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THE ANSO REPORT

Inside this Issue

<i>Central Region</i>	2-7
<i>Northern Region</i>	8-15
<i>Western Region</i>	16-18
<i>Eastern Region</i>	19-24
<i>Southern Region</i>	25-28
<i>ANSO Info Page</i>	29

YOU NEED TO KNOW

- General Daoud killed in explosion in Takhar
- Herat PRT comes under sustained attack
- Mass civilian casualties in IMF airstrike in Do Ab, Nuristan
- Ghazni, Khost and Paktya deteriorate severely

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

In the CENTRAL REGION, a lone BBIED managed to penetrate a military hospital in KABUL, killing 6, despite a generally improved level of ANSF capacity. In WARDAK, the migration of Kuchis caused tension in Daymirdad while in Nirkh IEA and HIG came to blows. In LOGAR, local AOGs stole equipment from deminers while in PARWAN ANSF operations in the Ghorband valley succeeded in temporarily clearing AOGs out.

In the NORTHERN REGION, an explosive device detonated at high level government meeting in TAKHAR on the 28th, killing the Northern Region Police Commander General Daoud and five others. The death of General Daoud may forebode political turmoil in the region and beyond. Elsewhere the killing of women in an IMF night raid sparked violent demonstrations in Taloqan city. In FARYAB, intense IMF-ANSF/ AOG clashes in Almar are resulting in internal displacement. In Chahar Dara, KUNDUZ, an IMF soldier is killed by an IED while AOGs target militias in Gorteppa, killing three. In BAGHLAN an IED targets ANP in Pul-i-

Kumri while night raids and 'reintegration's' occur elsewhere. In JAWZJAN, AOG target cell phone towers and establish vehicle check posts on the Shiber-gan-Sar-i-Pul road. In SARI-PUL itself, AOGs target ANP and militias in Sayyad.

In the WESTERN REGION, on May 30th a combination of suicide bombers, IEDs and infantry engaged the PRT in HERAT city for more than six hours in what was likely an attempt to discredit the transition process. In GHOR, NGO staff were intimidated. on two separate occasions, by AOGs on the roads in, and in to, Chaghcharan while in Pasaband armed local hooligans assault NGO clinic staff . AOGs in Pasaband and Taiwara continue a low level campaign of ambush and IED against ANSF. In FARAH and BADGHIS civilians continue to be killed by IEDs.

In the EASTERN REGION, a BBIED targets an irregular force commander in Alishing, LAGHMAN. In KUNAR an NGO clinic sustains collateral damage in a highly unusual SVBIED strike on the IMF while ANSF and IMF collaborate

effectively to repel attacks in Mano Gai. In NANGAHAR, NGO staff are arrested by IMF and threatened by AOG while a substantial SVBIED kills 15 in an attack on the Regional Training Centre. In NURISTAN, a major AOG forces captures Do Ab district. Up to 150 persons— including ANSF and civilians—are killed in IMF airstrikes to recapture it. ANSF Ops in Waygal are ineffective at restoring it to GOA control. In KHOST up to 4 AOGs target ANP QRF in a 5 hr battle. In PAKTYA, there is a mass murder of 36 local construction workers in Wuzu Zadran while in Gardez district 30 NGO deminers are abducted and released unharmed.

In the SOUTHERN REGION, with the exception of NIMROZ, all provinces continue to experience a high volume and velocity of incidents. Notable events include, in PAKTYA, the assassination, by silenced pistol, of the district NDS chief and the break up of a suicide cell in Yaha Khiel district and in HELMAND the attempted assassination of the Provincial Governor.

CENTRAL REGION

KABUL


Although AOGs conducted several significant strikes in Kabul this period—including a BBIED in Wazir Akbar Khan, an RCIED against an ANP contractor in Musaye, a strike on the Surobi section of the highway to Jalalabad, and a less significant night-time rocket attack against Kabul Airport—the momentum remained with the ANSF. As in the previous cycle, ANSF-IMF authored 80% of the security incidents in the province.

Around mid-day on the 21st of May, a single BBIED attacker wearing an ANA uniform entered the Daud Khan Military Hospital (a MoD facility), walked into the canteen where the medical staff were having lunch, and detonated his charge. The blast left 6 fatalities and dozens injured. NDS followed swiftly with a series of arrests in Shakardara (all inside one *qawm*, or extended family). The strike, sanctioned by the IEA, was executed with precision along recently emerged TTPs elsewhere in the country: the exploitation of soft-targets among the ANSF-IMF security personnel, the use of an ANA uniform (or even of a sleeping agent), and the deployment of a solo suicide attacker. The use of a single operative stands out in comparison with the simultaneous attacks recorded in

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

other regional centers recently, Herat City and Kandahar City in particular. A single BBIED has proven both effective and economical in Kabul, with the full devastating potential of the TTP appearing this cycle in Takhar. It is highly likely that AOG networks in Kabul City will continue to explore this tactical method in the future. The trends for 2011 comprise one suicide attack in Kabul City every three weeks.

An additional number of recent incidents require further assessment, in particular the two separate cases of IED discoveries in the Daud Khan Military Hospital (days after the BBIED strike at the location), and inside the drug store in the Baba Shah Mina Hospital (a civilian GOA-operated facility in PD 12). In the rural districts, Surobi (Sari Tapa, Liwan), Shakardara (Boyazar), Paghman (Daraye Pashai), Deh Sabz (Tarakhel) and Bagrami (Alu Khel, Dashti Botak) witnessed a number of IMF-ANSF operations. Of note to NGOs, several sizeable discoveries of stockpiled IED materiel and mines and arrests of IED operatives have been performed by ANSF and IMF in Surobi. The coming weeks may see the Surobi section of the Highway become a more sig-



nificant point of contention. NGOs should monitor eventual changes in AOG TTPs, noting IED deployment in particular.

Observing the developments in other regional centers, Kabul Province and the capital city constitute only a secondary area of interest for AOGs, with local considerations (such as the cost/benefit ratio) outweighed by AOG strategic and tactical focus on other regions. AOG-instigated violence also remains just one amongst many NGO risk factors in Central, the others including the clashing ‘business’ interests of powerful warlords (Paghman, Deh Sabz), the scope for public gatherings to turn violent (when grievances and frustrations of different kinds meet with the necessary level of organization) and urban criminality due to the mere size of the population amassed in the capital. In addition, political developments such as the killing of general Daud in Takhar, the ‘northern’ stream of legal opposition to the current establishment (centred around Panjshiri opposition figures), as well as the top-level negotiations among GOA representatives and Kuchi & Hazara leaders in the aftermath of Kuchi migration to Wardak were all factors debated by NGO security managers, although the impacts of any such developments on the NGO security paradigm are yet to be seen.


LOGAR

In the early morning of the 28th of May, five armed AOG members entered a local NGO demining site in Dehi Manaka (Zarghun Shahr Area), where sixty deminers were getting ready for the morning shift. The gunmen confiscated 16 VHF handsets, leaving the site shortly afterwards. Several IMF-ANSF operations have targeted the area recently and reinforced checkpoints have been implemented on the main access alleys. The robbery came weeks after the AOG destruction of a telecommunication mast in the area, and shortly followed a series of ANSF-IMF searches targeting IED cells. In the evening of the 23rd of May, an effective RCIED strike left 1 IMF killed and 3 IMF injured on the main road in Zarghun Shahr. Unlike in the East (Paktya, Khost, Nangarhar), where some of the recent incidents involving demining organizations could have stemmed from deliberate AOG efforts to expel the agencies from AOG areas of interest (for instance as a part of preparation for an intensive IED deployment), the Zarghun Shahr case seems solely motivated by the seizure of the lucrative VHFs. The authors did not seem to have an issue with the NGO programming in the area.

Overall, the incident volume stayed on par with the levels rec-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

orded during the previous reporting period. Major IMF-ANSF operations continued in the population centers of Baraki Barak, Puli Alam and Charkh. A night raid in the Sheikhan Area of Charkh sparked several demonstrations (reaching up to the Charkh DAC), and resulted in a series of additional arrests by security forces. AOG concentrated on sporadic close-range strikes against security forces in Baraki Barak and Puli Alam, while documented IED deployment dropped from 5 cases in the previous period (all neutralized) to 2 incidences (the mentioned RCIED blast in Zarghun Shah, and an additional IED discovery on the district road in Ali Khel, Baraki Barak). More significant than attacks against security forces were the cases of targeted killings and other form of intimidation, readily performed by mobile AOG squads right in the population centers, as well as along major roads. In the most prominent case, the head master of Porak Boys' School was gunned down on the highway in Porak on the 23rd of May (during the attack, his young son, seated on the motorbike behind his father, also sustained injuries). Although the motives remain unclear, local accounts reported that the head master had ignored several AOG grievances related to



the school establishment. A correlation exists between this attack and the presence of a particular AOG with a local agenda, responsible for the bombing of the girls' school in the same area in October 2010. Besides these two attacks, targeting of school establishments in Logar has become rare since 2008, as opposed to thirty cases recorded between 2006 and 2008. Also of note this cycle, Porak, the adjacent Niyazi, and Qalai Juma regularly witnessed AOG elements moving with ease on the highway in the late afternoon hours.

Further in contrast with rather low incident volumes, AOG fighters continued to infiltrate the province. Literally all the districts contain mature AOG structures. The recent election of a 'HIG shadow provincial governor' may represent an additional development of significance, and eventually cause a concern for the IEA (or at least for the current IEA TPSG, who had spent several years in HIG captivity in the past). Yet, as pointed out in previous reports, Logar-based AOGs including IEA and HIG are usually able to strike pragmatic alliances of convenience when facing concerted action from the security forces; the implications of such 'political' truces need to be assessed over a longer period of time.


NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the **25th of May 2011.**

KAPISA

In Kapisa, down-ward trends and low incident volumes were noticed this period. AOGs staged three mostly ineffective attacks against IMF-ANSF premises in Tagab (a close-range SAF assault and a failed rocket attack against ANP checkpoints in Malaya and Tatar Khel, and an IDF against the IMF outpost in Jalokhel), combined with two RCIEDs targeting security convoys in Afghaniya along the main access road to Tagab (which was also the target of several ANA-ANP-NDS operations). Similarly to the situation in Logar, the low number of incidents is in disparity with heavy AOG presence along the main district roads and in population centers. It is yet to be determined to what extent the current status quo reflects tangible

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

security gains on the side of the IMF-ANSF, or whether the current calm is rather a result of an AOG ‘waiting out’ strategy. The presence of foreign fighters was highlighted in Tatar Khel (Tagab) when an AOG unit attempted to target an ANP post with a rocket. During manipulation, the main operator accidentally dropped the projectile, which then detonated, killing himself and injuring his two colleagues. Local ANP established that the killed fighter was ‘a Chechen’ (a term often generically used for fighters from the post-Soviet countries), while his wounded accomplices were local. In the West, the string of make-shift IEDs continued with the discovery of another device on the link road to Koh Band in



Sanjan (Kohistan I), not far away from the site of the IED strike recorded last period (Tape Malik). The area is located just across the district border from Dizd Dara (Koh Band), where a civilian motorcyclist died in an IED blast in January. So far this year, the deployment of 8 road-side devices (including 3 detonations) has been attributed to the local unsophisticated AOG. At this stage, the activity does not constitute a substantial risk factor for NGO movements in the area, although caution and local awareness is advisable. In particular, movements in vehicles which from a distance may resemble security convoys should be avoided.

WARDAK

A steady growth in incident volumes characterized this cycle in Wardak. The province hosted every second AOG attack staged in Central Region. The yield of over thirty AOG-authored escalations also represents a 30% annual increase when compared to the same period in 2010.


The perennial issue of Kuchi migrations has resurfaced in the north-west of the province (Daymirdad, Behsud I & II, Jalrez), threatening to destabilize the current precarious balance between the nomads and the sedentary communities. The first reports came from Daymirdad, with the Kuchis making their way through the district towards the Helmand Valley in Behsud and clashing with ANP on two occasions. In anticipation of violence, a substantial part of Daymirdad's Hazara population vacated the areas along the access corridors, with a smaller group of residents retreating towards the DAC, and others leaving the district. At a later stage, an approximate 200 nomad families set up camps in Tehzak and Kajao, and an additional stream reached the site thru Jalrez. Despite the altercations in Kajao, Dashte Qutub Khel and in the eastern parts of Daymirdad, the on-going negotiations leave the scopes for peaceful resolution open (similar to the agreements reached last year). In counter-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

point, several risk factors still remain in play - in particular the presence of mobilized armed networks (offering also a more 'politicized' version of the issue) and the nomads' outreach deep into the Helmand Valley in Behsud, reminiscent of the situation preceding the violent clashes in 2009. The next days will tell as to the scope for open conflict to erupt between the communities.

Another recurrent vector in Wardak, the IEA units in Nirkh once again engaged local HIG networks, and failed again in evicting the rival party from the province. During a clash in Sad Murda (28 May), the IEA lost its leading military commander, himself the main champion of IEA aggressive stance towards HIG in the district. Whereas such a setback may prompt the IEA leadership to deploy more resources into Nirkh in the short term, it is rather expected that the IEA will dedicate its capabilities to the pursuance of the main cause.

Otherwise, the Saydabad section of the Kabul – Ghazni Highway attracted a major portion of AOG activity, with a combined 21 close-range attacks & IED blasts recorded so far this period (as opposed to only 5 such attacks during the equivalent cycle last year). AOGs remain committed to attacks against security and IMF-



contracted convoys (as demonstrated for instance by 6 IED blasts on the highway this cycle). The frequency of fighting on the road combined with steady traffic flows brings about the certitude of collateral civilian casualties. This cycle, one civilian was killed and an additional two were wounded on separate occasions, all of the victims impacted by SAF in the proximity of convoys under attack. However, civilians associated with IMF-contractors do constitute an explicit target, legitimized earlier this year in the IEA announcement of the Operation Badar. Noor and Salar Areas witnessed abductions of local drivers associated with the supply convoys. In the former case, two individuals were taken from their houses; in the latter, the driver was abducted when his truck was blocked and burned on the highway. The abductions occasionally end up with the payment of a large ransom from the victim's family, but direct execution of the abductee is a more typical outcome, serving the AOG intimidation campaign. Such was the fate of another driver, whose body was recovered by ANP in the Puli Sukhta Area (Nirkh) this cycle. To make the picture complete, reports this cycle also reiterated frequent AOG check-points on the highway, usually set up in the late afternoon hours in Salar, Shash Gaw and Sheikhabad.

BAMYAN


In the absence of criminality for the second consecutive cycle, external factors have dominated the security paradigm in Bamyan, in particular the linkages to Baghlan-based AOGs and the access via Parwan and Wardak.

On the night of May 22nd, two senior IEA commanders were killed by IMF-ANSF in Daka (between Puli Khumri and Dushi) in Baghlan. It has been put forward after the operation that one of the commanders was a member of the IEA military leadership in Bamyan. Bamyan IEA structures are actually rather a theoretical concept,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

cept, with the core of relevant IEA effectives constituted of Baghlan-based fighters. In this regards, the Tala wa Barfak – Kahmard road represents the main vector of insecurity, although security incidents along this route remain rare.

Occasional IED activity in the Ghorband Valley (Parwan) and kinetic attacks along the road in Jalrez (Wardak) remain issues of concern for NGOs in Bamyan in terms of collateral exposure (AOGs in both provinces concentrate on targeting security forces, including the PSCs). Bamyan ANP indeed



recorded three casualties resulting from the RCIED strike in Ghorband on the 15th of May. In counterpoint, Jalrez AOG structures comprise a much better developed network (whereas the district also hosts a plethora of local criminal networks, bringing an unpredictable element onto the NGO security map). The Parwan Route is currently assessed as less risky for NGO travels than the Wardak alternative.

PARWAN


AOG attacks in the Ghorband Valley have doubled since the announcement of Operation Badar. This cycle, Ghorband witnessed a number of IMF-ANP operations, with the IEA campaign running apace. Irregular IED activity on the main road to Bamyan remains a major concern for NGOs, though the deployments usually fall outside of the 0900 hrs – 1500 hrs and target the security forces. Yet, the majority of AOG-authored incidents (5 out of 9) were IDF attacks against security facilities in Chaharikar, Jabalussaraj and Bagram.

In Ghorband, two police operations swept across the DACs and northern side valleys of Siyagerd and Shinwari. The first initiative was carried out solely by ANP (13-16 May), largely in response to the abduction and a killing of a Jamiati commander in Wazhgar. The operation yielded only four arrests (in Wazhgar, Duzd Dara and Saydan). When the ANP retreated, an AOG abducted a local elder, probably in retribution for the community allowing the police force to investigate the area (as in several other parts of Ghorband, ANP usually seek the clearance of village elders prior to entering the communities). Following an intervention of the local shura, the elder was released unharmed ten days later, revealing that he had been

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	

warned by the AOG to refrain from his frequent meetings with GOA authorities in the DAC and in the provincial capital.

The second operation targeted the wider Quli Hir Area, and included an IMF element seconded to the ANP. On the 28th of May, a convoy of five IMF and four ANP vehicles came under SAF and RPG attack during transit in Dara Kafshan. The results of the operation are yet to be corroborated, though local sources confirmed that the core AOG force withdrew from the area as did the IMF-ANP force at a later stage. Such one-time police efforts remained futile in the past, as the initiatives failed to leave any permanent police presence behind. On a positive note, local AOGs have so far refrained from interfering with NGOs, a behaviour largely determined by the acceptance levels of NGO programming inside the communities. The opposite is true for the infrastructural projects implemented by private contractors, especially when these are dominated by local commanders turned entrepreneurs. Other conflicts pertain to the usual disputes over access to land and water. During this cycle, an unknown attacker broke inside a private residence further up the road in Sheikh Ali District, and used a



hunting rifle to kill a local malek (who was also a former commander and a member of Ittihad Islami).

A combined 5 IDF attacks targeted police and military facilities in Bagram, Chaharikar and Jabalussaraj. The Bagram Airfield base witnessed an accurate strike, with a single 107mm rocket causing numerous casualties among the personnel. Besides the IDF, increased IED activity is expected throughout the summer months on the roads in the vicinity of the Base. In Chaharikar and Jabalussaraj, the Korean PRT base is the usual recipient of IDF and RPG attacks. This period two RPGs also impacted in the vicinity of the ANP checkpoint in the bazaar of Jabalussaraj, reminiscent of similar attacks in the past. Local observers often point out criminal motivations behind such attacks, namely on-going power struggles among local commanders. In another show-case of local power-struggles, a local Jamiati commander was gunned down in an execution style killing in Guzare Payeen of Jabalussaraj.

Lastly, the IMF and NDS reported a number of AOG arrests, including a night raid against an AOG cell in Chaharikar City, which yielded the seizure of two suicide vests and the arrests of three AOG members.

NORTHERN REGION

KUNDUZ


Although security incident reporting has remained consistent (and relatively high) in Kunduz Province over the last 2 months, this trend is likely to change in June, as widely circulated reports have surfaced that a new military operation (Operation “Omaid”) is being launched with the mandate to clear Kunduz Province of any AOG presence. This reporting period, Kunduz was again the most volatile province in the region, with 30 security incidents. Following a series of high profile BBIED attacks that took place in the first quarter of 2011, Kunduz security has remained steady, showing no significant escalation or deterioration over the last 3 reporting periods.

Breaking down security reporting further, Kunduz District saw the most security incidents in the Province, with the majority (8 of 11) consisting of military operations and/or IED discoveries. Exceptions

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

to these included an attack on a pro-government militia position in Ghortepea area (May 28)—which resulted in the deaths of 3 militia-men and injuries to 11 others—and the detonation of an IED on the vehicle of a former Jihadi commander on the 18th in Khawaja Ghaltan area.

Outside of Kunduz District, the province maintained the usual high rate of insecurity in common hot spots, with 7 security incidents recorded in Khanabad—including an illegal checkpoint by ACGs in Nikpai Area on the 18th—and 5 in Chahar Dara—including multiple IEDs detonation on IMF vehicles in Zadran Village on the 25th, 1 of which resulted in the death of an IMF soldier and injuries to 2 others. In total, Kunduz, Khanabad, and Chahara Dara accounted for 23 of the 30 recorded security incidents.




In regards to the upcoming military operations: While it is impossible to accurately predict the scope of military actions that Operation Omaid will entail, it is difficult to predict an end result different than what has occurred frequently with operations of this ilk. Established trends would point to this operation causing a notable short term lull in insecurity inside the target areas, as AOGs hunker down to avoid direct confrontations, potentially creating a small window of perceived security. It would further seem likely that this window would diminish as Operation Omaid draws to a close, and eventually give way to a short spike in attacks as AOGs seek to re-establish their ability to conduct operations. However, this represents established regional trends, and further assessment is required to determine whether this operation follows the same patterns.

BALKH

Although there were 17 security incidents in Balkh Province, it was the death of General Daoud in Taloqan (see Takhar)—the commander of all northern police forces—that left the greatest impression. General Daoud—based out of Mazar-e Sharif—was considered by many the pre-eminent Jamiat leader in the North, and was known for his strong drive to combat AOGs rather than as a politician. The tangible effect that his death may have on the security paradigm is debatable—and will take time to assess, as the north waits to see who surfaces as his replacement (and from what political party). Predictions about the lasting consequences of his death range from outbreaks of political violence (as they scramble to assign blame and lobby to have their party fill the vacant position) to boosting the morale of AOGs (who took responsibility for the attack hours after it happened) to opening a wider door for GOA/AOG peace talks. How the government deals with—and fills—his loss will be a process that the entire region observes. In the meantime, his death is expected to play a prominent short term role in regional security, with expectations that services—and perhaps demonstrations—will surface as local communities and political parties consider the ramifications of his death. In terms of insecurity in the province, Chimtal and Chahar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

Bolak displayed increasingly maturing AOG networks. Although it is widely assumed that these are already acting at their full capacity, the eradication of poppies from a few villages across Chimtal on the 17th May may have prompted an additional series of attacks. Anecdotal reports from the area suggest that AOGs had asked or ordered villagers to grow these crops in order to finance their operations, and that in return, the AOGs bought the crops and promised to protect them. 5 incidents occurred in the district concomitantly to the eradication efforts, including an IED detonation on an ANP vehicle on the 18th in Chimtal village, 2 incidents on the 20th in Arab Mazari village (an AOG ambushing the ANP, followed by an IED detonation on an ANP vehicle a few hours later), an IDF (7 mortar rounds fired at an ANP checkpoint near Hotaki village on the 21st), and on the 24th, SAF attacks against an ANP near the gas pipeline checkpoint around Pashma Qala and Imam Sahib villages. On the 24th in the neighbouring Chahar Bolak, an AOG engaged an ANP patrol along the main Mazar-Shibirghan road in a fire-fight that caused damages to a civilian bus caught in the crossfire. Elsewhere, AOG activity has declined in Kishindih District to the far south of Balkh, whereas Sholgara District has seen a steady pace of manifest-



ed insecurity—much of it AOG related—with 4 incidents this period, including an AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint along the main Sholgara-Mazar road. Sholgara has seen an increase in activity this year, with 18 security incidents recorded thus far (nearly twice as many as the 10 it witnessed between January and June in 2010).

The deterioration of security in Sholgara and eastern Jawzjan may be linked to the maturing of AOGs in Chimtal and Chahar Bolak, who seem to be increasing their influence across various districts in Balkh and further. A new set of military operations has been planned to quell this, however, it is questionable what sustained effect these will have, as it appears that year to year, the infrastructure in these 2 districts has remained and matured, so that when AOGs are temporarily forced from their operating areas (after—for instance—last December’s Operation Ebtekar) they return after operations cease to a better prepared infrastructure, support base, and operations level, allowing them to make slowed but incremental gains.

Incidents within Mazar-e Sharif City included multiple reports of military helicopters performing night ops between the 29th and 31st, 2 reports of SAF—both the results of ACGs, and a UXO explosion which killed 4 children in PD#8. Finally, Zari District was the site of yet another road robbery, marking the 5th such incidence this year.

FARYAB

Despite the launch of Operation “Wahdat 2”, a new effort to clear the Andkhoy – Maymana road in the north of Faryab, it was deteriorating security in the southern cradle of Faryab (Qaysar, Almar, Kohistan, Pahstun Kot, and Bilchiragh) which remained the primary concern for NGOs working in the province. The pertinent question is whether increased insecurity in these districts is affecting NGO access, and to what extent conflict in the southern districts is affecting security within Maymana City—a city that has seen little demonstrated AOG activity, and has anecdotally remained under strong GOA control.

NGO reports from the province suggest that Maymana continues to host an operable environment, although some anecdotal reports hint that an undercurrent of mistrust of “foreigners” has arisen since the demonstrations that occurred after the burning of the Koran, and the violence—mostly aimed at the PRT—that took place just following it. However, conflicting reports tell differing stories.


While the areas in Qaysar and Almar directly bordering Ghormach were continuously referred to for their heightened insecurity, outside of these areas, most NGOs claimed to

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

maintain decent access amidst an increased presence of AOG actors. How the conflict, resulting instability, and increased AOG presence in the southern districts is specifically effecting Maymana remains unclear.

Civilian-military relations in the city remain strained, as illustrated by the recent firing of an RPG at the PRT in Maymana on the 12th, and perhaps due to incidents such as the accidental firing of a grenade by a returning IMF patrol near the ANP HQ in Almar, which resulted in at least 1 civilian death (constituting 1 of 5 security incidents in the district this reporting period). Just following the burning of the Koran, it was elders from Qaysar who were reportedly most active in coming to Maymana, seeking to start demonstrations.

However, it is southern Faryab—and Almar in particular—which was the focal point of insecurity this reporting period. With GOA/IMF/AOG fighting going on, a large number of IDPs have been forced to move towards the district centers of those districts bordering Ghormach. AOGs from Ghormach may be creating a more controlled environment within these districts—with the potential to limit NGO access—while further east, an increased presence is



being noted in Kohistan and Pashtun Kot as well. It should be noted that the IDPs—victims of the general instability throughout the south of Faryab—have reported fleeing the entire conflict, with anecdotal reports surfacing that many of them have specifically voiced concern over night raids and aerial bombardments.

Kohistan to the south may also be coming more under the influence of AOGs, and acting as a rally point for AOG forces, with anecdotal reports suggesting that AOGs are moving in and out of communities, on occasions forcing families to feed and shelter them. Further sources suggest that Pashtun Kot may be in a similar situation, despite the overall low incident volumes (1 security report this period). It should be noted that NGOs do not all agree on the extent to which this has (or may in the future) affected their access.

Notable amongst the 3 AOG incidents in Almar this period was a clash that took place in Kaftar Khan Uzbekia village between villagers and an AOG. Qaysar saw a further 3 security incidents, including an IED detonation on 2 civilians, the discovery of 6 IEDs, and on May 21st, the AOG abduction of 2 alleged spies from Khwaja Kinti area. Such accusations & abductions remain a tactic of AOG intimidation and control, reported in increasing numbers throughout the region.

TAKHAR

Approximately 2 months of improved security in Takhar—which was translating to improved access for NGOs—was violently disrupted when an IED detonated in Taloqan City at approximately 1640 hours on May 28th. The blast killed at least 6 individuals including General Daoud—the North Regional Police Commander—and the Takhar Provincial Chief of Police, and injured an additional 10-15 more, including the Commander of RC-North and the Provincial Governor. This attack took place just a week after 2 demonstrations against an IMF night raid occurred on the 18th and 19th, both of which resulted in significant violence.

Reconstructing the chain of events, the violence started late on the evening of the 17th with an IMF night raid—allegedly targeting an AOG weapons dealer—which ended in at least 4 deaths and a number of arrests. Amongst those killed were 2 women. Despite reports released by IMF claiming that the women had attacked them during the raid, the community was furious—decrying that an inappropriate assault had taken place on the women, and that the victims had been innocent members of a family rather than legitimate targets. This was the initial impetus for the demonstration which took place on the 18th that grew to


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

well over 1,000.

The demonstration occurred in Taloqan City, and while the vast majority of demonstrators remained in the centre of the city, a subdivision branched off and marched to the Provincial Assistance Team (PAT). At the PAT the demonstrators threw rocks and make shift explosives into the compound, setting off a number of fires, as PAT guards shot warning shots. It appears both sides were armed, and at some point shots were fired by the PAT guards, IMF, ANP, and the demonstrators, resulting in at least 7 demonstrators killed and over 80 injured (incl. at least 4 PAT guards and 2 IMF) in violence that did not cease until ANSF reinforcements arrived to clear the streets at 1400.

The following day (May 19th) a second demonstration—considerably smaller than the first—took place (mostly around the ANP HQ). While this one resulted in violence as well (ANP motorcycles set on fire, and at least 7 additional casualties amongst the demonstrators), fresh security reinforcements made a number of arrests and regained control without the same level of violence occurring as the day prior.

The demonstrators—whom were mostly Jumbesh—put forward a list of demands



which included top local government authorities stepping down (all of them Jamiat) and the removal of the PAT from Taloqan. Although the anger over the night raid was real, it appears likely that Jumbesh party members—unhappy with their lack of political representation in the previously contested city—had also used the incident to further a political agenda. The deadline for the demands to be met was moved back a number of times as members of the Ministry of Interior from Kabul and General Daoud—based out of Mazar—got involved. Although political tensions subsequently ceased, the issue remained unresolved when the above IED attack took place at the Provincial Governor’s office during a high level meeting chaired by General Daoud, and including the provincial governor and the commander of RC-North.

The death of General Daoud—a charismatic leader of the Jamiat party—is sure to cause an increase in tensions not only between the GOA and AOGs (who claimed responsibility for the attack mere hours later), but also between the historically tense Jamiat and Jumbesh parties in Taloqan as they seek to refill the position and assign blame. In the immediate future, this is likely to result in some amount of civil unrest throughout Takhar and the greater North, as General Daoud supporters from all sides seek to make sense of this attack and what it means going forward (see Balkh section).

BAGHLAN


The detonation of an IED on an ANP vehicle in Puli Khumri on the 31st—causing the death of 1 ANP and injuries to 2 others—disrupted an otherwise quiet reporting period in Baghlan Province. Other than the explosion—a rare occurrence in Baghlan recently—military operations and the surrender of former combatants made up the rest of the security reporting recorded, with 2 night raids in Dushi District, and a night raid and an airstrike in Tala Wa Barfak.

The explosion—occurring on the 31st at approximately 0945 hours—marked the first AOG attributed incident since an April 27th clash in Dushi District between pro-government militia members and an AOG. In Puli Khumri, it was the first AOG initiated incident since an attack on an IMF convoy took place along the main Puli-Khumri - Kabul road on January 19th. While Baghlan is known to have a strong AOG presence, the province has seen a considerable lull in activity as Operation Nowruz has focused military operations on the northern districts for 2 months straight, with operations creeping further south recently as

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

incident reporting has done the same.

In Dushi District—the quiet district which saw an uncharacteristic spike in insecurity around April this year—a night raid in Kalagai Area (Daka Village) early on the 23rd resulted in the killing of 4 AOG members, including the District Shadow Governor of Dushi. Night raids continue to be a point of contention throughout the country, and have drawn criticism from GOA politicians and inspired civil unrest (such as the demonstrations which occurred in Taloqan City—see Takhar section). IMF has countered that night raids are an integral part of their “counter insurgency” strategy. Without being able to find stronger political or civil support for these raids, IMF risks widening the divide that has formed in the wake of widespread public allegations over civilian casualties. In Baghlan, out of the 9 security incidents that were recorded this reporting period - a mere 60% of the volumes (15) recorded over the same period in 2010 - 5 were IMF operations (incl. the mentioned 3 night raids), while one



entry was an ANA operation. This represents a significantly diminished amount of security reporting, with the final 2 incidents consisting of AOG elements surrendering to the GOA (both in Phuli Khumri—where 14 former AOG members operating in Baghlani Jadid surrendered on the 21st—and in Dahana-I Ghuri, where 7 former fighters surrendered on the 22nd).

In light of the reduced incident reporting, IMF claims to be witnessing a tangible change in the security paradigm for the province, and the numbers indeed appear to support this. However, historically it has been rare to see well entrenched AOG strongholds give up their allegiances. Baghlan is considered an AOG stronghold, located just south of Kunduz—the most consistently volatile province in the North and the focal point of AOG operations in the region—and it appears likely that the lull in security reporting is more the direct result of ongoing military actions than a sustained change in provincial dynamics and/or loyalties. It remains early in the process to determine whether this change will be sustained, or whether it is simply the result of the present surge.

JAWZJAN


Although Jawzjan witnessed only 11 security incidents this reporting period (a number that is consistent with the last 2 reporting periods), the security paradigm for the province may be more in flux than the numbers suggest. Security reporting has made subtle moves from the tri-provincial area (Qush Tapa and Darzab Districts) towards the north-eastern portion of the province (bordering Chintal and Chahar Bolak Districts in Balkh Province), and insecurity is being reported in districts that have not historically seen significant conflict dynamics. These districts—most notably Fayzabad—are gaining some momentum concurrent to the surfacing of reports that security is deteriorating. While the vast majority of NGOs find the eastern districts of Jawzjan still largely operable, it is a trend worth monitoring. Other notable developments include a rash of AOG attacks on communications towers in various districts, 3 incidents in Shibirghan (including an abduction and an illegal checkpoint), and a clash in Fayzabad District a mere 400 meters from the main Mazar-Shibirghan road on May 23rd.

The 3 incidents in Shibirghan

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

are noteworthy, but should not be assessed as new trends. The abduction—occurring on May 17th—was of a successful businessman on his way home from the Mosque in the Bander Aqcha area, likely the work of an ACG. It was reported on the 31st that the abductee had been freed. The illegal checkpoint, occurring along the main Shibirghan – Sar-e Pul road on the 22nd, took place at 0720 hrs in the Seshanba area, marking the 8th such incidence along that road this year (not including 3 additional reports of AOG members loitering around the main road with the likely intent to set up checkpoints, which would bring the true number up to 11). It should be noted that shortly afterwards, an additional checkpoint was set up along the road, this time across the border in Sar-e Pul Province (see Sar-e Pul section), bringing the number to 12. Shibirghan was also home to a large demonstration on the 28th, held to commemorate the deaths of Jumbesh demonstrators 4 years earlier. The demonstration remained peaceful.

Jawzjan continued to witness insecurity along the main Mazar-Shibirghan road, with an



ANP/AOG clash that occurred in Gorjak and Shesha Khana villages in Feyzabad District on May 23rd. This is noteworthy for 2 reasons, firstly, it occurred on a well travelled route later than these types of clashes typically happen (they tend to occur between 1700 at night and 0700 the following morning) and secondly, as part of a larger trend, it represents a continuation of eastern Faryab’s developing security issues. Not only Fayzabad, but Aqcha, and anecdotally Mardyan have seen issues with AOGs lately, likely the result of AOGs from Chintal and Chahar Bolak increasing their influence further west (See Balkh). While security reporting has remained sparse in Mardyan District, anecdotal reports from the district refer to insecurity which is taking place but goes unreported.

Lastly, multiple attacks on telecommunication towers occurred throughout the province (but nowhere else throughout the North) after a telephone company failed to cave to AOG demands that they cease all operations at night (so that AOG activity and movement cannot be monitored). AOGs burnt down telecommunications towers in 4 districts in the Province including Aqcha, Fayzabad, Darzab, and Mardyan.


SAMANGAN

Samangan remains relatively quiet, with the only incidents of consequence to the security paradigm taking place in Dara-i Suf Payin, where on the 22nd 4 armed thieves robbed a road construction worker of his mobile phone and cash in the Dashtak area (along the Dara-i Suf Payin – Dara-i Suf Bala road), and on the 27th a cache of weapons and ammunitions was found in Lola Village. Anecdotal reporting maintains that Dara-i Suf Payin remains under the strong control of AOGs, and it is likely that any criminal acts taking place in the district are known to—or committed by—AOG actors.

While Aybak remains relatively free of security incident reporting, the potential for a change in the dynamics there remains relatively strong. Sources from the area continue to assert that

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

communities throughout the province—including those in Aybak—remain largely distrustful of any IMF presence, and that IMF patrols are generally not receiving local acceptance—and are in fact treated with suspicion—if not outright hostility. Although reports suggest that the AOG presence noticed in the district a few months prior (March) has subsided over the last month and a half, it remains logical for the community—which played an active role in dislocating the small PRT out of Aybak—to stand firmly behind their decision and actions. All the more so with the recent violence that has occurred around PRTs countrywide (Taloqan, Maymana, and Herat for instance).



When reports of an AOG presence in Aybak surfaced, it was assessed as likely that AOGs from Northern Baghlan were moving through the district in an effort to gather community support so that they could use it as a safe haven when necessary, and as a transport hub between the AOG strongholds of the Northeast (Northern Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar) and those of the Northwest (parts of Balkh, the tri-provincial area, and the southern cradle of Faryab). With this in mind, it is possible that the military operations set to begin in Kunduz (Operation Omaid—see Kunduz) could initiate this activity again, and cause AOGs to relocate via Baghlan through Aybak. However, this is conjecture, and thus far, there have been

SAR-E PUL

Sar-e Pul recorded only 2 security incidents over the first week of the reporting period, neither of them particularly noteworthy. However, activities began to increase in the second half of the cycle, with an illegal checkpoint along the main Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan Road on the 26th (Sayed Abad area) and 4 security incidents taking place in Sayyad District on the 23rd, the 25th, and 2 in Ganda area on the 27th. The illegal checkpoint—where armed individuals stopped cars to search for GOA employees—occurred at 1700 and marked the 9th checkpoint along this stretch of road this year (the situation along the road is further detailed in the Jawzjan section).


In Sayyad District, all but the first of the 4 incidents (an IMF operation in Qiz Wala village the evening of the 23rd) were initiated by AOGs. On the 25th an AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint in Khoja Yagaan village, and on the 27th in Ganda, an AOG attacked the residence of a pro-government

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

militia’s family, and then later—in the same area on the same day—an AOG abducted 5 civilians whom they accused of spying.

The abduction of civilians has become more common in Sar-e Pul Province. In a twist on this trend, an abduction in Gosfandi District went awry for the would-be abductors when, at 0300 hrs the morning of the 20th, the 3 individuals abducted launched a counter-attack on their abductors (presumed to be members of an AOG). This resulted in 6 AOG members and 2 of the abducted killed, and the final would-be abductee injured but alive.

A total of 7 security incidents represents a low number for a province which has seen a significant deterioration in security over the past year and a half. The low number is likely the result of 2 factors: 1) Operation Wahdat, while not maintaining a strong hold or build phase, likely had a significant short term impact on the present strength and capacity of



AOGs operating out of strongholds in Sayyad. While it is likely that the AOGs did not suffer damages that they cannot mitigate, as witnessed by a number of high profile attacks just following the operations, it is likely that they need time to regroup and rebuild. It should be noted here that while Operation Wahdat 2 has already begun, it will not target the Tri-Provincial area (which includes Sayyad in Sar-e Pul), but rather the road between Andkhoy and Maymana. 2) AOG operations have increased significantly in Southern Faryab and Eastern Jawzjan. As other locations throughout the North take priority or draw AOG attention, it is likely to cause lulls in previously kinetic areas from where these AOG actors have relocated from. More information continues to surface referencing region-wide networks and a flow of fighters between areas as far ranging as the Tri-Provincial area and Kunduz. This dynamic requires further assessment.

WESTERN REGION

GHOR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	3

Ghor Province saw three direct NGO incidents, of which two were AOG initiated and indicating a change in the security situation in Charsada District and Murghab Area of Chaghcharan District as it was already became apparent at the end of last year.

On 21st of May, two armed men on a motorbike stopped a civilian vehicle rented by an INGO in Durahee Band Area of Chaghcharan District on the main road to Murghab Valley. The armed men explained to the INGO staff verbally as well as in a signed letter that organizations that want to implement projects in Murghab Area of Chaghcharan, as well as in Dawlat Yar and Charsada districts, should contact them directly and pay a certain amount of money to them. One of the armed men is reportedly a local commander from Murghab with links to AOGs as well as to an influential commander in Charsada. The incident shows that the security situation in the area remains concerning and that an extension of this instability to Charsada and northern Dawlat Yar, where armed groups from Murghab Area were also active in January this year, cannot be excluded.

On 18th of May, AOG established an illegal checkpoint in Khame Safed Area on the main Charsada – Chaghcharan Road. Among other vehicles, the armed men stopped a local transport vehicle rented by national INGO staff members, who were travelling low profile and therefore were not recognized as such. This was the third recorded illegal checkpoint in three and a half weeks, which further confirms that AOG are getting more influential in the area. In addition, on 28th of May AOG set a commercial truck in Chasma-E-Ghul Area on the Charsada – Chaghcharan Main Road on fire, which was parked at the side of the road due to a technical problem. The truck was part of a convoy carrying IO food items. The main convoy did reach its destination without problems and the truck, which was set on fire, seems to have been rather a target of opportunity. Nevertheless, AOG activity has become more notable on the main road between Charsada and Chaghcharan lately.

The third NGO incident took place in the south. On 23rd of May, two armed men entered



an NGO clinic in Talmastan Area and physically assaulted the head after clinic after he refused to visit a patient in a house nearby, as other patients needed to be treated in the clinic. The armed men were reportedly not AOG members but influential neighbours of the clinic and their violent reaction a demonstration of power to ensure compliance with their medical support requests in future.

In regard to AOG activity in the south, it is becoming notable in Taywara and Pasaband as expected. In Taywara AOG ambushed an ANP convoy in Farahrod Village on 28th of May, and Pasaband saw an abduction in Synai Area on 30th of May. Of note, AOGs became active again in Kakuri Area of Pasaband, which became a kind of ‘safe haven’ or base from where – especially non-local – AOGs were operating in the district in 2010. On 23 May, an armed clash between AOG and armed locals in Kakuri Area. This armed clash marks the first recorded incident in the area after an IMF airstrike last December. The recent incident indicates that AOGs regrouped in the abovementioned area despite the airstrike.

HERAT


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Herat saw the first attack including suicide attackers inside the city since 2009. On 30 May, there were reportedly two explosions between 1100 hrs and 1130 hrs. One explosion – most likely an RCIED attached to a motorbike or a bicycle – took place in Chawke Cinama Area of District 2, causing a higher number of civilian casualties. A second explosion at the main gate of the PRT was caused by a truck, damaging the PRT gate and perimeter wall. Shortly afterwards, AOG started to attack the PRT with SAF and RPGs from a building opposite of the PRT main gate. ANSF engaged the attackers in the building and explosions heard during the afternoon were RPGs as well as suicide attackers, who detonated in the building during the fighting. The fighting ended between 1700 hrs and 1800 hrs.

Despite frequent generic threat warnings in regard to suicide attacks against high profile locations, incidents involving suicide attackers remain very rare in Herat City. Of note, only two BBIED attacks – both in 2009 – were recorded since 2007. However, the surroundings of the city especially the Herat-Airport road saw a slightly higher number but even there incidents including suicide attackers remain rare with three such attacks in 2010. The last one occurred on 23 October 2010 and targeted an IO compound. The recent at-

tacks needs to be seen in light of the announced handover of primary/lead security responsibility from ISAF to ANSF in Herat City as part of the first tranche in Afghanistan, which was likely to trigger a response from AOGs to challenge ANSF capabilities and undermine their credibility. In addition, the attack needs to be also seen as part of the spring offensive announced at the beginning of May creating a certain pressure on AOGs also in the Western Region to attract high media attention, which especially the length of the fighting in the building close to the PRT ensured even though casualties and damages remained limited. Although further AOG related incidents in and around Herat City need to be expected, the recent events alone do not directly change the overall security situation in Herat City and such attacks are not likely to increase on a large scale or be repeated in such a dimension on a frequent bases.

Herat Province saw direct fire attacks particularly on main roads in the north-eastern and central eastern districts during this reporting period. Kushki Kuhna saw a direct fire attack against an ANSF/IMF patrol in the usual Darzak Area on the main road to Kushk District. In Pashtun Zarghun, AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint in Mar Abad Area on the Herat-Obe Main Road during



the night and Karukh saw an attack against a PSC convoy in Ab Khoban Area on the main road to Qala-I-Naw in the morning of 25th of May. Ab Khoban was already known for AOG activity in 2010. As Karukh, Obe also saw the comeback of AOG activity in last year's hotspot, which is close to the border with Badghis District. Chashmae-I-Shafa Area was already known for a significant level of AOG presence last year and an airstrike last October underlined that the security situation in the area was deteriorating. Although AOGs have concentrated their activity in Obe on the western part of the Herat-Obe Main Road this year, they expected to re-emerge in their old base during spring. Unconfirmed reports suggest that AOGs from the north of Obe were responsible for a direct fire attack against an ANP checkpoint and an RCIED strike against the arriving ANP reinforcement in Turkabad Area on the main Herat-Obe Road on 22nd of May. Later on the same day, the second IED strike affecting civilians in Obe this year was recorded in Payan Daman Area on the main road to Chashmae-I-Shafa. Further IEDs on this road are not unlikely if AOGs continue to operate from there in order to deter ANSF movement on the road. Of note, these were the first IEDs affecting civilians, which were recorded in Obe District during the last three and a half years, reconfirming a change in the security situation in Obe due to increased AOG presence.


FARAH

After ANSF/IMF reacted with several operations on a recent shift in AOG activity towards the western districts of Farah Province at the end of the last reporting period, Anar Dara, Shib Koh and Qala-I-Kah districts remained quiet during this reporting period apart from an ANP operation on 29 May in Pusht Koh Area of Qala-I-Kah. Reports indicate that the ANSF/IMF operations during the last cycle pushed AOGs back to Pusht Rod District, which saw an increase in incidents during the last two weeks. Of note, nearly all recorded incidents were AOG initiated and the majority were IED detonations. Most of them hit civilians, signalling an

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

increased risk for civilians on the main road between Farah City and Pusht Rod, which also saw an IED detonation on the side of Farah District. In addition, civilians in Pusht Rod were affected by IEDs on secondary roads around Panjit Gaw Village and Boldani Village. A fourth IED was recorded on the main road between Pusht Rod and Khaki Safed District.

In addition, the historic hotspots Bala Buluk and Bakwa districts, which were relatively quiet in regard to incident numbers during the previous cycles, accounted for nearly half of all incidents during the last two weeks of May.




Similar to Pusht Rod, again nearly all incidents were AOG initiated or IED detonations. This indicates a comeback of AOG activity in these districts, which is combined with rumours of AOG movement from the south to Farah Province. In Bakwa and Bala Buluk the Herat-Kandahar Main Road saw three direct fire attacks against PSCs and two IED detonations against ANSF vehicles. Apart from that, Shiwan Village – already an area of concern last year – was again in the focus of AOGs with three direct fire attacks and one IDF attack against ANSF, suggesting that it will be again a hotspot this summer.

BADGHIS

In Badghis Province AOG - ANSF/IMF hostilities were clearly concentrated on Murghab District, which saw 50% of all recorded incidents and 57% of all AOG incidents including IED discoveries. In addition, 80% of ANSF/IMF operations took place in the district. Also worth noting is that more than half of all incidents in Murghab took place on main roads. The Muqur – Murghab Main road saw an IMF operation in Haji Mohammad Khan Village, the main road between the Murghab DAC and Murichaq Area saw four IED discoveries and the main road to Murghab DAC saw a direct fire attack against ANP as well as two IED related incidents.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Other main roads affected by hostilities were the main road between Muqur and Dara-E-Boom of Qadis District, which saw an IED detonation against ANSF/IMF, and in Qadis the main road from the DAC to Khirkhana Area in the east. Of note, ten out of 13 IED related incidents in Badghis Province took place on main roads, indicating an AOG focus on these roads most likely due to frequent ANSF/IMF movements. Qadis District was also in the spotlight during this reporting period. Not only because of several direct fire attacks and a premature IED detonation, but also because of a significant number of AOG members



joining the reconciliation process. On 23 May, around 115 AOG members among others also from the Ghal Charkh Area, known for its notable AOG presence, joined the GoA. Apart from the relatively high number of AOGs reconciling, the timing is surprising since AOGs are usually joining the GoA before the winter season and not during the spring offensive. Nevertheless, it is too early to tell if this is already an indicator that the APRP will be more sustainable in Qadis District.

EASTERN REGION

LAGHMAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Laghman continued to see signs that AOGs operating in the province have a definite plan aimed at destabilising what has been a relatively peaceful province as its capital undergoes transition to ANSF control. First, this is the second period in a row in which a BBIED attack has struck in the province, in this case striking the vehicle of a former ANA commander who was involved in managing the local national guard force for IMF facilities in the province; 4 people including the commander were killed in the incident in the Qala-ye Nazir area of Alishing district. Two nights previously in Alishing, an IED accidentally detonated in the house of an AOG commander in Golota, which was being used as an informal IED factory; two of his family members were wounded when it detonated. To the north, in Dawlat Shah, IMF conducted an airstrike against a VBIED, but other than that there were no reports from the heavily AOG-influenced northern dis-

trict.

Second, there were also some concerning signs of more confident AOG penetration in the provincial capital. An AOG CP was established a short distance outside the city to search for GOA officials, in the Armul area on the road to Alingar on the night of the 15th, without any reports that they were successful in their search. On the 22nd in the Sundalay area, early morning, AOG fighters attacked a group of tribal elders with SAF and RPGs, leading to the death of 2 and the injury of 3 others. Also in the capital district, an IED struck an IMF vehicle as it was moving through the Chelgazi area, while another IED was discovered and defused under a telecommunications tower. In Bad Pakh, two rockets were fired at the new ANP HQ, and reports of AOG attempts to co-opt the community to its anti-GOA stance were also recorded.

In Alingar, the conflict intensified slightly, with the familiar



pattern of IED emplacement supplemented by two significant IMF operations and the abduction of an ANP policeman. The only IED detonation recorded occurred in the Wati Jabarkhel area, which was home to both of the IMF operations, which took place on consecutive days shortly after the IED; together, they led to the death of 2 AOG fighters and the detention of 4 others. Finally in that district, local community members attacked an AOG unit in the Nuralam valley for unknown reasons, killing 1 and injuring 2 others.

In Qarghayi, on the 29th AOG fighters attacked ANP and three fuel trucks at close range at 0400 hrs in the Surkhakan area, with two trucks being destroyed. This area has emerged as in recent weeks as a more important site for attacks than Tangi Abrisham, but the threat remains an early morning one, and ANSO's daytime travel advisory stands.

KUNAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1

Incident volumes continued to decline in Kunar during this period, from 90 to 63, in a continuation of the trend from the first half of May, likely connected to the increased AOG focus on Nuristan in recent weeks. With fewer AOG fighters present in the province, a consequent lower number of direct AOG assaults on ANSF and IMF targets – the characteristic form of attack in the provincial security landscape – were the primary cause of the overall drop; from 51 last period, this period saw just 30. However, NGO incidents to clinics continued to be recorded, with this period’s incident taking the form of superficial damage to a clinic in the Sirkanay DAC area after an SVBIED attack against an IMF convoy visiting the DAC on the 28th. This was, in fact, the first VBIED attack ever in Kunar, and would be highly significant even without the fact that it occurred in a district where major IMF operations finished in mid-April, which led to nearly 100 AOG fighters killed in joint ground and air operations. In neighbouring Marawara, where the aforementioned operation also took place, a further air operation was recorded early in the period, which led to the killing of 17 AOG fighters, including a commander.

Those places that remained characterised by a relatively high number of direct AOG attacks were Sirkanay (4),

Chapa Dara (4), Manogai (8), WataPur (8), with Nari and Ghaziabad registering but at a lower number than usual. In Manogai, the registered attacks demonstrated a level confidence in the part of the AOG forces in the area, with attacks on a number of significant ANSF installations, with the only response a short and apparently ineffectual IMF operation there on the 17th that led to the deaths of two civilians and no AOG fighters. However, after an IDF attack on ANA in the Nangalam area on May 29th, IMF air support called in by ANA helped repel the attack and in targeting AOG locations killed 2 AOG fighters. This is the kind of effective tactical collaboration that the ‘transition’ to ANA field presence that has occurred in the western corridor is supposed to generate, and is one positive sign from an otherwise unoptimistic part of the province.

In WataPur, none of these direct attacks had any consequence, but one of the 5 IDF attacks against IMF facilities that were launched in the district caused the death of 2 civilians and the injury of 6 others when one of the mortars landed in the Kharano bazaar. Finally in that district, where AOGs are clearly concentrating their forces, they also destroyed a newly-built ANP CP with explosives, which had yet to be occupied, while an IMF vehicle also struck an IED causing



mild damage. Asadabad remained quiet, with the IMF presence in WataPur thought to be halting the advance on the provincial capital. The only recorded incident there was the arrest of an ANP policeman trying to smuggle a small quantity of weaponry into the prison, in an apparent attempt to aid prisoners inside.

In northern Kunar, which recently featured a spate of particularly predatory AOG/ACG actions and a heightened level of general conflict, things were a little calmer during this period. In Dangam, the only significant incidents were two cross-border IDF attacks from the PakMil, which were apparently aimed at AOG fighters on their side of the border but came across into Afghan territory. In Ghaziabad, just two direct attacks on ANA OPs were recorded, alongside an IED attack on an IMF vehicle in the Chechen area. In Nari and Shegal, a small number of inconsequential direct attacks were recorded too, but in all, none of the large abduction, killing or robbery incidents recently seen there took place during this fortnight.

The security of the Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway has improved after an AOG-IMF firefight on the Nurgal-KuzKunar border stretch on May 23rd, which led to the death of 6 AOG fighters and the injury of their commander, who was responsible for all the attacks on this stretch of the road. As such, with the commander recovering and his manpower significantly weakened, the Highway is assessed to be slightly safer for the coming weeks and months.

NANGARHAR

Two NGO incidents were recorded during this period, the first of which in fact took place at the end of the first half of the month, when a local NGO employee was arrested by IMF in Memla during the course of a search for a high profile target. The IMF confirmed the innocence of the employee and released him at the end of the period. The second incident occurred to a local NGO demining agency in Pachir wa Agam, which received a night-letter warning the staff about ‘working with non-Muslims’, similar to a number of demining-targeting incidents in key border areas in recent months.


This period also saw the first significant attack on a major target in the Jalalabad City area after a considerable period of quiet, with an SVBIED attack hitting an ANP RTC vehicle convoy near to the Customs office. It is the third time this year IEDs have targeted RTC convoys. In the event, 15 people were killed, with all but 2 of them employees at the RTC. As the year has progressed, it has become increasingly apparent that the prime target in the greater Jalalabad area is the ANP, likely because they are a softer target than the alternatives – the ANA, the IMF and central GOA facilities. However, now that this targeting has become apparent, we may see AOG attempts against more difficult targets, including com-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	

plex attacks on ANSF and GOA in the city centre. Yet attacks on the ANP are likely to continue; in this vein, an IED detonated against an ANP vehicle in Zone 2 on May 27th, injuring one policeman and 7 civilians.

Beyond the provincial capital, Bati Kot, the Khogyani-Sherzad area, Shinwar and Sorkh Rod remained the key areas of contest. In Bati Kot, the profile of incidents was slightly different from before, with just one IED discovery on Highway 7 and no direct attacks on tankers. However, there was one attack on an ANBP vehicle in the Farmi Char area. In Chardeh, a local was shot and killed for what appeared to be criminal motives while on the 21st, ANSF conducted an operation that led to the arrest of one AOG fighter and the seizure of a small weapons cache.

In the Khogyani-Sherzad area, the urban area of Wazir was the site of 3 separate AOG ambushes of IMF, with the most serious, on the 16th, leading to 3 civilians injured and 9 AOG fighters detained. This fighting is indicative of the confidence of the AOGs operating there. Elsewhere in these districts, the primary dynamics were of IEDs and IMF operations; 8 IED detonations were recorded, in Memla, Adwor, Haskemkhel, Wazir and Grabawa, targeting IMF, ANSF and a



fuel tanker. In Adwor, the IED seems to have misfired, killing two passing civilians. IMF operations were focused upon Memla, where they continued to hunt high-value targets; in three search operations there, 10 suspected AOG members were detained. The final incident of note in the area was an IDF attack on an IMF/ANSF recon team in Markikhel, which injured 3 policemen.

In Shinwar and Achin, two incidents were directly attributable to the ongoing land dispute; a rocket was fired in the Deh Sarak area by one of the feuding sub-tribes at the other, hitting a house and injuring 3 women and a man, and a firefight broke out in the Pekha area for two hours, but leading to no casualties. The remaining conflict events were mostly IED discoveries, but there were also two detonations – one in the Canal 25 area and one in the vicinity of the Goda Pump petrol station. Finally, AOG fighters ambushed IMF/ANSF in the Qalah-ye Kundi area, which led to 3 AOG deaths and the injury of their commander.

Chaparhar was quiet during the period, a consequence of recent IMF operations, while Lal Pur saw two direct attacks against IMF and ANSF in the Fateh Mina area, a locality NGOs are advised to be particularly careful about for the time being. In all, Nangarhar and Jalalabad in particular have not continued the early year trends of significant deterioration, although major problems remain in the key

NURISTAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

The major developments seen in Nuristan this period were witnessed in the normally sleepy Do Ab, where AOG fighters temporarily seized the DAC on the 25th after sporadic fighting starting in the early hours of the 23rd, with 3 AOG fighters killed in the event. The IMF and ANSF response was, in contrast to the seizure of Waygal, decisive but bloody, with the intense military force that the IMF brought to bear on the AOG fighters occupying the DAC causing the largest single casualty figure seen in a day's fighting in the eastern region in at least the past 18 months; 150 people – AOG, ANP and civilians – were reported killed by F-16 aerial bombardment of the DAC area and then the surrounding areas as the AOG fighters beat a retreat, with at least one bombing run directly striking ANP reinforcements arriving from Laghman via Nurgaram, killing 35 and injuring two dozen more. A further 170 from across the spectrum were injured, while an NGO clinic, schools, shops and other such facilities in the DAC area were also damaged to varying degrees of severity.

This was the latest attempt by the IEA to take a Nuristan district for themselves, after the seizure of Waygal and more recent attempts to seize BargiMatal and to harass Parun. However, none of the previous fighting has been this

bloody, primarily because of the absence of such IMF air assets, with Waygal, for instance, being seized without a single death. The consequences of these events are likely to be far-reaching, although it remained too early to tell at the end of the reporting period, with major medical assistance efforts still underway; however, the high death toll from the ANP is likely to be an issue of particular tension. Some reports received at the end of the period, moreover, suggested that AOGs were returning to the district to target the ANSF and IMF currently occupying the DAC area. As such, the potential for further clashes in Do Ab remains very real.

Elsewhere in the province, Waygal stood out with two significant developments. First, a small ANSF clearing operation was reported to have occurred in the Chatras area of the AOG-controlled district around the 18th-20th, as this was a key staging point for the planning of attacks on Parun. While some fighting was reported, no casualties were registered, and the operation was clearly all but ineffective. As evinced by a dark incident that occurred in the same village on May 20th; while a 12 year old boy was undergoing suicide attack instruction by what was reported to be both Arab al Qaeda and Pakistani fighters, the boy initi-



ated his vest, killing himself, two Arabs and two Pakistanis and injuring a dozen more. In addition, a larger operation was conducted by ANP in the Ghosht-Chatras area on the 29th, killing 4 AOG fighters and injuring 4 others, and reclaiming some of the area for the government, including the roadway up to 25 km south of Parun. At the time of writing, however, the road remains blocked by AOGs at Gawardar.

In Nurgaram, AOG members distributed nightletters on the 16th warning locals to not cooperate with local authorities. However, local community representatives rejected the AOG responsible and declared it would oppose it, denouncing it as 'Pakistani' and therefore not a legitimate Afghan entity. This is an excellent insight into the difficulty that any political force will have in trying to bring the population of Nuristan into line with an agenda not seen as highly localised in nature – be they GOA or AOG.

Towards the end of the period, finally, further AOG fighters were reported to have entered BargiMatal and Kamdesh as part of a renewed effort to target the BargiMatal DAC. As such, in spite of the heavy losses faced by AOG fighters in Do Ab, there are clear signs of both their persistent strength and their intention to continue to pressure ANSF and seize further territory.

KHOST


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

The stand-out incident in Khost this period was the complex suicide attack on the joint Traffic Police-ANP QRF compound in Khost City, in which 4 AOG fighters including 2 BBIED operatives penetrated the facility at approximately 0400 hrs and engaged ANSF and IMF in an extended fire-fight until roughly 0930 hrs. The presence of a VBIED outside the facility indicated that, as with previous complex suicide attacks in the border region, the AOG fighters were well trained and equipped with multiple attack options – albeit in this case not succeeding entirely in every element of their plan, as it was not detonated before all operatives were killed, being subsequently defused by IMF. In total, all the attackers died, as did 3 policemen, with a further 6 police and 1 civilian injured.

However, beyond that spectacular attack the key trend was again a 33% drop in the total reported number of conflict incidents, from last period’s 100 to 66, which was also lower than the equivalent period last year. As with last period, a large component of this drop was the almost total absence of AOG-initiated incidents in

Bak, Sabari and TereZayi, for much of the past year the key battleground between AOGs and IMF. To illustrate, in Bak the only evidence of AOG activity was a single IED discovery, while it played host to 4 further IMF operations, detaining a total of 7 AOG members. ANP also detained two AOG members during a patrol in the district. In Sabari there were 5 AOG attacks on various targets – 3 ineffectual assaults on the Spin Ghar ANP CP, one on the DAC and one in which they assassinated a former ANP employee – but this small number of incidents, much lower than in previous months, was outweighed by 7 IMF operations that detained a total of 16 AOG members. And in TereZayi, the only recorded incidents were an inaccurate rocket attack on the IMF base in the Chargutee area and a single IED discovery.

Back again in Khost city, with the exception of the complex attack described above the primary risk comprised IEDs. That being said, even in this respect only two IEDs detonated during this fortnight, one against an ANP vehicle in Matun village and one in the



motorcycle bazaar on the morning of the 30th. The 10 remaining IEDs were all discovered and defused, although one did detonate as ANP were trying to defuse it, injuring two policemen, and in once instance, ANP detained an AOG operative as he was planting an IED in the currency exchange market, evincing a further enhanced ANSF effectiveness in tackling this particular element of AOG activity.

Of the remaining events across the wider province, the majority of significant occurrences were IMF operations, with 1 in Spera detaining 6; 2 in Musa Khel detaining 3 and killing 10, including a commander; 3 in Mando Zayi detaining 7; and 1 in Gurbuz with no detentions or killings. In Musa Khel, finally, there were two AOG attacks on the DAC, without major consequence. It remains true therefore that during the entirety of May in Khost the momentum has been very much with the IMF; whether or not they can maintain this momentum will be a matter of great interest in coming weeks and months, but the change is a remarkable one from trends seen over the past 6 months.

PAKTYA


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

This period’s absolute level of conflict incidents fell on last period in Paktya, by 25%, but amongst those incidents there were both a highly violent mass killing and a mass abduction of NGO staff. To take the latter first, 30 demining staff from a local demining NGO were abducted *en masse* on the Kabul-Gardez Highway, in the Tandan area of Gardez district, on May 21st; they were released within 6 hours after the intervention of local community representatives. This was the largest demining abduction incident of the spate of such incidents in the border region recently, and while the motives remain unclear, it may be connected to mostly criminal and/or bargaining motivations. The other outstanding incident was the violent assault on a road construction company site in Wuzza Zadran on the 19th, which left 36 workers killed and 20 injured, all Afghans. Work crews are often a target for such large scale attacks in the southeast, but it is unusual that such a large number were killed without the use of, for example, a large truck VBIED, as occurred in Paktikaon March 27th, and indicates an extremity of violence unusual for Paktya.

More broadly in the province, Gardez accounted for half of all recorded incidents, with the usually restive Zurmat remaining relatively quiet, and the northern districts of Chamka-

nay and DandwaPatan accounting for most of the rest. In the provincial capital, Ibrahim Khel was the site of two direct assaults, one on ANP CPs on the 28th and one on an IMF convoy on the 29th. There were also three IDF attacks on key regional security force facilities; rockets were fired at the 203rd Corps HQ and the provincial ANP HQ on the 21st, while the PRT came under rocket attack on the 29th, although none of these caused any damage. In the Shaikhan area, nightletters were distributed warning people against supporting the government and security forces, while on May 17th, AOG operatives attacked and destroyed an IMF supply truck with RPGs in the GhafoorKhel area. Attacks on a RCC and on a PSC CP in separate incidents in the Gardez environs on the 30th led to 18 deaths on both sides, while on the 31st an IED struck an ANA vehicle near a UN compound in the city. In sum these incidents paint a concerning picture of AOG penetration into Gardez, something that was evident but less consequential in recent months.

Chamkanay and DandwaPatan represented a second area of concentration, with a quarter of incidents occurring here. In Chamkanay incident severity was not high, with just 3 ineffectual rocket attacks on the Chamkanay DAC. In



DandwaPatan, a number of fatal engagements were recorded, with two attacks on ANBP CPs in the DAC on consecutive days leading to a policeman killed in each, and two further direct attacks, one on an ANBP CP on the border and one on a joint IMF-ANP patrol in the Muqbal area, where later in the period an IMF-ANBP operation also took place, in which one policeman was killed after engaging AOG fighters present in the area. The day after the second DAC attack, moreover, IMF engaged in a clearing operation in the same area, detaining 3.

The only incidents recorded in Zurmat, after a particularly busy previous period, were an accidental IED detonation in Kotalgo killing the AOG operative planting it, and an ineffectual attack on a joint convoy in Aba Pul, as well as an IMF operation that detained 4. There was, moreover, one other AOG attack, on an ANP CP in the Shoghla area that injured two policemen, and an IMF operation that detained a number of fighters and a HQN sub-commander. And of the rest of the incidents, the most noteworthy were an AOG attack on a RCC PSC in Wuzza Zadran, which led to 3 PSC guards killed, and four direct attacks against DAC and ANSF targets in Jaji, JaniKhel and LijaMangal, none leading to fatalities. As such, Paktya saw an unusually high number of conflict fatalities during this period, and with drops in Khost and Nangarhar, stood out as of above-average importance and insecurity in

SOUTHERN REGION


KANDAHAR

It would appear that Kandahar Province has reached ‘saturation’, in that incident volumes have remained relatively consistent in a yearly comparison leaving little room for significant increase or decrease. This can be attributed to the state of equilibrium that has developed between the two main parties of the conflict, with each side having reached their maximum capacities. While there have been shifts at the tactical level, with both sides implementing shifting focal areas (both geographic and operational) and tactics, there is unlikely to be any major changes in the overall context through to the mid-term.

While the majority of incidents reported this period fell into the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	

standards well expected of this province, a recent IED incident in Shorabak District (claimed by the IEA) is notable due to the extreme fatality rate that resulted from it. Up to 7 IMF soldiers along with 2 ANP (engaged on a foot patrol) were killed in an IED strike. While incidents are relatively rare in this district, 10 of the 11 recorded for 2010 were IED related. The low levels of incident are likely related to a number of factors, including the limited presence of security forces and sparse population. However, it is also a strategic cross border infiltration route for AOG as well as for smugglers, with the latter attested to by the large seizure of drugs in February. It remains in both



parties best interest to limit action, and therefore attention, to this strategic area, despite the recent efforts of the ANBP commanded out of Spin Boldak


NIMROZ

There is a typically limited number of incidents reported from this province, with this period being no exception, with the distribution and type also remaining consistent. There are an average 13 incidents reported per month, with over 60% of the total reported from Khash Rod alone. This is to be expected due to its proximity to Helmand as well as the presence of key provincial access routes that transect the district, and thusly hosts the most active AOG presence. This periods pro-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	

jections of AOG force included an attack against IMF (which maintain a limited presence in this province), an IED discovery by the same, as well as the establishment of illegal checkpoint in which 2 civilians were abducted. In a more rare event, an IED in Chahar Burjak (in the far south of the province) resulted in the death of 3 ANP and the wounding of another.

Second to Khash Rod, Zaranj reports 27% of the provinces inci-



dents, though the nature of these are more related to border issues, including smuggling, illegal immigration, and clashes between opposing border police forces.

PAKTIKA

After an intense 6 weeks, Paktika recorded a slight drop in conflict incidents this period, although in absolute terms, it remained the most violent province in the southeast, a mantel recently poached from neighbouring Khost. The biggest drop by incident type was in direct attacks by AOGs, which fell about a quarter to 16; IDF attacks and IED incidents remained at identical levels, although there was a marked increase in the proportion of IED detonations relative to discoveries.


With Barmal incidents again revolving around IDF attacks on IMF bases, Yahya Khel was a particular focus for direct AOG assaults, with 6 recorded, the most significant of which was the assassination of the district NDS Chief with a silenced weapon on May 20th. Remaining attacks comprised 2 on the DAC, 2 on ANP convoys, and 1 on an NDS vehicle in the Ghaibi Khel area. Also in YahyaKhel, a BBIED opera-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

tive defected from the AOG side and turned himself in to the district ANP HQ, which led to a search operation in the Shamulzayi area that detained the facilitator of this particular network of BBIEDs.

Other direct attacks took place in small numbers across the province, none of which led to conflict party fatalities, and only one, in Mata Khan, leading to the death of a child in the crossfire. Apart from Barmal, IDF attacks concentrated on Dila, Gayan and Omna, as per usual, with none recorded being of significant consequence.

In regard to IMF operations, all but 2 of the 8 recorded operations took place in Urgun, where a total of 18 AOG fighters were detained, including one commander, and where in one joint ground and air operation the forces killed 12 AOG fighters and wounded an unknown further number. The remaining operations took place in Gayan and Mata Khan;



in the first, 2 AOG fighters were arrested, while in the latter, 4 AOG members were killed in a gun battle. The intensity of operations has not dropped during this period, although the numbers killed have fallen slightly; but it is likely that the cumulative effect of these operations is one important reason for the slight decrease in AOG-initiated attacks across the province in this period.

Finally, with regard to the IED campaign in the province, there were 4 IED strikes against IMF vehicles, although no reports of casualties, while there were 8 instances of successful IED disposals by the security forces. The most noteworthy of these was the discovery and subsequent defusing of two IEDs attached to a donkey in the main Barmal bazaar, in what appears to be a thwarted DBIED attack.

GHAZNI

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	


Incident volumes within Ghazni continued to surge this period, in sharp counterpoint to the steady downwards trend identified in Helmand, bringing to the fore once again the clearly contested nature of this province. This year is following a very similar growth pattern to last and indicates that these high volumes are likely to persist through the summer months.

This is likely due to a variety of factors, including geography and strategic importance. This province's relative proximity to cross-border infiltration and supply routes, as well as the large stretch of Highway 1 that bisects it, denotes its strategic importance within the regional context. As well, it also hosts a lower level of IMF & ANSF elements, indicating that opposition groups can enjoy a higher level of freedom of movement and action. As most of these elements are focused on

securing the main artery, AOG can also express their dominance in the distant, more rural, districts as seen in the extreme eastern and western districts such as Nawa and Ajristan. This dominance is expressed in a variety of ways, including the closure of mobile networks, which remains ongoing in Qarabagh.

Not unlike Zabul to the south, AOG efforts to affect stability along the highway remains ongoing, with PSC escorts of logistical convoys typically bearing the brunt of attacks.

While the majority of the incidents continue to be a blend of the standard tactics and types, intimidation efforts on the part of AOG were noted in this period. The visitation (of a warning nature) to the relations of serving ANP by AOG in Arghistan is but one example of this. As this



province is one of the areas in Ghazni where AOG hold sway, these are warnings that will likely be taken seriously, though how this develops into action remains to be seen.


ZABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	

Zabul incident volumes have continued to surge this period, marking their highest yet recorded for 2011 as well as a two year high. It being early in the year, this is suggestive of a highly volatile summer season to come.

Beyond the local AOG forces, elements from southern Ghazni (primarily Nawa District) are known to project their influence into Zabul, with both having a specific focus on Highway 1. Districts bisected by this primary artery the remain the most affected by the conflict. These districts include Shahjoy, Qalat (the provincial capital), and Tarnak Wa

Jaldak, at the extreme south of the province and bordering Kandahar. Incidents recorded this period represent the typical expressions of AOG presence, include indicted fire attacks against static security force installations, direct attack against convoys (both logistical and security), as well as the more rare IED event. Of note, a tactic used commonly in this province, unlike most other parts of the South, is the use of explosive devices to destroy culverts and bridges, likely in an attempt to impede patrol access. As a result of this, however, civilian freedom



of movement is also continuously impacted by this activity. On the reverse, security forces continue to pursue a program of interdiction and arrest, with much of this activity focused in Qalat City.

While the incident volume has increased, the distribution and tactic type (described above) has experienced little change over the years with this year unlikely to disrupt this pattern.

HELMAND



The overall incident rate within Helmand continues its downward trend, though the sharp drop noted during the last period is starting to level off, likely as the result of the closing of the poppy harvest season. Nonetheless, even with the drop, the significant volumes noted in the opening months of the year indicate a significant increase over last (as provided graphs illustrate). The drop may also be partially attributed to the reorientation of men and materials to Ghazni, which has noted a dramatic increase of late (see Ghazni). It would appear that the approaching summer months will bring with them volumes in line, if not above, those recorded last year.

While this period brought with it the standard incident type (IEDs, direct attacks) and distribution (districts flanking the Helmand River valley) there were a few noteworthy occurrences that fell outside these trends. In the first,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	

there the Helmand Provincial Governors convoy was ambushed while enroute to Lashkar Gah following a visit to Sangin. While this ambush proved mostly ineffective, the concentration of key governance and security officials within the convoy likely proved to be an opportunity and resulted in a hastily planned attack. Included in the convoy, beyond the governor, were the Provincial Chief of the NDS and the ANP. If effective, the attack would have effectively decapitated provincial governance.

In Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital, AOG continue to express their presence and while generally ineffective, these efforts are likely to continue, if not increase, in light of the planned upcoming transition of the city. Recent tactics have included indirect fire attacks (RPG and rockets), IEDs, and direct attacks against ANP, as well as the use of the now stand-



ard 2 man motorcycle borne 'hit teams'. The various types of attacks have occurred both within the city and the surrounding environs and primarily reflect opportunities to present the impression of insecurity (for limited tactical investment), and serve as part of the counter-narrative to the language of transition.

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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **ANCOP**-Afghan National
Civil Order Police / **AOG**-
Armed Opposition Group /
APPF-Afghan Public Protection
Forces (local deputised mili-
tias) / **DC**-District Centre /
GOA-Government of Afghani-
stan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex:
mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Ex-
plosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /
VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro-
vised Explosive Device / **PDO**-
Private Development Organisa-
tion / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police
/ **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative /
IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani-
stan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial
Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-
District Shadow Governor (IEA)
/ **APRP**-Afghan Peace and Re-
integration Program

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Daykondi
Panjshir
Badakshan

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES: Advisory Board email address

ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the ANSO Advisory Board at advisoryboard@afgnso.org.