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THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- 1st tranche of transition areas upcoming
- Militias a regular component in incident reporting from the North
- High profile incidents/deaths within Kandahar
- Heavy contestation of Nuristan
- Mass abductions in Farah involving NGOs

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

While various areas in CENTRAL are slated for transition in the coming weeks, this period continued the well established trends of the conflicts impact on the region. With 2 suicide attacks reported (Wardak & Kapisa), it was the latter that proved most significant as it resulted in 9 IMF casualties. In addition, there were 3 NGO incidents in the region, 2 from Kabul and a 3rd in Panjshir, all of which once again involved the demining sector. Panjshir also reported an incident noteworthy for its rarity and violence in which 2 IMF soldiers were killed and a third wounded during an altercation with an NDS officer.

Mazar-i-Sharif City is the sole site slated for transition in the NORTH. Balkh Province was also the site of one of the two NGO incidents from the region. The first involved a rather benign interaction at one of the now ubiquitous illegal checkpoints while the second, this time in Badakhshan, also presented a regular feature for NGO incidents in this province, that is the use of grenades against NGO facilities, apparently for the purposes of intimidation. Due to the prevalence of pro-government militias within the NR, they have become a

common locus for incident reporting. Besides regular attacks against them by AOG (partially due to competition for area control as seen in Jawzjan & Sar-e Pul) there were also occurrences of armed clashes between neighbouring militias. This dynamic was primarily noted in Kunduz and represent possible early indicators that fractures along local lines are beginning to develop from within broader groups cohesion.

Reporting from the SOUTH this period was dominated by the assassination of the Head of the Provincial Council in Kandahar. Besides the formal power this role granted, the deceased (a close relative to the President) also enjoyed extensive informal power through various structures existent in the area. While the exact circumstances surrounding his death remain murky, AOG utilised the observations following his murder to target other senior leadership in the South, including an attempted IED attack against the Helmand PG as well as a suicide attack against a service taking place in a mosque in Kandahar City. This latter attack resulted in numerous casualties, including the death of the Head

of the Kandahar Ulema Shura.

Some of the key elements in reporting from the EAST included the numerous indirect fire incidents affecting the border areas (originating from elements of the PakMil) as well the ongoing struggle for dominance of various areas within Nuristan between opposition groups and government forces. In addition, Nangarhar also recorded another NGO incident, the 9th this year, once again affecting the health sector though this time perpetrated by the IMF.

In the WEST, 2 mass abductions reported from Farah dominated reporting, both due to the rarity of such events in the region as well as the involvement of NGO staff in both. In one event, a single demining organisation had 31 of its staff directly targeted and abducted, with the incident concluding after the execution of 4 (mostly the groups leadership) with the remainder being released. In the other incident (involving up to 35), a lone NGO staff member appeared to be the victim of circumstance and was released shortly thereafter.

CENTRAL REGION

KABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	2


During this cycle, 9 AOG incidents were recorded in Kabul Province, representing 25% of the total incident volume while ANSF-IMF were responsible for a further 65%. IMF direct actions included 3 arrest operations in Paghman, and 1 engagement with AOG in Seyajoy of Musayi. In addition, there were 2 NGO incidents this period, both of which involved demining agencies.

On 11 July, an AP mine (likely a remnant from previous conflicts) detonated under the wheel of a local taxi in Sahak, Bagrami and an ANP search of the area following this located another AP mine in the vicinity. The ANP handed over the device to a driver employed with a demining NGO working on a site nearby, and after the driver took the mine to the camp, it accidentally detonated (causing light injuries to the said NGO staff). The next day, another demining NGO had to deal with an AOG intercepting one of their vehicles (reportedly an ambulance) in Tangi Lalandar (Chahar Asyab). The NGO occupants were not harmed, though the car was seized by the AOG gunmen who consequently drove away in the vehicle.

In the absence of significant attacks in Kabul City, Deh Sabz emerged as a focal area for AOG

activity with four AOG-initiated attacks. Two cases were IDF attacks launched towards the local ANA base (1 case was accurate), probably by AOG networks based in Kohi Safi. Two additional cases were IEDs. One device prematurely detonated on a secondary road in Tangi Kalay, shortly before an ANA convoy drove thru the area. Another case pertained to a set of two magnetic devices which were attached and detonated on a fuel tanker parked on the New Bagram Road. The vehicle recently arrived from Nangarhar, where this TTP remains a common occurrence. Nonetheless, a similar device had been identified (and neutralized) on another fuel tanker which arrived to Kabul from Nangarhar on 9 June (Jalalabad Road, Paktya Kot). Two additional attacks against IMF-contracted fuel tankers were reported from Surobi (Kas Shirkhan & Qabre Mullah Burjan).

Musayi hosted another significant portion of conflict-related escalations. Besides the IMF operation mentioned in Seyajoy, NDS performed another arrest operation in Qalai Abdul Rauf. AOG ensured their share of incidents with an IDF attack against the DAC, and more prominently with a con-



certed three-fold rocket strike on the ANA base in Qalai Ahmadkhan (adjacent to the Kabul – Logar Highway) and the deployment of two RCIEDs on the secondary road in the same location on the same day (discovered and neutralized by ANA). AOG activity in Musayi has intensified during the last two cycles (as it regularly does during the summer months every year) and should be monitored by NGOs with operations in the district.

In Kabul City, an 82mm mortar rigged as an IED detonated in a culvert close by a checkpoint operated by Traffic Police on the Deh Mazang Circle (opposite the Traffic Police HQ) on 3 July. The blast injured four ANP. So far, there has been no evidence which would link the incident to AOG activity. The planned security transition in Kabul Province (excluding Surobi) has entered the terminal phase, scheduled to conclude during the last week of July. The process will likely have little change to the security paradigm in the province as the momentum in rural district clearly lies with the ANSF. AOG will likely continue to pursue their focus on sporadic spectacular attacks against high profile GOA and security targets in Kabul City, another constant feature of local security environment.


LOGAR

Following the steep peak in AOG volumes in June (44 AOG-initiated incidents, compared to 25 in May), AOG activity dropped to 10 escalations recorded so far during this cycle (four close-range and six stand-off attacks, the latter incl. three cases of IDF and three IED detonations). ANSF-IMF operations maintained similar volumes, and were mainly visible in Baraki Barak and Mohammad Agha. Meanwhile, Azra remained in the orbit of both sides of the conflict. An encounter in the district (Sherzad Area) encompassed a series of clashes between AOG and IMF and concluded with an air-strike resulting in a number of civilian casualties (7 civilians besides 9 AOG). It seems that the operation followed closely after an important coordination meeting attended by several IEA shadow District Shadow Governors, though the IMF announced that their effort was mainly dedicated to eliminating a commander usually active in the neighbouring Hisarak District of Nangarhar. Khushi was another district with

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

low incident volumes, yet reputed for AOG safe havens occasionally used by commanders and networks temporarily relocating from other districts, such as Mohammad Agha. During this cycle, four Pakistani workers employed with a construction company were killed and three local workers sustained injuries when AOG attacked a new ANP checkpoint under construction.

Operation Omeide 8 concluded in Mohammad Agha. Zarghun Shahr continued to attract the majority of incidents and witnessed five escalations in the span of five days, including a close-range attack on a joint ANP/NDS convoy which resulted in two casualties among the security force. The IMF-ANSF plans to establish a joint ANP-ANA base in the area will likely stimulate further AOG activity, the home turf to HIG networks. Criminal syndicates present another actor in play in Zarghun Shahr, though these rather tend to avoid confrontation with IMF-ANSF, and the recent



case of a criminal abduction of a young boy in Qutubkhel (a location in Puli Alam linked by a direct road to Zarghun Shahr) was likely the job of a group temporarily dislodged from Zarghun Shahr. The frustration of local communities in reaction to the perceived resurgence of criminal abductions north of Puli Alam was also picked up by the IEA who released an official statement praising its Logar units for tracking down and punishing the criminals (the veracity of these allegations is yet to be confirmed).

A brief look at the geographic distribution of the mentioned developments indicates that besides the road network in Baraki Barak, the joint Muhammad Agha-Azra area (incl. northern Khushi) has emerged as a focal area this summer, a development which highlights the importance of the infiltration routes from Pakistan.

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the **13th of July 2011.**

KAPISA


Tagab remains the focal area in Kapisa. So far this year, the district has hosted the second highest number of AOG-incidents in Central (after Saydabad in Wardak, though the gap between the two higher than the actual number of incidents in Tagab). This cycle, the district hosted 11 out of 13 incidents recorded in the province. A BM-1 rocket attack launched against a private residence in Nijrab (presumably an escalation of a dispute between two families and unrelated to the political conflict) and an RCIED detonation against an NDS vehicle in Shukhi (Mahmudi Raqi - Nijrab Road) were the only outliers, the rest pertaining to escalations in Tagab. These included 7 AOG attacks (1 BBIED, 5 SAF, and 2 IED detonations), 3 IED discoveries by IMF & ANSF and an IMF night-time operation in Sultankhel (days after the BBIED attack). Of note to NGOs, all the mentioned incidents took place on the main roads and within a short distance from major population centers.

The developments took a dramatic turn with a surprise visit by the French President on 12 July, which was followed the next day by a lethal BBIED attack against French troops halted at a police checkpoint in Joybar (Tagab).

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

The attack resulted in at least 9 IMF casualties (incl. 5 killed), the second heaviest toll among the French forces since the ambush in the Uzbin Valley of Surobi in August 2009. The strike also marked the second suicide attack against French IMF in the district this year. Despite the rare utilization of a BBIED, targeting has stayed in line with the long-term trend of AOG focusing on IMF (over 50% of AOG attacks in Tagab clearly targeted IMF this year; compared to 20% for ANP and over 10% each for ANA and GOA militias/ALP).

Indeed, an increased willingness on the side of AOG to take up the fight was noticed in Tagab. It is noteworthy that the community often attributed this 'AOG boost of confidence' to the rumoured deal in relation to the release of the two French journalists during the previous two weeks. Reportedly, 2 AOG commanders and an additional 8 fighters were set free by GOA in exchange for the captives. Disregarding where the truth actually lies, the belief that the release of French prisoners thru negotiations with AOG was seen locally as a victory of AOG over GOA & IMF. In more concrete terms, the steady flow of opposition fighters and the ease



with which AOG operate in their known strongholds provide grounds to assume that the opposition networks have returned in strength to the areas where extensive IMF-ANSF operations took place earlier this year.

The current statistics indicate a continued growth in AOG-initiated attacks in Tagab, while this year's AOG volumes are similar to those recorded in 2010). AOG also kept pace with IMF-ANSF operations (over 40 entries on each side since January 2011, though it is assumed that a fair deal of IMF special operations go unreported). This leaves a grim projection for GOA/IMF efforts in the future as AOG continue to pursue a campaign which has proved effective for the last decade of the conflict (that is 'a perpetually escalating stalemate', ref. to the ANSO Quarterly Report 2/2011). Meanwhile, the French military, the pivotal component of GOA military efforts on the ground, have announced the beginning of their withdrawal process, with a quarter of the current troops slated to exit before the end of 2012, and the remainder before the end of 2014. Whereas the AOG appear to have the resources readily available to stay the course, IMF are wholly focusing their plans around the abilities of the ANSF post-transition and withdrawal.


WARDAK

AOG incident volumes remained relatively high in Wardak, with the Saydabad section of the Kabul – Ghazni Highway attracting two thirds of all AOG escalations in the province (17 out of 26). AOG activity volumes in Saydabad indeed returned back to an upward trend after the drop recorded throughout June (15 AOG attacks compared to 32 in May). An SVBIED strike against the military base in Dashte Towp on 13 July went almost unnoticed as the strike occurred one day after the killing of Ahmad Wali Karzai in Kandahar. The device involved a substantial charge rigged in a Mazda truck, though did not create any significant impact besides the injuries to two ANA soldiers as the base protection personnel positively identified and killed the driver when the truck was still some 20m before the main entry

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

point. Since the opening of the ANA-ANP Training Center in Dashte Towp, the base has attracted 11 attacks (mostly IDF). For instance, an IDF attack was launched on 15 June, occurring a few hours after the official inauguration ceremony concluded inside the base with numerous IMF and GOA VIPs in attendance (including the vice-president).

The 12 remaining AOG attacks in Saydabad this cycle were also concentrated on the Kabul – Ghazni Highway. Overall, the attacks were equally split between close-range (7 cases of SAF against fuel tankers/PSCs and ANSF vehicles, 1 arson attack on telecom infrastructure) and stand-off strikes (two IDF attacks in Dashte Towp, five effective IED strikes in addition to one premature detonation). AOG volumes in the other



districts remained low, though they outnumbered (Nirakh, Jalrez) or stayed on par with ANSF-IMF interventions (Maidan Shahr, Chaki Wardak, Day Mirdad).

In Behsud I and II, Kuchi families commenced to withdraw (most notably from Tezak), a development likely due to the deployment of ANA following the spate of violence four weeks ago. The two districts remained devoid of security incidents and it may be assumed that the area will slowly continue to normalize. However, the underlying roots of the crisis have yet to be addressed and the Kuchi/Hazara clashes over access to land and water will certainly re-emerge with the migration cycle next year.

BAMYAN


Following the AOG surge in Ghorband, ANP in this province have been frequently tasked with performing search operations in the Shikary and Ghandak valleys of Shibar. This cycle, one such operation yielded four AP mines recovered from an old cache though there is no hard evidence to indicate that the district would host a significant AOG network or that exogenous AOG would transit thru the area with any regularity.

With the exception of AOG night-letters distributed in Kahmard and Sayghan in mid-June (and more likely authored by a community leader rather than an active AOG, though the inspiration probably came from Parwan), the only physical AOG imprint in the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

province dates back to two escalations in Kahmard in April (a SAF engagement of ANP manning a checkpoint in Eshpushta and a light IED detonating against an IMF convoy in Do Ab Mikh Zarin).

In sum, Bamyan remains almost devoid of an AOG presence while the security forces head towards the transition ceremony announced for the last week of July. According to current projections, AOG activity will remain an important factor along the access routes via Baghlan, Parwan and Wardak. While the ability of the opposition networks to penetrate the province is minimal, Kahmard warrants attention as this district sporadically hosts an AOG pres-



ence.

Perhaps a more visible development than the transition process, the Hajigak iron reserves came to the fore as the GOA is soon to open the bidding process and several Indian companies have expressed interest. There is unlikely to be any direct impact on the security context as the experience from Mes Aynak in Logar indicates that large projects, even those associated with GOA, do not necessarily become an important target even if located within areas where AOG maintain a heavy presence.

DAYKUNDI

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0


Incident volumes continue to remain low in Daykundi. This attests to the pervasive isolation of the province as the structural causes of insecurity remain in place. Criminality and violent escalations driven by local warlords continue to shape the environment in the north, while the political conflict occasionally spills into the southern districts of Kajran and Gizab. During this cycle, ANP clashed with a local warlord in Khadir while three security incidents were reported from the south.

A Bollywood-style scenario rolled out in the village of Karas (Korga Ulya Area of Khadir) in the end of June. A local warlord (based in Quli Khushk and heading a splinter group of gunmen formerly loyal to Sipah Pasdaran) appeared in the area, pressurizing the local community to financially support his two dozen men at arms in exchange for ‘protection’. When the community failed to deliver, the commander and his men appeared in the village in the morning of 1 July, ready to loot. An ANP unit arrived to the loca-

tion and engaged the group and the police force ousted the attackers but paid a heavy toll with one serviceman killed and one injured during the operation. The armed group remains at large.

In Kajran, an ANP patrol located two pressure-plate IEDs in Kafter Khana on the road to Kiti on 7 July. Since the beginning of this year, 12 IED incidents have been recorded in Kajran and Gizab combined, with three cases resulting in detonations. Besides two strikes against NDS and IMF, one pressure-plate device detonated against a civilian vehicle in Gizab, killing two and injuring another passenger. Occasional IED activity is an expression of AOG networks facilitating their passage between Ghazni and the battlefields in the south (Uruzgan, Kandahar, and Helmand).

On 11 July, IMF announced the seizure of a substantial cache including 900 kg of opium and an assortment of weapons and ammunition in Kajran. While one can draw casual correlations between insecurity and the opium



trade, the documented cases of ANSF-IMF disrupting the drug business in Daykundi are rare. Five such cases have been captured by ANSO since 2006 (2 in Shahristan, 1 in Gizab, Kiti and Kajran each). In counter-point, the amounts of opium seized (3 seizures yielded between 50 and 150 kg and 2 seizures were above 400 kg) indicate that the business runs large-scale across the province. Closing the portfolio, an IMF-ANSF operation in Omerkel of Gizab resulted in the arrest of two suspected AOG members on 10 July. Overall, the ramifications of the conflict in the south are quite seasonal and culminate with the passage of AOG in the late spring and late autumn. The summer months will likely remain quiet in Daykundi unless a new development (for instance a concerted IMF push in the adjacent districts of Helmand or Uruzgan) creates an incentive for AOG to relocate upwards to Daykundi.

PANJSHIR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

While a rare NGO incident was recorded this cycle in Anaba, the case was less significant than a dispute which escalated into a shoot-out between an off-duty NDS officer and an IMF unit in Dara.

In the late evening hours of 28 June, an unidentified attacker threw a light IED over the boundary wall into an NGO compound. The device failed to initiate and was safely disposed of. There were no concrete claims or threats linked to the case and the NGO draws on a long-established presence and high acceptance levels of its programming locally. Looking deeper into the valley where the power-centers are concentrated, ‘warning’ IEDs and hand grenades are not unusual (especially in Rukha and Bazarak) with a total eleven such cases rec-

orded in the province since 2006. These were mostly linked to clan-driven power-struggles or personal issues (involving local politics or business interests), and do not have direct relationship with the main conflict vectors.

In the morning of 9 July, a uniformed NDS member, who served as a bodyguard of a high-ranking NDS officer in Kabul, approached an IMF detail stationed on the side of the road in Dara. A verbal dispute ensued shortly afterwards which ended with the NDS officer drawing his gun and opening fire on his IMF interlocutors. Two IMF were killed and another serviceman sustained injuries, though he also managed to shoot and kill the attacker. Most sources agree that the escalation resulted from a

spontaneous reaction of the NDS officer.

Of note, the incident marked a third violent escalation recorded between the community and an IMF element this year. While some NGO observers have noted a growing gap between the more conservative circles of Panjshiri and the IMF contingent, most sources agree that the more likely explanation of the attack was to be sought in the subjective postures and behaviours of the two parties. In this regard, the incident is reminiscent of the April shoot-out at KAIA, which turned fatal for an Afghan pilot and nine international mentors.

Nonetheless, the province steadily progresses towards transition and an inauguration ceremony has been slated for the last week of July. As per the current assessment, AOG ability to penetrate the province is minimal and local circles cultivate the legacy of strong opposition to their historical rivals. The Panjshiris also maintain a comfortable level of influence inside the GOA and ANSF, which does not make them likely to abandon their ties to this important resource base anytime in the near future.

PARWAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Ghorband remained in the fore with two AOG attacks (Baghe Afghan on the Bamyān Road, and Dara Khishki in Siyagerd) while the IEA structures have been further consolidated with the appointment of District Shadow Governors in Shinwari (a commander originally based in Kohi Safi) and Siyagerd (a local mullah from Wazghar). The Kohi Safi-Shinwari linkage is of interest as the personal relationships among the domestic networks may translate into a further boost of AOG capacities in Ghorband, until now rather dependent on the cross-border cooperation with networks in Baghlan and Wardak. With the Provincial Shadow Governor and a District Shadow Governor for Kohi Safi already in place, the IEA structures in Parwan seem to have emerged in strength this summer, although the overall incident volumes remain low. Elsewhere, the cycle experienced five typical IDF attacks against the military bases in Chaharikar and Bagram, as well as a rare case of an RCIED neutralized in Anarak (Jabalussaraj). ANP-IMF performed two arrest operations targeting suspected AOG supporters

in Doab, Siyagerd and Toghbirdi, Chaharikar.

In the night of 5 July, a civilian Azerbaijani plane contracted by IMF crashed in the mountains of Siyagerd with 9 crew members aboard. The circumstances of the crash have not been determined, though an AOG implication does not appear plausible. The following day, ANP sent a sizeable expeditionary force to assess the location and while on their way back to Chaharikar, the convoy of over 70 ANP members came under SAF/RPG attack in Baghe Afghan, a locality on the Bamyān Road which is easily accessible from AOG strongholds in northern Shinwari. While the attack failed and 11 AOG members were captured by the force, AOG nevertheless once again demonstrated confidence in their ability to deal with the police forces (even one of this size) in the district.

In counter-point, IMF & ANSF placed efforts in touring the villages in Siyagerd in order to mobilize the communities against AOG. Towards the end of this cycle, AOG abducted and killed a



former HIG commander, who was facilitating the outreach of ANP in Dara Khishki. Since the beginning of 2011, 6 cases of abductions & killings have been recorded in the valley, making it a prominent AOG TTP. Of note, this type of activity is on par with the number of stand-off attacks – IEDs or IDF, while the close-range attacks (typically SAF and/or RPGs) prevail with 9 cases (38% of all attacks).

Two criminal incidents also raised attention this cycle. In Chaharikar, a driver employed with a private development organization (PDO) escalated a personal dispute and killed a fellow driver from the same organization. In Senjed Dara, a local commander turned entrepreneur invited two fellow businessmen into his private residence to discuss a land acquisition deal. The negotiations seemingly did not quite work out, as the commander pulled his gun and shot both interlocutors dead, himself receiving a gunshot injury in his thigh in the melee.

NORTHERN REGION

BALKH

With the (mostly ceremonial) transition of security in Mazar from ISAF to GOA set to occur later this month (anticipated for July 23rd though is subject to change with little notice), questions have risen as to what immediate and/or lasting effects this may have on the security paradigm. While it remains unclear whether or not a ceremony will take place commemorating the shift (a ceremony would potentially create a short term security risk, but also mean a likely boost in security forces), in actuality, Mazar has been primarily under GOA security for an extensive period, and the transition is merely political. However, the transition period opens a window to AOGs who may wish to attempt a statement action, though this window would be partially mitigated by a corresponding surge in security forces. In short, while the overall composition of security forces within Mazar will not witness any significant change, the probability that AOGs may attempt a high profile attack before, during, or directly following the transition should be considered increased.


This reporting period witnessed IED explosions in Mazar and

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	1

Nahri Shahi, an ACG robbing vehicles in Khulm, and an IED discovery in Kaldar. These districts, usually deemed relatively “calm and stable”, have seen an unexpected spate of incident reporting.

Amongst these, Nahri Shahi saw the most significant surge. After anecdotal reports indicated that AOGs based in Shahrak Afghanistan (Nahri Shahi) were conducting operations as far north as Dawlat-abad, the district witnessed the targeted killing of a school headmaster (who was singled out and pulled from a vehicle to be executed), the armed stopping of an NGO vehicle, and an IED detonation on a pro-government militia commander’s vehicle (along the Sahrak – Mazar road). Prior to these 3 incidents there had been only 12 incidents in Nahri Shahi in 2011, and none of those prior to May had been AOG attributed.

In the NGO related incident, a bus transiting from Mazar, run and driven by an NGO, was stopped by armed men who asked the driver if the road ahead was clear. When the driver reported that it was, the armed men al-



lowed him to drive on unimpeded. This level of activity in Nahri Shahi represents a significant deviation from the previous level of insecurity, and while it remains unlikely that a well structured group capable of large operations is entrenched there, the situation should be monitored for further developments.

Mazar saw the 3rd IED detonation to occur this year (whereas only 1 occurred in 2010) and the 2nd within weeks. An IED detonated under a culvert at 0700 on the 4th, between Kartee Adalat and Yaka Toot, likely targeting the ANP chief of logistics who had just passed in an ANP Ranger. The appearance of 2 IEDs over such a short period in Mazar—where AOGs have had a difficult time moving such assets into the city in the past—is itself worth monitoring, especially as the possibility for a high profile incident (around the transition) approaches.

Insecurity continued in more traditionally volatile locations as well, but it was the increase in incident reporting in relatively calm areas (as noted above) that best demonstrated the overall trend of deteriorating security in Balkh. This trend is likely to continue through the summer.


KUNDUZ

This was an irregular reporting period for the most volatile province in the North, both in terms of volume and incident type. Kunduz registered only 17 security incidents this reporting period—a little over half of the usual average per reporting period this year—with 7 of them consisting of IMF initiated operations (3 in Chahar Dara and 3 in Archi). Further adding to this deviation, rather than the usual high volume of AOG initiated incidents (or IED discoveries), 3 of the 17 incidents consisted of clashes between rival Jamiat Pro-Government Militias (PGMs). Of note, all 3 of the inter-PGM clashes took place in Khanabad, but did not involve the same PGMs. This appears to suggest that relations between PGMs in Khanabad have temporarily fallen apart on a relatively broad level.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

AOG activity for the reporting period was limited to 1 clash between an AOG and a PGM (which only occurred after the PGM attempted to make an arrest), an RCIED detonation on an IMF EOD team, and 2 different IED discoveries made (Chahar Dara and Khanabad).

While trends towards relative insecurity in Chahar Dara (both AOG and IMF), Archi (IMF), and Khanabad (PGM) were notable, the scope and variety of incidents represented an outlier to the usual security paradigm, and demonstrates a similar trend to what was seen earlier this year in Baghlan, when Operation Nowruz activities were at their strongest. However, the strategic and sentimental importance of Kunduz make it unlikely that the province will see a long or significant lull in AOG



attacks such as Baghlan did, and it is more likely that this inactivity will end soon, with more asymmetric attacks to occur in the near future.

PGM vs PGM insecurity will be a trend worth monitoring in the Northeast, as there are a number of competing groups in Kunduz, and as mentioned here previously, the assassination of General Daoud (head of all police forces in the North), is especially significant among this population. Many PGMs (especially in the NE in Kunduz and Takhar) were only barely kept in line by General Daoud's strong presence, and it is likely that his death will continue to be most strongly felt in the loss of control over those important actors (as seen above in Khanabad).

BAGHLAN

Although witnessing only 14 incidents this reporting period, Baghlan continues to show signs of deteriorating security. The reporting of IMF operations that seemed to define the security paradigm during the first quarter has given way to reports of illegal checkpoints, attacks on fuel tankers, and IED detonations and discoveries.


In Puli Khumri a magnetic IED was attached to a bank vehicle (a Toyota Hi-Lux), and subsequently detonated on July 14th in the middle of the day (at approximately 1110 hrs), injuring 2 bank employees and 4 passer-by's, while in Baghlani Jadid, 2 IEDs were removed from Band Sang village on the 5th, and on the 8th, in Alaud-din Khil Area, an IED detonated

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

on an ANP vehicle injuring 3 ANP.

Fuel tankers were also targeted over the reporting period, with a fuel tanker receiving SAF along the Tala Wa Barfak – Dushi road on the 1st (at 1600), and another being set on fire on July 4th in Puli Khumri along the main road at approximately 0100 hrs in the morning.

Adding to the insecurity, 2 IEDs were found in Nahrin (1 on the 2nd and 1 on the 9th) both of them removed before detonating. Of note, these were the first IEDs recorded in Nahrin district since October of 2008, and local sources have suggested that they were the work of feuding power brokers rather than AOGs.



Lastly, prior to this reporting period (but only recorded during it), an ACG conducted an illegal checkpoint along a district road in Dih Salah on June 30th. While the variety of incident reporting shows few emerging trends, it appears that after a fairly extensive lull, Baghlan is witnessing a general increase in insecurity, especially IED activity and attacks on fuel tankers. As the season progresses, this trend is likely to continue and generally center around traditional hot spots (Baghlani Jadid and Puli Khumri) though more analysis will be required to complete the picture.

FARYAB

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0


In terms of reporting volume, Faryab surpassed even Kunduz this reporting period (partially due to the large number of incidents in Faryab, but also due to a relatively quiet reporting period in Kunduz), accounting for 26 total security incidents, with half of those 26 taking place in either Qaysar (8) and Dawlatabad (5).

Qaysar saw the full spectrum of incident reporting with rocket attacks, IED detonations and discoveries, illegal checkpoints (CPs), and attacks on ANP CPs. Standing out amongst these were the ones where the potential (or actualization) of civilian casualties were high. At 1800 on the 9th of July, an AOG shot an RPG at an ANP CP in Shakh village. The RPG missed the CP but impacted a local Mosque, where it injured 18 children who were praying there (1 of them was injured seriously, while the other 17 suffered minor injuries). Although no casualties were reported, AOG rocket attacks also occurred twice in the Chil Gazai Market area, showing a willingness in the district to engage in civilian heavy areas.

Other insecurity included 3 IED detonations and an illegal checkpoint along the Qaysar – Almar road.

Dawlatabad also continues to be a focal point for insecurity, especially notable around the main Andkhoy – Maymana road and/or for incidents occurring during the day. In all, Dawlatabad has now witnessed 15 security incidents over the past month and a half (June and the first half of July) which is practically equal to the 16 it witnessed over the entire first 5 months of the year. An exceptional 13 of those 31 incidents have occurred during the day.

5 of the above 15 incidents took place this reporting period, including 2 attacks on ANP CPs (both on the 1st), a daytime illegal CP on the 8th and the stoppage and burning of a gravel truck, including the abduction of the driver, on the 7th. All 4 of these occurred in the Jungal area, which has seen the most activity, partially due to the ease in which AOGs can conceal themselves and move amongst the low bush in this area.



The 5th incident took place on the 11th, in the Qozi Boy Qala Area, when an AOG attacked an ANP CP. Attacks against civilians in Dawlatabad (including the most recent abduction and the shooting of a rickshaw driver last reporting period) have increased with the surge in insecurity, although most of the daytime incidents have been directed against GOA/IMF security forces.

Outside of these 2 districts, insecurity elsewhere included notable incidents in Maymana City on the 3rd, when a grenade was thrown into a co-ed school at 1245 hrs, badly injuring 2 children (as well as causing minor injuries to 15 others), and an AOG rocket attack targeting the ANP HQ in the DAC of Khwaja Sabz Posh District at 0300 hours on the 9th. With the high number of AOGs continuing to move through Ghormach into the province, and the continued conflict in that area (Ghormach/Qaysar), insecurity is likely to continue in Qaysar, and subsequently throughout the province for the foreseeable future.

TAKHAR

This reporting period remained fairly indistinct for Takhar, other than the relatively high number of incidents that were recorded (17). The 17 incidents represent a total that was only duplicated once thus far in 2011, during the first reporting period in June. While incident reporting in Takhar has not demonstrated distinct patterns or problem areas (outside of predictable criminality in Taloqan), it has shown mild volume increments that are generally in line with region wide seasonal trends. Takhar is doubly effected by such trends, as it is potentially subject to both AOG activities and drug trafficking criminality that occurs during the drug harvest season. However, despite these potential issues, the true security paradigm for the province has remained relatively unchanged, with armed criminality remaining an existent but not prohibitive issue, and few districts witnessing any sustained AOG/GOA operations.


Of the 17 incidents this reporting period, 5 were attributed to ACGs and 4 to AOGs, with those latter 4 including an armed clash between 2 AOGs in Yangi Qala, the killing of the District Chief of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Intelligence in Khwaja Ghar (Qrogh Area), and an IED detonation in Rustaq (Sar-e Chawk Area).

The IED detonation is notable amongst these, as it marks only the 3rd security incident in Rustaq District this year, as well as the first to be AOG initiated since March 2010, and the first IED detonation since August 2006. However, no information has surfaced as to any other increased AOG activity in the district. In Yangi Qala District, specifically in Ishan Abad Village, 2 AOGs clashed on July 2nd, followed by an AOG/ANSF clash on the 5th, which led to the arrest of 2 AOG members on the 9th. Prior to this series of incidents, there had been only 8 security incidents of any type in this district over the previous 6 months, with none of them occurring in Ishan Abad Village. In both of the above districts, the incidents described bare noting—as they are outside of the existing security paradigms—but without follow up activity, appear to represent outliers rather than the establishment of new trends.

Of note elsewhere around the



province: Darqad District witnessed 2 separate ANSF operations on the 9th—1 in Kaltoot Village and 1 in Qul Abad Village—and an IMF air strike occurred near Nowabad Village on the 6th in Dashti Qala Distirct, where anecdotal reports suggest that IMF was targeting 3 AOG members who had recently arrived in the area to plant IEDs.

While the last 2 months have seen the average level of incident volumes rise slightly, these increases do not demonstrate specific location or category threats (such as a sudden spike in IED related incidents in any particular district might). As with most other provinces, some type of deterioration to security is expected during the summer, when AOGs are conducting more operations and drug trafficking crime is more prominent (Takhar is a drug harvesting and trafficking province, although less so than Badakhshan). In light of this, while it is likely that Takhar will continue to reflect some seasonal increases in AOG/ACG activity—as per the region—the general security paradigm remains relatively consistent at this time, with AOGs, the GOA, and IMF in the Northeast still primarily focused on Kunduz (and to a much lesser extent, Baghlan).

GRAPH INFORMATION:

The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the **13th of July 2011**. In addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not captured in this data.


JAWZJAN

Jawzjan saw a relatively low total volume of incident reporting this reporting period, with 10 security incidents total, 8 of those taking place in the strongly contested Tri-Provincial Area (TPA), including 7 in Qush Tapa and 1 in Darzab. Incident reporting eased up in the eastern districts of Jawzjan (Mardyan, Mingajik, Aqcha, and Fayzabad), where more activity had been recorded recently, as Operation Ebtakar 2 moved AOGs from their usual operational areas near the ring road further into the districts. This reporting period that portion of the province saw only 1 incident in Fayazabad, when an IED detonated on an ANP vehicle, killing 8 ANP on the 7th in Kokal Dash, and 1 in Mardyin, when 2 pressure cooker IEDs were discovered in a culvert in the Jungal Aareq village on the 10th.

Qush Tapa’s insecurity continues to be strongly defined by AOG initiatives against Pro-Government Militias (PGMs).

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

PGMs—as written about previously—present a physical threat to AOG control in the stronghold, but more importantly also draw from the same target population that AOGs draw from for much needed community support. The more PGMs the GOA can recruit in any area, the less easy it is for AOGs to find support in that same area. It remains in the best interest of AOGs to deter civilians from joining PGMs by showing them how dangerous it is for themselves and for their families. In that light, it is not surprising that amongst the 7 incidents in Qush Tapa, 6 were AOG attacks on PGMs or PGM family members, with the 7th being a PGM attack on an AOG position. Notable amongst these were 2 separate attacks on PGMs in Khanaqa Village, and the abduction and killing of a family member of a PGM in Abdul Rahman Pahlawan Village (where an AOG also attacked 2 PGM checkpoints). The



only incident to occur in Darzab was the detonation of a UXO. In light of the competition for resources, PGM vs AOG incident reporting in the AOG strong TPA is likely to continue to increase for the remainder of the summer “fighting season.”

Also of note, the 2 nationals (a driver and a translator) who were abducted along with 3 international engineers at a previously reported illegal checkpoint in Khwaja Du Koh District (28 June), were released on the 10th of July. Allegedly their families paid a ransom, and it has been suggested that the same group that took them has asked for a large ransom for the release of the internationals. The ransom request is unconfirmed, but if true, may suggest that this is the work of an ACG rather than an AOG. However, blurred lines and/or motives are common in these types of crimes, and further assessment of the actors and their intentions are required.


SAMANGAN

The willful destruction of a GOA contracted water tanker in Hazrati Sultan District (Chochman Village) was the most notable incident in the still quiet province of Samangan this reporting period, with conflicting views on whether the tanker was destroyed by AOGs or ACGs with no proof to clarify yet existent.

That incident aside, Samangan saw a total of 3 incidents, including a UXO detonation in Maqsood Village in Dara-I Suf Payin, which injured 3 shepherds.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Looking more closely at Dara-I Suf Payin, multiple unconfirmed reports surfaced that AOGs were laying IEDs along the Aybak – Dara-I Suf Payin road, with a number of NGOs and GOA officials remarking that the road from Mazar through Sholgara/Kishinde (Balkh) to Dara-I Suf Payin remains the safer route. It is believed that the group in Dara-I Suf Payin is working with less power and infrastructure than it had previously, and—despite strong rumors of outsiders in their



midst—the majority of sources in the field have remarked that the groups in this district remain comprised mostly of locals. However, the above somewhat conflicts with earlier reports, and alternative opinions still exist. Further assessment as to the structure and ability of the AOGs in Dara-I Su Payin will be required going forward.

SAR-E PUL


Sar-e Pul’s security paradigm this reporting period was mostly dominated by issues between AOGs and Pro-Government Militias (PGMs), and the threat of illegal checkpoints along the main Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan Road. 7 of the 14 incidents in the province took place inside the district of Sar-e Pul, including 2 illegal checkpoints along the above stretch of road on the 4th and 14th. Of specific note, both of these checkpoints took place during daytime hours (0900 hrs on the 4th, and 1030 hrs on the 14th), which is during NGO travel times and shows the comfort level of AOGs operating there to conduct activities in broad daylight.

Although this road has seen a total of 13 successful illegal checkpoints (averaging exactly 2 a month), the volume-per-month has fluctuated, with July and August tending to be more active, so further increases may be on the near horizon. So far July has already seen 2 illegal checkpoints in the first 2 weeks, with the possi-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

bility that the road will see more over the latter 2 as insecurity continues to increase. This stretch of road is generally considered one of the least secure in the North thus far in 2011, although over the past 7 weeks, Dawlatabad District in Faryab has seen more recorded insecurity. Contrasting the 2 districts, Dawlatabad in Faryab has seen less day light illegal checkpoints (although more daylight incidents), while in Sar-e Pul, AOGs have stuck primarily (although not entirely) to conducting illegal checkpoints, and have shown at times a high level of intelligence gathering and spotting, allowing them to identify and stop specific targets (such as GOA officials or businessmen) en route—even during the day. The road between Sar-e Pul and Shibirghan has also seen 2 abductions, and 3 attempted checkpoints, plus various skirmishes.

The other source of major insecurity this reporting period consisted of issues between AOGs and



PGMs. In Panjshir Village in Sar-e Pul, AOGs twice attacked PGM checkpoints (CPs) on different nights, making up 2 of the 5 AOG attacks on PGM CPs this reporting period (the others occurring in Kohistanat (Sardara and Tangi Afghan Villages) and Sayyad (where twice AOGs attacked 3 PGM CPs simultaneously in Pistamazar Village)).

As noted in the Jawzjan section, in areas under strong AOG influence, PGMs put themselves in direct physical competition with AOGs, not only for security, but for influence over the local communities, from which they both draw support and recruit from. Aqso Village in Sayyad twice witnessed these issues when on the 12th, 1 PGM member left the PGM to join an AOG, and then afterwards, 2 others tried to follow suit but were arrested. PGM vs AOG dynamics in the Tri-Provincial Area (TPA)—which includes Sayyad—are likely to continue to create strong instability in Sar-e Pul Province for the remainder of the fighting season and beyond.

BADAKHSHAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1


With the drug harvest in season, it is no surprise that Baharak and Warduj, 2 eastern districts situated along the main drug trafficking route that links Badakhshan to Tajikistan, remained the epicentre for insecurity in Badakhshan this reporting period. Baharak, following the replacement of the District Chief of Police, has been perhaps the most volatile district in the province this year, and Warduj has seen a spike in activity that has corresponded with the harvest.

In Baharak, the hurling of a grenade into an INGO office at approximately 2115 hrs on the 11th accounted for this year's 5th NGO related incident in the district, and the 7th in the province. With many of these incidents following a similar modus operandi (grenade, IED, missile attack on an NGO compound or living residence in the District Administrative Center (DAC)), it appears to be a relatively common aspect of the landscape for the district. These fit the greater overall trend of general violence throughout the DAC, where 18 of the district's 25 incidents have taken

place. This particular incident was followed 10 minutes later by a grenade thrown into the prison approximately a kilometre away.

Other random violence in Baharak included a missile/SAF attack on a civilian vehicle the same day, which caused injuries to 2 local civilians. Security in the district is not expected to get better until the animosity between the ACG responsible for these attacks and the GOA can be amended (either through deals or conflict), and insecurity is likely to continue at these levels for the duration of the drug season, when the importance of controlling criminal activities in the district is at its most crucial (lucrative). However, insecurity has mostly attempted to intimidate, and has caused very few casualties to this point.

Also tied to the drug season and the lucrative nature of controlling the trafficking routes, insecurity increased in Warduj (just bordering Baharak and along the same trafficking route). This first manifested when a group set up an illegal checkpoint along the main road (Baharak – Ishkashim, part of



said trafficking route) on the 3rd, where vehicle were supposedly searched for GOA/ANSF employees. After that, anecdotal reports suggest that the GOA approached elders to speak with the AOG and ask them not to establish illegal checkpoints. When the elders met with the AOG, the AOG demanded a number of concessions which the elders were unable to fulfill.

Issues continued in the district, with rumors surfacing of IEDs being laid on the road, and one incident in which a teacher was shot and killed by an AOG on the 11th. This resulted in a large ANSF force of over 250 entering the area on the 12th to seek out the AOG in an operation that would go on for over 2 days. The main road was blocked off by ANSF as they went into the Bashund Area (where much of the instability had occurred) and engaged in a 3 hour firefight that ended with ANSF attempting to track the AOG through the mountains around the area (Khirman). The lasting effect of this large scale operation remains unknown, as that portion of the trafficking route is likely to remain heavily contested.

WESTERN REGION


HERAT

Once again, there was no reported AOG activity in Herat City this period while there were five criminal events. This indicates a volume of criminal activity consistent with longer term trends following a reduction in ANSF activity levels this period. The recent surge in security force activity, while partially in response to the attack against the PRT, was also likely linked to the pending transition of Herat to ANSF control slated to take place in the coming weeks.

At the provincial level, AOG continue to concentrate their activity in the northern and southern dis-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

tricts, particularly Kushk and Shindand. During this reporting period 75% of the total incidents in these districts happened while the affected parties were in transit, and 86% of the total attacks were conducted with IED or SAF. For instance, 2 out of 3 AOG attacks in Shindand District and 3 out of 4 in Kushk occurred against IMF convoys and ANA patrolling vehicles. As a result of these attacks a total of 1 IMF soldier and 7 ANA soldiers were killed and a further 1 IMF soldier and 4 ANA soldiers



were wounded. In addition, 9 fuel tankers were also destroyed.

Overall, these cases further trends identifying that AOG activity is primarily concentrated in the northern and southern districts along major roads used by IMF/ANSF for patrolling and logistical resupply. In addition, the use of IED and SAF is likely to remain the primary tactics for AOG in targeting the same.


GHOR

While the total number of AOG attacks during the first 6 months of this year is similar to that of the last year, the data indicates that the areas of AOG activity has gradually been shifting. While there is an apparent decline of AOG action in Du Layna (from 4 to 0), Passaband (from 12 to 2), and Saghar (from 4 to 0) Districts, the number of AOG related incidents has risen in Charsada (from 2 to 6), Shahrak (from 1 to 5), Taywara (from 1 to 7), and Tulak (from 1 to 4). Among these changes, the sharp decline of AOG activity in Passaband District is noticeable since it had been an area where AOG were traditionally most active in the prov-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	0

ince, primarily due to the districts proximity to Helmand and the AOG networks active there. The cause of this shifting is unclear at this time, as there have been no major IMF/ANSF operation reported thus far this year. However, as seen in the increase of AOG activity in Tulak, Taywara, and Shahrak districts, there is a possibility that some of the AOG elements from Passaband District have moved into these neighbouring districts.

Regarding NGO incidents, while the period of the first 6 months of the last year recorded only 3 NGO incidents, there have been a total of 12 NGO incidents thus



far this year. There appears to be some correlation between the geographical shift of AOG activity in the province and NGO incidents volumes. Among 12 NGO incidents this year, 50% was authored by AOG, and 67% of these have occurred in the 4 districts (i.e. Charsada, Shahrak, Taywara, and Tulak districts) where AOG activity levels have increased. The data also indicates that NGOs were primarily affected while in transit: 3 out of 6 AOG related NGO incidents that happened this year have involved AOG use of roadblock/searches.


FARAH

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	2

During this reporting period, there were two mass abduction incidents, both AOG attributed, and which involved NGO staff. The first and most significant incident involved the abduction of 31 demining NGO staff members in Bala Buluk District on the 6th of July. The AOG subsequently killed 4 of the staff (and apparently targeting the leadership of the group) while the remaining were released in Bakwa District a few days later. While the exact motives behind this event are not entirely clear at present, there are indicators that the AOG responsible was dissatisfied with some aspect of organisations activities. In the second case, AOG abducted up to 35 locals in Gulistan District, with one NGO staff mem-

ber amongst them, on the 10th of July 2011. Based on an accusation made by the AOG, the abductees were perceived as collaborators with the GOA and it would appear that the NGO staff member was only incidentally involved in the incident. The NGO staff member, along with 2 other abductees were released, on the 14th following vigorous questioning.

These cases mark the first NGO incidents in this province since November 2009 when two NGO staff members were kidnapped while in transit in Khaki Safed District. Although it is not clear at this moment what caused these two incidents almost simultaneously, there could be a correlation between them and the change in



the pattern of the AOG presence in this province. In comparison between the first of this year to the last, AOG activity has increased in Bala Buluk (from 22 to 36), Khaki Safed (from 9 to 16), Pusht Rod (from 21 to 41), and Qala-I-Kah (from 0 to 6) Districts while Bakwa District has remained consistently unstable (18 AOG incidents recorded). These two events occurred in the central districts (i.e. Bala Buluk and Bakwa districts), where most AOG activities have been concentrated this year. While these two incidents alone are not sufficient to establish trends, it does suggest that there exists an increased risk of abduction in the central districts, at least in the short term.


BADGHIS

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Compared to the period of the first half of the last year, AOG activity in Badghis Province has increased nearly 21% while at the district level; there has also been a change in the pattern of AOG presence. The data indicates that Qadis District has hosted the sharpest increase of the number of AOG attacks from 9 to 35 (constituting a 290% increase), while there has been a 35% drop in Muqur District. Increases in IMF/ANSF operations in Muqur

could be one of factors which contribute to the change of the pattern this year as it was previously reported that AOG moved from Muqur into Qadis due to these operations, while other factors, such as a change in AOG leadership and AOG involvement in the APRP may also be contributing.

While there have been geographical changes, there has been little change in tactics and targeting.



Targets of AOG attacks are continuously focused to IMF/ANSF and the use of IEDs and SAFs still remain a common tactic for AOG, as 80% of the total AOG attacks this year were IEDs or SAF against IMF/ANSF.

EASTERN REGION

NANGARHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	1


The sole NGO incident in this reporting period occurred in Kot district, when IMF searched and interrogated doctors in an NGO clinic on suspicion of treating injured AOG fighters, as well as accusing them of storing weapons for AOG fighters – which were not found upon inspection of the facility – before warning them they would return if they found evidence of such activity in the future.

That AOGs were not responsible for this NGO incident is indicative of the broader security picture of Nangarhar during the period, where AOG-initiated activities continued the June trend of significant decline. With only 12 this period, if next period's AOG-initiated incident volumes continue in this vein, July would represent a decline of more than a third over June's levels, and nearly a quarter of May's peak. To illustrate, Jalalabad City witnessed only a single IED discovery on the morning of the 13th, when an IED was discovered and defused at the perimeter of the provincial ANP HQ. The reasons behind this unexpected calm can only be speculated about, with the theory that Nangarhar's AOG command are re-assessing their provincial strategy after some significant IMF-led setbacks the most likely explanation; a reported recent reshuffle of a number of District Shadow Governors is consistent with this. However, whatever the reasons it is likely that, with Ramadan due to arrive, this calm is

likely to continue until early September.

The southwest of the province represents the only part of Nangarhar that recorded significant AOG presence and kinetic engagements between IMF and AOGs. After a large infiltration of Afghan and Pakistani AOG fighters into the southern parts of Khogyani and Sherzad on July 3rd, IMF combined air and ground operations the following day in Khogyani's Balalkhel area killed 30 of the fighters, including one of their commanders and the Hisarak District Shadow Governor, while other operations in Memla and Markikhel killed 2 and arrested 5 in the same week. With many of the newly arrived fighters reported to have returned back to Kurram Agency after the IMF operation, it can be said that the IMF presence in these districts is bearing fruit in preventing a return to the heavily AOG-dominated local environment seen in late 2010, in spite of the impossibility at full prevention of infiltration. However, in demonstration of the continued AOG presence, gunmen attacked the former Khogyani DG in the Pirakhel area, while an IED struck a private vehicle and killed one in the Grabawa area of Khogyani. Two mobile antennas were also struck by grenades in Memla and Hakimabad.

In the neighbouring districts of Hisarak and Surkh Rod, incidents were also limited; in the former



the only incident was the attempted RCIED assassination of the Hisarak District Governor in the main bazaar, while in the latter it was likewise restricted to a single IED against an ANA convoy in the Fatehabad area of the main Khogyani Road on July 10th, although two seemingly criminally-motivated killings of locals were also recorded.

In Chaparhar, an IEA stronghold, a girl's school was set on fire and partially destroyed, the third such incident in the past 2 months; locals see this as criminally motivated or at the behest of 'Pakistani elements', as the IEA in the region are known to have lifted their objection to this emotive social issue. And, further north on the southern outskirts of Jalalabad City, near to Chaparhar's northern district boundary, ANSF conducted raids on suspected AOG locations in Mawlawi Khalis Family Colony, the HIK township known to have been a staging point for AOG operations on the Ring Road and in the provincial capital; at the time of writing, the results of these raids remained unknown.

Along the northeast border with Mohmand Agency, on 13th July an ANBP vehicle was struck by an IED, killing 2 policemen. And finally, four separate artillery fire incidents were recorded in Goshta, each of which were reported to have come from Pakistani military forces across the border, and landing in Afghan territory – including one incident in the Anargay area, which was the site of a number of PakMil attacks on villages and an ANBP CP in February, March and May.

KUNAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	1

The only NGO incident recorded during this period in Kunar was an indirect one, where 4 informal labourers employed by the CDC of an NGO NSP project were accidentally killed in an IMF airstrike in Asmar district, after an IMF base in the area came under fire from the hillside upon which the labourers were constructing an irrigation channel. Civilian casualties are an unfortunately common feature of the conflict landscape in Kunar, from both the IMF and AOG sides.

More broadly, incident volumes remained similar to June levels, and as such down on the May peak; for AOG-initiated incidents, this drop is of the order of 40% from that month. Moreover, after the conclusion of the Wata Pur operation in late June, this period saw only 1 recorded IMF incident (beyond the above NGO incident), an airstrike on AOG locations in Nari in which two women were reported injured. Direct attacks remained the most prevalent form of AOG TTP, with Wata Pur recording the highest – 9 – focused on IMF facilities and the DAC, while an illegal CP was also established on the Manogai-Wata Pur road, in which an ANP officer was abducted, a further indi-

cation that the recent IMF clearing operations there only partially dented the AOG presence (which remains a mix between IEA and HIG).

Other areas that saw significant numbers of such direct attacks were Chawkay’s Gato Kala (3), Ghaziabad’s Shaheed Barily (2), Narang’s Ghulam Mohammad Khan Ghundy (4), Nari’s Sawo (4) and Sirkanay’s Yar Khan (2). The majority of these targeted ANP CPs and ANA OPs, and resulted in short, non-fatal exchanges of fire (apart from civilian collateral fatalities/injuries in a small number of them). Some, though, stood out, most notably the SAF attack on the Provincial Governor’s convoy in the Shen Korak area of Shegal, as he was returning to Asadabad – the fifth time the governor has been attacked since October 2010, and the fourth time when he was in transit – in a demonstration of the excellent information networks that the province’s opposition groups maintain about key province-level GOA officials. Another such attack that stood out occurred in Nari, where AOG fighters entered the house of an ANA officer, killing him and injuring his brother.



In respect to other notable incidents, perhaps the most significant was the abduction of the Ghaziabad District Governor in the Dabrora area of the district on July 1st; even more significant was the fact that he was released the following day, an unusual conclusion to such incidents in the eastern region. Of note, his captors were reported to have told him – a Ghaziabad native – that Ghaziabad belongs to Nuristan, and as such it should be relinquished to the non-Pashtun peoples of that province – significant because it appears to demonstrate that underneath much of the contemporary conflict in Kunar and Nuristan, historical tribal and geographical rivalries continue to exist, which are likely to become more pronounced as IMF numbers and the intensity of their activities decrease, as has already begun in Kunar.


Finally, Pakistani military shelling of Afghan territory continued, with multiple incidents being recorded across 4 districts, Khas Kunar, Dangam, Shegal and Asmar – with one fatality, a child, being recorded in Khas Kunar as a result.

NURISTAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Nuristan’s Gawardesh area – the key border crossing into Kamdesh District, and from there, into Bargi Matal and AOG-held Waygal – witnessed the most severe AOG assault on the ANBP positions there registered since the October 2010 beginning of a concerted AOG push against the ANBP in the valley. After IMF and supporting ANA withdrew from the area in late 2009/early 2010, ANBP positions had been established there to prevent such infiltration, and while AOGs, primarily IEA and allied Pakistani groups, skirmished with the ANBP there a number of times a month since October, the status quo had remained unchanged by these mostly inconsequential engagements. However, these latest clashes, beginning on July 5th, intensifying on the 6th and lasting until the 9th, stood outside the norm for the much greater numbers of combatants, heavier casualties, and capture of territory and CPs – and as such represents a clear AOG attempt to establish a firmer hold over this infiltration route. On the 6th, more than 100 AOG fighters engaged the ANBP CPs on the valley floor, killing 23

– and suffering 40 fatalities of their own, including 15 Pakistanis – as they overran at least 4 CPs and took land kilometres from the border. This also led to a dozen civilian deaths, and 7-10 local residences destroyed. After ANA assistance, both from their recently established facilities overlooking the valley floor and from air assets based elsewhere, the ANBP managed to take back their lost CPs and push the AOG fighters back towards the border late on the 6th and into the 7th. Moreover, the local communities, angry at the loss of life caused by the AOG-initiated fighting, decided on the 9th to actively oppose further cross-border infiltration. As such, when combined with what is likely to be a sustained period of heavier ANSF presence in the area, this period’s events can be seen to be something of a shot in the foot of the AOGs’ efforts to strengthen their ability to infiltrate into Kamdesh, a district already held by antagonistic, GOA-reconciled HIG leadership – perhaps even making their low-key passage through rural parts of the district more difficult.



Further north in the Bashgal valley, elevated threat reporting was registered concerning AOG movements into the area around the Bargi Matal DAC, where it appeared momentum was gathering on further attempts to take the DAC, after the unsuccessful attempts at the beginning of May, when ANA commandos raided a key camp and staging post in Awla Gul, and killed two dozen local and Pakistani fighters. However, after the unsuccessful operation in Kamdesh described above, it appears that AOG numbers in Bargi Matal have fallen again, perhaps as the groups in the broader eastern Nuristan area regroup.

Finally, after being reopened to civilians, the road to Wama was again temporarily blocked because of rivalries between Gosalak AOGs and a pro-GOA local leader in southern Wama. These local rivalries remain ongoing, but the road has again been opened to civilians, with each faction only giving trouble to those attempting to transit on the road that are allied with the other side.

KHOST

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0


Consistent with the broader regional pattern, Khost has also recorded a substantial drop in AOG-initiated conflict incidents during the first half of July, with slightly less than half the number recorded in the previous period – from 48 to 22. Khost City and its environs in particular saw the continued low level of incidents that began during last period, with just 11 registered, and only 3 AOG-initiated: two IED detonations with no resulting damage or casualties, one in the ANP hospital area, and an ill-advised attack on a parked container in the Durgi area, to which the family that owned it took exception – engaging and killing three AOG fighters in a firefight.

Sabari, which had witnessed a relative calm in the past two months after being the focus for provincial conflict over much of the past year, saw an increase in the number of incidents recorded there, although the majority continued to be in the form of IMF-ANSF operations (9), in which 32 AOG fighters were arrested. Just 6 AOG-initiated attacks were recorded; three IDF attacks that failed to hit their target, two IED detonations in the Kholbesat area, and the shooting dead of a civilian. As such, the IMF appear to have maintained the momentum they have had over the past 2 months, although currently in what seems primarily a pre-emptive manner. In neighbouring

Bak and Tere Zayi, just one AOG-initiated incident was recorded apiece, an IDF on the DAC in the former, causing minor building damage, and an IED in the latter’s Dabgee village, injuring a civilian. Also in Bak, IMF also conducted an airstrike, in which three locals were killed. In all, AOG activity in this formerly key trio of districts continues to be sharply lower than in winter and spring.

In the border districts of Tani and Gurbuz, IED emplacement remained a problem, but 5 of the 6 attempts at IED attacks were disrupted by the ANP, with just a single detonation in Gurbuz’s Borikhel village, injuring 4 ANBP policemen. In Tani one direct attack on the main district IMF base was also recorded, which was short and inconsequential, but a similar direct attack in Gurbuz’s Torkhabee area, on an ANSF patrol, led to the death of 4 AOG fighters.

In Shamal, two stand out incidents occurred. In the first, local villagers in the Zamaysa area attacked AOG fighters lying in wait to ambush IMF/ANSF convoy, killing 3 and injuring 3 others, who were then detained and handed over to the ANP for processing. Secondly, a July 6th IMF airstrike on a house in which AOG fighters were (correctly) believed to be located killed 11, including 6 women and children, which generated a protest by the



fellow villagers of the deceased the following day on the Khost-Gardez Highway, blocking it for 6 hours. These two incidents stand in interesting contrast to each other, in that the first is an excellent demonstration of the frequent opposition local communities can have to AOG activities, while the second is a salutary reminder that it is the civilian casualties resulting from anti-AOG operations by IMF that can degrade the same local support.

In Nadir Shah Kot, 3 of the 4 incidents that occurred did so in the Shambawoot village, all AOG-initiated. First, an IED struck an ANA vehicle on the 8th, and the following day, a local schoolteacher was beheaded by local AOG fighters. Three days later, AOG operatives attacked the house of a local doctor, killing a family member before ANA arrived and engaged the attackers, leading to the detention of 5 and the injury of two ANA soldiers. These unusual targets suggest that the AOG unit operating in this area may have a particularly ruthless commander, and NGOs operating there are advised to be aware of potential threats to their staff.

At the provincial level, while the Khost conflict environment remains unpredictable and fragile, AOG activities and IMF kinetic operations continue to be recorded at a significantly decreased level relative to the spring, although the province is far away from being considered on the way to a sustained reduction in violence.


LAGHMAN

The number of total conflict incidents, as well as AOG-initiated events, rose in Laghman over last period, although still a little below the May peak. Some of the most serious of these continued to be found in Qarghayi's Surkhakan area, where the two IEA units operating there out of the Torghar mountains, one of which is reported to have recently arrived from Azra, continued to engage in attacks and abductions. First, on July 1st they attacked the convoy of a tribal elder with SAF, killing two civilians and injuring 5 others – notable for occurring at 1400 hrs – while on the evening of July 8th in the Kheirokhel area, they abducted 5 civilians not known to be connected to the GOA as they were transiting the area in a Corolla, releasing one later. For broader Highway 7 security, therefore, the pattern of incidents over the past 6-8 weeks has indicated a shift in the focus for insecurity from Tangi Abrisham (although attacks still continue in that area,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

see Kabul provincial assessment) to the Surkhakan area.

However, perhaps the most serious incident that occurred did so in Alingar, Mango area, in which the Do Ab ANP Chief was abducted from his home village along with two bodyguards. Whether it was criminal or AOG-related is unknown, but from the details of the incident it appears well thought out and specifically targeted. Negotiations for his release are underway at the time of writing. Also in Alingar, AOG fighters established an illegal CP on a secondary road in the Sangar area, which ran unmolested for 24 hours as they searched vehicles for GOA employees before withdrawing to Nurgaram – an indication of the weak IMF and ANSF presence away from Alingar's main roads. Even the DAC area registered single IDF and IED attacks, unusual for the district. IMF did, however, conduct an operation in Alingar, Parwai area,



detaining 1 AOG operative, but it appears that AOG presence in the district has risen in the past month.

In Mehtarlam city, where the handover to ANSF-led security responsibility is underway, two IDF attacks occurred out of the Sultan Ghazi township fired in the general direction of the city, in each case damaging a house, while an IMF vehicle was targeted by an IED in the Pachakhel area. And in Alishing, Barow area saw one IED detonation against an IMF vehicle, and one IED discovery. Bad Pakh remained quiet. In all, then, the key loci of insecurity were Surkhakan and Alingar, with a slight increase in incident volumes across Laghman, although the province has fortunately been free of the high-profile suicide attacks and significant kinetic engagements that were recorded in the spring.

PAKTYA

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	1


Paktya saw one NGO incident during this period, in the form of a collateral damage event in Lija Mangal district DAC area. On July 6th, incoming mortar fire missed the GOA buildings and impacted in the vicinity of an NGO clinic, injuring two nurses. This came a day after AOG fighters attacked the same DAC facility with SAF and RPGs, withdrawing after an exchange of fire that injured an ANP officer and a civilian. This sort of event is an unfortunately common by-product of NGO facilities situated close to DACs across the region, particularly in rural districts.

More broadly, after the sharp upturn in AOG-initiated conflict incidents in May and June, the first half of July has seen a notable fall in these incidents, with just 23 this period compared with 43 in the second half of June, almost a 50% drop over last period's peak. Part of this appears attributable to an increase in ANSF numbers over the past two weeks, as well as their equipping with heavy weapons, but it is likely to also reflect the consequences of the PakMil operation in Kurram Agency, making it more difficult for AOGs – even those not being

targeted by the operation – to transit through that agency into Paktya.

In the restive southern zone of Zurmat, Wuza Zadran and Shwak, there were just 5 incidents, down 50% on last period. In Shwak just a single incident was recorded, a short ambush of an ANA convoy in the Sato Kandow area, while in Wuza Zadran AOG fighters mortared the district's IMF base, which drew an air response by the IMF; in the resulting airstrike, two AOG fighters were killed. In Zurmat, site of a half dozen IMF operations during last period, just 3 IED detonations were recorded; however, both those that occurred in the Sahak area led to security force deaths – the first killing 3 IMF soldiers and the second killing two ANA.

Gardez district, the secondary focus for conflict in the province, also registered a decline in conflict incidents. Notable incidents included one AOG SAF assault on an ANP convoy on the Kabul-Gardez Highway, and the distribution of nightletters in the Abdullah Kala village, warning locals against working with the GOA or IMF, and in the same village the



previous week an ANP vehicle was also targeted by an IED. Finally, AOG fighters unsuccessfully targeted an IMF helicopter with an RPG in the Momenkhel area. In neighbouring Sayed Karam, where much of the recent escalation in AOG-initiated violence was recorded, including last period's failed BBIED, just a single incident was recorded – an abduction of three civilians from the Kohseen area, but further insecurity can be expected in the district in the near future.

To the north of the province, Chamkanay and Dand wa Patan were both relatively quiet, with just a single incident in the former – albeit a serious incident, in which AOG fighters shot and killed two ANA soldiers travelling in a private vehicle in the Bagyar area. And in Jani Khel, where the conflict is focused upon the DAC area, only 3 incidents occurred in contrast to last period's 6; however, each one was of a serious nature, with an IED killing an ANP officer, another dying when AOG fighters attacked the DAC, and two further ANP being kidnapped from the private vehicle in which they were travelling.

SOUTHERN REGION


KANDAHAR

In Kandahar, after several weeks with no high profile media attracting security incidents, this reporting period saw several incidents of note, although connected to one specific event – the killing of the Head of Provincial Council, Ahmed Wali Karzai that occurred on 12 July. Ahmed Wali Karzai was killed with small arms fire by a trusted bodyguard inside his house with the perpetrator consequently shot and killed by another member of the security detail of the said official. While assassinations or targeted killings of ANSF or GoA personnel (generally by AOG) remain one of the most common features of the security paradigm in Kandahar City, the death of the Head of the Provincial Council (and close relative of President Karzai) marks one of the most significant high-profile assassinations thus far. While AOG were quick to take (as is usually the case in high profile incidents) the responsibility for the killing, the exact motive for the assassination remains unclear. Given the high profile, and at times controversial nature, of the victim as well his status as one of the key powerbrokers of both the province and region, other mo-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

tives (tribal or personal) explaining the impetus behind the incident should not be ruled out. The death of such a powerful person marks a significant change in the security paradigm in the region and also beyond, and will certainly leave a certain power vacuum in Kandahar. The subsequent appointment of Shah Wali Khan Karzai as a replacement Head of the Provincial Council marks an attempt to avoid this vacuum. However, at this stage there are numerous potential scenarios that can emerge following this incident, nonetheless NGOs should be attuned to possible changes in security dynamics in the area of their activities.

Although there were no reports of incidents directly associated with the burial ceremony that occurred on 13th July, in Karz area of Dand, an explosive device detonated in Maywand District while the convoy of the Helmand Governor and the NDS Chief was travelling on Highway 1 to participate in this ceremony. The officials escaped unharmed but two NDS employees were wounded. As frequently mentioned in ANSO reports, public gatherings or



ceremonies due to the presence of VIPs or officials remain opportunistic targets and as such should be avoided. This was highlighted on 14th July, when a single BBIED attacker managed to get access to the Red Mosque during a related commemoration ceremony for the deceased. As a result of the blast, besides the death of the attacker, four civilians were killed (including the Head of the Kandahar Ulema Shura) and an additional 17 persons were wounded. Although the account of casualties is significant, this number could have been worse as the attack occurred at the end of the ceremony when the mosque was less crowded.

In regards to the province as a whole, the threat picture remains consistent with the previous period. In the last fortnight the districts of Zhari, Panjwayi and Kandahar City bore the brunt of AOG activities, with IED emplacement being the AOG favoured tactics. On a different note, the first week of this reporting period marked the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Kandahar and the end of their combat mission in the country.

PAKTIKA


Similar to its northern neighbour Paktya, Paktika witnessed a slight drop in total incident numbers, after the peak reached in the second half of June, and returning more into line with levels recorded in the six weeks from the start of May until mid-June. However, even with this slight drop the province remains the most violent in the southeast, inclusive of Khost, Paktya and Zabul, both in terms of absolute number of conflict incidents and in terms of the levels of conflict fatalities recorded.

The Barmal-Urgun-Gayan trio of districts continued to be the central focus of AOG-initiated violence, with 30 of the 73 overall incidents recorded in their borders. More than 50% of these occurred in Barmal, and the majority took the form of IDF and SAF attacks on the IMF bases in Shkin and Margha. None of these led to recorded fatalities or injuries, although an AOG-ANBP firefight in Margha on the 7th did lead to 4 AOG and 2 ANBP deaths. Gayan saw a similar pattern, with 5 rocket attacks on the IMF base there. It also saw one occurrence of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

cross-border mortar shelling in the Lwari area, although it is unclear if this was an AOG incident or carried out by the PakMil, as has been occurring across the length of the border in recent weeks. In Urgun, finally, AOG fighters engaged IMF and ANSF in 3 separate firefights in the Shwai Kamar area, as well as rocketing the DAC. An armed clash between IMF and AOG fighters in the DAC area was also recorded on July 5th, wounding one soldier.

Elsewhere in the province, Dila stood out with two IDF attacks and an ambush of an IMF/ANSF patrol in the DAC area, which also saw an IED strike on an IMF vehicle that injured two soldiers. In Omna, unknown gunmen shot and killed a local mullah and former Paktika Shura head. This incident was similar to the shooting dead of the brother of the Laghman provincial governor in Waza Khwa district on the 4th, as well as a number of targeted assassinations of pro-GOA figures in recent months.



Finally from the AOG side, the IED campaign was held in partial check by security forces, disrupting 10 of the 18 attempted IED attacks, while of those 8 that did detonate, 3 struck tractors, killing and/or injuring civilians, 3 struck IMF vehicles, 1 prematurely detonated and 1 killed two ANA soldiers in an ANA vehicle in the Do Ab area of Sar Hawza. Of note was the absence, as in the rest of the border region, of any BBIED or VBIED attacks during this period.

Significant IMF operations were recorded in a number of districts: Mata Khan (3), Khair Kot (2), Sar Hawza (2), and one each in Gomal, Omna, Sarobi, Yosef Khel and the provincial capital Sharana. In all, across the operations, 7 AOG fighters were killed and 21 arrested, with a number of weapons caches also seized. While this signifies that Paktika remains the most kinetic area of IMF operations in the southeast, these figures are substantially down on previous months.

NEW SOUTHERN REGION RSA:

ANSO would like to welcome and introduce the newest member of the team, Mr. Volker Lankow. He is a welcome addition, coming to us with a wealth of experience from both the NGO community and Afghanistan. He will be taking over the responsibility for the South in the coming weeks and will be based in Kandahar City.


You will be able to contact him at south@afgnso.org or 0796 688 416

URUZGAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

In Uruzgan the overall volume in security incidents remained relatively consistent with the previous reporting period; though there was a slight decrease in the number of AOG initiated actions. It is worth noting that almost 60% of all incidents recorded across the province were related to IED emplacement, displaying a familiar pattern of tactics employed across the province. In the last fortnight the large majority of IED related incidents occurred in Chora and Tirin Kot districts. A notable incident took place on 12 July in the provincial capital -Tirin Kot City- where two RCIEDs placed in a ditch detonated one after the other against IMF/ANSF in front of a newly built ANP HQ. As a result, one civilian was killed and two other civilians along with one ANP official were wounded in the blasts. Subsequently, security forces located and defused a third

IED placed in the ditch on the opposite side of the first ones. Although the said attack did not cause significant damage or casualties to security forces, this two-fold IED strike seems to indicate the presence of sophisticated skills and availability of materiel to wage a continued IED campaign in the area. While the overall number of actual detonations was lower than last period, nonetheless IED assaults resulted in a significant number of casualties. In addition to the aforementioned incident, an IED strike targeting a civilian vehicle reported in Khas Uruzgan District on 11th July, caused 6 deaths (3 adults and 3 children) with five other passengers wounded. Prior to this, in Chora, a roadside IED struck an Afghan Local Police (ALP) vehicle, killing six ALP members and one civilian. AOG initiated direct attacks have



decreased as well in the last two weeks and were carried out on five different occasions. A noteworthy incident occurred on 5th July, when AOG attacked an ANP post located in the vicinity of the gate of Tirin Kot Airfield, wounding three ANP.

During the present cycle the AOG campaign of targeted killings were focused on Tirin Kot District. In three separate attacks conducted by AOG mobile 'hit teams' a total of four ANP and one ANA were wounded. On the ANSF/IMF side documented operations (6) were reported in Chora, Khas Uruzgan and Tirin Kot districts, resulting in seven AOG members killed, two wounded and nine arrested.

NIMROZ


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

In Nimroz Province the periods incident level was slightly increased when compared to the last. In parallel, IED emplacement and direct attacks – the two preferred AOG tactics in the province – showed an upward trend as well.

It is worth noting that a 6 month review of reveals that 67% of all recorded incidents in Nimroz occurred in Khash Rod, followed by Zaranj, Kang and Chahar Burjak. In the past two weeks Khash Rod continued to be volatile and accounted for the majority of incidents. A noteworthy incident was reported at the end of the last reporting period, highlighting the threat of collateral involvement for the local population due to the ongoing conflict. On 30th June in the afternoon, a local bus

struck a roadside IED while travelling on Khash Rod – Zaranj Main Road in Dehmazang area, killing 18 passengers and wounding 26 others. An additional two IED strikes were reported in Dlareem area, one against an IMF patrol and one against an ANP vehicle of note in Zaranj (Bazaar area). IED detonations in Zaranj District have so far been quite rare as the said incident is the third IED that detonated in the district this year.

AOG direct attacks were focused on the areas of Posht-e Hassan, Ghor Ghor and Dilaram (twice). The most significant took place in Ghor Ghor Town on 4 July when AOG attacked an ANP post with heavy weapons and SAF. The fire fight lasted for one hour, resulting



in five AOG members killed and one ANP wounded.

While IED and direct attacks remain the main AOG TTPs in the province, a rocket attack was also reported this period. On 3rd July, AOG fired four rockets against Ghor Ghor Town (Khash Rod) that landed in an open field. The incident marks the fourth IDF assault reported this year and the fourth to occur in Khash Rod District. Similar to last year's pattern, sporadic IDF attacks became an element of the 'spring offensive' as all incidents have been reported over the last three months.

HELMAND

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

An extremely high number of AOG direct attacks on ANP along with IED strikes against IMF mobile patrols constituted the main characteristic of the security environment in the past two weeks in Helmand. In this reporting period the geographical distribution of incidents followed previously established patterns, with the majority of AOG initiated incidents taking place in Nahri Sarraj, Sangin, Musa Qala and Marja districts.


Although the volume of AOG direct attacks reported throughout the province remained impressive, in the majority of cases these attacks did not involve casualties on either side. There were only two separate incidents that reported casualties, with one ANP injured and one AOG killed.

In the last two weeks at least 60 IEDs, mainly against IMF or joint IMF/ANP patrols (in addition to a further 62 discoveries/disposals which were reported across the province). Apart from the four ANP wounded in two separate

incidents in Nahri Sarraj and Nawa-i-Barak Zayi, civilians continued to be involved in IED incidents. In Shahbaz village of Kajaki District, two civilians were killed and another was wounded in an IED detonation, and in Nahri Sarraj another explosive device wounded two locals.

AOG indirect fire attacks are usually rare across the province when compared to the huge volume of direct and IED attacks. This reporting period five ineffective rocket attacks against IMF FOBs (Forward Operating Base) occurred in Naw Zad and Nahri Sarraj districts. In the latter district on 2nd July in Mirmandaw area, two AOG members riding on a motorcycle shot and killed a local Shura member in the vicinity of his house.

In Lashkar Gah City AOG continued to show efforts to assert their presence as the date of the official transition approaches. For instance, on 9th July, an IED placed in a parcel, detonated



prematurely in the vehicle parking lot of the ANP HQ, causing no casualties. The same day it was reported that in the bazaar area, a suspected AOG member wearing the uniform of a PSC guard, opened fire on a passing ANP vehicle wounding one ANP. He was consequently killed by other ANP elements.

Although Lashkar Gah City appears to be the most challenging area for the transition in the countrywide context, the process remains rather symbolic than actual as ANSF have been in defacto charge of security, as is the case in the majority of areas that have been chosen for the transition. The process is expected to be officially finalised by the end of July and a formal ceremony marking this symbolic date is likely to occur in the coming days. However, it will likely remain very low profile in order to lower the risk for potential AOG attacks.


ZABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Zabul has witnessed a drop in incidents this reporting period. A glance at current data shows that whereas AOG has scaled down their activities (with a decrease observed in both-direct attacks and IED incidents as compared to the previous period), ANSF/IMF has maintained a high tempo of operations throughout the province.

This reporting period AOG activities were focused, in particular on Shahjoy and Qalat districts. The most noteworthy incident in the last fortnight was reported from Qalat City, when on 9th July an attacker riding on a motorcycle targeted an ANP convoy carrying the COP in Bazaar area. While none of the official party sustained injury, casualties included

two killed (the attacker and a 12 year old boy who died of his wounds) and another eight civilians injured. The incident is the second involving a suicide attacker reported in Zabul Province this year. On 22 March, also in the Bazaar area of Qalat City, a suicide bomber riding on a motorcycle accidentally collided with a private vehicle before reaching its target. His explosive device detonated, killing himself and 1 civilian, and wounding another 13 civilians. Although the main AOG targets remain ANSF/IMF, it would appear that the authors of such attacks have little reluctance to carry out assaults in areas which may result in numerous civilian casualties, as seen in both instances this year.



The number of IED incidents decreased this reporting period, for a total of 16 IED related events across the province. However, the number of casualties associated with them was once again significant. On 2nd July in Zanzir area of Shamulzayi District a roadside IED detonated against a civilian vehicle, killing 11 occupants (5 men, 4 women and 2 children). In addition, on five other occasions ANSF/IMF and PSC vehicles were hit by roadside IEDs, resulting in 4 ANA soldiers and 2 PSC guards being killed, and 2 ANA and another 2 PSC guards wounded.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

GHAZNI


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

In the past two weeks the level of AOG activity reported from Ghazni showed signs of decrease. However, the province nonetheless witnessed the usual spate of AOG initiated direct and indirect attacks, IED strikes and intimidations. AOG direct attacks recorded this period were concentrated on ANP check posts, in particular in Ghazni District with 8 reported assaults and 4 in Qarabagh. Further AOG direct attacks were carried out against DACs across the province, some of them receiving multiple attacks. For instance, in the last fortnight the Andar and Ajristan DACs came under SAF and RPGs fire two and six times respectively.

In line with previous periods, AOG attacks along the Highway remained a distinctive feature of the security environment in Ghazni. Apart from ambushes on ANSF/IMF convoys, AOG appear to focus on disrupting IMF supply channels leading attacks on logistical convoys on at least nine different occasions. IMF logistical convoys in Qarabah, Gelan, Andar, Muqur, and Ghazni districts were attacked by AOG with SAF and RPGs. AOGs operating

in Ghazni frequently disengage rapidly during a fire fight while facing strictly military opponents, and employing ‘hit and run’ tactics rarely results in casualties. During this cycle, however, their attacks on ‘softer’ targets such as IMF logistical convoys appeared more efficient and resulted in numerous PSC casualties who escort these convoys.

In addition to multiple direct attacks, IED emplacement remains another AOG typical tactic in the province. This period at least 22 IED strikes were reported in Andar, Dih Yak and, in particular, in Ghazni district. On 1st July a premature detonation of an IED reported in Ganj area of Ghazni city resulted in one civilian wounded, however the most deadly incident took place in Pule-Bazak area of Qarabagh District where on 7th July, four ANA soldiers were killed when their vehicle struck a roadside IED. Besides IED emplacement, another inherent threat for the local population in Ghazni is related to indirect attacks. In the past two weeks at least 14 rocket or mortar attacks were reported in the prov-



ince with the Gelan DAC being the most frequent target along with Andar and Ajristan. Whereas a rocket attack against Ghazni city on 11th July was ineffective, on 1st July one child was killed and another three civilians (1 woman and 2 children) were wounded when another projectile impacted on their house in Ta-weed Abad village of Ghazni District.

This reporting period AOG attempts to intimidate locals from cooperating with the GOA continued in the DAC of Muqur, where on 12 July, AOG shot and killed a son of a local GoA employee. In two separate incidents- in Ajristan and Qarabagh -AOG also abducted two civilians over the accusation of having links with IMF/ANSF.

ANSF/IMF conducted at least 22 documented operations, a majority of them experienced in Andar, Dih Yak and Gelan districts. Whereas weapon and ammunition discoveries were rare, ANSF/IMF focused their efforts on AOG manpower employing air assets on several occasions and killing a significant number of AOG elements.

ACRONYMS:

Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.



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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **ANCOP**-Afghan National
Civil Order Police / **AOG**-
Armed Opposition Group /
APPF-Afghan Public Protection
Forces (local deputised mili-
tias) / **DC**-District Centre /
GOA-Government of Afghani-
stan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex:
mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Ex-
plosive Device / **RCIED**-Remote
or Radio Controlled IED / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device /
BBIED-Body Borne IED / **PDO**-
Private Development Organisa-
tion / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police
/ **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative /
IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani-
stan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial
Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-
District Shadow Governor (IEA)
/ **APRP**-Afghan Peace and Re-
integration Program

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

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