Introduction:

The Central African Republic (CAR) is the fifteenth most violent country in the ACLED dataset, with over 2,000 recorded events of political violence between January 1997 and September 2014. Almost 8,000 fatalities have occurred during this time, making it the fourteenth most fatal country in the dataset in this regard. However, violence has escalated sharply in recent years: the majority of these events occurred since the outbreak of the current conflict in the country in late 2012.

The current conflict in CAR is superficially a religious conflict, between the largely Muslim Séléka and Christian Anti-Balaka. However, its dynamics are rooted in the failing political infrastructure of the state. Indeed, the conflict has seen very limited involvement of state forces, including the army and police forces, which are overwhelmed and under-resourced. Furthermore, the Christian versus Muslim dynamic reflects other divides within the country, including CAR's political geography – former President and allegded Anti-Balaka supporter François Bozizé's home area of the northwest, while Séléka emerged in the north and northeast; and also the concept of 'foreignness', particularly in relation to regional patterns of migration involving Chadian immigrants and their primarily Muslim descendants. The religious dimension of the conflict has also given rise to activity by Christian and Muslim militias, often in the form of reprisal attacks.

Violence peaked in the first quarter of 2014, both in terms of the number of violent political events and the number of deaths associated with this unrest (*see* **Figure 1**). Indeed, as of September 2014, 2014 was the most violent year for CAR in the ACLED dataset, with over 800 politically violent events resulting in over 3,000 fatalities – this is more than double the number of events up to the same point in 2013 – the second most violent year on record for CAR.

Targeted violence against civilians is a significant characteristic of the conflict in CAR, accounting for over half of all conflict events in the country (*see* **Figure 2**). This far exceeds the African continental average of 35%, and is higher than other African states experiencing ongoing civil conflict. In the Central African region, the percentage of violence that has been directed at unarmed civilians in CAR surpasses even that of the Democratic Republic of Congo. A contributing factor to the levels of violence is the weak chains of command within the active rebel groups and the 'communal' nature of conflict as state forces have been relatively absent agents in the recent wave of unrest. This has resulted in civilians being targeted not only for strategic political reasons – including with the intention of terrorising and displacing large sections of the population – but also for personal gain by local commanders or individual elements, effectively 'going rogue' for material benefit.


Figure 1: Count of Violent Events & Sum of Fatalities, Central African Republic, Jan. 1997- Sept. 2014.   1

Figure 2: Number of Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities by Event Type, Central African Republic, 1997 - Sept 2014.

Geographically, CAR sits in a wider regional context of political unrest. The outbreak of the violence in 2012 was facilitated by the presence of Chadian and Sudanese fighters in the northeast of the country, who represent a substantial part of the Séléka group.

At the sub-national level, overall levels of violence mask important geographic disparities in the locations of unrest: while violence has occurred throughout CAR, particularly high levels of violence have been seen in the south; in the autonomous commune of Bangui, and in Ombella-M'Poko prefecture. Violence is also high in the northwest, in Ouham and Ouham-Pendé prefectures, and in Ouaka prefecture in the centre of the country (*see* **Figure 3**). Haut-Mbomou prefecture in the east is an area particularly vulnerable to attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

This report will explore the dynamics of CAR with a focus on the key actors in order to understand the drivers of the violence on each side of the conflict. Section 2 reviews the formation and growth of the Séléka, including levels and locations of violence perpetrated by the group; Section 3 explores the reactionary rise of the Anti-Balaka, the dynamics of contest and conflict between the two groups, and the role of civilians in the conflict; and Section 4 provides a discussion of the religious element of the conflict.

The Séléka:

The Séléka Coalition first emerged at the end of 2012, taking its name from the Sango word for *alliance*. This predominantly Muslim group was formed following the merger of multiple existing rebel groups from the north of the country (**Human Rights Watch, 2014**): a splinter group of the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the largely unknown Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK). Reports differ as to whether or not other groups were involved in the formation of the Séléka, with some reports linking the Democratic Front for the People of the Central African Republic (FDPC), the Union of Republican Forces (UFR) and the Alliance for Revival and Rebuilding (A2R) to the formation (**Herbert, et al., 2013; Fortin, 2013**). The UFDR and the FDPC had signed peace agreements with the government in 2007 and 2008, under which the rebels would reintegrate into the army in exchange for, in particular, payment to those who disarmed, and the release of political prisoners (**Herbert, et al., 2013**).

Although the Séléka emerged as an alliance of previously existing groups, there are important differences in the dynamics and behaviour of the groups at these different stages of unrest in the country. Comparing the activity of the Séléka to that of two of their predecessors, the Séléka

Figure 3: Conflict Events by Event Type, Central African Republic, January 2012 - September 2014.

are a drastically more violent group in terms of the frequency of violent actions. Both the CPJP and UFDR engaged in an average of less than one event of political violence per month during their active periods to November 2012. This is in comparison to an average of almost 26 per month involving the Séléka, between December 2012 and September 2014. This increase in violence is also reflected in the related fatality figures for these groups: while fatalities associated with activity by both the CPJP and UFDR averaged approximately 3 associated fatalities per month, fatality figures for the Séléka attacks averaged 154 per month. Violence against civilians, which constituted 18% and 10% of CPJP and UFDR activity respectively, accounts for over half of all the political violence in which the Séléka engages.

Geographically, CPJP activities took place throughout the country, with many concentrated in northern and central regions, while UFDR activity was largely focused in the north-eastern area: both of these groups had a very small presence in Bangui. In addition to high levels of activity in the central and western regions, the largest portion of the Séléka violence occurred in the capital, Bangui. The neighbourhoods of Boeing and Boy-Rabe in Bangui, for example, were particularly targeted by the Séléka as they are seen as strongholds of the former regime and associated with Bozizé (Huser & Umugwaneza, 2013). The Séléka has had a limited presence in the eastern and north-eastern areas (*see* **Figure 4**).

In 2012, the Séléka, led by Michel Djotodia of the UFDR, accused then-president François Bozizé of neglecting the terms of this accord. In December, the Séléka launched an offensive, progressing through the northern and central regions of the country. The rise of the Séléka came with immediate military successes, making swift gains in the north and east of the country (Crisis Group, 2012; Themnér & Wallensteen, 2013). The high levels of violence of the group may be due to greater access to resources, increased levels of public support, or greater interaction with the internal actors in CAR.

However, there were many reports of fractures within the group and this, coupled with the lack of a strong chain of command, meant that instructions to stop human rights violations went largely unheard (Huser & Umugwaneza, 2013; Amnesty, 2013). Motivated by *règlement de comptes*, the violence of the Séléka is characterised by personalised, individual targeting, usually towards civilians (Huser & Umugwaneza, 2013). In addition, the weak chain of command means that small-scale abuses such as shootings, assaults, lootings, rapes, extortion and so on are likely to be individually motivated, or else ordered by local commanders, on an ad hoc basis for personal gain or material interests.

Mediated by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Séléka and Bozizé's government signed a peace agreement in Libreville, Gabon, on 11th

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January 2013. By the end of January, however, the rebels accused the president of failing to comply with this agreement and, in particular, of an unwillingness to elect a member of the Séléka as Minster for Defence (Fortin, 2013). As can be seen in **Figure 5**, these tensions resulted in an ineffective ceasefire, with the Séléka continuing to engage in violence, ultimately leading to the capture of Bangui in a coup on 24th March 2013, when Michel Djotodia appointed himself the new president of CAR. He formally took office in August 2013. After the ousting of Bozizé, the Séléka alliance continued to engage in attacks, with levels of violence actually increasing (*see* **Figure 5**).

Following the coup, levels of engagement of the Séléka in violence against civilians also rose. Not wanting to have their control of the Séléka questioned, authorities of the new government blamed the human rights abuses on "fake Séléka" and members of the former Bozizé government (Human Rights Watch, 2013a). Despite Djotodia officially disbanding Séléka in September 2013 (Human Rights Watch, 2014), violence persisted, and in fact peaked in late 2013 / early 2014, during which time they were involved in widespread clashes in Bangui in particular.

The dysfunctional government of CAR has contributed to the impunity under which the Séléka has engaged in battles with other groups and attacks on civilians. While they ignored the order to disband in September 2013, the government also seemed to be without a plan to integrate or disarm the Séléka and other armed groups. In a context where small arms are circulating freely, state institutions such as the police, the gendarmerie and the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) have either collapsed, been overwhelmed, or have proved to be largely ineffective (Huser & Umugwaneza, 2013). State forces under Bozizé, Djotodia and under the two heads of the transition to date, Nguendet and Samba-Panza, have not been very active since the emergence of the Séléka. Rebel forces, political and communal militias and external forces have shown a much higher level of activity during this time.

In February 2014, overall levels of violence began to decline. This may be due to a number of factors, including the resignation of Djotodia as president in January, the passing of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2134 (2014) which allowed a heavier deployment of Sangaris troops in Bangui and elsewhere, and the disarmament conducted in Bangui by the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) and Sangaris French Mission in Central African Republic in Support of MISCA. Over the course of the conflict, while the Séléka has engaged in battles with multiple other groups, including state forces, other armed groups, political and communal militias, and international forces such as those of the UN, they have had a particularly violent relationship with the Anti-Balaka, which has come to define the conflict.


Figure 4: Location CPJP (Jan 1997 – Nov 2012), UFDR (Jan 1997 – Nov 2012) and the Séléka (Dec 2012 – Sep 2014) events.

Figure 5: Conflict Events Involving the Séléka, Central African Republic, December 2012 - September 2014.

The Anti-Balaka:

Balaka means machete in the local Sango and Mandja languages, with Anti-Balaka roughly translating as *machete-proof* or *invincible* (IRIN, 2014a). The term has reportedly been used since 2004 to describe local vigilante groups who formed in self-defence to protect communities from rebel abuses, bandits, cattle-raiders and poachers (Marima, 2013; IRIN, 2014a).

However, a modern coalition of these groups re-emerged in August-September 2013. This loosely-organised, modern Anti-Balaka mainly hails from former president Bozizé's home region in the north-west of the country, and is reported to consist of various groups, including former soldiers, defected members of the Séléka, Christian vigilante farmers, members of the Association of Central African Farmers (ACP), and the Front for the Return to the Constitutional Order in Central Africa (FROCCA), which itself consists of former officers of Bozizé's army, and local vigilantes (Marima, 2013).

Together, this diverse range of predominantly Christian actors formed local units, which sought to defend communities against the actions of the Séléka, while also retaliating against Muslim communities.

Since the emergence of Anti-Balaka in 2013, the ACLED dataset has recorded 128 battles between them and the Séléka. Almost 30% of these battles of these battles have occurred in Bangui. There are a number of potential reasons for the high level of interaction in Bangui. While the Séléka is entrenched in the north and north-east of the country, the region to which many Muslims have fled, the Anti-Balaka have strongholds across the rest of CAR, which is predominantly Christian. This makes Bangui a primary site of confrontation.

In addition, the Anti-Balaka have campaigned against Muslim presence in enclaves in the capital, sparking clashes with and reprisals from the Séléka. Furthermore, the Séléka stations located in Bangui, such as Camp Béal, Camp Kasaï and Camp RDOT, have been the sites of targeted attacks by the Anti-Balaka. Of particular note were the December 2013 clashes between the two sides, in which hundreds of lives were lost, both among the armed combatants and among the civilian population. January 2014 witnessed a wave of reprisal attacks for these clashes in an escalating cycle of violence, prompting the resignation of Djotodia as president. Battles have also taken

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place in the prefectures of Ombella-M'Poko, Ouaka, Ouham and Ouham-Pendé (*see* **Figure 6**).

These regions are some of the areas of highest population density in the country. Some of the most intense violence between the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka has taken place around the religiously diverse towns of Bozoum, Baoro and Bossemptele, where Christians and Muslims live side-by-side as neighbours, thus providing the ideal setting for revenge and reprisal attacks (**Heras, 2014).**

To little apparent effect, a second ceasefire agreement was signed in Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, on 23rd July 2014 between the Séléka, the Anti-Balaka and others to bring to a halt all forms of violence. Although the agreement is relatively recent and may take some time to come into effect, the data do not yet show a significant reduction in violence and related fatalities after the signing of this document (*see* **Figure 7**).

The seeming ineffectiveness of this ceasefire is not surprising for a number of reasons. Firstly, the agreement did not contain guidelines for implementing the ceasefire, nor any disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)

arrangements. In addition, the Anti-Balaka and the Séléka signatories were unable to maintain control of their combatants.

Furthermore, fractures formed within the Séléka on a regional basis, including an Ali Darass-led group that emerged in Bambari, a group under Adam Nourredine in Kaga-Bandoro, and a cluster under Damane Zacharia and Joseph Zoundeko in Bria (**Ngoulou & Ganalahou, 2014**). The ceasefire was also snubbed by General Joseph Zoundeko, who had been named leader of the Séléka's military wing in May 2014, insisting that the Séléka signatory, Dhaffane, could not represent his group. Thus, while the Séléka was a signatory to the ceasefire, the politics of the group often did not echo the views of the rebels on the ground **(Ucko Neill, 2014**; **RFI, 2014)**.

Although the emergence of the Anti-Balaka in 2013 was in response to the abuses committed by the Séléka, its clashes with the Séléka represent only one aspect of their activity. **Figure 8** shows the variety of activities in which the Anti-Balaka have been involved, and the associated number of fatalities.


Figure 6: Map of Battles Between the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka, Central African Republic, August 2013 – September 2014.

In total, over half of the Anti-Balaka activities are battles. While over 60% of these battles are with the Séléka, the remaining share of the Anti-Balaka battles engage a wide range of actors, from political, communal and ethnic militias, to government forces and international forces such as MISCA and Sangaris. This conveys the complex nature of both the Anti-Balaka group and the political environment within CAR.

The Anti-Balaka have also been responsible for a large number of instances of civilian targeting. Over 40% of all the Anti-Balaka activity involves violence against civilians. Taking the activities of the Anti-Balaka over time, it is clear that violence against civilians (as shown in **Figure 9**) is a persistent tactic of the group.

Levels of violence against civilians were particularly high at the end of 2013 and early 2014, as reprisals attacks were carried out by both the Anti-Balaka and the Séléka for the December 2013 clashes in Bangui. The proportion of events that involved violence against civilians dropped during the summer of 2014 (during which time the ceasefire was signed), however, there is no consistent pattern to the violence carried out by the Anti-Balaka over time. Indeed, the group has been described in a similar manner to the Séléka in terms of its members sometimes engaging in random, opportunistic violence, which would contribute to the lack of a distinct pattern to their violence type (**Global Centre for R2P, 2014**). In fact, the French Operation Sangaris in CAR was often accused by residents of being unfairly biased towards the Anti-Balaka (**Heras, 2014**). Demonstrations occurred in Bangui and Bambari as communities objected to Sangaris and their disarmament operations, which they felt focused too heavily on the Séléka and Muslims, leaving them unable to defend themselves against the Anti-Balaka and Christian vigilantes (**RJDH, 2014**; **Xinhua, 2014**). In spite of these perceptions, the data show that incidents in which Sangaris has clashed directly with the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka are relatively evenly balanced in terms of the numbers of events. However, the data do show that while Sangaris began to engage violently with the Séléka in December 2013, they did not do so with the Anti-Balaka until March 2014.

Additionally, while their interactions with the Séléka resulted in almost associated 100 deaths, the number of fatalities linked to their interactions with the Anti-Balaka stands at less than 30. It should be noted, however, that reports only occasionally indicate whether violence arose in the context of a disarmament activity or otherwise and, as such, no firm conclusions can be drawn as to the bias of Operation Sangaris towards the Anti-Balaka.


Figure 7: Battle Events between the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka and Associated Fatalities, Central African Republic August 2013 - September 2014.

Figure 8: Conflict Events Involving the Anti-Balaka, Central African Republic, August 2013 - September 2014.

The Religious Dimension of the Conflict and Other Actors:

Although the majority of the country's population is Christian, the Séléka emerged from the north of the country where Islam is the majority religion. Most of its members are Muslim, including leader Michel Djotodia, who served as president from August 2013 – January 2014.

In contrast to this, the Anti-Balaka is a largely Christian group, with reported ties to the Bozizé regime. While membership of the Séléka is heavily Muslim, the group did not initially target civilians or other actors because of their faith (**Käihkö & Utas, 2014**). Indeed, before the emergence of the Anti-Balaka, the ACLED dataset holds no record of the Séléka targeting another group solely because of their religious affiliation. However, the actions of the Séléka, including killings, violence, rape, arson and looting, contributed to surfacing of sectarian hostility within the country (**Amnesty, 2014**).

Tactically, however, the Anti-Balaka has exhibited a much clearer pattern of deliberate targeting of Muslims; Sebastien Wenezoui of the Anti-Balaka claimed that the movement was fighting in order to defend Christians (**IRIN, 2014a**). Some have suggested that this targeting may be

an attempt to attract Western sympathy, with the media soon classing the conflict as "religious" (**Käihkö & Utas, 2014**).

The Anti-Balaka have equated those of Islamic faith with the Séléka, making little or no distinction between Muslim civilians and the armed Séléka, and have carried out widespread attacks against Muslim civilians (**Human Rights Watch, 2014**). This has led to reprisal attacks on the part of the Séléka, and targeting by both groups now frequently focuses on the religion of the victim.

21% of incidents of violence against civilians by the Anti-Balaka targeted Muslims, while 17% of those of the Séléka targeted Christians. It should be noted that these figures are likely to be underestimations, as it represents only those records for which reporting explicitly referred to the religious backgrounds of the targeted civilians.

Such reprisals have also led to the rise of political violence by informal religious militia, which are distinct from, and not formally incorporated into, either the Anti-Balaka or the Séléka groups. 60 cases of violence involving Muslim and/or Christian militias have occurred since the emergence of the Anti-Balaka, and the subsequent, frequent targeting of people based on religion. The distribution of

these incidents and the related fatalities can be seen in **Figure 10**. Given this targeted violence, there has been a mass exodus of tens of thousands of Muslims from CAR (**IRIN, 2014a**). The flight of Muslims was particularly pronounced in the south of the country, leading to a *de facto* partition of CAR. A demand to formalise this partition was echoed by some members of the Séléka, however this call was abandoned during the July 2014 Brazzaville ceasefire talks (**Elion, 2014**).

However, to view the conflict solely based on religious grounds would be a crude oversimplification. While the sectarian targeting of civilians has very real implications for the security, vulnerability and co-existence of communities of different faiths, the religious dimension of the conflict should not be overstated. In effect, classifying the CAR conflict as religious in nature works to conceal a contest for power between political actors at different levels. Religious leaders of both faiths within CAR have asserted that the groups do not represent their respective faiths, and that their motives are not religious (**IRIN, 2014b**).

> **Classifying the CAR conflict as religious in nature works to conceal a contest for power between political actors at different levels. Religion is linked to various other divisions within CAR.**

Moreover, religion is linked to various other divisions within CAR, including the concept of "foreignness" (**Lombard, 2013**). The descendants of Chadian immigrants are often regarded as "foreigners", with this perspective frequently being applied to Muslims more widely. More recently, Chad and reportedly the Justice and Equality Movement in the Darfur area of Sudan provided support for the Séléka in overthrowing Bozizé's government (**Achu Check, 2014**).

It is also suspected that the Séléka membership includes many Chadians and Sudanese, particularly as victims have reported that many of the rebels speak Arabic instead of the national language, Sango (**Human Rights Watch, 2013b**). The Chadian contingent of the MISCA force was also the subject of criticism for an apparent bias towards the Séléka. Thus, the anti-Muslim violence is not solely based on religion, but can also be mapped onto another divide within the country – an "anti-Chad" or "anti-foreign" divide (**Swain, 2014**). As described by Wilson (2014), "The root is mistrust, expressed in foreignness, exacerbated by pov-

Figure 9: Anti-Balaka-Related Conflict Events, Central African Republic, August 2013 - September 2014.

Figure 10: Events Involving Muslim and/or Christian Militias and Associated Fatalities, Central African Republic, September 2013 - August 2014.

erty and ignited by (personal) political agendas" (**Wilson, 2014**).

That religious divisions are not the sole driver of political violence in CAR is also evident in the range of other violent actors in the country. While recent international attention has largely focused on the Séléka, the Anti-Balaka and associated religious militias, it is important to consider the complex political arena which exists in CAR. ACLED has recorded just under 1,300 events of political violence since the emergence of the Séléka (December 2012), of which nearly 40% was not associated with any of these main groups.

Figure 11 provides an overview of the various actors engaging in violence against civilians in CAR. Players of particular note include the LRA, and Fulani and Peul ethnic militias. Analysing data for 2014, CAR had second-highest proportion of violence against civilians of all high-activity countries in the ACLED dataset. Such is the level of violence against civilians in CAR, the International Criminal Court announced on 7th February 2014 that it would launch a preliminary investigation, following this with the announcement of a second investigation on 24th September 2014 (**ICC, 2014**).

Conclusion:

The Central African Republic is currently experiencing its most severe political crisis in recent history, and 2014 was the country's most politically violent year on record. The emergence of the largely Muslim Séléka in December 2012 and its widespread violence led to a coup in March 2013, in which the leader of the Séléka - Michel Djotodia - declared himself president. This did not mark an end to the violence committed by the Séléka, however, and the number of violent events involving the group generally increased in the months following the coup.

A majority-Christian coalition of the Anti-Balaka resurfaced in August 2013 in response to the abuses committed by the Séléka. While this group formed to retaliate against the Séléka, it too became responsible for extensive violence against civilians. The severity of the violence peaked in December 2013, the month with most fatalities on record. This is due to clashes between the Anti-Balaka and the Séléka in Bangui, during which time hundreds of deaths were reported.

A religious dimension had emerged in the conflict, with the Anti-Balaka targeting Muslim civilians. This led to reprisals in which the Séléka targeted Christian civilians.

Furthermore, Christian and Muslim militias continue to attack civilians of the other faith.

While this is one aspect of the conflict, to consider the conflict overall to be religious in nature would be incorrect (Käihkö & Utas, 2014). It is also important to bear in mind the variety of other actors that exist in the political arena of CAR. While media attention has focused heavily on the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka in recent times, groups such as the LRA and Fulani/Peul ethnic militias contribute to the complex setting of CAR. Presently, the Séléka is re-grouping, and three factions have emerged: the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) under Ali Daras, the Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central Africa (FPRC) under Adam Nourredine and the Patriotic Assembly for the Renaissance of Central Africa (RPRC) under Damane Zacharia and Joseph Zoundeko.

The Anti-Balaka has now formed the Central African Party for Unity and Development (PCUD), a political party seeking to legitimatise their role in CAR and use institutional forces to continue their struggle (with international support). The Anti-Balaka has won the international PR campaign and their activities, in particular those against civilians, including forced migrations and campaigns of ethnic cleansing against Muslims in CAR, have largely been ignored, while laying the land for them to be a major success politically.

Unable to halt the violence and restore order, the government has done little to inspire the confidence of the people of CAR with its weak control and few resources. While members of the rebel groups have been integrated into the government, with some holding ministerial positions, impunity continues in the context of a crippled judicial system.

Interim President Catherine Samba-Panza has come under fire amid accusations that her administration was responsible for the embezzlement of US$10m of Angolan aid, with the Anti-Balaka calling for her resignation. Amidst persistent insecurity, the transition period has been extended for six months and the elections, scheduled for February 2015, have now been postponed until the summer of 2015. The real impact of this government and its reconciliation plan is yet to be seen, and is now considered by some as a contributor to the problem rather than part of a solution.


Figure 11: Percentage of Events by Non-State Actors Engaging in Violence Against Civilians, Central African Republic, December 2012 - September 2014.

	Appendix I: Table of Actors, Central African Republic			
Group	**Dates of Activity**	**Features**	**Location**	**Associated Actors**
Séléka	**December 2012:** Launch of Séléka insurgency **January 2013:** Ceasefire agreement signed, then broken, between Bozizé government and Séléka coalition **March 2013:** Deposed Bozizé; escalation in ongoing violence **September 2013:** Officially dissolved. Militia organisation calls for secession of Muslim communities, regroups after external forces and Anti-Balaka battles. **September 2013 - present:** Continued violence, carried out by militia groups referred to as 'ex-Séléka'	• Loose coalition of armed groups united by the aim of overthrowing Bozizé (no unifying political ideology or centralised chain of command) • Largely Muslim but not politically Islamist • Splintered into multiple factions following March 2013 (no longer n united organisation, loss of control over Séléka by Djotodia) • Widespread violence against communities prior to and after coup (attacks, raids, kidnapping, killings, sexual violence, looting) • Attacks on civilians in Bangui (looting, killings, executions, torture) from March 2013, targeting former military and members of Gbaya ethnic group believed to be pro-Bozizé • Djotodia officially dissolved Séléka in September 2013, but they did not disarm or disband, and have resisted DDR efforts • Clashes between Séléka factions (e.g. territory)	Originally based in northeast CAR. **March 2013:** Séléka forces controlled 15 of 16 provinces **Late 2013:** Clashes between Séléka and Anti-Balaka forces primarily in northwest (e.g. Bossangoa, Bouca, Bouar) **Early 2014:** Local clustered activity, increasing moving to Eastern CAR	Included UFDR, CPJP, CPSK, and UFR, and supported by A2K and FDPC Also reported to include Chadian and Sudanese fighters Allied with Mbarara (and possibly other Peul militia) in some areas, particularly in attacks on northern villages Three political parties have emerged from the Séléka: the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) in Bambari under Ali Darass, the Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central Africa (FPRC) in Kaga-Bandoro under Adam Nourredine, and the Patriotic Assembly for the Renaissance of Central Africa (RPRC) in Bria under Damane Zacharia and Joseph Zoundeko.

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Appendix I: Table of Actors, Central African Republic cont...				
Group	**Dates of Activity**	**Features**	**Location**	**Associated Actors**
Anti-Balaka	**March 2013:** Emerged in current form in response to Séléka violence **Late- 2013:** Significant fighting force, reports of alliance with former FACA and Police Forces. *De facto* control of Western CAR in early 2014. **2014 - present:** Continued violence, particularly clashes with Séléka forces	• Emerged in response to Séléka violence • Community self-defence units, made up of local militias (e.g. Christian vigilante farmers), anti-Séléka armed groups, former soldiers, breakaway Séléka rebels, bandits • Also supported by ACP (Association of Central African Farmers), an anti-Séléka peasant movement • Some links to the Bozizé regime, supported by Bozizé's FROCCA • Largely Christian groups • Largely regional movement, despite "Bozizé elements," not fully coordinated • During 2004-07 war, Anti-Balaka were local vigilante groups resisting APRD and UFDR violence against northern communities	Based primarily in northern regions, capital. Clashes between Séléka and Anti-Balaka forces primarily in northwest (e.g. Bossangoa, Bouca, Bouar)	Anti-Balaka attacks sometimes in coordination with ex-army elements loyal to Bozizé. The Anti-Balaka has now formed a political party: the Central African Party for Unity and Development (PCUD).
FACA		Military Forces of the Central African Republic • Ex-Séléka form *de facto* government forces (**Amnesty International, Oct 2013**) • For much of 2013, in the absence of national armed forces, Séléka units sometimes stood in (in uniform) to contain violence by other Séléka combatants (**International Crisis Group, June 2013**). • As of late 2013, efforts to rebuild FACA are underway mainly by encouraging Bozize forces to return and retrain. Reports that many are also involved in Anti-Balaka groups.	Nationally	

Group	Dates of Activity	Features	Location	Associated Actors
Former FACA		Reports of human rights abuses by Bozizé forces (Presidential Guard, in particular) during the Séléka offensive, including detention and torture in military detention facilities, mostly (Muslim) detainees from the north, accused of being rebels Power concentration and favouritism (recruitment, training) for Gbaya ethnic group (Bozizé's ethnic group)	Nationally	
MISCA	**December 2013 - September 2014** (replaced by MINUSCA)	African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic. Comprises soldiers from Gabon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville and Cameroon (mainly Chadian). • Established by the African Union in July 2013 to replace FOMAC/MICOPAX • 1-year MISCA deployment approved by UN Security Council in early December 2013 • Also known as AFISM-CAR	Nationally	
UFDR		Union of Democratic Forces for Unity. Former rebel group in Central African Republic; believed demobilised during 2007 peace agreement. Signed the 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement.	Primarily north-east and north	
CPJP		Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace. Former rebel group in Central African Republic; signed ceasefire agreement in 2011.	Primarily north and north-central (including N'Délé)	
APRD		People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy. Former rebel group in Central African Republic; participated in peace negotiations during 2008-2009.	Primarily north-west	
FDPC		Democratic Front of the Central African People. Former rebel group in Central African Republic; signed ceasefire agreement in 2007.	Primarily north and north-west	