protocol. Given high contact and cooperation rates in Afghanistan, almost all interviews (99.7 percent) were completed on the first attempt.

Appendix B: Topline Data Report

This appendix provides complete question wording and topline results for the 2011 UNDP Police Perception survey in Afghanistan.

*= less than 0.5 per cent

1. In terms of public services, tell me, how far in minutes/hours from your house are the following things?

10/27/11 – Summary table

| | 0-5 min | 6-15 min | 16-30 min | 31-60 min | 1-3 hours | 3+ hours | No. opin. |
|---|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| a. District/nahia government office | 4 | 18 | 31 | 26 | 14 | 5 | 2 |
| b. Government court | 1 | 12 | 30 | 30 | 18 | 7 | 2 |
| c. Afghan National Police (ANP) station | 5 | 22 | 32 | 22 | 12 | 5 | 2 |

Trend:

a. District/nahia government office

| | 0-5 min | 6-15 min | 16-30 min | 31-60 min | 1-3 hours | 3+ hours | No opinion |
|----------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|
| 10/27/11 | 4 | 18 | 31 | 26 | 14 | 5 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 2 | 12 | 32 | 33 | 15 | 5 | 2 |
| 7/21/09 | 2 | 9 | 23 | 31 | 22 | 9 | 4 |

b. Government court

| | 0-5 min | 6-15 min | 16-30 min | 31-60 min | 1-3 hours | 3+ hours | No opinion |
|----------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|
| 10/27/11 | 1 | 12 | 30 | 30 | 18 | 7 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 1 | 8 | 25 | 32 | 23 | 8 | 3 |
| 7/21/09 | 1 | 6 | 14 | 29 | 26 | 16 | 8 |

c. Afghan National Police (ANP) Station

| | 0-5 min | 6-15 min | 16-30 min | 31-60 min | 1-3 hours | 3+ hours | No opinion |
|-----------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|
| 10/27/11* | 5 | 22 | 32 | 22 | 12 | 5 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 4 | 19 | 29 | 28 | 13 | 5 | 2 |
| 7/21/09 | 3 | 15 | 24 | 27 | 19 | 9 | 5 |

*In this wave, previous references to the “police (ANP)” or the “police” were specified to be “Afghan National Police (ANP).” Questions that previously referred to the “police (ANP)” include: 13b, 15a, 17a, 18, 19a, 25a, 26-29, 31-33, 37, 38b,f-I, 42-43, 47b, 48a, 49-50, 53-54, 60, 65-66. Questions that previously referred to just the “police” include: 7d, 8d, 13a, 15b 19b-c, 38a,c-e,j, 39, 46, 47a, 48b, 72-73.

2. Do you think that things in our country are generally going in the right direction or are things going in the wrong direction?

| | Right | Wrong | Mixed (vol.) | No opinion |
|----------|-------|-------|--------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 53 | 33 | 12 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 53 | 29 | 16 | 3 |
| 7/21/09 | 50 | 31 | 14 | 6 |

3. Why do you say that things are going in the right direction? Why else?

| | --- First --- | | | -- Second -- | | | --- Total --- | | |
|--|---------------|-----|-----|--------------|-----|-----|---------------|-----|-----|
| | '11 | '10 | '09 | '11 | '10 | '09 | '11 | '10 | '09 |
| Reconstruction | 35 | 36 | 21 | 9 | 12 | 16 | 44 | 48 | 37 |
| Better security | 10 | 12 | 29 | 10 | 13 | 15 | 21 | 25 | 44 |
| Good government | 9 | 9 | 9 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 20 | 18 | 18 |
| Freedom | 8 | 7 | 4 | 11 | 10 | 5 | 18 | 17 | 9 |
| Girls' schools | 6 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 10 | 13 | 11 | 19 |
| Better police* | 4 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 11 | 11 | 9 |
| Elections | 5 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 9 | 13 | 12 |
| Removal of Taliban | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 4 |
| Women's rights | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 7 | 6 | 2 |
| Better economy | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| Improved education opportunities** | 2 | * | 0 | 3 | * | * | 5 | 1 | * |
| Better army | 1 | NA | NA | 3 | NA | NA | 5 | NA | NA |
| Telecommunication advances | 1 | 1 | * | 2 | 1 | * | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| More electricity | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| Constitution | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| More international aid*** | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| Poppy eradication | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Peace and reintegration efforts | 1 | NA | NA | 2 | NA | NA | 2 | NA | NA |
| More US/NATO/ISAF forces**** | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Disbandment of illegal armed groups***** | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 |
| Improved health care | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Improved culture | 1 | * | * | 1 | 1 | * | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Provincial councils | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 2 | * | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| More employment | 1 | * | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Unity among Afghans | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| Decrease in administrative corruption | * | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Decrease in kidnappings***** | * | * | * | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Government opposition to foreigners | * | NA | NA | * | NA | NA | * | NA | NA |
| No opinion | * | * | 1 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 2 | 2 | 18 |

*11/14/10 and previous: “better police and army”

**11/14/10 and previous: “betterment of education”

***11/14/10 and previous: “more foreign aid”

****11/14/10 and previous: “more US forces”

*****11/14/10 and previous: “disarmament”

*****11/14/10 and previous: “decrease in child kidnappings”

4. Why do you say that things are going in the wrong direction? Why else?

| | --- First --- | | | -- Second -- | | | --- Total --- | | |
|---|---------------|-----|-----|--------------|-----|-----|---------------|-----|-----|
| | '11 | '10 | '09 | '11 | '10 | '09 | '11 | '10 | '09 |
| Insecurity | 37 | 41 | 36 | 6 | 8 | 11 | 43 | 49 | 47 |
| Administrative corruption | 8 | 11 | 10 | 14 | 16 | 9 | 21 | 27 | 19 |
| Unemployment | 7 | 8 | 9 | 14 | 15 | 12 | 21 | 23 | 21 |
| Weak government | 9 | 6 | 11 | 9 | 6 | 11 | 18 | 12 | 22 |
| Terrorism | 6 | 5 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 13 | 12 | 5 |
| Financial problems/economic situation* | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 9 | 10 | 12 | 15 | 15 |
| Suicide attacks | 4 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 12 | 8 | 8 |
| Interference of foreign countries | 4 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 7 | 6 |
| Poor reconstruction | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 5 |
| Kidnappings | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| Existence of anti-government elements | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 |
| Poppy cultivation | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| Lack of electricity | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 2 |
| Lack of law | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Weak police | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| Airstrikes by international forces** | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Harassment from foreigners*** | 1 | * | * | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Lack of unity | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Crimes | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Moral corruption | 1 | NA | NA | 1 | NA | NA | 2 | NA | NA |
| Lack of schools | * | * | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Lack of shelter | * | 1 | * | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Lack of women's rights | * | * | * | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Violations of the rights of minorities | * | * | 0 | 1 | * | 0 | 1 | * | 0 |
| Shortage of food | * | NA | NA | 1 | NA | NA | 1 | NA | NA |
| Taliban | 1 | “ | “ | 2 | “ | “ | 2 | “ | “ |
| Lack of disbandment of illegal armed groups**** | * | * | 1 | * | * | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Shortage of health care | * | * | 0 | * | * | 0 | * | * | 0 |
| Lack of water | * | 0 | 0 | * | * | 0 | 1 | * | 0 |
| Lack of assistance to farmers | * | 0 | 0 | * | * | 0 | 1 | * | 0 |
| Weak army | * | NA | NA | * | NA | NA | 1 | NA | NA |
| Other | * | * | 0 | 2 | * | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| No opinion | * | 1 | * | 2 | 4 | 19 | 2 | 5 | 20 |

*”economic situation” added 10/27/11

**11/14/10 and previous: “airstrikes by foreign troops”

***11/14/10 and previous: “harassment”

****11/14/10 and previous: “lack of disarmament”

5. I would like to ask you about today’s conditions in the village/neighborhood where you live. How would you rate the following: very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | ----- Good ----- | | | ----- Bad ----- | | | No op. |
|---|------------------|------|--------|-----------------|--------|------|-----------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| a. Your living conditions overall | 79 | 24 | 55 | 21 | 16 | 5 | * |
| b. Security from crime and violence | 64 | 22 | 42 | 35 | 28 | 7 | 1 |
| c. Availability of jobs/ economic opportunities | 46 | 12 | 34 | 53 | 33 | 20 | 1 |
| d. Roads, bridges and other infrastructure | 53 | 15 | 38 | 47 | 29 | 18 | * |
| e. Your freedom of movement – the ability to go where you wish safely | 67 | 26 | 41 | 33 | 25 | 8 | * |
| f. Security from the Taliban and other armed groups | 53 | 23 | 31 | 46 | 26 | 20 | 1 |
| g. Women’s rights | 65 | 23 | 43 | 33 | 24 | 10 | 1 |

Trend:

a. Your living conditions overall

| | ----- Good ----- | | | ----- Bad ----- | | | No opinion |
|----------|------------------|------|--------|-----------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 79 | 24 | 55 | 21 | 16 | 5 | * |
| 11/14/10 | 81 | 20 | 61 | 19 | 16 | 4 | * |

b. Security from crime and violence

| | ----- Good ----- | | | ----- Bad ----- | | | No opinion |
|----------|------------------|------|--------|-----------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 64 | 22 | 42 | 35 | 28 | 7 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 67 | 23 | 45 | 33 | 27 | 5 | 1 |

c. Availability of jobs/economic opportunities

| | ----- Good ----- | | | ----- Bad ----- | | | No opinion |
|----------|------------------|------|--------|-----------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 46 | 12 | 34 | 53 | 33 | 20 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 47 | 11 | 36 | 53 | 38 | 15 | 1 |

d. Roads, bridges and other infrastructure

| | ----- Good ----- | | | ----- Bad ----- | | | No opinion |
|------------|------------------|------|--------|-----------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/1153 | 15 | 38 | 47 | 29 | 18 | * | |
| 11/14/10 | 56 | 15 | 41 | 43 | 30 | 13 | * |

e. Your freedom of movement – the ability to go where you wish safely

| | ----- Good ----- | | | ----- Bad ----- | | | No opinion |
|------------|------------------|------|--------|-----------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/1167 | 26 | 41 | 33 | 25 | 8 | * | |
| 11/14/10 | 68 | 25 | 43 | 31 | 25 | 7 | * |

f. Security from the Taliban and other armed groups

| | ----- Good ----- | | | ----- Bad ----- | | | No opinion |
|------------|------------------|------|--------|-----------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/1153 | 23 | 31 | 46 | 26 | 20 | 1 | |
| 11/14/10 | 57 | 22 | 34 | 42 | 27 | 15 | 1 |

g. No trend.

6. Compared to last year, in your village/neighbourhood where you live, is each item I name much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | ---- Better ---- | | | ----- Worse ----- | | | No op. | |
|---|------------------|------|--------|-------------------|-----|--------|--------|------|
| | NET | Much | Smwhat | Same | NET | Smwhat | | Much |
| a. Your living conditions overall | 63 | 20 | 43 | 28 | 8 | 7 | 2 | * |
| b. Security from crime and violence | 50 | 15 | 34 | 37 | 13 | 11 | 2 | 1 |
| c. Availability of jobs/ economic opportunities | 39 | 11 | 28 | 35 | 25 | 19 | 6 | 1 |
| d. Roads, bridges and other infrastructure | 45 | 13 | 32 | 34 | 21 | 15 | 6 | * |
| e. Your freedom of movement – the ability to go where you wish safely | 54 | 19 | 34 | 31 | 15 | 13 | 3 | * |
| f. Security from the Taliban and other armed groups | 44 | 18 | 27 | 28 | 26 | 18 | 9 | 1 |
| g. Women's rights | 55 | 19 | 37 | 30 | 13 | 10 | 3 | 1 |

Trend:

a. Your living conditions overall

| | --- Better --- | | | Same | ----- Worse ----- | | | No opinion |
|----------|----------------|------|--------|------|-------------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Much | Smwhat | | NET | Smwhat | Much | |
| 10/27/11 | 63 | 20 | 43 | 28 | 8 | 7 | 2 | * |
| 11/14/10 | 63 | 16 | 47 | 30 | 7 | 6 | 1 | * |

b. Security from crime and violence

| | ----- Better ----- | | | Same | ----- Worse ----- | | | No opinion |
|------------|--------------------|------|--------|------|-------------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Much | Smwhat | | NET | Smwhat | Much | |
| 10/27/1150 | 15 | 34 | 37 | 13 | 11 | 2 | 1 | |
| 11/14/10 | 52 | 15 | 37 | 35 | 12 | 11 | 2 | * |

c. Availability of jobs/economic opportunities

| | ----- Better ----- | | | Same | ----- Worse ----- | | | No opinion |
|------------|--------------------|------|--------|------|-------------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Much | Smwhat | | NET | Smwhat | Much | |
| 10/27/1139 | 11 | 28 | 35 | 25 | 19 | 6 | 1 | |
| 11/14/10 | 38 | 9 | 29 | 38 | 24 | 19 | 5 | 1 |

d. Roads, bridges and other infrastructure

| | ----- Better ----- | | | Same | ----- Worse ----- | | | No opinion |
|------------|--------------------|------|--------|------|-------------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Much | Smwhat | | NET | Smwhat | Much | |
| 10/27/1145 | 13 | 32 | 34 | 21 | 15 | 6 | * | |
| 11/14/10 | 46 | 12 | 34 | 35 | 19 | 14 | 5 | * |

e. Your freedom of movement – the ability to go where you wish safely

| | ----- Better ----- | | | Same | ----- Worse ----- | | | No opinion |
|------------|--------------------|------|--------|------|-------------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Much | Smwhat | | NET | Smwhat | Much | |
| 10/27/1154 | 19 | 34 | 31 | 15 | 13 | 3 | * | |
| 11/14/10 | 54 | 18 | 36 | 30 | 16 | 13 | 3 | * |

f. Security from the Taliban and other armed groups

| | ----- Better ----- | | | Same | ----- Worse ----- | | | No opinion |
|-------------|--------------------|------|--------|------|-------------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Much | Smwhat | | NET | Smwhat | Much | |
| 10/27/1144 | 18 | 27 | 28 | 26 | 18 | 9 | 1 | |
| 11/14/10 45 | 17 | 28 | 29 | 25 | 18 | 7 | 1 | |

g. No trend.

7. Do you have very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable or very unfavourable opinions of the following institutions and groups of people?

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | ---- Favourable ---- | | | --- Unfavourable --- | | | No op. |
|---|----------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------|-----------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| a. Central government | 83 | 36 | 47 | 16 | 12 | 4 | 1 |
| b. Provincial/district government | 73 | 28 | 44 | 26 | 22 | 4 | 1 |
| c. Courts | 52 | 16 | 36 | 45 | 31 | 14 | 3 |
| d. The Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area | 77 | 34 | 44 | 21 | 16 | 5 | 2 |
| e. Afghan Local Police (ALP) | 64 | 26 | 38 | 29 | 20 | 9 | 7 |
| f. Afghan National Army (ANA) | 79 | 44 | 35 | 18 | 14 | 4 | 3 |
| g. ISAF/international forces | 43 | 11 | 32 | 54 | 33 | 21 | 3 |
| h. Taliban | 13 | 3 | 10 | 84 | 17 | 67 | 3 |
| i. Other warlords/militias | 23 | 4 | 18 | 75 | 28 | 47 | 2 |
| j. International aid organizations | 58 | 16 | 42 | 40 | 26 | 14 | 2 |

Trend:

a. Central government

| | ---- Favourable ---- | | | --- Unfavourable --- | | | No opinion |
|----------|----------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 83 | 36 | 47 | 16 | 12 | 4 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 83 | 34 | 48 | 17 | 14 | 3 | 1 |
| 7/21/09 | 84 | 39 | 44 | 14 | 10 | 4 | 2 |

b. Provincial/district government

| | ---- Favourable ---- | | | --- Unfavourable --- | | | No opinion |
|----------|----------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 73 | 28 | 44 | 26 | 22 | 4 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 74 | 28 | 46 | 25 | 20 | 4 | 2 |
| 7/21/09 | 71 | 28 | 44 | 27 | 21 | 5 | 2 |

*11/14/10 and previous: "district government"

c. Courts

| | ---- Favourable ---- | | | --- Unfavourable --- | | | No opinion |
|----------|----------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------|---------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 52 | 16 | 36 | 45 | 31 | 14 | 3 |
| 11/14/10 | 57 | 16 | 41 | 40 | 30 | 10 | 3 |
| 7/21/09 | 47 | 13 | 35 | 45 | 28 | 17 | 8 |

d. The Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area

| | ---- Favourable ---- | | | --- Unfavourable --- | | | No opinion |
|----------|----------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 77 | 34 | 44 | 21 | 16 | 5 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 79 | 38 | 41 | 20 | 15 | 5 | 1 |
| 7/21/09 | 79 | 40 | 39 | 18 | 14 | 4 | 3 |

e. No trend.

f. Afghan National Army (ANA)

| | ---- Favourable ---- | | | --- Unfavourable --- | | | No opinion |
|----------|----------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 79 | 44 | 35 | 18 | 14 | 4 | 3 |
| 11/14/10 | 80 | 42 | 38 | 18 | 14 | 3 | 2 |
| 7/21/09 | 82 | 49 | 33 | 14 | 10 | 4 | 4 |

g. ISAF/international forces

| | ---- Favourable ---- | | | --- Unfavourable --- | | | No opinion |
|-----------|----------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 43 | 11 | 32 | 54 | 33 | 21 | 3 |
| 11/14/10* | 41 | 10 | 31 | 55 | 35 | 20 | 4 |
| 7/21/09 | 43 | 11 | 33 | 51 | 28 | 23 | 6 |

*11/14/10 and previous: "ISAF/foreign forces"

h. Taliban

| | ---- Favourable ---- | | | --- Unfavourable --- | | | No opinion |
|----------|----------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 13 | 3 | 10 | 84 | 17 | 67 | 3 |
| 11/14/10 | 13 | 3 | 11 | 83 | 21 | 61 | 4 |
| 7/21/09 | 11 | 3 | 8 | 85 | 15 | 69 | 5 |

i. Other warlords/militias

| | --- Favourable --- | | | --- Unfavourable --- | | | No opinion |
|-----------|--------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 23 | 4 | 18 | 75 | 28 | 47 | 2 |
| 11/14/10* | 19 | 3 | 15 | 78 | 29 | 49 | 3 |
| 7/21/09 | 12 | 3 | 9 | 82 | 23 | 60 | 5 |

*11/14/10 and previous: "local militia/warlords"

j. International aid organizations

| | --- Favourable --- | | | --- Unfavourable --- | | | No opinion |
|-----------|--------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 58 | 16 | 42 | 40 | 26 | 14 | 2 |
| 11/14/10* | 56 | 15 | 41 | 41 | 26 | 15 | 3 |

*“foreign aid organizations”

8. For each of the following, how strong a presence does it have in this area – a very strong presence, a fairly strong presence, a fairly weak presence or no significant presence at all?

10/27/11 – Summary table

| | ---- Strong ---- | | | ---- Weak/none ---- | | | No op. |
|--|------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|--------|
| | NET | Very | Fairly | NET | Fairly | None | |
| a. Central government | 76 | 33 | 43 | 24 | 17 | 7 | 1 |
| b. Provincial/district government | 73 | 32 | 42 | 26 | 22 | 4 | 1 |
| c. Courts | 55 | 20 | 36 | 43 | 31 | 12 | 2 |
| d. The Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area | 76 | 36 | 40 | 23 | 18 | 5 | 1 |
| e. Afghan Local Police (ALP) | 58 | 25 | 33 | 38 | 20 | 19 | 3 |
| f. Afghan National Army (ANA) | 63 | 30 | 33 | 35 | 20 | 14 | 2 |
| g. ISAF/international forces | 36 | 11 | 25 | 62 | 32 | 30 | 2 |
| h. Taliban | 17 | 5 | 12 | 81 | 24 | 57 | 2 |
| i. Other warlords/militias | 26 | 5 | 21 | 72 | 33 | 39 | 2 |
| j. International aid organizations | 45 | 10 | 35 | 54 | 31 | 23 | 2 |

Trend:

a. Central government

| | ---- Strong ---- | | | ---- Weak/none ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Fairly | NET | Fairly | None | |
| 10/27/11 | 76 | 33 | 43 | 24 | 17 | 7 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 76 | 32 | 44 | 23 | 18 | 6 | 1 |

b. Provincial/district government

| | ---- Strong ---- | | | ---- Weak/none ---- | | | No opinion |
|-----------|------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Fairly | NET | Fairly | None | |
| 10/27/11 | 73 | 32 | 42 | 26 | 22 | 4 | 1 |
| 11/14/10* | 73 | 31 | 42 | 26 | 22 | 4 | 1 |

*“District government”

c. Courts

| | ---- Strong ----- | | | ---- Weak/none ---- | | | No |
|----------|-------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|---------|
| | NET | Very | Fairly | NET | Fairly | None | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 55 | 20 | 36 | 43 | 31 | 12 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 54 | 16 | 38 | 44 | 33 | 12 | 2 |

d. The Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area

| | ---- Strong ----- | | | ---- Weak/none ---- | | | No |
|----------|-------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|---------|
| | NET | Very | Fairly | NET | Fairly | None | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 76 | 36 | 40 | 23 | 18 | 5 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 81 | 42 | 39 | 18 | 16 | 3 | 1 |

e. No trend.

f. Afghan National Army (ANA)

| | ---- Strong ----- | | | ---- Weak/none ---- | | | No |
|----------|-------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|---------|
| | NET | Very | Fairly | NET | Fairly | None | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 63 | 30 | 33 | 35 | 20 | 14 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 67 | 32 | 35 | 33 | 20 | 13 | 1 |

g. ISAF/international forces

| | ---- Strong ----- | | | ---- Weak/none ---- | | | No |
|-----------|-------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|---------|
| | NET | Very | Fairly | NET | Fairly | None | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 36 | 11 | 25 | 62 | 32 | 30 | 2 |
| 11/14/10* | 37 | 10 | 28 | 61 | 33 | 27 | 1 |

*“ISAF/foreign forces”

h. Taliban

| | ---- Strong ----- | | | ---- Weak/none ---- | | | No |
|----------|-------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|---------|
| | NET | Very | Fairly | NET | Fairly | None | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 17 | 5 | 12 | 81 | 24 | 57 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 19 | 4 | 14 | 79 | 27 | 52 | 2 |

i. Other warlords/militias

| | ---- Strong ----- | | | ---- Weak/none ---- | | | No |
|-----------|-------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|---------|
| | NET | Very | Fairly | NET | Fairly | None | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 26 | 5 | 21 | 72 | 33 | 39 | 2 |
| 11/14/10* | 23 | 4 | 19 | 75 | 34 | 41 | 2 |

*“Local militia/warlords”

j. International aid organizations

| | ---- Strong ----- | | | --- Weak/none ---- | | | No |
|-----------|-------------------|------|--------|--------------------|--------|------|---------|
| | NET | Very | Fairly | NET | Fairly | None | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 45 | 10 | 35 | 54 | 31 | 23 | 2 |
| 11/14/10* | 42 | 7 | 35 | 57 | 33 | 24 | 2 |

*“Foreign aid organizations”

9a-b. Who or what brings insecurity in your area? Who and what else?

| | --- First --- | | | -- Second --- | | | --- Total --- | | |
|---|---------------|-----|-----|---------------|-----|-----|---------------|-----|-----|
| | '11 | '10 | '09 | '11 | '10 | '09 | '11 | '10 | '09 |
| Unemployment | 28 | 31 | 21 | 7 | 10 | 11 | 36 | 41 | 32 |
| Taliban | 17 | 17 | 17 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 27 | 27 | 30 |
| Foreigners | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 12 | 10 | 16 |
| Illiteracy | 5 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 12 | 10 | 6 |
| Lack of law | 4 | 4 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 11 | 9 | 2 |
| No one/nothing | 5 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 10 | 14 | 12 |
| Warlords | 5 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 10 | 9 | 17 |
| Weak government | 4 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 9 | 8 | 6 |
| Theft | 3 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 8 | 7 |
| Corruption | 3 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 9 | 10 | 3 |
| Anti-government elements | 3 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 11 | 18 |
| Weak economy | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 11 |
| Crimes | 2 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 6 | 6 |
| Local militia | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 9 |
| Lack of agriculture | 1 | 1 | * | 2 | 2 | * | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| Poppy cultivation | 1 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 10 |
| Lack of unity in community* | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| Neighbouring countries | 1 | * | 0 | 2 | * | * | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Suicide attackers | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | * | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| Terrorists | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| Kidnappers | 1 | * | * | * | 1 | * | 1 | 1 | * |
| Powerful people in general | * | NA | NA | 1 | NA | NA | 1 | NA | NA |
| Local people themselves** | * | 0 | 0 | 1 | * | * | 1 | * | * |
| Lack of shelter | * | 1 | * | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 2 | * |
| Low salaries of government employees | * | 1 | * | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Lack of disbandment of armed illegal groups*** | * | * | 1 | * | 1 | 1 | * | 2 | 2 |
| Police | * | * | 2 | * | * | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Land mafia | * | NA | NA | * | NA | NA | * | NA | NA |
| People addicted to drugs | * | | | * | 1 | | | | |
| Army | * | “ | “ | * | “ | “ | * | “ | “ |
| o opinion | 1 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 19 | 3 | 6 | 23 |

*“in community” added 10/27/11

**“local” added 10/27/11

***11/14/10 and previous: “lack of disarmament”

10a-b. And who or what ensures security in your area? Who or what else?

| | --- First --- | | | -- Second --- | | | --- Total --- | | |
|---|---------------|-----|-----|---------------|-----|-----|---------------|-----|-----|
| | '11 | '10 | '09 | '11 | '10 | '09 | '11 | '10 | '09 |
| Afghan National Police (ANP) | 48 | 48 | 41 | 11 | 11 | 18 | 58 | 59 | 18 |
| People themselves | 15 | 15 | 16 | 22 | 21 | 16 | 36 | 36 | 16 |
| Afghan National Army (ANA) | 9 | 8 | 11 | 17 | 15 | 16 | 26 | 23 | 16 |
| Tribal elders | 5 | 5 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 15 | 15 | 10 |
| Provincial/district governor* | 4 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 9 | 10 | 2 |
| Government | 3 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 6 |
| Law | 4 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 8 | 7 | 1 |
| Employment | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 8 | 8 | 3 |
| International troops** | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Development of educational system | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| Good economy | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 |
| Eradication of corruption | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 |
| Disbandment of illegal armed groups*** | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 |
| No one/nothing | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| When neighbouring countries stop interfering | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 1 | * | 2 | 2 | * |
| National Department of Security (NDS) | * | NA | NA | 2 | NA | NA | 2 | NA | NA |
| Mullahs | * | * | * | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Freedom of speech | * | * | * | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 2 | * |
| Reconstruction | * | 1 | * | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 2 | * |
| Poppy eradication | * | * | * | 1 | 1 | * | 1 | 2 | * |
| Women's rights | * | * | * | * | 1 | * | 1 | 2 | * |
| Taliban | * | 1 | 1 | * | * | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Community groups | * | NA | NA | * | NA | NA | 1 | NA | NA |
| Security checkpoints | * | * | * | | | | | | |
| Afghan Local Police (ALP) | * | “ | “ | * | “ | “ | * | “ | “ |
| No opinion | * | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 17 | 3 | 5 | 17 |

*”provincial” added 10/27/11

**10/27/11 and previous: “foreign troops”

***11/14/10 and previous: “disarmament”

11. Do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe [ITEM]?

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | ----- Safe ----- | | | ----- Unsafe ----- | | | No op. |
|--|------------------|------|--------|--------------------|--------|------|-----------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| a. Walking alone in your area during the day | 90 | 49 | 41 | 10 | 8 | 2 | * |
| b. Staying alone at home after dark (night time) | 68 | 29 | 39 | 32 | 25 | 7 | * |
| c. From the risk of roadside bombs/explosions | 49 | 18 | 30 | 50 | 32 | 18 | 1 |
| d. From the risk of suicide attacks | 45 | 17 | 27 | 54 | 30 | 24 | 1 |

Trend:

a. Walking alone in your area during the day

| | ----- Safe ----- | | | ----- Unsafe ----- | | | No op. |
|----------|------------------|------|--------|--------------------|--------|------|-----------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 90 | 49 | 41 | 10 | 8 | 2 | * |
| 11/14/10 | 89 | 48 | 41 | 11 | 9 | 2 | 1 |
| 7/21/09 | 87 | 51 | 36 | 12 | 10 | 2 | 1 |

b. Staying alone at home after dark (night time)

| | ----- Safe ----- | | | ----- Unsafe ----- | | | No op. |
|----------|------------------|------|--------|--------------------|--------|------|-----------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 68 | 29 | 39 | 32 | 25 | 7 | * |
| 11/14/10 | 70 | 31 | 39 | 30 | 23 | 7 | 1 |
| 7/21/09 | 64 | 30 | 33 | 34 | 24 | 10 | 2 |

c-d. No trend.

12a. Overall, would you describe this area as an area of a low amount of crime, a moderate amount, or would you call this a high-crime area?

| | Low crime | Moderate crime | High crime | No opinion |
|----------|-----------|----------------|------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 52 | 40 | 7 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 49 | 38 | 10 | 2 |

12b. In comparison to last year, would say that the amount of crime in this area has increased, decreased, or stayed the same?

| | Increased | Same | Decreased | No crime (vol.) | No opinion |
|----------|-----------|------|-----------|-----------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 16 | 25 | 49 | 8 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 14 | 29 | 43 | 13 | 2 |

13. For each item I name, please tell me if it would make you feel more secure, would not have an effect on your feeling of security, or would make you feel less secure.

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | More | No effect | Less | No opin. |
|--|------|-----------|------|----------|
| a. If there were more Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area | 74 | 20 | 5 | * |
| b. If more of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area were women | 43 | 38 | 18 | 1 |
| c. If there were more Afghan Local Police (ALP) in this area | 51 | 29 | 18 | 2 |
| d. If there were more Afghan National Army (ANA) in this area | 66 | 24 | 9 | 1 |
| e. If there were more ISAF soldiers in this area | 24 | 39 | 35 | 1 |
| f. If there were more Taliban in this area | 9 | 28 | 61 | 3 |

Trend:

a. If there were more Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area

| | More | No effect | Less | No op. |
|----------|------|-----------|------|--------|
| 10/27/11 | 74 | 20 | 5 | * |
| 11/14/10 | 68 | 22 | 10 | * |

b. If more of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area were women

| | More | No effect | Less | No opinion |
|----------|------|-----------|------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 43 | 38 | 18 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 42 | 37 | 19 | 2 |

c-f. No trend.

14a. How much information do you get about the activities of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area? Do you get a great deal of information about this, a good amount of information, just some information or little to no information?

| | ----- NET | Great deal Great deal | Good amount Good amount | ----- NET | Just some/ Just some | Little to no Little to no | No opinion |
|----------|--------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|
| 10/27/11 | 65 | 22 | 43 | 34 | 19 | 14 | 1 |

14b. In comparison to last year, do you feel you have more, less or about the same amount of information about the activities of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area?

| | More | Same | Less | No opinion |
|----------|------|------|------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 30 | 50 | 19 | 1 |

15a. How much confidence do you have in the Afghan National Police (ANP): is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?

| | ----- Confidence ----- | | | --- No Confidence --- | | | No |
|----------|------------------------|------------|-------|-----------------------|----------|------|---------|
| | NET | Great deal | A lot | NET | Not much | None | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 74 | 29 | 45 | 25 | 19 | 6 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 71 | 28 | 43 | 28 | 22 | 7 | 1 |

15b. In comparison to the last year, would you say you are more confident, less confident, or have the same level of confidence in the Afghan National Police (ANP) as you do today?

| | Never had | | | No | |
|----------|-----------|------|------|------------|---------|
| | More | Same | Less | any (vol.) | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 46 | 27 | 22 | 4 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 34 | 41 | 17 | 7 | 2 |

15c. (IF MORE CONFIDENT) Why are you MORE confident in the police in comparison to last year?

| | - Mentions - | |
|------------------------------|--------------|-----|
| | '11 | '10 |
| Service to people | 37 | 20 |
| They are Afghan | 12 | 2 |
| Security has improved | 11 | 37 |
| They have improved | 10 | 6 |
| Good attitude with people | 8 | 4 |
| Their education has improved | 6 | 20 |
| They fight Taliban | 6 | 2 |
| They enforce the law | 3 | 1 |
| Their number has increased | 2 | 2 |
| They fight narcotics | 2 | 1 |
| Removing corruption | 1 | * |
| Their salary has increased | 1 | 1 |
| Other | * | * |
| No opinion | 1 | 5 |

15d. (IF LESS CONFIDENT) Why are you LESS confident in the police in comparison to last year?

| | - Mentions - | |
|--|--------------|-----|
| | '11 | '10 |
| Police are corrupt | 22 | 25 |
| Not well-enough equipped | 18 | 7 |
| Security has worsened | 14 | 10 |
| They are not serious in their attitude with people | 10 | 7 |
| They don't pay attention to their duty | 9 | 14 |
| We have bad memories of them | 7 | 2 |
| They don't respect people | 6 | 4 |
| They are addicted to drugs | 3 | 2 |
| Government doesn't have good control over the police | 3 | * |
| Other | * | 2 |
| No opinion | 8 | 27 |

16. Would you describe most Afghan National Police (ANP) officers as very effective, somewhat effective, somewhat ineffective, or very ineffective at the following tasks:

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | ---- Effective ---- | | | --- Ineffective --- | | | No op. |
|---|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|--------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| a. Resolving local crimes | 85 | 39 | 45 | 15 | 11 | 3 | 1 |
| b. Resolving traffic accidents | 72 | 32 | 40 | 27 | 21 | 5 | 1 |
| c. Preventing terrorist attacks | 69 | 33 | 36 | 30 | 22 | 8 | 1 |
| d. Resolving land disputes | 62 | 21 | 41 | 37 | 27 | 10 | 1 |
| e. Keeping the Taliban out of the area where you live | 68 | 34 | 33 | 31 | 21 | 11 | 1 |

17a. How much respect do you personally have for the Afghan National Police (ANP) in your area - is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?

| | ----- Respect ----- | | | --- No respect --- | | | No op. |
|----------|---------------------|------------|-------|--------------------|----------|------|--------|
| | NET | Great deal | A lot | NET | Not much | None | |
| 10/27/11 | 81 | 33 | 48 | 19 | 14 | 5 | * |
| 11/14/10 | 73 | 29 | 45 | 26 | 21 | 5 | 1 |

17b. In comparison to last year, do you have more respect, less respect, or about the same amount of respect for the Afghan National Police (ANP) as you have now?

| | More | Same | Less | No opinion |
|----------|------|------|------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 39 | 49 | 12 | * |

18. How much prestige do you feel there is in being an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer – is it an occupation that commands a great deal of prestige, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?

| | ----- Prestige ----- | | | ---- No prestige ---- | | | No op. |
|----------|----------------------|------------|-------|-----------------------|----------|------|--------|
| | NET | Great deal | A lot | NET | Not much | None | |
| 10/27/11 | 75 | 32 | 43 | 23 | 17 | 7 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 69 | 25 | 44 | 29 | 21 | 8 | 2 |

19a. Do you think that Afghan National Police (ANP) performance in your area over the past year has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse?

| | Better | Same | Worse | No opinion |
|----------|--------|------|-------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 45 | 45 | 8 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 32 | 57 | 8 | 4 |

19b. (IF GOTTEN BETTER) Why do you think Afghan National Police (ANP) performance has gotten BETTER in comparison to last year?

| | - Mentions - | |
|----------------------------------|--------------|-----|
| | '11 | '10 |
| Increase in the number of police | 23 | 8 |
| Establish security | 20 | 20 |
| They fight the tyranny | 15 | 3 |
| They have been well equipped | 10 | 7 |
| They honestly serve the country | 6 | 11 |
| They respect people | 6 | 8 |
| Education has improved | 5 | 29 |
| Their salary has increased | 4 | 3 |
| They solve peoples' problems | 4 | 1 |
| They have decreased corruption | 3 | 1 |
| Decrease poppy cultivation | 1 | 1 |
| They fight against the Taliban | * | NA |
| Other | * | * |
| No opinion | 1 | 8 |

19c. (IF GOTTEN WORSE) Why do you think Afghan National Police (ANP) performance has gotten WORSE in comparison to last year?

| | - Mentions - | |
|----------------------------------|--------------|-----|
| | '11 | '10 |
| They take bribes | 33 | 14 |
| Bad behaviour with people | 22 | 22 |
| Lack of enough education | 12 | 8 |
| Do not serve the people | 11 | 15 |
| Taliban have become stronger | 8 | 2 |
| Increase in the number of police | 4 | 12 |
| They are addicted | 4 | 3 |
| Other | * | 1 |
| No opinion | 6 | 24 |

20. If you were to experience [ITEM], who do you think you are most likely to turn to FIRST to report it?

Full text open-end precodes: Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Local Police (ALP)*, Provincial/district government office, Afghan National Army (ANA), Malik, Local elders, Religious leaders, Lawyer/court, Media, NGOs, ISAF/international forces**, Call 119, Taliban, Local militia*, Community/District Development Councils (CDC/DDC)*, Other (Specify), No opinion.

*Precode added 10/27/11

**11/14/10: "ISAF/foreign forces"

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | ANP | ALP | Gov | ANA | Mal | Eld | Rel | Crt | Med | NGO | ISAF | 119 | Tal | Mil | Dev | Oth | Off | One | No | No |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|
| a. Robbery, theft, burglary | 59 | 11 | 10 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 1 | * | * | * | 1 | * | * | 1 | * | * | * | * | 1 |
| b. Offences related to land ownership | 20 | 16 | 22 | 3 | 7 | 11 | 3 | 13 | * | * | * | * | * | 2 | * | * | * | * | * | 1 |
| c. Sexual offences | 27 | 11 | 20 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 10 | 1 | * | * | * | * | 1 | * | * | * | * | * | 2 |
| d. Kidnapping | 38 | 10 | 14 | 13 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 2 | * | 1 | 2 | * | * | 1 | * | * | * | * | 2 |
| e. Assault or threat | 28 | 9 | 16 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | * | * | 2 | * | * | * | * | 2 |
| f. Traffic accidents | 43 | 10 | 11 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | * | * | 1 | 1 | * | * | * | 3 |
| g. Unpaid loan | 17 | 6 | 15 | 4 | 9 | 19 | 8 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | * | * | * | * | 2 |
| h. Problem with employer | 14 | 6 | 20 | 4 | 8 | 15 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | * | * | * | * | 3 |
| i. Violence against women | 17 | 5 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 11 | 9 | 17 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | * | 2 |

Trend:

a. Robbery, theft, burglary

| | ANP | ALP | Gov | ANA | Mal | Eld | Rel | Crt | Med | NGO | ISAF | 119 | Tal | Mil | Dev | Oth | op. | No |
|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|
| 10/27/11 | 59 | 11 | 10 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 1 | * | * | * | 1 | * | * | 1 | * | * | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 66 | NA | 11 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | * | * | * | 1 | NA | NA | NA | 1 | |

b. Offences related to land ownership

| | ANP | ALP | Gov | ANA | Mal | Eld | Rel | Crt | Med | NGO | ISAF | 119 | Tal | Mil | Dev | Oth | op. | No |
|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|
| 10/27/11 | 20 | 16 | 22 | 3 | 7 | 11 | 3 | 13 | * | * | * | * | * | * | 2 | * | 1 | |
| 11/14/10 | 21 | NA | 36 | 4 | 9 | 14 | 3 | 11 | * | * | 0 | * | 1 | NA | NA | NA | 1 | |

c. Sexual offences

| | ANP | ALP | Gov | ANA | Mal | Eld | Rel | Crt | Med | NGO | ISAF | 119 | Tal | Mil | Dev | Oth | op. | No |
|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|
| 10/27/11 | 27 | 11 | 20 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 10 | 1 | * | * | * | * | * | 1 | * | 2 | |
| 11/14/10 | 32 | NA | 18 | 11 | 7 | 10 | 7 | 9 | * | * | * | 1 | 1 | NA | NA | NA | 3 | |

d. Kidnapping

| | ANP | ALP | Gov | ANA | Mal | Eld | Rel | Crt | Med | NGO | ISAF | 119 | Tal | Mil | Dev | Oth | op. | No |
|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|
| 10/27/11 | 38 | 10 | 14 | 13 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 2 | * | 1 | 2 | * | * | 1 | * | 2 | |
| 11/14/10 | 52 | NA | 15 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 1 | * | * | 1 | 1 | NA | NA | NA | 2 | |

e. Assault or threat

| | ANP | ALP | Gov | ANA | Mal | Eld | Rel | Crt | Med | NGO | ISAF | 119 | Tal | Mil | Dev | Oth | op. |
|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 10/27/11 | 28 | 9 | 16 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | * | * | 2 | * | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 41 | NA | 16 | 8 | 7 | 14 | 4 | 5 | 1 | * | 1 | 1 | 1 | NA | NA | NA | 2 |

f. Traffic accidents

| | ANP | ALP | Gov | ANA | Mal | Eld | Rel | Crt | Med | NGO | ISAF | 119 | Tal | Mil | Dev | Oth | op. |
|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 10/27/11 | 43 | 10 | 11 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | * | * | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 11/14/10 | 56 | NA | 14 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 1 | * | * | 3 | 1 | NA | NA | NA | 3 |

g. Unpaid loan

| | ANP | ALP | Gov | ANA | Mal | Eld | Rel | Crt | Med | NGO | ISAF | 119 | Tal | Mil | Dev | Oth | op. |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 10/27/11 | 17 | 6 | 15 | 4 | 9 | 19 | 8 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | * | 2 |
| 11/14/10* | 27 | NA | 16 | 5 | 12 | 21 | 6 | 9 | 1 | * | * | * | 1 | NA | NA | NA | 2 |

*"Unpaid loan, a debtor who refuses to pay back his loan"

h. Problem with employer

| | ANP | ALP | Gov | ANA | Mal | Eld | Rel | Crt | Med | NGO | ISAF | 119 | Tal | Mil | Dev | Oth | op. |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 10/27/11 | 14 | 6 | 20 | 4 | 8 | 15 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | * | 3 |
| 11/14/10* | 27 | NA | 21 | 5 | 9 | 17 | 5 | 7 | 2 | 1 | * | * | 1 | NA | NA | NA | 4 |

*"Problem with employer who declines to pay the agreed on amount"

i. Violence against women

| | ANP | ALP | Gov | ANA | Mal | Eld | Rel | Crt | Med | NGO | ISAF | 119 | Tal | Mil | Dev | Oth | op. |
|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 10/27/11 | 17 | 5 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 11 | 9 | 17 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 31 | NA | 17 | 3 | 6 | 13 | 9 | 12 | 3 | 2 | * | 1 | 1 | NA | NA | NA | 4 |

21. Have you yourself ever had any interaction with the Afghan National Police (ANP), or not?

| | Yes | No | No opinion |
|----------|-----|----|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 23 | 76 | 1 |

22a. (IF INTERACTED WITH ANP) When was the last time you interacted with the Afghan National Police (ANP) — about how long ago?

| | 1-3 months | 3-6 months | 6-12 months | 1-2 years | 2-5 years | 5+ years | No opinion |
|----------|------------|------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|----------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 33 | 34 | 19 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 1 |

21/22a NET:

| | NET | 1-3mo. | 3-6mo. | 6-12mo. | 1-2yrs. | 3-5yrs. | 5+yrs. | not | op. |
|----------|-----|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|--------|-----|-----|
| 10/27/11 | 23 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1 | * | 76 | 1 |

22b. (IF INTERACTED WITH ANP) About how many times have you interacted with the Afghan National police (ANP) within the past 12 months?

| | None | 1 time | 2 times | 3-5 times | 6-10 times | 11+ times | No opin. | Mean | SD |
|----------|------|-----------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|------|-----|
| 10/27/11 | * | 27 | 30 | 24 | 6 | 2 | * | 2.8 | 3.0 |

21/22b NET:

| | NET | Not in past yr. | 1 time | 2 times | 3-5 times | 6-10 times | 11+ times | Have not | No op. |
|----------|-----|--------------------|-----------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|-----------|
| 10/27/11 | 23 | * | 6 | 7 | 5 | 1 | * | 76 | 1 |

22c. (IF INTERACTED WITH ANP) Overall, would you describe your interactions(s) with the Afghan National Police (ANP) as very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative?

| | NET | Very Positive | Smewhat Positive | NET | Smewhat Negative | Very Mixed | (vol.) Mixed | No opinion |
|----------|-----|------------------|---------------------|-----|---------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|
| 10/27/11 | 79 | 35 | 45 | 15 | 11 | 4 | 4 | 2 |

21/22c NET:

| | NET | NET | Very Positive int. | Smwht Positive int. | NET | Smwht Negative int. | Very Mixed | (vol.) Mixed | Have not | No op. |
|----------|-----|-----|-----------------------|------------------------|-----|------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------|
| 10/27/11 | 23 | 18 | 8 | 10 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 76 | * |

23. Have you ever visited a police station to conduct business or obtain information, or not?

| | Yes | No | No opinion |
|----------|-----|----|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 23 | 76 | 1 |

24a. (IF VISITED POLICE STATION) About how many times have you visited a police station?

| | time | 1 times | 2 times | 3-5 times | 6-10 times | 11+ times | No opin. | Mean | SD |
|----------|------|------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|------|----|
| 10/27/11 | 31 | 34 | 22 | 3 | 1 | 11 | 2.4 | 2.8 | |

23/24a NET:

| | NET | time | 1 times | 2 times | 3-5 times | 6-10 times | 11+ times | Have not | No op. |
|----------|-----|------|------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|-----------|
| 10/27/11 | 23 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 1 | * | 76 | 2 | |

24b. (IF VISITED POLICE STATION) Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the service you received overall – very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

| | ---- Satisfied ---- | | | --- Dissatisfied -- | | | No opinion |
|----------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 78 | 33 | 44 | 21 | 15 | 6 | 2 |

23/24b NET:

| | ----- Have visited police station ----- | | | | | | | | |
|----------|---|-----|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|----------|--------|
| | --- Satisfied --- | | | | --- Dissatisfied -- | | | Have not | No op. |
| | NET | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | | |
| 10/27/11 | 23 | 18 | 8 | 10 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 76 | 2 |

25. If there were a matter to report to [ITEM], would you be willing to do this yourself, or would you bring someone with you?

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | Alone | Bring someone | No opinion |
|-------------------------------------|-------|---------------|------------|
| a. The Afghan National Police (ANP) | 50 | 47 | 3 |
| b. The elders | 46 | 50 | 4 |

Trend:

a. The Afghan National Police (ANP)

| | Alone | Bring someone | No opinion |
|----------|-------|---------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 50 | 47 | 3 |
| 11/14/10 | 59 | 39 | 2 |

b. The elders

| | Alone | Bring someone | No opinion |
|----------|-------|---------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 46 | 50 | 4 |
| 11/14/10 | 51 | 46 | 3 |

26. If a woman reports a crime alone, without being accompanied by a male family member, do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area would be more likely to investigate that crime fully, would it make no difference either way to them, or would they be less likely to investigate that crime fully?

| | More likely | No difference | Less likely | No opinion |
|----------|-------------|---------------|-------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 37 | 39 | 21 | 4 |
| 11/14/10 | 33 | 38 | 24 | 5 |

27. For each item I name, please tell me if you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area are involved in this activity a great deal, somewhat, just a little, or hardly at all.

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | --- Involved ---- | | | --- Not involved --- | | | |
|---|-------------------|------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | NET | Great deal | Some-what | NET | Just a little | Hardly at all | No opin. |
| a. Fighting insurgents | 76 | 40 | 36 | 23 | 12 | 11 | 1 |
| b. Poppy eradication | 62 | 29 | 33 | 37 | 23 | 14 | 1 |
| c. Fighting organized crime | 64 | 27 | 37 | 35 | 24 | 11 | 1 |
| d. Preventing inter-ethnic, inter-tribal violence | 59 | 22 | 38 | 40 | 26 | 13 | 1 |
| e. Fighting narcotics trade | 63 | 29 | 34 | 35 | 23 | 12 | 1 |
| f. Fighting corruption | 56 | 23 | 33 | 42 | 28 | 14 | 2 |
| g. Investigating routine crime | 63 | 26 | 38 | 35 | 25 | 10 | 2 |
| h. Preventing violence against women | 58 | 20 | 37 | 41 | 28 | 13 | 1 |
| i. Building partnerships with community groups | 62 | 23 | 40 | 36 | 25 | 10 | 2 |

Trend:

a. Fighting insurgents

| | ---- Involved ---- | | | --- Not involved --- | | | |
|----------|--------------------|------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | NET | Great deal | Some-what | NET | Just a little | Hardly at all | No opin. |
| 10/27/11 | 76 | 40 | 36 | 23 | 12 | 11 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 76 | 37 | 40 | 22 | 12 | 10 | 1 |
| 7/21/09* | 76 | 38 | 38 | 22 | 14 | 9 | 2 |

*Items a-f: "To what extent is the police in your province involved in performing the following tasks?" Response options: a lot, some, a little, not at all.

b. Poppy eradication

| | ---- Involved ---- | | | --- Not involved --- | | | |
|----------|--------------------|------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | NET | Great deal | Some-what | NET | Just a little | Hardly at all | No opin. |
| 10/27/11 | 62 | 29 | 33 | 37 | 23 | 14 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 61 | 26 | 35 | 37 | 23 | 13 | 2 |
| 7/21/09* | 65 | 34 | 31 | 33 | 22 | 11 | 2 |

c. Fighting organized crime

| | ---- Involved ---- | | | --- Not involved --- | | | |
|----------|--------------------|------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | NET | Great deal | Some-what | NET | Just a little | Hardly at all | No opin. |
| 10/27/11 | 64 | 27 | 37 | 35 | 24 | 11 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 65 | 25 | 41 | 34 | 25 | 9 | 1 |
| 7/21/09* | 65 | 28 | 37 | 33 | 22 | 11 | 3 |

d. Preventing inter-ethnic, inter-tribal violence

| | ---- Involved ---- | | | --- Not involved --- | | | |
|----------|--------------------|------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | NET | Great deal | Some-what | NET | Just a little | Hardly at all | No opin. |
| 10/27/11 | 59 | 22 | 38 | 40 | 26 | 13 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 63 | 24 | 39 | 36 | 26 | 10 | 1 |
| 7/21/09* | 59 | 24 | 35 | 39 | 26 | 13 | 2 |

e. Fighting narcotics trade

| | ---- Involved ---- | | | --- Not involved --- | | | |
|----------|--------------------|------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | NET | Great deal | Some-what | NET | Just a little | Hardly at all | No opin. |
| 10/27/11 | 63 | 29 | 34 | 35 | 23 | 12 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 62 | 24 | 37 | 37 | 26 | 11 | 2 |
| 7/21/09* | 60 | 29 | 31 | 37 | 23 | 13 | 3 |

f. Fighting corruption

| | ---- Involved ---- | | | --- Not involved --- | | | |
|----------|--------------------|------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | NET | Great deal | Some-what | NET | Just a little | Hardly at all | No opin. |
| 10/27/11 | 56 | 23 | 33 | 42 | 28 | 14 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 59 | 23 | 36 | 39 | 28 | 11 | 2 |
| 7/21/09* | 54 | 26 | 28 | 43 | 26 | 18 | 3 |

g. Investigating routine crime

| | ---- Involved ---- | | | --- Not involved --- | | | |
|------------|--------------------|------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | NET | Great deal | Some-what | NET | Just a little | Hardly at all | No opin. |
| 10/27/11 | 63 | 26 | 38 | 35 | 25 | 10 | 2 |
| 11/14/10** | 69 | 30 | 39 | 30 | 22 | 8 | 1 |

**"Investigating routine nonviolent crime like theft"

h. Preventing violence against women

| | ---- Involved ---- | | | --- Not involved --- | | | |
|----------|--------------------|------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | NET | Great deal | Some-what | NET | Just a little | Hardly at all | No opin. |
| 10/27/11 | 58 | 20 | 37 | 41 | 28 | 13 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 58 | 23 | 35 | 40 | 27 | 13 | 2 |

i. No trend.

28. Now for each of those please tell me if you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area should be spending more time on this activity, if it's the right amount of time, or they should spend less time on this activity.

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | More time | Right amount | Less time | No opin. |
|---|-----------|--------------|-----------|----------|
| a. Fighting insurgents | 55 | 34 | 10 | 1 |
| b. Poppy eradication | 42 | 40 | 17 | 1 |
| c. Fighting organized crime | 43 | 39 | 17 | 1 |
| d. Preventing inter-ethnic, inter-tribal violence | 35 | 44 | 21 | 1 |
| e. Fighting narcotics trade | 44 | 38 | 16 | 1 |
| f. Fighting corruption | 48 | 34 | 16 | 2 |
| g. Investigating routine crime | 34 | 46 | 18 | 2 |
| h. Preventing violence against women | 32 | 46 | 20 | 1 |
| i. Building partnerships with community groups | 36 | 45 | 17 | 2 |

Trend:

a. Fighting insurgents

| | More time | Right amount | Less time | No opinion |
|----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 55 | 34 | 10 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 55 | 33 | 10 | 2 |

b. Poppy eradication

| | More time | Right amount | Less time | No opinion |
|----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 42 | 40 | 17 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 40 | 41 | 16 | 3 |

c. Fighting organized crime

| | More time | Right amount | Less time | No opinion |
|----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 43 | 39 | 17 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 45 | 37 | 16 | 3 |

d. Preventing inter-ethnic, inter-tribal violence

| | More time | Right amount | Less time | No opinion |
|----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 35 | 44 | 21 | 1 |
| 11/4/10 | 37 | 42 | 19 | 2 |

e. Fighting narcotics trade

| | More time | Right amount | Less time | No opinion |
|----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 44 | 38 | 16 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 42 | 39 | 16 | 3 |

f. Fighting corruption

| | More time | Right amount | Less time | No opinion |
|----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 48 | 34 | 16 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 48 | 35 | 14 | 3 |

g. Investigating routine crime

| | More time | Right amount | Less time | No opinion |
|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 34 | 46 | 18 | 2 |
| 11/14/10* | 41 | 42 | 15 | 3 |

*"Investigating routine nonviolent crime like theft"

h. Preventing violence against women

| | More time | Right amount | Less time | No opinion |
|----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 32 | 46 | 20 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 36 | 42 | 20 | 3 |

i. No trend.

29. Overall, what kind of a task are Afghan National Police (ANP) in your area performing more often nowadays – the one of a law-enforcing institution preventing crime, or that of a counterinsurgency force?

| | Law enforcing | Both Counter-insurgency | (vol.) | No opinion |
|----------|---------------|----------------------------|--------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 40 | 32 | 24 | 3 |
| 11/14/10 | 32 | 30 | 31 | 7 |
| 7/21/09 | 38 | 24 | 28 | 10 |

30a. Overall, would you describe the Afghan National Police (ANP) as being very knowledgeable about their duties to enforce the law, somewhat knowledgeable, not very knowledgeable or not at all knowledgeable?

| | NET | Knowledgeable Very | Somewhat | NET | Not knowledgeable Not very | Not at all | No opinion |
|----------|-----|-----------------------|----------|-----|-------------------------------|------------|---------------|
| 10/27/11 | 76 | 30 | 47 | 22 | 17 | 5 | 2 |

30b. In comparison to one year ago, would you say that the Afghan National Police (ANP) are more knowledgeable about their duties to enforce the law, less knowledgeable, or about the same as before?

| | More | Same | Less | No opinion |
|----------|------|------|------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 35 | 50 | 13 | 2 |

31. In terms of [ITEM] please tell me if you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area are very effective, somewhat effective, somewhat ineffective, or very ineffective?

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | --- Effective --- | | -- Ineffective -- | | No | |
|--|-------------------|-------------|-------------------|--------|------|-----|
| | NET | Very Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | op. |
| a. Preventing crime | 88 | 46 | 42 | 12 | 9 | 3 * |
| b. Responding to complaints of crime | 75 | 28 | 46 | 25 | 21 | 4 1 |
| c. Bringing to justice those responsible for crimes that have been committed | 70 | 30 | 40 | 29 | 22 | 7 1 |
| d. Fighting insurgents | 75 | 36 | 39 | 24 | 18 | 6 1 |
| e. Maintaining law and order | 72 | 30 | 42 | 27 | 21 | 6 1 |

Trend:

a. Preventing crime

| | ---- Effective ---- | | | -- Not Effective -- | | | No |
|----------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|---------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 88 | 46 | 42 | 12 | 9 | 3 | * |
| 11/14/10 | 89 | 40 | 49 | 11 | 9 | 2 | 1 |

b. Responding to complaints of crime

| | ---- Effective ---- | | | -- Not Effective -- | | | No |
|----------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|---------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 75 | 28 | 46 | 25 | 21 | 4 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 74 | 25 | 49 | 25 | 21 | 2 | 1 |

c. Bringing to justice those responsible for crimes that have been committed

| | ---- Effective ---- | | | -- Not Effective -- | | | No |
|----------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|---------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 70 | 30 | 40 | 29 | 22 | 7 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 70 | 26 | 43 | 29 | 24 | 5 | 1 |

d. Fighting insurgents

| | ---- Effective ---- | | | -- Not Effective -- | | | No |
|----------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|---------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | opinion |
| 10/27/11 | 75 | 36 | 39 | 24 | 18 | 6 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 70 | 30 | 40 | 29 | 23 | 6 | 1 |

e. Maintaining law and order

| | ---- Effective ---- | | | -- Not Effective -- | | | No opinion |
|----------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 72 | 30 | 42 | 27 | 21 | 6 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 71 | 27 | 44 | 28 | 23 | 6 | 1 |

32. Overall, thinking of crime in your area, are the Afghan National Police (ANP) officers very capable, somewhat capable, somewhat incapable or very incapable to cope with [ITEM]?

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | ----- Capable ----- | | | ---- Incapable ---- | | | No opinion |
|---------------------------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| a. Small crimes, offences | 88 | 50 | 38 | 12 | 9 | 3 | 1 |
| b. Big, organized crimes | 67 | 24 | 42 | 33 | 25 | 7 | 1 |
| c. Corruption | 57 | 20 | 36 | 42 | 28 | 14 | 1 |
| d. Insurgency | 64 | 28 | 37 | 34 | 23 | 11 | 1 |

Trend:

a. Small crimes, offences

| | ----- Capable ----- | | | ---- Incapable ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 88 | 50 | 38 | 12 | 9 | 3 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 89 | 44 | 45 | 11 | 9 | 2 | * |
| 7/21/09* | 87 | 48 | 40 | 11 | 8 | 3 | 2 |

*Items a-d: "thinking of police officers in your area, are they..."

b. Big, organized crimes

| | ----- Capable ----- | | | ---- Incapable ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 67 | 24 | 43 | 33 | 25 | 7 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 67 | 21 | 46 | 32 | 25 | 7 | 1 |
| 7/21/09* | 66 | 26 | 41 | 32 | 24 | 7 | 2 |

c. Corruption

| | ----- Capable ----- | | | ---- Incapable ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 57 | 20 | 36 | 42 | 28 | 14 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 55 | 17 | 38 | 43 | 31 | 13 | 1 |
| 7/21/09* | 58 | 24 | 34 | 39 | 26 | 14 | 3 |

d. Insurgency

| | ---- Capable ---- | | | ---- Incapable ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|-------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 64 | 28 | 37 | 34 | 23 | 11 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 62 | 22 | 39 | 36 | 25 | 11 | 1 |
| 7/21/09* | 57 | 23 | 33 | 39 | 25 | 14 | 4 |

33. How well do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area where you live [ITEM] – very well, somewhat well, not so well or not well at all?

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | ---- Well ---- | | | ---- Not well ---- | | | No op. |
|--|----------------|------|--------|--------------------|--------|------------|--------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Not so | Not at all | |
| a. Understand the law | 81 | 35 | 46 | 18 | 14 | 4 | 1 |
| b. Understand what their duties are | 75 | 33 | 42 | 24 | 20 | 4 | 1 |
| c. Are trained to perform their duties | 71 | 28 | 43 | 28 | 22 | 6 | 1 |
| d. Are provided with the equipment they need | 63 | 24 | 40 | 35 | 26 | 9 | 2 |
| e. Are able to perform their duties without assistance from international forces | 63 | 21 | 42 | 35 | 26 | 10 | 2 |
| f. Are knowledgeable about the needs of the community | 71 | 25 | 46 | 28 | 22 | 6 | 1 |
| g. Are knowledgeable about human rights in general | 66 | 23 | 43 | 32 | 25 | 7 | 2 |

Trend:

a. Understand the law

| | ---- Well ---- | | | ---- Not well ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|----------------|------|--------|--------------------|--------|------------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Not so | Not at all | |
| 10/27/11 | 81 | 35 | 46 | 18 | 14 | 4 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 82 | 30 | 52 | 17 | 13 | 4 | 1 |

b. Understand what their duties are

| | ---- Well ---- | | | ---- Not well ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|----------------|------|--------|--------------------|--------|------------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Not so | Not at all | |
| 10/27/11 | 75 | 33 | 42 | 24 | 20 | 4 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 75 | 29 | 46 | 24 | 20 | 4 | 1 |

c. Are trained to perform their duties

| | ----- Well ----- | | | ----- Not well ----- | | | No opinion |
|----------|------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Not so | Not at all | |
| 10/27/11 | 71 | 28 | 43 | 28 | 22 | 6 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 70 | 28 | 41 | 29 | 23 | 6 | 2 |

d. Are provided with the equipment they need

| | ----- Well ----- | | | ----- Not well ----- | | | No opinion |
|----------|------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Not so | Not at all | |
| 10/27/11 | 63 | 24 | 40 | 35 | 26 | 9 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 65 | 25 | 41 | 33 | 26 | 7 | 2 |

e. Are able to perform their duties without assistance from international forces

| | ----- Well ----- | | | ----- Not well ----- | | | No opinion |
|----------|------------------|------|--------|----------------------|--------|------------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Not so | Not at all | |
| 10/27/11 | 63 | 21 | 42 | 35 | 26 | 10 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 63 | 23 | 40 | 35 | 27 | 8 | 2 |

f-g. No trend.

34. Either from your own experience or from what you have heard, what part of their job do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) do the BEST?

| | - Mentions - |
|--------------------------|--------------|
| | ‘11 |
| Maintain security | 40 |
| Help people | 9 |
| Behave well with people | 8 |
| Fight against AGE | 5 |
| Fight against crime | 4 |
| Perform all duties well | 4 |
| Nothing | 3 |
| Arrest smugglers | 3 |
| Implement the law | 2 |
| Fight against corruption | 2 |
| Discipline | 2 |
| Other | 3 |
| No opinion | 15 |

35. And either from your own experience or from what you have heard, what part of their job do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) do the WORST?

| | - Mentions - |
|-------------------|--------------|
| | ‘11 |
| Corruption | 20 |
| Tease people | 8 |
| Nothing | 8 |
| Not being capable | 8 |
| Misuse equipment | 6 |

| | |
|--------------------------------------|----|
| Fight against narcotics | 5 |
| Maintain security | 5 |
| Pay attention to duties | 4 |
| Behave badly | 4 |
| Implement the law | 2 |
| Fight against terrorism | 2 |
| Serve people | 1 |
| Pay attention to people's complaints | 1 |
| Other | 3 |
| No opinion | 24 |

36. Would you say the Afghan National Police (ANP) mainly deal with people in a way that is very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, or very unfair?

| | ----- Fair ----- | | | ---- Unfair ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|------------------|------|--------|------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 78 | 29 | 48 | 21 | 16 | 5 | 2 |

37. To what extent do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area [ITEM] – always, most of the time, some of the time or rarely?

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | ----- Often ----- | | | ---- Not often ---- | | | No opinion |
|---|-------------------|--------|------|---------------------|------|--------|------------|
| | NET | Always | Most | NET | Some | Rarely | |
| a. Treat everyone equally | 74 | 33 | 41 | 26 | 20 | 6 | 1 |
| b. Respect people's rights | 66 | 25 | 41 | 33 | 27 | 6 | 1 |
| c. Try to help people with their problems | 63 | 23 | 40 | 36 | 29 | 8 | * |
| d. Explain the reasons for their actions | 58 | 19 | 39 | 41 | 31 | 10 | 2 |
| e. Share the values of most people in the community | 63 | 23 | 41 | 35 | 26 | 9 | 1 |
| f. Respond to community concerns | 60 | 22 | 38 | 39 | 29 | 10 | 1 |
| g. Admit their mistakes and correct them | 56 | 19 | 37 | 43 | 29 | 13 | 2 |
| h. Treat women with proper respect | 71 | 33 | 39 | 27 | 21 | 6 | 1 |
| Trend: | | | | | | | |

a. Treat everyone equally

| | ----- Often ----- | | | ---- Not often ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|-------------------|--------|------|---------------------|------|--------|------------|
| | NET | Always | Most | NET | Some | Rarely | |
| 10/27/11 | 74 | 33 | 41 | 26 | 20 | 6 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 76 | 30 | 46 | 23 | 18 | 5 | 1 |

b. Respect people's rights

| | ----- Often ----- | | | ---- Not often ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|-------------------|--------|------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------|
| | NET | Always | Most | NET | Some | Rarely | |
| 10/27/11 | 66 | 25 | 41 | 33 | 27 | 6 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 66 | 26 | 40 | 33 | 26 | 8 | 1 |

c. Try to help people with their problems

| | ----- Often ----- | | | ---- Not often ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|-------------------|--------|------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------|
| | NET | Always | Most | NET | Some | Rarely | |
| 10/27/11 | 63 | 23 | 40 | 36 | 29 | 8 | * |
| 11/14/10 | 63 | 25 | 38 | 36 | 28 | 8 | 1 |

d. Explain the reasons for their actions

| | ----- Often ----- | | | ---- Not often ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|-------------------|--------|------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------|
| | NET | Always | Most | NET | Some | Rarely | |
| 10/27/11 | 58 | 19 | 39 | 41 | 31 | 10 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 58 | 18 | 40 | 39 | 30 | 9 | 3 |

e. Share the values of most people in the community

| | ----- Often ----- | | | ---- Not often ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|-------------------|--------|------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------|
| | NET | Always | Most | NET | Some | Rarely | |
| 10/27/11 | 63 | 23 | 41 | 35 | 26 | 9 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 64 | 22 | 42 | 33 | 26 | 8 | 2 |

f-h. No trend.

38. For each item I name, please tell me if it has happened to you or someone in your household in the last year or not.

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | Yes | No | No op. |
|---|-----|----|--------|
| a. Being offered help by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer in a legal and positive way when you needed assistance | 39 | 60 | 1 |
| b. Being stopped by Afghan National Police (ANP) on the street without good reason | 23 | 77 | 1 |
| c. Being addressed by the Afghan National Police (ANP) with insulting language | 21 | 78 | 1 |
| d. Being asked by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer to provide food | 17 | 82 | 1 |
| e. Being asked by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer for money or other payment in order for you to avoid arrest or a fine | 18 | 81 | 1 |
| f. Being asked by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer for money or other payment in order for the police to provide protection to your business or home | 15 | 84 | 1 |
| g. Being subjected to excessive physical force by the Afghan National Police (ANP) | 17 | 82 | 1 |
| h. Being falsely accused by the Afghan National Police (ANP) of a minor wrongdoing | 16 | 83 | 2 |
| i. Being falsely accused by the Afghan National Police (ANP) of a major wrongdoing | 16 | 83 | 2 |
| j. Being forced by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer to participate in a crime against your will | 11 | 88 | 1 |

Trend:

a. Being offered help by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer in a legal and positive way when you needed assistance

| | Yes | No | No opin. |
|-----------|-----|----|----------|
| 10/27/11 | 39 | 60 | 1 |
| 11/14/10* | 32 | 68 | NA |

*Items a-j: 11/14/10: No opinion was coded as "No"

b. Being stopped by Afghan National Police (ANP) on the street without good reason

| | Yes | No | No opin. |
|-----------|-----|----|----------|
| 10/27/11 | 23 | 77 | 1 |
| 11/14/10* | 23 | 77 | NA |

c. Being addressed by the Afghan National Police (ANP) with insulting language

| | Yes | No | No opin. |
|-----------|-----|----|----------|
| 10/27/11 | 21 | 78 | 1 |
| 11/14/10* | 23 | 77 | NA |

d. Being asked by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer to provide food

| | Yes | No | No opin. |
|----------|-----|----|----------|
| 10/27/11 | 17 | 82 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 15 | 85 | NA |

e. Being asked by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer for money or other payment in order for you to avoid arrest or a fine

| | Yes | No | No opin. |
|-----------|-----|----|----------|
| 10/27/11 | 18 | 81 | 1 |
| 11/14/10* | 16 | 84 | NA |

f. Being asked by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer for money or other payment in order for the police to provide protection to your business or home

| | Yes | No | No opin. |
|-----------|-----|----|----------|
| 10/27/11 | 15 | 84 | 1 |
| 11/14/10* | 12 | 88 | NA |

g. Being subjected to excessive physical force by the Afghan National Police (ANP)

| | Yes | No | No opin. |
|-----------|-----|----|----------|
| 10/27/11 | 17 | 82 | 1 |
| 11/14/10* | 14 | 87 | NA |

h. Being falsely accused by the Afghan National Police (ANP) of a minor wrongdoing

| | Yes | No | No opin. |
|-----------|-----|----|----------|
| 10/27/11 | 16 | 83 | 2 |
| 11/14/10* | 12 | 88 | NA |

i. Being falsely accused by the Afghan National Police (ANP) of a major wrongdoing

| | Yes | No | No opin. |
|-----------|-----|----|----------|
| 10/27/11 | 16 | 83 | 2 |
| 11/14/10* | 11 | 89 | NA |

j. Being forced by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer to participate in a crime against your will

| | Yes | No | No opin. |
|-----------|-----|----|----------|
| 10/27/11 | 11 | 88 | 1 |
| 11/14/10* | 10 | 90 | NA |

39. For each item I name, please tell me if you or someone in your household are aware of members of the police doing the following:

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | Yes | No | No opinion |
|---|-----|----|------------|
| a. Seeing a member of the Afghan National Police (ANP) use drugs/narcotics himself or herself | 31 | 68 | 1 |
| b. Seeing a member of the Afghan National Police (ANP) participate in the drugs/narcotics trade | 18 | 79 | 3 |

Trend:

a. Seeing a member of the Afghan National Police (ANP) use drugs/narcotics himself or herself

| | Yes | No | No opinion |
|----------|-----|----|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 31 | 68 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 26 | 74 | 0 |

b. Seeing a member of the Afghan National Police (ANP) participate in the drugs/narcotics trade

| | Yes | No | No opinion |
|----------|-----|----|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 18 | 79 | 3 |
| 11/14/10 | 19 | 81 | 0 |

40. There are times when a government representative may ask for money or other payment in exchange for favourable treatment in the performance of his official duties. Do you personally regard this as corruption, do you think it depends and may be corrupt in some cases but acceptable in others, or do you see it as acceptable behaviour?

| | Corruption | Depends | Acceptable | No opinion |
|----------|------------|---------|------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 57 | 33 | 7 | 3 |
| 11/14/10 | 65 | 28 | 6 | 1 |

41. Do you think there is a lot, some, just a little, or no corruption among [ITEM] in Afghanistan?

| | ----- A lot/ some | | | ----- Little/ none | | | No opinion |
|---|-------------------|-------|------|--------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | A lot | Some | NET | Little | None | |
| a. Government employees | 79 | 38 | 41 | 21 | 14 | 6 | 1 |
| b. Teachers | 29 | 6 | 23 | 70 | 31 | 38 | 2 |
| c. Afghan National Army (ANA) | 34 | 9 | 25 | 63 | 28 | 35 | 3 |
| d. Afghan National Police (ANP) | 53 | 18 | 35 | 45 | 27 | 18 | 2 |
| e. Afghan Local Police (ALP) | 49 | 18 | 32 | 44 | 25 | 18 | 7 |
| f. National Directorate of Security (NDS) | 49 | 17 | 31 | 47 | 27 | 20 | 4 |
| g. The government court system | 73 | 40 | 33 | 25 | 18 | 7 | 2 |
| h. The prison system | 66 | 28 | 37 | 30 | 22 | 8 | 4 |

Trend:

a. Government employees

| | ----- A lot/ some | | | ----- Little/ none | | | No opinion |
|----------|-------------------|-------|------|--------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | A lot | Some | NET | Little | None | |
| 10/27/11 | 79 | 38 | 41 | 21 | 14 | 6 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 85 | 43 | 41 | 14 | 12 | 2 | 2 |

b. Teachers

| | ----- A lot/ some | | | ----- Little/ none | | | No opinion |
|----------|-------------------|-------|------|--------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | A lot | Some | NET | Little | None | |
| 10/27/11 | 29 | 6 | 23 | 70 | 31 | 38 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 40 | 12 | 28 | 57 | 29 | 28 | 3 |

c. Afghan National Army (ANA)

| | ----- A lot/ some | | | ----- Little/ none | | | No opinion |
|----------|-------------------|-------|------|--------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | A lot | Some | NET | Little | None | |
| 10/27/11 | 34 | 9 | 25 | 63 | 28 | 35 | 3 |
| 11/14/10 | 42 | 12 | 30 | 53 | 31 | 22 | 6 |

d. Afghan National Police (ANP)

| | ----- A lot/ some | | | ----- Little/ none | | | No opinion |
|----------|-------------------|-------|------|--------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | A lot | Some | NET | Little | None | |
| 10/27/11 | 53 | 18 | 35 | 45 | 27 | 18 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 60 | 22 | 38 | 37 | 26 | 10 | 3 |

e-h. No trend.

42. Do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area are entirely honest, mostly honest, mostly corrupt or entirely corrupt?

| | ----- NET | Honest Entirely | ----- Mostly | ----- NET | Corrupt Mostly | ----- Entirely | No opinion |
|----------|--------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| 10/27/11 | 76 | 21 | 55 | 22 | 18 | 4 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 77 | 21 | 56 | 19 | 17 | 3 | 3 |

43. In the last year, would you say the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area have become more honest, remained about the same, or become more corrupt?

| | More honest | Same | More corrupt | No opinion |
|----------|-------------|------|--------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 30 | 57 | 11 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 27 | 61 | 8 | 4 |

44. What about the court system, do you think members of the judiciary in this area are entirely honest, mostly honest, mostly corrupt or entirely corrupt?

| | ----- NET | Honest Entirely | ----- Mostly | ----- NET | Corrupt Mostly | ----- Entirely | No opinion |
|----------|--------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| 10/27/11 | 57 | 16 | 41 | 40 | 30 | 10 | 3 |

45. And in the last year, would you say the members of the judiciary in this area have become more honest, remained about the same or become more corrupt?

| | More honest | Same | More corrupt | No opinion |
|----------|-------------|------|--------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 21 | 53 | 22 | 4 |

46. Thinking about the duties and responsibilities of each of the following groups that I read out, please tell me if you think the police should be paid more, less, or the same as these groups? Afghan National Police (ANP) should be paid more, paid less, or paid the same as [insert group]

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | More | Same | Less | No opinion |
|--|------|------|------|------------|
| a. Teachers | 55 | 18 | 26 | 1 |
| b. Doctors | 43 | 20 | 35 | 1 |
| c. Army (ANA) | 28 | 37 | 34 | 1 |
| d. Other government workers in general | 44 | 27 | 27 | 2 |

Trend:

a. Teachers

| | More | Same | Less | No opinion |
|----------|------|------|------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 55 | 18 | 26 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 63 | 14 | 22 | 2 |

b. Doctors

| | More | Same | Less | No opinion |
|----------|------|------|------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 43 | 20 | 35 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 44 | 20 | 34 | 2 |

c. Army (ANA)

| | More | Same | Less | No opinion |
|----------|------|------|------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 28 | 37 | 34 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 36 | 34 | 27 | 3 |

d. Other government workers in general

| | More | Same | Less | No opinion |
|----------|------|------|------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 44 | 27 | 27 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 44 | 27 | 25 | 4 |

47a. If the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area were better paid by the government, to what extent do you think that would reduce the possibility of corruption within their ranks – a great deal, somewhat, not so much or not at all?

| | NET | Would reduce Great deal | Smewhat | NET | Would not reduce Not so much | Not at all | No opinion |
|----------|-----|----------------------------|---------|-----|---------------------------------|------------|---------------|
| 10/27/11 | 77 | 39 | 38 | 21 | 15 | 6 | 2 |
| 11/14/10 | 74 | 38 | 36 | 22 | 15 | 8 | 4 |

47b. Do you think that corruption in your area is a bigger problem among the Afghan National Police (ANP) or the courts that enforce justice?

| | ANP forces | Courts | No opinion |
|----------|------------|--------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 34 | 62 | 4 |
| 11/14/10 | 36 | 57 | 7 |

48a. Do you think that when performing their duties Afghan National Police (ANP) officers in your area are partial in favour of people of their tribe (Quawm), or do you think they are not partial in favour of people of their tribe?

| | Partial | Not partial | No opinion |
|----------|---------|-------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 54 | 42 | 4 |
| 11/14/10 | 55 | 41 | 4 |
| 7/21/09 | 51 | 45 | 9 |

48b. And do you think that when recruiting new Afghan National Police cadets, high-ranking police officers are partial in favour of their tribe (Qawm) or do you think they are not partial in favour of their tribe?

| | Partial | Not partial | No opinion |
|----------|---------|-------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 35 | 56 | 9 |
| 11/14/10 | 38 | 54 | 9 |
| 7/21/09 | 36 | 52 | 12 |

49. Have you ever personally experienced a situation in which the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area refused to investigate, arrest, charge or prosecute a person because of that person's family relations to a police officer or government official, or has that not happened to you?

| | Yes | No | No opinion |
|-----------|-----|----|------------|
| 10/27/11* | 27 | 69 | 4 |
| 11/14/10 | 25 | 71 | 4 |

*"or has that not happened to you" added

50. Imagine that you have a complaint about an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer. Do you think filing a report would make your situation better, have no effect, or make your situation worse?

| | Better | No effect | Worse | No opinion |
|----------|--------|-----------|-------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 37 | 45 | 14 | 4 |
| 11/14/10 | 41 | 43 | 11 | 5 |

51. Excuse me for asking this, but have you or any member of your household been a victim of a crime in the past year, or not?

| | Yes | No | No opinion |
|----------|-----|----|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 18 | 81 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 15 | 84 | 2 |

52a. (IF VICTIM OF CRIME) What kind of a crime was that?

| | --- Mentions --- | | |
|---|------------------|-----|-----|
| | '11 | '10 | '09 |
| Traffic accidents | 26 | 24 | 11 |
| Offences related to land ownership and rights | 17 | 19 | 11 |
| Theft/robbery/burglary | 14 | 21 | 61 |
| Assaults and threats | 10 | 10 | 9 |
| Kidnapping | 9 | 8 | 4 |
| Sexual offences | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| Accidents related to military fighting | 4 | 6 | 4 |
| Extortion/forced payment of bribes | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Drug related crimes | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| Murder | 3 | NA | NA |
| Domestic violence against women | 3 | NA | NA |
| Other | 0 | * | 0 |
| No opinion | 2 | 4 | 1 |

52b. (IF VICTIM OF CRIME) Have you reported it to the police, or not?

| | Yes | No | No opinion |
|-----------------|-----|----|------------|
| 10/27/11* | 58 | 37 | 5 |
| 11/14/10 | 58 | 37 | 5 |
| 7/21/09 | 58 | 41 | 1 |
| *"or not" added | | | |

52c. (IF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE) Would you say that the police addressed the issue adequately, or addressed the issue inadequately?

| | Adequately | Inadequately | No opinion |
|----------|------------|--------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 59 | 40 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 56 | 43 | 1 |
| 7/21/09 | 56 | 43 | 1 |

52d. (IF CRIME NOT REPORTED TO POLICE) Why didn't you report it to the police?

| | --- Mentions --- | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|-----|-----|
| | '11 | '10 | '09 |
| It was not serious | 29 | 29 | 25 |
| Lack of trust | 19 | 19 | 12 |
| Lack of evidence | 16 | 10 | 14 |
| Danger or fear of retaliation | 15 | 10 | 14 |
| Bias in favour of the other party | 5 | 10 | 6 |
| Didn't know where to report it | 4 | 11 | 6 |
| Other | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| No opinion | 11 | 11 | 23 |

53. If a male member of your family was interested in joining the Afghan National Police (ANP) forces in your area, would you strongly support this, somewhat support this, not really support this, or not support this at all?

| | ----- Support ----- | | | ----- Not Support ----- | | | No opinion |
|----------|---------------------|----------|--------|-------------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | NET | Strongly | Smwhat | NET | Not really | Not at all | |
| 10/27/11 | 82 | 40 | 42 | 18 | 10 | 8 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 80 | 42 | 37 | 19 | 12 | 8 | 1 |

54. If a female member of your family was interested in joining the Afghan National Police (ANP) forces in your area, would you strongly support this, somewhat support this, not really support this, or not support this at all?

| | ----- Support ----- | | | ----- Not Support ----- | | | No opinion |
|----------|---------------------|----------|--------|-------------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | NET | Strongly | Smwhat | NET | Not really | Not at all | |
| 10/27/11 | 55 | 20 | 35 | 43 | 14 | 29 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 51 | 20 | 30 | 47 | 15 | 31 | 3 |

55. In general, do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea to have female police officers in your community?

| | Good | Bad | No opinion |
|----------|------|-----|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 53 | 42 | 5 |
| 11/14/10 | 45 | 42 | 13 |

56a. (IF GOOD IDEA) Why do you say that it is a good idea?

| | - Mentions - | '11 | '10 |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|-----|-----|
| For searching females | | 41 | 50 |
| Need of society | | 20 | 14 |
| Serve the country | | 10 | 5 |
| They have the right to work | | 9 | 11 |
| Security will improve | | 8 | 9 |
| To defend females | | 6 | 3 |
| They have equal rights with men | | 3 | 4 |
| Women do their job better than men* | | 1 | 2 |
| No opinion | | 1 | 4 |
| *11/14/10: "They perform better" | | | |

56b. (IF BAD IDEA) Why do you say that it is a bad idea?

| | - Mentions - | |
|--|--------------|-----|
| | '11 | '10 |
| Women shouldn't work NET | 57 | 55 |
| They should not work out of home | 21 | 25 |
| Against religion | 16 | 10 |
| Against the culture | 13 | 12 |
| Their families do not allow* | 7 | 3 |
| Women must be at home | NA | 6 |
| People will dislike them | 11 | 10 |
| It is not applicable in the current security situation | 10 | 11 |
| Women should not be given too much freedom | 10 | 2 |
| They cannot perform their duty well | 7 | 15 |
| People don't trust ANP | * | NA |
| No opinion | 3 | 8 |

*11/14/10: "Their families would not allow"

57. For each of the following, please tell me if you would be much more likely, somewhat more likely, somewhat less likely or much less likely to do each of the following:

10/27/11 - Summary table

| | --- More likely --- | | --- Less likely --- | | | No op. | |
|---|---------------------|------|---------------------|-----|--------|--------|------|
| | NET | Much | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | | Much |
| a. Report a crime if the police officer was female | 70 | 29 | 41 | 29 | 17 | 12 | 1 |
| b. Trust a female officer to fairly resolve a crime | 58 | 22 | 36 | 40 | 25 | 15 | 2 |

58. Afghan Local Police (ALP) are community volunteers who are paid to protect their village from insurgents and criminals. Are there any such local police forces in your area?

| | Yes | No | No opinion |
|----------|-----|----|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 31 | 65 | 4 |

59. (IF ALP IN AREA) Have the Afghan Local Police (ALP) improved security in this area, had no impact on security, or made security worse?

| | Improved | No impact | Worse | No opinion |
|----------|----------|-----------|-------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 68 | 23 | 7 | 2 |

60. Do you think that local watch groups of citizens, supported by the Afghan National Police (ANP), will improve security in the area, have no impact on security, or make it worse?

| | Improve | No impact | Make worse | No opinion |
|----------|---------|-----------|------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 54 | 32 | 9 | 5 |
| 11/14/10 | 51 | 33 | 8 | 8 |
| 7/21/09 | 54 | 19 | 18 | 9 |

61. (IF THINKS WATCH GROUPS WILL IMPROVE SECURITY) How willing are you to become a member of such a community group of citizens, if such would be established? Are you very willing, somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling or very unwilling?

| | ---- Willing ---- | | | ---- Unwilling ---- | | | No opinion |
|----------|-------------------|------|--------|---------------------|--------|------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Very | |
| 10/27/11 | 77 | 38 | 39 | 22 | 12 | 10 | 1 |
| 11/14/10 | 80 | 44 | 36 | 18 | 10 | 9 | 2 |
| 7/21/09 | 81 | 54 | 28 | 18 | 8 | 10 | 1 |

62. Do you think that efforts to include more women in local watch groups of citizens, supported by the Afghan National Police (ANP), will improve security in the area, have no impact on security, or make it worse?

| | Improve | No impact | Make worse | No opinion |
|----------|---------|-----------|------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 49 | 35 | 12 | 4 |

63. Have police community partnerships been established in this area?

| | Yes | No | No opinion |
|-----------|-----|----|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 27 | 66 | 8 |
| 11/14/10* | 19 | 75 | 6 |

*?Have such local self-defence groups been established in this area??"

64. (IF COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS ESTABLISHED) Have these police community partnerships improved security in this area, had no impact on security, or made security worse?

| | Improved | No impact | Made worse | No opinion |
|-----------|----------|-----------|------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 80 | 15 | 4 | 1 |
| 11/14/10* | 61 | 28 | 9 | 2 |

*?Has this group improved security in this area, had no impact on security, or made security worse??"

65. Do you think that regular public meetings with the Afghan National Police (ANP) where people can share their concerns would improve security in the area, have no impact, or make security worse?

| | Improve | No impact | Make worse | No opinion |
|-----------|---------|-----------|------------|------------|
| 10/27/11* | 66 | 26 | 4 | 4 |
| 11/14/10 | 54 | 37 | 5 | 5 |
| 7/21/09 | 65 | 17 | 13 | 5 |

*"regular" added

66. (IF THINKS MEETINGS WILL IMPROVE SECURITY) How willing are you to take part in such public meetings with the Afghan National Police (ANP)? Are you very willing, somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling or very unwilling?

| | Willing | | Unwilling | | | No opinion |
|----------|---------|------|-----------|-----|---------|------------|
| | NET | Very | Smewhat | NET | Smewhat | Very |
| 10/27/11 | 80 | 41 | 38 | 20 | 12 | 8 |
| 11/14/10 | 78 | 42 | 36 | 20 | 12 | 8 |
| 7/21/09 | 82 | 52 | 30 | 17 | 8 | 9 |

67. Have such public meetings with the Afghan National Police (ANP) occurred in this area in the past year, or not?

| | Yes | No | No opinion |
|----------|-----|----|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 22 | 71 | 8 |

68. (IF PUBLIC MEETING WITH THE ANP OCCURRED IN PAST YEAR) In the past year, how many public meetings with the Afghan National Police (ANP) have been held in this area?

| | 1-2 meetings | 3-5 meetings | 6+ meetings | No opinion |
|----------|--------------|--------------|-------------|------------|
| 10/27/11 | 56 | 29 | 4 | 11 |

67/68 NET:

| | Meetings held | | | | | No mtgs. held | No op. |
|----------|---------------|-----|-----|----|--------|---------------|--------|
| | NET | 1-2 | 3-5 | 6+ | No op. | held | op. |
| 10/27/11 | 22 | 12 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 71 | 8 |

69. How much longer should the international military forces remain in Afghanistan? Should they leave...?

| | - Total - |
|--|-----------|
| | '11 |
| Now | 24 |
| In 2014 as in the transition plan (Enteegal) | 21 |
| Once the Taliban has been defeated | 23 |
| Once Afghan military (ANA) and police (ANP) have been trained to fight the insurgency without international assistance | 24 |
| They should remain indefinitely on military bases in Afghanistan | 6 |
| Other (vol.) | 0 |
| No opinion | 2 |

70. How long do you think it will take to train the Afghan National Police (ANP) to be ready to take over all responsibilities from international forces for police duties?

| | Within Ready now | Within 1 year | Within 2-3 years | Never 3+ years | Other (vol.) | 00 (vol.) | No op. |
|----------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------|
| 10/27/11 | 21 | 26 | 28 | 18 | 4 | 0 | 3 |

71. To what extent do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) are presently prepared to perform their duties without assistance from international forces – are they now prepared to perform all, some, a few, or none of their duties without this assistance?

| | ---- NET | All/ All | some/ Some | ---- NET | A few/ A few | none/ None | --- opinion | No opinion |
|----------|-------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| 10/27/11 | 61 | 20 | 41 | 38 | 28 | 10 | 2 | |

72. If you were to recommend one area in which Afghan National Police (ANP) should receive more training, what would you recommend?

| | - Mentions - | '11 | '10* |
|---|--------------|-----|------|
| General police skills | 42 | 48 | |
| Anti-corruption skills | 22 | 21 | |
| Anti-drug trafficking skills | 14 | 12 | |
| Basic skills (literacy, math, etc.) | 13 | 12 | |
| Police do not need more training (vol.) | 5 | 1 | |
| General training | NA | 1 | |
| Good equipment | * | * | |
| Police must be smart | NA | * | |
| Police must know the law | * | * | |
| Establishing better security | * | * | |
| Behaviour with the people | * | NA | |
| Fighting against AGE | * | “ | |
| No opinion | 3 | 5 | |

*Only those who said they think public meetings will improve security in their area (54 per cent of the sample) were asked this question.

73. If you were to recommend providing Afghan National Police (ANP) with more equipment, what one kind of equipment do you think they need most?

| | - Mentions - | |
|--|--------------|------|
| | ‘11 | ‘10* |
| Weapons | 40 | 35 |
| Vehicles (cars, trucks, buses, planes, etc.) | 34 | 34 |
| Communication equipment (phones, radios, etc.) | 12 | 17 |
| Computers | 7 | 5 |
| Police do not need more equipment (vol.) | 3 | 2 |
| They need to be equipped with modern weapons | NA | 1 |
| Discipline | “ | * |
| Salary raise | * | * |
| Good faith | NA | * |
| Education | * | NA |
| Increase number of police | * | “ |
| No opinion | 3 | 6 |

*Only those who said they think public meetings will improve security in their area (54 per cent of the sample) were asked this question.

74. In order to improve the leadership of the Afghan National Police (ANP), how important are each of the following actions? Do you believe it is very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant or not at all important that the Afghan National Police (ANP) [ITEM]?

| | ---- Important | | ---- Unimportant | | ---- No | | |
|--|----------------|------|------------------|-----|---------|------------|-----|
| | NET | Very | Smwhat | NET | Smwhat | Not at all | op. |
| a. Rotate ANP leaders from their post in a region to a different region frequently | 88 | 48 | 40 | 11 | 8 | 3 | 2 |
| b. Appoint more female leaders in the ANP | 63 | 28 | 35 | 36 | 24 | 12 | 1 |
| c. Provide training for ANP leaders in countries outside of Afghanistan | 77 | 43 | 34 | 21 | 16 | 5 | 2 |
| d. Conduct performance evaluations of ANP leaders | 81 | 45 | 36 | 17 | 14 | 3 | 1 |
| e. Make ANP leaders more accessible to the public | 82 | 46 | 35 | 17 | 14 | 3 | 1 |

Appendix C: Statistical Modelling

A regression is a form of statistical modelling that measures the independent strength of the relationship between each predictor with the posited outcome, known as the dependent variable (DV). While it does not establish causality, a regression reveals the strength of the relationship between a predictor (e.g., strength of police presence) and the dependent variable (e.g., favourable ratings of the police), with all other possible predictors in the model held constant.

Many variables may be related to a given outcome. A regression identifies which of them explain the most unique variance in the dependent variable, after adjusting for these other relationships. Below we describe the variables used in the regression analyses reported in this study, followed by details of the regression results.

Key Variable Definitions

Distance to ANP (Q1c): A continuous variable reflecting how far in minutes/hours the respondent's house is from an ANP station with 1 = 0 to 5 minutes, 2 = 6 to 15 minutes, 3 = 16 to 30 minutes, 4 = 31-60 minutes, 5 = 1 to 3 hours, and 6 = more than 3 hours ($M = 3.29$, $SD = 1.24$).

Living conditions index (Q5a-g): A composite measure of the respondent's current living conditions. Created by recoding respondents' ratings of their living conditions overall, their security from crime and violence, the availability of jobs/economic opportunities, the roads, bridges, and other infrastructure, their freedom of movement, their security from the Taliban, and women's rights in their area, with a scale of 1 = very bad to 4 = very good. Responses to these seven items were then averaged to form the index ($\alpha = .68$), which ranges from 1 (indicating very bad ratings on all seven local condition items) to 4 (indicating very good ratings on all seven local condition items). The average index value is $M = 2.69$, $SD = .54$.

Opinion of government institutions index (Q7a-c, Q7f): A composite measure of the respondent's opinion of government institutions (except for the police) was computed by recoding respondents' opinion of the central government, the provincial/district government, the courts and the ANA to be on scales from 1 = very unfavourable to 4 = very favourable. Responses to these four items were then averaged to form an index ($\alpha = .64$), which ranges from 1 (indicating a very unfavourable view of all government institutions) to 4 (indicating a very favourable view of all government institutions). The average index value is $M = 2.98$, $SD = .59$.

Opinion of ANP (Q7d): A continuous variable reflecting the respondent's opinion of the ANP, with 1 = very unfavourable and 4 = very favourable ($M = 3.08$, $SD = .83$).

Strength of government presence index (Q8a-c, Q8f): A composite measure of how strong of a presence government institutions (excluding the police) have in the respondent's area was computed by recoding the strength of the presence of the central government, the provincial/district government, the courts and the ANA to be on scales from 1 = no

significant presence at all to 4 = very strong presence. Responses to these four items were then averaged to form an index ($\alpha = .67$), which ranges from 1 (indicating that all four government institutions have no significant presence in the respondent's area) to 4 (indicating that all four government institutions have a very strong presence in the respondent's area). The average index value is $M = 2.87$, $SD = .66$.

Strength of ANP presence (Q8d): A continuous variable reflecting how strong of a presence the respondent feels the ANP has in their area, with 1 = no significant presence at all and 4 = very strong presence ($M = 3.08$, $SD = .86$).

ANP ensures security (Q10a, Q10b): A binary variable that is set to 1 for respondents who mentioned that the ANP ensures security in their area (either first or second) and 0 for respondents who did not mention the ANP as the first or second entity that ensures security in their area.

Feelings of safety index (Q11a-d): A composite measure reflecting overall perceptions of safety was computed by recoding how safe respondents indicated feeling when they walk alone in their area during the day and stay alone at home after dark, as well as how safe they feel from the risk of roadside bombs and from the risk of suicide attacks on scales from 1 = very unsafe to 4 = very safe. Responses to these four items were then averaged to form an index ($\alpha = .72$), which ranges from 1 (indicating that the respondent feels very unsafe in all situations tested) to 4 (indicating that the respondent feels very safe in all situations tested). The average index value is $M = 2.79$, $SD = .68$).

Crime level (Q12a): A continuous variable reflecting the level of crime in the respondents' area from 1 = low crime to 3 = high crime ($M = 1.55$, $SD = .63$).

Change in crime level in past year (Q12b): A continuous variable reflecting how crime has changed in the respondent's area with 1 = never had any crime in this area, 2 = crime has decreased since last year, 3 = crime has stayed the same since last year and 4 = crime has increased since last year ($M = 2.50$, $SD = .86$).

Informed about ANP (Q14a): A continuous variable reflecting how much information the respondent feels they have about ANP activities in their area with 1 = little to no information and 4 = a great deal of information ($M = 2.74$, $SD = .97$).

Confidence in ANP (Q15a): A continuous variable reflecting respondents' confidence in the ANP, with 1 = no confidence at all and 4 = a great deal of confidence ($M = 2.98$, $SD = .86$).

ANP effectiveness/capabilities index (Q16a-e, Q31a-e, Q32a-d): A composite measure reflecting how effective/capable the respondent feels the ANP is in their area. Computed by recoding how effective the respondent feels the ANP in their area is at resolving local crime, resolving traffic accidents, preventing terrorist attacks, resolving land disputes, keeping the Taliban out of the area, preventing crime, responding to complaints of crime, bringing to justice those responsible for crimes that have been committed, fighting insurgents and maintaining law and order on scales from 1 = very ineffective to 4 = very effective, and

how capable the respondent says the ANP is in coping with small crimes and offences, big organized crime, corruption and insurgency on scales from 1 = very incapable to 4 = very capable. Responses to these 14 items were then averaged to form the index ($\alpha = .89$), which ranges from 1 (indicating the respondent feels the ANP is very ineffective and incapable at all 14 tasks) to 4 (indicating that the respondent feels the ANP is very effective and capable at all 14 tasks). The average index value is $M = 2.98$, $SD = .56$.

Respect for the ANP (Q17a): A continuous variable reflecting how much respect the respondent has for the ANP in their area, with 1 = no respect at all and 4 = a great deal of respect ($M = 3.08$, $SD = .82$).

Prestige of the ANP (Q18): A continuous variable reflecting how prestigious the respondent feels it is to be an ANP officer, with 1 = no prestige at all and 4 = a great deal of prestige ($M = 3.02$, $SD = .88$).

ANP performance past year (Q19a): A continuous variable reflecting whether the respondent feels the ANP performance in their area has gotten worse, stayed the same, or gotten better, with 1 = gotten worse, 2 = stayed the same and 3 = gotten better ($M = 2.37$, $SD = .64$).

Interacted with ANP (Q21): A binary variable that is set to 1 for people who have interacted with the ANP and 0 for everyone else.

Positivity of interactions with ANP (Q21, Q22c): A continuous variable indicating how positive the respondent's last interaction with the police was on a scale from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive). Set to the mean ($M = 3.97$, $SD = .52$) for those who have not interacted with the police in the past year, which is captured by the previous variable.

ANP activity index (Q27a-i): A composite measure indicating how involved the ANP in the area are in a variety of tasks including fighting insurgents, poppy eradication, fighting organized crime, preventing inter-ethnic, inter-tribal violence, fighting narcotics trade, fighting corruption, investigating routine crime, preventing violence against women, and building partnerships with community groups. Responses to these nine items were recoded so that 1 = involved in this activity hardly at all to 4 = involved in this activity a great deal. They were then averaged to form the index ($\alpha = .86$), which ranges from 1 (indicating that the respondent says the ANP in their area is hardly involved in any of the nine activities) to 4 (indicating that the respondent says the ANP in their area is involved a great deal in all of the nine activities). The average index value is $M = 2.78$, $SD = .66$.

ANP mostly fighting crime (Q29): A binary variable that is set to 1 for respondents who indicate that the ANP in their area are primarily performing law enforcing tasks and 0 for those who say the ANP are primarily performing counterinsurgency tasks or both.

ANP mostly fighting insurgents (Q29): A binary variable that is set to 1 for respondents who indicate that the ANP in their area are primarily working as a counterinsurgency force and 0 for those who say the ANP are primarily fighting crime or doing both tasks.

ANP knowledge/training index (Q30a, Q33a-d, f-g): A composite measure indicating

the extent to which the respondent feels the ANP in their area are knowledgeable/well-trained. Computed by recoding items assessing how knowledgeable the ANP is about their duties to enforce the law, how well they understand the law, how well they understand what their duties are, how well trained they are to perform their duties, how well provided they are with the equipment they need, how knowledgeable they are about the needs of the community and how knowledgeable they are about human rights in general on scales from 1 = not at all knowledgeable / not well at all to 4 = very knowledgeable / very well. Responses to these seven items were then averaged to form the index ($\alpha = .83$), which ranges from 1 (indicating that the respondent says the ANP is not at all knowledgeable/well-trained on any of the items) to 4 (indicating that the respondent says the ANP is very knowledgeable/well-trained on all seven items). The average index value is $M = 2.95$, $SD = .59$.

ANP performance without assistance (Q33e): A continuous variable reflecting how well the respondent thinks the ANP can perform their duties without assistance from international forces on a scale from 1 = not well at all to 4 = very well ($M = 2.76$, $SD = .90$).

ANP fairness (Q36): A continuous variable reflecting how fair the respondent thinks the ANP is on a scale from 1 = very unfair to 4 = very fair ($M = 3.04$, $SD = .80$).

ANP good behaviours index (Q37a-h): A composite measure indicating how often the respondent feels that the ANP engages in positive behaviours. Responses to items measuring how often the ANP: treat everyone equally, respect people's rights, try to help people with their problems, explain the reasons for their actions, share the values of most people in the community, respond to community concerns, admit their mistakes and correct them and treat women with proper respect were recoded so that 1 = rarely and 4 = always. Responses to these eight items were then averaged to form the index ($\alpha = .84$), which ranges from 1 (indicating that the respondent says the ANP in their area rarely engages in any of the eight positive behaviours) to 4 (indicating that the respondent says the ANP always engages in all eight of the positive behaviours). The average index value is $M = 2.81$, $SD = .62$.

Index of ANP misconduct (Q38b-j): An additive index counting how many bad behaviours the respondent reports has happened to them or a family member when interacting with the ANP. Behaviours assessed include: being stopped by ANP on the street without good reason, being addressed by the ANP with insulting language, being asked by an ANP officer to provide food, being asked by an ANP officer for money or other payment in order to avoid arrest or a fine, being asked by an ANP officer for money or other payment in order to protect their business or home, being subjected to excessive physical force by the ANP, being falsely accused by the ANP of a minor wrongdoing, being falsely accused by the ANP of a major wrongdoing, and being forced by an ANP officer to participate in a crime against their will. The index ranges from 0 (indicating that the respondent has not experienced any of these bad ANP behaviours) to 9 (indicating that the respondent has experienced all of these bad ANP behaviours). The average index value is $M = 1.51$, $SD = 1.92$.

ANP drug use index (Q39a-b): An additive index where 0 indicates that the respondent or someone in their household has not seen a member of the ANP use drugs/narcotics or participate in the drugs/narcotics trade, 1 indicates that the respondent or someone in their household has seen a member of the ANP do one of those two behaviours and 2 indicates that the respondent or someone in their household has both seen a member of the ANP

use drugs/narcotics and participate in the drugs/narcotics trade. The average index value is $M = .49$, $SD = .70$.

Define bribery as corruption (Q40): A binary variable that is set to 1 for respondents who define money or other payment in exchange for favourable treatment by a government representative as corruption, and set to 0 for everyone else.

Government corruption level index (Q41a, Q41c, Q41f-h): A composite measure indicating how much corruption the respondent sees in five government institutions including among government employees, in the ANA, in the National Directorate of Security, in the government court system and in the prison system. Responses from these five items were recoded, so that 1 = no corruption and 4 = a lot of corruption, and combined into an index ($\alpha = .66$). The index ranges from 1 (indicating no corruption in any of the five government groups tested) to 4 (indicating a lot of corruption in all five of the government groups tested), and averaged $M = 2.73$, $SD = .62$.

Corruption level among ANP (Q41d): A continuous variable indicating how much corruption the respondent thinks there is among the ANP, ranging from 1 = no corruption to 4 = a lot of corruption ($M = 2.54$, $SD = 1.00$).

ANP honesty (Q42): A continuous variable reflecting how honest the respondent thinks the ANP in their area are from 1 = entirely corrupt to 4 = entirely honest ($M = 2.96$, $SD = .74$).

ANP is partial to own tribe (Q48a): A binary variable that is set to 1 for respondents who think the ANP in their area are partial in their duties to members of their own tribe, set to 0 for those who say they are not.

ANP refused to investigate (Q49): A binary variable that is set to 1 for respondents who indicated that the ANP refused to investigate, arrest, charge or prosecute a person because of their connections. Set to 0 for those who have not experienced this.

Effect of filing a complaint (Q50): A continuous variable reflecting what the respondent thinks would be the outcome if they filed a complaint about an ANP officer where 1 = make the situation worse, 2 = have no effect and 3 = make the situation better ($M = 2.24$, $SD = .69$).

Victim of crime (Q51): A binary variable that is set to 1 for respondents who indicate that they or a member of their household has been a victim of a crime in the past year and 0 for those who say they have not.

Community watch in area (Q63): A binary variable set to 1 if the respondent indicates that watch groups have been set up in the area, 0 for those who say they have not been set up in the area.

Public meetings with ANP in area (Q67): A binary variable that is set to 1 for respondents who indicate that public meetings with the ANP have occurred in their area in the past year and 0 for those who say these meetings have not taken place in their area.

ANP prepared to perform their duties (Q71): A continuous variable reflecting the extent to which respondents feel the ANP can perform their duties without the assistance

of international forces, ranging from 1 = they aren't ready to perform any duties without assistance to 4 = they are ready to perform all of their duties without assistance ($M = 2.72$, $SD = .89$).

Demographic variables: In addition to the variables described above, the following demographic variables were included in the regression models described below: gender, age, metro status, ethnicity, income, whether or not there is a police officer in the family, education, unemployment and region.

Regression results

Results of the regression analyses are summarized in the tables below. For simplicity, only statistically significant predictors are displayed.

DV= Opinion of ANP, $R^2 = .41$

| Significant predictors | Beta | t | Sig. |
|--|------|-------|------|
| Opinion of government institutions index | .29 | 22.35 | .00 |
| Strength of ANP presence | .18 | 14.48 | .00 |
| ANP effectiveness/capabilities index | .14 | 8.18 | .00 |
| Gender: Male | -.06 | 4.91 | .00 |
| Region: South Central | -.06 | 4.22 | .00 |
| Region: South West | -.06 | 4.21 | .00 |
| Knowledge/training index | .06 | 3.25 | .00 |
| Index of ANP misconduct | -.04 | 3.02 | .00 |
| ANP honesty | .04 | 2.90 | .00 |
| Ethnicity: Tajik | -.04 | 2.50 | .01 |
| Informed about ANP | -.03 | 2.57 | .01 |
| Living conditions index | .03 | 2.68 | .01 |
| Respect for the ANP | .03 | 2.39 | .02 |
| Metro status: Rural | .03 | 2.20 | .03 |
| Ethnicity: Pashtun | -.03 | 2.06 | .04 |
| Corruption level among ANP | -.03 | 1.99 | .05 |
| Effect of filing a complaint | -.02 | 2.09 | .04 |

DV = Confidence in ANP, $R^2 = .48$

| Significant predictors | Beta | t | Sig. |
|--------------------------------------|------|-------|------|
| Respect for the ANP | .23 | 17.23 | .00 |
| Informed about ANP | .16 | 15.18 | .00 |
| Prestige of the ANP | .15 | 11.45 | .00 |
| ANP effectiveness/capabilities index | .11 | 6.70 | .00 |
| ANP honesty | .06 | 4.96 | .00 |
| ANP fairness | .06 | 4.78 | .00 |
| Corruption level among ANP | -.05 | 4.38 | .00 |

| | | | |
|--|------|------|-----|
| Region: East | .05 | 3.77 | .00 |
| Feelings of safety index | .04 | 3.94 | .00 |
| ANP performance past year | .04 | 3.53 | .00 |
| ANP drug use index | -.04 | 3.34 | .00 |
| Region: Kabul | -.04 | 2.83 | .01 |
| Ethnicity: Tajik | .04 | 2.81 | .01 |
| Crime level | -.03 | 3.07 | .00 |
| ANP ensures security | .03 | 2.73 | .01 |
| Effect of filing a complaint | .03 | 2.62 | .01 |
| Region: South West | -.03 | 2.30 | .03 |
| Region: South Central | -.03 | 2.21 | .03 |
| Opinion of government institutions index | .03 | 2.01 | .05 |
| Positivity of interactions with ANP | .02 | 2.36 | .02 |
| Region: Central/Hazarjat | -.02 | 2.24 | .03 |

DV = Effectiveness/Capabilities Index, R² = .68

| Significant predictors | Beta | t | Sig |
|--|------|-------|-----|
| Knowledge-training index | .33 | 26.80 | .00 |
| ANP activities index | .17 | 19.82 | .00 |
| ANP good behaviours index | .13 | 12.46 | .00 |
| Feelings of safety index | .09 | 10.59 | .00 |
| Opinion of government institutions index | .08 | 8.18 | .00 |
| Respect for the ANP | .08 | 7.71 | .00 |
| Region: East | -.07 | 7.60 | .00 |
| Index of ANP misconduct | -.06 | 6.53 | .00 |
| Region: West | -.05 | 6.04 | .00 |
| ANP performance past year | .05 | 5.74 | .00 |
| Strength of ANP presence | .05 | 5.60 | .00 |
| ANP performance without assistance | .05 | 5.07 | .00 |
| Crime level change | -.04 | 5.62 | .00 |
| Police in Family | .03 | 4.43 | .00 |
| Informed about ANP | -.03 | 3.88 | .00 |
| Government corruption level index | .03 | 3.55 | .00 |
| ANP fairness | .03 | 3.37 | .00 |
| Ethnicity: Uzbek | -.03 | 3.26 | .00 |
| ANP prepared to perform duties | -.02 | 2.56 | .01 |
| ANP honesty | .02 | 2.46 | .01 |
| Distance to ANP | -.02 | 2.28 | .02 |
| ANP ensures security | .02 | 2.18 | .03 |
| ANP refused to investigate | -.02 | 2.02 | .04 |

DV = Corruption level among ANP, R² = .20

| Significant predictors | Beta | t | Sig |
|----------------------------------|------|-------|-----|
| Region: South West | -.16 | 10.74 | .00 |
| Knowledge-training index | -.15 | 9.08 | .00 |
| Index of ANP misconduct | .13 | 9.09 | .00 |
| Region: Kabul | .12 | 7.49 | .00 |
| Region: South Central | -.11 | 7.19 | .00 |
| ANP drug use index | .10 | 7.57 | .00 |
| ANP good behaviours index | -.10 | 6.70 | .00 |
| Metro status: Rural | -.08 | 5.70 | .00 |
| Region: Eastern | -.07 | 5.06 | .00 |
| Define bribery as corruption | .05 | 4.63 | .00 |
| Ethnicity: Pashtun | -.05 | 2.81 | .01 |
| Unemployed | -.04 | 3.01 | .00 |
| ANP performance in the past year | -.04 | 2.84 | .00 |
| Ethnicity: Tajik | -.04 | 2.65 | .01 |
| Crime level | .03 | 2.52 | .01 |
| Gender: Male | .03 | 1.98 | .05 |

DV = Strength of ANP presence, R² = .19

| Significant predictors | Beta | t | Sig |
|----------------------------------|------|-------|-----|
| ANP activity index | .19 | 16.09 | .00 |
| Region: Kabul | .16 | 10.57 | .00 |
| Feelings of safety index | .10 | 7.67 | .00 |
| Distance to ANP station | -.08 | 6.37 | .00 |
| Crime level | -.07 | 5.56 | .00 |
| Region: East | -.07 | 4.42 | .00 |
| Informed about ANP | .06 | 5.04 | .00 |
| ANP performance in the past year | .06 | 4.71 | .00 |
| Public meetings with ANP in area | .05 | 4.32 | .00 |
| Region: South Central | -.06 | 3.79 | .00 |
| Region: South West | -.06 | 3.69 | .00 |
| Unemployed | -.04 | 3.36 | .00 |
| Gender: Male | -.03 | 2.16 | .03 |
| Region: West | -.04 | 2.62 | .01 |
| Change in crime level | -.03 | 2.78 | .01 |
| Community watch in area | .03 | 2.32 | .02 |

Appendix D: Full Questionnaire

This appendix reproduces the full, formatted questionnaire for the 2011 UNDP Police Perception survey in Afghanistan.

SURVEY MANAGEMENT SECTION

M-1. Respondent Identification Number: _ _ _ _ _

M-2. Intentional Blank

M-3. Wave Number 3

M-4. Region

1. Central/Kabul
2. Eastern
3. South Central
4. South Western
5. Western
6. Northern
7. Central/Hazarjat

M-5. Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed: _ _ _ _ _

M-6. Geographic Code

1. Villages
2. Towns
3. City
4. Metro (Kabul)

M-7. Province

1. Kabul
2. Kapisa
3. Parwan
4. Wardak
5. Logar
6. Ghazni
7. Paktia
8. Paktika
9. Khost
10. Ningarhar
11. Laghman
12. Kunar
13. Nooristan
14. Badakhshan
15. Takhar

16. Baghlan
17. Kunduz
18. Balkh
19. Samangan
20. Juzjan
21. Sar-i-Pul
22. Faryab
23. Badghis
24. Herat
25. Farah
26. Nimroz
27. Helmand
28. Kandahar
29. Zabul
30. Uruzghan
31. Ghor
32. Bamyan
33. Panjshir
34. Dehkondi

M-8. Year of Interview: 2011

M-9. Month of Interview

1. January
2. February
3. March
4. April
5. May
6. June
7. July
8. August
9. September
10. October
11. November
12. December

M-10. Date of Interview: __ __

M-11. Day of Week of Interview

1. Friday
2. Saturday
3. Sunday
4. Monday
5. Tuesday
6. Wednesday
7. Thursday

M-12. Interviewer Code: _____

M-13. Interview Completed on the ...

1. First Contact
2. Second Contact
3. Third Contact

M-14. Supervisor Code: _____

M-15. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Began: ____ : ____

(Record Time Began Starting With Q-1)

M-16. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Ended: ____ : ____

(Fill in all four data positions)

M-17. Record Length of Interview in Minutes: _____

M-18. Date Formatted Field: SEP 2011

M-19. Keypuncher Code ____

M-20. Language of Interview

1. Pashto
2. Dari
3. Other
4. Pashaye
5. Shari
6. Uzbek
7. Turkmen

M-21. Coder Code ____

RECORD THE TIME THE ACTUAL INTERVIEW BEGUN AT M-15

AND USE A 24 HOUR CLOCK (14:24, for 2:24 pm)

Warm Up Questions

Q-1. In terms of public services, tell me, how far in minutes/hours from your house are the following things?

| | 0-5 min | 6-15 min | 16-30 min | 31-60 min | 1-3 hours | 3+ hours | Ref. | DK |
|---|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|------|----|
| a) District/nahia government office | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 9 |
| b) Government court | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 9 |
| c) Afghan National Police (ANP) station | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 9 |

General Questions

Q-2. Do you think that things in our country are generally going in the right direction or are things going in the wrong direction?

1. Right
2. Wrong

GO TO Q-3a
SKIP TO Q-4a

-
3. Staying the same, not changing (vol.)
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

SKIP TO Q-5
SKIP TO Q-5
SKIP TO Q-5

Q-3a/b. (Ask if code 1, 'Right Direction' at Q-2) Why do you say things are going in the right direction? Why else? [**Do Not Read Codes to Respondent**]

Write Answer Q-3a: _____

Write Answer Q-3b: _____

| | Q3a | Q3b |
|-------------------------------------|-----|-----|
| Reconstruction | 1 | 1 |
| Good government | 2 | 2 |
| Elections | 3 | 3 |
| Freedom | 4 | 4 |
| Better economy | 5 | 5 |
| Girls' schools | 6 | 6 |
| Better security | 7 | 7 |
| Better police | 8 | 8 |
| Women's rights | 9 | 9 |
| More US/NATO/ISAF forces | 10 | 10 |
| Removal of Taliban | 11 | 11 |
| Disbandment of illegal armed groups | 12 | 12 |
| Telecommunication advances | 13 | 13 |
| More electricity | 14 | 14 |
| Improved health care | 15 | 15 |
| More international aid | 16 | 16 |
| Improved culture | 17 | 17 |
| Decrease in kidnappings | 18 | 18 |
| Provincial councils | 19 | 19 |
| Constitution | 20 | 20 |
| More employment | 21 | 21 |

| | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-----|
| Poppy eradication | 22 | 22 |
| Decrease in administrative corruption | 23 | 23 |
| Unity among Afghans | 24 | 24 |
| Government opposition to foreigners | 25 | 25 |
| Improved education opportunities | 26 | 26 |
| Better army | 27 | 27 |
| Peace & reintegration efforts | 28 | 28 |
| _____ | | |
| 996. Other, specify _____ | 996 | 996 |
| 997. Not Asked | 997 | 997 |
| 998. Refused (vol.) | 998 | 998 |
| 999. Don't know (vol.) | 999 | 999 |

Q-4a/b. (Filtered, if 'Wrong Direction' at Q-2, code 2) Why do you say things are going in the wrong direction? Why else? [Do Not Read Codes to Respondent]

Write Answer Q-4a: _____

Write Answer Q-4b: _____

| | Q4a | Q4b |
|---|-----|-----|
| Insecurity | 1 | 1 |
| Financial problems / Economic situation | 2 | 2 |
| Poppy cultivation | 3 | 3 |
| Terrorism | 4 | 4 |
| Weak government | 5 | 5 |
| Administrative corruption | 6 | 6 |
| Poor reconstruction | 7 | 7 |
| Unemployment | 8 | 8 |
| Kidnappings | 9 | 9 |
| Existence of Anti-government elements | 10 | 10 |
| Interference of foreign countries | 11 | 11 |
| Suicide attacks | 12 | 12 |
| Weak police | 13 | 13 |
| Airstrikes by international forces | 14 | 14 |
| Harassment from foreigners | 15 | 15 |
| Lack of electricity | 16 | 16 |
| Lack of schools | 17 | 17 |
| Lack of disbandment of illegal armed groups | 18 | 18 |
| Lack of shelter | 19 | 19 |

| | | |
|--|-----|-----|
| Lack of women's rights | 20 | 20 |
| Lack of unity | 21 | 21 |
| Crimes | 22 | 22 |
| Lack of law | 23 | 23 |
| Violations of the rights of minorities | 24 | 24 |
| Moral corruption | 25 | 25 |
| Shortage of food | 26 | 26 |
| Shortage of health care | 27 | 27 |
| Lack of water | 28 | 28 |
| Lack of assistance to farmers | 29 | 29 |
| Weak army | 30 | 30 |
| Taliban | 31 | 31 |
| _____ | | |
| 996. Other, specify _____ | 996 | 996 |
| 997. Not Asked | 997 | 997 |
| 998. Refused (vol.) | 998 | 998 |
| 999. Don't know (vol.) | 999 | 999 |

Q-5a-g. (ASK ALL) I would like to ask you about today's conditions in the village/ neighbourhood where you live. How would you rate each of the following: very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?

| | Very good | Somewhat good | Somewhat bad | Very bad | REF (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|--|-----------|---------------|--------------|----------|------------|-----------|
| a. Your living conditions overall. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b. Security from crime and violence. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c. Availability of jobs/economic opportunities. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d. Roads, bridges and other infrastructure. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| e. Your freedom of movement – the ability to go where you wish safely. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| f. Security from the Taliban and other armed groups. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| g. Women's Rights | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Q-6a-g. Compared to last year, in your village/neighbourhood where you live, is each item I name much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

| | Much better now | Somewhat better | About the same | Somewhat worse | Much worse | Ref. (vol.) | Don't know (vol.) |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|------------|-------------|-------------------|
| a. Your living conditions overall. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 9 |
| b. Security from crime and violence. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 9 |
| c. Availability of jobs/economic opportunities. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 9 |
| d. Roads, bridges and other infrastructure. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 9 |
| e. Your freedom of movement – the ability to go where you wish safely. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 9 |
| f. Security from the Taliban and other armed groups. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 9 |
| g. Women's Rights | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 9 |

Q-7a-j. Do you have very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable or very unfavourable opinions of the following institutions and groups of people?

| | Very favourable | Somewhat favourable | Somewhat unfavourable | Very unfavourable | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|--|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------|-----------|
| a) Central Government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b) Provincial / District Government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c) Courts | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d) The Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| e) Afghan Local Police (ALP) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| f) Afghan National Army (ANA) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| g) ISAF/ international forces | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| h) Taliban | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| i) Other warlords / militias | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| j) International aid organizations | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Q-8a-j. For each of the following, how strong a presence does it have in this area – a very strong presence, a fairly strong presence, a fairly weak presence or no significant presence at all?

| | Very Strong | Fairly Strong | Fairly Weak | No presence at all | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|--|-------------|---------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------|
| a) Central Government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b) Provincial / District Government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c) Courts | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d) The Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| e) Afghan Local Police (ALP) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| f) Afghan National Army (ANA) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| g) ISAF/international forces | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| h) Taliban | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| i) Other warlords / militias | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| j) International aid organizations | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Security/Safety Questions

Q-9a-b. Who or what brings insecurity in year area? Who and what else? (Interviewer: Record up to two mentions, **Do Not Read Codes to Respondent**)

Write Answer Q9a. _____

Write Answer Q9b. _____

| | Q9a | Q9b |
|---|-----|-----|
| Unemployment | 1 | 1 |
| Taliban | 2 | 2 |
| Foreigners | 3 | 3 |
| Warlords | 4 | 4 |
| Local militia | 5 | 5 |
| Lack of law | 6 | 6 |
| Lack of agriculture | 7 | 7 |
| Weak government | 8 | 8 |
| Thefts | 9 | 9 |
| Poppy cultivation | 10 | 10 |
| Weak economy | 11 | 11 |
| Anti-government elements | 12 | 12 |
| Illiteracy | 13 | 13 |
| Corruption | 14 | 14 |
| Crimes | 15 | 15 |
| No one/Nothing | 16 | 16 |
| Lack of shelter | 17 | 17 |
| Low salaries of government employees | 18 | 18 |
| Police | 19 | 19 |
| Lack of unity in community | 20 | 20 |
| Lack of disbandment of armed illegal groups | 21 | 21 |
| Suicide attackers | 22 | 22 |
| Kidnappers | 23 | 23 |
| Terrorists | 24 | 24 |
| Powerful people in general | 25 | 25 |
| Neighbouring countries | 26 | 26 |
| Local people themselves | 27 | 27 |
| Land mafia | 28 | 28 |
| Army | 29 | 29 |
| _____ | | |
| 996. Other, specify _____ | 996 | 996 |
| 998. Refused (vol.) | 998 | 998 |
| 999. Don't know (vol.) | 999 | 999 |

Q-10a-b. And who or what ensures security in your area? Who or what else? (Interviewer: Record up to two mentions, **Do Not Read Codes to Respondent**)

Write Answer Q10a. _____

Write Answer Q10b. _____

| | Q10a | Q10b |
|---|------|------|
| Afghan National Police (ANP) | 1 | 1 |
| Afghan National Army (ANA) | 2 | 2 |
| International troops | 3 | 3 |
| Employment | 4 | 4 |
| People themselves | 5 | 5 |
| Law | 6 | 6 |
| Provincial / District governor | 7 | 7 |
| Government | 8 | 8 |
| Disbandment of illegal armed groups | 9 | 9 |
| Development of educational system | 10 | 10 |
| No one / nothing | 12 | 12 |
| Taliban | 13 | 13 |
| Tribal elders | 14 | 14 |
| Good economy | 15 | 15 |
| Poppy eradication | 16 | 16 |
| Women's rights | 17 | 17 |
| Eradication of corruption | 18 | 18 |
| Mullahs | 19 | 19 |
| When neighbouring countries stop interfering | 20 | 20 |
| Freedom of speech | 21 | 21 |
| Reconstruction | 22 | 22 |
| National Department of Security (NDS) 23 | 23 | |
| Community groups | 24 | 24 |
| _____ | | |
| 996. Other, specify _____ | 996 | 996 |
| 998. Refused (vol.) | 998 | 998 |
| 999. Don't know (vol.) | 999 | 999 |

Q-11a-d. Do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe...

| | Very safe | Somewhat safe | Somewhat unsafe | Very unsafe | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|---|-----------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|
| a) Walking alone in your area during the day? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b) Staying alone at home after dark (night time)? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c) From the risk of roadside bombs / explosions? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d) From the risk of suicide attacks? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Q-12a. Overall, would you describe this area as an area of a low amount of crime, a moderate amount, or would you call this a high-crime area?

1. Low amount of crime
2. Moderate amount of crime
3. High amount of crime

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-12b. In comparison to last year, would say that the amount of crime in this area has increased, decreased, or stayed the same?

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Stayed the same

-
4. Never had any crime in this area (vol.)
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-13a-f. For each item I name, please tell me if it would make you feel more secure, would not have an effect on your feeling of security, or would make you feel less secure.

| | More Secure | No effect | Less Secure | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|---|-------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-----------|
| a. If there were more Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| b. If more of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area were women. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| c. If there were more Afghan Local Police (ALP) in this area | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| d. If there were more Afghan National Army (ANA) in this area | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| e. If there were more ISAF soldiers in this area | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| f. If there were more Taliban in this area | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |

General Police Questions

Q-14a. How much information do you get about the activities of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area? Do you get a great deal of information about this, a good amount of information, just some information or little to no information?

1. A great deal of information
2. A good amount of information
3. Just some information
4. Little to no information

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14b. In comparison to last year, do you feel you have more, less, or about the same amount information about the activities of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area?

1. More information
2. About the same amount of information
3. Less information

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-15a. How much confidence do you have in the Afghan National Police(ANP): Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?

1. A great deal of confidence
2. Quite a lot of confidence
3. Not very much confidence
4. No confidence at all

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-15b. In comparison to the last year, would you say you are more confident, less confident, or have the same level of confidence in the Afghan National Police (ANP) as you do today?

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|
| 1. More confident | ASK Q15c |
| 2. Less confident | ASK Q15d |
| 3. Have the same level of confidence | SKIP to Q16 |

-
- | | |
|--|-------------|
| 4. Never had confidence in police (vol.) | SKIP to Q16 |
| 8. Refused (vol.) | SKIP to Q16 |
| 9. Don't Know (vol.) | SKIP to Q16 |

Q15c. (Ask if respondent answered “**MORE** confident” code 1 in Q15b) Why are you MORE confident in the police in comparison to last year?

Write Answer: _____

1. Service to people
2. They have improved
3. Security has improved
4. Their education has improved
5. They are Afghan
6. They fight narcotics
7. Good attitude with people
8. Their number has increased
9. Their salary has increased
10. They fight Taliban
11. They enforce the law
12. Removing corruption

96. Other
97. Not asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q15d. (Ask if respondent answered “**LESS** confident” code 2 in Q15b) Why are you LESS confident in the police in comparison to last year?

Write Answer: _____

1. Police are corrupt
2. They are not serious in their attitude with people
3. Not well-enough equipped
4. Security has worsened
5. We have bad memories of them
6. They don't respect people
7. They don't pay attention to their duty
8. They are addicted to drugs
9. Government doesn't have good control over the police

96. Other
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-16a-c. Would you describe most Afghan National Police (ANP) officers as very effective, somewhat effective, somewhat ineffective, or very ineffective at the following tasks:

| | Very effective | Somewhat effective | Somewhat ineffective | Very ineffective | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|--|----------------|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------|-----------|
| a) resolving local crimes? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b) resolving traffic accidents? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c) preventing terrorist attacks? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d) resolving land disputes? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| e) keeping the Taliban out of the area where you live? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Q-17a. How much respect do you personally have for the Afghan National Police (ANP) in your area: Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?

1. A great deal of respect
2. Quite a lot of respect
3. Not very much respect
4. No respect at all

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-17b. In comparison to last year, do you have more respect, less respect, or about the same amount of respect for the Afghan National Police (ANP) as you have now?

1. More respect
2. About the same amount of respect
3. Less respect

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-18. How much prestige do you feel there is in being an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer – is it an occupation that commands a great deal of prestige, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?

1. A great deal of prestige
2. Quite a lot of prestige
3. Not very much prestige
4. No prestige at all

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-19a. Do you think that Afghan National Police (ANP) performance in your area over the past year has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse?

- | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Gotten better | (ASK Q-19b) |
| 2. Stayed the same | (SKIP TO Q-20) |
| 3. Gotten worse | (ASK Q-19c) |

-
- | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 8. Refused (vol.) | (SKIP TO Q-20) |
| 9. Don't Know (vol.) | (SKIP TO Q-20) |

Q19b. [Ask if respondent answered “gotten BETTER” code 1 in Q19a] Why do you think Afghan National Police (ANP) performance has gotten BETTER in comparison to last year?

Write Answer: _____

1. Increase in the number of police
2. They fight the tyranny
3. They honestly serve the country
4. They have been well equipped
5. Establish security
6. They salary has increased
7. They respect people
8. Education has improved
9. They have decreased corruption
10. They solve people' problems
11. Decrease poppy cultivation

-
96. Other
 97. Not Asked
 98. Refused (vol.)
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q19c. [Ask if respondent answered “gotten WORSE” code 3 in Q19a] Why do you think Afghan National Police (ANP) performance has gotten WORSE in comparison to last year?

Write Answer: _____

1. Increase in the number of police
2. They take bribes
3. Bad behaviour with people
4. Lack of enough education
5. Do not serve the people
6. Taliban have become stronger
7. They are addicted

-
96. Other
 97. Not Asked
 98. Refused (vol.)
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-21. Have you yourself ever had any interaction with the Afghan National Police (ANP), or not?

- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Yes | GO TO Q-22a |
| 2. No | SKIP TO Q-23 |
| <hr/> | |
| 8. Refused (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-23 |
| 9. Don't Know (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-23 |

Q-22a. (Ask if respondent gave code 1, "Yes" at Q-21) When was the last time you interacted with the Afghan National Police (ANP) – about how long ago?

1. One to three months
 2. Three to six months ago
 3. Six to twelve months ago
 4. A year to two years ago
 5. Two to five years ago
 6. More than five years ago
-
7. Not Asked
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-22b. (Ask if respondent gave code 1, "Yes" at Q-21) About how many times have you interacted with the Afghan National police (ANP) within the past 12 months?

Record number of interactions: ____

-
97. Not Asked
 98. Refused (vol.)
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-22c. (Ask if respondent gave code 1, "Yes" at Q-21) Overall, would you describe your interaction(s) with the Afghan National Police (ANP) as very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or very negative?

1. Very positive
 2. Somewhat positive
 3. Somewhat negative
 4. Very negative
-
5. Mixed (vol.)
 7. Not Asked
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-23. (ASK ALL) Have you ever visited a police station to conduct business or obtain information, or not?

- 1. Yes **GO TO Q-24a**
- 2. No **SKIP TO Q-25**

- 8. Refused (vol.) **SKIP TO Q-25**
- 9. Don't Know (vol.) **SKIP TO Q-25**

Q-24a. (Ask if respondent gave code 1, "Yes" at Q-23) About how many times have you visited a police station?

Record number of visits: ____

- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-24b. (Ask if respondent gave code 1, "Yes" at Q-23) Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the service you received overall – very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

- 1. Very satisfied
- 2. Somewhat satisfied
- 3. Somewhat dissatisfied
- 4. Very dissatisfied

- 7. Not Asked
- 8. Refused (vol.)
- 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-25a-b. [ASK ALL] If there were a matter to report to **[READ ITEM]**, would you be willing to do this yourself, or would you bring someone with you?

| | Willing to do yourself | Bring Someone along | REF (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|------------|-----------|
| a. The Afghan National Police (ANP) | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| b. The Elders | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |

Q-26. If a woman reports a crime alone, without being accompanied by a male family member, do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area would be more likely to investigate that crime fully, would it make no difference either way to them, or would they be less likely to investigate that crime fully?

- 1. More likely to investigate
- 2. No difference either way

3. Less likely to investigate

8. Refused (vol.)

9. Don't Know (vol.)

Police Activities Questions

Q-27a-i. For each item I name, please tell me if you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area are involved in this activity a great deal, somewhat, just a little, or hardly at all.

| | A Great Deal | Somewhat | Just a little | Not at all | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|---|--------------|----------|---------------|------------|-------------|-----------|
| a. Fighting insurgents | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b. Poppy eradication | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c. Fighting organized crime | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d. Preventing inter-ethnic, inter-tribal violence | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| e. Fighting narcotics trade | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| f. Fighting corruption | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| g. Investigating routine crime | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| h. Preventing violence against women | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| i. Building partnerships with community groups | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Q-28a-i. Now for each of those please tell me if you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area should be spending more time on this activity, if it's the right amount of time, or they should spend less time on this activity.

| | More time | Just right | Less time | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|---|-----------|------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| a. Fighting insurgents | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| b. Poppy eradication | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| c. Fighting organized crime | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| d. Preventing inter-ethnic, inter-tribal violence | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| e. Fighting narcotics trade | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| f. Fighting corruption | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| g. Investigating routine crime | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| h. Preventing violence against women | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| i. Building partnerships with community groups | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |

Q-29. Overall, what kind of a tasks are Afghan National Police (ANP) in your area performing more often nowadays – the one of a law-enforcing institution preventing crime, or that of a counter-insurgency force?

1. Law-enforcing, preventing crime
 2. Counter-insurgency force
-
3. Both (vol.)
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Police Knowledge/Training/Capabilities Questions

Q-30a. Overall, would you describe the Afghan National Police (ANP) as being very knowledgeable about their duties to enforce the law, somewhat knowledgeable, not very knowledgeable or not at all knowledgeable?

1. Very knowledgeable
 2. Somewhat knowledgeable
 3. Not very knowledgeable
 4. Not at all knowledgeable
-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-30b. In comparison to one year ago, would you say that the Afghan National Police (ANP) are more knowledgeable about their duties to enforce the law, less knowledgeable, or about the same as before?

1. More knowledgeable
 2. About the same as before
 3. Less knowledgeable
-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-31a-e. In terms of **[READ ITEM]** please tell me if you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area are very effective, somewhat effective, somewhat ineffective, or very ineffective?

| | Very effective | Somewhat effective | Somewhat ineffective | Very ineffective | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|--|----------------|--------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------|-----------|
| a) preventing crime | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b) responding to complaints of crime | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c) bringing to justice those responsible for crimes that have been committed | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d) fighting insurgents | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| e) maintaining law and order | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Q-32a-d. Overall, thinking of crime in your area, are the Afghan National Police (ANP) officers very capable, somewhat capable, somewhat incapable or very incapable to cope with...

| | Very capable | Somewhat capable | Somewhat incapable | Very incapable | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|---------------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------|-----------|
| a) small crimes, offences | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b) big, organized crimes | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c) corruption | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d) insurgency | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Q-33a-g. How well do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area where you live [READ ITEM] – very well, somewhat well, not so well or not well at all?

| | Very well | Somewhat well | Not so well | Not well at all | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|---|-----------|---------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------|
| a) understand the law? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b) understand what their duties are? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c) are trained to perform their duties? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d) are provided with the equipment they need? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| e) are able to perform their duties without assistance from international forces? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| f) are knowledgeable about the needs of the community? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| g) are knowledgeable about human rights in general? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Q-34. Either from your own experience or from what you have heard, what part of their job do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) do the BEST?
(Open Ended; Code in only one response)

Write in response: _____

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-35. And either from your own experience or from what you have heard, what part of their job do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) do the WORST?
(Open Ended; Code in only one response)

Write in response: _____

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Police Behaviour Questions

Q-36. Would you say the Afghan National Police (ANP) mainly deal with people in a way that is very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, or very unfair?

1. Very fair
 2. Somewhat fair
 3. Somewhat unfair
 4. Very unfair
-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-37a-h. To what extent do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area **[READ ITEM]** – always, most of the time, some of the time or rarely?

| | Always | Most of the time | Some of the time | Rarely | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|---|--------|------------------|------------------|--------|-------------|-----------|
| a. Treat everyone equally | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b. Respect people's rights | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c. Try to help people with their problems | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d. Explain the reasons for their actions | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| e. Share the values of most people in the community | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| f. Respond to community concerns | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| g. Admit their mistakes and correct them | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| h. Treat women with proper respect | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Q-38a-j. For each item I name, please tell me if it has happened to you or someone in your household in the last year or not.

| | Yes | No | Ref. (vol) | DK (vol) |
|--|-----|----|------------|----------|
| a. Being offered help by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer in a legal and positive way when you needed assistance. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| b. Being stopped by Afghan National Police (ANP) on the street without good reason. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| c. Being addressed by the Afghan National Police (ANP) with insulting language. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| d. Being asked by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer to provide food. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| e. Being asked by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer for money or other payment in order for you to avoid arrest or a fine. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| f. Being asked by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer for money or other payment in order for the police to provide protection to your business or home. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| g. Being subjected to excessive physical force by the Afghan National Police (ANP). | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| h. Being falsely accused by the Afghan National Police (ANP) of a minor wrongdoing. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| i. Being falsely accused by the Afghan National Police (ANP) of a major wrongdoing. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| j. Being forced by an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer to participate in a crime against your will. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |

Q-39a-b. For each item I name, please tell me if you or someone in your household are aware of members of the police doing the following:

| | Yes | No | Ref. (vol) | DK (vol) |
|--|-----|----|------------|----------|
| a. Seeing a member of the Afghan National Police (ANP) use drugs / narcotics himself or herself | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| b. Seeing a member of the Afghan National Police (ANP) participate in the drugs / narcotics trade. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |

Corruption Questions

Q-40. There are times when a government representative may ask for money or other payment in exchange for favourable treatment in the performance of his official duties. Do you personally regard this as corruption, do you think it depends and may be corrupt in some cases but acceptable in others, or do you see it as acceptable behaviour?

1. Regard as corruption
2. May be acceptable sometimes
3. Generally acceptable behaviour

8. Refused (vol.)

9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-41a-h. Do you think there is a lot, some, just a little, or no corruption among [INSERT ITEM] in Afghanistan?

| | A lot of corruption | Some corruption | Just a little corruption | No corruption at all | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|---|---------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------|-----------|
| a. Government employees | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b. Teachers | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c. Afghan National Army (ANA) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d. Afghan National Police (ANP) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| e. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| f. National Directorate of Security (NDS) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| g. The government court system | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| h. The prison system | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Q-42. Do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area are entirely honest, mostly honest, mostly corrupt or entirely corrupt?

1. Entirely honest
2. Mostly honest
3. Mostly corrupt
4. Entirely corrupt

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-43. In the last year, would you say the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area have become more honest, remained about the same, or become more corrupt?

1. More honest
2. Remained about the same
3. More corrupt

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-44. What about the court system, do you think members of the judiciary in this area are entirely honest, mostly honest, mostly corrupt or entirely corrupt?

1. Entirely honest
2. Mostly honest
3. Mostly corrupt
4. Entirely corrupt

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-45. And in the last year, would you say the members of the judiciary in this area have become more honest, remained about the same or become more corrupt?

1. Become more honest
2. Remained about the same
3. Become more corrupt

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-46a-d. Thinking about the duties and responsibilities of each of the following groups that I read out, please tell me if you think the police should be paid more, less, or the same as these groups? Afghan National Police (ANP) should be paid more, paid less, or paid the same as [insert group]?

| | Police Paid More | Police Paid Less | Police Paid the Same | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|--|------------------|------------------|----------------------|-------------|-----------|
| a) Teachers | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| b) Doctors | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| c) Army (ANA) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |
| d) Other government workers in general | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 9 |

Q-47a. If the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area were better paid by the government, to what extent do you think that would reduce the possibility of corruption within their ranks – a great deal, somewhat, not so much or not at all?

1. A great deal
2. Somewhat
3. Not so much
4. Not at all

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-47b. Do you think that corruption in your area is a bigger problem among the Afghan National Police (ANP) or the courts that enforce justice?

1. Afghan National Police (ANP)
2. The Courts

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-48a. Do you think that when performing their duties Afghan National Police (ANP) officers in your area are partial in favour of people of their tribe (Qawm), or do you think they are not partial in favour of people of their tribe?

Q-48b. And do you think that when recruiting new Afghan National Police (ANP) cadets, high-ranking police officers are partial in favour of their tribe (Qawm) or do you think they are not partial in favour of their tribe?

| | Q-48a. | Q-48b. |
|----------------------------------|---|---|
| Partial in favour of their tribe | 1 | 1 |
| Not partial | 2 | 2 |
| | <hr style="width: 10%; margin: 0 auto;"/> | <hr style="width: 10%; margin: 0 auto;"/> |
| Refused (vol.) | 8 | 8 |
| Don't Know (vol.) | 9 | 9 |

Q-49. Have you ever personally experienced a situation in which the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this area refused to investigate, arrest, charge or prosecute a person because of that person's family relations to a police officer or government official, or has that not happened to you?

1. Yes
2. No

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-50. Imagine that you have a complaint about an Afghan National Police (ANP) officer. Do you think filing a report would make your situation better, have no effect, or make your situation worse?

1. Better
2. No Effect
3. Worse

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Experience with Crime Questions

Q-51. Excuse me for asking this, but have you or any member of your household been a victim of a crime in the past year, or not?

- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Yes | GO TO Q-52a |
| 2. No | SKIP TO Q-53 |
| <hr/> | |
| 8. Refused (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-53 |
| 9. Don't Know (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-53 |

Q-52a. (Ask if respondent gave code 1, "Yes" at Q-51) What kind of a crime was that? (Interviewer: If more than one, ask for the last kind of crime, only code one)

1. Theft/Robbery/Burglary
 2. Offences related to land ownership and rights
 3. Sexual offences
 4. Kidnapping
 5. Assaults and threats
 6. Traffic accidents
 7. Accidents related to military fighting
 8. Extortion / forced payment of bribes
 9. Drug related crimes
 10. Murder
 11. Domestic violence against women
-
96. Other (specify) _____
 97. Not Asked
 98. Refused (vol.)
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-52b. (Ask if respondent gave code 1, "Yes" at Q-51) Have you reported it to the police, or not?

- | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Yes | GO TO Q-52c |
| 2. No | SKIP TO Q-52d |
| <hr/> | |
| 7. Not Asked | |
| 8. Refused (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-53 |
| 9. Don't Know (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-53 |

Q-52c. (Ask if respondent gave code 1, "Yes" at Q-52b) Would you say that the police addressed the issue adequately, or addressed the issue inadequately?

- | | |
|-----------------|---------------------|
| 1. Adequately | SKIP TO Q-53 |
| 2. Inadequately | SKIP TO Q-53 |
| <hr/> | |

- 7. Not Asked
- 8. Refused (vol.)
- 9. Don't Know (vol.)

SKIP TO Q-53
SKIP TO Q-53

Q-52d. (Ask if respondent gave code 2, "No" at Q-52b) Why didn't you report it to the police?

WRITE Response: _____

- 1. Danger or fear of retaliation
- 2. Lack of evidence
- 3. It was not serious
- 4. Didn't know where to report it
- 5. Lack of trust
- 6. Bias in favour of the other party

- _____
- 96. Other (specify) _____
 - 97. Not Asked
 - 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don't know (vol.)

Women in the Police Force Questions

Q-53. [ASK ALL] If a male member of your family was interested in joining the Afghan National Police (ANP) forces in your area, would you strongly support this, somewhat support this, not really support this, or not support this at all?

- 1. Strongly support
- 2. Somewhat support
- 3. Not really support
- 4. Not support at all

- _____
- 8. Refused (vol.)
 - 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-54. If a female member of your family was interested in joining the Afghan National Police (ANP) forces in your area, would you strongly support this, somewhat support this, not really support this, or not support this at all?

- 1. Strongly support
- 2. Somewhat support
- 3. Not really support
- 4. Not support at all

- _____
- 8. Refused (vol.)
 - 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-55. In general, do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea to have female police officers in your community?

- | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Good idea | GO TO Q-56a |
| 2. Bad idea | SKIP TO Q-56b |
| <hr/> | |
| 8. Refused (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-57a |
| 9. Don't Know (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-57a |

Q-56a. (ASK those who answered code 1 "GOOD IDEA" at Q-55) Why do you say that it is a good idea?

Write in response: _____

1. For searching females
 2. Need of society
 3. They have the right to work
 4. Security will improve
 5. Serve the country
 6. Women do their job better than men
 7. They have equal rights with men
 8. To defend the females
-
96. Other (specify)
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-56b. (ASK those who answered code 2 "BAD IDEA" at Q-55) Why do you say that it is a bad idea?

Write in response: _____

1. They should not work out of home
 2. Women should not be given too much freedom
 3. They cannot perform their duty well
 4. Against the culture
 5. People will dislike them
 6. It is not applicable in current security situation
 7. Their families do not allow
 8. Against religion
-
96. Other
97. Not Asked (vol.)
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-57a/b. (ASK ALL) For each of the following, please tell me if you would be much more likely, somewhat more likely, somewhat less likely or much less likely to do each of the following:

| | Much more likely | Somewhat more likely | Somewhat less likely | Much less likely | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|--|------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------|-----------|
| a. Report a crime if the police officer was female | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b. Trust a female police officer to fairly resolve a crime | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Local Police / Meetings Questions

Q-58. Afghan Local Police (ALP) are community volunteers who are paid to protect their village from insurgents and criminals. Are there any such local police forces in your area?

- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Yes | GO TO Q-59 |
| 2. No | SKIP TO Q-60 |
| <hr/> | |
| 8. Refused (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-60 |
| 9. Don't Know (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-60 |

Q-59. (Ask if respondent gave code 1, "Yes" at Q-58) Have the Afghan Local Police (ALP) improved security in this area, had no impact on security, or made security worse?

- | | |
|--------------------------|--|
| 1. Improved security | |
| 2. No impact on security | |
| 3. Make security worse | |
| <hr/> | |
| 7. Not asked | |
| 8. Refused (vol.) | |
| 9. Don't Know (vol.) | |

Q-60. [ASK ALL] Do you think that local watch groups of citizens, supported by the Afghan National Police (ANP), will improve security in the area, have no impact on security, or make it worse?

- | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Improved security | GO TO Q-61 |
| 2. No impact on security | SKIP TO Q-62 |
| 3. Make security worse | SKIP TO Q-62 |
| <hr/> | |
| 8. Refused (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-62 |
| 9. Don't Know (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-62 |

Q-61. (Ask if respondent answered code 1 “Improved Security”, at Q-60) How willing are you to become a member of such a community group of citizens, if such would be established? Are you...

1. Very willing
2. Somewhat willing
3. Somewhat unwilling
4. Very unwilling

-
7. Not Asked
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-62. [ASK ALL] Do you think that efforts to include MORE WOMEN in local watch groups of citizens, supported by the Afghan National Police (ANP), will improve security in the area, have no impact on security, or make it worse?

1. Improved security
2. No impact on security
3. Make security worse

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-63. Have police community partnerships been established in this area?

1. Yes
2. No

GO TO Q-64
SKIP TO Q-65

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

SKIP TO Q-65
SKIP TO Q-65

Q-64. (ASK if respondent answered “Yes”, code 1 at Q-63) Have these police community partnerships improved security in this area, had no impact on security, or made security worse?

1. Improved security
2. No impact on security
3. Made security worse

-
7. Not Asked
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-65. [Ask All] Do you think that regular public meetings with the Afghan National Police (ANP) where people can share their concerns would improve security in the area, have no impact, or make security worse?

- | | |
|---------------|---------------------|
| 1. Improve | GO TO Q-66 |
| 2. No impact | SKIP TO Q-67 |
| 3. Make worse | SKIP TO Q-67 |

-
- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| 8. Refused (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-67 |
| 9. Don't Know (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-67 |

Q-66. (Ask if respondent answered 'Improve' code 1 at Q-65) How willing are you to take part in such public meetings with the Afghan National Police (ANP)? Are you...

1. Very willing
2. Somewhat willing
3. Somewhat unwilling
4. Very unwilling

-
7. Not Asked
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-67. [ASK ALL] Have such public meetings with the Afghan National Police (ANP) occurred in this area in the past year, or not?

- | | |
|--------|---------------------|
| 1. Yes | GO TO Q-68 |
| 2. No | SKIP TO Q-69 |

-
- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| 8. Refused (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-69 |
| 9. Don't Know (vol.) | SKIP TO Q-69 |

Q-68. (Ask if respondent answered code 1, "Yes" at Q-67) In the past year, how many public meetings with the Afghan National Police (ANP) have been held in this area?

Write in response: _____

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-69.(ASK ALL) How much longer should the international military forces remain in Afghanistan? Should they leave...?

1. now,
 2. in 2014 as in the transition plan (Enteqal)
 3. once the Taliban has been defeated,
 4. once Afghan military (ANA) and police (ANP) have been trained to fight the insurgency without international assistance, or
 5. they should remain indefinitely on military bases in Afghanistan?
-
6. Other (vol.)
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.)

Q-70. How long do you think it will take to train the Afghan National Police (ANP) to be ready to take over all responsibilities from international forces for police duties?
[READ OUT RESPONSES]

1. ANP is ready now.
 2. ANP will be ready within 1 year.
 3. ANP will be ready within 2 to 3 years.
 4. ANP will need more than 3 years.
-
5. It will never happen (vol.)
 6. Other (vol.)
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.)

Q-71. To what extent do you think the Afghan National Police (ANP) are presently prepared to perform their duties without assistance from international forces – are they now prepared to perform all, some, a few, or none of their duties without this assistance?

1. They are ready to perform ALL of their duties without assistance
 2. They are ready to perform SOME of their duties without assistance
 3. They are ready to perform A FEW of their duties without assistance
 4. They are ready to perform NONE of their duties without assistance
-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

Finally, I would like to ask for your recommendations for the police

Q-72. If you were to recommend one area in which Afghan National Police (ANP) should receive more training, what would you recommend? **[Open End, with pre-codes, Do Not Read Out Responses]**

Record Response: _____

1. General police skills
2. Anti-drug trafficking skills
3. Anti-corruption skills
4. Basic skills (literacy, math, etc.)

95. Police do not need more training (vol.)

96. Other (specify): _____

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-73. If you were to recommend providing Afghan National Police (ANP) with more equipment, what one kind of equipment do you think they need most? **[Open End, with pre-codes, Do Not Read Out Responses]**

Record Response: _____

1. Vehicles (cars, trucks, buses, planes, etc.)
2. Communication equipment (phones, radios, etc.)
3. Weapons
4. Computers

95. Police do not need more equipment (vol.)

96. Other (specify): _____

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-74. In order to improve the leadership of the Afghan National Police (ANP), how important are each of the following actions? Do you believe that it is very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant or not at all important that the Afghan National Police (ANP) **[INSERT ITEM]**?

| | Very Important | Somewhat Important | Somewhat Unimportant | Not At All Important | Ref. (vol.) | DK (vol.) |
|--|----------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------|-----------|
| a. Rotate ANP leaders from their post in a region to a different region frequently | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| b. Appoint more female leaders in the ANP | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| c. Provide training for ANP leaders in countries outside of Afghanistan | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| d. Conduct performance evaluations of ANP leaders | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |
| e. Make ANP leaders more accessible to the public | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 9 |

Demographics Section

(Interviewer Read): “I would now like to ask you some questions for statistical purposes.”

D-1. Gender (Interviewer: Code, do not ask)

1. Male
2. Female

D-2. **(Ask All)** How old were you on your last birthday? (Interviewer: Record actual age; if respondent refuses, please estimate)

— —

D-3a. Are you able to read and write?

1. Not at all – Illiterate
2. Some
3. I can read and write what I want.

—

8. Refused (vol.)
9. Don't know (vol.)

D-3b. How many years of formal education have you completed?

1. None
2. Up to and including 5 years
3. 6 to 8 Years
4. 9-10 Years

- 5. 11-12 Years
- 6. College graduate
- 7. Post-Graduate

-
- 8. Refused (vol.)
 - 9. Don't Know (vol.)

D-4a. What is your job status now? Are you ...

- 1. Working full-time
- 2. Working part-time
- 3. Unemployed-Looking For Work
- 4. Unemployed-Not Looking For Work
- 5. Housewife (not working outside of the home)
- 6. Student/Apprentice
- 7. Retired/ Disabled _____
- 8. Refused (vol.)
- 9. Don't Know (vol.)

D-4b. (Ask If Respondent Is Working, Unemployed, Or Retired, codes 1-4 or code 7 at D-4a): What is/was your primary occupation? (Interviewer: For Those Who Answered Unemployed Or Retired/Disabled, Ask The Respondent What Their Occupation Was When They Were Working. Record Below and Code).

INTERVIEWER WRITE OCCUPATION: _____

| |
|--|
| 1. Government Employee Support Staff |
| 2. Government Employee Mid Level (Supervisory) |
| 3. Government Employee Senior Level Officer |
| 4. Agricultural Laborer |
| 5. Farming On Own Farm |
| 6. Farm Owner Employing Labourers |
| 7. Unskilled Worker |
| 8. Semi-Skilled Worker |
| 9. Skilled Worker |
| 10. Private Employee Support Staff |
| 11. Private Employee Mid-Level (Supervisory) |
| 12. Private Employee Senior Officer |
| 13. Private Business Sole Proprietor |
| 14. Private Business Employing 1-5 Workers |
| 15. Private Business Employing More Than 5 Workers |
| 16. Military/Police |
| 96. Other |
| 97. Not Asked |
| 98. Refused (vol.) |
| 99. Don't Know (vol.) |

D-5. Are you the head of the household?

1. Yes
2. No

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

D-6. Do you, any member of your household, or close relatives...

| | Yes | No | Refused | Don't Know |
|--|-----|----|---------|------------|
| a) work in the Afghan National Police (ANP)? | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| b) work in the District or Provincial Government? | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| c) act as a member of the local Jirga/Shura? | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| d) have a close friend in the police force? | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| e) work or volunteer in the Afghan Local Police (ALP)? | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |

D-7a. Have you lived abroad for 3 or more months?

1. Yes
2. No

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't Know (vol.)

D-7b. **(Ask if answered Yes at D-7a)** In which country have you lived (the most)?
(Interviewer: Write Down Response)

1. Iran
2. Pakistan
3. India
4. Saudi Arabia
5. Russia
6. Tajikistan
7. Norway
8. China
9. Canada
10. America
11. Germany
12. Denmark
13. Turkey

-
97. Not Asked
 98. Refused
 99. Don't Know

D-8. (Ask All) How many people live here at this address? (Interviewer: Record Number Below)

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-9. Do you consider yourself to be...

1. Pashtun

2. Tajik

3. Uzbek

4. Turkmen

5. Hazara

6. Baloch

7. Kirghiz

8. Nuristani

9. Aimak

10. Arab

11. Pashaye

12. Shali

13. Qezelbash

14. Sadat

96. Other (vol.)

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

D-10. What is your religious affiliation? (**If Respondent Says Muslim Ask**): Do you consider yourself to be Sunni or Shia? (Open-Ended With Pre-Codes.)

1. Shia Muslim

2. Sunni Muslim

6. Other (vol.)

8. Refused (vol.)

9. Don't Know (vol.)

D-11. What is your household's total monthly income from all sources, that is all types of income for all the people living at this address?

1. 2,000 Afghanis or less,

2. From 2,001 to 10,000

3. From 10,001 to 20,000

4. From 20,001 to 30,000

5. From 30,001 to 40,000

6. Greater than 40,000 Afghanis?

8. Refused (vol.)

9. Don't Know (vol.)

D-12. SES Level (Interviewer code): Code household status. Based on your impressions from the dwelling of the household, the environment, the appearance of its members, please rate the living standard of this household:

| | |
|---|--|
| 1 | The household is well-off; its standard is by all accounts well above the average |
| 2 | The household is enjoying a fair well-being, but generally, the features of luxury are missing, they are not rich |
| 3 | The household is not denying itself the most important, vital goods of life, but the environment bears indications of moderate existence; they can't indulge in any excesses |
| 4 | The household is not denying itself the most important, vital goods of life, but the physical infrastructure of the household is in bad condition or in need of repair |
| 5 | Property-wise the household is more or less OK, but there is an apparent problem with incomes; they are obviously surviving and living with difficulty |
| 6 | The household bears all signs of poverty; living in misery, with privations |

D-13. (Interviewer code): How many people were present for the interview? _____

D-14. Would you be willing to participate in another of our surveys next year?

1. Yes
2. No

**RECORD THE TIME (USING 24 HOUR CLOCK) INTERVIEW WAS
COMPLETED AND THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW
(M-16 AND M-17)**

Read Closing Statement to the Respondent:

“Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you may have. To help him do that, could I have your telephone number?”

Respondent Information: Name: _____
 Address: _____
 Telephone: _____

Interviewer Certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instructions provided me by the Afghan Centre for Socio-economic and Opinion Research.”

Signed

Date

D-15. Interviewer Code: Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

1. The respondent understood all of the questions
2. The respondent understood most of the questions
3. The respondent understood most of the questions but with some help.
4. The respondent had difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from me

D-16. Interviewer Code: Which of the following statements best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?

1. The respondent was comfortable (at ease) with the entire questionnaire
2. The respondent was comfortable with most of the questions
3. The respondent was comfortable with only some of the questions
4. The respondent was generally uncomfortable with the survey questionnaire

D-17. Interviewer Code: Please indicate which, if any, of the following surveyed issues caused this respondent any uneasiness or decreased cooperation during the interview.

| | Yes | No |
|-------------------------------|-----|----|
| a) Types of crime in the area | 1 | 2 |
| b) Cooperation with police | 1 | 2 |
| c) Corruption | 1 | 2 |
| d) Weapons possession | 1 | 2 |

To Be Completed By The Supervisor:

S-1. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?

1. Yes
2. No

S-2. Method of quality control/back-check

1. Direct supervision during interview
2. Back-check in person by supervisor
3. Back-check from the central office
4. Not applicable

Appendix E: Literature Review

The following review of the existing literature on attitudes toward the police, perceptions of police performance and the development of a police force in Afghanistan was conducted by Langer Research Associates of New York to support and inform the UNDP/LOTFA Police Perception Survey - 2011.

We identified and evaluated more than 30 relevant studies, chiefly academic. While most were conducted in Western countries, we also concentrated on available evaluations of policing efforts in Afghanistan as well as other developing countries. We draw from these insights to provide context for the analysis of police perceptions in Afghanistan as measured in this and the two previous UNDP/LOTFA studies, and to place these studies within the broader literature.

This review is presented in five sections:

- I. Trust, Legitimacy and Police Reform in Afghanistan
- II. Afghanistan Reports and Findings
- III. Russian Police Reform
- IV. U.S./U.K. Findings on Attitudes Toward the Police
- V. Summary and Conclusions

I. Trust, Legitimacy and Police Reform in Afghanistan

Public confidence in the police is the cornerstone of cooperation and the basis for police legitimacy in a democratic society. This confidence is marked by trust and consent to police power. To gain confidence, police values must be perceived to align with those of the citizenry and be perceived as fair (Hough et al., 2010).

Although objective conditions such as crime rates and economic development are important, Jackson and Bradford (2010) report that perceptions can be just as important. One difficulty in understanding attitudes toward the police is the extent to which such judgments are based on subjective perceptions of conditions and performance. For example, perceptions that crime is rising can detract from evaluations of police performance, regardless of the actual crime rate.

Trust in the police, similar to trust in other public institutions, has three dimensions (Jackson & Bradford, 2010):

1. Trust that officers, and the system, will be effective, fair and display community values
2. Trust in the police as an institution (system-level public attitudes)
3. Interpersonal trust within the context of interaction with police

Along with trust, legitimacy is a necessary element of a stable and effective police force. Perceived police legitimacy is a more powerful predictor of compliance with the law than is the strength of sanctions (Hough et al., 2010). Reiner (2000) lists several behavioral and organizational components of police legitimacy, including:

- An organized and well-functioning bureaucracy
- Rule of law
- Strategy of minimal force
- Non-partisanship
- Accountability
- Public service orientation
- Preventive policing that focuses on alleviating the root causes of crime

Just as there are factors that can increase perceived police legitimacy, other behaviours and conditions can decrease it. Marenin (2005) lists these elements:

- Lack of community support, trust and cooperation
- Corruption and abuse, whether real or perceived
- Lack of visible oversight and accountability
- The belief that the police serve the state/powerful first, themselves second and citizens last
- Familial/kinship bias
- Links to crime
- Political interference in policing

The UNDP-LOTFA studies of perceptions of the Afghan police measure many of these factors. Results covered in the main report on this year's survey include perceptions of bias, corruption, bribery, links to crime, and their impacts on community support, trust and confidence.

While these factors affect police legitimacy in any country, their importance can be heightened in developing countries whose institutions are in their formative stages. Police reform must not only overcome these factors, but also attempt to change long-term patterns and norms that may not be consonant with administration of the rule of law.

Peake (2004) points to essential police reforms in post-conflict countries with weak institutions:

- Focus on accountability and transparency
- Increase civil society involvement
- Work with local strengths and strategies

Many factors can impede well-intentioned programs for building a sustainable and effective police force. Obstacles include:

- Resistance to justice reform, especially by those in power or recently deposed from power
- Reliance on simple classroom training
- Non-transferability of some knowledge and training to local context

II. Afghanistan Reports and Findings

There is little research on the success and effects of police reform in Afghanistan, a key reason UNDP/LOTFA undertook its current series of annual Police Perception surveys. Indeed, Murray (2007) noted the absence of such research two years before the first UNDP/LOTFA survey was conducted.

More generally, Griffiths et al. (2005) note the lack of evidence of effective police-building in developing societies, suggesting that aid organizations focus too much on raw training numbers given pressure to produce tangible results. Marenin (2005) and Murray (2007) point to a similar focus on numbers trained rather than on the effectiveness of that training or on the post-training structures and resources required for success in the field.

1. *U.S. Department of Defence, October 2011 Report*

Raw training numbers are supplied by the U.S. Department of Defence. As of September 2011, it reports there were 136,122 Afghan policetrained, including 21,704 officers, 34,414 non-commissioned officers, 73,853 patrolmen and 6,151 initial entry trainees. A low attrition rate is reported, 1.5 per cent in the previous six months. Police forces included 14,400 Afghanistan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 20,852 Afghanistan Border Police (ABP), 79,432 Afghanistan Uniform Police and a small number of police participating in Special Operations Forces (SOP). Training capacity was 14,500, with 18,016 recruits trained since the beginning of April 2011.

The report details improvements in equipment and logistics but also notes significant challenges in both areas; Afghan police remain underequipped and are not expected to be self-sufficient on logistics until 2014. The ANP has not met its targets for the inclusion of women, who make up less than 1 per cent of the force and are not being recruited at noticeable levels.

The report notes progress in approving and training Afghan Local Police (ALP) units, made up of Afghans in rural areas trained and equipped to defend their communities. The present force is 8,100 officers in 48 units. The report characterizes these forces as effective at disrupting insurgents, but also notes that competition and co-optation by non-government militias are problems for the perceived and actual legitimacy of ALP units.

2. *Marenin(2005) and Murray's(2007)Afghanistan Studies*

As noted, successful police force development relies heavily on public perceptions; hence the need for attitudinal surveys of the general population on this subject. Among the reasons cited by Hennigen, Maxson and Ranney (2002):

- Public acceptance of police authority is essential to maintain public order.
- Public confidence in police can lead to cooperation that is needed for effective policing.
- Public support can be a crucial element in justification for police funding.
- Accurate measurement of public opinion on policing serves to monitor the police.
- Exchange of information fosters police-community partnerships.

Security is essential for fostering civil society. But in contrast to stable and secure democracies, Murray (2007) contends that “security” has two meanings in conflict zones:

- *National security* implies cessation of fighting, incapacitation of belligerents, restoration of government and protection of national sovereignty.
- *Civil security*, founded on the rule of law, includes law enforcement, prevention of crime, protection of human rights, and the creation and maintenance of orderly communities.

Challenges to national security in Afghanistan makes it harder to foster civil security, in part by pulling police away from their traditional civil role and into conflict with anti-government forces. Yet there also have been othersignificant difficulties with police reform and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Murray (2007) chronicles these:

- Lack of officers with experience as police
- Ethnic allegiances
- Loyalty to tribal militia commanders
- Power struggles and lack of a clear chain of command within the bureaucracy
- Lack of discipline and formal policies and procedures
- Lack of facilities, equipment and uniforms
- Low public trust
- Low pay for officers
- Corruption
- Involvement in local poppy production, especially in the South and Northeast

Marenin (2005) points to several other hindrances to effective police reform in Afghanistan and other post-conflict and developing countries:

- Inability to differentiate police from military in the general security situation
- Insurgent attacks on the police, forcing them to take a military rather than civil security role
- Unfamiliarity with existing research and knowledge on policing
- Suspect quality and lack of measurement of training efforts
- Insufficient attention to Afghanistan’s cultural, political and social context
- Lack of planning and strategic direction

III. Russian Police Reform

Other evaluations of police reform shed further insight into the critical variables and challenges of building a well-functioning police force in difficult circumstances.

The Russian transition to an (arguably) post-authoritarian political and legal system has some bearing on the transition in Afghanistan. Attempts to reform Russia’s police system have met with difficulties including corruption and what Gerber and Mendelson (2008) call “predatory policing,” a phenomenon common to policing in developing and post-authoritarian countries.

Predatory policing occurs when police officers use their authority to advance their own material interests. This is especially harmful given the police’s supposed role in protecting individual security. Predatory policing reduces public confidence, thus impeding democratic reforms.

Gerber and Mendelson (2008)note that the long-term experiences of the Russian public with predatory policing damages expectations for better treatment and renders the concept of procedural justice “highly abstract and irrelevant.” There may be similar risk in Afghanistan given past and continued corruption here.

IV. U.S. and U.K. Findings on Attitudes Toward the Police

Many studies focus on three possible influences on attitudes toward the police: personal experiences, quality of life (perceptions of the state of the neighbourhood) and neighbourhood context (measures of conditions). Basic findings include the following:

Demographics and predispositions

- Increased age and education are positively related to attitudes about the police (Wortley, et al., 1997).
- Ethnicity, age, gender and socioeconomic status (especially concentrated economic disadvantage) are important (Bridenball & Jesilow, 2008).
- Lai and Zhao (2010) also found age and gender were important.
- Initial attitudes are important (works the same as any stereotypes) (Rosenbaum et al., 2005).

Conditions

- Actual and perceived conditions are important. Satisfaction with police is lower in neighbourhoods with higher crime and fear of crime (Bridenball & Jesilow, 2008; Reisig & Parks, 2000; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).

Police behaviour and interactions

- Police behaviour matters. People are less satisfied with police when they say officers are rude, unfair, unconcerned, unhelpful and unprofessional in their interactions (especially when they use excessive force) (Chaurprakobkit & Bartsch, 2001; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Wortley et al., 1997).
- Bad experiences with police are more influential than are good ones (Bradford, Stanko & Jackson, 2009; Skogan, 2006).
- Bradford et al. (2009) list factors that affect perceptions that are in the control of the police to change:
 - Demeanour and treatment of people in encounters
 - Dealing with matters promptly, seriously, and following up
 - Better communication, both individually and through mass communication
- People who initiate contact with police (e.g., call for assistance) are more satisfied than those who have involuntary interactions with them (e.g., traffic stop) (Decker, 1981).

Indirect influences

- Indirect and vicarious experience (i.e., learning that someone else has had a good/bad encounter with the police) influences attitudes (Bradford et al., 2009; Rosenbaum et al., 2005).
- Important sources include media, family, friends and other social networks (Rosenbaum et al., 2005).
- For those without direct interactions with police, the media can be particularly salient (Fitzgerald, Hough, Joseph and Qureshi, 2002; Mawby, 2002; Skogan, 1990; 1994).

Community policing approach

- Community policing approach includes (SEESAC, 2003; Peak, Bradshaw & Glensor, 1992):
 - Increased accessibility of officers (e.g., foot patrols)
 - Decentralization of operations to communities

- Implementation of crime-prevention programs
- Establishment of close police-community relationships and collaboration
- Increased role and responsibility of citizens in neighbourhood safety
- A focus on customer (citizen) satisfaction
- A longitudinal study (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997) shows that community-focused policing increases positive feelings about the police. There also is some evidence in a British study that positive encounters can have a small but significant effect on trust and satisfaction (Bradford et al., 2009).
- Most citizens are open to the idea of community-police partnerships despite many pre-existing negative opinions (Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998).

V. Summary of Key Findings

The literature on police perception, as well as specific studies of Afghanistan's post-Taliban police reform efforts, provide a basis for conclusions that support the findings of the UNDP/LOTFA Police Perception Survey - 2011. Key point from the literature include the following:

- Public confidence in police is a function of feelings of trust, perceived legitimacy and consent to the difference in power.
- Trust has three components: (1) trust in the police as an institution, (2) interpersonal trust in actual encounters with police and (3) trust in the effectiveness and fairness of officers, and that they will display community values
- Perceived legitimacy is enhanced through effective bureaucratic organization, obeying and enforcing the rule of law, using minimal force, non-partisanship, transparency and accountability, viewing the occupation in a service role and undertaking preventive policing. Legitimacy is damaged by lack of community support, trust and cooperation; corruption; lack of institutional credibility; lack of accountability; familial/kinship bias; links to crime; and undue influence of political and powerful entities.
- Objective conditions (e.g., crime rate, general neighbourhood conditions) are important to judgments of police performance. Satisfaction is lower with higher crime and fear of crime. Subjective perceptions are independently influential, and may trump actual conditions.
- Police presence matters. Putting “boots in the streets” and increasing police visibility increases positive views of performance.
- Police behaviour affects perceptions. People are less satisfied with police if they are seen as rude, unfair, unconcerned, unhelpful and unprofessional. Specifically, community-focused policing increases positive perceptions.
- Attitudes also are influenced by indirect experiences, including stories from friends, family and media.

Appendix F: References

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Appendix G: Afghanistan Provincial and Regional Map

