

Refugee Review Tribunal

AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

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This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

1. Can you provide any information about the current or recent situation in Char Bagh, which used to be in Shibarghan district of Jawzjan province but, from the AIMS maps, is now in Sar-e Pol district of Sar-e Pol province? Can you confirm or otherwise the claim that most of the Hazaras there (it was mainly a Hazara village) have been driven out by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Pashtuns from neighbouring areas, because they're Hazara and Shi'a and/or no protection is given to them because of their ethnicity and religion?
2. Please provide recent information on the control and security situation in Sar-e Pol province generally.
3. Please provide recent information on the control and security situation in Sar-e Pol district.
4. Please provide recent information on the situation of Hazaras in Sar-e Pol district and province now.
5. Please provide any evidence of experiences of Hazaras who have returned to Sar-e Pol district or province.

RESPONSE

Background Information

Attached for reference is a map dating from 1997 of the ethno linguistic groups in Afghanistan ('Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan', 1997, *Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection* (Uni of Texas Library Online); originally produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/middle_east_and_asia/Afghanistan_Ethnoling_97.jpg - Accessed 2 Dec 1999 – Attachment 1).

1. Can you provide any information about the current or recent situation in Char Bagh, which used to be in Shibarghan district of Jawzjan province but, from the AIMS maps,

is now in Sar-e Pol district of Sar-e Pol province? Can you confirm or otherwise the claim that most of the Hazaras there (it was mainly a Hazara village) have been driven out by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Pashtuns from neighbouring areas, because they're Hazara and Shi'a and/or no protection is given to them because of their ethnicity and religion?

Searches were made for Char Bagh and Charbagh.

The attached map locates Char Bagh in Sari Pul District of Sari Pul Province. It is identified as a village about 10 kilometres north of Sari Pul city ('Sari Pul District: Located in Sari Pul Province', 2002, *AIMS*, August – Attachment 2).

However, the following two references to Char Bagh area suggest it is within Sar-i-Pul centre.

The UNHCR Protection team in Mazar advised the Char Bagh area (Sar-i-Pul centre) was one of the main districts where Hazaras live in Sar-i-Pul (UNHCR Protection team/SO Mazar 2003, *Hazaras in Sar-i-Pul Province*, 24 November –Attachment 3).

A 2004 UNHCR report describes Char Bagh centre as “a Hazara dominated area” (UNHCR 2004, *Compilation Of Country Of Origin Information On Afghanistan Relevant In The Context Of Refugee Status Determination In Australia– Part II*, 26 March - Attachment 4).

The UNHCR Protection team in Mazar advised, “there are no reports about specific persecution or harassment incidents... against Hazaras”. The report noted that “in comparison, Pashtuns face harsher conditions, for ex. in Sar-e-Pul Center, ...” (UNHCR Protection team/SO Mazar 2003, *Hazaras in Sar-i-Pul Province*, 24 November –Attachment 3).

2. Please provide recent information on the control and security situation in Sar-e Pol province generally.

A recent UNHCR report indicates “part of the provincial capital of Sar-i-Pul” as one of the areas “where (non-formal) armed groups continue to be present and active, factional fighting has taken place intermittently, and where high levels of indiscriminate actions by commanders are reported, such as illegal taxation for different reasons, forcible recruitment to armed groups or for labor purposes or payment of money instead, illegal occupation and confiscation of immovable property” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 2005, *Update on the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations*, Geneva, June, p.59-60 – Attachment 26).

A September 2004, Human Rights Watch report provides this account of the forces controlling the province:

For the most part, military, police, and intelligence forces in the north are allied with the leader of the Junbish faction, General Rashid Dostum, or to a lesser degree with the Jamiat-allied commander Atta Mohammad or the Hezb-e Wahdat commander Mohammad Mohaqqiq (Human Rights Watch 2004, *Human Rights Watch – Backgrounders: III. Threats and General Political Repression*, September, p.7 - Attachment 5).

Security Situation

A January 2003 UN report stated “local conflicts have exacted a heavy toll, among civilians and such conflicts among local armed groups have been reported from different districts, including Faizabad (Jawzjan province), Qala-I-Shahr (Sari-pul province) ... (UN Commission on Human Rights 2003, *Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan*, A/CN.2/2003/39, Fifty-ninth session, 13 January, para. 19. – Attachment 6).

A November 2003 *Agence France-Presse* article notes, “the two rival factions regularly fight each other over the control of the drug trafficking route from central Afghanistan's Bamiyan, Ghor and Badghis provinces” (‘At least seven killed in factional fighting in northern Afghanistan’ 2003, Relief Web website, sourced from *Agence France-Presse (AFP)*, 2 November -

<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/2d06ea7656fea82f49256dd300059270>

- Accessed 18 August 2005 – Attachment 7). The article also details one such incident:

Fighting between the Jamiat militia, made up of ethnic Tajik fighters, and the Junbish militia of ethnic Uzbeks started in Kohistanat district of Saripul province [killing] five militia members and two civilians (‘At least seven killed in factional fighting in northern Afghanistan’ 2003, Relief Web website, sourced from *Agence France-Presse (AFP)*, 2 November.

(<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/2d06ea7656fea82f49256dd300059270> - Accessed 18 August 2005 - Attachment 7).

The UK Home Office stated in its October 2004 report:

5.88 In a report to the UN Security Council dated 23 July 2003, the Secretary-General stated that,

During the reporting period, localized tensions between rival factions in the north have taken a dramatic turn for the worse. During June and July [2003], the Junbish forces of General Abdul Rashid Dostum and the Jamiat forces of Ustad Atta Mohammed repeatedly clashed in Balkh, Samangan and Sari Pul Provinces, resulting in direct intervention by the two factional leaders.” (UK Home Office 2004, *Afghanistan Country Report*, October – Attachment 8).

Three UNHCR updates, all dated 2004, report on security issues in Sar-i-pul Province:

- there is still tension in Kohistanat and Gusfandi villages and the presence of heavy weapons is still a problem and a cause for concern in the province (UNHCR 2004, *Return Information Update*, Issue 51, 15 February – Attachment 9).
- a local feud in fourth week of July resulted in death of two in Sangcharak district (UNHCR 2004, *Return Information Update*, Issue 62, 1 August – Attachment 10).
- on 29 September 2004, WFP reported that one of their rented trucks, transporting food to Balkhab district, was stopped by a local commander and offloaded by force in Sar-i-pul Province (UNHCR 2004, *Return Information Update*, Issue 67, 15 October – Attachment 11).

A December 2003 UNHCR update stated, “some areas in Sar-i-pul such as Sangcharak, Gosfandi and Kohistanat remain frequently of (sic) limit to the UN (i.e. no returnee monitoring)” (UNHCR 2003, *Return Information Update*, Issue 47, 15 December –

Attachment 12). The report detailed security problems in Kohistanat district of Sar-i-pul Province:

The factional fighting that took place in November in Kachen of Kohistanat district has been stopped after a delegation of the security commission comprised of the Coalition, the UN and factional representatives went to the area. The delegation succeeded to withdraw three local commanders of Jamiat and four local commanders from Junbish. However, forced recruitment and arbitrary acts by the local commanders continues to be widespread (UNHCR 2003, *Return Information Update*, Issue 47, 15 December – Attachment 12).

US Department of State's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2003 - Afghanistan*, noted:

While most girls throughout the country were able to attend school, the U.N. reported that, in some areas, a climate of insecurity persisted. From August 2002 to June, there were more than 30 attacks on girls and boys schools in Ghazni, Kabul, Kandahar, Logar, Sar-e-Pul, Wardak, Zabul, Jawzjan, and Laghman causing minor injuries and building damage (US Department of State 2004, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2003 - Afghanistan*, February 25 – Attachment 13).

A June 2005 report claimed Junbish forces were involved in skirmishes with Hezbe-Wahdat:

Fighting has been reported in the city of Mazar-e Sharif, the Sholgarah District and the northern province of Sar-e Pol. UN personnel have been in contact with the two parties involved, Jamiat-e Jombesh and Hezb-e Wahdat, at the regional and national levels ('NGO concerned over security in the south', 2005, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 June (Source: IRINnews.org, 10 June 2005) (Attachment 14).

Two reports from June 2005 note that NATO has established a temporary satellite Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Sar-i-Pul. One report notes:

(PRTs) are teams of international civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan's provinces to extend the authority of the central government and to provide a safer and more secure environment in which reconstruction can take place ('Helping secure Afghanistan's future' 2005, *NATO On Line Library*, January) (Attachment 15).

Another report notes of the role of the PRTs:

(PRTs) are relatively small, inter-disciplinary groups formed to assist local authorities, the national government, nongovernmental organizations, and United Nations agencies, in their efforts to rebuild Afghanistan, reform its security sector and disarm, demobilize and reintegrate its armed members.

PRTs focus on supporting change to a wide variety of areas, among them education, customs, infrastructure, agriculture, police, the judiciary, and public health. As capabilities improve over time, PRT duties will gradually be transferred to the government or the commercial sector ('Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)' (undated), *Global Security* (Attachment 16).

Political control

Reports from mid-2004 note that the central government appointed Mr. Shafaq as governor for Sar-i-Pul province but he has not been installed in the post due to resistance by local authorities opposed to the extension of the central government authority there (UNHCR 2004, *Return Information Update*, Issue 61, 15 July – Attachment 17).

A June 2004 UNHCR update expanded on the nature of the opposition to the new governor:

Army Division No 82 prevented the newly appointed governor of Sar-i-Pul, Abdul Haq Shafaq, from entering his office. Shafaq was accompanied by the police forces from the capital. He met opposition from the Division No 82 when he wanted to enter the governor's office. The new governor and those accompanying him were surrounded and forced to leave Sar-i-Pul. Shafaq is a former commander of Hezb-i-Wahdat party (UNHCR 2004, *Return Information Update*, Issue 59, 15 June – Attachment 18).

According to a 2005 *International Security and Relations Network*, article it appears the designated governor never took office and Dostum's militia "forced him to retreat to a neighboring northern province" ('Afghan warlord appointed chief-of-staff' 2005, *International Security and Relations Network*, 10 June (Attachment 19)).

A June 2005 report from *BBC Monitoring South Asia* reports the current Sar-i-Pul Province Governor is Sayed Eqbal Monib ('Northern Afghan Province Governor launches recruitment drive for police' 2005, *BBC Monitoring South Asia*, 7 June – Attachment 31).

According to the same report, Abdul Rashid Dostum has been appointed as the country's chief-of-staff to the commander of the armed forces ('Afghan warlord appointed chief-of-staff' 2005, *International Security and Relations Network*, 10 June (Attachment 19)).

The same report speculates "it could be a bid by the president to win the influential militia commander's support ahead of Afghanistan's parliamentary elections, tentatively scheduled for this fall". The report continues:

Elections were originally planned for May, but have been delayed due to security and organizational reasons. Dostum is an ethnic Uzbek and a former communist army general who heads an Uzbek militia that controls parts of northern Afghanistan. ... Dostum has been accused of involvement in human rights abuses. ... Reuters quoted the Brussels-based International Crisis Group think tank as saying that Karzai and his US supporters had conspired to maintain the power of militia commanders to fight Islamic militancy, despite the threat that strategy posed to Afghanistan's upcoming parliamentary poll ('Afghan warlord appointed chief-of-staff' 2005, *International Security and Relations Network*, 10 June - Attachment 19).

AKE Intelligence reported on the same day, "the reshuffle of nine senior police officers apparently in an effort to improve security following an increase in hostile activity", and the appointment of a new police chief in northern Sar-e-Pul ('AKE Bespoke Intelligence Reports 2005, *AKE Intelligence*, 10 June (Attachment 20)).

The September 2004, Human Rights Watch report also reports widespread allegations of political manipulation in the electoral process in Sar-e-Pul province:

The three factions are also engaging in ongoing political repression. According to numerous observers with the joint UNAMA-AIHRC political rights verification team, as well as NGO and U.N. officials, Junbish, Jamiat and Wahdat (Mohaqqiq) commanders have already threatened local leaders to ensure that local populations vote as they command.²⁶ Representatives from several areas confirmed this.²⁷ The UNAMA-AIHRC team has also confirmed several cases of commanders using false pretenses or outright force to compel registered voters to hand over their cards to the factions, presumably so they could be photocopied for use in nominating factional candidates.²⁸

JEMB, UNAMA, and AIHRC staff working in Sar-e Pol, Faryab, Jawzjan, and Samangan provinces confirmed cases of voter card confiscation and of local leaders being instructed how to vote.²⁹ Observers familiar with Samangan said that the local commander there, Ahmed Khan, would deliver votes for Junbish, while in Sar-e Pol the votes would be controlled by a local warlord there, Commander Kamal.³⁰ (Human Rights Watch 2004, *Human Rights Watch – Backgrounders: III. Threats and General Political Repression*, September, p.7 - Attachment 5).

Further information on the allegations against Commander Kamal is provided in a recent IWPR report which claims intimidation by candidates in the upcoming parliamentary election:

In Sayed Abad district of neighbouring Sar-e-Pul province, a resident accused Kamal Cherik of maintaining an armed militia so that no one could disobey his orders. This man, who did not want to give his name, said the candidate's followers were responsible for killing and torture.

"The failure to remove Kamal's name from the final list has made us distrust the government, and each day that passes the real nature of [President Hamed] Karzai and his colleagues has become clear for the nation," said the man.

IWPR's efforts to interview Kamal Cherik at his strongly guarded house failed.

"The commander doesn't want to be interviewed by anyone," said one of the heavily-armed militia men with a laugh, after disappearing for 10 minutes inside the high walls surrounding the building.

The election rules are quite clear: no one with guns or armed supporters, other than two duly licensed bodyguards, can stand (Ghafari, Salima, Amani, Wahidullah and Ibrahimi, Sayed Yaqub 2005, 'Gunmen Have Elections In Their Sights', *IWPR'S Afghan Recovery Report*, No. 182, August 12 – Attachment 21).

According to a July 2005 International Crisis Group report, the Junbish Party is expected to fare well in the upcoming elections despite internal friction caused by Dostum's appointment to these government positions. The report notes:

Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, has faced difficulties since its leader, Abdul Rashid Dostum, took a position in the central government. According to a political expert in Mazar-e Sharif, "there is a problem with party leaders and the politics of the party. Junbish has both former communists and mujahidin party members. Both are fighting with each other. The party could be pulling itself apart".¹³⁸ However, the Junbish can be expected to do well, given its historic influence in the north, party discipline, and links to northeastern jihadi networks (International Crisis Group 2005, *Afghanistan Elections: Endgame Or New Beginning?*, Asia Report N°101, 21 July –Attachment 22).

Olivier Roy provides this analysis of Dostum's willingness to align with government forces:

Rashid Dostum's power relies, as does that of Ismail Khan, on a central military corps, which, whatever its real efficiency, could be matched only by other warlords and not by local commanders. He has been able to merge his Jawzjani militiamen with other remnants of the Communist army, and benefits from a stronghold, Shiberghan, where the local population is loyal to him. But, situated in a flat, desert like area, Shiberghan is not easily defensible in case of an attack by an army with light armoured vehicles. Like the other warlords, Dostum has not created a civil administration. Lacking a defensible geographical stronghold,

Dostum's power remains fragile, and he has in fact chosen to act in close cooperation with the central government.

Dostum's main opponent, and sometime ally, Atta Mohammed, is a product of the *shura-ye nazar* system, that is a military commander who is supported by local commanders on the basis of regional and sub-ethnic identity (Sunni Persian speakers). But he needs the support of the central state (and specifically from Defence Minister Mohammed Fahim) in order to have access to weapons and money. The rivalry between Dostum and Atta places the central government in the position of mediator. This is therefore a typical example of the pattern where warlords do not fight the central state, but look for state support and arbitration in order to extend their power at the expense of a rival. And it also explains why Dostum agreed to head the disarmament commission (Roy, O. 2003, *Afghanistan: Internal politics and socio-economic dynamics and groupings*, WRITENET Paper No.12/2002, UNHCR Emergency & Security Service, March – Attachment 23).

3. Please provide recent information on the control and security situation in Sar-e Pol district.

A September 2004, Human Rights Watch report specifically notes Junbish commanders have control of the Sar-e-Pol district. The report states:

Human Rights Watch has received recent evidence of forces in several districts engaging in land and property seizures, looting, and extortion or “per capita tax.”²⁵ Abuses are reportedly particularly bad in the Junbish controlled districts of Jawzjan, Sar-e Pol, and Faryab, where local commanders have repeatedly defied the Karzai government and prevented Karzai's appointed governors from taking up their posts (Human Rights Watch 2004, *Human Rights Watch – Backgrounders: III. Threats and General Political Repression*, September, p.7 - Attachment 5).

Hafizullah Gardish also discusses this incident in Sar-i-Pul province, noting Abdul Haq Shafaq stepped down as governor after coming under pressure. He adds “Saripul is also under Dostum's sway” and observes:

Such incidents underscore Karzai's political need to win over the commanders. The irony is that one of his greatest problems lies with many of the same northern leaders who just three years ago helped his ally America defeat the Taleban and bring him to power (Gardish, H. 2004, ‘Hamed Karzai: Karzai Re-election Seen as a Done Deal - President Hamed Karzai is tipped to win - but will the poll be fair?’, in *Background Details On Some Presidential Candidates*, ed. Qanuni, Younis, Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 6 October - Attachment 24).

4. Please provide recent information on the situation of Hazaras in Sar-e Pol district and province now.

5. Please provide any evidence of experiences of Hazaras who have returned to Sar-e Pol district or province.

A UNHCR OCM Kabul report entitled *Operational Information Monthly Summary Report: March 02 – June 05*, shows that between March 2002 and June 2005, 6,198 Hazaras returned to Sar-i-Pul province out of a total of 28,483 returnees (UNHCR OCM Kabul 2005, *Operational Information Monthly Summary Report: March 02 – June 05*, June, p.9

http://www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/emergency_assistance/refugee/unhcr_summaries/jun_05/summary1.pdf - Attachment 25). These figures indicate Hazaras are statistically the second largest group returning to the province, after the Uzbeks.

No information was located on the experiences of Hazaras returning to Sar-i-Pul district. The only reference to Hazaras in Sar-i-Pul province, is dated November 2003 and states, “there are no reports about specific persecution or harassment incidents... against Hazaras” (UNHCR Protection team/SO Mazar 2003, *Hazaras in Sar-i-Pul Province*, 24 November – Attachment 3). The report adds:

It should be mentioned that, there are reports of illegal taxation, forced military recruitment, and extortion. This applies to Hazaras as well as other ethnicities living in Sar-i-Pul (UNHCR Protection team/SO Mazar 2003, *Hazaras in Sar-i-Pul Province*, 24 November – Attachment 3).

The UNHCR’s 2005 *Update on the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations*, relevantly notes:

Afghans of Hazara ethnic origin from areas of the West and South of Afghanistan might also be exposed to discrimination, including discrimination amounting to persecution. Generally, asylum claims of Afghans originating from areas where they are the ethnic minority continue to require particular attention, especially during the electoral process for parliamentary elections in September 2005 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 2005, *Update on the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations*, Geneva, June, p. 49 – Attachment 26).

The available reports do mention targeting of ethnic groups but the Pashtuns are the only ethnic groups specifically named, as is the case in the following two reports:

- The UNHCR Protection team report noted that “in comparison, Pashtuns face harsher conditions, for ex. in Sar-e-Pul Center, ...” (UNHCR Protection team/SO Mazar 2003, *Hazaras in Sar-i-Pul Province*, 24 November – Attachment 3).
- A February 2004 UNHCR update claimed, “the return of tens of thousands of displaced persons to the north-west is currently hampered by ongoing security problems facing civilians living in the area, particularly Pashtuns (‘Go-And-See Visit By Displaced Afghans Gets Underway’ 2004, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 12 February - Attachment 27).

A January 2003 UNHCR report, *Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan*, does not specify the targets but claimed:

Local commanders are blamed for the harassment and expulsion of certain ethnic groups; appropriation of land, looting of cattle and other property and forced expulsions of people belonging to a specific ethnicity were also reported in the provinces of Sari Pul, Faryab, Badakshan and Takhar (UN Commission on Human Rights 2003, *Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan*, A/CN.2/2003/39, Fifty-ninth session, 13 January, para. 17. – Attachment 6).

A 2004 UNHCR report notes two instances in Sar-i-Pol province where returnees were able to recover their property without problems. The report notes:

Though exceptional, there have been cases where returnees have been able to recover their property without problems. Generally, this has been the case in those areas where returnees belong to the same ethnic or tribal group as the majority of the residents, or are supporters of

the same political party or commander. In the areas of Gurkab Afgania in Suzmaqala and Abkhour in Gusfandee, Saripul province, the returnees who have recently returned had all recovered their property smoothly and no disputes had been reported (UNHCR 2004, *Compilation Of Country Of Origin Information On Afghanistan Relevant In The Context Of Refugee Status Determination In Australia– Part II*, 26 March - Attachment 4).

The following three reports provide general information on assistance offered to returnees to Sar-i-Pul province.

An April 2005 statement from UNAMA announced accommodation assistance to families in Sar-i-Pul:

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) have identified more than 3,500 vulnerable returnee and internally displaced families in need of urgent accommodation. The families - 1000 in Balkh, 800 in Jawzjan, 800 in Faryab, 300 in Samangan and 700 in Saripul – will be provided with materials with which to undertake construction themselves (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 2005, *Press briefing by Ariane Quentier, Senior Public Information Officer and UN agencies in Afghanistan*, 24 April – Attachment 28).

Through its several implementing partners in the country, UNHCR has been providing shelters for returning vulnerable refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in rural areas. The NGO ZOA, for example, has just concluded 400 shelters in four districts of Saripul Province (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 2004, *Press briefing by Manoel de Almeida e Silva, UNAMA Spokesman*, Relief Web website, 18 August <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MHII-68E5LG?OpenDocument> - Accessed 18 August 2005 – Attachment 29).

An article in the *Afghan Press Monitor* reported eight million US dollars has been allocated for reconstruction of the northern Sar-e-Pul province, following a government delegation travelling to Sar-e-Pul to evaluate the problems facing people, such as the shortage of roads, electricity, drinking water, health clinics and schools ('Eight million dollars for Sar-e-Pul reconstruction' 2005, *AOP Afghan News*, 16 August (Source: Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Islah, No 132, 14-15 August) – Attachment 30).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Google search engine

UNHCR *REFWORLD* UNHCR Refugee Information Online

Databases:

Public	<i>FACTIVA</i>	Reuters Business Briefing
DIMIA	<i>BACIS</i>	Country Information
	<i>REFINFO</i>	IRBDC Research Responses (Canada)
RRT	<i>ISYS</i>	RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State <i>Country Reports on Human Rights Practices</i> .
RRT Library	<i>FIRST</i>	RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. 'Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan', 1997, *Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection* (Uni of Texas Library Online); originally produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/middle_east_and_asia/Afghanistan_Ethnoling_97.jpg - Accessed 2 Dec 1999.
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5. Human Rights Watch 2004, *Human Rights Watch – Backgrounders: III. Threats and General Political Repression*, September. (CISNET Afghanistan CX122906)
6. UN Commission on Human Rights 2003, *Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan*, A/CN.2/2003/39, Fifty-ninth session, 13 January.
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13. US Department of State 2004, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2003 - Afghanistan*, February 25.
14. 'NGO concerned over security in the south', 2005, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 10 June (Source: IRINnews.org, 10 June 2005). (CISNET Afghanistan CX123348)
15. 'Helping secure Afghanistan's future' 2005, *NATO On Line Library*, January. (CISNET Afghanistan CX123349)
16. 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)' (undated), *Global Security*. (CISNET Afghanistan CX123256)
17. UNHCR 2004, *Return Information Update*, Issue 61, 15 July.

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19. 'Afghan warlord appointed chief-of-staff' 2005, International Security and Relations Network, 10 June. (CISNET CX123350)
20. 'AKE Bespoke Intelligence Reports, 2005, *AKE Intelligence*, 10 June. (CISNET CX123485 Afghanistan)
21. Ghafari, Salima, Amani, Wahidullah and Ibrahimi, Sayed Yaqub 2005, 'Gunmen Have Elections In Their Sights', *IWPR'S Afghan Recovery Report*, No. 182, August 12.
22. International Crisis Group 2005, *Afghanistan Elections: Endgame Or New Beginning?*, Asia Report N°101, 21 July.
23. Roy, O. 2003, *Afghanistan: Internal politics and socio-economic dynamics and groupings*, WRITENET Paper No.12/2002, UNHCR Emergency & Security Service, March.
24. Gardish, H. 2004, 'Hamed Karzai: Karzai Re-election Seen as a Done Deal - President Hamed Karzai is tipped to win - but will the poll be fair?', in *Background Details On Some Presidential Candidates*, ed. Qanuni, Younis, Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 6 October. (CISNET Afghanistan CX104596)
25. UNHCR OCM Kabul 2005, *Operational Information Monthly Summary Report: March 02 – June 05*
(http://www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/emergency_assistance/refugee/unhcr_summaries/jun_05/summary1.pdf).
26. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 2005, *Update on the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations*, Geneva, June.
27. 'Go-And-See Visit By Displaced Afghans Gets Underway' 2004, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 12 February. (CISNET Afghanistan CX89252)
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(<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MHII-68E5LG?OpenDocument> - Accessed 18 August 2005)
30. 'Eight million dollars for Sar-e-Pul reconstruction' 2005, *AOP Afghan News*, 16 August (Source: Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Islah, No 132, 14-15 August).
31. 'Northern Afghan Province Governor launches recruitment drive for police' 2005, *BBC Monitoring South Asia*, 7 June. (FACTIVA)