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THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Parliamentary elections related violence countrywide
- Multiple NGO abductions in Faryab
- AOG complex attack against IMF bases Khost
- Major AOG activity across Helmand and Kandahar
- Elections related intimidation in the West

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

In the **CENTRAL** region long running Hazara/Kuchi disputes quieted in KABUL while unknown assailant targeted officials from the Supreme Court. Opposing Parliamentary Candidates clashed with small arms fire in Charikar and Kohi Safid in PARWAN while in WARDAK AOG's threatened locals against voting in Nirkh and Saydabad and challenged an NGO community development project in Jaghatu.

In the **NORTHERN** regions multiple NGO staff were abducted by AOG across FARYAB, an election worker is abducted (Shirin Tagab) and an IO vehicle is caught in the cross fire of an AOG ambush (Dawlatabad). In TAKHAR the ANBP are routed by AOG attack in the border area of Yangi Qala while in JAWZJAN (Shibirgan) two persons carrying suicide vests are arrested on a public bus. In Shahri Buzorg area of BADAKSHAN two NGO staff are killed in an IED strike in what looks like a case of mistaken identity, a parliamentary candidate is attacked while AOG warn locals in Kisham against participation in elections a warning repeated in Marmul district, BALKH. In KUNDUZ an NGO vehicle convoy was

robbed by armed criminals on the Khanadab road while AOG checkpoints in BAGHLAN continue to actively search for NGO staff.

In the **EAST** region AOG launched an assault against two US Military bases in KHOST with up to 30 fighters, many wearing US military uniforms, engaging in a five hour battle. Magnetic IEDs continue to plague road travel in Jalalabad, NANGAHAR, with one device targeting the District Governor of Lal Pur. Unknown assailants attacked a local parliamentary candidate in Aligar, LAGHMAN, killing his body guard, while AOG warned locals in Gardez, PAKTYA, to avoid voting or risk having their fingers cut off. In KUNAR AOG abducted the District Governor of Chawkay.

In the **SOUTH** major AOG activity continues across HELMAND province despite US presence. In Haiberabad area upwards of 200 AOG stage a 12 hour assault against a PSC compound leaving up to 130 dead from both sides. In Lashkar Gah NDS detained eight persons for planning attacks on election officials while IMF seize more than 40 IEDs and in

Musa Qala a joint IMF/ANSF raid uncovers an AOG detention facility housing up to 30 prisoners. In GHAZNI AOG launch assaults on multiple District Administration Centres while fighting in Andar continues to cause internal displacement. In KANDAHAR the Daman Chief of Police is killed in a SVBIED while unknown assailants fire RPG rounds in to the compound of Ahmed Wali Karzi. In ZABUL use of rockets escalates while the Director of Tribal Affairs is killed in ZABUL.

In the **WEST** supporters of opposing parliamentary candidates clashed in Jandak, GHOR, while an NGO vehicle was stopped by supporters in Murghab. In HERAT city NGO offices received threatening emails while in Karuk an NGO vehicle was stopped and questioned by unknown men. In Injil an NGO office was asked to post anti-election poster on the walls. In BADGHIS an ANP officer shot and killed two IMF in a dispute while in FARAH multiple BBIED's targeted the compound of the Provincial Governor

KABUL


The overall threat picture pertaining to NGO operations in Kabul Province has not changed significantly. AOG intent and capacity to stage high-profile, media-grabbing attacks in the capital remain of concern, particularly in light of the upcoming Parliamentary elections.

Despite the assumption that some of the election-related incidents, particularly intimidation cases, remain unreported, the province has not seen significant election-related incidents during this period. So far, recent developments seem to indicate that the dynamics related to the election campaign and ensuing risks to NGOs remain localized in nature, reflecting

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

the interests and agendas of local election stakeholders inside the communities. The recurring confrontation between the Kuchi and the Hazara communities in Kabul, which was the origin of the violent demonstrations in the past period, seems to have been temporarily resolved through negotiations between the leaders of both communities, assisted by GOA and UN. The current resolution accepted by both parties specifies that the core matter of the confrontation, i.e. particular land rights issues, will be reopened after the Parliamentary elections.

Despite the overall low rate of incidents in Kabul province, two attacks were intensively covered in the media, while for both of them, the identity of perpetrators and the underlying motives have not been determined. The first was the case of a poison attack against



students and teachers of Tuteya Girls' School in Karte Naw, PD 8 on 25 August and on 31 August, a private vehicle used by the Supreme Court for daily transport of its employees between Musayi and Kabul City was accosted by two unknown attackers riding a motorbike. 2 occupants were killed and another 5 were wounded by weapons fire. This incident marked the first lethal attack against civilian GOA employees in the district and occurred one day after the District Governor publicly voiced his concerns about the security situation in Musayi. As well, increased AOG activity targeting IMF convoys was reported from the previously calm northern district of Qarabagh, including a SAF attack on 20 August, followed by an IED attack on 28 August.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Spectacular attacks
- Elections related incidents
- Criminality

KAPISA

Similar to the patterns registered in the first half of August, Kapisa witnessed 5 AOG initiated attacks during this period, although the district-wide distribution changed with 3 AOG attacks reported from Tagab, and one respectively from Nijrab and Mahmudi Raqi. The tactics used by AOG during this period pertained mainly to SAF attacks, while no IED placements were reported. However, a weapon cache including an unspecified amount of IEDs was discovered on 21 August in Qalacha, Mahmudi Raqi district.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Incident levels recorded in August 2010 roughly correspond to the July 2010 rates, while they mark a decline in intensity as compared to the usual monthly incident rates of the first six months of this year. Despite the fact that hard security incidents concentrate mainly in the eastern districts of Tagab, Alasay and Nijrab where NGO operations remain very limited, NGOs should note the overall increase in combined AOG and ACG initiated incidents in Kapisa. They have almost doubled in absolute numbers with 93 incidents reported for the first eight months of 2010 in comparison to 58 incidents recorded in the same period in 2009. AOG freedom of movement in the eastern districts is concomi-



tant to a limited imprint by ANSF and IMF. Besides AOG, political rivalries in the western districts are dominated by the standoff between Hezb-e-Islami and Jamiat; while AOG of both HIG and pro-Taliban (IEA) affiliation appear to disapprove of the election and its integrity. Factional clashes among the supporters of Jamiat, Hezb-e-Islami and other Pashtun parties may eventually affect Kohistan 1&2 and Mahmud Raqi during the upcoming election period; however, previous reporting has not revealed any significant incidents related to factional disputes.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG in Alasay, Nijrab, & Tagab
- Factional disputes in Kohistan I & II

PARWAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

NGOs operating in Parwan should monitor the developments in the western districts located along the Ghorband Valley (which are dominated by AOG activity) due to the potential for spill-over into adjacent districts. Other areas of concern are Kohi Safid district, which neighbours the restive Tagab district of Kapisa.

Six combined AOG and ACG incidents were reported from Parwan in the past two weeks, half of them occurring in Shinwari. On 17 August, AOG staged a combined IDF and SAF assault on Shinwari District Administrative Centre, during which the ANSF personnel requested air support to repel the attackers. On 25 August, AOG ambushed an ANP convoy transporting detainees en route to the DAC in Astana area; 3 days later, the DAC came under another IDF attack during which an ANP member sustained injuries. Despite a slight build-up of ANP forces in Shinwari DAC during

the past week, ANSF continue exercising only a limited footprint in the area, while being outnumbered by AOG and ACG networks.

Sporadic stand-off attacks, more effective in demonstrating AOG presence rather than actually disrupting the IMF base in Bagram, continued with 2 IDF incidents reported on 17 and 22 August respectively. On 23 August, Bagram district was the site another demonstration, and due to an unprepared ANP, resulted in a violent clash leaving 1 protestor killed and 3 others wounded. The demonstration originated from backlash to an ANP arrest of a local mullah in Ghulam Ali for suspected ties to AOG, whose followers set off for a march towards Bagram DAC. The casualties occurred as a result of ANP attempts at containing the crowd when a radicalized group among the 300 protestors turned on the troops monitoring the demonstration. In the light of this incident, NGOs are advised to sensitize their staff members about increased potential for escalations of violence when larger demon-



strations are staged in Bagram district.

The on-going parliamentary campaign brought additional elements of violence, as demonstrated by two specific clashes among local campaigners in Chaharikar and Kohi Safid. On 28 August, local residents with suspected ties to HIG burned the house used as the campaign headquarters by a new political figure. On 29 August, partisans of a local Jamiate Islami commander campaigning for his second term in Wolesi Jirga clashed with supporters of a newly emerged businessman turned independent politician in Rabat, Chaharikar. Following deterrence SAF from both sides, local elders engaged leaders of both groups in negotiations that eventually resulted in a commitment made by both parties not to disrupt each other's campaign. The two incidents reveal the likelihood of election-related clashes to erupt when a newcomer steps in to challenge existing local power-structures. In mitigation of such threats, NGOs should assess potential localized conflict lines in their particular areas as well as avoid association with any of the high-profile stakeholders involved.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Elections related violence
- AOG activity in Ghorband

GRAPHS:

Please note that graphs in this report are current as of 31 August 2010.


DAYKUNDI

Security dynamics in Daykundi have not changed significantly, as a security vacuum continues to span over large remote areas of the province. With the exception of the DAC, Gizab essentially remains out of reach to GOA structures and two other southern districts (Kiti and Kijran), with a predominant Pashtun population, as well as the Hazara-inhabited districts in the North, remained calm over the reporting period. Only one security incident was reported during this period. On

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

23 August, an armed clash erupted between two parties of local residents in Tokhmojoy village, Kiti district, allegedly revolving around a land property. The incident had a political undertone in the sense that one of the parties is believed to have ties to HIG.

Negotiations are still on-going between GOA and a particular Hazara AOG commander, whose networks are active in Khadir and Gizab. Another in the series of deadlines for the commander to disarm has expired without tangible outcomes. As mentioned in previous reports, the commanders' eventual acceptance to disarm may lead to consequent negotia-



tions over his taking over the position of COP in Gizab district, which could in turn spark violent reactions from the local communities in the district. Further developments in the case are required in order to assess its potential impact on the security environment in the area. Despite the low level of security incidents, latest data indicate a 45% increase in combined AOG and ACG initiated incidents for the first eight months of this year as compared to the same period in 2009.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Security vacuum
- Ethno-political tensions
- Spoilers-to-peace in Gizab

WARDAK

During the reporting period, an INGO with long-established presence in the province faced explicit intimidation from AOG networks against continuing the implementation of a combined rural development/local governance program in Jaghatu. Following similar threats voiced against program beneficiaries in what may eventually be a part of AOG intimidation campaign in the light of the upcoming election, the INGO has put its operations in the district on standby in order to assess the situation and undertake negotiations with local communities. In general, Wardak constitutes a high-risk security environment for NGO operations. During the past two weeks, the incident levels, territorial distribution of incidents,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

and intensity of both stand-off and close range AOG initiated attacks matched the patterns recorded in the previous period. The variation of tactical methods spanned the typical range. IED emplacement, close range SAF attacks, IDF against DACs, occurred along with simple displays of force, as witnessed in the district centres of Jaghatu, Maydan Shahr, Nirkh and Chaki Wardak. It is of note, however, that AOG attacks in Wardak seem to increasingly converge with the agenda of criminal groups and local competitors, all having stakes pertaining to the lucrative freight traffic on the Kabul – Ghazni highway. Salar area in Saydabad can be singled out as the most prominent ambush point on the Wardak part of the road with 3 IED strikes and 1 SAF attack recorded. Differentiating attacks by AOG and ACG in the vicinity



of Highway 1 is therefore ever more difficult as motivations and support structures are increasingly intertwined compounding the criminal threat.

The legacy of previously reported inter-AOG clashes in Nirkh featuring HIG and pro-Taliban factions found an echo in a single inter-AOG incident on 16 August, when two rival commanders clashed in Mar Khana. Despite this incident, the two main AOG networks still seem to be locked down in a delicate status quo with peace negotiations brokered by local elders on-going. In reaction to the relative popularity of Pashtun political parties in the Pashtun belt, partisans of both major AOG networks warned the locals against taking part in the election with anecdotal evidence suggesting that election related intimidation will continue apace particularly in Saydabad, Nirkh and Jaghatu.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG prevelance in Sayadabad and Nirkh
- Attacks along Hwy 1

LOGAR

AOG-initiated attacks against IMF, ANSF and PSC, concentrated within the proximity of the Kabul-Gardez highway, is the defining factor of insecurity within this province and reflects the stakeholders' convergence of interests around a strategic supply artery. This also presents the main challenge to NGO safety and freedom of movement across the province.

While overall conflict patterns in Logar remained largely unchanged, this period did record a decline by 25% in AOG-initiated attacks in comparison to July. IED placement continued to be a favoured tactic for engagement of ANSF/IMF by AOG, limiting their own exposure to immediate retaliation while maximizing the effect as compared to other types


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

of attacks. Out of 12 AOG initiated incidents in total, 5 were IED strikes against ANSF/IMF/PSC in Baraki Barak (3), Kushi and Mohammad Agha (1 in each district); while 2 IEDs were discovered in Puli Alam, and another one in Mohammad Agha. Out of 22 armed clashes either initiated by AOGs, or resulting from proactive engagement of AOGs by ANSF and IMF, Puli Alam district stood for 50% of such operations, while the second half was evenly distributed between Chark, Muhammad Agha and Baraki Barak with 3 incidents each, followed by Khushi where 2 such operations occurred.

The intensity of clashes between IMF/ANSF and AOG came to the fore on August 18 in Qala Juma Area of Puli Alam, when AOG ambushed an IMF patrol with SAF and RPGs. IMF returned fire and called in for close



air support. The clash resulted in 2 IMF killed and 1 wounded along with 12 AOG fatalities. Further reports indicate that a high-ranking IEA commander, purportedly the deputy shadow governor, was identified among the casualties. While such cases of elimination of high-rank leaders may decrease particular AOG capacity in the short term (due to the essentially local roots of AOG networks in Logar) in general the leadership vacuum is usually swiftly taken over and the chain of command restored.

Given the preponderance of AOG influence and outreach in the province, it can be assumed that intimidation against participation in the elections is going apace but remains unreported. NGOs should avoid any exposure to election related venues, premises, institutions and higher-profile stakeholders in the province.

BAMYAN

With no reported incidents for the past three weeks, Bamyani is credited as representing one of the safest areas for NGO operations. The exception to this is Kahmard, where a variety of local AOG and ACG co-exist and occasionally host larger AOG groups commuting from neighbouring Tala wa Barfak district of Baghlan. Of note, this area has a higher concentration of lower-rank Pashtun jihadi commanders as well as numerous ACG which are responsive to occasional calls for action sponsored by larger AOG. While Kahmard remains lightly policed


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Civil unrest
- Instability in Khamard

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

by ANSF, the drop in the number of reported incidents may be ascribed to the lack of information on the district developments rather than to an eventual decrease in AOG/ACG presence in the North-East.

Election campaigning in the province has continued without significant hampering, although hard information is lacking on the actual situation. In the North-East, among the Pashtun communities several former jihadi commanders compete for seats in the Wolesi Jirga, either as independent candidates, or under the wings of HIG. The Hazara communities in the rest of the province follow in majority local candidates with more



or less pronounced ties to Hezb-e Wahdat, while Hezb-e Harakat, represented by a former jihadi commander and current parliamentarian, seems to maintain its position in Waras. Risks specific to NGO community mainly involve the elevated threat of attacks along the access road from Parwan to Bamyani via Ghorband valley. ANSO also cautions NGOs against using the access road from Kabul to Bamyani via Hajigak Pass (Wardak), as well as the road from Bamyani to Dushi via Tala wa Barfak.

JAWZJAN

In Jawzjan Province this period an IMF air strike in Darzab District Centre mistakenly killed four ANP and injured thirteen others, possibly including some civilians. The air strike was called in by ANSF during a clash with AOGs in the District Centre. According to ANSO data, this is the first “friendly fire” incident involving IMF air assets to result in ANSF deaths in the northwestern region. In the neighbouring northeastern region, at least two “friendly fire” incidents have resulted in ANSF casualties this year. AOG activity in Darzab and Qush Tepa districts has resurged in the past three months, following a month-long pause in April 2010 after ANSF established an Forward Operating

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Base north of Darzab District Centre. The respite in AOG activity was short-lived, however, as ANSF were unable to maintain security in the area. In June and July a series of direct-fire and IED attacks were reported in Qush Tepa District, with increasing efficiency near the end of July, when two separate IED attacks killed three ANA members and injured nine others. AOGs first attacked the Darzab District Centre with SAF and RPGs on the afternoon of 18 August, showing their intent to undermine ANSF’s newly established presence in Jawzjan’s southern-most district which links AOG networks and supply lines from Sayyad District (Sar-e Pul) to Bilchiragh District (Faryab). AOGs in the tri-provincial area (where Jawzjan, Faryab and Sar-e Pul meet) are suspected to have consolidated a large amount of

weapons and fighters over the past three months, where ANSF has been reluctant and unable to maintain a sustainable presence. The AOG offensive in southern Jawzjan will surely compel further IMF/ANSF operations in the area, and the probable continuation of AOG-ANSF/IMF clashes, as well as in the surrounding areas of eastern Bilchiragh (Faryab), Sayyad (Sar-e Pul), and northwestern Kohistanat (Sar-e Pul). In March 2010 the new IMF Police Mentoring Unit arrived in the northern region with additional helicopters, increasing IMF/ANSF’s access to air assets and the probability that such assets will be used during operations and clashes. Thus, an increase in the use of air assets will also likely be seen in this area. Friday’s incident will most likely have a negative impact on public perceptions of IMF, as well as relations between ANSF and IMF at the local, provincial and perhaps regional level.

In the provincial capital of Shibirgan, two local nationals, allegedly from Dawlatabad District (Faryab), were arrested from a public bus for possession of two suicide vests. While the potential for suicide attacks in the northern region is always a present, the legitimacy of this arrest and seizure have been doubted by some security sources.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Clashes in Darzab & Qush Tepa

BALKH

Balkh Province was relatively quiet this period, with a virtual two-week respite from day-time attacks on the Mazar-Shibirgan Road. One SAF attack was reported on an ANP checkpoint in the late evening hours, and one direct-fire attack occurred against an IMF convoy in the early evening hours. The latter attack was the second-recorded direct-fire incident involving IMF, and signifies an increasing boldness among AOGs in the area, who previously reserved direct-fire power for soft-skin vehicles such as ANSF rangers and PSC vehicles. In Ali-zai Village of Chimalt District

	NGO Incidents
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This Report Period	0

three AOGs were injured when the IED they were planting detonated. Over twenty IED-related incidents have been reported in Balkh Province since the beginning of June 2010 when the first IED in six months was discovered along the Mazar-Shibirgan Road. Balkh experienced a similar surge in IED-related incidents in November 2009; however, that rate rapidly fell off after an AOG shadow governor was killed when the IED he was transporting prematurely detonated. The sudden surge in IED-related incidents suggests the re-emergence of IED capabilities in the province, and the current rate of IED-related incidents supersedes that of November 2009. One IED was also reported east of the river in Shol-



gara District, which injured a local civilian. Intimidation was reported in three districts of Balkh – in Chahar Bolak a large group of AOGs entered a village and requested villagers to pay Ushur; in Kishindeh a group of AOGs discouraged locals from participating in the elections and requested Ushur; and in Marmul night letters were found discouraging locals from cooperating with IMF and asking them to join Jihad. While intimidation is more common in Chahar Bolak District, the latter two incidents are significant of AOG mobilization efforts outside their typical areas of operation.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Night letters & intimidation
- IED

BADAKHSHAN


The relatively peaceful province of Badakhshan experienced a second fatal NGO incident this period, when an INGO vehicle was struck by an RCIED in Shahri Buzorg District. The RCIED, which is believed to have been intended for the convoy of a parliamentarian candidate, struck an INGO unmarked white Land Cruiser, killing two INGO staff and injuring a third. One community volunteer was also killed and another was injured in the attack. While RCIEDs have been employed on occasion against security forces in the district, this is the first time in which NGO operations in the district have been directly impacted by the conflict. The incident comes on the heels of last month's brutal murder of 10 INGO-affiliated staff in Kuran Wa Munjan District, which may temporarily raise international donor and headquarters' concerns about the safety of the province as a whole. Despite the series of unfortunate events, ANSO asserts that the incidents were isolated; however, they do bear valuable lessons-learned for the NGO community.

It is important to distinguish between incidents of intentional targeting, such as the killings in Kuran Wa Munjan, and the risks of collateral involvement, such as the IED in Shahri Buzorg. The vehicle struck by the RCIED in Shahri Buzorg is suspected to have been targeted, due to the evidence that two civilian vehicles had passed by the same spot only

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

moments before. However, the INGO itself was not the target. Rather it is logical to assume that the vehicle was mistaken for another high-profile target. Local authorities suggest that the intended target was the vehicle of a parliamentarian candidate which was supposed to pass through the area around the same time. This incident adds to the body of evidence emphasizing the dangers of traveling in unmarked white 4x4 vehicles. Two INGO vehicles have been struck by RCIEDs in the past nine months in the northern region, both of which were unmarked white 4x4 vehicles. The previous incident occurred in Balkh Province along the Mazar-Shibirgan Road in December 2009, and it was evident that the IED was intended for a white unmarked ANSF vehicle which had been passing at the same time. In another notable incident in northern Takhar, AOGs stopped an unmarked white INGO vehicle and requested that the NGO staff either mark their vehicles or use a different type to avoid confusion between the INGO and similar security force vehicles. Based on this body of evidence, it is clear that the use of such vehicles significantly increases the risk of being mistakenly targeted.

Concerns have been raised regarding the presence of exogenous AOGs from Nuristan and Pakistan in the southeastern districts of Badakhshan. According to unconfirmed reports there has been an influx in the number of AOGs in Zebak and Kuran Wa Munjan districts, who are possibly associated with the non-local AOGs



who carried out last month's murders. While their likely objectives are to target GOA and ANSF establishments, their suspected association with last month's attacks should be noted. Non-local AOGs are a greater threat to NGOs because they are not bound by the same social contract to adhere to the consensus of the local population, as are local AOGs. The bordering districts to Zebak and Kuran Wa Munjan such as Yamgan, Baharak, Jurm and Warduj, already host a degree of radical influence which may be readily mobilized by the groups coming in from outside. To date there has been no concrete evidence of their presence; however, NGOs should be conscious of the potential future impact of the presence and influence of non-local AOGs in these districts.

Pre-election violence in Badakhshan has been characterized primarily by conflicts between local candidates, rather than general opposition to the elections (aside from a number of night letters against the elections which were distributed by a newly formed intellectual-religious group which appears to be unarmed). One high-profile incident involved an attack on a parliamentarian candidate in which the son of a local power broker was an alleged perpetrator and was subsequently shot dead. These incidents do not pose a general threat to NGO security, but highlight the importance of NGO neutrality and ensuring that both operations and staff remain politically neutral. Further developments may be expected in Kishim District ahead of the elections, where AOGs from within and outside of the province have reportedly gathered to disrupt pre-election and election-day proceedings. Thus far kinetic attacks have been limited to a single RPG attack against the vehicle of the provincial chief of NDS as he was traveling during the day along the Feyzabad-Kishim Main Road.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- RCIED
- Instability in Kishim
- Election related tensions

SAMANGAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Following a period of concern regarding increased armed actors in Samangan Province, some NGOs have resumed their operations after proactively soliciting security guarantees from local government and community elders. IMF reportedly came under SAF while inspecting polling centres in the province; however, this was not confirmed by official sources. AOG-initiated incidents targeting GOA or security forces ahead of the elections may be expected.

KUNDUZ


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

As developments in the majority of Kunduz Province were defined by conflict between AOGs and security forces, a rare criminal incident impacted an NGO this period. An NGO convoy of white marked Land Cruisers were stopped on the Aliabad-Khanabad Main Road, among other civilian vehicles, and robbed of their VHF handsets. This incident asserts that criminal activity continues in some remote areas of Kunduz (particularly in Khanabad District), despite the preeminent AOG control throughout most of the province.

Elsewhere in the province, two rare RCIED strikes challenged government control in both Qala-e Zal and Archi District Centres. Over the past twelve months in Qala-e Zal District pro-government militias led by an influential commander have managed to maintain a relative degree of security as compared to its neighboring districts. However, an RCIED which targeted a passing IMF convoy, resulting in the injury of six civilians and the death of one child, demonstrated that AOGs continue to be capable of

infiltrating the district centre, and that the government may be under increased pressure to support the militias in order to ward off additional attacks. Comparatively, the majority of Archi District has fallen to AOG control over the course of the past year. While GOA maintain control over the district centre, AOGs have typically challenged that control through direct-fire or long-range attacks directed toward the district centre and the government-controlled area of Qarlogh. This period the first RCIED strike recorded in the district displayed an emergence of IED capabilities. In addition, the timing and location of the strike (bazaar day in the district centre) appeared to have targeted public opinion ahead of elections, an alarming tactic that is not typically employed by Afghan AOGs, who strategically avoid direct attacks against noncombatants. The blast resulted in the deaths of two ANP, two civilians and the injury of sixteen others. IED capabilities may have been introduced to the district via the Archi-Khwaja Ghar road, where another RCIED struck an ANP vehicle this period. The road links the district with AOGs in northern Takhar.

While joint ANSF/IMF operations have been put on hold dur-



ing the past two weeks, a series of IMF night raids and air operations continued in Chahar Dara and Kunduz districts, resulting in the deaths of at least two AOG commanders and a several other AOGs, as well as a number of arrests. These operations may be seen as successes by security forces; however, that the use of air strikes have occasionally resulted in civilian casualties and damage to civilian property, such tactics appear to alienate the civilian population.

Sporadic attacks within the Kunduz City limits continued this period. Most notably, the checkpoint in Bandar-e Imam Sahib Area was attacked with SAF in the early morning hours, resulting in the deaths of eight ANP and the injury of one other. The AOGs were able to inflict such a high number of casualties due to the fact that the ANP at the checkpoint were sleeping. A similar attack occurred in December 2009 in Baghlani Jadid. Such an attack would demand a high degree of planning and will therefore not likely occur frequently in the future; however, it does demonstrate an ability to survey and infiltrate this part of the city. Also, in Zakhil Area of Kunduz City an RCIED detonated against an ANP vehicle which was escorting the provincial head of NDS. This is the fourth RCIED detonation targeting security forces in this area of the city since June 2010.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks against ANP
- Criminality
- IMF night operations


BAGHLAN

While Operation Tawhid III may have temporarily disrupted AOG capabilities within the outlying areas of western Baghlan, instability on the major highways continues to inhibit safe movement both north and west of Pul-e Khumri City. On the Pul-e Khumri-Kunduz Road, AOGs continue to establish illegal checkpoints in search of GOA, ANSF or NGO employees. One NGO staff member was abducted and released this period while travelling in public transportation along the road. The individual did not identify himself as an NGO staff member; however, AOGs proceeded to call the contacts in his phone in order to determine his affiliation. The individual was released less than twelve hours later through negotiations with local elders. It is not clear why AOGs in this area con-

NGO Incidents	
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	1

tinue to search for NGO employees, as AOGs do not target NGOs for abduction elsewhere in the northern region, aside from Faryab Province. On occasion NGOs have been abducted for the purposes of ransom; however, these abductions are apparently carried out by low-level AOGs or ACGs who only claim to have an ideological orientation. More often, as has been seen in both provinces, low-level AOGs or newly appointed AOG leaders have carried out abductions in order to demonstrate their authority in an area. Once NGOs are able to prove their local acceptance and neutrality from parties to the conflict, the staff are inevitably released.

In addition to AOG checkpoints north of Pul-e Khumri City, RCIED and direct-fire attacks on ANSF and IMF continued along both major highways. West of Pul-e Khumri City, attacks on the Pul-e Khumri-Mazar Highway re-




sumed this period, following a two-week pause during Operation Tawhid III. In addition to a day-time RCIED and SAF attack which resulted in the injury of three IMF soldiers, AOGs also ambushed the convoy of the son of a national powerbroker.

Two high-profile incidents involving civilian casualties raised local animosity towards ANSF and IMF this period. In southwestern Tala Wa Barfak District, an air strike aimed at routing out AOGs along the Bamyan border mistakenly killed six civilians and injured twelve others. Within Pul-e Khumri District, an arrest operation led by a newly appointed pro-government militia commander resulted in the mistaken killing of a civilian boy. This prompted an immediate reaction among the community, who staged a demonstration against ANSF and IMF in Dand-e Shahabuddin Area, blocking off the Pul-e Khumri-Kunduz Road for several hours.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG checkpoints
- Attacks along main routes
- IMF operations

COMBINED (ACG/AOG) 2010 DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS



NOTE: This graph represents countrywide data and is current as of 31 August 2010


FARYAB

Though AOGs have undergone a concerted effort to establish a functional provincial and sub-provincial shadow government in Faryab Province, there appears to be a continued disconnect between official AOG policy and local-level practice with regard to NGO abductions. Throughout the province newly appointed AOG leaders and local-level AOGs who claim to be associated with the broader movement are carrying out NGO abductions for what appears to be their own personal gain. The reprimanding response of legitimate AOG authority has been late to react to this trend, and the threat of abduction persists in virtually all regions of the province. In Qaysar District the threat of abduction presented itself in Chilgazi Area, where it appears that an AOG commander from a neighbouring district is attempting to establish his place among the plethora of sub-district level commanders in Qaysar. In Kohistan District, AOGs who have infiltrated from Pashtun Kot and have mobilized local opposition groups in Bandar Area have presented a threat to NGOs who have attempted to remain neutral in the face of AOG efforts to illicit local support for the shadow government. In Qaramqul District the threat of abduction has been presented by a group which is likely linked to AOGs in Dawlatabad District, which currently hosts the centre of authority for the provincial shadow government. In each past incident of NGO abduction, the NGO staff have been released following negotiations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	13
This Report Period	0

with local elders. It appears that once the perpetrators are made aware of the local support for the NGO, the AOGs release the staff with their sanctioning to continue operations in the area. On one occasion it was rumoured that an AOG leader responsible for abducting NGO staff collected ransom from the families, but then were reprimanded by higher AOG authorities and made to reimburse the ransom. Until the trend in abductions subsides, it is recommended that NGOs proactively engage their beneficiaries to assert their neutrality and communicate their purpose in order to ensure their protection. In all cases of abduction NGOs should attempt to resolve the abductions at the local level through the support of familial ties and community elders. Attempting to resolve abductions through political pressure or the use of force will inevitably endanger the abductees and compromise the organization's neutrality.

Day-time direct-fire and RCIED attacks have proliferated on the Ring Road in Dawlatabad District where an IO vehicle was caught in the cross-fire of an ambush on a parliamentarian candidate late this reporting period. Though four day-time attacks were reported on the road in the course of one week, this is the first such incident to impact an IO or NGO vehicle. The proximity of the IO vehicle to the attack may place additional pressure on security forces to proactively engage the AOGs who have recently increased their day-time activity on this road; however, it is questionable whether security forces will direct their attention toward this area ahead of the elections, at a time when all



efforts have been directed toward securing polling centres and major population centres. In Qaysar District, security forces have thus far refrained from re-entering Khwaja Kenti Village for the same reason, as polling centres in Khwaja Kenti and southern Qaysar are not expected to open. AOGs have once again gone on the offensive in Almar and Bilchiragh districts, expanding activity into areas where GOA have fought to maintain control. In southern Almar District AOGs assassinated a prominent former jihadi commander and community leader with an RCIED, a tactic used to undermine local informal authority structures. The same tactic was employed against an influential pro-government commander last period in Chilgazi Area of Qaysar District. In Bilchiragh District AOGs continue to attack ANSF targets in Qorchi Village, the eastern-most village in the district which has remained under virtual siege for the past month. While the neighbouring villages have fallen to AOG control, Qorchi has been isolated by GOA in order to inhibit AOG access between eastern Bilchiragh and the neighbouring provinces of Jawzjan and Sar-e Pul. The sustainability of enforcing GOA control in this area is questionable, however, as major military operations have to be undertaken in order to bring in basic commercial goods and supplies.

Election-related violence was also reported in the province, where an election campaigner was abducted just 500 meters east of the Ring Road in Shirin Tagab District. Election-related violence is often characterized as AOG-initiated; however, as seen throughout the northern region, AOG attacks against particular campaign or candidates may be mobilized the victim's political opposition. Abductions and attacks in Shirin Tagab and Dawlatabad, however, are genuinely believed to be anti-governmental.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- NGO abduction
- AOG expansion
- Election related violence

TAKHAR

Fighting in northern Takhar intensified this period, where AOGs attacked both district centers of Darqad and Yangi Qala districts, and managed to over-run a number of ANBP checkpoints in Darqad, forcing seven ANBP members to flee and seizing their weapons and ammunition. Large areas of the three northern districts of Yangi Qala, Darqad and Khwaja Bahawuddin appear to have come under AOG control in the course of the past several weeks. While NGO workers have not been harmed to date, according to what has been reported to

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

ANSO, an individual from a partner contractor organization was abducted by AOGs this period in Darqad. The objective of the abduction appeared to be to gain the attention of local stakeholders, as upon his release the AOGs announced the creation of a newly established mechanism to monitor and coordinate the activities of all organizations working in the area. While pressure to pay illegal taxes is evident in all areas under AOG control, this is the first organized commission of its kind seen thus far in the northern region. The conflict in northern Takhar has developed at such a rapid pace due to the fact that it has essentially been unencumbered by any serious degree of international or military force presence. The result



has been the development of a mature and functional shadow government with freedom of movement along two provincial borders and access to an international border-crossing. The situation as it is seen thus far will likely continue for the foreseeable future, as neither national or international forces have prioritized this area. Given that the current power structure will likely remain in place for an undetermined amount of time, the administrative pressure placed on NGOs demands an organized response which will allow the NGOs to continue operating without compromising their neutrality.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG shadow governance
- IED along airport road
- Increased instability in north


SAR-E PUL

The security situation in Sar-e Pul remains stable in the majority of the province, despite what appears to be a gradual rise in AOG activity in some areas outside traditional AOG strongholds in Sayyad District. While kinetic activity within Sari Pul City is rare, the presence of AOGs in the city and surrounding villages was demonstrated by a series of night letters and a few security incidents within the city and along the Shibirgan-Sari Pul Road. The first ever daytime AOG checkpoint was reported along the Sar-e Pul-Shibirgan Road, at which armed men were searching vehicles for GOA or ANSF employees in the mid-morning hours. The ANP responded and after a brief ex-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

change of fire the AOGs dispersed. In addition, AOGs attacked the Imam Jafar checkpoint on the north end of Sari Pul City. Notably, both incidents were not new in form, as AOGs had previously established a checkpoint in the same area at night approximately one month prior, and had attacked Imam Jafar checkpoint in a similar manner in January of this year. The significance of the former incident is apparent, however, as it occurred during the day, perhaps signifying an increased boldness among the AOGs.

In the first ANSO-recorded incident of night letters in Sari Pul City, 40 night letters were distributed in various parts of the provincial capital, urging locals to resist the influence of “foreign infidels” and pay tithes to the AOGs. In a second incident a different letter was discovered in a



village in Sar-e Pul District, discouraging locals from cooperating with IMF, and threatening ANSF to quit their jobs. The letters definitely belie an underlying AOG influence in the surrounding villages, and an attempt to expand that influence, perhaps with the assistance of Sayyad-based AOGs.

In Alef Safed Area of Kohistanat District, a joint IMF/ANSF operation appears to have temporarily deterred AOG activity on the road linking Kohistanat to its neighboring districts. As access along this route is a strategic advantage to AOGs who are transiting from Sayyad into Sar-e Pul, forming a link between Faryab and Sar-e Pul provinces, it is likely that control of the territory continue to be contested by AOGs who remain present in Kohistanat.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG checkpoints
- Night letters
- Instability in Kohistanat


NANGARHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

On 30 August in Jalalabad City, an explosive device, apparently a magnetic IED, detonated against the private vehicle of the District Governor of Lal Pur District when the vehicle was approaching the Provincial Governor’s Office. As a result of the explosion, the District Governor was killed, and four of his bodyguards as well as two civilians were wounded. This marks the second high profile attack recorded in Jalalabad City this month, the first of which occurred on 2 August in Zone 2 targeting the convoy of a presidential advisor from Kunar which wounded eight. In addition, an RCIED detonated on 28 August in Zone 4 against an ANA vehicle on the secondary road, slightly injuring two ANA officers and one civilian. Besides this incident one should note that the AOG activity in Central Nangarhar has decreased in line with seasonal trends during the Holy month of Ramadan. Nonetheless, another incident of note occurred also on

30 August with two rockets that impacted in Zone 1 in the early morning, causing no damage or casualties. It should be noted that IDF assaults in Jalalabad City are rather unusual; however, they are used frequently against JAF, with three incidents recorded during the present cycle. Nonetheless, despite the fact that IDF is marked by rather limited efficiency, it is more often used with intention to intimidate; therefore it is likely that frequency of such attacks will increase before the upcoming elections.

Another characteristic of the present reporting period was a demonstration that took place on 18 August in Surkh Rod District blocking the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway. The motivation behind the demonstration was a dissent towards an IMF operation in Zalmabad, when an IMF team allegedly killed two civilians. It is worthy to note that this kind of civil unrest or public discontent is rather a usual feature in Nangarhar and it should encourage NGOs to monitor their surroundings as such events occur often with little or no warning.



In all, 20 AOG initiated incidents were recorded during the present cycle across the province displaying a decrease of 20% in comparison to the last period. Yet, AOGs remain active in Nangarhar’s south and south-eastern districts of Khogyani, Chaparhar, Hisarak and Muhmand Dara. Of note, sporadic attacks continued along the Jalalabad-Torkham Road. For instance on 19 August, in Bati Kot, a magnetic IED detonated against a fuel tanker truck. Three private vehicles in the vicinity caught fire, killing one local and injuring another. Subsequently, local villagers protested and blocked the main road for about three hours, vowing to deny all fuel tankers passage on that portion of the highway. The occurrence of such incidents may suggest an increased influx of AOG into surrounding areas although it still remains unclear if all of the incidents are AOG related as in the abovementioned incident local villagers suspected a driver to be involved for reasons that are unclear at this time.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Attacks on ANSF/IMF
- AOGs in south of province

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.


ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

KUNAR

Although the province witnessed significant flooding this did not slow the pace of AOG initiated incidents with 91 being recorded in the past two weeks. It indicates that Kunar continues to be the most active province in the Eastern Region and also that August has become the most violent month in 2010 so far. In line with ANSO assessments, it appears that ANSF have not been able to ensure the security along the Jalalabad-Asadabad Road. On 21 August, AOG purportedly dressed in ANA uniforms, stopped the vehicle of the District Governor of Chawkay on the main Jalalabad-Asadabad Road in Asadabad District and abducted him, his son and his bodyguard. AOG destroyed the vehicle, and brought them to an unknown location. Moreover, around the same time

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

in Sirkanay District, AOG abducted at least 12 workers from a project site of a construction company in Donai area. Asadabad District experienced another incident of note, on 24 August in Andarsheer area. AOG apparently wearing also ANA uniforms established a mobile CP along the main road between Asadabad and Wata Pur. The influx of Pakistani AOG, already described in the previous reports, into the mentioned areas appears to have increased further, and it is assumed that at least the abduction in Sirkanay is the work of a specific Pakistani group which was also responsible for previous abduction incidents in Chawkay and Sirkanay districts. It seems that following this abduction security forces have increased patrols in the area, but without setting up further static positions. This led to the conclusion that the threat of abduction still remains elevated along the Jalalabad-Asadabad



Road, as well as in Sirkanay. Compared to the previous report the geographical concentration of AOG activity has shifted once again towards Pech Valley (Manogai and Water Pur districts) which experienced around 36% of all AOG initiated incidents. As mentioned previously, the main AOG tactic in the area is by direct attacks, therefore IDF assaults against security forces and DACs remain high with 13 incidents reported during the present cycle. Besides IDF related incidents in Manogai, Nari and Sirkanay, on 23 August in Asadabad District AOG fired five mortar rounds towards an ANP HQ.

Intimidation efforts and abductions of the local population continued as well across the province. For instance, on 22 August in Nari District, AOG abducted a local teacher, and on the same day, but in Manogai, another three civilians were abducted from Tarale area.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG attacks along Jalalabad-Asadabad road
- Abductions

LAGHMAN

During the present cycle AOG activity in Laghman significantly increased with 19 AOG incidents recorded in comparison to the previous period. The large majority of reported incidents took place at mobile check points established by AOGs on an intermittent basis searching vehicles for civilians working for the GOA/ANSF/IMF. These check points were concentrated in the northern Laghman, particularly in

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Alishing District, where 8 incidents were reported with 6 in Dawlat Shah and 2 in Alingar. On the one hand the appearance of AOG check points is a clear demonstration of expanded AOG presence but on the other it is probably related to upcoming elections and AOG efforts to intimidate the local population. This has been underlined, for instance, with an attack on a parliamentary candidate's vehicle that occurred on 18 August in Alingar District, killing a bodyguard and injuring another one. Additionally, intimidation attempts continued in



Dawlat Shah when, on 16 August, AOG distributed night letters, ordering the local community to compel their sons and family members to quit their jobs with GOA/ANSF/IMF. NGOs should be aware of an increase in AOG presence in Dawlat Shah where the bulk of AOG activity and especially intimidation efforts were recorded. Finally, no incidents have been reported in the past two weeks along the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway which confirms the trend already underlined in previous reports.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Instability in Mitharlam

KHOST

The security environment in Khost was dominated by an AOG complex attack targeting two IMF bases - FOBs Salerno and Chapman. On 28 August, at around 0230-0300 hrs, AOGs, some of them wearing U.S uniforms, attacked simultaneously both IMF facilities. The attack included a failed (S)VBIED (stuck in mud en route and captured by IMF later) and BBIEDs (at least three suicide vests were found), a mortar/RPGs attack, and a direct armed assault attempt. A prolonged fire fight of more than five hours ensued, involving IMF air assets. Casualty reports indicate that at least twenty AOGs were killed

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

and five arrested, with four IMF, one ANSF and one civilian being wounded. Moreover, one IMF helicopter made a hard landing after being engaged by AOG and one ANP vehicle was destroyed. The attack seems to be a part of an AOG campaign targeting IMF facilities across the country (i.e. Bagram on 19 May, Jalalabad Airfield on 30 June and Kandahar both on 23 May and 3 August,) and should be underlined for its coordination, scale and duration. Nonetheless, Khost has witnessed already similar sporadic high profile attacks. For instance, last December, a BBIED attacker detonated his device inside the FOB Chapman killing seven CIA employees and later on 8 March in Khost City, AOG launched a complex attack involving several BBIEDs.



In conjunction with the neighboring province of Paktya, after a temporary lull, AOG activity throughout Khost continued to increase, with 36 AOG incidents recorded during the present cycle, which represents an increase by 17% compared to the previous report. Therefore, the level of AOG incidents remains far behind the peak recorded in July. In the past two weeks, AOGs operating in Khost, concentrated their activity particularly in Tani, Musa Khel and Bak districts. It is worth noting that during the present cycle, IDF has become AOG's tactic of choice, with rocket strikes/mortars reported from Tani, Bak, Musa Khel, Nadir Shah Kot and Spera districts.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs in Matun
- IDF in Bak & Sabari
- Complex attacks

PAKTYA

After the temporary lull that had been observed during the previous period (partially related to heavy floods affecting eastern areas of the province), AOG activity has resumed in Paktya. Compared to 10 AOG incidents recorded during the last reporting period, the overall level of AOG activity has increased sharply in the past two weeks to 38 AOG initiated incidents. During the present cycle AOG activity remained concentrated in Gardez District, which experienced more than 39 % of all AOG initiated incidents. As underlined in previ-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ous reports, AOG's tactic of choice in the district remains IED deployment with a total of 14 devices detonated. During the present cycle, Gardez and Shwak districts experienced the bulk of IED attacks. However, regarding the province as a whole, the main AOG tactic continued to be direct attacks with 19 incidents recorded. It is worth noting that besides the usual AOG targets of IMF/ANSF, PSCs constitute the second favoured target throughout the province. For instance, during this period PSC convoys came under attack in Shwak, Gardez and Lilja Ahmad Khel districts.



ANP officer's house, wounding his mother. Another incident, this time related to the election period occurred on 16 August, also in Gardez, when AOG warned locals not to vote during the upcoming parliamentary election, with threats to cut off their fingers.

In order to counter this AOG activity IMF conducted several operations which, during the present cycle, were focused particularly on Zurmat and Wuza Zadran districts. For instance, on 27 August in Zurmat (Sahak area), twelve AOG were killed and another five were arrested as a result of a series of IMF air strikes and ground operations.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Direct attacks against ANSF

Intimidation continued unabated when, on 18 August in Gardez, a hand grenade was hurled into an

GHAZNI


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Ghazni Province has not only remained one of the most insecure provinces in the country, the level of AOG activity has actually slightly increased over the past reporting period. Over 90 separate direct and indirect fire attacks were recorded during the last two weeks, and this level of violence has resulted in reports of families leaving villages in Andar District, the most affected and arguably the most dangerous area in the country. This displacement of civilians is even more troubling when one considers that such movements have in the past occurred as a result of a distinct military operation, with specific start and end points, such as in Marja District in Helmand. In these current cases,

however, the movement is a result of the inexorable increase of insecurity over months, with no end point in sight. Demonstrations protesting the continued insecurity occurred in Ghazni City and in Andar District, and will likely continue as the situation persists.

Andar District alone accounted for 26 AOG attacks, primarily direct attacks on ANP vehicles and IMF convoys. In these attacks, AOG appeared to follow a similar pattern – ambush the target, inflict as much damage as possible, and then retreat before a decisive response could be organized. On a few occasions AOG also used indirect fire (rockets, mortars) on IMF facilities, but without inflicting considerable damage.

Elsewhere in the province, the DACs of most of the remaining districts were attacked by both indirect and direct fire, multiple



times in each location. Rockets struck the DACs of Gelan (three times), Muqur (three times), Ajristan (twice) Ab Band (twice), and Dih Yak (once), while SAF and RPGs were used against the DACs of Waghaz (three times), Rashidan (twice), Qarabagh (twice), and Khogyani (twice). Outside of the DACs, attacks on moving targets consisted mainly of ambushes on IMF/ANSF convoys along the Kandahar – Kabul highway.

As with Helmand province, the frenetic activity of AOG was in stark contrast to the lull in IMF/ANSF operations. During the reporting period, only six reported operations took place, in the districts of Ghazni, Muqur, Waghaz and Gelan, with a total of 15 AOG killed and another 22 detained. Airstrikes were

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IDF against DAC
- AOG attacks against convoys

PAKTIKA


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Paktika Province remained extremely insecure and the profile of security incidents was much like that of neighbouring Ghazni Province – a large number of direct and indirect AOG attacks, employing significant numbers of rockets and mortars against static IMF targets as well as DACs. IEDs were a significant problem during the report period as well. Also mirroring Ghazni Province, it appears IMF/ANSF operations were somewhat muted.

wherein AOG attacked a peace jirga of tribal elders and GOA officials. No one was killed in the attack, however needless to say, the proceedings ended rather abruptly.

In the Barmal district center, IMF detained six ANBP who allegedly had deserted their unit and were trying to join local AOG units. This latter incident perhaps provides a glimpse into the morale of the ANSF forces in the area, however incidents like these remain relatively isolated, and should be monitored to determine if any important patterns emerge over the coming weeks and months.

Lastly, a local radio station in Sharan was shut down by ANSF, after the station broadcast reports



of local citizens complaining of the inability of ANP to provide security to the district. This report was initiated after local AOG had posted messages throughout the area warning civilians to stop using the cameras on their mobile phones. Local citizens then complained to authorities about these threats, which were in turn reported on the local news. This incident will be monitored closely to see if other media outlets are threatened or closed when reporting the realities of the deteriorating security situation in the south.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Attacks against DAC

HELMAND


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Putting to shame those who have over the last weeks claimed ‘progress was being made’, Helmand province witnessed an enormous, and increasing, amount of AOG activity, mostly in the form of direct attacks on all types of IMF and ANSF targets – posts, bases, patrols, convoys and even helicopters. The recent report period represents an impressive demonstration of the ability of AOG to strike at will throughout all parts of the province.

There were over 50 recorded direct attacks by AOG during the report period, the most ever recorded for this type of incident in Helmand. In Marja, IMF patrols and convoys were attacked four times, and IMF facilities were attacked on three other occasions. ANP patrols were also attacked six times in the district. Importantly there were significant numbers of civilian casualties in the attacks taking place in Marja, indicating that the majority of these took place in built-up areas such as the DAC. The DAC was also the location of the majority of clashes in Sangin District, which witnessed a total of 11 attacks, targeting a mixture of IMF vehicles and ANP patrols. Of note however is a large-scale attack launched by AOG – over 200 in all – in which the assailants stormed a PSC compound supporting a road construction project near Haiderabad village. A prolonged fire-fight took place, reportedly over the space of 12 hours, during which approxi-

mately 50 PSC and 80 AOG members were killed, and over 30 construction vehicles of various types were either destroyed or stolen. Accurate reports about the incident were difficult to ascertain, as ANP sources publicly – and tellingly – admitted it took place in an area which ANSF could not at the present time venture into.

In Nad Ali District, AOG launched attacks on both patrols and convoys, however AOG also managed to attack IMF helicopters on two different occasions, once with SAF and once with RPGs, but to no reported effect. AOG were particularly active in Nahri Sarraj District during the report period, as they attacked ANP posts on eight occasions, overrunning one such post near Wazir Manda village, killing four ANP, abducting two more and taking the post’s weapons, vehicle and supplies. Near Grishk, a joint IMF / ANSF patrol was attacked by heavy weapons – RPGs and mortars – however the only reported casualties were two civilians. IMF patrols were attacked in the district a total of six times, primarily in the area of Charharbagh, near Babaji village (which is actually located in neighbouring Lashkar Gah District, and is a historical hotspot for clashes), and near the villages of Band-e-barq and Grishk. Not wanting to be outdone by their brothers in Nad Ali District, AOG in Nahri Sarraj also attempted to down an IMF helicopter using SAF, without any success. Finally, in Lashkar Gah District, AOG in Babaji village attacked an IMF patrol, killing one IMF and wounding two others, and in the city of Lashkar



Gah, AOG fired a total of five rockets, which landed in various parts of the city and caused no significant damage. The use of rockets is somewhat rare in the Helmand – as opposed to the provinces further east, as the majority of these types of munitions come from Pakistan. It will be important to monitor any increase in their use in the province.

There were 16 IED incidents during the report period, however it is apparent that many of these were not RCIEDs, but rather IEDs that had been left by AOG to generally impede movement. As a result, many of the incidents involved civilians accidentally detonating the devices; in this manner, a total of seven civilians were killed and six others wounded.

IMF/ANSF activity was rather muted in the face of such an unprecedented level of AOG attacks; in total there were reports of 14 deliberate operations throughout the province. In Lashkar Gah City, NDS detained eight men accused of planning to carry out attacks related to the upcoming elections. In Garmser District two IMF operations resulted in a total of 40 IEDs and 11 Motorola radios being seized, and four individuals arrested. Most significantly, however, was a joint IMF/ANSF raid on an AOG prison complex in Musa Qala District, which resulted in 13 AOG killed and a total of 27 civilian prisoners released. During the operation, however, five prisoners were killed, including two local employees of a private development organization who had been abducted several weeks earlier. For most observers it was surprising that AOG actually ran such operations, instead of housing abductees in smaller groups; having the ability to run a ‘prison complex’ speaks to the ability of AOG to operate openly in certain parts of the province.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks
- IMF operations
- IEDs

KANDAHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0


Over the past report period, Kandahar Province has had arguably the highest levels of security incidents to date. This may seem surprising, as there has been a relative lack of ‘spectacular’ attacks in Kandahar City, however AOG have maintained a vigorous pace of direct attacks in the surrounding districts, and have increased the rate of targeted killings within the city itself. IMF/ANSF have also clearly stepped up the activity levels, initiating operations on the outskirts of Kandahar City. In addition, it is apparent that IEDs are being deployed at a greater rate, reflected in both the number of IED strikes and also the increasing number of IED discovery and disposal operations by IMF / ANSF units.

Direct AOG attacks in the province took place a total of 33 times. 11 of these attacks were launched against IMF / ANSF convoys, travelling to support IMF / ANSF presence in the districts of Zhari and Maywand. ANP posts were also targeted at total of nine times. In Zhari District, ANP posts in the villages of Howz-e-Madad, Ashogha, Makwan, Jawar Manda, and Pashmul were attacked by AOG, with Pashmul witnessing AOG on at least five separate occasions. In Maywand District the DAC was attacked but with no significant results. In Kandahar City, AOG limited their direct attacks to ANP posts, killing six

ANP in District 3, two ANP in District 6, and two ANP in District 2. Lastly, in Daman District, the District CoP was killed, along with five others, when a SVBIED attacker drove into an ANP convoy near the Tarnak Bridge and detonated, wounding 18 others.

Target killings rose in Kandahar City, with 20 such incidents in the city and two others in neighbouring Arghandab District. These numbers will undoubtedly rise as election-related killings become more likely in the next month. In this report period, victims have included: three GOA employees, three prominent tribal elders, two local Shura members, two retired ANP officers, two IMF translators, two local employees of private development organizations, and six others labeled as ‘collaborators’ with either IMF or GOA. It is important to note that these are in addition to those incidents in which crime and/or family disputes are suspected, of which a total of six additional bodies were discovered.

In an incident which cannot yet be attributed to AOG, unknown assailants fired three to four RPG rounds at the compound residence of the head of the Provincial Council and half-brother to the President, Ahmed Wali Karzai. Three of his guards were wounded in this attack, as well as one guard of a nearby IO. The possible motives for this attack are numerous, as this individual holds a variety of formal and informal roles in the country.



IMF operations have increased throughout most of the province, with the majority of effort focused on construction/enhancement of the series of checkpoints leading into Kandahar City, as they have publicly stated that by the end of September the security perimeter will be complete. As a result, the southwestern edge (District 2) and the western edge (District 8) of Kandahar City have become primary locations for clashes between IMF and AOG. During the period 25 – 29 August, a series of night operations in the Malajat area of District 2 involved prolonged exchanges of heavy weapons and small arms fire, and resulted in the arrest of over 150 individuals, currently being processed by ANSF. In District 8, near the villages of Deh Kochi and Pir Paimal, IMF airstrikes were conducted three times to dislodge AOG positions during the report period. Both districts are critical to stop the flow of AOG personnel and arms into Kandahar City. In addition, IMF operations in Arghandab itself, in the villages of Chargolba and Zhwando Hadira, resulted in four AOG killed, and six detained. Lastly, IMF operations, including airstrikes, near the village of Wali in Panjwayi District claimed three AOG and resulted in the arrest of eight others. The use of airstrikes in IMF operations in Kandahar province is clearly increasing, and this can be attributed somewhat as a response to the complaints of mid-level commanders who, under recently departed General McChrystal, had claimed they were being asked to fight ‘with one arm tied behind their back’ in an effort to limit airstrikes and consequent civilian casualties.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Assassinations
- Attacks against ANP
- IMF airstrikes

URUZGAN

As in recent months, incidents in Uruzgan were a mix of AOG attacks and IED strikes. The overall level of incidents remained approximately the same as in previous report periods, however one new trend is a marked increase in the use of rockets by AOG in the province, implying a greater supply of such munitions flowing in from the neighbouring provinces of Ghazni and Zabul, where weak border controls with Pakistan permit their importation.

In all, AOG launched 26 separate attacks, targeting joint IMF/ANSF patrols in Tirin Kot and Char Chino Districts, as well as ANP posts in Chora District. Three rocket attacks were launched in Tirin Kot District,


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

twice against the IMF airbase, and once against an ANA base near the village of Balochi. An additional two rocket attacks were conducted in the Poza area of Chora District and in Ghoram area of Dihrawud District, the latter being directed towards an ANP post. In all cases, there were no significant damages incurred, implying that, although the munitions may be flowing into the province at an increased rate, the skills required to employ them effectively has not.

Targeted killings of ‘collaborators’ continued at a steady pace as compared with previous report periods. In Garmab Manda village of Tirin Kot District AOG killed four civilians accused of having links with the GOA. Killings also occurred in the market area of Tirin Kot City and in the village of Qalacha. Lastly, in three separate incidents in Dihrawud

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED strikes
- Attacks against ANSF/IMF
- Targeted killings



District – in the villages of Paytoto, Shoraki, and Deh Sang – it was reported that AOG killed civilians who they accused of supporting IMF/ANSF efforts.

IMF/ANSF activity was subdued, with only five reported operations in the province. Near the village of Surkh Murghab in Tirin Kot District, ANA arrested six suspected AOG in an operation while in the Nawa area of Dihrawud six AOG were killed during a joint IMF/ANSF operation. Two other operations in Khas Uruzgan resulted in the deaths of four AOG, and two ANA. Finally, a joint operation uncovered a substantial amount of ammunition in the village of Mayan Do in Dihrawud District, resulting in the seizure of approximately 150 RPG rounds and almost a dozen hand grenades. No suspects were detained.

NIMROZ

Nimroz Province has remained quiet during the report period, with only a handful of incidents to report. AOG undertook targeted killings on two occasions, killing an ANP officer in the Lokhi area of Khash Rod District, as well as beheading a civilian whose brother is employed by a private construction company near the village of Posht-e-Hassan. In this same area, AOG set up an illegal checkpoint a few days later, apparently searching for IMF/GOA employees.

In a rare direct and rather prolonged attack, AOG near the vil-


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

lage of Ghorghori in the same District assaulted an ANP station with SAF and RPG fire for two hours. Reports indicate that two AOG and two ANP were killed and several civilians were wounded in the initial moments of the attack.

In the provincial capital of Zaranj, two RCIEDs were deployed by AOG, one in the Cinema Square and another in the Shuhada Square. The latter exploded prematurely near an ANP post, causing no damage or injuries, and the former was discovered and safely disposed of by ANP forces. In the past Zaranj, despite its status as the capital, has escaped the type of serious incidents which take place in Khash Rod District how-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG checkpoints
- Attacks against ANP



ever it remains to be seen if incident levels rise over the next weeks, especially in light of the upcoming elections.

With respect to ANSF operations, ANP seized a substantial amount of raw and processed opium, along with some other processing materials, near the Zaranj Airport, arresting three suspects. In addition, a raid on a warehouse near Zaranj produced a large but unspecified quantity of hashish and heroin, and two ANP officers were arrested.


ZABUL

Zabul province has enjoyed a significant drop in incidents during the report period, with both AOG and IMF/ANSF appearing to scale down their activities. Whether this lull will hold through the remainder of Ramadan and into the fall period remains to be seen.

AOG activity was confined to several targeted killings, all taking place in Shahjoy District. In Pasano village, a tribal elder was killed, and in the main town of Shahjoy AOG abducted two brothers from the Abdul Aziz mosque who were accused of working on the nearby IMF base; they are both presumed to have been killed. In the most high pro-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

file incident, the Provincial Director of Tribal Affairs and his wife were shot at their residence near the main bazaar area of the town. In a significant operation near the village of Dagger in Shamulzayi District, it was reported that 28 AOG were captured, including two local commanders, when their compound was located and surrounded by IMF units. ANP conducted several search operations, primarily in Qalat District, and seized a total of 350 kgs of opium from two separate locations. In the Seghan area of Shahjoy, a large IMF/ANSF operation killed five AOG and resulted in the capture of a mid-level commander along with three others. Near the village of Show Bar, also in Shahjoy District, IMF forces clashed with AOG, resulting in the deaths of four AOG and the



detention of five more fighters. Lastly, a routine search of vehicles at an ANP checkpoint in the area of Zanzeer, in Qalat District, yielded a total of 127 pistols and 80 AK-47s. This last incident, along with the drop in direct and indirect attacks, suggests that AOG – as IMF also plan to do – are shifting their forces and concentrating on more critical areas of the south, leaving Zabul as a transit/storage point for weapons and narcotics. Helmand and Kandahar are most likely the recipients of new groups of AOG, where incident levels have risen, in response to IMF/ANSF plans to begin pulling forces from areas such as the north and the west and shifting them to these provinces.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Targeted killings
- IMF operations

GHOR

Tensions in the Murghab Area of Chaghcharan District is on the increase in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in September. Already on 12 August, armed men blocked the road and forced an INGO convoy in Murghab Valley (15 km from Shuraba Village) on the way to Chaghcharan City to stop and take another route. The INGO afterwards discussed the situation with local commanders, who advised to suspend NGO activities until after the elections as there are indications that the presence of NGOs, IOs or the government is not welcome in the area during this period. In addition,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

armed men, allegedly supporters of two election candidates in the area, clashed and attacked each other with SAF on 30 August in Jandak Village. At present, local elders have brokered a truce between the both groups and the Governor of Ghor has sent a peace delegation. Government control in Murghab Area has typically been limited and the area is under de-facto control of several local – though more or less pro-government – commanders, who are linked to certain election candidates, the likely source of the present instability. Beyond this, an incident of occurred on 30 August when an IED hit an IMF patrol in Pushtae Wardakha Area of Chaghcharan. According to ANSO data, this is



the first successful IED strike recorded for this area and also the first one against IMF in Ghor since the beginning of 2008. However, compared to the other districts in Ghor, Chaghcharan has had the highest number of IED discoveries (around 35%) since 2009 as witnessed by the recent IED discovery in Nar Koh Area of Chaghcharan and the explosives seizure in Turbulagh Area of Du Layna. Further IED related incidents especially in Chaghcharan District, probably targeting ANSF and IMF, should be expected, although it is too early to predict the efficacy of these efforts.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in Pasaband & Tarwara
- IEDs

HERAT

During the present reporting period, Herat Province once again experienced several incidents directly related to NGOs. Of note, the sum of these incidents do not present an increase in the overall threat profile for NGOs, rather constitute part of a more general increase of tensions during the run-up period to the elections as well as the prevailing climate of instability and opportunistic criminality which accompanies it.

On 17 August, an e-mail, threatening to target Afghan nationals working for foreign organizations, was sent to a list of undisclosed recipients by a group claiming to be from Herat. One national and two international NGO staff members have received the e-mail; however, it seems unlikely at present that NGOs are specifically targeted since two of the recipients do not even fit the target profile. Therefore, the intention of the e-mail seems aimed at causing a climate of fear rather than present a specific threat.


In Herat City, four suspicious men were seen in the vicinity of the Albiruni Clinic in Herat City (District 5) and an INGO com-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	13
This Report Period	5

pound on 22 August, allegedly discussing a planned suicide attack. In light of the recent increase of threat reports in regard to suicide attacks in the city, it cannot be excluded that the conversation has taken place as reported, but it also needs to be also taken into account, that the increased threat warnings enhance the likelihood of misunderstandings. In regard to the possibility of a suicide attack against an NGO compound, there have been no such attacks against an NGO compound recorded in the Western Region. Nevertheless, locations which would generate high media attention are generally at a higher risk of being targeted, which includes compounds with a concentration of internationals.

On 18 August, in Neyestan Area of Karukh six unarmed men stopped a rented vehicle with four INGO national staff and questioned them. ANP assessed after arresting the perpetrators that they were criminals and the incident was related to the upcoming elections. Travel is expected to be increasingly affected by the election period, especially in areas of high political tension as well as more unstable areas with significant AOG presence.

The fourth incident involving an



NGO took place on 27 August in Injil, where men appeared at an INGO compound and handed over two copies of a letter requesting that the guards put them on the compound wall. The letter requested people to not participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Of note, since the letter does not include a threat, the main intention seems to be influencing public perception. Similar letters were also distributed in Gulran District in June and now again on 26 August. In addition, letters were found in Kushk on 26 August and Syawshan as well as Dadshan Village of Guzara District on 25 August. AOG are visibly stepping up their anti-election activities in Herat Province.

In the final incident, a national and an international IO staff member were abducted in the south-eastern part of Guzara. Reports indicate that the abduction was conducted by one specific ACG, and though a certain level of planning appears likely, the IO in question was more a target of opportunity. While the targeting focus of ACG in the area will likely continue to be targets of opportunity (primarily of nationals); one cannot rule out the risks to NGOs and the International Community in general, since both are usually perceived as lucrative targets in such activities.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Election related incidents
- Abductions
- Intimidation efforts

BADGHIS

On 25 August in the morning, Qala-I-Naw City witnessed a gun fight at the PRT base in the city centre. An ANP officer shot and killed two IMF soldiers as well as an interpreter and wounded two IMF soldiers, after refusing to hand over his weapon at the entrance. IMF soldiers nearby returned fire and killed the ANP officer. The incident very quickly – approximately within half an hour – aroused a violent demonstration by locals. According to reports, the demonstration caused 25 civilians casualties, most of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

them were wounded due to stones and gun fire of other demonstrators. ANSF restored full control in the city in the afternoon and ANP re-enforcements were brought Qala-I-Naw from Herat. The situation since then has remained calm; however, it is too early to see the full impact the incident will have on the public’s perception regarding ISAF and/or ANP. The PRT has enjoyed a generally positive reputation among locals for several years already, so this incident suggests that the shooting and the demonstration were planned and executed for the purpose of tarnishing this reputation as well as negatively impact local stability, further supported by reporting which



indicates a relationship between the ANP officer in question and AOGs. Murghab, Ghormach and – after a quieter period in the beginning of August – Muqur were the focus of AOG activity as usual. The majority of incidents were direct attacks targeting ANSF and IMF in these districts as well as in Qadis, where AOG attacked an ANP patrol with RPGs and SAF in Takak Area. ANSF/IMF had intensive operations in Murghab and a search operation in Ghormach, seizing mortars.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Deteriorating security in Qala-I-Naw
- Armed clashes

FARAH

On 29 August, two BBIED attempted to enter the Governor’s Office in Farah City and detonated when they were stopped. Apart from the suicide attackers, no casualties were reported. While suicide attackers are usually rare in Farah City, during the last reporting period a suicide attacker detonated prematurely in the Abdulla Khan Mosque, and the last suicide attack before that was recorded eight month ago. Two BBIED attacks in one month after such a long pause is suggestive of perhaps the arrival of the technical expertise to deploy such weapons. If this is the case, more such at-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

tacks should be expected in the upcoming months, primarily targeting high profile facilities as well as ANSF and IMF. In addition, Farah City once again had the highest IED related incident rate compared to other areas, accounting for nearly one-third of all IED incidents in the Province. All of the incidents during the current reporting cycle occurred in District 1: directly at the Governor’s Office, in Chawke Walayat Area and Ganj Gandum Area on Farah - Bakwa Main Road. The other IED related incidents were concentrated on hotspots of AOG activity such as Bakwa, Bala Buluk, Pusht Rod and especially Gulistan. The detonations were targeting ANSF, IMF and supply trucks; however, also one civilian was hit by a roadside IED in Bala



Buluk. Intimidation cases were recorded in the District Centre Area of Gulistan, where AOG killed an official and a shopkeeper, and in Farah Rod Bazaar Area of Bala Buluk, where an ANSF officer was killed. In general, AOG activity was concentrated on Gulistan, Bala Buluk and Farah City as well as to a lesser extent on Pusht Rod, where also an ANSF/IMF operation was conducted. During the ANSF/IMF operation, an airstrike was targeting an AOG facility and accidentally killing also three civilians, which highlights again the risk for civilians in areas where AOG and ANSF/IMF clash.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- Intimidation efforts
- AOG activity in Gulistan



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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised militias) / **DC**-District Centre / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **IMF**-International Military Forces / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Panjshir

Nuristan

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

ANSO VACANCY

ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers. This month, ANSO is recruiting for a **Regional Safety Advisor (Jalalabad City)**.

If you have NGO experience, an analytical background, and the desire to be challenged, all while being part of a close-knit team, pass your CV, cover letter, and two substantive English writing samples to operations@afgnso.org.

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