Africa

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TUNISIA
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
LIBYA
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Western Sahara
MAURITANIA
MALI
NIGER
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CHAD
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BENIN
NIGERIA
SIERRA LEONE
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
TOGO
GHANA
LIBERIA
ETHIOPIA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.
SOUTH SUDAN
CAMEROON
SOMALIA
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
EQUAT. GUINEA
UGANDA
KENYA
GABON
REP. OF THE CONGO
RWANDA
BURUNDI
DEM. REP. OF THE CONGO
INDIAN OCEAN
TANZANIA
ANGOLA
MALAWI
ZAMBIA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
MOZAMBIQUE
ZIMBABWE
MADAGASCAR
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
SWAZILAND
LESOTHO
SOUTH AFRICA

East Africa and the Horn

Laura A. Young

Conflict over land and natural resources continued to dominate the landscape for minorities and indigenous peoples in East Africa during 2014. Major issues included large-scale protests in Ethiopia related to the expansion of Addis Ababa, the hearing of the first indigenous rights case at the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights on Ogiek land rights in Kenya, and continuing disputes over the rights of communities across the region to benefit from the exploitation of natural resources in their territories. The failure of East African governments to effectively implement legal and policy frameworks that could substantially enhance the situation of minority and indigenous peoples remains a significant challenge throughout the region. For instance, the Kenyan government's inability to date to pass required legislation on community land and evictions or to operationalize the Constitution's provisions on affirmative action in relation to minority communities reflects the slow rate of progress on these types of issues.

Urbanization in East Africa is a critical issue; it is one of the fastest urbanizing regions in the world, with a projected urban growth of 5.35 per cent between 2010 and 2020. Between 1960 and 2010, the population living in cities increased from 6 million to more than 77 million. This rapid change in East Africa's landscape is having important impacts on economics, climate, health, conflict, culture and gender roles, as well as almost every other aspect of daily life in the region. It is also having significant impacts on minorities and indigenous peoples.

Right: An Anuak woman works on her family's banana plantation in the village of Karmi, in Ethopia's Gambella Province. The Anuak community were relocated to the site as part of the Government 'villagization' program. *Panos/ Robin Hammond*

Conflict and climate change have for many years had a disproportionate impact on minorities and indigenous peoples in East Africa. As these issues continue to cause population displacements in the region, minorities and indigenous peoples find themselves forced to migrate to urban areas for survival. These types of population displacements often create vulnerable female-headed households in urban and peri-urban areas. East African indigenous peoples, who consist mainly of pastoralists and hunter-gatherer groups, can find the transition to urban life particularly challenging. Forced into environments where their traditional livelihoods are unavailable, they adopt a multitude of coping strategies. As described in a study by UN-Habitat, some of these strategies 'include the commoditization of certain aspects of their culture such as performing traditional dances for the entertainment of tourists, selling traditional handcraft, herbs and medicinal plants…Women engage in beadwork and in making and selling handicrafts as well as in selling medicinal herbs.' Despite these coping strategies, poverty and inequality remain defining characteristics of East Africa's urban areas, whether in large capital cities or in smaller urban areas. When this pattern of inequality intersects with the consistent marginalization of minority and indigenous communities, one finds minority groups in urban areas at the extreme end of the inequality scale.

Ethiopia

Minority and indigenous communities in Ethiopia include Afar, and indigenous Anuak, Oromo, Somalis and many other ethnic groups. Muslims also are a significant religious minority in the predominantly Coptic Christian nation. Despite a federalist constitutional structure that provides important autonomy and cultural rights for Ethiopia's diverse communities, many of Ethiopia's minorities and indigenous peoples continue to be marginalized. Repeated reports

of human rights violations as a result of the Ethiopian government's development strategy in the Lower Omo Valley and the Gambella led the US Congress to take action through its 2014 Appropriations Act. The legislation specifies that funds for development cannot be used to support activities that directly or indirectly involve forced evictions, and that the use of funds shall be subject to a process of prior consultation with affected communities. While this was a significant victory for communities in the Lower Omo Valley and the Gambella, the impact of these provisions on the government's policies remains to be seen.

The creation of large-scale agricultural plantations in the Gambella region continued in 2014. Indigenous communities in Ethiopia's Gambella region have been in conflict with the government over plans to convert thousands of hectares into large-scale agricultural plantations. Anuak communities took action through the World Bank's Inspection Panel to protect their rights to land and culture in the face of large-scale land dispossession. Controversies over the development of the Gibe III dam also continued during the year. The dam threatens to damage the local environment and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of indigenous people who have lived in the Lower Omo region for centuries. Despite significant concerns about the social and environmental impact of the dam, particularly on pastoralist communities, the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation reported at the end of the year that the project was 89 per cent complete.

Reports indicate that Majengir hunter-gatherers have also been the victims of land loss and increasing violence in relation to plans for large-scale coffee production, including the detention of Majengir leaders in 2014. Evidence from satellite imagery indicates that development projects in the Lower Omo Valley have significantly reduced grazing lands for the multiple pastoralist communities who live in the region. These changes in land use patterns have led to increased conflict in the region. For example, indigenous Suri pastoralists have come into conflict with neighbouring communities and with the government as a result of being accused of trespassing on traditional grazing lands that were converted into a palm oil plantation. The Ethiopian government has initiated a process of small-scale urbanization, known as *sefara*, to induce or coerce the non-sedentary Suri into

giving up their traditional pastoralist lifestyle and settling in small towns.

Similarly, the government's controversial use of 'villagization' has continued for a number of years and involved the planned relocation of the majority of Gambella region's rural residents to officially designated settlements. The process has been widely criticized by human rights groups, who have reported evictions, violence, intimidation and sexual assault by police and military enforcing the policy. Though justified by authorities as a means to provide communities located in underpopulated areas with better access to basic services and livelihood opportunities, the relocation sites have in practice often proved inhospitable, with much of the promised development and infrastructure failing to materialize. In some instances, according to previous research by Human Rights Watch (HRW), Anuak families have been forcibly relocated from urban areas to government villages with limited services or infrastructure, undermining access to essential services such as education. The organization expressed concern that the underlying motive in these cases was to release valuable land for private investment.

Ethiopia, though largely rural, is urbanizing rapidly. Addis Ababa – the capital and home to the offices of the African Union – is projected to grow by more than 60 per cent between 2010 and 2025. The city reportedly has the highest slum incidence in the world, with poor access to basic services even for those living outside the slums. This is placing increasing pressure on the surrounding Oromia region, particularly with the proposed implementation of the government's Addis Adaba Integrated Development Master Plan. The plan to expand Addis Ababa would bring multiple towns in the surrounding Oromia region under its jurisdiction.

However, the Ethiopian Oromo community, the largest ethnic group in the country, has long been in conflict with the central government. The conflict has deep historical roots in the displacement of Oromos from their traditional territory, which is now home to Addis Ababa, and in Ethiopia's constitutionally established federal structure. Currently, towns in the Oromo region fall under the administration of the Oromo regional authority, and the Oromo language is officially used for education, business and public service. Should the towns be absorbed into Addis Ababa, they would fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government and, among other changes, the official language would change to Amharic. The announcement of the central government's plans to expand the boundaries of Addis Ababa provoked protests by Oromo students during the year. As with past protests by other Ethiopian minority groups, the government reportedly used excessive force, including beatings of protesters, arbitrary arrests and detentions which led to the deaths of dozens of students.

Kenya

Land rights continued to be a major issue for minority and indigenous communities in Kenya during 2014. In January, thousands of Sengwer were forcibly removed from Embobut forest, in the western part of the country, and their houses torched by armed members of the Kenyan Forest Service. This was in direct violation of a 2013 High Court injunction prohibiting evictions of the community. The government justified its actions against members of the indigenous community, who have been labelled as 'squatters' despite their long-standing ancestral claims, as a necessary measure to protect local water supplies and biodiversity. The territory lies within the World Bank-funded National Resource Management Project (NRMP), a multi-year programme designed to strengthen environmental conservation in the Cherangany Hills. However, the NRMP has been accused of failing to address indigenous land rights issues, as well as moving the boundaries of the Cherangany forest reserves so that Sengwer homes were relocated without consultation. Following a complaint by the Sengwer community in 2013, the World Bank's Inspection Panel launched an investigation and concluded, in a report leaked to the media, that the NRMP had failed to follow basic safeguards and had neglected to involve the indigenous community. Nevertheless, the World Bank concluded that despite these issues the NRMP was not linked to the evictions. The displacement of Sengwer continued into early 2015, with ongoing evictions and house burning by Kenyan Forest Service guards.

Right: An elder Endorois woman in a small town in Kenya's Rift Valley. The Endorois are fighting to achieve implementation of the 2010 African Commission decision granting them rights to Lake Bogoria. *Minority Rights Group/Rebecca Marlin*

The ongoing land rights case brought by the Ogiek hunter-gatherer community was heard before the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights in November 2014. The case was referred to the Court in 2012 by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. MRG has represented the Ogiek community in their litigation at the regional level since the case began with a Communication at the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in 2009. The Ogiek are trying to achieve a permanent resolution to their decades-long struggle for recognition of their rights to inhabit their traditional territory in the Mau forest. A judgment in the case is expected in 2015.

The Endorois community continued to advocate for implementation of a 2010 decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights that ruled that the government must restitute their ancestral land, compensate them for the eviction and loss of access to their land, and pay royalties for developments which occurred on it. The government in 2014 established a Task Force to undertake implementation of the decision. The Task Force will be addressing restitution of the land to the Endorois, compensation for losses resulting from their eviction and benefit-sharing of royalties derived from lucrative bioenzymes and rubies found on the land. The Task Force's mandate provides that it may 'solicit, receive and consider views from members of the public and other interest groups', but it does not require consultation with the Endorois community, nor is there any Endorois representative on the Task Force.

The multi-country Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor continued to move ahead in 2014. The massive project is designed to bring investment, infrastructure and in some cases the creation of entire new cities along a corridor in northern Kenya that has historically been ignored from a development perspective. It has already led to increased land speculation along the entire corridor, which stretches through territories that have been inhabited by pastoralists and hunter-gatherer communities for centuries. The port component of the project is being built in Lamu, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and home to indigenous hunter-gatherer communities, fishing communities and several pastoralist groups. The first stages of construction began in 2014 amid substantial concerns over the environmental, health, and livelihood impacts of the massive changes, although the project continues to be challenged by litigation from multiple parties.

Though around three-quarters of the country's population still reside in rural areas, Kenya is one of the fastest urbanizing countries in the world. Nairobi, the capital, is projected to grow by almost 80 per cent between 2010 and 2025. It currently hosts more than 200 informal settlements, also known as urban slums, where living conditions are among the worst in Africa

because population densities reach up to 26,000 people per square kilometre. High population density, poverty and lack of services have combined with a volatile political environment where neighbourhoods are strongly politicized along tribal lines. Certain Kenyan minority communities, including Asians, Nubians and Somalis, have significant urban populations and are particularly affected by this trend of rapid and largely unmanaged growth. Maasai indigenous to the area, in particular, have suffered displacement from their land over the last century as Nairobi has steadily expanded. Farmers and developers have seized large swathes of their grazing lands, leading to the erosion of traditional livelihoods as pastoralism has become increasingly untenable.

Part of the conflict over land in many of Kenya's informal settlements, as well as in rural areas inhabited by Kenya's indigenous communities, is the lack of an effective legislative regime controlling land tenure and the manner in which evictions are to be carried out when people occupy land informally. The Community Land Bill and the Evictions and Resettlement Bill were introduced in parliament in 2014, but remain stalled because of their controversial nature and lack of effective public participation. Forced evictions and the proliferation of informal settlements remain significant issues in Kenya's other major cities, such as Mombasa and Kisumu. Kenya's indigenous coastal communities, broadly known as the Mijikenda, often can only access land as squatters or through the informal market as tenants because of the historical and legal complexities of land titling at the coast, as well as continual land grabbing. This situation leads to ongoing evictions as land values along Kenya's Indian Ocean coast continue to increase.

In Nairobi, one of the most well-known informal settlements is Kibera. Though historically it was Maasai grazing land, the area was ceded to the British colonial government in the 1904 Maasai Agreements and later designated as a settlement for the Nubian community, who are descendants of Sudanese members of the King's African Rifles who served in Uganda and Kenya. Previously an agricultural and residential settlement for the Nubians, Kibera has been reduced to one of the world's most notorious slums through successive invasions and land grabbing. After Kenya's independence, the Nubian community also effectively became stateless because the government refused to recognize them as citizens, although most had been born in Kenya and any ties with Sudan had been severed decades earlier. After decades of struggle to receive recognition of their claim to Kenyan citizenship as well as title to their land in Kibera, conflict over land titles erupted again in 2014. The Nubians claim that the land allotted to them in Kibera during colonial rule was originally more than 4,000 acres. A proposal by the current government to issue titles to the Nubian community led to riots and the title handover was cancelled at the last minute.

Another area with a large minority population is Eastleigh, where a large proportion of Nairobi's Somali population resides. The district has repeatedly been a target in the wake of security incidents associated with the militant group al-Shabaab, including two attacks in Mombasa and Nairobi in March 2014. Following these incidents, the Kenyan government initiated 'Operation Usalama Watch', which led to the round-up and detention of more than 4,000 Somalis in a stadium on the outskirts of Nairobi. Reports of extortion, inhumane detention conditions, sexual assaults, arbitrary arrest, as well as the summary deportation of Somalis found without identity papers, were widespread during the operation.

As with previous security crackdowns, the focus was concentrated primarily in Eastleigh, with the interior minister announcing on 5 April 2014 that 6,000 police were to be deployed in the area to round up foreign nationals. Even before the second attack took place in a busy area of Eastleigh on 31 March, killing six people, the government had already announced plans to relocate urban refugees to camps outside Nairobi, such as Dabaab. This encampment policy has been promoted by the government for a number of years, particularly in the wake of violent incidents, despite a 2013 court ruling that condemned it as illegal. Previous anti-terror operations, such as the 2011 security crackdown, have specifically targeted Eastleigh and its Somali residents. Buildings in the area, particularly those near the airport, have been demolished as

Case study *by Rebecca Marlin*

Urban migration and the loss of traditional culture among Endorois youth in Kenya

Indigenous Endorois had inhabited Lake Bogoria for centuries when, in the 1970s, the Kenyan government forcibly removed them from their ancestral land. Their eviction brought to an end a unique way of life rich with culture and tradition, and they have been advocating for the rightful return of their land ever since. Despite a 2010 ruling by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in their favour, secured with MRG's support, the government has yet to comply.

In October 2014, MRG spent three weeks visiting the areas near Lake Bogoria where the community is now based, and interviewed nearly 500 Endorois about their lives. Many Endorois described how, while living at Lake Bogoria, they engaged in a variety of cultural and religious activities, such as worshipping at the graves of their ancestors, collecting herbs for medicinal purposes and practising initiation ceremonies. As pastoralists, they followed the natural grazing patterns of their livestock, and maintained beehives to collect honey.

In the 40 years since their displacement, however, the Endorois have been struggling to maintain their traditions, while living in marginal areas with extremely limited access to health care, basic infrastructure and education. As a result, younger generations have made efforts to better their lives by heading to cities such as Eldoret, Nakuru and Nairobi. Their reasons for moving are varied: some are in search of higher education, others are looking for employment, while many are also seeking to escape frequent outbreaks of violence as a result of cattle-rustling carried out by neighbouring communities.

Some Endorois youth, frustrated by their marginalized status, also leave in the hope of securing greater recognition within Kenyan society. One Endorois attending law school in Nairobi discussed the numerous challenges facing young Endorois, such as ongoing government repression, exclusion from local job recruitment, leadership problems and their continued stigmatization. He explained that these factors 'have caused the youth to move away from Endorois land in order to disassociate from the community and be given greater consideration by Kenyan leaders'.

Migration to urban areas has produced benefits and challenges for Endorois families. On the positive side, it has given young Endorois access to higher education and frequently the skills they gain may be used to improve the lives of their community as well. Endorois who find employment in cities are also able to send some of their wages home to their families, where they are desperately needed.

At the same time, Endorois who move to larger cities report that they face discrimination based on their minority status and often are only able to find employment in non-permanent or contract-based jobs, usually in private security or domestic work. Endorois employed in this way are rarely given time off by their employers to visit their families, who often can only be reached after a long journey through remote and potentially dangerous areas. The result is that many young Endorois end up not returning home for extended periods, and find themselves increasingly out of touch with day-to-day life within the Endorois community.

Endorois tradition is passed down from elders to youth, with frequent interaction between the two groups. With more and more from the younger generation leaving their rural communities, however, this chain has been broken. Almost all Endorois

surveyed, both elders and youth, reported that they felt the younger generation were losing their culture. One Endorois woman remarked that it was sad to see so many Endorois leaving at a young age for cities, because 'this is the time when the younger generation is expected to learn how ceremonies are conducted. Generations to come will lose the unique Endorois culture and livelihood as they are continuously exposed to urban culture.' Endorois also find that it is frequently those who might become Endorois leaders who are most likely to leave. 'The community is affected when the youth move out, leaving them without energetic and visionary people,' said one Endorois man. 'Those with ideas do not share them with the community and the community is left behind.'

Endorois are therefore struggling to develop a way to maintain their traditions in the face of the strong draw of the cities, but many feel defeated. A majority of those surveyed believed that the only way to ensure Endorois youth remained in the community was to regain access to their territory at Lake Bogoria, where they could fully reinstate their traditions and offer a more attractive future to the next generation. Despite the government's obligation to restore their land, return remains a distant reality for Kenya's Endorois, who must now struggle with the loss not only of their culture, livelihoods and traditions, but their youth as well. ■

Right: Makeshift houses of Gaboye families in a village in Hargeisa, Somali. The Gaboye minority are among the most vulnerable in Somalia. *Somaliska Fred/Andreas Ragnarsson*

potential security threats.

Kenya also has a significant Asian minority, primarily Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims of Indian origin, who are largely based in the country's major urban centres. Though they have long played an important role in the country's economy, the perceived wealth of the community has also been a source of resentment among other groups. These tensions were brought into focus during the year in Kisumu, Kenya's third largest city, when the minority Sikh community erected a statue to celebrate 100 years of settlement in the city. However, angry responses from some prominent local Christian preachers led to violence, hate speech and the vandalization of the statue. Ultimately, the Sikh community decided to remove the statue after attempts to negotiate on the matter failed to resolve the conflict, though restoration work was subsequently undertaken on the statue. The next month, the Sikh community was nevertheless able to celebrate its centenary without serious incident, with local leaders celebrating its contribution to the city's history.

Somalia

Despite continuing international intervention and the presence of more than 20,000 African Union troops in Somalia, political instability increased in 2014 and attacks by the militant group al-Shabaab continued inside Somalia and throughout the East Africa region. Attacks late in 2014 along the Somali–Kenyan border and on the African Union's main military base in Mogadishu highlighted the continuing and significant threat from al-Shabaab. With increasing instability inside Somalia, minority groups such as Bantu and Banadiri continue to face vulnerability and exclusion. Other vulnerable groups include occupational minorities or clans that are associated with specific trades, such as Gaboye, Tumal and Yibrow, who work as blacksmiths, carpenters, tanners, barbers and in other trades.

The importance of the clan governance system

in the different regions of Somalia is reflected in lower levels of political representation. In South-Central Somalia, for example, though minorities are estimated to make up anything between a fifth and a third of the total Somali population, the parliament's 4.5 power-sharing formula provides equal political representation to the four major clans while leaving only a half share for the rest of the Somali population. However, the limited reach of central authorities in many areas enhances the importance of clan-based security structures and governance through *xeer*, the complex system of traditional customary law from which many minority groups are sidelined. This exclusion from the dominant clan structure, or membership in a weaker clan, leaves minority groups more vulnerable to property-grabbing, physical attacks, killings and general discrimination. Research by MRG during 2014 in Somalia found that clan-based hierarchies continued to enable widespread sexual violence and other rights abuses against minorities, particularly women.

In Mogadishu, for example, urbanization patterns have become dominated by clans, ensuring that residence in specific neighbourhoods is controlled by clan affiliation. Urban areas, especially in conflict-affected countries such as Somalia, often present very high risks for women, especially women who may be outside the protection regime of a dominant clan. The clan networks dominating residential patterns in Mogadishu also extend to the displaced people's settlements around the city. Accordingly, those who fall outside the clan structures, specifically minority groups, often cannot access basic services provided for displaced people in the camps, such as water, food and health care.

Clan politics in urban areas can be especially intense as dominant groups monopolize local political structures. In Mogadishu, for instance, municipal government positions are occupied almost exclusively by Hawiye. The common perception among clan members that Mogadishu and surrounding areas, as territory traditionally inhabited by Hawiye, belong solely to their clan has left them reluctant to share land and other resources with other communities, despite the fact that, as the capital, it now accommodates a wide variety of groups.

Case study *by Michelle Minc*

Minorities on the margins of Mogadishu

Mogadishu, one of the oldest cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, has undergone tremendous population growth over the last century. This has been accompanied by the development of informal settlements, or *obbosibo*, which have sprung up across the city with little or no planning. As far back as the 1960s, donor-financed and government-led initiatives attempted to address the issue through the construction of affordable housing. These efforts were ultimately unable to keep up with the influx of migrants to the city, however, and today many of its inhabitants live in congested conditions without access to basic housing materials or public services. Despite its troubles, Mogadishu continues to attract large numbers of new arrivals, with an annual population increase of almost 9 per cent.

Though no precise figures are available, evidence suggests that minority groups make up a disproportionate part of the population of the overcrowded and unhygienic *obbosibo* that run through the city. More often than not, minority populations have ended up in Mogadishu after being displaced by conflict, hunger or land grabbing elsewhere, usually southern Somalia. Yet their lives in the capital's informal settlements continue to be plagued by insecurity, sexual violence and discrimination, making it almost impossible for them to make ends meet. Furthermore, the forcible appropriation of their land by members of dominant clans makes returning home an unfeasible option.

Minority women and youth living in *obbosibo* are particularly vulnerable as many lack connections and extended family support. As a result, they often find themselves excluded from livelihood opportunities by majority groups. Women tend to work in informal sectors such as domestic work, where they are frequently subjected to gender-based violence or denied payment. In these harsh conditions one of the coping strategies employed by minority households is child labour, with the youngest family members sent out at an early age to earn money as herders, shoe shiners or street vendors.

With limited employment opportunities, many families living in informal settlements rely on hand-outs from international and local donors. Yet, in line with other forms of discrimination perpetrated against minorities, humanitarian aid is systematically diverted from those who need it most. The informal settlements are often run by powerbrokers who administer the camps; these so called 'gatekeepers', comprising local land-owners, government officials and businessmen, are drawn exclusively from majority clans. Together they monopolize control over those migrating to the city, requisitioning public and private property to house displaced communities – often minorities – in return for monetary or other forms of payment. In this context, the mismanagement of humanitarian assistance continues to fuel the power of gatekeepers in the overcrowded and unprotected settlements.

Today, Mogadishu continues to grapple with the issue of *obbosibo*. But instead of constructing alternative affordable housing or attempting to tackle the unsafe living conditions in settlements, the government has embarked on a campaign of forcible evictions. Between January and December 2014, over 32,500 individuals were forcibly evicted from public and private land and buildings in Mogadishu. While no disaggregated statistics are available to identify the proportion of minority groups among the victims, the vast majority (over 90 per cent) of evictees were IDPs, who heavily originate from minority groups. Other IDPs remain at imminent risk of

forced evictions. Most recently, in March 2015, Somali state security forces forcibly evicted an estimated 21,000 IDPs from informal camps in the Kahda district of Mogadishu, with security forces destroying shelters and beating those resisting orders to vacate. No adequate notification, compensation or resettlement option is provided to the communities displaced.

These evictions reflect a broader context where decisions over land, housing and other issues are routinely made by dominant groups – in this case, Mogadishu's majority-dominated local authorities – without any form of consultation with those communities, usually minorities, most affected. Despite Mogadishu's rich and diverse population, power continues to be narrowly concentrated with majority clan members. This has serious implications for the city's future. Without a concerted effort to recognize and integrate them, its marginalized minority population will remain homeless, hungry and exposed, moving from one informal settlement to the next – a situation that will not only further entrench their secondary status in Somalia, but also perpetuate the sad legacy of Mogadishu's *obbosibo* for generations to come. ■

South Sudan

The conflict in South Sudan continued throughout 2014, despite repeated attempts at brokering a lasting peace agreement between the warring factions. The conflict has subsumed and exacerbated ongoing conflicts between ethnic minorities and the national government and army, primarily controlled by the largely Nuer and Dinka ethnic leaders. This has been particularly the case in Jonglei State, where conflict has been a consistent feature of life over the past several decades. By the end of the year, the UN reported that tens of thousands had been killed and 1.9 million people displaced by the conflict.

Jonglei is home to multiple ethnic communities and sub-groups, including Anuak, Dinka, Jiye, Kachipo, Murle and Nuer groups. Bor town, an urban centre and the capital of Jonglei State, is particularly multi-ethnic, including foreign nationals who live in the town to conduct business. Bor was hard-hit during the early days of the fighting. The UN Mission in South Sudan reported that South Sudanese minorities such as Anuak, Murle and Shilluk, as well as foreigners from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, appeared to be specifically targeted. By the end of 2014, various parts of Jonglei State were still being contested by government forces, opposition forces and an ethnic militia. An August 2014 report noted that Jonglei State had the highest number of displaced people and the highest food insecurity rate in South Sudan. There is substantial concern that as the rainy season comes to an end in 2015, extensive fighting will erupt again.

The national conflict between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar has exacerbated long-standing tensions between communities over land rights, lack of community-centred development and violent rivalries that have developed over centuries. Research conducted by MRG in 2014 highlighted the underlying grievances among minority communities in Jonglei, including lack of access to water, conflicts over dry-season grazing areas, violent cattle raids and the manipulation of vulnerable populations by local politicians. The national conflict has worsened these underlying problems, given that many

development projects have been halted and public assets such as schools, medical facilities and water access points have been attacked or destroyed. Though the South Sudan peace process continued throughout 2014, it has largely focused on the national-level conflict between Kiir and Machar to the exclusion of many of the other fighting groups that have become part and parcel of the conflict. Concerns have been raised that this strategy cannot lead to lasting peace and will not address many of the concerns of minority communities in the country.

Urban growth in South Sudan has in recent years been accelerated by large-scale displacement. In Yei, for example, previous research has highlighted how increasing pressure on land and the return of the town's Kakwa inhabitants around the time of the country's independence in 2011 exacerbated tensions with the largely Dinka displaced. More recently, however, major urban centres have been devastated and depopulated by renewed conflict. In Bor, for example, after the town was occupied by opposition forces with support from thousands of Nuer militias in December 2013, the largely Dinka residents were targeted and forced to flee. The UN estimated that in Bor town alone 5–10 per cent of housing, as well as the central market, had been destroyed during the early fighting. After changing hands a number of times, the town was recaptured by government forces in January 2014. There were subsequent reports of repeated attacks on displaced Nuer based in the UN-managed camp near Bor by government soldiers. While some of the country's large displaced population has been able to return to their home towns, many remain in a limbo.

Despite the conflict, plans for a new national capital of South Sudan remain on the table. This has come in part because of objections by the Bari community who are the traditional inhabitants of Juba, the current capital. Bari have for several years expressed concerns about Juba's rapid expansion and the resultant land grabbing and absorption of Bari villages. The population of Juba has doubled since the end of the war for independence in 2005. Bari community leaders have petitioned the government to speed up the relocation of the capital to a new site, noting that they agreed to Juba becoming the seat of the government as an interim measure and that their constitutionally protected community land rights are under threat.

Right: A Batwa girl stands overlooking the forest area where her community lived before being evicted, Kisoro, Uganda, 2014. *Emma Eastwood/ Minority Rights Goup*

Uganda

Conflict over land and natural resources remained a defining feature of life in Uganda for minorities and indigenous peoples in 2014. In July, the Rwenzori region of Western Uganda erupted into conflict, affecting multiple communities in Kasese, Bundibugyo and Ntoroko districts. These areas are home to, among others, the pastoralist Basongora, and in recent years have witnessed renewed violence. These outbreaks have reignited long-standing conflicts over political power and land rights between pastoralists and agricultural communities in the region. The region is also experiencing rapid population growth which is contributing to the scarcity of available land and natural resources for the diverse communities that inhabit the area. Advocacy groups, including MRG, urged the Ugandan government to address the long-standing root causes of conflict in the region.

Batwa communities in Uganda continued to experience violations of their rights in 2014. According to reports from the United Organization for Batwa Development in Uganda (UOBDU), Batwa houses were burned to the ground in Kisoro in June 2014. The incident, which led to the destruction of 13 homes and to many Batwa fleeing their residences, was an outbreak of a long-standing conflict between Batwa and a neighbouring community. On a positive note however, in Kabaale, members of the Batwa community were able to purchase land for settlement through the assistance of UOBDU. Land will be held by the Batwa as a community and will support enhanced development for the community in the area.

Free, prior and informed consent in relation to mining in the Karamoja region continues to be a concern. MRG reported on this issue in 2011, highlighting the environmental concerns and human rights violations against local populations

associated with mineral exploration in the area. A 2014 HRW report again documented the issue, making clear that little progress has been made in relation to the rights of communities in the region. Indeed, in recent years, the extractive industry in Uganda has undergone significant growth, without attendant monitoring and regulation to ensure that the interests of communities are protected. This has exacerbated the difficulties experienced by the agro-pastoralist Karamajong people living in the region, including climate change, land rights issues and violent disarmament operations by government forces.

The poverty and lack of opportunities in the region has pushed some Karamajong to migrate to urban areas such as Kampala, where they typically face exploitation, discrimination and periodic round-ups by security forces. Many end up begging for their survival, particularly Karamajong women and children, who are especially vulnerable to exploitation. There is also evidence in recent years that issues such as alcohol abuse have become more common among urban Karamajong migrants. Other urban minority groups, such as Uganda's Nubian population, reside in poorly serviced and unsanitary slums. Acholi Quarter in Kampala, for example, is largely populated by formerly rural Acholi from Northern Uganda, uprooted by years of conflict and now caught in a situation of prolonged displacement. Though some sense of a community and identity has persisted among residents, the area is characterized by sub-standard housing, poor environmental health and limited livelihood opportunities.

During the past several years, Uganda has embarked on an extensive process of policy development around land, housing and urban development, with a draft National Land Policy now approved but not yet officially gazetted as of the end of 2014. The policy acknowledges the role that conflict, instability and rural poverty have played in driving urban migration, as well as the prevalence of slum dwellings in urban areas. It also recognizes the particular vulnerability of marginalized groups such as women, children and IDPs, committing the government to 'ensure that both women and men, including children, enjoy equal rights and opportunities with regard to access to affordable urban services without discrimination' and to 'put in place

measures to address the issues of internally displaced persons.' Despite these commitments, the description of such strategies and measures is vague and contains no detail in relation to key populations such as minorities or indigenous peoples. As policy development moves forward, the reality of such commitments will be seen in implementation.

West and Central Africa

Paige Wilhite Jennings

The year 2014 saw increasing sectarian conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Nigeria, with cross-border attacks spreading strife into neighbouring countries. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mali, some progress towards peace at the start of the year was followed by ongoing violence in certain areas, causing continued insecurity and displacement. West Africa, particularly Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, faced a devastating outbreak of the Ebola virus which decimated health services and brought travel, trade, agriculture and other production to a near halt.

While many of the countries in West and Central Africa remain largely rural, both regions are urbanizing rapidly and struggling to keep pace with this growth: the overwhelming majority of West Africa's urban population, for instance, is believed to be living in slums. Migration from particular rural areas often over time encourages other community members to relocate, particularly as remittances can raise hopes of increased wages in cities. In some circumstances this can contribute to the creation of ethnically based migrant neighbourhoods within urban centres. In responding to these 'pull' factors, however, migrants can encounter discrimination and resentment from the established or dominant population, particularly in countries with pre-existing tensions between 'indigenous' and 'settler' populations. In some situations, competition for scarce resources or resentment of the success of certain migrant communities can exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions.

Right: 'The forest used to be for the Ba'aka but not anymore. We would walk in the forest according to the seasons but now we're afraid.' say the Ba'aka of Cameroon. *Survival International*

West Africa's urban centres are concentrated along its low-lying coastline and are vulnerable to the impact of climate change, particularly rising sea levels, with densely populated slums populated by the most marginalized groups especially vulnerable. In the Sahel, meanwhile, desertification is pushing both farming and pastoralist populations south, heightening tensions over land, water and other resources, and stimulating urban migration among rural communities. Conflict-induced displacement, often arising from ethnic tensions, has led to significant urban growth accompanied by a decline in living conditions and a rise in unemployment. The poorest live in informal settlements on the periphery of urban centres, in conditions where, given the region's diverse ethnic make-up, differences between groups can be easily exploited.

West Africa

Cameroon

In 2014 Cameroon's northern region faced an increasing threat from Boko Haram, an armed extremist group based in Nigeria that aims to set up an Islamic state. Despite joint military efforts between Cameroon and Nigeria to subdue Boko Haram, it increased cross-border operations in Cameroon's rural and impoverished far north, attacking and shelling groupings of Nigerian refugees and restricting humanitarian aid efforts. It also targeted Cameroonian villages, churches and security forces, killing, wounding or displacing minority Christians and majority Muslims alike. Some of those displaced sought refuge in regional towns such as Kolofata and Mora, or in the regional capital Maroua,



but as Boko Haram encroached further into Cameroon's territory, others reportedly went further south, out of danger, to Yaoundéô. By late 2014 scores of schools had been closed in response to cross-border attacks and kidnappings, and the school buildings occupied by those fleeing Boko Haram. Community leaders reported that some young Cameroonian Muslims had been coerced into joining Boko Haram or reportedly recruited by the offer of a cash payment upon joining, a powerful incentive in the poor region.

February saw the beginning of a mass return to east Cameroon of Cameroonian Muslim migrants who had been living in the CAR until violence at the hands of armed Christian and animist self-defence 'anti-*balaka*' ('anti-machete') militias forced them to flee the country. In addition, large numbers of largely Muslim CAR refugees fled to Cameroon. During 2014, more than 187,000 CAR refugees fled to neighbouring countries. By the end of the year, UNHCR was using planning estimates for approximately 210,000 CAR refugees in Cameroon alone. Many took refuge in towns and villages somewhat inside Cameroon, away from the border, to avoid attack. By doing so they transformed a swathe of formerly majority Christian settlements into majority Muslim ones. In some areas conflict has broken out with local residents over resources, such as access to health services and shelter. Food supplies have been stretched past capacity, causing hardship for locals and refugees alike, and fuelling competition and resentment between them. Cattle-herding Peuhl (also known as Mbororo) refugees – targeted in the CAR for their perceived wealth and livestock – have also struggled to locate adequate grazing land for their cattle, at times resulting in disputes over grazing land and other resources with local farmers, who are largely Christian.

Among Cameroon's indigenous peoples, reports continued of the displacement of Ba'aka, traditional forest-dwelling hunter-gatherers, by logging and other development activities. Many have been forced to move to villages and roadside settlements elsewhere, where they face exclusion, poverty and related problems ranging from malnutrition to alcoholism. In 2014, some Ba'aka were reportedly denied access to their ancestral lands and suffered abuse at the hands of security forces deployed to curb poaching and enforce conservation norms.

Cameroonian Mbororo pastoralists, believed to make up 12 per cent of the population, at times conflicted with sedentary farmers, ranchers,

agro-industrial businesses and newly established national parks over issues around land use. In April, Rita Izsák and James Anaya, the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues and the then UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples' rights, expressed concern at the reported eviction of Mbororo families from their ancestral lands in western Cameroon, in the context of a long-standing land dispute with the Catholic University in Bamenda. An estimated 300 people had been made homeless. The university claimed that it had provided compensation, whereas the community stated that it had been misled and would never have agreed to leave their homes.

Cameroon has urbanized rapidly over the last three decades, in part due to drought and famine. Men from the Mbororo community, for instance, have been forced by drought to abandon pastoralism and search for work in urban centres, leaving their families behind. Climate change has led to the encroachment of invasive plant species, also limiting pasture lands. This has in turn led to a decrease in milk production, traditionally a source of income for Mbororo women; without that extra money, Mbororo women have become more dependent on men for support. These trends have disrupted family structures, damaged family cohesion, and increased the risk of violence against women as well as exposure to HIV/AIDS, among other impacts. More recently, too, conflict has also driven displacement and migration to urban areas, with cross-border attacks by Boko Haram forcing many to flee rural areas for urban centres. In eastern Cameroon, similarly, refugees from CAR have swelled the population of local towns, at times raising tensions with residents and concerns about security.

Côte d'Ivoire

For several decades after independence in 1960, Côte d'Ivoire became the most common destination for West African migrants due to perceptions of its wealth and stability. Many of them settled in urban areas, particularly the economic capital Abidjan. Extensive immigration led to some resentment and insecurity among the pre-existing population, however. Long-standing post-independence president Félix Houphouët-Boigny's administrations practised an informal quota system to maintain stability by ensuring an ethnic and regional balance in state institutions. Following his death in 1993, dominant political actors – predominantly southern Christians – developed the political concept of '*ivorité*', giving precedence to what they described as 'native' as opposed to 'foreign' citizens. This discourse was used to disenfranchise 'northerners', the majority of them Muslim, for instance by calling their nationality – and thus their fitness to stand for elections – into question.

These issues culminated during the 2010 elections, when Laurent Gbagbo, a southerner, mobilized xenophobic sentiment against his northern opponent Alassane Ouattara. Ouattara, an Ivorian national whose mother was from Burkina Faso, had previously been barred as a 'foreigner' from running for office until the Constitution was revised following the country's 2002 civil war. Following Ouattara's victory, Gbagbo refused to concede and the country descended into armed conflict. Though Ouattara was ultimately able to secure power in 2011 after defeating Gbagbo militarily, the conflict served to further reinforce the country's divisions.

In September 2014, almost three years after its formation, the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR) began public testimony regarding nearly a decade of political violence, including the 2010–11 conflict. Eighty people, including both victims and perpetrators, contributed testimony during three weeks of public hearings; however, the lack of television broadcasting and limited media coverage diminished their impact. In addition, the commission reportedly heard testimony from up to 65,000 people; however, dissatisfaction with its progress, capability and impact in promoting reconciliation remained. One issue affecting its credibility was the naming of a former prime minister – a political opponent of Gbagbo and former adviser to Ouattara – Charles Konan Banny, as its chair.

Meanwhile, some of those accused of human rights abuses against Ouattara supporters during the conflict faced trial. Laurent Gbagbo's trial before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague is set to begin in July 2015. In March, the former leader of his 'Young Patriots' militia, Charles Blé Goudé, was sent before the

ICC and he now faces four charges of crimes against humanity. The trial of Simone Gbagbo and another 82 of her husband's supporters opened in Abidjan in December, with the former first lady receiving a 20-year prison sentence in March 2015. Four years on from the conflict, however, no Ouattara partisans have been brought before the courts, despite domestic and international findings that both sides committed abuses. This imbalance continued to undermine national reconciliation and public trust in the justice system.

The failure of authorities to disarm and disband armed groups on both sides, and to rehabilitate and reintegrate former combatants, has contributed to many marginalized youth joining armed gangs. This has led to serious security concerns in areas of Abidjan. Though some have been integrated into the security forces, problems persist. In November, for instance, former combatants demonstrated to demand back pay and benefits that had been promised to them. Evidence that the underlying problems of ethnic tensions were still unresolved came in March 2014 when Gbagbo's party, the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), accused Ouattara's government of manipulating the country's census to bolster his support. These ethnic and political tensions may flare again in the run-up to presidential elections set for October 2015.

More than half (53 per cent) of Côte d'Ivoire's population now live in urban areas, a proportion that is expected to continue to rise for decades to come. The rise in urbanization has helped to fuel ethnic conflict, exacerbating tension and resentment between groups over access to resources, political influence and other issues. The impacts of this rapid growth have also been felt outside urban areas, with Prime Minister Daniel Kablan Duncan reporting in October 2014 that more than three-quarters of the country's forests had disappeared in the last 50 years due to increasing urbanization and the spread of agriculture. This has heightened competition for land, particularly in western Côte d'Ivoire, exacerbating communal tensions between 'native' land-owners and those perceived by them as migrants or immigrants. Some of those displaced from the west during the post-electoral conflict of 2010–11, primarily Gbagbo supporters of Guéré ethnicity, have since returned home to find their houses and land occupied by Ouattara supporters – a situation that could lay the foundation for further conflict in future.

Mauritania

In Mauritania the Haratine minority, known as 'Black Moors', were enslaved by the dominant Arab Berber population over centuries in a system of hereditary slavery. Though slavery has been banned in Mauritania several times, most recently in 2007, the law has not been enforced and in reality the practice persists. In 2014, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, Mutuma Ruteere, reported that an estimated 50 per cent of Haratines face *de facto* slavery, including as domestic servants and bonded labourers. In November, the Walk Free Foundation also reported that Mauritania had the highest proportion of slaves to population in the world.

In 2013 the government set up an agency ('Tadamoun') to fight poverty and the legacy of slavery. However, its functionality and effectiveness to date have been questioned by some observers, who have expressed doubts about its credibility and efficiency. NGOs in particular continue to press for the ability to bring complaints themselves on behalf of victims, arguing that this presents a more credible option for those who have suffered slavery. In March 2014, the government formally adopted a road map for the implementation of UN anti-slavery recommendations. Critics expressed concern at the lack of civil society involvement in the road map framework, which they say places the process solely under state control. They point to the role of the authorities in maintaining the practice of slavery in the past, as well as to more recent reports of official complicity in these abuses, such as a December 2014 complaint against family members of Lemina Mint El Ghotob Ould Momma, the serving government minister for social affairs concerning children and the family.

Haratines, whether slaves or free, face ongoing discrimination and marginalization across Mauritanian society. In April 2014, anti-discrimination activists held a march in the



Left: Biram Dah Abeid, a Haratine anti-slavery activist, was arrested in November 2014. *Emiliano Granado*

capital Nouakchott to mark the first anniversary of the 2013 Haratine Manifesto, which called for equality and fulfilment of a broad spectrum of political, economic and social rights. In presidential elections in June, eventually won by the incumbent, slavery was also highlighted as an issue. The second-running candidate, with 8.9 per cent of the vote, was long-standing anti-slavery activist and head of the civil society group Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement (IRA), Biram Dah Abeid. However, Abeid was arrested in November 2014 with at least seven others, including IRA members, in the context of a peaceful campaign against slavery and in favour of agrarian reform. International legal experts expressed grave concerns about their access to due process. In January 2015 Abeid and two others were tried on charges of belonging to an illegal organization, leading an unauthorized rally and violence against the police. They were convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. Police used tear gas and batons to disperse protesters against the verdict.

Mauritania faces perennial drought and food insecurity, exacerbated by climate change and depletion of natural resources. The World Food Programme estimates that between 20 and 30 per cent of the population suffers from high food insecurity. These factors have contributed to increasing urbanization, with around three-fifths of the country's population now living in towns and cities, particularly the capital of Nouakchott. In times of drought, even nomadic groups have tended to congregate outside urban centres. In some families, men migrate to urban centres alone in search of work, sending remittances back to women and children left behind to farm increasingly unproductive land. The separation has a detrimental effect on family well-being and cohesion, with reports suggesting that divorce and abandonment rates have risen in some communities.

For Haratine slaves, urban migration has long offered the possibility of anonymity and a new start away from the master and his family. Urban areas have provided a relatively safe space for escaped slaves, where they face less risk of recapture, and Nouakchott in particular now hosts a number of NGOs that are able to provide social, moral and legal support for former slaves. However, Haratines are disproportionately concentrated in the city's most deprived areas, with little access to sanitation or basic services. Residents do not have title to the land, and their existence is precarious. Furthermore, they still face ongoing social discrimination. Newly freed slaves, with little education or life skills training, most often end up in low-paid, unskilled and vulnerable positions. For women this includes, for instance, work as market sellers, domestic workers for relatives of their former masters or sex workers. Access to education for Haratine children is also limited, with the city mayor reportedly informing the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism during his visit in September 2013 that around 80 per cent of Haratine children were not in school, partly because of issues surrounding their lack of legal registration. As a result, their marginalization is being replicated among the younger generation.

Case study *by Joana Dabaj*

Cultural heritage as a vehicle for peace in Timbuktu

The fabled 'city of 333 Saints', Timbuktu, is located in the republic of Mali at the edge of the Sahara desert and near the Niger River. Founded in the 5th century, it was long regarded as a centre for the diffusion of Islam through West Africa and a city of trade, where manuscripts and books were sold for more money than merchandise. By 1988, when Timbuktu was designated as a World Heritage Site for its holy places and their essential role in the spread of Islam in Africa, much of the ancient city still stood as a testament to the city's golden age. Though many of its monuments were in urgent need of conservation, its mosques, mausoleums and holy places nevertheless offered clear proof of the city's rich history.

Having survived for centuries, however, Timbuktu received a devastating blow in 2012 when it fell under the control of Ansar Dine, an extremist group who at that time controlled most of northern Mali. Militants set about destroying the city's mosque, mausoleums, shrines and holy statues in a move described by the ICC as a war crime. It represented an assault on everything that Timbuktu represented, including the values of cultural exchange and peaceful cohabitation. Irreplaceable manuscripts, covering geography, history and religion, were burned and music forbidden, in a country renowned for its rich musical traditions.

The occupation of Timbuktu only came to an end when French and Malian forces intervened in January 2013, expelling the militants from the city. Though this has restored a measure of stability, the legacy of the occupation and the divisions it created have persisted. In particular, the city's Arab and Tuareg minorities were subjected to reprisals by other residents who accused them of sympathizing with Ansar Dine. Besides looting of shops and homes, many were reportedly forced to flee the city. However, an organization set up in the wake of the conflict, the Timbuktu Renaissance Action Group, seeks to rebuild social cohesion by reviving what the city came close to losing during its occupation – Timbuktu's rich and multi-faceted culture.

The planned cultural revival will incorporate music festivals, documentary films, preservation and exhibition of the manuscripts, as well as the creation of a cultural centre in Timbuktu to share them. A prime aim is to return to Timbuktu the 'Festival au Désert', once a magnet for musicians and enthusiasts from all over the world who came to enjoy a range of different art forms, including traditional Tuareg music. Though at present the festival is still in exile, efforts to bring it back are ongoing. Other organizations, such as UNESCO, are also supporting heritage restoration, with a number of shrines in the process of being rebuilt – beginning with three shrines of saints with different ethnicities to symbolize Mali's diversity.

The need to protect cultural heritage in the world we live in is more important than ever, particularly as armed groups increasingly target sites of spiritual or historic significance with the specific aim of creating dissent. By contrast, restoring Timbuktu's cultural heritage will encourage conciliation and promote a shared sense of belonging while protecting the many distinct identities of its population. ■

Nigeria

Nigeria is extremely diverse, with hundreds of ethnic groups and even more languages governed through a federal system of 36 separate states, each with their own ethnic and religious composition. Though this has contributed to the country's rich cultural life, it has also at times been the source of tensions between different groups over power and control of local resources. Nigeria's practice, at the state level, of giving groups 'indigenous' or 'native' to each region preferential treatment over 'settler' or 'immigrant' groups – many of whom may have been based for two generations in the areas – has at times contributed to inequality, competition and conflict between ethnicities. The country's presidential, parliamentary and state elections, slated for March and April 2015, saw President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian southerner, defeated by a strong opposition that brought to power Muhammadu Buhari, a former military leader and Muslim northerner.

A key issue in the election was the ongoing campaign of violence perpetrated by the armed group Boko Haram. The group is responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians since launching an armed insurrection in 2009 from its base in the city of Maiduguri in north-eastern Nigeria. In August 2014, the group declared an Islamic state in the areas of north-east Nigeria then under its control. While Boko Haram has targeted Christians, a minority in Nigeria's largely Muslim north-east, the bulk of its victims have reportedly been fellow Muslims. Boko Haram is known for targeted attacks on moderate Muslims whose views conflict with their own.

In 2014 Boko Haram continued its attacks on soft targets, often in urban centres, including bus stations, schools, churches, mosques and markets, as well as continuing to target moderate Muslim politicians and clerics. It also staged attacks outside the northern states most affected, including a bomb that killed 75 people in the capital Abuja in April. The most high-profile incident during the year, however, was the abduction by militants of 276 girls at gunpoint from their secondary school in the north-eastern village of Chibok, Borno State. In a video released by the group, its leader reportedly referred to the girls as 'slaves' and threatened to sell them 'in the market' or 'marry them off'. HRW has estimated that, since 2009, Boko Haram has abducted over 500 women and girls, targeted for being students or Christian, with victims then coerced into converting to the group's radical version of Islam. In November, a suicide bomb attack staged during assembly at a boys' school in Potiskum killed almost 50 students and wounded nearly 80.

Communal violence also continued elsewhere. Around Jos, Plateau State, in the Middle Belt, violence continued between 'indigene' farmers of the Christian Berom group and Fulani Muslim pastoralists considered 'settlers', with more than 1,000 people killed in the first few months of 2014. Elsewhere, suspected Fulani attackers killed more than 100 people in three largely Christian villages in central Kaduna State in March.

The indigenous Ogoni people of the Niger Delta continued to urge the government to act on the findings of a UNEP (UN Environmental Programme) environmental assessment report into the impact of Shell oil spills on their lands in 2008 and 2009. The UNEP report was released in 2011, but the devastation caused by the spills remains, endangering the living conditions and livelihoods of residents of small villages and towns such as Yenagoa. The damage to surrounding agricultural land, and other stresses brought on by the urbanization of the region related to the oil industry, has forced many Ogoni to migrate in search of work, further disrupting the traditional culture and cohesion of the group.

Nigeria's population is relatively urbanized, with around half the population now based in towns or cities. Lagos, with over 11 million inhabitants in 2011, is now Africa's most populated city. With roughly three-quarters of the country's industrial base, as well as the bulk of its financial and commercial resources, it is now the main destination for rural migrants in search of employment. Unsurprisingly, it is also the Nigerian city most affected by unplanned, unregulated growth. Though the capital concentrates many of the country's ethnic groups, other sources indicate that this is not an accurate image. Some describe the centre as largely populated (and controlled) by 'native' Lagos-dwellers, while the slums and shanty

towns on the periphery are largely made up of migrants from other regions, at times grouped in ethnically oriented neighbourhoods. While Lagos State itself now offers a relatively open system of registration to all residents, regardless of their ethnicity or place of origin, in many urban areas elsewhere inequalities between relatively privileged 'indigenes' and the 'settler' populations are sharply evident, in areas such as land rights, service access and other benefits. As pressure on land increases with rapid population growth and migration, these disparities have the potential to create further conflict if unaddressed.

Central Africa

Burundi

Conflict around land, sharpened by population growth and the scarcity of arable land, continued in Burundi during 2014. The government established a Land Commission on 31 December 2013, with a special court to deal with land issues subsequently established in April. These measures were perceived by some as potentially prioritizing the interests of repatriated citizens, primarily members of the Hutu majority, with the risk of creating further friction with the Tutsi minority.

Tensions have been further heightened by upcoming presidential elections, set for June 2015. Observers have called for an official investigation into claims that the military had supplied arms to the youth wing of the ruling party, the Hutu-dominated National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces (CNDD-FDD), which has been accused of political violence, intimidation and even killings of opposition supporters. These warnings came within a broader climate of repression against perceived government opponents. Following a one-day mass trial in March that failed to respect defendants' rights to due process, 48 people, mainly activists from one opposition party, were given sentences ranging from two years to life imprisonment. Some had been arrested in clashes with police, others while jogging; the authorities claimed that the latter were planning to converge and stage an unauthorized political demonstration.

Meanwhile, the National Assembly passed a law establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in April. The TRC is mandated to investigate past human rights abuses carried out during the country's various episodes of inter-ethnic violence between its Hutu majority and Tutsi minority since independence. Its commissioners include six Hutus, four Tutsis and one Twa. They were selected and sworn in to their positions in December. Critics noted that the government had disregarded some of the recommendations of the public consultation process, with implications for the credibility of the TRC, the involvement of civil society organizations and its accessibility to victims of all ethnic groups and political affiliations.

A court enquiry into the massacre of more than 150 Tutsi refugees, primarily women and children from South Kivu, DRC, at the Gatumba UNHCR site in Burundi ten years ago, opened on 1 December. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the largely Hutu rebel group National Liberation Forces (*Forces nationales de libération*, FNL). In 2014, Burundi's army reportedly clashed several times with the FNL in South Kivu.

Burundi's population is still largely rural, with only one in ten people living in urban areas. Burundi is highly vulnerable to natural hazards: the capital Bujumbura, on the shores of a lake surrounded by steep hills, faced severe flooding and mudslides following heavy rains in February 2014. At least 68 people were killed and 20,000 displaced, including residents of the city's precarious shanty towns, home to many poor and marginalized groups including returning refugees from DRC previously displaced by the country's ethnic conflict. The government has attempted to provide vulnerable urban residents, including landless, displaced or returning groups, with secure housing through the establishment of planned 'peace villages' that include a mix of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa residents to promote social harmony and inter-ethnic interaction. Some of these settlements are located on Bujumbura's outskirts. While they face a number of challenges, they represent Burundi's ambition towards ethnic integration – an important development for a country where, during the conflictive 1990s, many neighbourhoods in Bujumbura divided along ethnic lines, with residents driving

Above: Bangui Muslim women and children crowd the floor of a Catholic Church in Boali, Central African Republic, 2014. The priest gave them sanctuary from Christian vigillante groups seeking to attack and kill Muslims in response to the 2013 *Seleka* rebellion. *Panos/Sven Torfinn*

out neighbours of the opposing ethnicity and other, ethnically mixed neighbourhoods saw violent combat between Tutsi and Hutu militias. According to a 2013 study, the record of the peace villages is mixed, with at least some inhabitants facing social exclusion and experiencing tensions with surrounding communities.

Central African Republic

In 2013, a loose coalition (*Seleka*) of largely Muslim insurgent groups, angered by what they perceived as the marginalization and exclusion of northern Muslims from the benefits of CAR's vast resource wealth, advanced south, dislodging François Bozizé's government in March. *Seleka* forces were accused of egregious abuses against the mainly Christian civilian population in their path, including massacres, sexual violence, recruitment of children and mass displacement. In December 2013, on the eve of the arrival of a French force sent to quell the violence, armed Christian and animist self-defence 'anti-*balaka*' ('anti-machete') militia, with some support from soldiers of the defeated army, took the offensive. They staged revenge attacks in Bangui, not only on suspected rebels but also indiscriminately on the local Muslim population, perceived due to their religion and language as sympathizing with the insurgency.

In January 2014, *Seleka* leader Michel Djotodia ceded power under international pressure. Catherine Samba-Panza, a Christian who had been appointed mayor of Bangui by Djotodia, was elected president of the interim government. The French force disarmed some *Seleka* fighters, who then withdrew from the south and west of the country, regrouping in the north and east. Anti-*balaka* forces took advantage of its retreat to conduct further attacks on Muslim communities. Muslim foreign nationals and many from CAR's previously well-established Muslim minority fled for their lives. Despite its roots in political and economic issues, the conflict took on an increasingly sectarian tone, with abuses

and reprisal attacks escalating and spreading throughout the country. As the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay condemned the television broadcasting of hate speech against Muslims by anti-*balaka* militia, the latter moved from staging revenge attacks to what some described as a deliberate campaign to clear the country of all Muslims, either through killings or forced displacement.

The presence of African Union (AU), French and subsequently European Union troops was not enough to stop the violence. Humanitarian workers and international troops themselves came increasingly under attack. In some instances, Chadian and other soldiers among the AU peacekeepers were accused of targeted violations against suspected anti-*balaka*. Entire neighbourhoods of Bangui were emptied of Muslims, as were towns in western CAR that had been home to thousands of Muslims, with columns of evacuating civilians deliberately attacked by anti-*balaka* fighters. Anti-*balaka* were also reported to prey increasingly on non-Muslims, particularly among the displaced populations. Some abuses and retaliatory violence against Christian communities by *Seleka* during and after their retreat were also reported. As the year went on, splits were reported within both *Seleka* and anti-*balaka* forces, adding an intra-communal element to some of the violence. In July, *Seleka* and anti-*balaka* leaders signed a ceasefire, along with CAR's Christian archbishop and leading imam, both strong advocates of tolerance. However, no agreement was reached on disarmament, and clashes continued.

A new UN force was deployed to replace the AU force in September 2014. However, it was unable to prevent ongoing violence, as all armed groups targeted civilians who they believed supported opposing sides. While much of the violence was following the *Seleka* onslaught and its subsequent collapse, some of it was reportedly rooted in long-standing tensions between farmers and pastoralists, including the nomadic Muslim Peuhl (Fulani) minority, who in the current climate were perceived as supporting *Seleka*. Past instances of encroachment onto farmland as well as crop damage by pastoralists' herds added to the more immediate resentments that drove the anti-*balaka* violence. Moreover, some Peuhl were themselves responsible for attacks on Christians, often in revenge for violence against their own community. In any event, according to HRW, by the end of 2014, Peuhl made up a very large majority of the inhabitants in almost all of the CAR refugee camps in Cameroon.

CAR's Muslims, who had made up about 15 per cent of the national population, were divided between pastoral farmers and herders, living mainly in the country's north-east, and a largely urban merchant class based in Bangui and other provincial towns such as Bria, a centre of the diamond trade. Particularly in urban areas, it was noted that anti-*balaka* and communal violence against Muslims was fuelled not just by sectarian feeling but also by political grievances, economic opportunism and resentment against wealthier Muslims. Muslim Arab traders were particularly vulnerable, as their perceived wealth and relative control over the gold and diamond trades spread anger among poorer communities. Their homes and places of business were typically methodically looted before being destroyed or, at times, occupied by Christians. By mid-year, a reported 80 per cent of Bangui's Muslims had fled. In other areas, the destruction of Muslim homes after looting by anti-*balaka* may be intended to ensure that Muslims cannot return to the area: that is, as part of a concerted effort to segregate and cement control over the territory.

An early exception to the widespread sectarian violence was the central town of Bambari. As violence spread elsewhere, Christian and Muslim leaders worked together to keep the peace in the mixed town, including through messages of tolerance on local radio. However, the peace had collapsed by the end of May when Bambari became part of an unofficial front line between the warring sides, with retaliatory killings carried out by both. The presence of French peacekeepers in the town may have reduced but could not altogether prevent the violence. Attacks by *Seleka* and anti-*balaka* forces reported in and around the city continued: in early July, for instance, *Seleka* reportedly attacked displaced people sheltering in Bambari's cathedral, killing more than 26 people and wounding others. By the end of the year, only a fraction of Bambari's 60,000 residents remained in the town, living in dire circumstances.

By December, over 187,000 refugees, primarily Muslims, had fled the country in 2014 alone, bringing the total number of CAR refugees in the region to more than 423,000. These figures included nearly all of the estimated 130,000 Muslim residents of Bangui. Some Muslims remained, primarily in the east and north; thousands more were isolated in anti-*balaka*-surrounded enclaves across the country, under protection of international troops. Since April, transitional authorities had refused to allow them to leave the country in order to avoid accomplishing the anti-*balaka* aim of the 'ethnic cleansing' of the west. Around 430,000 people were reported to be internally displaced at year's end. Refugees and internally displaced together amounted to nearly one-fifth of the country's population of 4.5 million.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

At the end of 2014 conflict in eastern DRC, with at present no fewer than 54 different armed groups, had caused roughly 430,000 people to flee to neighbouring countries and left some 2.7 million more internally displaced.

North and South Kivu provinces

After the UN Intervention Brigade and DRC troops dislodged a largely ethnic Tutsi armed group, M23, in 2013, the focus turned to the Hutu-dominated Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), under UN sanctions for abuses including ethnically based killings in Rwanda and the DRC. Some FDLR fighters were among the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. In July, an international meeting of ministers of defence set a six-month timeframe for the voluntary surrender of the FDLR. It publicly agreed to demobilize, but by year's end had made no serious effort to do so. Humanitarian staff expressed concern at the potential for harm to civilians during any offensive against the FDLR as the group, unlike M23, does not set up discrete camps but rather lives among the local population. Another UN/DRC military operation, in January 2014 in the Beni region of North Kivu against the Ugandan-led Islamist armed group Alliance of Democratic Forces-NALU (ADF-NALU), had caused mass civilian displacement. ADF-NALU, formed with the aim of creating an Islamic state in Uganda, was reportedly pushed across the border into the DRC in 1995. In the last quarter of the year, ADF-NALU was believed to have been responsible for a series of brutal attacks in Beni in which more than 250 civilians were killed by attackers using knives, hoes and machetes. Tens of thousands fled their homes.

Right: Deforestation is a primary threat to the survival of Twa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who rely on the forests for their livelihoods. *Jan-Joseph Stok*

Inter-ethnic violence persisted elsewhere during the year. In February, Hunde and Hutu ethnically oriented militias in Masisi territory, North Kivu, were each accused of carrying out human rights abuses against civilians perceived to support the opposing group, resulting in at least 40 civilian deaths. At the root of the violence is control over land: Hunde leaders claim customary right to it, which has created tensions with Hutu residents.

In June at least 30 people, mostly from the Bafuliro ethnic group, were killed in an attack on an outdoor church service and nearby buildings in the village of Mutarule, South Kivu. Bafuliro had been engaged in a conflict over cattle theft and local power with members of the Banyamulenge Tutsi and Barundi ethnicities living nearby. The head of the UN mission to Congo (MONUSCO) apologized for his troops' failure to intervene despite being repeatedly alerted to the attack. The roots of the Bafuliro–Barundi conflict date back to colonial times, in an ongoing struggle over land and leadership in the Ruzizi plain.

Katanga province

Despite its mineral wealth, the population of resource-rich Katanga suffers from widespread poverty, weak state services and the impact of diseases such as cholera. In this context, land and inequalities create serious tensions that regularly erupt into violence. In the Tanganyika district of Katanga, violence between indigenous hunter-gatherer Twa inhabitants and ethnic Luba, a Bantu group, displaced more than 70,000 people during the year, primarily indigenous Twa. Some Luba accuse Twa of supporting the

armed forces in their fight against the (largely Luba) secessionist Mai Mai militia groups known as Kata Katanga. The struggle is also rooted in social inequalities between the historically marginalized Twa and the more privileged ethnic group, as well as in competition for land and resources.

In July 2014, a proposal for a law on the rights of indigenous peoples was submitted to the DRC legislature for consideration. It is hoped that this will address key issues facing indigenous hunter-gatherer communities such as Twa, including discrimination but also specific government policies such as those around forestry that limit their ability to exercise their traditional livelihoods and land rights.

More than a third of the DRC's population is now urban and this proportion is projected to exceed 50 per cent by 2040, with many concentrated in Kinshasa, Africa's third largest city. Plans for a luxury billion-dollar development on two reclaimed islands on the Congo River in the capital, dubbed Cité du Fleuve, contrast markedly with the situation of Kinshasa's urban poor, struggling to survive through the informal economy within unofficial settlements on the urban periphery. Kinshasa is ethnically diverse, and has seen tensions between residents seen as 'native' and those perceived as migrants. In Kinshasa this has been heightened by the fact that long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko was succeeded in 1997 by Laurent Kabila, the head of a largely Tutsi-led military movement that ousted Hutu refugees and militia from camps in eastern DRC where they had fled following the Rwandan genocide. Opposition to his presidency, and that of his son Joseph, who was elected after his assassination, has at times taken an ethnic slant as ethnicity becomes increasingly politicized.

Many communities in conflict-affected areas have been forced to relocate to cities such as Goma, where they have ended up in a state of protracted displacement in overcrowded settlements on the urban periphery. Residents in

Case study *by Paige Wilhite Jennings*

Promoting peace through sustainable urban development in Kigali

April 2014 saw the 20th anniversary of the genocide in which an estimated 800,000 people – three-quarters of the Rwanda's Tutsi minority, as well as moderates from the Hutu majority – were killed in 100 days. While this small landlocked country's population density, the highest in Africa, may have contributed to social tensions, ethnic differences had long been manipulated and exploited for political purposes in Rwanda. Belgian colonial policies favoured the Tutsis until independence in 1962, when the Hutu majority began to dominate. In the run-up to April 1994, Hutu extremists from the political class, the security forces and the main political party's armed militia used radio broadcasts from Kigali to incite ethnic hatred, playing on Hutu fears of a Tutsi uprising and coercing ordinary Hutus into taking part. Though orchestrated from the capital, the genocidal campaign took advantage of the hierarchical structures of social organization that permeated the countryside to reach throughout the country.

The slaughter was only ended by the advance from Uganda of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), made up of significant numbers of Tutsi refugees. By July the RPF had defeated the Rwandan army, forcing hundreds of thousands of Hutus, including *génocidaires*, to flee.

Over the last 20 years Rwanda has made great strides in rebuilding its devastated institutions, infrastructure and services, and has taken important social measures such as those promoting gender equity. The impact of some legal and judicial steps, however, has been mixed. While community-based trials (*gacaca*) and other platforms have dealt with thousands of cases against alleged *génocidaires*, claims of RPF abuses have generally not been investigated. New measures banning identification on ethnic grounds in favour of a common national identity have effectively denied the indigenous Batwa their right to their own identity and culture, and have prevented positive measures to redress the inequalities they clearly face.

In this context, programmes such as the 'Bye Bye Nyakatsi' project, aimed at improving housing by replacing traditional thatched roof houses with iron-roofed ones, were found to disproportionately affect the indigenous Batwa minority due to their frequent use of traditional building methods, in the short term appearing to leave many without shelter. Finally, laws prohibiting genocide ideology, genocide denial and sectarianism have in practice been used to limit fundamental freedoms and to punish dissent.

Mass returns of former refugees, alongside rural–urban displacement due in part to fears of ongoing insecurity as a result of the actions on Rwandese territory of armed groups based in the DRC, for instance, have led to one of the world's fastest urbanization rates: Rwanda's urban population grew from 385,000 in 1990 to almost 2.5 million today. To cope with pressure on land, the government has developed a national land use plan and framework for land registration and management. Meanwhile the authorities have embraced urbanization as a means of achieving their goal of making Rwanda a middle-income country by doubling the country's urban share of the population, currently around 18 per cent, to 35 per cent by 2020. According to President Kagame, urbanization is 'part and parcel of our unity and reconciliation efforts'. An ambitious Master Plan with design input from the US and Singapore is in place for Kigali, which in 2008 became

the first city in Africa to be awarded the UN-Habitat Scroll of Honour Award. Six smaller cities have been identified as poles of growth. The Rwanda Housing Authority is elaborating Local Development Plans for each of the country's 30 districts, with sustainable settlements organized around pre-planned infrastructure.

Critics say, however, that Rwanda's urban development to date has benefited its upper and middle classes to the detriment of its poor. In Kigali, where half of the urban population lives, authorities have systematically removed informal settlers from public land to make way for approved works. It is unclear where they have gone; poor families have been increasingly priced out of urban property as high demand has raised prices.

In order to profit all Rwandese, Rwanda's urban development efforts must meet the needs of its poor for low-income housing and sources of work: otherwise, the new Kigali risks becoming an elite city, with no place or use for low-income Rwandese. For this, however, the authorities must listen, not just to the international developers and experts who have recently been advising it on urbanization, but also to the most marginalized of its people – even when their views contradict official plans for the future. For ultimately, in the words of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, 'a society without room for critical voices speaking freely and peacefully is unsustainable'. Inclusive growth for all in Kigali is therefore crucial in ensuring that Rwanda continues to move forwards from the tragedy of the genocide towards lasting peace and stability. ■

these areas typically struggle with limited basic services such as water or sanitation, chronic economic insecurity and an elevated risk of violence or sexual assault by armed militias. A 2014 profile by the Norwegian Refugee Council of displaced populations in Goma found that a third of those surveyed intended to stay in the city, while others who wished to return were often unable to do so because their land had been forcibly seized – effectively leaving them in a state of indefinite displacement. The situation of displaced populations in Goma and other urban centres in conflict-affected regions of DRC may therefore represent a long-term challenge that will need to be addressed through effective and integrated urban policies to ensure their protection and prevent regular outbreaks of violence.

Southern Africa

Inga Thiemann

Namibia

The year 2014 was an election year in Namibia, with the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) Prime Minister Hage Geingob taking 86.7 per cent of all declared votes and SWAPO maintaining its two-thirds majority. Urbanization was a key topic in the election campaign, as the government plans to spend US$4.1 billion on urban housing. Though about a quarter of Namibians live in informal urban settlements, Namibia has been praised for its progressive approach to combatting its housing crisis and its pro-poor urban strategies, including significant financial support for self-help grassroots movements and saving groups.

However, the specific needs of minority groups are not always catered for in Namibia, despite a number of government initiatives. According to Namibia's Fourth National Development Plan 2012/20 to 2016/17, the government aims to eradicate extreme poverty, especially in households of 'certain language groups'

previously excluded from the Namibian social protection system despite experiencing extreme deprivation. Nonetheless, San remain Namibia's most disadvantaged group, ranking far lower than the rest of the population with regard to almost all development indicators due to decades of discrimination.

Since 2005, a dedicated government programme, the San Development Programme, exists in the Office of the Prime Minister. However, government officials often demonstrate prejudice and lack of understanding for the San. Despite the concerns raised by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, in 2013, there has been no improvement in the political representation of Himba and San, as a third of their leaders have still not been recognized as official traditional leaders and remain excluded from decision making processes at local and national level. In 2014, there was not a single San member of parliament and just one San regional council member.

Though the only San regional councillor is a woman, in general gender inequality is a growing problem among the San community. One reason for this is that the community has been increasingly influenced by the hierarchical structures within wider Namibian society, where men are typically placed above women. Feminist organizations such as the Women's Leadership Centre, founded by Elizabeth Khaxas, aim to build feminist politics based on indigenous cultures in Namibia. The group works with women from the Khwe community in north-eastern Namibia to build their leadership and to educate them on their rights as both women and indigenous people.

Namibian women achieved a victory in 2014 with the Namibian Supreme Court condemning the forced sterilization of three HIV-positive women and acknowledging their lack of consent. Their case is considered a precedent for many more HIV-positive women who have been forcibly sterilized. The ruling could have particular relevance for minority women, as the HIV-infection risk is higher among minority communities due to a lack of public health campaigns in minority languages and insufficient outreach to minority communities living in remote areas.

Right: Crowds of people gathered across South Africa to mourn the death, and celebrate the life, of Nelson Mandela, December 2013. *REUTERS/ Mark Wessels*

Physical, social and legal constraints mean state development programmes do not benefit all Namibians to the same degree, and rural–urban inequalities could further exacerbate these disparities. As many minority and indigenous communities still live in conservation areas, forests and national parks, they typically gain less from government initiatives to combat poverty and improve access to health care, as these tend to be focused on the urban poor. Consequently, though the government's plan to invest in urban housing is welcome, it is important that it is balanced with targeted rural development to ensure that the situation of San and other marginalized groups in these areas also improves.

In recent decades, having previously lived almost exclusively in rural areas, a significant proportion of San have resettled in camps or on the edge of townships due to their lack of access to land and the decline in available employment on commercial farms. With few resources or skills applicable to the urban labour market, their situation is especially vulnerable. Many urban San face serious food insecurity and limited prospects of formal employment, with most engaging in odd jobs to survive. Even among other low-income residents, previous research has suggested that San are still far poorer than other squatters.

But while these issues must be addressed with inclusive urban poverty reduction measures, efforts should also focus on rural issues such as agriculture to reduce unemployment – a major driver of migration to urban areas. Other strategies, such as livelihood diversification and training opportunities for San agricultural workers on commercial farms, will also help provide them with a broader set of skills that allow them either to remain in their community or integrate with greater ease into urban labour markets.

South Africa

The year 2014 started as a year of mourning

after the death of Nelson Mandela in December 2013. Politically, the first half of the year was dominated by the general election on 7 May. The African National Congress (ANC) remained in power with a 62.2 per cent share of the votes, down from 65.9 per cent, with the Democratic Alliance (DA) increasing its share to 22.2 per cent and the newly established Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) gaining 6.4 per cent of the votes.

According to an IPSOS survey conducted shortly before the election, less than half (47 per cent) of the population believe that the government has the country's interests at heart, with even lower levels among white (17 per cent) and coloured (23 per cent) citizens.

Land rights and distribution remain unresolved and contentious issues in South Africa. The large majority of the country's land is still owned by white South Africans, who make up less than 10 per cent of the population. The ANC, despite committing after the end of apartheid to ensuring a significant proportion of land would be redistributed, has so far failed to achieve this. The EFF's leader, Julius Malema – a controversial figure who has two convictions for hate speech and who was expelled from the ANC Youth League in 2012 – has strongly criticized the current system and called for the expropriation of farms owned by white South Africans without compensation.

In June, the ANC signed an amendment to the 1994 Restitution of Land Rights Bill into law, allowing those who failed to file claims in 1998 to still do so now. The bill has received mixed responses, as many claims may contest existing claims filed pre-1998 and create a further backlog. A separate policy is also planned which

could benefit the Khoi and San communities by allowing them, in some instances, to lodge claims for land dispossessed pre-1913. These changes are intended to also include heritage sites, which might benefit other ethnic groups, such as Zulu, who have made claims for certain areas which belonged to former Zulu kingdoms.

The land rights of women from the Muslim minority are also likely to improve following the legal recognition of Muslim marriages for the first time in South Africa in May 2014. Though issues remain about the lack of inclusion of women in the negotiations and the apparent absence of females among the more than 100 officially appointed marriage officers, the decision represents a milestone for the country's Muslim community. Previously, Muslim marriages had no status in South African law, meaning that women could have no legal rights in the event of divorce or the death of their spouses. In August, shortly after the change in law, a landmark case in South Africa reversed the eviction of a Muslim woman following her divorce. The eviction had originally been considered legal, as she had been married in a religious ceremony only and the title deed to her home was in her husband's name.

Twenty years after the abolition of apartheid in 1994, South Africa continues to struggle with its legacy of racial division. These issues came to the fore in July when South Africa's Human Rights Commission found a public school in Bloemfontein guilty of hate speech towards coloured and black pupils. The teachers were accused of racially abusing the students and telling them to go back to the black schools in their townships – the second such incident in Bloemfontein within a year.

Though South Africa has undergone significant transformation in the last two decades, including rapid urbanization, the country's history of racial segregation continues to shape its development. Despite the ANC's pledge in 1994 to provide adequate housing to its citizens, the government's housing programme has been outstripped by the pace of urban migration and reached a backlog in 2013 of 2.1 million planned free housing units for the poor. As a result, a significant proportion of urban residents still face poor living conditions, with around a third based in slums.

Since the end of apartheid, some of the old structures of white-dominated towns and black-dominated townships on the outskirts of those towns have somewhat broken up. Nonetheless, subsequent surveys suggest that a large proportion of the urban black population is still concentrated in these townships on the urban periphery, where issues such as unemployment, violence and sexual assault are still evident. Despite attempts to counter the ghettoization of these areas – for example, through government investment in public transport in townships – spatial segregation persists. While middle-class blacks have migrated in recent years to formerly white neighbourhoods, the majority of the country's black urban poor remain concentrated in the townships. Though explicit exclusion of blacks is rare and South Africa's social division is now in many ways informed by class, the disproportionate poverty levels among the black population mean that in practice this separation still has strong racial dimensions. In Cape Town, for example, reports suggest that many of the city's black population still feel excluded and unwelcome in the centre and other upmarket neighbourhoods.

The physical and social legacy of apartheid urban planning has contributed to ongoing problems of crime, delinquency and unemployment, particularly among urban youth. Issues such as housing, reinforced by xenophobia, have also led to growing frictions between South Africans and migrant communities from countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique. These tensions culminated in the violent outbreak in Alexandra township in Johannesburg in April 2015, killing seven people and injuring many others, making it the country's worst outbreak of xenophobic violence since 2008. The ongoing violence has caused the military to step in, while some migrant countries of origin have arranged for their citizens to return home. A speech by Zulu chief King Goodwill Zwelithini the previous month calling for foreigners to 'pack their bags and go home' was blamed for triggering the violence, though Zwelithini claimed that his comments had been taken out of context.

Zimbabwe

Following the 2013 amendment to the Zimbabwean Constitution, several minority

languages are now officially recognized. However, there has been little progress on the promotion of minority languages since former Minister of Education, Sport, Arts and Culture David Coltart ended his term in office in August 2013. He claimed that any incoming minister would have to honour the language policies in place, but also stated that it was 'too early to say whether the new government will have the political will to promote minority languages'. In May 2014, former Matabeleland South governor Angeline Masuku called for greater promotion of traditional Zimbabwean languages over English, arguing that knowledge of other languages spoken in their regions could help reduce tribalism. Her concern was particularly with regard to the lack of knowledge among some Matabeleland residents of Ndebele.

The San community has also criticized the government for failing to understand their culture and traditions, as the Constitution refers to their language as Khoisan, whereas the correct name of the language is Tshwao. Tshwao is under particular risk of extinction, as some sources suggest that there are little more than a dozen people left who speak the language fluently, with the rest of the San community speaking a diluted version. One of the issues highlighted by San leaders is the fact that the few San children who are able to attend school are taught in Ndebele, and as a result many are increasingly separated from their own culture. Attempts to introduce a Tshwao curriculum are made more difficult by the lack of orthography and phonology for the language. Tshwao has no written records and is currently not systematically passed from one generation to the next. Additionally, the vocabulary reflects the San community's traditional way of life in the bush, and therefore lacks terminology for many aspects of contemporary living. Researchers working on preserving Tshwao and making it usable for younger generations of San have requested support from the Education Ministry to enable them to travel to Botswana and Namibia for learning visits to other San communities.

Other minorities are equally struggling for the promotion of their languages. Kalanga representatives have argued that SeTswana, the language they speak at home, should also be taught at their schools and be promoted in line with the new Constitution. Kalanga representative Pax Nkomo also questioned the imposition of Ndebele chiefs on Kalanga people in seven districts of Matabeleland South and called on the new Zimbabwean government to 'give Kalanga language affirmative action so we can liberate our culture which was suppressed'. Both San and Kalanga, as well as other linguistic minorities in Zimbabwe, need government assistance to maintain their languages.

Zimbabwe faces acute urban challenges, including inadequate water and sanitation, resulting in diarrhoea, typhoid and other health risks, particularly in its large informal settlements. The government, however, has not only failed to address the problems of corruption and exclusion that have contributed to these issues, but has worsened the situation of many poor and vulnerable communities through aggressive policies of eviction and slum clearance, such as the so-called Operation Murambatsvina – literally, 'Drive Out Rubbish' – in which approximately 700,000 residents were forcibly displaced in a 'clean-up' exercise a decade ago, with foreign nationals particularly targeted.

A key objective of the crackdown was to force residents of informal settlements to 'return' to rural areas. In Matabeleland, where many urban residents were forcibly resettled, the legacy of the clearance has contributed to increasing diasporisation as a result. While the Zimbabwean government is threatening further demolitions in several areas, it has generally failed to provide alternative housing to those it has displaced. This is particularly true for the already poor and marginalized in Zimbabwean society, which includes migrant communities and minorities who have migrated to cities. Protecting marginalized rural communities while improving the living conditions of the urban populations is one of the main challenges facing Zimbabwe. A government-supported initiative, Training for Rural Economic Development, was launched in 2014 with the aim of reducing rural–urban migration by providing more livelihood opportunities in local communities. ■

Case study *by Inga Thiemann*

The San in southern Africa – adjusting to urbanization as a first people

Southern African countries have urbanized rapidly in the last few decades, with significant impacts on San indigenous populations in the entire region. Urbanization has not only threatened access to land among rural communities but also in areas where some measure of urbanization has taken place, while the government has failed to provide San residents with skills, education or other assets. Very few have been able to find secure and well remunerated work in towns and cities, while many continue to face severe discrimination.

In Namibia, the San's quality of life declined post-independence due to land redistribution and incidents of expulsion from their traditional grazing lands. They faced increasing obstacles to their hunter-gatherer culture, as most land was distributed among other ethnic groups. Post-independence, many San ended up seeking new livelihoods in nearby towns or migrating to communal areas occupied by other groups, for example in the Omaheke Region.

Many San households rely on food donations both from the Namibian government and NGOs, as well as state pensions as livelihood strategies. In many cases a basic government pension is the main source of household income. The Namibian Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 2009/10 found that 20.1 per cent of Khoisan speakers were relying on this as their main source of income. The San use the pension money to cover the costs of basic items for entire households, such as food, clothing and education-related expenses. However, many San households experience debt to the extent that most of the pension is spent on settling household debts on the day of the pay-out, leaving very little to survive on for the next month and resulting in further borrowing. Rural San often have difficulties accessing government pensions and other support schemes, as they lack identification documents or funds to travel to towns to register.

'Veldfood', a variety of fruits, roots, wild vegetables and worms gathered from uncultivated lands, remains a significant contributor to the San household diet, where possible. Gathering such food is both a cultural practice and a way



of supplementing insufficient and irregular food supplies. However, limitations on San access to land have restricted their ability to gather 'veldfood'. This is particularly true for San in settlements and on resettlement farms on commercial land, in urban areas with access only to small areas of land or on communal plots shared with cattle farmers from other ethnic groups.

The South African example of the San community at the Plantfontein farm shows that urbanization can have negative effects on the community, despite their access to the 'veld'. This community, consisting of San belonging to the !Xun and Khwe groups, lives under difficult sanitary conditions, with unstable access to water, as well as issues of wastewater from neighbouring communities spilling into their 'veld'. Irregular sanitation servicing of the communities' dry toilets not only leads to increased risk of disease, but also forces many community members to defecate in the open, further contaminating one of the San's vital food sources and undermining a key opportunity for them to maintain deep-rooted cultural practices despite urbanization. ■

Below: The traditional lifestyles of the San in Botswana, Namibia and across other parts of Southern Africa are constantly under threat from modernization programmes. ***Aino Tuominen***