

ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.2 2010

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STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

The counterinsurgency approach shows few signs of weakening the opposition. AOG attacks are 51% higher than last year, June hit a record 1,319 AOG operations and nine provinces saw growth in their average daily attack rate (p.8). It also shows few signs of protecting the population with a 23% rise in civilian casualties (p.9) and widespread assassination of civilian Government workers. We do not support the COIN perspective that this constitutes *“things getting worse before they get better”* but rather see it as being consistent with the five year trend of things just getting worse (p.7).

The ‘key terrain’ operation in Marjah has yet to deliver security for the people, provide safe return for the displaced or establish credibility for its boxed Government, as a result Helmand is now the most violent province in the country (p.8). The delayed operation in Kandahar (p.2) promises dire consequences for the civilian population with little to no impact on AOG capacity. There, as elsewhere, the application of unsupported COIN theories has only succeeded in dragging civilian development agencies in to the firing line (p.3)

The use of Local Defense Initiatives (LDI) & Arbaki, noted at Q1, continues to undermine the Governments claim to a ‘monopoly on violence’ and fracture the security landscape. Reminiscent of the 1963 South Vietnamese ‘Self Defence Corps’, LDIs are falling prey to all the same vices with active ones being murdered en-masse (Kandahar); smart ones partnering with AOG to exploit the population and Government supplies (Kunduz/Takhar); bold ones just being the AOG (Parwan) and timid ones keeping the status quo (Wardak). Some Arbaki have joined AOG when Government failed to give them weapons while others still have scared neighboring villagers to turn to the AOG for protection. The “Village Stability Program” (VSP, the US catchall moniker for such activities) is perhaps the most disturbing development of the year not least because it is so opaque with no single institution having an overview, let alone control, of all activities under this rubric.

Perhaps surprisingly, within this environment attacks against NGOs have dropped by 35% (p.4), and have been less severe, although still seven persons have been killed and 19 temporarily abducted. The reduction is attributed to improved security management procedures on behalf of the NGOs with many suspending road movements and improving stakeholder outreach, including to opposition forces, however we assess that the figures are also impacted by the AOG quest for legitimacy (p.5). The greatest challenge facing NGOs at Q2 is the plethora of new armed actors emerging under LDI, its various sponsors and the AOG response to it which leaves them required to renegotiate their position with a constantly rotating cast of local gunmen.

Looking forward, parliamentary elections in September could exacerbate emerging tensions regarding ethnic minority representation in Government, particularly amongst Hazaras. The US Congressional Review of its war strategy in December will be important with the appointment of General Petraeus, and the suspension of OP HAMKARI, improving the chances of an extension of the surge resources to July 2012. Factors such as civilian casualties, the activities of regional powers, AOG capability, ANSF development, the impact of HAMKARI, the cohesion of the Karzi Government and the perseverance of other ISAF countries will all play a major role in shaping the outcome of the review.

Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul 2010

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Humanitarian Aid





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2. Kandahar OP HAMKARI



The next, and some would argue final, significant stage of the IMF campaign is OP HAMKARI which will target Kandahar City, Arghandab, Dand, Panjwai Zahri (see map) as well as the

main routes connecting those districts to the city. These areas collectively account for more than 95% of the population of the province. More limited interventions will occur in Daman, Shah Wali Kot and Maiwand. IMF have committed about 30% of their total troop force to HAMKARI making it by far the largest single operation undertaken in the nine year conflict and in many ways the 'grand finale' of the IMF effort.

HAMKARI will pursue both civilian and military purposes both being funded from the military purse (CERP).

The "Hold & Build" phases, which this time come ahead of "Clear" and are currently ongoing, are aimed at fulfilling the authorized tashkeel of government staff (IDLG estimates a 158 person shortfall); constructing vital government buildings; securing operational resources from salaries to fuel and ensuring the personal survival of key officials. This characteristically technocratic approach to governance may well produce the required metrics on 'presence' and 'asset availability' but will do little to address issues of representation, transparency, credibility or legitimacy. By all accounts, IMF governance efforts are, and will remain, seen by the population as being in support of an already unpopular clique of oligarchs.

The main effort of the "Clear" stage will be the Security Ring, around the administrative boundary of Kandahar city, intended to reach full operational capacity by November (aka SRPF). The check-posts of the SRPF will be manned by both Afghan and International forces making them attractive targets for attack. Once operational initial reports suggest that ANSF alone will move within the city conducting door-to-door searches. Such a simple concept of operations seems deeply ill-suited to a city with such complex and interlocking incentive structures* and it should not be assumed that battling the Taliban will be the top of every stakeholders agenda. (* see "Power & Politics In Kandahar", Forsberg April 2010)

As currently articulated **HAMKARI looks very unlikely to be the 'breaking point' of the Taliban**. It seems more likely to go the way of OP MOSHTARAK, in Helmand, with lots of public ballyhoo around the actions of the IMF while the Afghan 'partners' discreetly pursue their own, often countervailing, agendas. ANSO considers it likely that HAMKARI will cause a significant rise in support for the armed opposition in Kandahar and, with that, make eventual Taliban ascendancy feasible.

3. Private Development Organizations (For-Profits)

The first half of 2010 has seen a dramatic growth in attacks against private development organizations (PDO) with more than 30 staff killed and 50 injured between January to April 2010 (see chart, right) (Source USAID).

Most attacks have occurred in the violent South but a recent incident in Kunduz suggests a broader intent. Attacks are properly coordinated military assaults confirming that they occur as a result of deliberate AOG policy as opposed to locally specific grievances.



The superficial similarity between the activities of these organizations and NGO programming has led some to speculate that the 'aid community' is being targeted but we do not agree. PDOs are attacked not for *what* they do but rather *why* they do it.

Unlike NGOs, who act independently and impartially, PDOs are often required by contract to integrate their programs with the counter-insurgency in an effort to win legitimacy for the government. This requirement extends from the IMF belief that development projects can be used to sway the 'population on the fence' to support their side. An intellectual underpinning of COIN theory globally.

Although there is no evidence to support this belief, and a growing body to contest it*, IMF compel these civilian organizations to assist with their campaign while they advertise their participation through Strategic Communications. The quiet acquiescence of the PDOs themselves, to what in other circumstances would surely be intolerable risks, also warrants criticism though a lens of corporate responsibility. (* see Wilder, "Winning Hearts & Minds? Understanding the relationship between Aid & Security" 2010, Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University)


From this analytical perspective then **it is the weakest part of the IMF strategy that is being targeted in these attacks** rather than the PDO specifically or the 'aid community' generally. The unclassified ISAF slide (above right), obtained from an April briefing on the subject, suggests that the attacks undermine COIN by impeding the development line of operation (LOO). AOGs have predictably made the same calculus and so their efforts are very likely to continue and even escalate.

AOG seem able to distinguish an NGO from a PDO (as the latter often go armored & armed) but the possibility for a misguided attack exists. Avoiding association with PDOs in terms of location, programming, appearance, donors etc may soon take on the same urgency as avoiding the IMF themselves.



4. GENERAL NGO TRENDS

ANSO: Total # Security Incidents directly involving NGO per month




June 2010 reached a five month low point of NGO attacks (above) and the total volume over the Q.2 period has dropped approximately 35% on 2009 (right). While there could be unknown drivers for this drop, such as the number of aid workers per capita, it would seem the bulk of the downturn is attributable to **improvements in NGOs own security awareness and management**.

NGOs have reported additional mitigation measures such as suspension of road movements; adaptation of local National staff to suit their work location (being from the district of work); replacement or relocation of vulnerable International staff; improved internal security management capacity (like a dedicated security focal point) and a disengagement from potentially contentious partners and donors.

More importantly perhaps many NGOs have also reported renewed efforts to manage perception of their organizations amongst stakeholders such as beneficiaries, their own staff, local community leaders and indeed even opposition members. Such efforts seem particularly worthwhile in areas where the opposition is homogeneous but are proving difficult in the more fractured landscapes of the North. The creation of Arbaki, and the responsive flex of AOG muscle, **has introduced a variety of new armed actors to the field** with no sense of over-arching control. NGOs are often at pains to determine who is in 'control' of any given area and subsequently who should be approached for reassurances of safety.

ANSO: # NGO security incidents Jan-Jun period, 2007 to 2010



5. TYPES OF NGO INCIDENTS

AOG incidents against NGOs (right) do account for 67% of the total events but the **severity has been in notable decline** with direct kinetic attacks down from 12 to 5 (3 IED+2 SAF), fatalities down from ten to seven and abductions down from 29 to 19 persons, all being released unharmed.

The previous section concluded that the *quantitative* drop in incidents can be attributed to changes in NGO behavior arguing that measures, such as the suspension of road movement, create less opportunities for AOG to get their hands on NGO staff. This makes sense but cannot be said to account for *qualitative* decline in the severity of the action once AOG actually capture an NGO staff member or gain control over their resources. Why have they not killed abductees for instance?

Certainly the main AOG, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, has no strategic interest in killing NGO workers but as far as we know this has not been translated in to a specific order and the 'benevolent sentiments' are hardly likely to have been passed down to the field. We would do better to look towards more immediate causes.


AOG do not generally see NGOs as complicit in the IMF campaign, as they do contractors for instance, but rather see them as an element of the local community. As such their approach towards them, particularly the decision to apply violence, is more often than not driven by the nature of their *own relationship* to the local people.

The AOG may wish to appear as a facilitator of access to assistance projects, and so will take a friendly approach to an NGOs, or alternatively may be attempting to shape the local population to adopt an ideological point, opposition to female education for instance, in which case it will target any NGO activity that supports this. In both cases the action is not about the NGO itself but about the AOGs relationship with, credibility within and power over the local community.


From this analytical perspective then we suggest that the decrease in violence being deployed against NGOs results from **the AOGs immediate need to appear legitimate in the eyes of the community** rather than from an improved opinion of the NGO itself. This currently local dynamic probably has unarticulated roots in the 'sense' the opposition movement has of its own strategic ascendancy.

The risk of course is that enlightened self-interest can disappear rapidly, unexpectedly and violently.

ANSO: Types of **armed opposition** incidents against NGO, Jan-Jun 2010




ANSO: Types of **criminal** incidents against NGO, Jan-Jun 2010



6. NGO INCIDENT MAPPING

ANSO: Location of serious NGO Incidents, Jan-Jun 2010




1. Entry of Site/Compound ●
2. Abduction & Release ●
3. Kinetic Attack (IED/SAF/IDF) ★
4. Threat ▲
5. Robbery/Attempted Robbery ■


NGO incidents have been predictably concentrated in the North/North East (42%) this year mostly as a result of the flurry of AOG activity in Faryab where Al-Qaeda inspired factions took issue with female education. Abductions have centered on the insecure sectors of Highway 1 still used by NGOs (Wardak/Ghazni) although just out of the reporting period we also see a spike of abductions in Baghlan (enroute to Kunduz). The two most serious kinetic incidents (IEDs) occurred in the South (Uruzgan & Kandahar) resulting in six of the seven fatalities of the half-year. The seventh fatality occurring during the criminal armed robbery in Ghor.

The comparison of incidents per region over Q2 08 to 10 (right) shows significant reduction in the total attacks occurring in the Central (24 down to 9) and Eastern (15 down to 7) regions and growth in the North (10 to 14)

ANSO: Direct NGO incidents per region, Jan-Jun, 2008-2010



7. AOG INITIATED ATTACKS




ANSOs independent conflict monitoring (above) indicates that the level of AOG attacks is **51% higher than at Q2 2009** (3,559 vs 5,359). May and June saw the highest attack counts on record, surpassing even the election spike of August 2009.

Having the five year perspective confirms that the escalation is part of a **consistent pattern of growth** unlikely to be related to the 'new' counterinsurgency approach. AOG simply field a better campaign each year. It is important for NGOs not to be misled by authoritative, but unsubstantiated, statements that progress is being made in turning back AOG capability. It is very clearly not.

Regional disaggregation (right) shows that while N/NE remain the smallest in absolute numbers they have seen the highest growth rates over last year (93% and 86% respectively) evidencing that AOG are expanding outside of the IMF's south/east focus areas in an effort to present a national presence. Their access to these traditionally hostile areas is improving because of the community polarization being caused by Local Defense Initiatives (Arbaki).


Direct intervention campaigns in the South have not stemmed violence with the region seeing an 86% growth over the 2009 Q2 period and more than 45% of all attacks occurring there.

ANSO: Number of AOG attacks occurring per region, Jan-Jun, 2008-2010



8. CONFLICT AREAS & RATES


ANSO: Number of provinces having average daily attack rates between 0.0 - >3.0



The maps (right) show the total AOG attacks per province at the Q.2 stage for 2009 and 2010. The increased conflict between Arbaki and AOG is evident in Kunduz & Takhar while AOG internecine conflict, and IMF attempts to capitalize on it, has doubled the rate in Baghlan. **Ghazni has seen startling growth** (269 to 570), reportedly as a result a Pakistani based faction trying to secure more territory, also deteriorating the P2K area. Helmand beats Kunar to the “most violent province” prize, with close to 15% of all attacks occurring there, likely as a result of IMF reduction in Korangal and escalation in Marjah. The western provinces of Herat, Ghor and Nimroz show minor improvements but these aggregated provincial figures reportedly conceal some severe district level deteriorations indicating that AOG are concentrating in certain areas rather than moving out.


ANSO : AOG attacks per province by Q.2 2009

(This is NOT a threat map colors represent incident rates NOT level of accessibility)



ANSO: AOG attacks per province by Q.2 2010

(This is NOT a threat map colors represent incident rates NOT level of accessibility)




The average daily attack rate chart (above left) shows that the number of provinces having more than three attacks per day has grown from 1 to 4 while the number of provinces seeing the lowest rate (<1 per 2 days) has dropped from 22 to 19. Overall ANSO assess that, in terms of daily attack rates, 23 provinces have remained stable, 1 has improved and **nine provinces have deteriorated** being Nangahar, Paktia, Kandahar, Paktika, Uruzgan, Helmand, Ghazni, Farah, Kunduz.


AOG are presenting a formidable geographic presence and are escalating attacks, in areas well outside of IMF main focus, at their own direction and tempo.

9. FATALITIES (Civilian Casualties)


ANSO: Gross fatalities, all causes, per sector, Jan-Jun 2010



ANSO: Cause of death to civilians, Jan-Jun 2010 only



ANSO: Civilian killed by AOG/IMF, Jan-Jun, 2008-2010



ANSOs data demonstrates a **23% increase in combat related civilian casualties** over the Q2 period of 2009 for a total of 1,110 deaths (ARM recently released figures of 1,074 for the same period). IEDs have been the leading cause of death. AOG have caused the bulk of the fatalities (83%) while **IMF have killed less than** last year both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the whole.

IMFs own fatalities have grown by 53% (217 vs 142 at 2009) while ANSF fatalities, although greater in actual numbers, have seen negative growth of -2% (940 vs 920 at 2009) perhaps reflecting improved ANSF capability or just that IMF shoulder the bulk of the conflict burden.

Of the civilian males killed by AOG (c.850) approximately **175 are assessed to be targeted assassinations** of civilians associated to the Government administration including three District Governors (Chist-i-Sharif, Saydabad, Arghandab) and scores of mayors, council members, district shura leaders, line ministry staff, pro-government Mullahs, tribal leaders and all manner of spies and informants. In short a classic guerilla campaign against the civilian administration and its supporters.

Acronyms:

AOG - Armed Opposition Groups (specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban); Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiH)

IMF - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF)

ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army)

IED - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb)

CAS - Close Air Support (airstrike)

EOF - Escalation of Force (shooting a vehicle at a check post that fails to stop)

SAF - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK47)

P2K - Paktya, Paktika & Khost

PDO - Private Development Organization (profit making development agency)

CERP - Commander Emergency Response Program (US commanders slush fund)

IDLG - Independent Directorate of Local Governance

SRPF - Security Ring Protection Force

REPORT ENDS

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