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THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Complex attacks within population centres
- Reduction/reorientation of ISAF within East
- Civilian casualties
- Numerous & diverse NGO incidents

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

The AOG focus on population centres noted in the previous period continued on into this one, providing for the defining dynamic of the month. While this activity has primarily involved suicide attacks, the complex attack within Jalalabad City (similar to Kandahar in the PRP) was the stand out event, due to both the number of casualties that resulted and level of sophistication. In addition, the suicide attacks in Khost (an apparent premature detonation), Kunduz, Faryab and Kandahar also incurred considerable casualty figures; with all these events denoting a greater ‘flexibility’ in AOG targeting definitions while resulting in high civilian casualty volumes. In the cases of Jalalabad, Faryab and Kunduz the locations targeted were civil structures, though the individuals within (the predetermined targets) could be loosely defined as ‘security forces’ or legitimate targets. However, these attacks have resulted in universal condemnation (including the IEA itself) and the negative implications on AOG acceptance may force greater restrictions on such efforts, though it nonetheless sets a troubling precedent early on in the year.

The issue of civilian casualties also came to the fore as a result of IMF operations, primarily from the Eastern Region. The great majority of these were the result of air strikes, and appear to be associated with the ongoing regional ‘reorientation’ of forces from such areas as the Pech Valley in Kunar towards the population centres, where it is felt a greater strategic impact can be achieved. These actions can be seen as part of the overall ISAF ‘population centric’ strategy, as seen in the South during *Operation Mushtarak* late last year; steps that also represent the early stages of the eventual transition to ANSF in the long term.

Thus far, the NGO presence in the West and South has remained unaffected with no incidents reported this year. In contrast, the East and North continue to report the vast majority of NGO incidents, accounting for 6 of the seven total events this period, bringing the months total to 11. The death of an NGO national staff member (the 3rd this year overall and the 2nd in the East) during the attack on the bank in Jala-

labad, though collateral, provides a sobering example of the pervasiveness of the conflict and the impact it can have on the most routine of activities. The theft of communication equipment in Faryab, along with the periods only Central incident in Kabul, served as reminders that criminality remains a universal concern for the community, no matter the context.

Helmand in the South has consistently recorded the highest comparative provincial incident volumes this year (Ghazni held this distinction in 2010), both from a regional and country perspective, with over 200 AOG incidents in February alone. Kunar, in the East, typically records the second highest, though Khost is closing in on this range. Wardak remains the most volatile province within Central, though Badghis surpasses it, also reporting the highest volumes in the West. Lastly, Faryab presents the highest volumes from a Northern perspective, surpassing such historically volatile areas as Kunduz.

CENTRAL REGION


KABUL

	NGO Incidents
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The early morning hours of Friday 18 February saw two INGO employees report in the Kabul City office pretending to be on duty, and successfully drive away in the agency’s two high-profile vehicles. Both staff members had joined the organization shortly before the theft, with the senior between them having concluded a couple of months at a managerial position. Capitalizing on his influence, the individual also recommended his accomplice to join the INGO as a driver. The incident serves as a reminder that NGOs (as any other type of organizations) are not immune to this type of criminality. The ‘inside’ jobs and deflection, especially by freshly-recruited staff, are rather a common feature. Holidays, weekends and after COB hours represent a typical timing for such schemes, as the office and project premises are manned by less personnel and the discipline is more relaxed. Regulated access to assets and implementation of strict reporting procedures shall prevent most of similar schemes. It also appears that this category of criminal cases is often preceded by symptomatic irregularities such as dissension among the team members, individual discipline issues or, as simple as it is, unexpected transgression of SOPs or breaking of routines.

For the rest, Kabul Province witnessed only two non-lethal AOG escalations. A text-book targeting of two fuel tankers in Surobi on

16 February was followed ten days later by an early-morning multiple rocket attack against high-profile locations in the capital city. The said morning, three BM-1 (107mm) rockets impacted in the vicinity of the Ministry of Defence and the Presidential Police in PD 9 & 2 without causing casualties. The strike denotes a return to another tactic of choice favoured by AOG planners in the past years and often put in motion when AOG decided to discredit GOA discourse on security gains. Due to the type of weaponry used in combination with TTPs used, indirect fire attacks remain inherently inaccurate, and pose mainly the risk of collateral damage for civilian residences located along its trajectories. Undoubtedly, the actual accuracy of IDF attacks as much as any other considerations matter less than their occurrence and timing. This cycle’s IDF actually connects with the recent suicide missions in the capital as both types of attack stand out for being a minimal tactical investment in return for maximum strategic impact, that is, on perceptions of insecurity. Concomitantly though, both types of attacks lead to an absurd situation in which civilians are caught (or worse, targeted on purpose) in the fighting, the AOG, successfully or not, damage the reputation of GOA structures and their international sponsors, but by doing so also detrimentally erode their own self-image as legitimate opposition



(with a disciplined rank-and-file and an ability to implement the internal code of conduct) - this is applicable in minimum to the IEA and its leadership’s approving such attacks. The future will actually show whether the IEA leadership (as opposed to the HQN splinter group and foreign AOG elements for which such considerations do not apply), will be willing and able to align the tactical & strategic considerations in the field back with its own ideological standpoints and code of conduct, including reigning in the HQN element.


From another perspective, this cycle was characterized by a higher than usual occurrence of false security alarms, with two notable cases of a detonation (inside a military training ground in PD 9) and an accidental ‘friendly-fire’ (among the private security detail of a restaurant in PD 10) prompting several Afghan and international agencies to circulate unsubstantiated reports of AOG attacks. In the current context, when further AOG attacks in the City represent a statistical certitude, one will benefit from a simple ‘common sense’ analysis which fast reveals that the AOG threats revolve around a predictable set of targets and situations. As opposed to ‘chasing’ generic threat reports issued by external agencies, NGOs will benefit from keeping focused on the analysis of their staff vulnerabilities along the standard vectors: 1. proximity to security targets, 2. travel situations, 3. exposure in ‘target-rich’ public venues.

LOGAR

So far, a modest 18 incidents (incl. 7 AOG) have been recorded for February. Whereas the final account may be subject to change, the overall levels indicate that also Logar renounced to the usual incident volumes, with IMF & ANSF operations outnumbering AOG direct attacks by roughly 50%. Whereas the first two weeks saw the action mainly boil in Muhammad Agha and Baraki Barak, with larger scale operations sporadically reported from the peripheral Kharwar and Charkh Districts, Puli Alam came back to the fore during this reporting cycle. Three close-range ambushes of military convoys & patrols in addition to an IED blast (triggered by an IMF patrol) and the burning of two fuel tankers were reported from the central district. Qalai Ali Khan to the North of Puli Alam also rose to prominence, having ac-

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counted for one AOG attack against a supply truck and its occupant, and the only IED blast recorded against security forces, which then sparked an IMF operation resulting in the arrest of two locals. Further up the road towards Kabul, in Puli Kandahari, a presumed couple of teenagers stuck a magnetic IED on a slow-moving fuel tanker. The device reportedly detonated shortly after the alarmed driver and his assistant, noticing the hasty retreat of the youngsters from the vicinity of the truck, vacated the vehicle. In the Mohmand Area of Baraki Barak, two RPGs were fired towards the IMF FOB. 2 road-side IEDs were recovered by IMF from Ebrahim Khel in Baraki Barak, while another emplaced device was discovered by ANP in the Qala Shahi Area of Muhammad Aghan. Additional AOG



kinetic activity has been claimed by IEA units in the peripheral districts as well as in Baraki Barak, but could not be independently corroborated so far.

An IMF/ANSF night raid, this time in Babus Area (Puli Alam) on the night of 27 February, resulted in the arrest of 5 local residents, and channeled a wave of local resentment against such operations which led the community to stage a protest in Puli Alam center a couple of hours after the arrest.

From March onwards, NGOs may anticipate a steady increase in kinetic operations, which shall likely resume along the road networks. It is yet to be seen whether the current momentum will remain with the pro-GOA forces.

BAMYAN


Communities in Bamyan continue to face harsh weather conditions, with access being of particular concern. The province is currently off reach through the majority of communications, the exception being the Ghorband Road. Indeed, Shibar remains the only open pass among those which stretch along the main access roads. Passage through the isolated areas of the province also constitutes the most important risk factor for NGOs, and shall be mitigated by adequate awareness of the local road situation, adequate equipment of vehicles and passengers with winter gear, reasonable timing and effective

	NGO Incidents
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movement tracking of NGO road missions. Of note, particularly low temperatures are anticipated for the first week of March.

Otherwise, ten years since the destruction of Bamyan Buddhas by IEA troops, the course of security developments in the province largely revolved around discoveries of weapons caches as well as voluntary handovers of military material by the communities to the IMF.

February concluded with a peaceful demonstration in front of the Governor's office in Sarasyab (Bamyan Markaz), called for by



the local parties upon the announcement of the Meshrano Jirga members by the President (one third of the chamber). According to local views, the final assortment of presidential appointees under-represents Bamyan's domestic elites and interests, with the only Bamyan delegate in the previous session having been replaced by a Hazara candidate from Parwan.


KAPISA

Tagab remained in the spotlight of ANSF & IMF efforts as well as of AOG counter-offensive operations, although the intensity and volumes of combat action significantly decreased after the initial, extremely kinetic, phase of the IMF operations in the district. Still, Tagab hosted every second out of the total 31 incidents recorded in February in the province, including 5 out of 7 AOG-authored attacks. The adjacent districts of Alasay and Nijrab (Afghaniya Valley) received a secondary portion of incidents, largely echoing the operations in Tagab. Alasay, however, may well have marked another milestone in the operation with a publicly decried airstrike, which allegedly killed a party of five bird-hunters mistakenly taken for AOG fighters. Meanwhile in the West, Kohistan I made for all three security incidents including a hand-grenade attack and two cases of IED and explosive material discoveries by ANP.

The developments in Tagab pursue an undeniable momentum on the side of the IMF&ANSF forces, heading towards security transition announced for this year. Surgical strikes against IEA leadership (led by special forces, and often accompanied by the air support), cordon search operations

	NGO Incidents
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aimed at disruption of supply networks, and ‘clear & hold’ phase operations along the main road network including active involvement of ANSF and local ‘public protection force’ in policing the ‘cleared’ areas have dominated the period, and will most likely continue on irregular basis throughout the spring season. During this cycle, the IMF paid a heavy toll of several casualties in AOG counter-strikes along the typical TTPs on the main district roads: IED deployment (in Qurghar), close-range SAF and ambushes (in Landa Khel, another ambush in Shah Khel did not result in casualties). Both types of attacks were also replicated in Nijrab (Chahar Qala and Afghanya), but did not cause casualties on the IMF side. The afore-mentioned also indicates the red lines of AOG riposte to the offensive. Besides increased IED activity and tactical complex ambushes along the roads, a third addition previously identified as a likely option, materialized during this cycle. Two targeted killings of the militia members (‘public protection force’ in Kapisa’s security jargon), including an exemplary hanging from a tree, were perpetrated in AOG hotspots of Bodrab and Morad Khel Area. Indicators that the course of action will follow ‘targeted killings’



are to be found in the history (and success) of the recent IEA expansion in the province (targeting local HIG and other jihadi elements as much as local sympathizers/members of ANSF), and more pragmatically in the well established patterns of ‘prize money’ paid for each ‘successfully’ conducted operation. This strand of conflict also brings imminent risks for those community members rightly or falsely accused of sympathizing with the current IMF efforts. It is of crucial importance for NGOs active in the eastern districts to ensure that their staff are aware about such risks, and do not undertake actions which may be interpreted otherwise.

In the context of resumed debate on civilian casualties due to IMF airstrikes in the Eastern Region, an unfortunate incident occurred in the early morning of 24 February in Wahshi Area of Alasay. In a case of presumed mistaken identity, IMF air assets identified a party of armed men as AOG fighters, and conducted an aerial strike. Although the identity of the five fatalities and two casualties has not been verified in situ thru independent sources yet, local witnesses as well as GOA authorities claimed that the victims were actually local hunters.

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the **23rd of February 2011.**


WARDAK

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Although the conclusive figures may still change, the month of February stands out due to a dramatic lull in AOG kinetic activity, with just 6 corroborated AOG incidents so far (Nirakh, Saydabad, Jalrez). Besides one exception (an arson attack against a private truck on the Highway in Saydabad), all of these being close-range SAF engagements ranging from IEA-HIG infighting in Nirakh to the more traditional attacks against ANSF/IMF patrols and controls. The geographic distribution of operations (valid both for AOG & ACG and the security forces) largely following main road networks in Nirk & Saydabad (Highway) and Jalrez (Maidan to Jalrez Road). The volumes so far, and in particular the absence of any IED strike (or even recovery by IMF/ANSF), stand in contrast to the previous month, which had seen a triple number of AOG incidents including 7 IED detonations. It however remains largely consistent with low incidents volumes recorded in February 2009

(7 AOG incidents) and February 2010 (3 AOG incidents). The picture of AOG activity was complemented by a single criminal incidence related to the setting up of an illegal checkpoint along Jalrez Main Road on 18 February.

A case apart, IEA briefly re-engaged the HIG positions in Nirakh (Sadonak) during this cycle, withdrawing before any casualties occurred. Both groups continue to sport a hostile stance towards each other, although the opened infightings of scale lost momentum following the IMF's elimination of major commanders on both sides recently. Whereas HIG's dominant position has been maintained so far, and despite local leaders' efforts at reconciling the two groups, re-escalation of open hostilities should be anticipated during the spring & summer fighting season. In addition, the introduction of the Afghan Local Police program in the very short term in Nirakh, will likely complicate the matter



for the IEA especially if local HIG elements infiltrate or overtly opt for joining the program (the latter option remains unlikely at this stage, but may become more feasible if HIG succumb to the IEA pressure, as witnessed in the northern provinces throughout 2010).

Changing the perspective, it appears clearly that AOG faced continued pressure from the side of IMF & ANSF throughout February (a combined 15 operations were reported). The security forces have been building up on the current decrease of conflict intensity, focusing mainly on special forces capture/kill operations, and disruption of AOG supply networks. Two thirds of operations concentrated in the vicinity of major AOG hotspots in Saydabad. The only lethal combat, however, was reported from Chaki Wardak, where an IMF element clashed with AOG, killing one opposition fighter.

PANJSHIR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

To the contentment of local communities and NGOs, Panjshir fared throughout February without any significant incident. The province offers a stable operational environment for NGOs, provided distance is taken from

local disputes and factional rivalries which have become as constant a feature there as the personality cult of the valley's most famous Jihadi commander.

The comfortable level of security has also been illustrated by refreshing announcements made at the 2011 Panjshir Agricultural Conference in Astana. Among the 2011 agricultural highlights is the inauguration of the weekly farmers' markets in Bazarak, opening of livestock markets in Shutul and Paryan, and the Panjshir Mulberry Festival, a major agro-tourism event scheduled for the summer.


DAYKUNDI

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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Typical for the winter season, heavy precipitation and climatic conditions outweighed political and criminal violence in Daykundi throughout this cycle. A sole exception, Kajran District remained in the spotlight due to AOG kinetic activity. This strand nevertheless continues to be sporadic and usually non-lethal, largely resulting from AOG efforts to ensure smooth transit of fighters and equipment. On 21 February in the Sulimunji Area of Zarda Gulan Valley, South from the DAC, an AOG element engaged a detachment of Afghan Local Police manning a checkpoint on the road with SAF. The clash did not result in casualties. Seen through the lens of the overall conflict dynamics, the passage through Kajran gained importance as an AOG link road between the major fronts in Helmand and Kandahar, as well as for in- and out-bound transit between the aforementioned operational areas and Pakistan. Hardly surprising, amplified AOG movements across the district found an echo in higher levels of incidents, which remain geographically distributed along the major roads and itineraries. According to ANSO data, the years of 2006-2009 saw in average just 3 to 5 AOG attacks in Kajran

per annum, while 2010 marked a spike with 11 cases documented and an additional three recorded this year. The overall tempo of AOG activity outnumbers ANSF-IMF operations by a ratio of two to one, although the latter are often more busy with combating crime rather than political violence.

Among the latest security additions, ALP units in Kajran occasionally take over manning of the road-side checkpoints from ANP and actively participate in combat. To the extent that the law-enforcement authority of the ALP units is strictly confined inside the boundaries of their home communities (the ALP are basically meant to improve the communities' capability to police their constituencies) non-lethal AOG strikes may be plausibly interpreted as warnings destined to the communities against interfering with the AOG in transit. Nevertheless, in contested districts with higher kinetic activity, which Kajran may eventually become throughout the spring season, local defence initiatives (LDI) often become a serious target of choice for AOGs due to more concrete considerations such as (a) being seen as a 'softer' target compared to IMF &



ANSF, (b) waged in retribution against the active stance of the community, or even more pragmatically, (c) for fear of AOG that the local recruits provide accurate and up-to-date intelligence to IMF & ANSF. In the short term at least, the incident levels in Kajran will likely maintain the upward trajectory with the anticipated influx of AOG fighters moving back to the southern fronts.

Looking North, Shahrstan, in particular Dasht Valley, witnessed a marred attempt by a law-enforcement officer to kidnap a young girl from a private residence. The intruder was apprehended by the owner of the compound, and ended up in Miramor District Hospital as a result of the physical altercation which ensued. Local reaction to the incident encompassed a demonstration attended by well a hundred community members two days later, on 18 February, requesting the authorities to dismiss the perpetrator. Needless to say, similar excesses, especially if not prosecuted, in as much as privatization of public functions for private or factional interests by local potentates, undermine the communities' acceptance of the central government.


PARWAN

	NGO Incidents
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The high-profile targeted killing of a local religious leader, reported in the previous period, continued to haunt the security environment in Chaharikar during this cycle. The authorities, occasionally assisted by IMF, engaged in arrest operations, which were not always appreciated by the communities under focus. At one occasion, IMF claimed having detained ‘a HIG media magnate’, resident in Chaharikar and involved in HIG operations in the Kabul Province. A more tangible outcome, though, were several weapons cache seizures, and, at one occasion, the discovery of an RCIED mounted on a bicycle in Chaharikar. While the tracking of hostile AOG networks has been recently emphasized in Chaharikar, the most imminent concerns to NGO safety still pertain to the local factional issues, often echoed in targeted killings, and rarely investigated. The undercurrent of dis-

dain for women’s programming and micro-finance schemes has become a constant and quite rigid mental picture in the community, too often mentioned in local accounts to be disregarded, but too poorly supported by coherent evidence to be emphasized as a distinctive feature of the NGO security threat picture in the province. This said, the investigation of the latest killing of the NGO female staff member in Deh Qazi Area has not revealed any conclusive leads as to the motivation of the attack, or identity of the attackers, so far.


While Bagram district remained calm with a single incidence of weapons cache seizure, another AOG/ACG hub, the Ghorband Valley, saw more sustained activity. In particular, migration and arrests of criminal elements in Ghorband (Siyagerd), reports of AOG fighters taking back posi-



tions in the Siyagerd and Namak Ab Valleys, and an IED detonation on the main Chaharikar – Bamyar Road (again in Siyagerd) made the news.

Mandiqol in Kohi Safi continued to feature in security reporting, in particular in relation to the local safe havens of endogenous AOG elements, specializing in the ‘Surobi fuel tanker attacks’, most probably finding the district definitely more user friendly than the highly risky Tagab District across the provincial border, and in a comfortable distance to the Kabul City IDF launching sites in Kohi Safi and Deh Sabz mountain ranges, which beyond prestige and fame, also bring more material compensation by AOG leadership, that is prize money and more supplies.

February AOG Initiated Incident Volumes: Yearly Comparison 2006-2011
(as of 23 Feb 2011)



NORTHERN REGION

BALKH

Kishindih District—the site of this year’s only previous NGO related incident in the province—resurfaced as the unlikely focal point of insecurity for INGOs in Balkh this reporting period. In less than 24 hours, Kishindih witnessed 2 direct attacks on INGOs; 1 RPG strike against an INGO compound and 1 IED detonation against an INGO convoy. While these 2 incidents happened to 2 different INGOs, they took place in very close proximity in terms of both time and location.

Balkh Province was the source of 13 total security incidents this reporting period. Aside from the 2 above, there were 3 incidents in Mazar-e Sharif City, road insecurity in Balkh and Zari districts, an IED detonation on an IMF convoy in Shortepa (24th), an IED discovery in Chahar Bolak (Salartepa Village) on the 17th, and an AOG attack on the 26th in Chimtal.


Kishindih District, which borders Sholgarah District to the north and Dara-i Sufi Payin District in Samangan Province to the East, has historically been considered a relatively secure district. A pocket of insecurity that existed up until last summer mostly disappeared following the arrest of 2 of the AOG members responsible, and the departure of a third to Pakistan. Nevertheless, Kishindih has now had 3 incidents directly targeting INGOs over the first 2 months of this year, 2 of them this reporting period.

At 0200 in the early morning hours of the 21st, an INGO compound was hit by an RPG in

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Naqelin Area. The INGO had not had any known prior issues in the area, and claimed strong ties with the community. Later that day, at approximately 1230 hours, an INGO convoy consisting of 4 low profile, unmarked vehicles was hit by an IED along a small road close to the site of the first incident. Although the IED caused only minor damages to the vehicle, it was later determined that the detonation was likely the result of a large RCIED that, had it detonated closer to the vehicle, could have caused significantly more damage. There is at least one theory that the second IED was not meant for the INGO but for the district police and government officials who were expected to use the road while investigating the first attack.

There are numerous theories about what caused these 2 incidents, but almost all of them presuppose that the 2 attacks were carried out by the same individuals. Right now, with no follow up robberies or monetary demands being made after the attacks, the likelihood that this is the work of an ACG appears somewhat diminished. This could be the work of a new AOG trying to establish itself by pulling off highly visible attacks in the area to gain the attention and recognition of more established AOG groups in the province. Whether this is a new AOG in the region, the previous AOG re-establishing itself, or the work of an AOG from one of the nearby districts (perhaps Dar-I Sufi Payin or Sholgara) is currently unclear. What appears certain is that there was no previously es-



tablished AOG operating in the region. If a new AOG is operating in the area—and it certainly seems that one is intentionally drawing attention to itself—it stands to put itself at odds with the many “retired” Jihadi commanders who reside in the otherwise quiet district, though the involvement of any of these actors should also not be ruled out.

In Chimtal, which is (along with Chahar Bolak) widely considered one of the most insecure districts in the province, the first AOG initiated physical confrontation occurred since the onset of Operation Ebtikar. On the 26th, an AOG stopped and abducted a government bus along with its driver in Taraki village. After the bus became stuck in the mud, the AOG departed taking the driver hostage. ANP deployed to the area and recovered the vehicle after driving away a subsequent ANP attack, but the hostage remains at large. Prior to this, Chimtal has only seen IED incidents and ACG crime in the wake of Ebtikar.

Elsewhere in the province, the civilian population of Dawlatabad voiced their displeasure over the recent night raid that took in 3 alleged AOG members (PRP), anecdotal evidence suggests that the government has called on behalf of the prisoners, and that the community is unhappy about the allegedly “disrespectful” way in which the raid was carried out. The only further insecurity in the district came from the discovery of 8 mortar rounds in a ditch.

Finally, in Zari District, just to the West of Kishindih, on the 22nd an ACG stopped vehicles and robbed them in the Amrakh area until the ANP responded and drove them out.

KUNDUZ

14 security incidents took place in Kunduz Province this reporting period—5 in Chahar Dara, 3 in Imam Sahib, and 2 in Kunduz—the largest of which was a BBIED detonation inside the civilian statistics office in Imam Sahib which created waves throughout the country.

This was the second suicide bombing this year in Kunduz Province, both of them taking place shortly after the recent circulation of IMF reports that AOG presence throughout the province had been significantly diminished. The previous bombing took place on February 10th in the District Center of Chahar Dara, and killed the District Governor, while this most recent BBIED detonated in a census office just adjacent to the Imam Sahib District Governor’s office, and was responsible for the deaths of 34 and injures to an additional 53. While only 2 of the individuals killed in this BBIED were uniformed ANP members, the vast majority of them consisted of individuals from 3 separate local militias who were in the course of joining the pro-government militia as part of the peace process. The


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
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strike was likely an attempt to discredit IMF reports that all AOGs had been removed from the area, while simultaneously seeking to send a warning to civilians and combatants alike about what could happen to those who engaged with the GOA in the militia programs.

This continues a countrywide trend of AOG targeting pro-government militia members and their families.

This attack took place in Imam Sahib—a known AOG stronghold in Kunduz—in conjunction with a visit by the High Peace Council, which had come to the province to inaugurate the Kunduz Provincial Peace Committee, adding further to the potential impact. Activity in the district had slowly tapered off since last year, with 7 incidents occurring in December and 5 in January, but this marks the second high profile attack in the province over the last two weeks as AOGs continue to ensure that their presence is felt.

Elsewhere in Kunduz District, there were 2 attacks along the Aliabad-Kunduz road, one on the



20th in the Sedarak area when a magnetic IED (the first to be used in the North) which had been attached to the back of a fuel tanker detonated. The fuel tanker did not ignite, so only minor damages were caused to the vehicle and no injuries were reported. Another occurred on the 21st in the Qabri Bangi area, when a group of armed robbers set up an illegal checkpoint to rob vehicles.

Insecurity in other districts included 5 noteworthy security incidents in Chahar Dara District (the site of the previous BBIED) that included an IED detonation in the Ghundi Kalay area which killed 1 ANP and injured another, a RCIED detonation on an ANSF convoy, an AOG attack on an IMF convoy in the Dobandi area which resulted in the deaths of 3 IMF soldiers, an AOG attack on an IMF convoy between Gul Bagh and Qara Khani, and the discovery in Ainal Majar of a significant cache of mortar rounds and IEDs in an abandoned residence. Also on the 20th in the Asqalan area, ACG released 2 local doctors who had been abducted from the Dasht Abdan Area of Imam Sahib District on the 15th.

FARYAB

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1


Faryab recorded 15 security incidents this reporting period, with 4 in Qaysar, 3 in Pashtun Kot, and 3 in Maymana. The most significant of these included an ANP assault on an IO staff member in Qaysar, an armed assault of an INGO communications center (also Qaysar), a BBIED detonation on the Buzkashi field in Shirin Tagab District, and a SAF/RPG attack on the Ring Road against the convoy of the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP).

In Qaysar on the 17th, an IO staff member was assaulted by the ANP during a food distribution to IDPs. The altercation started due to alleged grievances on behalf of the population concerning the individuals being served, and as a result of the confrontation, the distribution program has been suspended until further notice. Relationships between the IO and ANP became temporarily strained during the operation when the ANP—reportedly on behalf of members of their local populace—challenged the IO’s choice in determining whom to distribute food to. Following the incident, the IO met with the provincial government, who reassured them that the ANP have no mandate to decide where—and to whom—aid is delivered.

The following evening (18 Feb), also in Qaysar Province, but in the Nahrin Mountain area, an INGO communications center was

robbed by 3 armed men. The bandits broke into the compound and severely assaulted the guards, before damaging and stealing communications equipment and fleeing. The guards were left in critical condition in a ditch, and discovered only when members of the Community Development Council (CDC) —who had been alerted by the INGO when the guards missed their radio check—located them and got them to medical treatment. Although Qaysar has a strong, established AOG infrastructure, the location of this 2nd attack was not an especially insecure/contested area, and the possibility that this was retaliation by individuals who were upset over the incident with the IO cannot be ruled out. Qaysar, aside from being an AOG stronghold, has been the site of recent tensions due to military operations against questionable targets, making relations in the district extremely combustible.

Further insecurity manifested itself in an incident denounced publicly by President Karzai and IMF, when a BBIED detonated during a Buzkashi match in Shirin Tagab on the 26th. 4 civilians were killed and a further 22 injured. The match was being held to honor the coming of age of young members of the Pahlawan family, and the likely targets; Guli Pahlawan—the brother of Rasul Pahlawan—and Rasul’s 2 sons, were in attendance. Further potential targets present included at least one other Jumbesh commander and the District Chief of Police. This was the first BBIED detonation in this district, and 1 of only 3 that have occurred in Faryab province—the most recent taking place on November 5th, 2010 in Khwaja Sabz Posh District, when a BBIED detonated on the vehicle of the Provincial Council Chairman.



Rounding up the profile of insecurity in the region, the widely used Ring Road that connects Maymana to Shibirghan was the site of an attack on the 24th, when a convoy which included the Provincial Chief of Police for Faryab Province was attacked with SAF and RPGs along the Jungal section in Dawlatabad District. In Pashtun Kot, another district which has been the recipient of significant insecurity, 11 AOG members surrendered to the GOA, 2 ANP officers were abducted in Jar Qala Village, and on the 23rd, 2 AOGs fought over the right to tax local citizens near Khwaja Namosa village. Gurziwan District also had a number of AOG members (12) join the peace process, and lastly, a military operation was launched to clear out areas in and around Sayyad District in Sar-E Pul, Bilchiragh District was the only district from Faryab involved in the operations.

TAKHAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Despite significant AOG presence, and a strong possibility that AOG who are pushed out of northern Kunduz flee to Takhar, Takhar province saw few significant AOG attacks amongst the 13 incidents this reporting period. The physical breakdown includes 3 incidents in Khwaja Ghar, 3 in Taluqan, and 2 in Baharak.

Perhaps the most notable incident occurred on the 25th in Tangi Qala District - Safi Ha area, when ANP arrested a high ranking ANP member from Dasht Qala District with 2 of his soldiers. They were caught transporting a large quantity of opium in an ANP vehicle. Drug trafficking throughout Takhar and Badakhshan is a lucrative

business, and one that is ingrained deeply in the infrastructure of both criminal and government parties. Much of the insecurity recently in both provinces has come about as a result of changes amongst the District Chiefs of Police (perhaps shifting precarious power dynamics), and unhappiness amongst drug traffickers in the region. Khwaja Ghar, a likely AOG destination as the district closest to Archi in Kunduz, also saw drug related activity when an arrest was made of 2 drug traffickers.

Other notable events included one in Chah Ab, on the 18th (Dara-E-Nooraba village), when un-



known men attacked an ANP checkpoint with SAF before escaping from the area. In Baharak District on the 19th in Jilo Village (very close to Khwaja Ghar), a RCIED detonated against a pro-government militia vehicle, damaging the vehicle, and in Haji Ismael village on the 21st IMF arrested 3 AOG members during a night operation.

Taluqan District, where most of the NGOs working in the area are based, saw 3 personal disputes deteriorate to violence, two of them assaults on personal residences.


SAMANGAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Although there were extremely few security incidents in Samangan this reporting period, there were 2 notable developments. In Aybak—a historically secure district—anecdotal reports surfaced that AOGs were pressuring local nationals to rebel against the GOA presence in the district and halt any cooperation with foreigners. This initiative may prove responsible for the IED that detonated on an IMF vehicle near Aybak city in the Akhakam area on the 15th. The IMF vehicle was en route to an often used shooting range when they were hit. The detonation killed 1 IMF soldier and injured another. The detonation occurred in the middle of the

day along an extremely narrow stretch of the road. This has led to the conclusion that it must have been planted recently, and specifically to target the military forces that regularly used that road.

Secondly, anecdotal reports have surfaced referencing 2 new AOGs operating in and around Dara-i Suf District. Dara-i Sufi has long been considered an insecure district with 2-3 identified AOGs already operating in the area. In the past this group has been able to pull off high profile incidents such as the kidnapping of 7 international construction workers late last year. It has been alleged that



some of the individuals responsible are the same ones who have recently begun to join the peace process, with 4 new AOG members surrendering to the GOA as recently as February 16th. There is at least some possibility that one of these groups may be the same individuals that are responsible for the attacks in Kishindih (Balkh) profiled elsewhere in this report. What these potential new actors mean for security in this province—as well as that of neighbouring Kishindih—are yet to be determined.


BAGHLAN

Baghlan, with 14 security incidents total, was the focus of international attention this reporting period when an ANA soldier shot IMF troops on a military installation, killing 3 and injuring 6, before being shot and killed. This occurred in Baghlani Jadid on the 18th, and took much of the attention away from circulated IMF reports stating that “Operation Nowruz” had cleared Northern Baghlan of AOG presence. There is substantial evidence that the IMF shooting was the result of an interpersonal conflict rather than an AOG attack.

Baghlani Jadid has long occupied the focal point of insecurity in the Baghlan Province. This period, Operation Nowruz resulted in the surrendering of 20 AOG members in Shahi Khil before it paused due to increment weather. IMF has claimed that in total, 80 villages have been cleared and over 20 AOG members killed as a direct result of the operation.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Although anecdotal reports claim that the operation—which resulted in the deaths of 2 major AOG commanders—has resulted in a temporary lull in violence and a corresponding increase in access within the district, the notion that it is free of AOG presence remains questionable. In contrast to these reports, increased chatter surfaced regarding potential BBIED attacks in the province (specifically in Baghlani Jadid) which—should they come to fruition—would mirror what took place in Kunduz; where substantial military operations led to widely circulated reports that Kunduz AOG strongholds were “AOG free,” only to see 2 BBIED attacks. BBIED attacks after sustained military operations make tactical sense, as recovering AOGs often have their infrastructure and man power depleted, lessening their ability (and desire) to engage in open attacks. What BBIEDs lack in manpower they



make up for in casualties and shock value, creating a perceived atmosphere of insecurity.

Nowruz operations that took place during this reporting period in Baghlani Jadid included an IMF night raid in the Larkhabi Ha area of the Old City on the 17th, and operations in Alawdin Village on the 20th. Following these, 7 AOG members from the district joined the peace process on the 24th and a GOA employee who had been abducted from Chahar Shanbi Tewa area on the 17th of December 2010 was freed.

Also in Baghlani Jadid, AOG attacked an IMF convoy in the Old City, and there were 2 ACG incidents in the Fabrika area of the district on the 23rd— an RPG attack on a local residence and SAF on a private vehicle. It is unclear what the motives for these last 2 attacks were, as neither of them resulted in robberies.

JAWZJAN


Jawzjan saw the most conflict out of the 3 provinces involved in a new military operation to clear districts around Sayyad, Qush Tapa, and Darzab (Jawzjan, Faryab, and Sar-e Pul were all involved), a focus that is not surprising, as security forces have framed this area as a ‘triangle of insecurity’ in the past. In all, Jawzjan witnessed 11 security incidents, 9 of which were attributed to this operation (6 in Qush Tapa and 3 in Darzab), as well as 1 incident in Shibirghan along the widely travelled Shibirghan - Sar-e Pul Road.

A joint IMF/ANSF operation that was taking place in the above mentioned provinces took IMF/ANSF into—and out of—Qush Tapa and Darzab (with no military elements left in these districts to establish any “hold” phase). Incidents related to this operation in Qush Tapa included; on the 21st,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

in Chaqma Choqor area, an IED detonated on an ANBP vehicle killing 2 and injuring 5, and on the 23rd in Gardan area, AOG ambushed an IMF/ANSF convoy (the convoy called in air support which left 4 AOG members dead). The operation further resulted in the discovery of 3 IEDs on the 16th in Taraghli Village, followed the next evening (the 17th) by a large armed clash in the village between ANSF/IMF and AOG (4 AOG killed). Counter attacking, AOG attacked temporary ANP checkpoints on subsequent evenings in Jarqodoq area (18th), and in Khanaqa Village (19th). Both attacks were repelled.

As the operation pushed on through Darzab, 3 incidents took place on the 20th, 2 of these in Khwaja Ashkara. In these 2, ANSF/IMF first discovered and removed 3 IEDs, and then got



into a clash with AOG. The 3rd incident involved an AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint in the District Administrative Center (DAC).

In Shibirghan District, at 2300 hours on the 15th, AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint along the Shibirghan – Sar-e Pul Road in the Tasfiya Khana area. This stretch of road is vital to INGO access in and out of Sar-e Pul. In this incident, the ANP drove the AOG to retreat after a 30 minute long fire fight that left 1 GOA employee injured. There were anecdotal reports that this attack (and another on this road in Sar-e Pul Province) may have been led by the brother of an AOG leader arrested in Balkh during the PRP, and that the group was intent on capturing a hostage they hoped to exchange for his release.


SAR-E PUL

Military operations in Sayyad were the cause of much of the insecurity in the province this reporting period. There was also road insecurity—possibly spurred on by the previous arrest in Balkh province (see Jawzjan)—along the Shibirghan-Sar-e Pul Road. In total there were only 6 security incidents this period, with 4 of those in Sayyad as a direct result of the IMF/ANSF operations taking place there.

As part of the operations being conducted in Sayyad, there were ANSF clashes with AOGs in the village of Beland Ghor on both the 14th and 15th. On the 16th, ANSF moved into Qaflatoon and Alqani villages, where they seized weapons and engaged with AOG

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

in a fight that left 1 AOG member killed and 2 others injured, and on the 17th, 42 AOG members surrendered from Ahao, Qaraghaj, and Aqso Sharqui. While none of the three operations (Sar-e Pul, Jawzjan, Faryab) left behind elements to initiate a “hold phase,” there is the belief that the large number of surrendered AOG from Sayyad which have been incorporated into the growing Arbakis in the district may have a tangible effect on the security paradigm there. Whether or not that effect will be positive is yet to be determined, as Arbakis have often created more insecurity both actively—by causing problems and engaging in criminal activi-



ties—and passively—villages of recent Arbaki recruits are often targeted by AOGs who want to penalize the communities for working with the government.

The Sar-e Pul—Jawzjan road had an incident take place on the evening of the 17th, when, in Sar-e Pul District (Adbakhshi village), a group of armed men believed to be AOGs were sighted. ANSF/IMF deployed to the area and chased off the group after an hour and a half fire fight. In Sar-e Pul City, a further 16 AOG members joined the peace process.

BADAKHSHAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Badakhshan Province remained relatively stable this reporting period with 9 total security incidents. 4 of these took place in Baharak, which has become a fairly active district in 2011, while elsewhere, a RCIED was discovered in Fayzabad, and an armed robbery took place along the Jurm-Baharak District Main Road.


As the headquarters district for much of the humanitarian community in the province, insecurity in Fayzabad is always of particular concern. After the PRP’s reporting of minor civil unrest over election politics and new leadership in the district, a RCIED was found in the city on the 16th in PD #3, Mandawi Kohna area. While this alone does not represent a shift in the security paradigm for Fayzabad — and it is far from the first IED discovery in the district — it was the first IED discovery in Fayzabad since October 25th. No other security incidents took place in the district prior to — or following — its discovery and subsequent removal.

Baharak District, which was the site of the only NGO incident in Badakhshan this year, has now seen 9 security incidents over the first 2 months (accounting for

36% of the total for the province). Many of these (3 this period) have taken place in the District Administrative Center (DAC), which is always a sign of a significant deterioration in district security. The district has demonstrated a substantial increase from the 14 incidents which took place over the entire previous year, and Baharak District accounted for almost half of Badakhshan’s total security incidents this period.

In Baharak DAC, 2 of the 3 occurred within hours of each other on the 19th, and the 3rd on the evening of the 26th. These consisted of a grenade hurled into a girl’s school on the 19th, and 2 RPG attacks. None of the attacks resulted in any casualties. Although attacks against girl’s schools have slowly begun to re-surface throughout the North, with 2 taking place over the first 2 weeks of February, whether or not this will become a problem for Badakhshan (and Baharak District in particular) remains to be seen.

As mentioned in the PRP, Baharak District is not a known hub for AOG activity, and although these attacks are consistent with



AOG tactics, anecdotal evidence suggests that this rash of incidents is the result of local actors who are unhappy with the newly appointed District Chief of Police (DCOP). It is not uncommon throughout the North for individuals who have been removed from their official positions to demonstrate their dissatisfaction (and create an argument for why they should be reinstated) by participating in—and increasing—insecurity. The 4th event in Baharak was a civilian death attributed to an interpersonal dispute on the 21st.

Lastly, in Jurm District in Posh Ha Area along the Jurm – Baharak road, it was reported that criminals were stopping vehicles and robbing the passengers on February 17th. Although Jurm has not been an especially insecure district, with only 2 incidents this year and 7 in all of 2010, the ACG working in the area has demonstrated the ability to create some insecurity along the roadways, with many of the incidents consisting of illegal road robberies or abductions. The possibility that this is the same ACG that is acting out in neighboring Baharak cannot be ruled out, but the likelihood appears slim, as the method and motives appear substantially different.

WESTERN REGION

HERAT


During this reporting period the security environment in Herat was characterised by several notable incidents related to the use of IEDs throughout the province. On 27th of February, an explosive device detonated on the Herat City-Airport Main Road in Ghizan Area of Injil District targeting an ANP parked vehicle. The incident resulted in one teenage boy reported to have been killed and one ANP wounded. The explosion marks the first IED strike to occur on the main road since the 3rd of January, when an IED detonated against an IMF vehicle. The recent incident highlights once again the potential threat of collateral involvement for the local population, as well as for NGOs, while transiting along this road due to the proximity with AOG/ACG potential targets. In addition, on another important road, this time within Herat City, security forces located two IEDs which were emplaced in District 2, between Spin Ade and Darbe Kandahar Areas.

In the past two weeks the road from Herat to Pashtun Zarghun in the area of the Regional ANP HQ/Training Centre witnessed

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

more AOG activity than usual. Whereas the IED detonation on 21st of February marked the second IED related incident in the area this year, after an IED discovery reported in January, the RPGs attack that took place on the 18th marks a new development as AOG activity (although sporadic) has been generally concentrated on nearby Seyawshan Area. Nonetheless, further incidents in the area targeting ANSF personnel or facilities (particularly ANP checkpoints) are not unlikely, mainly due to the anticipated handover of security responsibilities from ISAF to ANSF. With this objective, the area of the Regional ANP HQ/Training Centre may become attractive targets for AOGs willing to demonstrate their strength and presence. Another notable incident took place on 28th of February, with an IED strike targeting an IMF vehicle on Herat-Kandahar Main Road in Adraskan District. The incident resulted in one IMF soldier killed and four wounded and marks also the first IED detonation on this road this year.

Apart from IED deployment, in-



security along district roads was underlined on the 22nd, with a marred abduction attempt that took place on Herat-Obe Main Road in Turkabad Area. Four armed men - purported AOG - stopped a local transport vehicle and attempted to kidnap a wealthy local civilian. ANP arrived at the scene and a brief fire fight ensued, allowing the victim to escape. The exact motivation of the group is unclear as the gunmen singled out this particular individual, hence a purely financial motivation cannot be ruled out. Nonetheless, NGOs should be aware of the possibility of illegal check points during daylight hours (as the incident occurred at 1000 hrs).

In Shindand, tensions in regard to the Afghan Local Police (ALP) have continued after a quieter period observed in the previous cycle. On the 18th, two AOG members riding on a motorcycle shot and injured three ALP members in the northern part of Zirko Valley. Since the disagreement surrounding the recruitment of ALP in the district has become noticeable, along with tribal tensions in the area, further violence related to the ALP process cannot be excluded.


FARAH

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

This reporting period in Farah, AOG were quite active, initiating nine of the overall nineteen incidents documented so far. In the last two weeks, roadside IED deployment, and to a lesser extent direct attacks and intimidations continued to pose the main threat throughout the province. Bala Buluk District was again in the fore of AOG attention. Of note, the main road between Pusht Rod and Farah City witnessed two IED detonations. One IED detonated against an ANP vehicle on 19th of February and another explosive device detonated prematurely. In addition, two IED related incidents were reported in Shiwan Area, which is halfway along the road from Pusht Rod to Farah City. The outlook for the

short term is grim as AOG will most likely intensify their efforts to disrupt vehicular movement on this road in the coming weeks. Bakwa District, in Delaram Area, witnessed another important strand of IED activity, this time along the Herat-Kandahar Highway, with three discoveries.

AOG also showed their presence in Khaki Safed, with a direct attack on an ANSF/IMF on 18th of February in Karize-Mohabbat Area. This time, the action claimed the lives of one ANA and one ANP servicemen. The said district saw also an attack on ANSF/IMF convoy in Islamabad Village, resulting in two AOG members and one ANA soldier wounded. AOG also continued



the intimidation campaign against the local population in Pusht Rod as on the 20th an ALP recruit along with three local civilians was abducted in Massaw Area. The civilians were released two days later due to negotiation of local elders but the ALP remains in custody. In addition, a local elder was abducted on 21st in Nawbahar Village.

ANSF/IMF operations were rather limited during the present cycle. The most notable occurred on 25th of February in Khaki Safed where IMF conducted an operation supported by air assets, killing six AOG members, including a commander and arresting another six.

TRAINING NOTICE:

ANSO will be conducting free Basic Guard training and Radio Communications training for NGOs in **Mazar-e-Sharif City beginning on the 20th of March 2011**. Please note that the two training courses are separate, take one whole day each, and will only be available in Kabul City during this period; however, organisations with staff in the surrounding provinces are more than welcome to bring them in for training if feasible.

Additionally, note that registration for the training will be closed as of 1630 hrs on the 16th of March – NO EXCEPTIONS. And as usual, the ANSO trainer will be rotating through the ANSO field offices in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat City, Jalalabad City, and Kandahar City at later dates to also provide this training. (ANSO will notify you of these dates at a later time).

If you would like the ANSO Trainer to conduct either of these courses at your office for your staff, please refer to the registration forms emailed previously or contact the Operations Coordinator National Counterpart, Masoud Habibi, at operations2@afgnsso.org.


BADGHIS

Badghis continues to be the most ‘active’ province in the WR. During this period AOG activity concentrated in Murghab and Qadis districts. Whereas Murghab is historically an AOG spot, the changing security environment in Qadis should be underlined.

In Murghab, there were four IED discoveries (two in Akazai, one respectively in Mangan and Yoye Khaja Area) in the past two weeks. The district also experienced three direct attacks against ANSF checkpoints in Khami Malik, Sarkhaland and Mulla Baran Area and an additional two attacks on ANSF/IMF bases. Despite numerous past ANSF/IMF operations the security situation in the district remains highly

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

unstable. This cycle AOG and IMF continued to wrestle over the influence in Qadis District, with the latter raising the stakes with two air-strikes being called in during this period. On 18th of February, in Dara-e-Boom Area IMF air assets killed three AOG members, including one AOG commander. Three days later in Khmak Kabucha Village, reportedly three local civilians died as a result of another air strike. The use of air strikes in a very short interval indicates that the situation in Qadis is deteriorating. It is worth noting that so far, Qadis recorded air strikes in areas of Dara-I-Boom, Khirkhana, Chah Talkh and Qarachaghi. This deterioration in the security envi-



ronment seems to revolve around Dara-e-Boom, as the area accounted for 50% of all incidents reported in the district.


Inter-AOG clashes have continued as well with one incident reported on 21st of February in Qadis Khordak area. Also on the 21st in this same area, 21 AOG members, including two local AOG commanders, surrendered and handed over their weapons to NDS. Participation of local elements in the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Process (APRP) will likely further exacerbate tensions between opposition groups.

GHOR

Ghor remains relatively quiet with very few reported incidents (literally two) across the province, the defining factor being difficult winter conditions and limited mobility in the area. Beside an ammunition discovery reported in Chaghcharan City, an incident of note occurred on 22nd of February in Gorge Village of Barakhana Area (north-west of Chaghcharan) with supporters of a local commander from Du Layna snatching a significant amount of sheep from a rival camp, constituted by the supporters of an influential local commander assassinated in December 2010. ANP was deployed to the area to prevent an escalation of the situation and

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

negotiations were undertaken. Though it seems that the perpetrators gave back a portion of the loot; however, reports differ and some continue to claim that the issue has not been settled down yet. Till a solution is found, tensions will be likely to reoccur. It should be noted that the situation in Barakhana Area was assessed as potentially unstable since the assassination of its most influential local commander on 6 December 2010 in Allayer/Barakhana Area. Unconfirmed reports suggested that the supporters of the assassinated local commander singled out and took action against suspected perpetrators, who be-



longed to Barakhana, but had also links to the abovementioned local commander from Du Layna. In addition, unconfirmed reports also indicated that the supporters of the commander from Du Layna approached local authorities to take action against the suspected perpetrators. Therefore, the recent incident is very likely connected to these longer-term tensions. If the skirmishes continue, the issue may affect the security situation in the north of Chaghcharan.

EASTERN REGION

NANGARHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	2


In Nangarhar this period, the stand-out security incident was the suicide-based complex attack on the Kabul Bank branch in Jalalabad City, just 20 metres away from the Governor’s Palace, in which a total of 40 people were killed (including one INGO national staff member) along with 5 of the 7 suicide attackers and wounding a further 92 others, approximately 80 of which suffered significant injuries. While we have seen an acceleration in the campaign of suicide attacks – both in planning and in actual operations – across the east recently, this incident stood out for its sophistication, its deadliness, and its targeting of unarmed individuals – even if many of them were off-duty ANSF collecting their salaries, the stated target of the attack.

As such, it has generated considerable concern in Jalalabad, as the first such large-scale attack of its kind, with much dissatisfaction at ANSF and GOA officials’ capacities to keep their people safe, and was a key factor in the political stand-off that occurred days later, where key political leaders opposed to the Nangarhar Governor attempted to push him out, ultimately proving unsuccessful after the Governor received support from Kabul. A day after the attack, a facilitator who provided shelter and procured weapons for the attackers was arrested in the

environs of the city, and on the 23th ANSF arrested a local responsible for overall coordination of the attack, a carpenter from Kunar. Events of this severity, with such a high casualty figure, are rare, and as such it is unlikely to be repeated frequently, even if the suicide campaign is likely to continue through the year; moreover, the distaste felt among the local population for such tactics may cause them to be discontinued, because of the danger of for AOGs of such methods alienating Afghans.

While this event overshadowed the rest of the security picture in Nangarhar, a few other incidents are worthy of note. Firstly, the other NGO incident of the period in Nangarhar occurred in Bihsud district, where a recently opened NGO education centre received night letters purported to be from the IEA stating general opposition to un-Islamic influences on Afghanistan, followed the next day by a visit from armed men telling the guards they should close down their centre. Upon being informed that the syllabus was compatible with Islam and Islamic values, the armed men departed, in what seems to have been a case of a combination of lack of information and a predisposition to be suspicious about the work of a foreign organisation.

The second major incident took



the form of a hit-and-run SAF and rocket attack on the Nangarhar PRT late on February 24th, marking the first of such attacks in 2011 and the resumption of this pattern of strikes on the main regional IMF facilities that was particularly visible in October and November 2010, but which was quiet in December and January. Moreover, connected to this targeting, a roadside IED was discovered and defused outside of JAF on the Jalalabad-Torkham Highway two days prior to the attack.

On the IED front, volumes were slightly lower than in recent periods, although this is primarily a function of the shorter timeframe in the second half of February. There were 25% more discoveries than detonations, signaling the ANP’s ongoing effectiveness in this particular area of their work, and of note, there was one IED detonation and one discovery within Jalalabad City, the former at Angur Bagh Chowk and the latter at the city’s Kabul bus station. In Achin, an IED struck an ANP vehicle, killing 5 ANP and injuring another, while in another incident in that district, one AOG operative was killed after an IMF vehicle struck an IED and opened fire in response. Finally, in Bati Kot, where AOG gains have been distinctly visible in the first months of the year, an IED struck an ANA vehicle after dark on the main Jalalabad-Torkham Highway, although it was reported that no casualties were sustained.

KUNAR


Kunar’s general security environment remained much as it has been, with large numbers of direct attacks aimed at IMF and ANSF. As such, the most notable single incident was also the sole NGO incident recorded in the province. An NGO ambulance and its 4 occupants were abducted in the Matin area of Manogai district, as it transited the area coming to Asadabad from Nuristan’s Wanat village with a patient. This abduction occurred exactly two weeks after another NGO ambulance and its occupants were abducted in the same area during the previous reporting period. In both cases, all occupants were released by their kidnappers within 24 hours. As such, NGOs should be particularly careful about transiting the Pech Valley-Asadabad road in the future, due to what appears to be an AOG willing to target medical actors. Furthermore, having strong relations with local communities is vital, in allowing for a quick reaction to such incidents in an attempt to secure the release of abductees.

In the wider security picture of the period, direct attacks again constituted the primary type of AOG incident, with 24 recorded

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

incidents focused on the central belt of districts – Sirkanay, Khas Kunar, Chawkay, Manogai and Wata Pur. Outside of the pattern of direct attacks, there was an attempted kidnapping of two Iranian road construction engineers in Chawkay’s Ghafoor Khawar area, which was disrupted by the quick response of a nearby ANP CP, who managed to capture one AOG after a 30 minute exchange of fire. Chawkay, as well as Khas Kunar and Sirkanay, are influenced by a cross-border AOG that emphasises kidnapping for ransom, particularly against private construction company targets, and this particular incident is likely to be the latest example of that AOG’s activities in this direction. Furthermore, in Manogai a local contractor for a local ANA base was stopped and kidnapped at an illegal AOG CP, and later killed.

From the IMF side, a high number – approximately 60 – of civilian casualties were claimed to have arisen from a series of air strikes and artillery-based operations across the province and in Ghaziabad in particular. This occurred simultaneous to the begin-



ning by IMF of withdrawal from parts of the province, which will last a number of months, and has begun with the highly insecure Pech Valley; the stated intent is to focus on areas where IMF can have a more tangible impact, such as population centres – implicitly admitting that attempts at denying AOGs presence in the area there have not succeeded. Indeed, what is perhaps of most concern is that this comes in the run-up to the deployment from Kabul of an additional ANA corps into the region to be completed over the coming 2-3 months, which will result in a quadrupling of the number of ANA stationed in Kunar. This raises serious concerns about medium-term GOA and ANSF authority in Kunar, as this partial withdrawal and transition will be taking place at a time when the 2011 fighting season will be well underway, and where there are strong doubts as to whether the ANA will be able to hold the land they are ceded by IMF, given their training, motivation and resources, let alone actively take ground from the local AOGs.


NURISTAN

Only three incidents were recorded in Nuristan during this reporting period, the first being an inter-village dispute over rights of cultivation and grazing on the Pashaghar mountain, which descended into a fire fight killing two and wounding 5 more. The second incident occurred in Wama district, where AOG entered an ANP CP by unknown means and kidnapped the 5 ANP policemen stationed there. Four of the five were released, and a fifth is apparently still in custody; the intent appears to have been to loot the ANP of their weapons and supplies. Finally, further reports of AOG infighting have been received from Waygal, which is now effectively under AOG control, where it appears that AOG fighters associated with the overall provincial AOG commander and those aligned with

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

another group engaged in armed clashes in the Amesoza village area, leading to at least 2 killed. This is further evidence of the fact that AOGs present in this AOG stronghold are primarily concerned about inter-AOG power relations, broadly unchallenged by IMF or GOA actors as they are.

More generally, it appears that the withdrawal of IMF from Nuristan is effectively complete, with just a rump presence remaining at the Nurgaram PRT. It now seems unlikely that any further IMF operations will take place in the east of the province, and as such, the *de facto* ceding of the province appears to be underway, with just the provincial capital Parun remaining under partial GOA control; there is already little to no GOA presence in Mandol and Doab, and the small number of




ANSF, particularly ABP, that are stationed in Bargi Matal and Kamdesh are significantly under-resourced, including with some basic provisions. This should be seen in the light of the beginning of the phased withdrawal of IMF from those Kunar districts that border Nuristan (see Kunar in this section), which could catalyse AOGs based out of Nuristan to substantially step up their campaign to roll back the ANSF and GOA presence in Kunar. This is not necessarily a bad thing for NGO operations, as much of the AOG presence is local and broadly accepting of development actors, but it remains too early to read the full implications.

LAGHMAN

A number of significant NGO and other incidents occurred in Laghman during this reporting period, although the absolute number of incidents remained relatively low. Firstly, an INGO vehicle was involved in a car accident with an ANP Ranger vehicle, thankfully causing no fatalities, on the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway, which resulted in the impounding of the NGO vehicle in question, and the detention of its driver, both of which were subsequently released. This event highlights the fact that practicing good road safety, including wearing seatbelts, is of crucial importance, particularly on such a dangerous road. In the provincial capital Mehtarlam, ANP are reported to be asking all inbound vehicles their starting point, and thoroughly searching all vehicles and occu-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	1

pants that have come from Nangarhar. This seems to have started only recently, and shortly after the arrest of a foreign individual suspected to be on his way to carry out a suicide attack. As the individual is currently in custody, few details are known at present, but it is likely that this arrest is connected to the escalating suicide campaign being implemented in the eastern region, and the decision of Laghman ANSF officials to try to counter such potential suicide attacker infiltration. Also related to Mehtarlam, an IED was discovered on the main road to the city from the Surkhakan junction on the 19th, and later defused. This is the first such IED to be found on this road, suggesting an increased AOG presence on this stretch of road, which has until



now been relatively secure. In Alingar, an IED detonated near Parwa'i village, killing a child, and two days later IMF and ANA conducted a joint search operation in the same village, detaining 4 suspects. Only two AOG direct attacks were recorded, one occurring in Alishing's Kotalkay area, where they briefly attacked an ANP CP with heavy weapons and small arms, and the other occurring in Alingar's northern Nuralam Saheb valley, where AOG fighters ambushed an IMF convoy and engaged them for a number of hours. At the time of writing, no details are known about casualties.

KHOST


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Khost alone constituted 40% of all security incidents in the eastern region during this period. If in the rest of the region IMF have been relatively quiet, in Khost they have maintained, if not further upped, their intensity during this period, with at least 16 significant operations, demonstrating that the international military focus at the present in the region is very much on the Waziristan-based AOG that has broad sway over the south-east. The operations focused again on the belt of Sabari (6), Tere Zayi (5) and Bak (3), detaining a total of 47 AOG fighters and killing 4, with no reports that mid-level commanders were a component of these numbers.

However, in spite of these ongoing operations, the number of AOG attacks have not fallen, with 15 direct attacks, focused on Bak (3), Khost City (4) and, unusually, Tani (3). In one notable incident, a school-aged child threw a grenade at a passing IMF convoy, injuring a foreign soldier, with the other attacks cumulatively causing approximately 4 ANSF and 2 IMF

injured. There were also 24 IDF attacks spread across the province, particularly Bak, Khost City and Tere Zayi, including 2 rocket attacks on the main IMF facility in Khost City, one of which injured an IMF servicemember. However, none of the other IDF attacks caused any significant casualties or damage. Furthermore, there were 10 IED detonations and 10 discovery-disposals, a quarter of the total occurring in Khost City, and the rest spread across Nadir Shah Kot, Mando Zayi and Gurbuz in particular. Of note, in one premature IED detonation in a *madrassa* in Khost, a local cleric thought to be an AOG member was killed.

The period's AOG incidents included two suicide bombing-related incidents. The first consisted of a premature SVBIED detonation at an ANP CP in Khost City, near to both offices of the Khost Governor and the UN and in a bazaar area; the driver of the vehicle is thought to have triggered the explosives after realising that he was being followed, and as such it remains an



open question if the target was in fact the Governor's office. The casualties figures of the attack were 41 wounded and 10 killed, including 2 women and 2 ANP. The second event occurred on February 21st, when a 14 year old suicide bomber wearing a BBIED surrendered himself in Khost City to the ANP.

As such, Khost remains highly afflicted by insecurity, although the level of civilian casualties have recently been much lower when compared to the other provinces, Kunar and Nangarhar, in the eastern region where significant fighting is also occurring; this is primarily a function of the special forces-led form of the conflict in Khost. But the high number of security incidents from the AOG side, just as the IMF seeks to sustain the heavy pressure on the main AOGs operating there, powerfully demonstrates that the AOG in question is willing to offer substantial resistance to IMF pressure. As such, we can expect the conflict in the province to sustain itself and accelerate through the coming months.

PAKTYA

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Paktya’s winter lull remained in place, with a total of just 15 incidents recorded during the reporting period. Among these, there were 2 AOG direct attacks, one on an IMF patrol in Zurmat on the 16th, which led to the detention of one of the AOG fighters involved. The other occurred in Jaji, where an ABP patrol convoy was temporarily attacked by a group of AOG fighters.


Beyond these, the only other incident of violence occurred as a result of the kidnapping of a local road construction engineer hostage by the villagers of Shaheed village, Wuza Zadran, on February 15th. In retaliation, the PSC working with the company attacked the village with SAF and RPGs, killing one villager and injuring two, before the villagers took 18 of the PSC gunmen hostage, subsequently killing one and finally releasing the others to the ANP.

The only IED incidents recorded were discoveries, 6 in total, and spread across the districts of Zurmat (3), Shwak, Dand wa Patan

and Chamkanay. IEDs are particularly uncommon in winter, and this slight increase over last period is indicative of the fact that as the weather warms and the ground defrosts, IED volumes are likely to again increase in the province.

From the IMF side, just two incidents were reported. The first was an operation in Zurmat’s Tatang area, which led to an exchange of fire with AOG fighters and the ultimate detention of one of the fighters. The other took place on the 24th in Nisti Kot, just north of Gardez, where IMF arrested 6 suspects armed with AK47s, including what the IMF stated as one IED maker. Locals disagreed, saying there were simply civilians, who, as with many locals, happened to be armed, although it remains unclear what they were doing armed together outside one another’s homes.

In wider news, a new Civil Order Police HQ was opened in Zurmat, as part of efforts to strengthen ANSF presence in this particularly



volatile district. Further north, reports were received of multiple SBBIED infiltrations into the province through Dand wa Patan from Kurram Agency, where a new route appears to have opened up to the region’s dominant Waziristan-based AOG after the peace agreement in the agency between that AOG and the local Shia. Reports have also been received that this agreement is currently in a trial phase, and this would be consistent with the relatively low level of security incidents seen through this period; as such, there could be a substantial uptick in incidents in Paktya in coming months if the apparent trial goes off without difficulty for the parties involved. Connected to this cross-border dynamic, ANP conducted an operation in Dand wa Patan, on the border, on February 26th and arrested 5 individuals, including 2 Pakistanis, in connection to the kidnapping of the Turkish engineers which occurred in late January.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

SOUTHERN REGION


KANDAHAR

Kandahar Province witnessed a decrease in the overall rate of security incidents compared to the extremely active previous reporting period. Nonetheless, a series of notable incidents involving different tactics has been recorded across the province. On 24th of February in Spin Boldak District, an SVBIED detonated in Bazaar Area. The explosion resulted in one civilian killed, and another 16 civilians, six NDS, two ANBP officials wounded. This attack marks the third significant incident to occur in the district this year. Prior to this, on 7th of January a suicide attack took place as an individual equipped with a BBIED entered a public bathhouse located also in Bazaar Area and detonated his device. Three days later, on the 10th, a VBIED detonated against an ANP vehicle on the Kandahar-Spin Boldak Main Road in Zarif Bawri Area. The pattern of the recent attacks in this district seems to indicate that AOGs continue to focus their activities on Spin Boldak, in

	NGO Incidents
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effort to counter Colonel Razzik's Border Police, which have been known as active willing ally in assisting IMF operations in the province. Another incident of note occurred on 27th of February in Arghandab District (north of Kandahar City) as two successive IEDs detonated while a large crowd of spectators was watching a dog fight in the area of Sarkari Bagh. The incident resulted in nine civilians killed, five ANP and four civilians wounded. With regard to NGOs, this attack should serve as reminder that gatherings should generally be avoided as such events frequently involve the presence of officials or other AOG/ACG potential targets.

The AOG campaign of targeting GOA officials also continued this period. On the 18th, in Nakodak Village an IED detonated against the convoy of the Dand District Governor, causing no casualties. In Kandahar City, mobile 'hit teams' continue to target ANP officials or civilians associated



with the GOA. In the last two weeks an on-duty ANP official was shot and killed in District 2. On a different occasion, a tribal elder, who was also an unsuccessful candidate in the last parliamentary election, was gunned down by two individuals riding on a motorcycle in District 4. Finally, an ANP trainer was the target of a deadly attack in District 9. A rather unusual incident was reported also in District 4, Kabul Darwaza Area, when seven ANP were apparently poisoned by their cook at an ANP check post. The victims were transported to the hospital and their health condition is not life threatening. Whereas AOG direct attacks continued apace in Panjwayi, Zhari, Arghandab and Kandahar City, IED initiated incidents have dropped this reporting period. Of note, an IED attack against an IMF convoy occurred in District 7 of Kandahar City, wounding one child and one IMF soldier.

PAKTIKA


Incident levels in Paktika remained relatively low, given the intensely cold winter weather still affecting it, and the AOG control of much of the province’s rural territory. This is likely the primary reason why just 3 IED incidents were recorded during the period, and why 2 of the 3 occurred toward the end of the period; it is also likely that only as the ground defrosts will the province register the return to normal levels of this form of attack. The earliest such IED incident was the ANP discovery of two in the same location in the Saigana area of Khair Kot. Later in the period, on the 24th, an IED struck an IMF vehicle in Yahya Khel, injuring a soldier, and the following day an IED was defused in Sar Hawza. Related to IED incidents, two AOG members were arrested by ANP in Omna while carrying IED raw materials.

Barmal remained a particular focus for AOG-IMF conflict, with 2

	NGO Incidents
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of the 3 direct AOG attacks occurring there – one of which was a RPG and SAF attack on a patrol in the Margha area, and the other a similar attack on a convoy in the district centre. The other direct attack took place in Gomal, where AOG fighters attacked the DAC with SAF and RPGs. Two of the five IDF attacks also occurred in Barmal, both targeting the IMF base in the district, with the final incident registered there an IMF air strike on AOG locations in the district centre area. The other IDF attacks occurred in Dila and Gayan, where IMF bases were targeted, and Omna, where the DAC was the target.

Urgun found itself home to four reported IMF/ANSF operations during the period, the first three together leading to the detention of 3 AOG members, including one mid-level commander on February 20th believed responsible for IED attacks. The fourth, in



the Pir Koti area, led to the discovery and confiscation of a suicide vest and a motorcycle rigged with explosives, evidently waiting to be deployed for a (potentially complex) suicide operation. Other IMF operations took place in the Yahya Khel DAC, with an air strike against AOG positions, and Mata Khan’s Marjani village, where three suspected AOG members were arrested. Also of note, two separate UAVs crashed of technical faults during the period, marking a new record, one in Gomal and one in Khair Kot.

Finally, in an unusual incident, the Khushmand District Governor shot and wounded a local shopkeeper in the district bazaar over a personal dispute. It is unknown at the time of writing if the DG will face any punishment for this incident.

NOTICE:

ANSO ORIENTATION SERVICE

All newly arrived NGO international staff (**no contractors or consultants**) from ANSO-registered NGOs are welcome to attend the next ANSO NGO International Staff Orientation that is scheduled for **0830 hrs at the ANSO Headquarters in Kabul on the 23rd of March 2011**. (The briefing will last approximately 3.5 hrs).

Please note, this service is designed for newly arrived international staff that would like to be sensitised to ANSO services, trends in the conflict, the conflict’s historical basis and regional-specific contexts, the NGO operational context, and an analytical overview of NGO recent incidents.

Organisations interested in having staff attend should register by fully filling in the attached document and supplying it to the Operations Coordinator National Counterpart, Masoud Habibi, at operations2@afgnso.org no later than 1300 hrs on the 22nd of March 2011.


URUZGAN

The overall rate of security incidents reported in Uruzgan Province has slightly risen as compared to the previous reporting period. Furthermore, AOGs have conducted more direct attacks, particularly in the second week of this cycle. In the past two weeks, at least eight AOG direct attacks were reported in Tirin Kot with four such occurrences, in addition to two occurrences in Dihrawud and one in Chora. It is worth noting that although still limited in number, one of these attacks involved casualties. On 20th of February, in Tirin Kot District an IMF soldier and a national interpreter were killed as a result of the fire fight with AOG elements. Apart from direct attacks, AOG activity manifested itself with another incident of note, which took

	NGO Incidents
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place on the 16th, in Chalabi Village of Chora District, where AOG abducted two relatives of ANP officials.

IED related incidents continued to be prevalent across the province. This reporting period saw a total of 13 IED incidents reported in Tirin Kot and Chora districts, a significant decrease relative to 20 incidents reported in the PRP. As is often the case in this province, the large majority of these incidents were ANSF/IMF recovery and disposal operations. Both aforementioned districts witnessed IED that detonated against IMF patrols, however there were no reports of casualties associated with these incidents. In order to prevent AOGs from using



Uruzgan as a supply base for operations in other southern provinces, ANSF/IMF units have continued to carry out numerous search operations. In the past two weeks these operations were concentrated on main AOG area of operations i.e. Tirin Kot, Chora and Dihrawud districts. In seven separate search operations throughout the aforementioned districts ANSF/IMF seized mainly ammunition and IED making materials. Similar to the last reporting period these operations were accompanied by AOG detentions, with 17 suspected AOG members reported to have been arrested in Tirin Kot and Chora districts.


ZABUL

The incident levels in Zabul slightly increased during this reporting period, nonetheless the volumes remained in line with seasonal trends that had been observed during the same period last year. This reporting period, Qalat and Shinkay districts have experienced the large majority of AOG initiated incidents. Apart from two AOG direct attacks that were reported in Qalat District and an IED strike in Shinkay (all of them targeting IMF patrols with no casualty reported), AOG activity manifested itself in a series of attacks on officials and against a tribal elder. In Kharwaryano Area of Qalat District, AOG elements shot and wounded an NDS offi-

	NGO Incidents
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cial on 20th of February. The same district experienced another targeted attack against NDS personnel as an official was shot and killed in Bakirzi Area also on the 20th. Finally, five days later two AOG members riding on a motorcycle shot and killed a tribal elder of Mizan District in the vicinity of his house.

The pace of IED incidents has remained robust with five reported incidents, of which one device resulted in detonation. Of note, in two separate discovery and disposal operations ANP located two AT mines and two IEDs in Qala Khel Area of Shahjой District. ANSF/IMF opera-




tions conducted in Qalat, Shahjой and Arghandab districts resulted in various ammunitions, weapons and IED making materials seizure. In addition, security forces discovered a suicide vest in Sinak Area of Qalat District. Several arrests of AOG members have been reported as well in these districts, including an AOG weapon facilitator that has been detained in the latter district along with his associate.

HELMAND

Although the overall incident volume has decreased as compared to the last period, Helmand Province continues to be very unsecure with an extremely high number of security incidents. ANSO data shows an increase of around 89% in the overall incident volume as compared to the same period in 2010 (with an increase of 45 % in AOG initiated incidents only) indicating the current intensity of conflict in the province. So far the majority of AOG initiated incidents have been recorded in Nahri Sarraj, Nad Ali, Sangin and Musa Qala districts. Furthermore, the aforementioned districts accounted for 55 % of all IED strikes recorded throughout the province and more than 80% of AOG direct attacks. There were at least 32 IED strikes in the past

	NGO Incidents
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two weeks targeting mainly ANSF/IMF patrols which resulted in the reported deaths of one ANA soldier and two ANP, another ANA and five ANP were wounded. In addition, one civilian was reportedly killed in an IED strike in Musa Qala District. The most deadly IED related incident occurred on 25th of February in Garmser when a roadside IED hit an ANP vehicle, killing one ANP and wounding four others. Another notable AOG initiated incident consisted of killing of two civilian workers employed by the GOA for cleaning canals in Nawa-I-Barak Zayi District. In Lashkar Gah City on the 23rd, two unknown individuals also shot and wounded a local staff member of a development organization.




Although a criminal motivation for the attack cannot be excluded for this particular attack, it should be noted that AOGs frequently target for-profit development organizations which are perceived as being associated with IMF efforts and objectives. Another feature that may have additional impact on the already tense security environment in Helmand Province is the beginning of the eradication campaign that started in five districts of Helmand Province- Nawa-i-Barak Zayi, Nad Ali, Marjah, Garmser and Nahri Sarraj.

GHAZNI

A sharp downturn in the volume of reported security incidents has been recorded in Ghazni in the past two weeks. This decrease is most likely related to difficult weather conditions and heavy snowfalls reported across the province, particularly in Nawur, Ajristan, Malistan and Jaghuri districts. AOG indirect attacks have continued to decrease with no recorded incidence this reporting period (as compared to only one recorded in the last report), however direct attacks remain the AOG's tactic of choice throughout the province. These attacks were led against various targets (IMF convoys, a road construction company or PSC escorting an

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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IMF logistical convoy) and were focalised on Andar, Waghaz and Qarabah districts. Similar to the previous report, AOG 'hit and run' tactics, in order to avoid the prolonged engagements with security forces, concluded in no casualty reported in the past two weeks. With regards to IED deployment, three explosive devices were reported to have detonated across the province (an increase as compared to one recorded in the PRP). The main target remains ANSF/IMF vehicle with two separate strikes that damaged ANP and IMF vehicles in Ghazni and Andar but caused no casualties. However, on 27th of Febru-



ary in the later district, an IMF vehicle was hit by an IED resulting in six IMF soldiers wounded. ANSF/IMF operations were limited this period with five search operations launched in Ghazni, Dih Yak and Qarabagh districts. Beside a quantity of weapons and ammunitions, six AOG members were arrested, including a mid-level AOG commander who was detained in Nawi Area of Qara Bagh District.



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advisoryboard@afgnso.org

ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised militias) / **DC**-District Centre / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **IMF**-International Military Forces / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device / **PDO**-Private Development Organisation / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police / **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative / **IEA**-Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-District Shadow Governor (IEA)

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Nimroz

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES: Advisory Board email address

ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the ANSO Advisory Board at advisoryboard@afgnso.org.