

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Abduction and kidnapping remain a prevalent countrywide concern
- The possibility of further AOG attacks against provincial capitals
- Seasonal downturn in overall incidents during September/October

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The recent AOG attacks upon Lashkar Gah City within Helmand Province denote a significant shift in AOG operational focus and mark the introduction of a new dynamic into the context of the conflict.

As the rural areas in many provinces (particularly in the SR) reach “saturation” levels in regards to AOG presence, it is a logical development that AOG would begin to focus on larger scale operations that bear results in greater visibility and political importance.

Though these attacks were tactically “unsuccessful”, it is not entirely clear at this point if they were actual attempts

at seizing and occupying the ground. What is more likely is that these attacks were probes whose purpose was to test security force capacity, reaction times, as well as the AOG tactics applied.


AOG elements have also been steadily increasing the sophistication and coordination of attacks, as in the melding of different attack vectors (i.e. suicide attacks supported by small arms fire). As seen over the winter of 2007 in the ER, AOG have also applied a greater effort to prove tactics prior to widespread dissemination and application.

As well, the importance of these attacks, and the subsequent press coverage of same, provide a significant “Information Operations” coup (as in the Kandahar City prison break). This cache can be used for a variety of goals, such as supporting recruiting efforts and increasing their international credibility. These factors, when taken together, suggest the conclusion that the spring of 2009 will bear witness to many more such occurrences, not only in the south but also other areas where AOG elements are strongest.

NGO DATA & TRENDS

As the data in the chart provided indicates (accurate as of 15 October 2008), the Central Region continues to account for the greatest volume of NGO direct incidents.

While this can be partly attributed to the significantly degraded security situation in some central provinces (i.e. Wardak, Logar), this can also be directly related to the concentration of NGO staff, offices, and operations within Kabul and surrounding environs.



KABUL


While not back up to the summer levels, incidents have picked up after slowing in September. On 12 October, a foreign journalist was abducted in mid-day when returning from an IDP camp in Cha Rahi Qambar, about six kilometres west of Kabul. Until more information comes to light, NGO should view the camp as an area of potential risk and this incident as further evidence of decreasing security in areas west of Kabul.

The general spacing of previous high profile and spectacular attacks in Kabul this year (Serena, 28 January; Independence Day parade, 27 April; Indian Embassy, 7 July) suggests the city is due for

	NGO Incidents
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another such incident. One such diverted event was an AOG plot to launch a spectacular attack on Pol-e-Charkhi prison, which NDS foiled last week. Given the planning and resources required for such an attack, its prevention reduces the chance of a high profile event in the near future. But AOG inroads made in and around the city in recent months facilitates additional and/or alternative plans, so the threat should not be considered eliminated.

In the past two weeks, there were at least three incidents of ISAF firing on civilians in the province, resulting in a total of two deaths and six injured, thus demonstrating one of the immediate practical dangers of proximity to security convoys. Additionally, such incidents can spark civil unrest and public retaliation. Another immediate danger is that of collateral damage from attacks directed at



the convoys. In the aggregate, the continual killing and injuring of civilians by the military erodes support for the government and international presence (including NGOs). Absent significant policy or procedural changes by the international military, its considerable presence can be expected to continue to pose a corollary threat to that of AOG.

After a relatively quiet period in Surobi, there were incidents in which AOG attacked police and military targets, as well as setting up an illegal check point. These incidents—as well as recent reports of AOG check points and attacks in Laghman—indicate a continued AOG threat between Kabul and Jalalabad; NGO should avoid all non-essential travel on that route.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Decreased security in districts surrounding the city
- Instability along main Kabul-Jalalabad road
- Abduction


WARDAK

Though incidents are decreasing from summer levels, the province continues to experience frequent clashes between AOG and military. The main road south from Kabul remains too dangerous for NGO travel, and AOG reportedly operates parallel governance structures in the eastern districts. Problems also extend into the

	NGO Incidents
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population centres. Over the last couple of months there have been frequent attacks on district centres, and the trend continues in October. So far this month, the District Centres in Nirkh, Saydabad, Maydan Sharh, Chak, Jaghatu, and Day Mirdad have all experienced attacks.

Voter registration efforts in Maydan Shah and Jalrez have been met with the distribution of night letters threatening anyone who participates in the election process. While in Saydabad, presumed



AOG abducted and killed the district education officer. For NGO, such incidences indicate likely AOG opposition to any operations that may be viewed as supportive of the government.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- DAC attacks
- Abduction
- Overall instability

PARWAN

Parwan has been relatively quiet for several weeks. The primary concern in recent months has been periodic IED incidents on the route west of Chahrikar leading to Bamyan. While there have been no such incidents this re-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED attacks
- AOG presence in Ghorband and Kohi Safi

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

porting period, the potential for such attacks should still be considered extant, especially if security vehicles and convoys are present.

Ghorband District reportedly has a notable AOG presence, and is prone to security incidents. However, it has been quiet this period. Kohi Safi is also alleged to have a notable AOG presence due to its proximity to Kapisa's active Ta-



gab District. Also, an absence of major roads isolates the district. Such factors make Kohi Safi potentially risky for NGO operations.

BAMYAN


As indicative of the AOG presence in Kahmard and Shibar districts, and both logged AOG incidents this period. On 7 October, a PRT vehicle was struck by an RCIED in Kahmard District (likely travelling the same route on which an RCIED struck an

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED and mines
- Banditry

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
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INGO vehicle in Shibar on 24 August). In Shibar, night letters were distributed to persuade locals to cooperate with AOG, and warning GoA employees to stop coming to the area. Travel and operations in these areas should be considered risky and especially dangerous for internationals. Additionally, the route into Shibar from Parwan should still be assumed to pose an IED threat.



The threat of armed highway robbery in Bamyan is persistent, and was evidenced this period in the form of armed truck robberies in Yakawlang.

DAYKUNDI

Direct security reporting from the province remains limited. A recent media report stated that parliament members are claiming that security is getting worse and will likely continue to deteriorate due to the strains of limited resources, a harsh natural environment, and AOG infiltration from neighboring provinces.


Anecdotal reporting suggests some truth in this. The southern

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Growing instability
- Limited security force presence
- AOG freedom of movement

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
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regions of the province are known to be especially risky and have high AOG infiltration, and recently there have been reports of increased AOG movement. On 12 October in Gili District, AOG abducted three members of a road construction crew (later released in an exchange for AOG captured during the incident). This event occurred even though the local population reportedly monitors the area and AOG had previously consented to the project. NGO should take note that project acceptance is neither permanent nor universal. Additionally, there are



reports of political struggles in the province that undermine the ability of the government to maintain control, and contribute to conditions that can directly affect NGO. Given this, NGO could see an increased likelihood of becoming pawns in power games—as was the case in July when a local warlord abducted two international staff to use as leverage for political and financial gains.

LOGAR

Military vehicles and civilian contractors continue to be attacked on the main road in Puli Alam. Areas off the main road or out of district centres are said to be AOG dominion, and after dark the government reportedly has little or no control of the province. Consequently, NGO opera-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG freedom of movement
- DAC attacks
- Attacks against high profile convoys

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

tions are risky and vulnerable to AOG attack and interference. ANSO does not recommend NGO travel or operations in the province.

In Muhammad Agha and Baraki Barak, AOG have issued threat letters warning locals not to participate in the voter registration process. For NGO, such threats can be viewed as indicative of the AOG presence, and as a measure of the general current security situation. For the long term, success or failure of the voter regis-



tration process will likely portend the area's future stability and the ability to conduct work deemed to be aligned with the Government of Afghanistan. As it still very early in the registration process, we currently have no information on the threat impact.

BADAKHSHAN

The distinguishing feature of Badakhshan is not its dearth of incidents but rather their sparse and unconnected nature. Challenges to security arise from its sharing borders with three other countries (and the conflict zone in southern Afghanistan) and politics which play out on the district level.

Interlocutors in Badakhshan as well as other northern provinces have voiced concern about the increased smuggling activity through its southern districts originating in Nuristan. The traffic pattern serves to bring weapons and drugs to Baghlan and Kunduz districts and hence does not directly lead to incidents in Badakhshan itself. Though the border with Chitral is porous, it is not problematic thanks to Chi-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Smuggling activities from Nuristan
- Anti-government sentiment centered in Warduj District

	NGO Incidents
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tralis' lack of sympathy towards Afghan AOGs' goals. On the other hand the border with Tajikistan poses the opposite problem in that it is too well sealed and therefore imposes significant restrictions on the movements and economic horizons of residents of Badakhshan's isolated northern districts, many of which are only practically accessible from Tajikistan.

The only pocket of true AOG sentiment in the province is Warduj District. It is important to note that this has not yet manifested itself as action. According to local sources, a large number of individuals have gone to study in Pakistani madrasas and brought their insights back with them as mullahs. The mullahs have gone on to form validating organisations, similar to those of right-wing Hindu groups, which offer unemployed young people a sense of belonging and pride and organised group activities. The growing



influence of this strain of Islamism is a source of concern to NGOs located in Warduj and neighbouring districts. Additionally NGOs based in Badakhshan are taking the possibility of home-grown AOGs as an incentive to focus on these districts before they become a real problem and threat to the greater NGO community. Although a cause for concern, Warduj should not yet be considered dangerous and the situation there will be monitored closely.

Other events in Badakhshan must be treated on a case-by-case basis. NGOs should allow extra time for the Fayzabad-Kesham road due to delays caused by construction. On the other hand, the amount of activity taking place along the road makes it relatively safe in that one is never far out of sight from an ANP checkpoint or construction crews.


TAKHAR

The issue of central concern to NGOs in Takhar province is the situation of the returned refugees from Pakistan to Khwaja Bahaudin District. The returnees are legitimate former inhabitants of Khwaja Bahauddin and its surroundings. The land titles they possess are legitimate, though some families do not have titles because they had not owned land in the first place. Their return was organised by UNHCR and not any other outside actor and were made more urgent by the deteriorating situation in NWFP/FATA. Moreover, according to local sources, the returnees are cogni-

	NGO Incidents
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zant of the difficulties involved in getting their former land back and willing to negotiate on this. Indeed, there has been a deal between returnees and local authorities about the principle of them being recompensated with other land, but the land has not been specified. The latest reports have local authorities being influenced by other political interests causing them to organise a demonstration and even handing out weapons to locals.

The returnees are not an immediate concern to NGOs' security but have the potential for long-term effects. Takhar has a large enough Pashtun minority for Pashtuns to become a political issue and/or an alternative power base. Without outside interference, the returnees issue would



most likely be addressed quickly, but with political intervention it could become a flashpoint in other disputes. Pockets of AOG sentiment have been reported amongst Pashtun communities in Kalafgan as well.

Another source of concern has been the incidents along the Taluqan-Kesham Road. While criminal activity is always a concern, the volume of incidents do not support this being a chronic issue in the area and it appears rather that a few isolated incidents, including one robbery/murder, have fanned the cycle of rumours. ANSO encourages an NGO with knowledge of such incidents to report them.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Criminal activity
- Tensions involving returnees

JAWZJAN

In Jawzjan an NGO whose compound had previously been hit with a BM-1 rocket was also subject to threats via a circuitous route in which vague threats were sent to police by SMS. Like the rockets, which draw attention but do not usually inflict damage, the

	NGO Incidents
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pattern of activity points to either ACG or being otherwise politically motivated. Generally threats are leveled against NGOs themselves and the perpetrators' interest lies in involving as few external actors as possible. An investigation into this situation is ongoing. Political activity is also on the rise in Shibirghan, with locals recently stopping and searching cars in order to find a local political leader. Political parties are signifi-



cant actors on Jawzjan's political scene and NGOs should expect them to increase jockeying in the run-up to next year's election, though it is far from clear this will have any ill effects of NGO activity.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political infighting
- ACG activity

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: *"..by NGOs for NGOs.."*

BAGHLAN

Key areas for concern in Baghlan are still Baghlani Jadid and Andarab/Puli Hisar Districts. ANP dispersed a group of AOG members who were setting up an illegal checkpoint, which is a cause for concern in that it parallels tactics seen in Kunduz such as giving


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing AOG activity

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

AOG-sermons at mosques and organising themselves into patrols.

The incidents in Andarab and Puli Hisar in previous reports can be traced to a local potentate who is receiving support from at least two political factions and being armed through the smuggling route mentioned in the Badakhshan section, which runs through



southern Badakhshan and Warsach districts. In this reporting period the AOG in Andarab/Puli Hisar has been focused on recruitment of locals to its cause.

HERAT

Once again criminal activity is the most direct item of concern to NGOs operating within Herat city. Areas south and east of Herat are unstable and should be avoided by NGOs, with the possible exception of Pashtun Zarghun, while areas north and west are relatively safer. This reporting period saw anxiety due to the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Recurring threats against the NGO community
- Criminal activity

	NGO Incidents
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repetition of threats from a former local politician turned AOG leader. The individual in question has not actually made any new threats but rather the same threat is continuing to resurface.

The kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of persons driving along the airport road is alarming and probably the result of ACG activity. The city airport is in Guzara district (south of Herat) and the incidents there underline that even areas immediately on



the southern outskirts of the city are more amenable to AOG or ACG activities. AOGs have generally been leaving the city alone and exerting influence in the surrounding countryside and have always avoided direct involvement in abductions as a tactic, possibly because of its local association with ACGs.

BADGHIS


The situation in Badghis remains little changed in its severity over that of the last period, although the focus of AOG activity has been shifting from the usual east-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Attacks against ANSF
- DAC attacks

	NGO Incidents
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ern districts to those more central. This was indicated by the incidents in which an IMF convoy was attacked near Qal'ai Naw and attack against the Muqur DAC. It is unclear at this time if this is indicative of a permanent shift in focus or an aberration in standard AOG activity patterns.



KHOST

The 13 AOG initiated incidents in Khost for the first part of October 2008 are almost double the number reported during the corresponding period in 2007. In common with last year only one non-AOG incident has been recorded.


Incidents occurred in districts where AOG activity is common, particularly Sabari and Khost City. Khulbefat in Sabari was the location of four incidents over nine days; a direct fire attack on IMF, a

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-Security force clashes
- Collateral damage threat
- Abduction threat

	NGO Incidents
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failed IED attack, an arson attack against the relative of a local official, and an attack against a vehicle transporting IMF supplies. On 05 October AOG attacked Camp Salerno in Khost with 5 rockets, and two days later in another part of the city a firefight between AOG and an ABP patrol resulted in the death of one of the ABP patrol members. Another ABP patrol was attacked in the east of the province on 05 October, during which two of the patrol were injured and another was abducted. A further abduction occurred in the south of the province when construction company workers



were taken from their taxis in Shamal District on 13 October. In the same district on the same morning, four national employees of a PSC were abducted from their vehicle by armed men wearing ANA uniforms.

The killing of Bak District NDS Chief with a BBIED on 10 October, together with the incidents already mentioned, illustrates the capacity of AOG to use a range of tactics in Khost and on a growing scale.

KUNAR

The anticipated upswing in incident rates occurred with 54 incidents in this reporting period, 38 of which were significant AOG initiated events. 29 of these were direct fire attacks on security force positions and locations, mostly taking place in the central districts of Mano Gai (Pech), Sirkanay and Wata Pur. The same period last year saw 37 AOG incidents, however the make-up of activity was noticeably different in 2007, with 10 indirect fire attacks in which over 60 rockets or mortar rounds were launched. Only two AOG


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG-IMF clashes
- Increased AOG presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
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indirect fire attacks occurred in Kunar during the first half of October 2008, with rockets being directed against Sirkanay District Centre and an IMF/ANA location in Mano Gai. Both attacks missed their targets, and the attack in Mano Gai killed a civilian and injured several others when a rocket landed and exploded in farmland.

In early October AOG placed two IEDs in a boys' school in Sirkanay, one of which exploded and caused structural damage but no casualties, and another which was found before detonation. An IED was also used against an IMF patrol in the SW of the province on 12 October, killing two IMF members and injuring another.




Recent weeks have seen increased reports of AOG movement and infiltration in many parts of the Eastern Region. Six such reports relate to AOG activity in Kunar and already some correlation can be seen between these reports and subsequent AOG incidents. Reports of groups moving into the Chawkay Valley, Wata Pur District Centre and Sirkanay have all been closely followed by confirmed AOG related incidents. The south-east of the province may therefore soon see increased levels activity and NGO travelling by road to Asadabad are advised to monitor the situation closely.

NANGARHAR

Parts of southern Nangarhar are increasingly under the de facto control of AOG outside daylight hours and, for limited periods in some places, during daylight hours itself. Reports of AOG movement and infiltration have in two instances been closely followed by AOG linked activity, acts of intimidation in Khogyani District and an IED being placed in Pachir Wa Agam. An AOG also conducted a VCP on a main road in northern Khogyani in the morning of 10 October, again illustrating the confidence with which some groups are able to operate in parts of the province. A night letter distributed in Bati

	NGO Incidents
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Kot and Surkh Rod districts on 03 October made clear threats against a range of people, including ‘those who work with non-Muslim organisations’, and the early hours of 13 October saw a small IED explode close the compound of an international organisation working on construction projects in Bati Kot. Elsewhere in the province, other IED incidents have occurred in Jalalabad city and have included a small IED exploding at a domestic property on 10 October, and a handheld IED thrown at and injuring a GoA employee on the evening of 15 October. On 10 October a SVBIED was used against an IMF patrol 7km south of the city in Behsud, injuring a member of the IMF and a patrol interpreter. This was the fourth suicide attack in the province this year and one of 11 confirmed AOG initiated incidents in this reporting period. The



same period in 2007 saw 3 AOG incidents in Nangarhar.

Two of the four reported AOG movements into the area have been linked to an objective of disrupting the voter registration process, and an AOG conveyed that message to the population of Wazir, Khogyani on 03 October, on the same night that two shops in the town were destroyed by arson.

The full impact of AOG activity against the voter registration is yet to be seen but even without activity linked to that process, the security situation in Nangarhar is clearly deteriorating. The recent announcement that the province will be one of the first to take part in the expanded NATO poppy eradication program is another dynamic to be considered by those working in the area.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Voter registration related intimidation
- IED activity affecting Jalalabad
- Prevalence of AOG in southern districts

LAGHMAN

AOG related activity occurring in Laghman during this reporting period has been distributed along the Alishing Valley between Route 1 in the south and Qal'a-i-Najil in the north. In the south, two incidents have occurred on Route 1 close to the Kharow Khel junction. On 07 October at about 1900hrs, AOG conducted a lengthy VCP, searching vehicles and passengers for any items that could be linked to the international community. A few kilome-

	NGO Incidents
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ters east, on 14 October at 1920hrs, an AOG attacked a marked ambulance belonging to a national demining company, injuring three people. Outside the Eastern Region but still on Route 1, close to Sorobi on 15 October at 1330hrs, an AOG is reported to have briefly held a VCP on the main road. Earlier in the month a report was received of an AOG moving into Alishing with the specific intent of disrupting traffic using Route 1. ANSO ER therefore considers it likely that further attacks will occur and advises NGOs to use other transport routes to convey international staff between Kabul-Jalalabad and



to consider the impact of transport disruption in medium and long term planning.

Other incidents taking place in Laghman during this reporting period have been around Alishing and in Mihtarlam. These incidents have included a grenade attack, an indirect fire attack against an IMF installation, and an abduction of three men, an incident believed to be a failed attempt to capture telephone engineers working in the area.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increased AOG presence
- AOG operations along Route 1
- Abduction threat

NURISTAN


Reports of AOG movement into Nuristan, coupled with the commencement of the voter registration process, increase the likelihood of AOG related incidents in

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Security force-AOG clashes
- Abduction threat

	NGO Incidents
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the province. In this reporting period however only one AOG incident has come to the attention of ANSO ER. A clash between AOG and IMF at Kamdesh on 03 October did not cause any casualties. The announcement of an IMF withdrawal from a FOB in Kamdesh



provides an indication of the level of AOG activity in parts of the province.

PAKTYA

While several unattributed or criminal incidents have been recorded in Paktya during the first half of October, there has been relatively little AOG activity. Criminal and unattributed incidents have included two murders and a personal dispute that resulted in an exchange of gunfire. AOG incidents have included a


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- District Center attacks
- Abduction threat

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

single rocket fired at Jaji District Centre in the north of the province and a short direct fire attack on Jani Khel District Centre in the east. Other AOG activity has included an abduction and an attack on an off-duty ANA member. In the west of the province an armed group operated a VCP on the main Gardez-Jaji road at 1700hrs on 07 October.

With a total of 7 AOG initiated incidents, the province has recorded a drop in activity com-



pared to the same period last year when there were 9. Several of the incidents that have occurred have been on or close to the Kabul-Gardez road and this should be considered by all those planning road moves in the province.

ZABUL


Highlighting the significant IED threat that permeates this province, a recent report indicated that on the 16th of September an INGO staff member was one of three fatalities resulting from an RCIED strike. While the staff member was not the primary target of this attack, as he was traveling in a two vehicle convoy con-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Pervasive IED threat
- Instability along Hwy 1
- Active AOG presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

veying local officials to a project site, it also indicates the inherent risks of traveling along the primary routes in this province, particularly within, or in proximity to, high profile targets. In addition to this, there were numerous other IED strikes, primarily targeting security forces, though civilians have also been affected. This is likely the result of AOG use of “victim operated” devices which are inherently indiscriminate, as seen in the strike which detonated against a tractor killing the 5 occupants. The threat of IED remains



greatest in the District of Shah Joy, which has consistently hosted high levels of AOG activity. This is a situation that will likely persist in light of recent reports which indicate that AOG elements will continue focusing their efforts on maintaining their dominance along Hwy 1.

KANDAHAR

The recent high profile politically motivated assassinations of GoA officials by AOG within Kandahar have added another dynamic to AOG efforts to influence the security climate within this strategically critical city. While these efforts are not necessarily new (as in the multiple attempts against the Governor and successful efforts against ANSF officials), the circumstances under which they occurred, during daylight hours within city limits, as well as the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Political assassinations
- Persistent and considerable AOG presence

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	12
This Report Period	0

profile of the targets, are successfully eroding public confidence in GoA ability to provide a safe and secure environment. When taken in conjunction with other high profile daylight attacks (as in the multiple suicide attack against ANP HQ), it further highlights AOG ability to operate with relative impunity within the city limits.

In addition, the threat of further large scale actions against the city should not be ruled out. As in the recent attacks against Lashkar Gah City in Helmand Province, the AOG “saturation” of the rural areas both enables and emboldens



AOG elements to carry out such large scale actions. It is possible that these assassinations are not only an attempt at eroding public confidence and sense of security but also a method of weakening local governance in advance of larger scale actions.

While this trend does not have any immediate or direct implications for NGO security, it does have a significant impact on the general security climate in which they operate.

HELMAND

The most significant development in the security context of Helmand for 2008 has been the recent focus of AOG efforts on the city of Lashkar Gah. Two direct attacks against the city, including an attempt on the provinces main


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG focus on Lashkar Gah City
- Pervasive AOG presence throughout province

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

prison (reminiscent of the successful operation in Kandahar), as well as a persistent presence in the immediate environs of the city, indicates that the rural areas have reached their saturation point and that AOG forces now enjoy a considerable level of freedom of movement.

This is now a reality in large portions of the SR, including Helmand, Kandahar, and Ghazni.



This development is further discussed on the front page of this report.

URUZGAN


Within the context of the SR, Uruzgan remains a province in which ANSO enjoys limited visibility. Having said this, there have been limited changes within the

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Unstable environment outside of city limits
- IED prevalence along main routes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

overall context throughout 2008, with security presence still greatest (and most effective) within Tirin Kot city limits. Outside of the city, there still exists an active AOG presence who have demonstrated a willingness to target NGO staff and operations and as such NGO are advised to con-



tinue limiting their activities to within the city limits.

GHAZNI


While the typical seasonal downswing in overall incident volume for September/October has occurred in this province (as it has country wide), this will likely be temporary as previous years have recorded an increase in AOG ac-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

tivity during November and December.

Incident composition has also remained largely unchanged, with IED, attacks against DAC, as well as AOG operations focused on Hwy 1 making up the bulk of incidents recorded.






The significant increase in AOG activity recorded this year will likely be sustained into 2009



therefore NGO with operations in this province should take this into consideration when conducting long term planning.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence on Hwy 1
- Significant AOG presence





ANSO is hosted by
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe

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operations2@afgnso.org

ANSO is managed by an NGO
Board. If you have any
feedback, good or bad, let
them know on:
ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Kapisa
- Panjshir
- Faryab
- Sar-e-Pul
- Balkh
- Kunduz
- Farah
- Ghor
- Nimroz
- Paktika

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better please contact us.

THE ANSO MANDATE

Scope of Services, P.1, 2008

The community of NGOs has established ANSO in recognition of their interdependence and shared responsibility towards security management.

They have acknowledged that ANSO is important in maintaining the impartiality, independence and political neutrality of NGOs by allowing them to be free from dependence upon security information originating from political or military sources.

They have also recognized the need to avoid association with the military in the complex Afghanistan environment and have therefore perceived a valuable role for ANSO in protecting NGO from direct contact with the military.

The community recognizes that the success of ANSO in fulfilling these functions is dependant upon the willingness of NGOs to cooperate with one another in the area of security management and to support ANSO in delivering these objectives.

In so forming ANSO then, the NGO community has accepted the inherent obligation to contribute and participate for the effective management of their own security.