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Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North

By Claire Mc Evoy and Ryan Murray

HM Government

NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Danida

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Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey

First published in July 2008

Copy edited by Emily Walmsley

Cartography by MAP*grafix*

Typeset in Optima and Palatino by Richard Jones, Exile: Design & Editorial Services (rick@studioexile.com)

Printed by nbmedia in Geneva, Switzerland

ISBN 2-8288-0100-4

The Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It serves as the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence, and as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists.

Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and by contributions from the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The Survey is grateful for past and current, project-specific support from Australia, and Denmark. Further funding has been provided by the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and the United Nations Fund for Children. The Small Arms Survey collaborates with research institutes and NGOs in many countries, including Brazil, Canada, Georgia, Germany, India, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

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The Human Security Baseline Assessment

The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a multi-year project administered by the Small Arms Survey. It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and a wide array of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely, empirical research the project supports violence reduction initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes, incentive schemes for civilian arms collection, as well as security sector reform and arms control interventions across Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice on redressing insecurity.

Sudan *Issue Briefs* are designed to provide periodic snapshots of baseline information in a timely and reader-friendly format. The HSBA also generates a series of longer and more detailed *Working Papers* in English and Arabic, available at www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan.

The HSBA project currently receives direct financial support from the UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the Danish International Development Agency (Danida), and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The HSBA has also received support from the Global Peace and Security Fund at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada.

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HSBA Working Paper series editor: Emile LeBrun

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Acronyms and abbreviations

APEDI	Adakar Peace and Development Initiatives
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSAC	Community Security and Arms Control
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
EDF	Equatoria Defence Force
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HSBA	Human Security Baseline Assessment
IDP	internally displaced person
JIU	Joint Integrated Unit
KPR	Kenya Police Reserve
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
NCP	National Congress Party
NGO	non-governmental organization
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defence Force

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Acknowledgements

Richard Garfield led and monitored the household survey in Eastern Equatoria State and Turkana North with assistance from James Bevan, Jonah Leff, and Louisa Lombard. Ananda Millard was responsible for the survey instrument. Pact Sudan and Adakar Peace and Development Initiatives (APEDI) provided essential logistical oversight, support, and contextual information. APEDI also participated in, and helped to oversee, the survey. Lafon Development Association oversaw transportation of the surveyors to the training site.

The authors would like to thank all of the reviewers of this paper who provided invaluable information and observations from the field.

Abstract

Eastern Equatoria State in South Sudan and Turkana North District in neighbouring Kenya lie in one of the most conflict-prone regions in the East and Horn of Africa, where the use of firearms is endemic. The Small Arms Survey conducted a household survey in this region in mid-2007 to gather data on levels of firearm-related victimization, and to explore actual and perceived security threats as well as attitudes towards disarmament. It found that insecurity, mostly related to cattle rustling, was rife and that dependency on firearms was widespread. Significantly, it found that both actual and perceived levels of insecurity were significantly worse on the Kenyan side of the border than they were in South Sudan, which is recovering from a 21-year civil war. The paper presents the survey findings and provides a broad contextual analysis of the local dynamics that give rise to insecurity, including competition for land and natural resources, inter-ethnic rivalry, poor governance, and armed group activity. In addition, it discusses government-led violence-reduction initiatives in the region, namely the disarmament of pastoralist communities, highlighting the security risks attached to ad hoc, short-term disarmament campaigns.



I. Introduction and key findings

Eastern Equatoria State, in south-eastern South Sudan, lies in a region experiencing chronic and recurring armed conflict (internal and cross-border), widespread cattle rustling, and general lawlessness. The area has been considered one of the most conflict-prone regions in the East and Horn of Africa (Munyes, 2007, p. 4). A key cause of this conflict is the geographical, social, and political marginalization of the agro-pastoralist communities living in Eastern Equatoria and the neighbouring regions of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya. These communities suffer from a lack of basic services, unreliable water supplies, poor leadership, depressed local economies, insufficient responses to drought, widespread poverty, and extremely poor health and education (Munyes, 2007, p. 7). As a result, a culture of cattle rustling has flourished among pastoralist communities, exacerbated by widespread access to and misuse of firearms. Governments' attempts to 'pacify' these communities have tended to be antagonistic, repressive, uneven, and top-down militaristic disarmament operations that have done little to address the root causes of local conflict while failing to provide security for disarmed communities, or to act in the interests of the local people.[1]



This paper reports the findings of a household survey undertaken by a Small Arms Survey (SAS) team in May–June 2007 in Eastern Equatoria State, South Sudan, and in border regions of Turkana North District in the Rift Valley province of neighbouring Kenya. The survey, which is the only one of its kind in the area, was carried out two and a half years after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan and sought to investigate and provide data on a range of security-related issues. These included levels of small arms-related victimization, perceptions of security, and attitudes towards disarmament. The paper complements the findings of the survey with a broad discussion of the factors that are influencing local insecurity and the government-led measures taken to counter it, cautioning against the use of forcible disarmament campaigns. It also provides anecdotal evidence of significantly worse levels of insecurity in Turkana North than in Eastern Equatoria, contrary to what might be expected given Sudan's recent emergence from decades of civil war.

As part of the SAS's Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), the paper focuses mainly on insecurity in Eastern Equatoria. However, it also details findings that are particular to Turkana North District in northern Kenya in an attempt to highlight regional conflict and security dynamics. The paper introduces the state of Eastern Equatoria by examining its social and economic conditions, and relating these to the second Sudanese civil war (1983–2005) and the regional spread of small arms and light weapons. It then examines the factors fuelling armed conflict in the state and the ongoing debate about civilian disarmament within the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and in neighbouring countries. The study then describes the methodology employed, presents the findings of the household survey and its limitations, and ends with a series of broad policy-relevant conclusions for the GoSS and regional governments, as well as partners in the UN and donor countries.

The key findings of this paper are the following:

- Across the entire survey sample in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North District, respondents' primary concern was a lack of security for their households and/or their animals.

- Sixty per cent of the sample had witnessed a cattle-rustling event; small arms were used in 97 per cent of reported cases.
- Almost 60 per cent of respondents said they were not satisfied with the level of security in their village. One-third reported feeling 'quite to very unsafe' when walking alone to the market *during daylight hours*.
- Almost 80 per cent of respondents said that small arms made them feel safer.
- More than 60 per cent of respondents said that disarmament would decrease security in their village. In Eastern Equatoria, opinions about disarmament were divided: more than 40 per cent said it would decrease insecurity while the same number said it would increase security.
- Forty per cent of respondents in Eastern Equatoria said safety in their village had *decreased* since the CPA.
- One-third of Eastern Equatorian residents said they were not protected by any state security institutions.
- Eighty percent of respondents in Turkana North said security in their village was not good enough; almost 70 per cent felt 'quite to very unsafe' walking alone to the market *during daylight hours.*
- Almost 80 per cent of all most recently witnessed violent events in Turkana North involved a small arm. Nevertheless, respondents were significantly more fearful of disarmament than their Sudanese neighbours: 94 per cent said it would *decrease* the security of their household.
- Contrary to expectations, actual and perceived levels of armed violence in Turkana North were significantly worse than in Eastern Equatoria.

II. About Eastern Equatoria and the surrounding region

Eastern Equatoria State, which borders Uganda to the south, Kenya to the south-east, and Ethiopia to the east, covers an estimated 82,540 km^2 (EES, 2007, p. 11). As one of the ten South Sudanese states, it came into existence on 22 September 2005, following the signing of the CPA. Its government was formed in November 2005, which was followed by the inauguration of its State Assembly in December of that year. Aloisio Emor Ajoetok is the appointed governor of the state and Torit is its capital.

Livelihoods in Eastern Equatoria are based largely on subsistence agriculture (mainly sorghum and millet) and livestock rearing, and to a lesser extent on fishing, natural resources, mining, and trade (see Table 1). There are almost no alternative employment opportunities. Erratic weather conditions, low pro-

Table 1 Livelihoods in Eastern Equatoria State

Agriculture	Animal-related	Plants	Minerals	Others
Tobacco	Livestock markets	Miraa (kat)	Gold	Bricks
Ground nuts	Skin and hides	Lulu	Whitewash	Furniture
Sorghum	Fisheries	Lallop	Sand	Crafts
Sesame	Honey and beeswax	Frankincense	Cement	Tailoring
Sunflower	Wildlife tourism	Palm products	Oil	Crafts
Cotton	Meat	Timber	Diamonds	Dried okra
Tea	Hunting	Bamboo	Iron ore	Roof tiles
Coffee			Mineral water	Blacksmithing
Cassava				

Source: EES (2007), p. 14 (slightly modified)

Table 2 Communities living in Eastern Equatoria State

County	Indigenous communities	IDPs and others*
Torit	Latuho	Lango, Acholi, Lopit, Madi
Kapoeta North	Toposa (mostly)	
Kapoeta South	Toposa (mostly)	Acholi, Latuko, Didinga, Buya, Dinka
Kapoeta East	Toposa (mostly)	Dinka, Madi, Didinga, Acholi, Nuba, Nuer, Lotuka, Lokoro
Budi	Didinga, Buya	
Ikotos	Lokwa, Lorwama, Logir, Imotong, Dongotono, Ketebe	Latuka
Lafon	Lopit, Pari, Tenet, Latuka	
Magwi	Madi, Acholi, Iyire, Lofiriha	Bari, Lokoya, Dinka Bor

Source: adapted from Oxfam (2007)

* Includes people who have moved there in search of employment[2]

ductivity, chronic insecurity, a lack of tenure rights, uncompetitive prices, a total lack of infrastructure, underdeveloped internal and external market links, and the absence of a legal framework or institutions to encourage investment have resulted in chronic poverty among the estimated 1.5 million inhabitants (EES, 2007, pp. 12–13).[3] This situation is compounded by the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the state—drawn by its relatively favourable climate and safe transit routes (EES, 2007, p. 14)—and by the rising number of refugees returning from neighbouring countries in the post-CPA period. Women, many of whom were widowed during the war or were displaced with their children, outnumber men in many communities (Oxfam, 2007).

Eastern Equatoria is considered the most ethnically diverse region in South Sudan, with six main ethno-linguistic groups across the state's eight counties: the Ateker, Lotuho, Lango, Surma, Lwo, and Sudanic (EES, 2007, p. 14). Table 2 illustrates the principal communities living in each county.

Sudan's second civil war (1983–2005) had a devastating impact on parts of the state, leaving other (mainly southern) areas relatively unscathed.[4] Certain regions were controlled and terrorized by Government of Sudan (GoS) allies such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). A number of government-controlled garrison towns in the state—such as Torit, Lafon, Kapoeta, and Parajok—passed back and forth between northern and southern control. Eastern Equatoria experienced regular aerial bombardments, military attacks, and fighting during the war that destroyed the limited infrastructure and led to widespread displacement.[5]

Armed groups allied to the GoS such as the LRA, Equatoria Defence Force (EDF), EDF II, Boya Forces, Didinga Forces, Lafon Forces, and Toposa and Mundari militias, all fought against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) at different times during the civil war as part of Khartoum's strategy of 'divide and rule'. The SPLA, in turn, aligned itself with militias opposed to Khartoum-backed groups in fast-changing alliances. Tribal militias adopted tactics 'aimed at denying the SPLA a civilian base of support', attacking civilian settlements known to have yielded recruits (Johnson, 2003, p. 151). Supplies of weapons from Khartoum, the SPLA, SPLA-splinters (after the rebel group fractured in 1991), and others resulted in an arms race between different parties to the conflict. Each time a garrison fell to one or other army there was an abandonment of supplies, including arms and ammunition, by defeated troops. Local pastoralist communities quickly learned to seize these opportunities to loot and supplement their armaments (Akabwai and Ateyo, 2007, p. 17). Simultaneously, cattle rustling increased and 'gun hunting' (a local term that describes armed assaults on passers-by to seize their weapons) became endemic (Ochan, 2007, p. 7). The plentiful supply of firearms and high demand across international borders stimulated a powerful regional gun trade.

Relations between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and Equatorians were often strained during the civil wars, with many of the latter viewing the movement as a 'vehicle of Dinka domination' (Branch and Mampilly, 2005, p. 4). This perceived Dinka dominance was—and continues to be—deeply resented by Equatorians, who believe the rebellion's original birthplace was in Torit: the 1955 mutiny of the Eastern Equatoria Corps in the town was a precursor to the official outbreak of the first civil war in 1956. The second civil war, beginning in 1983, resulted partly from the division of the South into the three separate provinces of Equatoria, Bahr el-Ghazal, and Upper Nile.[6] This division was decreed by Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri but it

was backed by many Equatorians who saw it as a means of stemming Dinka domination of the southern administration. In the earlier stages of the conflict Equatorians did not play a prominent role in the SPLA, which 'treated Equatoria as occupied territory', moving large Dinka populations into the area to protect them from fighting further north (thereby displacing Equatorians) and failing to build support among local people (Branch and Mampilly, 2007, p. 5).[7] The vision of a 'united New Sudan' that was held by the late John Garang—former SPLA leader and first president of the GoSS before his death in 2005—may also have alienated Equatorians, many of whom had separatist leanings (Johnson, 2003, p. 86). Today, the Khartoum-based National Congress Party (NCP) has a presence in the state as an opposition party, enjoying local support particularly in the former garrisons of Torit and Kapoeta (Schomerus, 2008, p. 28).

For long periods, Eastern Equatoria suffered from very limited or non-existent humanitarian aid due to chronic insecurity restricting access to large swathes of the state, especially in Magwi County where the LRA operated, and due to regular flight bans by the GoS blocking humanitarian cargoes. The SPLM/A, in turn, devoted its resources to the military struggle, failing almost completely to develop a civil administration across South Sudan. The impact of this is still felt today: despite the high number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) now working in Eastern Equatoria, it remains largely underserved (Oxfam, 2007, p. 3), lacking basic health,[8] education,[9] roads, and food security. Meanwhile, landmines and unexploded ordnance pose an ongoing threat to human security.[10]

Residents of the state share a number of key features with peripheral communities in neighbouring countries. The Karamoja region of Uganda[11] and Turkana region of Kenya,[12] for example, are also inhabited by pastoralist communities and characterized by the same set of chronic issues: poverty and social marginalization of their agro-pastoralists; the absence of effective governance and security institutions; arming of civilians by the state;[13] the widespread circulation of firearms (internally and cross-border); diminishing roles of traditional authorities; high levels of criminality and lawlessness; antagonistic relationships with central governments; frequent deadly cattle raids organized by young male 'warriors';[14] and complicity or inaction by local authorities against perpetrators of crimes. A laissez-faire attitude towards governance in these regions has meant that 'while the social and economic determinants of conflict and crime multiply, the role of the state in managing resources, grievances, and crime remains nascent in the extreme' (Bevan, 2008, p. 29). The spread of firearms has thus been widely facilitated by the failure of regional governments to provide security, as well as porous borders, and the antagonistic relationships and co-dependency[15] between agro-pastoralist groups.

With the rising demand for small arms, the regional weapons trade has burgeoned. Sudanese traders from Eastern Equatoria, for example, reportedly move with their cattle to Agoro market in Uganda where they often exchange their livestock for firearms and ammunition instead of cash (Akabwai and Ateyo, 2007, pp. 23–24). For years, the SPLA base just two kilometres from Lokichoggio in Turkana North was one of the main suppliers of firearms to the Turkana, while the Didinga also brought supplies through Solia Mountain.[16] The Jie and the Karimojong from Uganda were also involved in the regional firearms trade, as were the Dassenach from Ethiopia.[17] From 1989–2003, the Turkana and the SPLA had an open arms market in Lopiding, northern Kenya, where Sudanese sold firearms and ammunition to the Turkana in exchange for both cattle and cash (Akabwai and Ateyo, 2007, p. 19). In 2003 the market was officially closed, though it continued to operate underground until the end of the Sudanese civil war, when it largely disappeared.[18] Within Sudan, especially since the signing of the CPA, firearm trading has also gone underground. Gun traders continue to move across the border into Kenya, selling to dealers or agents in a steady trickle (an AK-47 currently sells for KES 30,000–35,000 or around USD 500), but the numbers are relatively low.[19] Most small arms being used in South Sudan are relics from the civil war, although competition between different (armed/ethnic) groups is also leading to the use of heavier and more sophisticated weaponry, including high-calibre machine guns, rockets, and grenades.

Current conflicts in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North are often caused by retaliatory attacks between local communities. This has been the case with sections of the Sudanese Toposa and the Kenyan Turkana—both surveyed in this study—whose relations are highly antagonistic. Following a 13-month period of peace that lasted until October 2007 several attacks have been reported, most recently by the Toposa against the Turkana in Lokichoggio Division, Tur-

kana North, on 26 May 2008. An estimated 43 people were killed in this incident, the majority Toposa. A retaliatory attack by the Toposa is expected shortly due to the heavy losses incurred.[20] The region in general has a long history of broken peace agreements, the latest of which was signed on 1 March 2008 and whose terms were broken within days.[21] A peace meeting had also been held for youth from the Turkana, Toposa, and Dodoth communities in Kapoeta, Eastern Equatoria State, in late May, just days before the above attack.

Local peace agreements and processes often fall apart in this region partly because they are rarely written down—making follow-up and accountability difficult—and partly because local, state, and police authorities are rarely involved and feel no ownership of them.[22] Local authorities may therefore be unable or unwilling to enforce agreements between groups or to provide law and order. Indeed, the 1 March peace agreement stated that the authorities' failure or delays in taking action against 'criminals' involved in local raiding was 'the main factor that motivates crime and criminals' (Turkana/Toposa community representatives, 2008, p. 1). Agreements also tend not to last because they involve community elders and youth leaders but not the breakaway youth who engage in the raiding. Another factor is the failure to disseminate the terms of agreements widely enough, which means that many people are unaware of them. In certain cases, however, the breakdown of an agreement suits some parties well as the temporary truce serves merely as a short-term tactical manoeuvre.[23] The resulting cycle of attacks and counter-attacks has led to 'lawlessness, bloodshed, and anarchy'[24] across the entire region.

In terms of perceptions of security, the survey findings reveal, significantly, that people feel far less safe on the Kenyan side of the border than they do in neighbouring Eastern Equatoria, despite the fact that South Sudan has just emerged from decades of civil war. The perception among surveyed Turkana is one of being 'besieged and beleaguered'[25] by numerous outside groups who have benefited from instability within their own countries: these include the Toposa and Nyangatom in Sudan, the Dassenesh and Nyangatom in Ethiopia, and the Dodoth (a Karimojong sub-clan) in Uganda. Their fear extends to Kenya's central government, with whom they have an antagonistic relationship and which partially disarmed areas of Turkana in 2005–06. One of the conclusions of this paper is that structural factors, including poverty, marginalization, and a lack of security services resulting from years of government neglect—in contrast to South Sudan's 'post-conflict' environment—are responsible for the absence of human security in areas of Turkana North.

III. Factors fuelling insecurity in Eastern Equatoria

Until recently, law enforcement staff (such as police and prison workers) in SPLM-controlled areas of South Sudan worked 'voluntarily'. They had little or no training and operated with minimal resources. The GoSS is now facing the daunting task of building these institutions from the ground up, as well as reorganizing and professionalizing the SPLA. These complex, long-term projects will take years to reap security benefits. In the meantime, armed violence remains highly prevalent.

The following section provides a contextual analysis of the survey findings (reported in Section VI), as well as some broader security-related issues not covered by the survey. Based on a literature review and a series of interviews in Sudan and Kenya between November 2007 and June 2008, it highlights factors that are driving current insecurity and that are likely to be sources of future conflict.

Cattle rustling

Cattle are the main source of livelihood across Eastern Equatoria and neighbouring areas of Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Cattle provide milk and meat, as well as being a source of wealth and prestige. Traditional livestock raiding,[26] aided by firearms[27] and influenced by commercial, political, and military interests, has degenerated into a free-for-all of vicious attacks and revenge attacks, often involving large numbers of cattle and significant loss of life (see pp. 41–42 on the prevalence of raiding). The attacks have a strong cross-border dimension, can include the abduction of children, and in some cases are organized by cartels controlled by individual military commanders.[28] Occurring in isolated areas, these attacks are often carried out with impunity, as it is extremely difficult to apprehend cattle raiders without mobile and well-connected security forces.

Stolen cattle bring wealth to communities living in an environment with very few other means of making a livelihood. The situation is exacerbated by a widespread belief that the CPA may break down, which encourages introspective, defensive worldviews coupled with fatalistic attitudes towards inter-ethnic conflict and raiding. Many adults 'have grown up with the belief that . . . rival communities will always threaten each other and that nothing will ever change' (Ochan, 2007, p. 10). Regional cattle rustling is particularly common between the Lango, Lotuko, Buya, and Didinga of Eastern Equatoria and the Karimojong of Uganda; between the Toposa of Eastern Equatoria and the Turkana of Kenya; and between the Dodoth of Uganda and the Turkana. Within Eastern Equatoria raiding typically occurs between the Toposa and the Buya, the Lotuko and the Lango, the Buya and the Logir, the Didinga and the Toposa, and the Lango and the Didinga/Buya.[29]

A culture of retribution in the region, especially in the absence of any legal method of obtaining justice or compensation for victims, is a major influencing factor in the decision to counter-raid.[30] The need to augment livestock numbers and compensate for thefts in order to survive, support families, and contribute to the productivity of the community, also plays an important role (Bevan, 2008, pp. 25, 28). All pastoralist communities in the region are required to obtain bride price before marrying, creating enormous pressure to acquire cattle. Among the Lango community, for example, a wife can currently cost 40–50 heads of cattle, in contrast to the pre-war price of 15–22 (Ochan, 2007, p. 12). Youth have even taken to raping or abducting girls and young women to force their families to lower their 'price'. In addition, there is considerable pressure on young men to conduct 'successful' raids in order to acquire the title of 'warrior'.[31] Among the Toposa in Kapoeta County, for example, a youth or man killed during a cattle raid is given a hero's funeral (Ochan, 2007, p. 15).

Conflict over natural resources

Insufficient pastures, limited water points, chronic poverty, and the absence of community-led, cross-border management of shared resources have resulted in intense competition and regular violent conflicts between ethnic groups and specific clans within Sudan and regionally. Drought-prone weather con-

ditions have forced groups to travel longer distances to graze, bringing them into contact with other clans and ethnic groups with whom they are not accustomed to dealing.[32] An estimated 75 per cent of conflicts fought between the Turkana and their neighbours in Eastern Equatoria, for example, are caused by the struggle to access and control dry-season grazing areas and water points along the border of Lokichoggio Division and Kapoeta East.[33]

The historical competition over natural resources has grown more violent with the widespread availability of firearms, used both to protect and to attack other communities. The absence of good governance and strong traditional systems of mediation have also led to a failure to prevent such disputes from escalating into full-scale armed conflict.

Inter-ethnic rivalry

Pastoralists in the region have extremely strong ethnic identities, which have become polarized in part due to intense competition between different groups.[34] Such strong ethnic divisions have also served to perpetuate and justify the demonization of what are considered other 'foreign' groups.[35] For example, in May 2007, cattle raiders (allegedly Toposa) attacked a Didinga community in Ngauro *payam* (district), Budi County, killing at least 50 civilians[36] and looting an estimated 400 cattle and 400 goats. Most of the dead were women and children. Observers noted a complex ambush involving around 1,500 attackers wearing SPLA military and police uniforms. They advanced from three directions and were reportedly armed with a variety of weapons including a 12.7mm heavy machine gun, PKM general-purpose machine guns, Kalashnikovs, and G3 rifles. The attack may have been organized in an attempt to displace the Didinga and thereby gain access to local resources (pastures and gold), or it may have been a revenge attack due to the Didingas' refusal to join a political alliance with the Toposa and Buya.[37] The motives remain unclear and the perpetrators have not been apprehended. Meanwhile, on 20 August 2007 an estimated 48 people were killed in raids and fighting between the Dongotono and the Logir sub-clans of the Lango in Chorokol village, Ikotos County. Reportedly 519 heads of cattle were driven away, a number of children were killed, and 19 women were raped.[38]

Notably, violent raiding and attacks generally occur *between* different ethnic groups, not within them. For example, between the six sub-tribes or sections of the Lango, cattle rustling is reportedly non-existent (Ochan, 2007). Sections of the Toposa do not raid one another either.[39] Over the years, a wide range of actors have attempted to promote peaceful co-existence between ethnic groups, generating numerous conferences, gatherings, and peace agreements, but few have had lasting success.

Weak governance

A lack of transparency, frequent partiality, and an unwillingness or inability among local authorities to tackle security problems all conspire to perpetuate the high levels of armed violence. Traditional structures, such as customary law courts, are still in place but they are too weak to cope effectively with the scope of the problems. One of the obstacles to dealing with the violence is that the notion of a coherent, supportive GoSS remains a new concept—largely promoted by intellectuals—to people on the ground. Political interests tend to be local, therefore, and local authorities and politicians tend to protect their own interests.[40] This can result in government officials downplaying conflicts, granting perpetrators effective impunity, and scapegoating rogue elements such as the LRA for attacks without carrying out any meaningful investigations. Local politicians, jockeying for power and favour while beholden to and intimidated by their superiors,[41] are also often unwilling to take action to stem insecurity.

One example of this appears in a GoSS parliamentary report on a spate of killings between the Dongotono and Logir between June and August 2007, which noted that the county commissioner, under the direction of the state governor, downplayed the conflict in Chorokol and did not deploy military force quickly enough to arrest the perpetrators. The report indicated that the authorities' reluctance to grant access to the area and the SPLA's refusal to grant clearance to fly there—claiming that the place did not exist on a map—severely delayed any interventions. 'Our leaders at present are the integral part of the problem,' the report added. 'Until we begin to see Governorship as a stewardship bestowed by the people and consider leadership as a privilege, not a right, Eastern Equatoria State's nightmare continues . . .' (GoSS, 2007, p. 6).

Trust between the authorities and local people remains low. Government representatives are seen as actively encouraging and condoning cattle raids by members of their own ethnic groups, while seeking to punish others. In Ikotos and Torit Counties, sections of the SPLA, police, and local administrators are accused of corruption, nepotism, arbitrary detention, imposing communal punishments, torture, and raping women from villages harbouring suspected criminals (Ochan, 2007, p. 20). These are unlikely to be isolated allegations. There is also a strong local sentiment that many politicians and members of the SPLA are directly involved in creating insecurity (for example, by bankrolling cattle rustling or trading in firearms) and therefore have no real interest in stemming it (Schomerus, 2008, p. 33).[42] To make matters worse, many communities have no state security institutions present at all, leaving people reliant on non-state institutions such as young male warriors or local ethnic militias to protect themselves from attacks and crime sometimes with counterproductive results (see pp. 46–49).

The struggle to gain access to economic assets and resources is also raising the stakes locally. Eastern Equatoria's oil,[43] diamonds, gold, cement, uranium, and timber, among other valuable resources, are currently attracting interest from outsiders. This is leading to manipulation by elites as they jockey for power and exploration rights. In the absence of a relevant legal framework and institutions to stem abuses, corruption is spreading.

Soldier abuses and mistrust

Frequent transgressions perpetrated by current and former soldiers are a constant threat to human security in the region. SPLA soldiers reportedly show disregard for local authorities and intimidate and harass local people, firing off guns during alcohol-fuelled disputes and engaging in sexual harassment and abuse. There are also reported cases of SPLA members using their support bases to control local trade and access to land and resources, partly by working against the police (Schomerus, 2008, pp. 46). Former SPLA, including deserters, are also said to compound local insecurity by training other youth in the use of weapons, raiding techniques, looting, and intimidating civilians with their weapons.[44]

In addition, the dynamics within the CPA-mandated Joint Integrated Units (JIUs)[45] cause insecurity. In March 2008, for example, the stabbing of a Dinka civilian by a JIU member of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Kapoeta town led to seven SAF members being killed in retaliation.

Armed group activity[46]

Eastern Equatoria is home to a range of armed ethnic militias, many of whom were backed by Khartoum during the civil war and may for opportunistic reasons retain loyalty to the NCP. For its part, the NCP, which has offices in the towns of Magwi, Torit, and Kapoeta, has a strong interest in building up local support using whatever means it can (Schomerus, 2008, pp. 28-29). This includes fomenting local ethnic tensions ahead of CPA-mandated national elections in 2009. There are also a number of former armed groups that pose a potential security threat. The EDF—the region's most well-known group, which once had a fighting force of about 12,000 (Schomerus, 2008, p. 60)—officially aligned with the SPLA in 2004 after years of engaging in a proxy war on behalf of Khartoum. The EDF's integration into the SPLA and its disarmament, however, have not been smooth, with some high-ranking members refusing to integrate and returning to their villages with their weapons, in some cases creating alliances with other former EDF (Schomerus, 2008, p. 60). The EDF, and its splinter, EDF II, are therefore no longer functional but the risk remains that personal loyalties, the problematic integration process, genuine political grievances, and political interference could lead to further splinter factions—whose members still have their firearms—regrouping. While many of these armed groups are dormant or lying low at the moment, they nevertheless pose a very real danger for the future.[47]

Similarly, there is a serious threat that groups associated with the LRA may continue to destabilize the region, even as the LRA itself claims to be withdrawing as a result of the peace process (which is yet to be concluded). The group largely moved out of Eastern Equatoria in mid-2007, having kept bases in Magwi County for some years.[48] However, there have been ongoing reports of attacks by unidentified groups across the Equatorias, which may or may not be LRA-related. There are also credible reports of LRA splinter groups made

up of rogue Ugandans and Sudanese, who may continue to operate as armed groups, militias, or criminals.

Land/border disputes

Land disputes are a key source of conflict in a state where boundaries between the newly formed counties[49]—and their resources—are highly contentious and access to land is the only means of livelihood and survival. The perceived lack of willingness in the GoSS to find permanent solutions to land issues is leading to growing resentment between communities. Toposa inhabitants of the region and refugees returning home from neighbouring Kenya and Uganda are finding their land occupied by (mainly Dinka) IDPs, some of whom have been in Eastern Equatoria for years and are reluctant to return to their less-developed places of origin, especially in Jonglei State. In some cases the IDPs have reportedly established parallel administrations to serve their own interests,[50] and are accused of being supported by the local SPLA, who in turn are known to have influence in the GoSS. There are also accusations of land-grabbing by Dinka, especially in Magwi County,[51] which is resulting in serious tensions between the Dinka and local Toposa.

The inability or unwillingness of either the local authorities or the GoSS to arbitrate in such disputes, along with the current legal vacuum and deeply rooted local anti-Dinka sentiments, are making Equatorians feel increasingly marginalized and mistreated within their own state of origin. As a result, accusations and counter-accusations of land theft are rife and anti-Dinka propaganda is widespread.[52] A November 2007 proposal from the Episcopal Church of the Diocese of Torit Peace Project, which planned to bring community members together to find solutions to the land problem, referred to 'contagious ethnic cleansing' by the IDPs, clearly illustrating the depth of local feeling (Episcopal Church of the Sudan Diocese of Torit, 2007, p. 2). Similar land disputes will undoubtedly increase as refugees return, and could potentially degenerate into open conflict.[53]

IV. Civilian disarmament and human security

In an attempt to stabilize South Sudan and to reduce the widespread (mis)use of firearms, the GoSS has made it clear that the disarmament of all civilians is essential. This process will parallel that of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) being planned for former combatants.

Civilian disarmament falls under the programme heading of 'Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC)',[54] a term that encompasses a host of activities including peace-building, humanitarian projects, rule of law/governance projects, cross-border dialogue, and security control, all of which are being planned by state authorities and UN partners. These initiatives, it is hoped, will contribute to a more secure and stable environment in which badly-needed development can take a foothold alongside a reduction in the use of firearms. This, in turn, it is hoped will lead to a gradual rejection of the heavily militarized lifestyle that has become the norm in South Sudan, thereby leading to a conducive environment for reintegrating former combatants and a secure, stable region in which communities can prosper and benefit from post-CPA peace dividends.

Despite these general plans to improve human security, progress on developing relevant policies and laws has been extremely slow. The one exception is the appointment in late 2007 of Dr Riak Gok Majok to lead a new CSAC Bureau under the presidency. This move was designed to create a CSAC-dedicated institution with its own clear mandate to lead the coordination of arms control activities (including disarmament) across South Sudan.[55] At the same time, however, numerous key questions about arms control remain unanswered by the GoSS, including how to regulate the ownership and use of firearms among civilians; the conditions under which possession and use might be legal; how to utilize traditional authorities in disarmament exercises; how to regulate stockpiles of collected weapons;[56] how to protect disarmed communities from attacks; and the respective roles of the SPLA and police in disarmament efforts. The DDR Bill, still to be passed by parliament, contains

some language related to arms reduction and control but it is considered inadequate, outdated, and in urgent need of replacement.[57]

The CPA, for its part, states in Article 14.6.5.15 of the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Annex that the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee will monitor the disarmament of civilians who are 'illegally armed',[58] but it offers no further legal guidance. This leaves the GoSS largely dependent on SPLA military decrees and orders, many of which are confidential, to govern these issues (Alila, 2007, p. 41).[59]

Six-month campaign

Despite the legal and policy vacuum, unilateral disarmament by the GoSS is proceeding. Since the CPA was signed ad hoc initiatives have taken place in the states of Jonglei, Warrap, Unity, Lakes, and, to a very limited extent, Eastern Equatoria.[60] A six-month campaign to disarm all of South Sudan's ten southern states was ordered by GoSS President Salva Kiir, beginning on 1 June 2008 (GoSS, 2008, p.1). The order, sent to each of South Sudan's state governors on 22 May 2008, states that the 'operation' shall be conducted by state authorities and the SPLA and that the overall objective is to 'peacefully have all civilians in the ten states surrender any kind of firearm in their possession'.[61] It also notes, however, that where individuals or groups refuse or show resistance, 'appropriate force must be used'.

This has ominous implications for many of South Sudan's pastoralist communities, not least in Eastern Equatoria, who rely heavily on firearms to defend themselves. The household survey results show, not surprisingly, that even a year ago, well before the recent order, there were mixed feelings locally about disarmament (see pp. 50–51), with many fearing it would increase levels of insecurity.[62] Local authorities and Members of Parliament in Eastern Equatoria fully realize the security risks involved.[63] Key members of the GoSS likewise recognize that disarmament in the state will have to be regional and comprehensive in order to be sustainable,[64] but they have yet to come up with a strategy to achieve this.[65] Given the latest presidential order which will likely be pushed forward by the GoSS's state-level security committees, there is now serious concern that in the absence of a broad, coherent strategy and legal framework, ad hoc measures will intensify, potentially leading to local resistance and significant loss of life.

Lessons from neighbouring Jonglei State, as well as neighbouring parts of Uganda and Kenya, clearly illustrate the risks to human security of forcible disarmament efforts. In 2006, a forcible unilateral campaign was undertaken by the SPLA in northern Jonglei among the 'white army' of the Lou Nuer. It was believed locally to have been politically motivated and led to considerable resistance, hundreds of deaths, thousands of displaced, the destruction of villages, burning of homes, looting, and widespread food insecurity—thereby massively destabilizing disarmed areas (Small Arms Survey, 2007a). During this and subsequent peaceful campaigns, SPLA promises to protect disarmed communities went largely unfulfilled, and cattle rustling and attacks explicitly targeted vulnerable settlements. The communities then rearmed to protect themselves, raising fundamental questions about the success of the campaigns,[66] as well as the sustainability of international involvement.

Neighbouring Uganda and Kenya have had similar recent experiences. In both countries military-style operations have frequently been characterized by the excessive use of force and grave human rights abuses, and have resulted in reprisals and increased insecurity. These disarmament campaigns have also served as 'forced upgrades' of firearms: as their old weapons are confiscated, communities are forced to acquire more modern ones to protect themselves (Eaton, 2008, p. 103). In Uganda, for example, a 2006–07 military operation[67] in the Karamoja region led to the widespread killing of civilians (including prominent local leaders and peacemakers), the burning of homes, numerous human rights abuses, and reprisal attacks against the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF).[68] Communities in Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan subsequently raided the Karimojong, who promptly rearmed (Small Arms Survey, 2007b).

Among the Turkana of Turkana South, a 2005–06 military-led campaign reportedly generated over 1,700 firearms and 5,700 rounds of ammunition. However, there were a host of problems associated with the process: it was widely viewed with suspicion as it rode on the back of previous failed disarmament efforts that had increased victimization and insecurity; Kenyan military personnel tortured and abused civilians who refused to surrender weapons; promises of 'disarmament for development' were never realized; the process

was rushed and piecemeal; and disarmed communities were not protected, leaving them vulnerable to attacks from neighbouring Karimojong and Pokot.[69] Broken promises, coupled with the abuses and subsequent attacks from other communities, left people feeling betrayed by both government and civil society, which had backed the campaign (Riam Riam, 2007).

As South Sudan gears up for the 2008 disarmament operation, it seems clear that hardliners within the GoSS security apparatus are leading the approach. This is despite the fact that at least some key government members are keenly aware of lessons learned from earlier disarmament efforts. A relevant GoSS document spells out clearly that that 'confidence-building' is required among targeted communities; that SPLA buffer zones must be in place before disarmament begins to avoid a security vacuum; that a policy framework must be put in place; that a 100 per cent success rate in terms of the numbers of weapons collected is unlikely; and that services must be provided to 'positively influence' local people.[70] Director of the CSAC Bureau Riak Gok Majok has said that he is in favour of voluntary, peaceful, community-led, legal (that is, within the context of a legal framework), reciprocal disarmament, based around the principles of 'persuasion' and respect for human rights.[71]

But there is a clear lack of consensus within the southern administration. Some feel that it is important for civilians to retain their firearms, or at least to have them accessible in the event of the breakdown of the CPA; others say that long-term disarmament and control cannot work because there are politicians in all countries in the region who are benefiting from the spoils of commercial raids.[72] Those who appear to have won the debate focus on the need to retain control of all South Sudan's disparate armed groups, to impose security on warring southern communities, and to remove weapons from communities who have the potential to act as CPA spoilers. For this opinion group, the government's prerogative to use force where and when it is deemed necessary is paramount to keeping order in a very unstable South Sudan.[73] There is an inherent tension, therefore, between the desire for urgent, forcible action to remove small arms from communities and a longer-term, voluntary process that wins hearts and minds but, in the meantime, allows some of the violence that is crippling the economy and preventing development to continue.[74]

The combination of these factors leaves Eastern Equatoria at a critical juncture and with a very uncertain future. Ad hoc disarmament and associated violence has already begun—SPLA soldiers were involved in a 'peace enforcement operation' or forcible disarmament of two warring villages, Iloli and Oguruny, in Hiyala *payam* on 4 June 2008. Eight SPLA and 11 civilians were killed during the operation, which began at 4am, and several more after it.[75] The SPLA then burned both villages to the ground in retaliation for the killings, forcing some 4,300 people to flee, arbitrarily arrested and beat up men from the villages, and slaughtered or kept cattle belonging to the population. Further disarmament is imminent and, in the absence of a holistic, coordinated, and regional approach, it is likely to result in even higher levels of insecurity than the household survey reveals. This, in turn, will have an impact on regional security, with an expected increase in cross-border attacks, including from Turkana North, that take advantage of disarmed communities.

V. Survey instruments and methods

The SAS household survey was carried out in Eastern Equatoria State and neighbouring border areas of Turkana North District in north-western Kenya between 23 May and 7 June 2007. A total of 29 surveyors from seven of Eastern Equatoria's eight counties were recruited, primarily by Pact Sudan (in inland areas of Eastern Equatoria) and Adakar Peace and Development Initiatives (APEDI) (in border areas with Kenya and Turkana). Twenty-two of the surveyors were Sudanese and seven were Kenyan.

The survey instrument (see Appendix on p. 55), developed by an SAS methodological expert and drawing on experiences from previous SAS surveys in South Sudan,[76] included 89 questions and focused on the following areas:

- personal details of respondents, including geographical information;
- violent events (not witnessed);
- violent events (witnessed);
- household victimization;
- perceptions of personal safety;
- attitudes towards and availability of small arms; and
- attitudes towards disarmament.

The average length of time spent answering the questionnaire was 23 minutes.

Surveyors from targeted communities were chosen on the basis of educational level (secondary school), language ability (fluency in English and a local language), civilian status, lack of overt political affiliations,[77] and status in their communities. Efforts were made to recruit as many women as possible but a lack of access to education combined with cultural factors (such as women being expected to work in the home), resulted in only seven of the 29 being female.

Surveyors were brought to a base just outside Kapoeta town, Kapoeta South, for three days of training on survey methodology by the SAS team. Each person then returned home and interviewed 60 households[78] in a mix of urban and rural targeted communities. In all areas, interviewers were members of the dominant ethnic group and spoke the local language. Communities were chosen from seven counties of Eastern Equatoria and the neighbouring divisions of Lokichoggio and Oropoi in Turkana North in an attempt to gather as broad a range of data as possible.

The surveyors were divided into two groups—A and B—for training and supervision. Group A surveyed Kapoeta North, Kapoeta South, Budi, Ikotos, Torit, and Lafon Counties and Group B surveyed southern Kapoeta East and Lokichoggio/Oropoi Divisions in Turkana North (see Maps 1 and 2). Each surveyor received at least one supervision visit from SAS staff except for a woman in Chukudum who was inaccessible due to the rains and impassable roads. Half of the data gathered was from Kenya and half from Sudan. In rural areas, villages were chosen on the basis of accessibility and the majority of residents were selected to participate.[79] Surveyed households in selected sites were generally chosen in a non-random manner, although where possible a spin-the-bottle method was used.[80]

One of the principal obstacles to choosing households randomly stemmed from the need to observe and respect local social protocols. First, the circular design of villages was such that the survey team had to enter via the main entrance in full view of the entire village. The village inhabitants then assembled to greet the surveyors who, in turn, spent time addressing the village and explaining their intentions. Second, owing to the fact that most people remained mildly suspicious of the team's intentions, interviews were conducted in the centre of the village where everyone could see the process, but not hear the responses (in the interest of confidentiality). The team found that random selection of homes caused people to feel uncomfortable and aroused suspicions.[81]

Notably, both the surveyors and monitors met several uncontrollable obstacles that impeded the smooth implementation of the survey. Due to heavy rains, flooded roads, necessary security precautions, and various other challenges (such as the lack of accurate maps) encountered on the ground, a significant portion of the survey was not conducted optimally. Poor roads and security threats delayed travel to survey sites and separated group members, who were then forced to spend longer periods than envisaged organizing ad hoc logistical arrangements. The size of the geographical area being surveyed was also unrealistically large for the small team implementing the survey.

These setbacks minimized the amount of time monitors could spend reviewing the questionnaires for errors as well as the time that surveyors could spend reflecting on their performance in an effort to improve it the following day. During a rigorous data screening after the survey was completed, 521 of the total 1,760 questionnaires were deemed fit for analysis, reflecting the strict margin of error at 2.5 per cent and the commitment to ethical and empirical integrity (that is, maintaining the validity and reliability of the data). Reliable questionnaires residing within the 2.5 per cent margin of error were determined using chi-square models for independence. Using rigorous statistical criteria, error was determined by way of missing and invalid responses, achieving a confidence rate of 95 per cent. Thus the analysed data, herein referred to as the 'tight sample', should be considered valid and reliable. These data should not, however, be interpreted as being representative of the entire sample.[82]

To help affirm the findings in the tight sample, this report also includes data from the larger sample. Although the error rate in the larger sample exceeds the limitations of the permissible 2.5 per cent margin, comparisons with the tight sample are still sometimes illuminating. It is important to note, however, that parallels in the larger sample may reflect error bias, not region-wide influences.

VI. Survey results

Geographic, geo-demographic, and gender distribution

Almost two-thirds of the tight sample are from Sudan while the rest are from Kenya. Within Eastern Equatoria, findings are from the counties of Ikotos, Kapoeta East, Kapoeta North, Kapoeta South, Lafon, and Torit. Within Turkana North, they are from the divisions of Lokichoggio and Oropoi.[83] Table 3 shows the distribution of sampled residents:

Table 3 Counties/divisions—tight sample

	County/division	N°	%
Eastern Equatoria	Ikotos	57	11.0%
	Kapoeta East	164	31.7%
	Kapoeta North	31	6.0%
	Kapoeta South	13	2.5%
	Lafon	14	2.7%
	Torit	45	8.7%
Turkana North	Lokichoggio/Oropoi	194	37.5%
Subtotal		518	100.0%
Unidentified		3	
Total		521	

The sampling imbalance is important to note, as the Turkana North portion heavily influences the results in the tight sample. To delineate the actual sources of influence better and to determine if any regional differences were occurring, three separate groups were distinguished for analysis in this report:

- tight sample (N = 521)
- Eastern Equatoria sample (N = 324)
- Turkana North sample (N = 194)

In the analysis that follows, the findings of the first two samples are compared with those of the larger sample to detect any important trends or patterns. However, as noted in the previous section, the error rate for the larger sample exceeds 2.5 per cent.

In the tight sample, the distribution of urban and rural residents[84] was unbalanced, with a significantly higher number of respondents residing in rural areas ($p<0.001$) (see Table 4).

Table 4 Geo-demographic distribution—tight sample

	Location	N°	%
	Urban	191	39.0%
	Rural	299	61.0%
Subtotal		490	100.0%
Unidentified		31	
Total		521	

The Eastern Equatoria sample demonstrated a very similar geo-demographic distribution between urban and rural residents ($p=0.420$) (see Table 5).

Table 5 Geo-demographic distribution— Eastern Equatoria

	Location	N°	%
	Urban	124	41.9%
	Rural	172	58.1%
Subtotal		296	100.0%
Unidentified		28	
Total		324	

The geo-demographic distribution in the larger sample did not differ significantly from either the tight or the Eastern Equatoria samples.

Gender distribution

In the tight sample, the number of men surveyed significantly outnumbered that of women (the ratio is about 1:2.5) (see Table 6).

Table 6 Gender—tight sample

	Gender	N°	%
	Male	373	71.7%
	Female	147	28.3%
Subtotal		520	100.0%
Unidentified		1	
Total		521	

The gender imbalance was slightly less pronounced in the Eastern Equatoria sample with a ratio closer to 1:2 (see Table 7). This is surprising considering the fact that many households are female-headed.

Table 7 Gender—Eastern Equatoria

	Gender	N°	%
	Male	208	64.4%
	Female	115	35.6%
Subtotal		323	100.0%
Unidentified		1	
Total		324	

The ratio of 1:2 is consistent in the larger sample (N = 1042).

Serious issues affecting the area

The primary concern for residents of the tight sample was security, specifically for households and animals. This was reflected clearly in the Turkana North sample, whereas in Eastern Equatoria the primary concern was the lack of, or inadequate, hospital and health facilities.

In the tight sample, the most serious issue of concern was the 'security of the household or of animals' (75.6 per cent, n = 394, N = 521). This may well be a reflection of the degree to which cattle rustling among communities makes them feel both vulnerable and protective of their property and possessions.

Figure 1 Serious issues affecting area
Tight sample (N = 521), Eastern Equatoria (N = 324)



This was followed by concern for 'food for household or for animals' (67.0 per cent, n = 349, N = 521), and a 'lack of, or inadequate, hospital facilities' (61.4 per cent, n = 320, N = 521) (see Figure 1).

In Eastern Equatoria, security was not ranked among the top three most serious issues (see Figure 1). When asked to rank priorities, residents of the region reported the lack of, or inadequate, hospital or health post facilities (77.2 per cent, n = 250, N = 324) as the most serious problem. This was followed by the lack of, or inadequate, education (64.5 per cent, n = 209, N = 324) and lack of, or inadequate, food for household members and/or animals (50.9 per cent, n = 165, N = 324).[85] This reflects an overriding concern about the lack of development, access to basic services, and food insecurity, despite the very pressing problem of armed violence across the state.

The larger sample parallels the Eastern Equatoria sample: the lack of or inadequate hospital and health facilities were the primary concern, followed by the lack of, or inadequate, food. Security was the third most reported issue (N = 1113).

In Turkana North, on the other hand, significantly more respondents (39.0 per cent, n = 291, N = 746)[86] were concerned about security for household members and/or animals than in neighbouring parts of Sudan. As this district is in one of Kenya's most drought-prone regions, food and access to water were also of major concern with almost 48 per cent of respondents saying they were the most serious issues affecting their areas. This breaks down to lack of, or inadequate, food for household members and/or animals (24.4 per cent, n = 260, n = 182, N = 746), and lack of, or inadequate, clean water (23.1 per cent, n = 172, N = 746).

Violent events ever witnessed

In the tight sample, almost half of respondents had witnessed a victimization event. In Turkana North this figure rose to 60 per cent, while in Eastern Equatoria it was just over one-third. Sixty per cent of the tight sample had witnessed cattle rustling.

Almost half of the tight sample (45.7 per cent, n = 238, N = 521) had witnessed at least one violent event in their lifetime. The number of witnessed events did not differ significantly between urban and rural locations (p = 0.693). Of all the violent events witnessed, cattle rustling was the most common (60.1 per cent, n = 143, N = 238) (see Figure 2).

In Eastern Equatoria, 36 per cent of residents sampled (36.1 per cent, n = 117, N = 324) had witnessed a violent event in their lifetime,[87] a figure that is lower than expected from anecdotal evidence of insecurity levels in the state. This finding did not differ significantly between urban and rural locations (p =0.853). The ordering of violent events witnessed in the Eastern Equatoria sample

Figure 2 All witnessed violent events[88]
Tight sample (N = 238), Eastern Equatoria (N = 117)[89]



paralleled the tight sample, with cattle rustling ranking first among all witnessed events (see Figure 2).

In the larger sample, more than half of respondents reported having witnessed a violent event. This proportion is significantly greater than in both the tight and Eastern Equatoria samples ($p<0.001$).

In Turkana North, more than 60 per cent (61.3 per cent, n = 119, N = 194) of residents from the tight sample had witnessed a violent event during their lifetime, a much higher figure than in neighbouring Sudan ($p<0.001$). Of the 119 respondents who had witnessed a violent event, almost 80 per cent (79.0 per cent, n = 94, N = 119) had witnessed cattle rustling.

This finding suggests that Turkana North experiences greater insecurity than parts of Eastern Equatoria, a finding that is surprising given Kenya's relative stability. A number of factors may have influenced these findings.[90] Surveyed Turkana villages tended to be closer to the border with Sudan than surveyed Toposa villages. Similarly, they were located closer to the grazing areas that both communities vie over. Both of these factors mean that Turkana respondents were more likely to have witnessed more frequent victimization events. Finally, the SAS team working in border areas noted that the Toposa villages that were surveyed had more 'non-combatants' (that is, women, children, elderly) in them than the Turkana villages. A much larger survey would be required to investigate these findings further.

Weapon use

Small arms were used more frequently than any other weapon in the most recently witnessed victimization events. This finding was consistent across all samples. Almost 100 per cent of all cattle rustling witnessed in the tight sample involved a small arm.

In the tight sample, there was a significantly greater usage of small arms during the most recently witnessed violent event than any another type of weapon. They were used in three-quarters of all such events (see Figure 3). An analysis of the most recently witnessed cattle rustling events shows that small arms were routinely used (96.9 per cent, n = 125, N = 129)—indeed, they were used more frequently than in all other witnessed events combined (46.9

Figure 3 Small arms versus other weapons used
Tight sample (N = 225), Eastern Equatoria (N = 105)[91]



per cent, n = 45, N = 96). This is no surprise in a region where the ownership of a firearm is considered normal for every male in a household in order to defend his community and cattle, as well as to participate in local cultural activities.[92]

The findings in Eastern Equatoria paralleled that of the tight sample (see Figure 3).

The larger sample shows a significantly smaller proportion of small arms usage when compared to both the tight ($p = 0.015$) and the Eastern Equatoria samples ($p < 0.001$).

In Turkana North, small arms were used in a far greater number of violent events than in Eastern Equatoria ($p<0.001$), with almost 80 per cent (78.1 per cent, n = 96, N = 123) of all most recently witnessed violent events involving one. This reflects the degree to which their use is endemic in Turkana North, despite the Kenyan regulatory framework. The police presence in this area is extremely limited and largely confined to the towns, in part due to a lack of police vehicles and roads.

Perceptions of security

Almost 60 per cent of respondents in the tight sample reported that security in their village was inadequate. This figure rose to more than 80 per cent in

Figure 4 Is security currently good enough?
Tight sample (N = 508), Eastern Equatoria (N = 311)



Turkana North. Notably, 40 per cent of Eastern Equatoria respondents said that levels of security had *decreased* since the CPA.

In the tight sample, almost 60 per cent (57.9 per cent, n = 294, N = 508) of residents were dissatisfied with the current security in their village (see Figure 4). In Eastern Equatoria, more than 40 per cent (41.8 per cent, n = 130, N = 311) felt that security was inadequate. This explains, to some extent, the degree to which many respondents are dependent on firearms for protection and have to rely on non-state institutions to protect themselves (see pp. 46–50).

Only 41 per cent (41.4 per cent, n = 213, N = 514) of the tight sample reported feeling 'quite to very safe' when walking to the market alone *during daylight hours* while one third (32.5 per cent, n = 167, N = 513) reported feeling 'quite to very unsafe' (see Figure 5). The feeling of safety decreased significantly as the length of time to walk to the market increased ($p < 0.001$).

Figure 5 Level of safety when walking alone to the market
Tight sample (N = 514), Eastern Equatoria (N = 318)



Eastern Equatoria residents generally reported feeling 'safe' or 'quite to very safe' when walking alone to the market during daylight hours (Figure 5). Only 11 per cent (10.7 per cent, n =34, N = 318) felt 'quite to very unsafe'.

Almost 30 per cent of the tight sample (29.4 per cent, n = 153, N = 520) said that their village was less safe than before the CPA (see Figure 6).[93] Significantly, 40 per cent of respondents in Eastern Equatoria (39.9 per cent, n = 129, N = 323) believed that the safety of their village had *decreased* since the CPA (see Figure 6). This is likely to be due to a general lack of law and order in the state and minimal respect for the rule of law. This figure reflects just how few peace dividends have been forthcoming for many communities in terms of improved human security. Given that this is the case, the degree to which respondents were concerned with basic services and food security, above and beyond security, is striking (see p. 40). It underscores the fact that the situation regarding service provision is so dire that it is a greater concern for many people than the high levels of violent conflict.

In the larger sample perceptions differed, showing a greater satisfaction with security. This divergence is more likely due to error bias in the larger sample than to actual regional influences that were not detected in one of the two samples.

In Turkana North, perceptions of security were decidedly more negative than in neighbouring Eastern Equatoria. More than 80 per cent of respondents in Turkana North said that security in their village was currently not good enough (83.4 per cent, n = 161, N = 193, $p < 0.001$). Respondents felt significantly less

Figure 6 Perceived levels of safety since the CPA
Tight sample (N = 520), Eastern Equatoria (N = 323)



safe when walking alone to the market than in neighbouring Kapoeta East. Almost 70 per cent (68.9 per cent, n = 133, N = 193) said they felt 'quite to very unsafe' when travelling alone to the market place *during daylight hours,* while only a fifth (20.7 per cent, n = 40, N = 193) reported feeling 'quite to very safe'. Rural residents of Turkana North generally felt less safe then their urban counterparts ($p < 0.001$). Perceptions of widespread insecurity and pervasive local fears in border areas may well be attributable to the fact that the Turkana live near a number of other rival ethnic groups, such as the Sudanese Toposa, who are perceived to be better armed, have better access to ammunition, and frequently attack them on Turkana soil.[94] This has led to a heightened sense of vulnerability that perpetuates local fears. Another factor may be that the surveyed town of Lokichoggio is markedly different to other surveyed areas in that it has begun to show signs of urbanization, including the dissolution of families, overcrowding, and inner-city crime.[95] Surveyed areas in Eastern Equatoria and other areas of Turkana North do not face similar threats.

Reliance on non-state versus state security institutions

Almost 60 per cent (56.6 per cent, n = 294, N = 519) of respondents in the tight sample lived in areas where the state did not provide any security at all, despite the high levels of reported insecurity and use of small arms. In Eastern Equatoria this figure reduced to one-third. There was a heavy reliance on young male warriors for protection across all samples.

State versus non-state institutions

Respondents were asked to name the security institutions (both state and non-state) that were present in their village. A state institution was defined as the police, SPLA, or the army, and non-state institutions as warriors, local tribesmen, unidentifiable armed groups, and the quasi-state Kenya Police Reserve (KPR).[96]

Almost 10 per cent (8.7 per cent, n = 45, N = 519) of respondents in the tight sample said that there were no institutions providing security in their village, while almost half (48.0 per cent, n = 249, N = 519) were protected by non-state or quasi-state security groups (see Figure 7). The fact that more than half of

Figure 7 Presence of security groups in respondents' villages
Tight sample (N = 519)[97]



sampled residents were not protected by a state-operated security institution reflects the degree to which they are forced to provide their own security in the absence of functioning and deployed state-operated security institutions. This may also be a reflection of the larger numbers of rural residents who responded to the survey, as policing is invariably better in urban areas.

Residents in the tight sample reported the presence of both non-state security groups *and* state-operated groups in their villages (see Figure 8). Three-quarters of sampled residents (75.7 per cent, n = 393, N = 519) reported a non-state institution in their village (see Figure 8).

In Eastern Equatoria, a slightly higher percentage of sampled residents were unprotected by any security group (10.2 per cent, n = 33, N = 322) (see Figure 8). More than 60 per cent (61.2 per cent, n = 197, N = 322) reported the presence of a state-operated security group and 56 per cent that of a non-state group (see Figure 8). The fact that well over one-third of sampled Eastern Equatorian residents said they were not protected by a state-operated institution again reflects the absence of police or other formal security groups, especially in rural areas, and the resulting vulnerability of local people.

In the larger sample, there was a significantly greater proportion of state institutions reported than in both the tight sample ($p < 0.01$) and the Eastern Equatoria sample ($p < 0.001$).

In the tight sample, residents were protected mostly by warriors (46.6 per cent, n = 242, N = 519), police (28.3 per cent, n = 147, N = 519), the army or

Figure 8 State versus non-state groups or institutions present in respondents' villages
Tight sample (N = 519), Eastern Equatoria (N = 322)[98]



* Includes KPR, a quasi-state group

SPLA (15.0 per cent, n = 78, N = 519), and local tribes and villagers (12.9 per cent, n = 67, N = 519) (see Figure 9). A significant number of sampled residents from Turkana North (31.5 per cent, n = 58, N = 184) said they were protected by the KPR.

In Eastern Equatoria, sampled residents said they were protected mostly by police (39.8 per cent, n = 128, N = 322), warriors (28.9 per cent, n = 93, N = 322), the SPLA (21.4 per cent, n = 69, N = 322), and then local tribes and villagers (20.5 per cent, n = 66, N = 322) (see Figure 9).

Figure 9 Types of security group
Tight sample (N = 519), Eastern Equatoria (N = 322)



* Includes age-group associations such as 'Monye Miji' and 'Mojo Miji'

The findings show that, surprisingly, the security vacuum in Turkana North is significantly worse than in neighbouring Sudan. Turkana North appears to be guarded almost exclusively (nearly 89 per cent of all security institutions reported) by non-state and quasi-state groups (for example, KPRs), reflecting the almost complete absence of police in the area, apart from in towns such as Lokichoggio. Non-state institutions comprised almost 90 per cent (88.5 per cent, n = 208, N = 235) of all security institutions/groups reported. More than 60 per cent of people reported relying on warriors for protection (62.6 per cent, n = 147, N = 235). In contrast, one-quarter reported relying on the KPR (24.3 per cent, n = 57, N = 235) and only eight per cent on the police (8.1 per cent, n = 19, N = 235). This heavy reliance on non-state security institutions goes some way to explaining the degree to which the Turkana are dependent on small arms (see pp. 49–50 on the role of small arms) and their reluctance to relinquish them (see section pp. 50–51 on disarmament).

Role of small arms

Across all samples, respondents felt that possessing a small arm increased their safety. The tight sample showed a greater proportion of respondents attesting to a small arm's protective benefits than that in the Eastern Equatoria sample.

In the tight sample, almost 80 per cent (77.5 per cent, n = 400, N = 516) of respondents said that a small arm made a person safer, showing a heavy reli-

Figure 10 Does owning a small arm make a person more or less safe?
Tight sample (N = 516), Eastern Equatoria (N = 319)



ance on small arms for protection and defence purposes (see Figure 10). In the Eastern Equatoria sample, almost 70 per cent (67.4 per cent) shared this sentiment, while just over one-quarter felt it made people less safe (27.6 per cent, n = 88, N = 319, p<0.001).

In Turkana North, strikingly, there was an almost universal belief (93.9 per cent, n = 185, N = 197) that possessing a small arm made a person safer. In contrast, only six per cent (6.1 per cent, n = 12, N = 197) said that it would make a person less safe. None of the sampled participants believed that possessing a small arm would not make a difference in some way.

In the larger sample, findings paralleled those of the Eastern Equatoria sample.

Sentiments regarding potential disarmament

Respondents in the tight sample exhibited a fear of possible disarmament, believing that it could decrease their security. In Eastern Equatoria, opinions were divided: almost equal numbers said it would either increase or decrease security. The Turkana, however, almost unanimously said it would decrease human security.

Perceived effects of possible disarmament

In the tight sample, more than 60 per cent of respondents (61.0 per cent, n = 313, N = 513) said that disarmament in their village would decrease security, presumably due to a combination of both local and cross-border security threats, the prevalence of firearms elsewhere, and the lack of security provided by the state (see Figure 11).

Feelings about disarmament in Eastern Equatoria were extremely mixed: 41 per cent (40.8 per cent, n = 129, N = 316) of respondents said it would decrease security in their village, while another 41 per cent (40.5 per cent, n = 128, N = 316) said it would increase security (see Figure 11). The divided opinions may be due to the fact that surveyed residents of Eastern Equatoria had no experience of a large-scale disarmament campaign occurring in their region. As pastoralists, however, who are involved in frequent cross-border and internal raids, it is clear that a significant percentage of them still felt threatened by the idea. Notably, handing over weapons to the SPLA, which is seen as a

Figure 11 Sentiments regarding the effects of disarmament on households
Tight sample (N = 513), Eastern Equatoria (N = 316)



potential enemy (Schomerus, 2008, p. 53), is considered problematic, while there are also fears of collected weapons being recycled into the wrong hands.

Almost a fifth (18.7 per cent, n = 59, N = 316) of Eastern Equatoria respondents said disarmament would not have any effect on their village's security at all (see Figure 11). The reasons for this are unclear but it may be because they felt that a disarmament campaign would not be effective.

In the larger sample, the percentage of respondents believing that possible disarmament would negatively impact on their security paralleled the Eastern Equatoria sample more closely than the tight sample.

In Turkana North, the results were more extreme. Almost all residents (93.8 per cent, n = 182, N = 194, p<0.001) said that disarmament would decrease the security of their household. This is probably due to the fact that, in contrast to the Eastern Equatorians, the Turkana have considerable experience in recent years of top-down forcible disarmament and the memories are still fresh. Although the most recent violent campaign occurred in Turkana South, residents of Turkana North would have heard about it on the radio, as they would have heard of other violent disarmament efforts in neighbouring Uganda, making them extremely fearful of a similar campaign in their areas.[99] With the porous borders surrounding them, numerous external threats, and the absence of state-provided security they 'look upon themselves and their rifles as the only source and guarantee for personal security and that of their property'. Disarmament is often viewed as a 'conspiracy to have them wiped out'.[100]

VI. Survey limitations

Given the paucity of census data, in particular in South Sudan, as well as the weighting imbalance in the tight sample, the survey findings should neither be generalized nor (mis)construed to develop a portrayal of the region.

There were many uncontrollable obstacles encountered by the survey team (described in Section V), and as a result data collection was limited to areas that were accessible, that promised a moderate to high level of security, and that were located within sedentary villages. As a result, members of the nomadic pastoralist communities—a large population within the region—were unable to be identified and interviewed, in part due to logistical problems and poor information on their whereabouts. Similarly, the team was unable to survey in the *kraals* (temporary cattle camps), where most of the rustling and fighting takes place, as they had relocated just before the arrival of the SAS team.[101]

We can therefore conclude that while the findings reported here are important in that they offer an insightful window into certain security perceptions and dynamics within Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North, they do not include the full range of attitudes, beliefs, and preoccupations that may be present in response to fluctuating security dynamics.

VII. Conclusion

By June 2007, two and a half years after the signing of the CPA, many people in Eastern Equatoria had still not benefited from peace dividends. Security remained elusive, and in some cases worse than during the war; access to services was poor; dependency on small arms and non-state institutions for security was widespread; and attitudes to disarmament were very mixed. One year later, on the eve of a civilian disarmament campaign, security in the state—and in neighbouring Turkana—depends on how carefully that process is managed. The survey revealed that communities in Turkana North felt even less safe than their Sudanese neighbours, that they were less protected by the state, and that they were even more fearful of potential disarmament.

Disarmament initiatives in South Sudan (and in neighbouring Uganda and Kenya) have produced disappointing results. There is a wealth of evidence documenting the failure of ad hoc campaigns,[102] showing that there are no quick fixes to the region's security problems. Previous campaigns have been characterized by ineffective implementation, poor coordination, a lack of buy-in from local communities, the absence of sustainable regional peace-building, and in some cases, the excessive use of force. Crucially, they have rarely been conducted in the best interests of those whose lives have been most affected. Indeed, reactive, forcible disarmament, far from increasing security, has often led to increased local conflict and violence. Most are also geographically limited, while the strong cross-border, regional dimension to cattle rustling in Eastern Equatoria, for example, highlights the need for simultaneous cross-border initiatives. Until this occurs, ad hoc disarmament in Eastern Equatoria will not be effective.

The GoSS needs to develop not only a local strategy and legal framework for arms reduction and control but also, together with neighbouring governments, a comprehensive regional strategy that contains clear objectives and benchmarks. It appears that Vice-President Riek Machar is involved in planning a relevant meeting with regional states: while this is promising, the initiative

will only be effective if it leads to long-term commitment. Implementation will require regular contact with neighbouring governments and the establishment of a cross-border institutional framework and budget, with the necessary technical expertise to lead and guide the process. The engagement of the Government of National Unity and transparent information sharing are required to ensure that tangible steps are taken to mitigate emerging sources of armed conflict.

A fundamental obstacle to human security in Eastern Equatoria and the wider region is the lack of effective governance. This is especially apparent in the survey findings from Turkana North, which reveal the insecurity resulting from decades of neglect by central government (including the lack of roads, communications equipment, law enforcement, and trained security forces). Unless governments in Juba and Khartoum, as well as Kampala and Nairobi, overcome the commercial interests, corruption, and apathy that feed the cycles of retaliatory violence in the region, the status quo will continue. It is also essential that, as part of regional peace-building efforts, local comprehensive agreements are actively supported to allow stolen cattle to be retrieved and/or compensation to be paid in accordance with local cultures. Accessible public institutions, including traditional structures and peace committee systems, could also play a role in providing equitable solutions to minor cattle-rustling incidents, thereby helping to stem revenge attacks.

Finally, it is crucial that the land question be addressed as a top priority in South Sudan. To take a strong and credible lead in this area, the GoSS must refrain from land appropriation, openly condemn the practice, and investigate transparently who is backing it—whether government officials, local authorities, SPLA, or private investors.[103] An effective starting point would be the establishment of a comprehensive legal framework, including policies that recognize customary land ownership.[104] Measures to manage land allocations, registration, and compensation—both monetary and in-kind (Pantuliano, 2007, p. 7)—should be included. The Southern Sudan Land Commission is best placed to engage in these activities, but it requires a clear mandate, resources, and budget.[105] One of the most important prerequisite for improved security in South Sudan is concerted political will on the part of the GoSS to address one of South Sudan's most pressing problems and most recurring sources of conflict.

Appendix
Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment: Family survey on safety and security

S1 GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

To be filled by the interviewers team:

1) Team ID: ___ ___ **2)** Form ID: ___ ___ ___

3) GPS number: ___ ___ ___

4) GPS record: ___ ___ ___

5) Latitude: N __ __ . __ __ __ __ __

6) Longitude: E __ __ . __ __ __ __ __

7) Region: _____

8) State: _____

9) County/Locality _____

10) Payam/Rural council: _____

13) Village/Boma: _____

11) Topography:

12) Urban/Peri/Rural:

14) Stl_Code: (refer to field atlas) SU__ __ __ __ - __ __ __

15) Cluster: ___ ___ ___

16) Date (dd.mm.yy): ___ ___ . ___ ___ . ___ ___

17) Starting time (hh.mm): ___ ___ . ___ ___

Identify the household where the interview will take place. Find the appropriate person introduce yourself and the project and start the interview.

My name is _____. I work for_____. I am currently conducting a household questionnaire to better understand the people of this area. This questionnaire is part of a larger project that involves other regions in South Sudan. I would be very thankful if you were willing to answer some question for me. I will not be writing your name down or sharing the information you give me with anyone in this area or the government.

S2 RESPONDENT INFORMATION

1) Do you eat and sleep in this household most days? (Circle answer given)

1. Yes

2. No

IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS NO, YOU SHOULD ASK IF YOU MAY SPEAK WITH SOMEONE ELSE FROM THE HOUSEHOLD THAT DOES EAT AND SLEEP IN THE HOUSEHOLD MOST DAYS. IF YOU HAD TO IDENTIFY A NEW RESPONDENT PLACE AN X HERE_____

2) Which ethnic group do you belong to?

1) Please specify: _____

99) Do not want to answer

3) How old are you? (Circle answer given)

1) 0-13 years old

2) 14-20 years old

3) 21-35 years old

4) 36+ years old

88) Do not know

4) Are you the head of this household? (Circle answer given)

1. Yes

2. No

IF NO, CONTINUE, IF YES GO TO QUESTION 6

5) What is your relationship to the head of this household? Please specify: _____

READ before asking question 6… Throughout this interview I will ask you questions regarding things that have happened before or after the "peace agreement". By peace agreement I mean the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed on the 9th of January 2005 by John Garang and the Khartoum government.

6) **Have you lived in this village/boma since the Peace Agreement was signed? (Circle answer given)**

1. Yes

2. No

IF NO CONTINUE, IF YES GO TO QUESTION 8

7) Do you move the location of your household at least once per year? (Circle answer given)

1. Yes

2. No

8) **How many people live in this household? Please specify:** _____

9) In your opinion, of the list below, what are three most serious issues, or lack of services, affecting your village/boma ? (Please circle a maximum of 3 answers)

1) Education (lack of or inadequate)

2) Hospital/ health post (lack of or inadequate)

3) Transport within the vicinity of the village/boma (lack of or inadequate)

4) Transport to areas away from the village/boma (lack of or inadequate)

5) Cash generating activities (lack of or inadequate)

6) Clean water (lack of or inadequate)

7) Food for household members/humans (lack of or inadequate)

8) Food for household animals (lack of or inadequate)

9) Security of household members/humans (lack of or inadequate)

10) Security of household animals (lack of or inadequate)

11) Other. Please specify:_____

12) There are no issues or lack of services that currently affect this village/boma

99) Do not want to answer

S3 VIOLENT EVENT(S) INFORMATION

READ… All the questions that I am about to ask you are about things that have happened since the Peace Agreement was signed.

I would like to talk about events that you have NOT seen, but which you were TOLD about by your friends, neighbors or family members. Please focus on events that have taken place around your household and which have taken place since the peace agreement.

10) Have you been told by your friends, neighbors or family members of any violent event(s) taking place around your household? (Circle answer given)

1. Yes

2. No

99. Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 28

11) What type(s) of violent event have you been told about? (Multiple answers possible) (Circle answers given)

1) Fight involving only people from your village/boma
2) Fight involving only people from outside your village/boma
3) Fight involving both people from your village/boma and people from outside your village/boma
4) Robbery by only people from your village/boma
5) Robbery by only people from outside your village/boma
6) Robbery by both people from your village/boma and people from outside your village/boma
7) Cattle rustling event
8) Disarmament effort by local authorities
9) Attack by people from a neighboring village/boma
10) Other (please specify): _____
99) Do not want to answer

IF THE RESPONDENT GIVES YOU ONLY ONE ANSWER, FEEL FREE TO SAY: "ARE THERE ANY OTHER TYPES OF VIOLENT EVENT WHICH YOU HAVE WITNESSED AROUND YOUR HOUSEHOLD?" YOU MAY CONTINUE ADDING RESPONSES UNTIL THE RESPONDENT TELLS YOU THERE ARE NONE LEFT.

READ… The following questions are about the most recent violent event your friends, neighbors or family told you took place around your household, but you did not see happen.

12) What year did the most recent violent event take place?

1) Year. Please specify: _____
88) Do not remember/ Do not know
99) Do not want to answer

13) What time of year did it take place? (Circle answer given)

1) Early rainy season (March-June)
2) Late rainy season (July-August)
3) Early dry season (Sep-Oct)
4) Late dry season (Nov-Feb)
88) Do not remember /Do not know
99) Do not want to answer

14) What type of event was it? (Circle answer given)

1) Fight involving only people from your village/boma
2) Fight involving only people from outside your village/boma
3) Fight involving both people from your village/boma and people from outside your village/boma
4) Robbery by only people from your village/boma
5) Robbery by only people from outside your village/boma
6) Robbery by both people from your village/boma and people from outside your village/boma
7) Cattle rustling event
8) Disarmament effort by local authorities
9) Attack by people from a neighboring village/boma
10) Other (please specify): _____
99) Do not want to answer

SUDAN HUMAN SECURITY BASELINE ASSESSMENT:
FAMILY SURVEY ON SAFETY AND SECURITY

READ… Let's continue focusing on this most recent event which your friends, neighbors or family told you about.

15) Was anything used to cause injury to someone during the event? (Circle answer given)

1) Yes
2) No
88) Do not know
99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 26

16) What was used to cause injury? (Multiple answers possible) (Circle answers given)

1) Fists and feet (punching and kicking)
2) Sharp or blunt instruments (knives, farm tools, sticks)
3) Small arms (pistols, rifles, AK-47s)
4) Explosive weapons (RPGs, rocket launchers)
5) Other explosive device(s). Please specify: _____
6) Other. Please specify: _____
88) Do not know
99) Do not want to answer

READ… I will now ask you a few questions about who was injured in the event you have just told me about.

17) Do you know if any boys or girls age 0 to 13 years old were injured or killed during this event? (Circle answer given)

1) Yes
2) No
88) Do not know/ Not sure
99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 20

18) If YES, how many?

1) Please specify: _____
88) Do not know/ Not sure
99) Do not want to answer

19) What was used to injure or kill them? (Multiple responses are acceptable) (Circle answers given)

1) Fists and feet (punching and kicking)
2) Sharp or blunt instruments (knives, farm tools, sticks)
3) Small arms (pistols, rifles, AK-47s)
4) Explosive weapons (RPGs, rocket launchers)
5) Other explosive device(s). Please specify: _____
6) Other. Please specify: _____
88) Do not know
99) Do not want to answer

20) **Do you know if any males 14 years old or older were injured or killed? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

88) Do not know/ Not sure

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 23

21) If YES, how many?

1) Please specify: _____

88) Do not know/ Not sure

99) Do not want to answer

22) What was used to injure or kill them? (Multiple responses are acceptable) (Circle answers given)

1) Fists and feet (punching and kicking)

2) Sharp or blunt instruments (knives, farm tools, sticks)

3) Small arms (pistols, rifles, AK-47s)

4) Explosive weapons (RPGs, rocket launchers)

5) Other explosive device(s). Please specify: _____

6) Other. Please specify: _____

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

23) **Do you know if any females 14 years old or older were injured or killed? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

88) Do not know/ Not sure

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 26

24) If YES, how many?

1) Please specify: _____

88) Do not know/ Not sure

99) Do not want to answer

25) What was used to injure or kill them? (Multiple responses are acceptable) (Circle answers given)

1) Fists and feet (punching and kicking)

2) Sharp or blunt instruments (knives, farm tools, sticks)

3) Small arms (pistols, rifles, AK-47s)

4) Explosive weapons (RPGs, rocket launchers)

5) Other explosive device(s). Please specify: _____

6) Other. Please specify: _____

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

READ before asking question 26… Thank you for your patience so far. I have a couple more questions and would like that you continue focusing on the last violent event you have been telling me about.

26) **Do you know whether anyone who witnessed the event reported it? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

88) Do not know/ Not sure

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 28

27) Who, or which institution, was the event reported to?

1) Please specify: _____

88) Do not know/ Not sure

99) Do not want to answer

READ before asking question 28… Now that we have spoken about events that you have NOT witnessed, I would like to talk about events that you have seen. Please continue to focus on events that have taken place around your household and which have taken place since the peace agreement.

28) **Have you ever witnessed any violent event(s) taking place around your household? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 48

29) What type(s) of violent event have you witnessed taking place around your household most often? (Multiple answers possible) (Circle answers given)

1) Fight with or involving only people from your village/boma

2) Fight with or involving only people from outside your village/boma

3) Fight with or involving both people from your village/boma and people from outside your village/boma

4) Robbery by only people from your village/boma

5) Robbery by only people from outside your village/boma

6) Robbery by both people from your village/boma and people from outside your village/boma

7) Cattle rustling event

8) Disarmament effort by local authorities

9) Attack by people from a neighboring village/boma

10) Other (please specify): _____

99) Do not want to answer

IF THE RESPONDENT GIVES YOU ONLY ONE ANSWER, FEEL FREE TO SAY: "ARE THERE ANY OTHER TYPES OF VIOLENT EVENT WHICH YOU HAVE WITNESSED AROUND YOUR HOUSEHOLD?" YOU MAY CONTINUE ADDING RESPONSES UNTIL THE RESPONDENT TELLS YOU THERE ARE NONE LEFT.

READ… The following questions are about the most recent violent event you witnessed.

30) What year did the most recent event take place?

1) Year. Please specify: _____

88) Do not remember/ Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

31) What time of year did it take place? (Circle answer given)

1) Early rainy season (March-June)

2) Late rainy season (July-August)

3) Early dry season (Sep-Oct)

4) Late dry season (Nov-Feb)

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

32) Where did it take place?

1) Place. Please specify: _____

99) Do not want to answer

33) What type of event was it? (Circle answer given)

1) Fight with or involving only people from your village/boma

2) Fight with or involving only people from outside your village/boma

3) Fight with or involving both people from your village/boma and people from outside your village/boma

4) Robbery by only people from your village/boma

5) Robbery by only people from outside your village/boma

6) Robbery by both people from your village/boma and people from outside your village/boma

7) Cattle rustling event

8) Disarmament effort by local authorities

9) Attack by people from a neighboring village/boma

10) Other (please specify): _____

99) Do not want to answer

READ… Let's continue focusing on the most recent event which took place around your household, and which you have witnessed with your own eyes.

34) Was anything used to cause injury to someone during the event? (Circle answer given)

1) Yes

2) No

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 46

35) What was used to cause injury? (Multiple answers possible) (Circle answers given)

1) Fists and feet (punching and kicking)

2) Sharp or blunt instruments (knives, farm tools, sticks)

3) Small arms (pistols, rifles, AK-47s)

4) Explosive weapons (RPGs, rocket launchers)

5) Other explosive device(s). Please specify: _____

6) Other. Please specify: _____

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

READ… I will now ask you a few questions about who was injured in the event you have just told me about.

36) Were any boys or girls age 0 to 13 years old injured or killed during this event? (Circle answer given)

1) Yes

2) No

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 39

37) If YES, how many?

1) Please specify: _____

88) Do not know/ Not sure / Do not remember

99) Do not want to answer

38) What was used to injure or kill them? (Multiple responses are acceptable) (Circle answers given)

1) Fists and feet (punching and kicking)

2) Sharp or blunt instruments (knives, farm tools, sticks)

3) Small arms (pistols, rifles, AK-47s)

4) Explosive weapons (RPGs, rocket launchers)

5) Other explosive device(s). Please specify: _____

6) Other. Please specify: _____

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

39) **Were any males 14 years old or older injured or killed? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

88) Do not know/ Not sure / Do not remember

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 42

40) If YES, how many?

1) Please specify: _____

88) Do not know/ Not sure / Do not remember

99) Do not want to answer

41) What was used to injure or kill them? (Multiple responses are acceptable) (Circle answers given)

1) Fists and feet (punching and kicking)
2) Sharp or blunt instruments (knives, farm tools, sticks)
3) Small arms (pistols, rifles, AK-47s)
4) Explosive weapons (RPGs, rocket launchers)
5) Other explosive device(s). Please specify: _____
6) Other. Please specify: _____
88) Do not know
99) Do not want to answer

42) **Were any females 14 years old or older injured or killed? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes
2) No
88) Do not know/ Not sure / Do not remember
99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 46

43) If YES, how many?

1) Please specify: _____
88) Do not know/ Not sure / Do not remember
99) Do not want to answer

45) What was used to injure or kill them? (Multiple responses are acceptable) (Circle answers given)

1) Fists and feet (punching and kicking)
2) Sharp or blunt instruments (knives, farm tools, sticks)
3) Small arms (pistols, rifles, AK-47s)
4) Explosive weapons (RPGs, rocket launchers)
5) Other explosive device(s). Please specify: _____
6) Other. Please specify: _____
88) Do not know
99) Do not want to answer

READ before asking question 46… Thank you for your patience. I have a couple more questions on the violent event we have just talked about.

46) **Did you, or someone else in your household who witnessed the event with you, report the event? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes
2) No
88) Do not know/ Not Sure/ Do not remember
99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 48

47) Who, or which institution, was the event reported to?

1) Please specify: _____
88) Do not know/ Not sure / Do not remember
99) Do not want to answer

S4 SMALL ARMS RELATED INCIDENTS

READ before asking question 48… Thank you for answering my questions. Now I will ask you some questions about small arms related incident(s) that have occurred since the Peace Agreement.

48) **Has anyone from this household been injured, but not killed, with a small arm? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes
2) No
99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 50

49) If YES, how many people in total?

1) Please specify: _____
99) Do not want to answer

50) **Has anyone from this household died as a result of a small arm related injury? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes
2) No
99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 52

51) If YES, how many people in total?

1) Please specify: _____
99) Do not want to answer

52) **Has anyone from your household been involved in a landmine accident? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes
2) No
99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 55

54) If yes, did any of the landmine accident(s) happen within half a day's walk from this household? (Circle answer given)

1) Yes
2) No
88) Do not know/ Not Sure/ Do not remember
99) Do not want to answer

S5 GENRAL SECURITY

READ before asking question 55… Thank you for answering my questions about people who have been injured or have been killed. Now I have a few questions to ask you about your perceptions of your own safety.

55) **How far from your home, in walking time, is the market used by your household to purchase common goods?**

1) Please specify: _____
99) Do not want to answer

READ… Let's talk a little about your perception of your own safety at the present time when walking to the market you told me about just now.

56) How safe do you feel walking from your home to the market during daylight alone at present? (Circle correct answer)

1) Very safe
2) Quite Safe
3) Safe
4) Quite unsafe
5) Very unsafe
6) Never go to the market alone during the daylight
99) Do not want to answer

57) How safe do you feel walking from your home to the market during daylight with someone else at present? (Circle answer given)

1) Very safe
2) Quite Safe
3) Safe
4) Quite unsafe
5) Very unsafe
6) Never go to the market with someone else during the daylight
99) Do not want to answer

READ… Now I want you to tell me about how safe you felt before the peace agreement.

58) Back then, how safe did you feel walking from your home to the market alone during daylight? (Circle answer given)

1) Very safe
2) Quite safe
3) Safe
4) Quite unsafe
5) Very unsafe
6) Never went to the market alone during the daylight
99) Do not want to answer

59) Back then, how safe did you feel walking from your home to the market with someone else during daylight? (Circle answer given)

1) Very safe
2) Quite safe
3) Safe
4) Quite unsafe
5) Very unsafe
6) Never went to the market with someone else during the daylight
99) Do not want to answer

READ… Now a few questions about your perception of security generally

60) In general, do you think that your village/boma is more or less safe than it was before the peace agreement? (Circle answer given)

1) Much safer
2) A little safer
3) Stayed the same
4) A little less safe
5) Much less safe
6) I am not sure
99) Do not want to answer

61) Do you think that the security of your village/boma is currently good enough? (Circle answer given)

1) Yes
2) No
88) Do not know
99) Do not want to answer

S6 SMALL ARMS AVAILABILITY AND SECURITY

62) In your opinion does having a small arm make a person more or less safe? (Circle answers given)

1) Much safer
2) A little safer
3) Does not make a difference
4) A little less safe
5) Much less safe
6) I am not sure
99) Do not want to answer

63) To your knowledge does anyone in this village/boma own small arms? (Circle answer given)

1) Yes
2) No
88) Do not know
99) Do not want to answer

IF NO GO TO QUESTION 66, IF ANY OTHER ANSWER CONTINUE

64) Do you think that reducing the number of small arms in your village/boma would affect the security of your village/boma? (Circle answer given)

1) Yes
2) No
99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 66

65) How would it affect the security in your village/boma? (Circle answer given)

1) Increase security a lot

2) Increase security a little

3) would not make a difference

4) decrease security a little

5) decrease security a lot

88) I am not sure

99) Do not want to answer

66) **Do you or someone else in your household have a small arm? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 70

67) Do you think that having a small arm in your household affects the security of the household? (Circle answer given)

1) Yes

2) No

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 70

68) How does it affect the security of your household? (Circle answer given)

1) Increases security a lot

2) Increases security a little

3) Does not make a difference

4) Decreases security a little

5) Decreases security a lot

88) I am not sure

99) Do not want to answer

69) What is the small arm which is currently held in your household used for?

1) Please specify: _____

99) Do not want to answer

70) **Have you ever purchased, or been given, a small arm yourself? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 76

READ… Let's talk a little about the small arm you bought or were given most recently.

71) What type of small arm was it? (Circle answer given)

1) Pistol or revolver

2) Assault rifle (G3, SLR, AK)

3) Explosive weapon (RPGs, rocket launchers)

4) Other. Please specify:_____.

99) Do not want to answer

72) Was the small arm used or new, at the time that you received it? (Circle answer given)

1) Used

2) New

99) Do not want to answer

73) Did you pay for the small arm? (circle answer given)

1) Yes

2) No

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 76

74) What did you use to pay for the small arm? (Circle answer given)

1) Kenyan shillings

2) Ugandan shillings

3) Sudan dinar

4) Cattle

5) Goats

6) Gold

7) Other. Please specify:_____

99) Do not want to answer

75) How much did you have to pay for the small arm?

1) Please specify:_____

99) Do not want to answer

READ before asking question 76… Thank you for telling me your opinions about small arm use. Now I would like to ask you a few questions about ammunition.

76) **Have you ever purchased ammunition for a small arm? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 78

77) What type of ammunition did you purchase most recently? (Multiple options possible) (Circle answers given)

1) AK ammunition (7.62 x 39mm)

2) G3 or SLR ammunition (7.62 x 51mm)

3) Pistol ammunition

4) Other (Please specify_____

88) Do not know/ Do not remember

99) Do not want to answer

S7 DISARMAMENT

READ before asking question 78… Thank you for your patience. I just have a few questions left. I would like to ask you about disarmament efforts.

78) **Have you heard about the disarmament effort which took place in the state of Jonglei? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 81

79) Do you think that disarmament effort in Jonglei changed the security of the population living in the disarmed areas? (Circle answer given)

1) Yes

2) No

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 81

80) How do you think the disarmament effort affected the security of the people living in the area? (Circle answer given)

1) Increased security a lot

2) Increased security a little

3) Did not make a difference

4) Decreased security a little

5) Decreased security a lot

88) Do not know/ Not sure

99) Do not want to answer

81) **Do you think anyone should be disarmed in Eastern Equatoria? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 84

82) Who do you think should be disarmed first?

1) Please specify:_____

99) Do not want to answer

83) Who do you think should disarm them ?

1) Please specify:_____

99) Do not want to answer

84) **Are there institutions/groups of people that provide security to your village/boma? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO QUESTION 88

85) Who are these institutions or organizations? (Multiple answers possible) (Circle answers given)

1) Warriors

2) Police

3) SPLA

4) Militia

5) Other Armed Groups

6) Army

7) Other. Please specify:_____

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

READ… Let's talk about the institutions/groups of people that provide your village/boma with security. Let's call these groups and institutions: collective security.

86) **If there was disarmament locally, would this affect the collective security in your village/boma? (Circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

87) Would the group providing collective security change? (Circle answer given)

1) Yes

2) No

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

88) **Do you think that disarmament in this area would affect you and your household's level of security? (circle answer given)**

1) Yes

2) No

88) Do not know

99) Do not want to answer

IF YES CONTINUE, IF NO GO TO END

89) If yes, how would it affect your and your household's security? (circle answers given)

1) Increase security a lot

2) Increase security a little

3) Would not make a difference

4) Decrease security a little

5) Decrease security a lot

88) Do not know/ Not sure

99) Do not want to answer

READ… THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND ASSISTANCE. IS THERE ANYTHING I MAY ANSWER FOR YOU BEFORE I LEAVE

END

THE SECTION BELOW SHOULD BE FILLED IN BY THE SURVEYOR ALONE

18) Ending time (hh.mm): ___ ___ . ___ ___

19) Sex of the respondent

1) Female

2) Male

20) I think the respondent was…(Circle one)

1) 0-13 years old

2) 14-20 years old

3) 21-35 years old

4) 36+ years old

21) The tribe of the people in this area is_____

22) The clan of the people in this area is_____

23) When you arrived to conduct the interview the respondent was clearly occupied with something else? (Circle one)

1) Yes. Please specify:_____

2) No

24) Did you feel that the respondent was eager to respond to your questions? (Circle one)

1) Yes

2) No

25) Did you feel that the respondent was apprehensive to respond to your questions? (Circle one)

1) Yes

2) No

26) Did you feel that the responded was distracted when you were asking him/her questions? (Circle one)

1) Yes

2) No

27) Did you feel that the respondent was attentive to your questions? (Circle one)

1) Yes

2) No

28) Did the respondent ask you to give them choices for answers he/she should provide you with? (Circle one)

1) Yes

2) No

29) Which question do you think was most problematic to the respondent and why? (Circle one)

1) Yes

2) No

YOU ARE DONE, THANK YOU!

Endnotes

1 See Small Arms Survey (2007b) for background information on these approaches in Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan.
2 Interview with Eastern Equatoria analyst, Nairobi, May 2008.
3 The results of the 2008 census are forthcoming: estimates of population figures are therefore intended merely as a guide.
4 Security dynamics (as well as political, economic, and social relations) in border areas can be quite different from those further inland. In this regard, the Eastern Equatoria–Turkana North border merits further study.
5 In 1992, between March and July alone, nearly 100,000 people were displaced as a result of government offensives in South Sudan, as part of which Kapoeta and Torit were captured. See Johnson (2003), p. 202.
6 This division greatly reduced the autonomy of the South at a time when *sharia* law was being introduced country-wide. Attempts were also made to redraw the North–South boundary placing key resources in the North, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly was closed, and the High Executive Council dismantled. All these factors combined led to the formation of the SPLA and the resumption of war. See Jok (2007), pp. 215–216.
7 Later on (in the 1990s), Equatorians played a much greater role with the defection of prominent people from the GoS armed forces, such as Thomas Cirilo, adding to the many Equatorians already in the SPLA. Interview with Eastern Equatoria analyst, Nairobi, May 2008.
8 The authorities in Eastern Equatoria State estimate that 75 per cent of the population does not have access to clean water and 65 per cent have no sanitation facilities. There are four hospitals in the state but its health service has only one doctor. EES (2007), pp. 33–36.
9 Although 40 per cent of the population is estimated to be of school-going age, enrolment rates in schools are approximately ten per cent. Enrolment for girls is even lower as most are kept at home to help with farming and housework, or for marriage. EES (2007), p. 34.
10 See SAC/MAG (2006) for a detailed analysis of the threat posed by landmines across the state. More than 80,000 people are estimated to live in communities affected by landmines. Most casualties result from people involved in livelihood activities such as herding, farming, or collecting firewood.
11 See Akabwai and Ateyo (2007) for background information.
12 For background on armed violence among the Turkana see Buchanan-Smith and Lind (2005).
13 There have been various 'quasi-formal security arrangements' in place: in Uganda the state has armed Local Defence Units, vigilantes, and militias to protect communities, while in Kenya the state has armed Police Reservists. See Mkutu (2007), pp. 52–53.
14 The term 'warrior' can denote a male as young as 12 years of age who has successfully earned the title by engaging in a range of activities such as killing animals and raiding.
15 The Didinga of South Sudan and the Dodoth of Uganda, for example, raided one another between 1973 and 1992. Since then they have established an alliance, largely due to a realization on the part of the Didinga that they needed access to Ugandan consumer goods, trade, educational opportunities, and escape routes from South Sudan. The Didinga have a similar relationship with the Turkana of Kenya, which facilitates trade in firearms. See Akabwai and Ateyo (2007), pp. 18–19.
16 Interview with Alexander Losikiria (Head of State's Commendation), project coordinator, Adakar Peace and Development Initiatives (APEDI), March 2008.
17 Interview with Alexander Losikiria, project coordinator, APEDI, March 2008.
18 The SPLA base was officially demobilized on 22 August 2007. Field observation, Alexander Losikiria, project coordinator, APEDI, May 2008.
19 Interview with Alexander Losikiria, project coordinator, APEDI, March 2008. Interestingly, while the price of guns along the neighbouring Kenya–Uganda border went down drastically during the Sudanese civil war due to the market being flooded, ammunition—which is relatively rare—went up in price, especially in Kenya. See also Mkutu (2007), p. 68.
20 Interview with Alexander Losikiria, project coordinator, APEDI, June 2008.
21 As part of the agreement, stolen cattle were supposed to have been returned to their owners. In the end, however, just 11 cattle were returned out of 114 stolen in a previous raid.
22 Communication with UN official, Juba, May 2008.
23 Communication with UN official, Juba, May 2008.
24 Interview with Alexander Losikiria, project coordinator, APEDI, March 2008.
25 Interview with Alexander Losikiria, project coordinator, APEDI, March 2008.
26 Traditionally, raiding helped to disperse or redistribute wealth in times of need—that is, it was beneficial to the groups involved. See Mkutu (2007), p. 48, and Eaton (2008), p. 98.
27 The use of firearms in raiding, as opposed to traditional weapons, is widely presumed to increase the number of associated killings. In some instances this is undoubtedly the case. Research from the Kenya–Uganda border, however, also indicates the contrary, suggesting that audible gunshots lead to communities dispersing quickly, resulting in fewer deaths. See Eaton (2008), p. 104.
28 Interview with UN official, Juba, November 2007.
29 Interview with Eastern Equatoria analyst, Nairobi, March 2008.
30 Dave Eaton (2008) suggests that many researchers take for granted the causal relationship between raiding and the proliferation of firearms, poverty, and resource scarcity along the Kenya–Uganda border, but he points out that, in fact, 'in almost all cases, the root causes of a raid can be found in an obscure livestock theft' (Eaton, 2008, p. 106). He therefore argues in favour of obtaining a deeper understanding of what he calls the 'dynamics of retaliation' in order to understand why raiding occurs.
31 Interview with Eastern Equatoria analyst, Nairobi, March 2008.
32 Field observation, Jonah Leff, Small Arms Survey (SAS), April 2008.
33 Interview with Alexander Losikiria, project coordinator, APEDI, March 2008.
34 See the March 2008 statement from Sudan's church leaders, noting the problem across Sudan: 'We applaud the great progress made in the CPA, but see that we—within the country, within the communities but also within the churches—still experience many divisions along regions, ethnic lines, according to colour, according to tribe or through the absence of respect for own languages' (Sudanese Church, 2008, p. 3).
35 Interview with Alessio Clement, Sudanese conflict analyst, Nairobi, March 2008.
36 A separate report to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly documented 66 deaths.
37 Interview with Alessio Clement, Sudanese conflict analyst, Nairobi, March 2008.
38 Interview with UN official, Juba, January 2008.

39 Interview with Alessio Clement, Sudanese conflict analyst, Nairobi, March 2008.
40 Interview with Eastern Equatoria analyst, Nairobi, March 2008.
41 Interviews with UN and NGO workers, Juba, November 2007.
42 See also Akabwai and Ateyo (2007), pp. 21, 24, 27.
43 Block B, which covers an area half the size of the United Kingdom, extends into Eastern Equatoria. It remains unexplored but is considered to be the 'most promising' of the non-producing blocks. It is expected to come on stream by 2014. See European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (2007), p. 5.
44 Interview with UN official, Juba, November 2007.
45 See Small Arms Survey (2008) for background on the JIUs. The units are composed of the SPLA and SAF and are intended to form the nucleus of a joint army in the event of national unity post-2011.
46 See Schomerus (2008), p. 57 for detailed background on armed group activity in Eastern and Central Equatoria States.
47 Interview with Eastern Equatoria analyst, Nairobi, March 2008.
48 Interview with Mareike Schomerus, March 2008, author of *The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview*. See Schomerus (2007).
49 Traditionally, many of these borders were defined by ethnic groups or clans. Communication with UN official, Juba, May 2008.
50 Interview with UN official, Juba, November 2007.
51 Interview with Alessio Clement, Sudanese conflict analyst, Nairobi, March 2008.
52 Anti-Dinka sentiment is so strong that according to one analyst many Eastern Equatorians may choose to vote for unity rather than secession in the 2011 referendum. This would reflect their preference for rule by Khartoum than by the Dinka. Interview in Nairobi, March 2008.
53 See Pantuliano (2007) for background on land-related sources of conflict and tension across Sudan.
54 The accepted definition of 'community security' is 'the state/condition that enables communities to live in peace and harmony with each other through provision of security guarantees, through the action of arms reduction/control measures and through sustained and sustainable approaches of service delivery to address long-term problems such as poverty and conflict' (GoSS, Southern Sudan DDR Commission and UNDP, 2007, p. 4).
55 Until the appointment CSAC fell under the de facto mandate of the South Sudan DDR Commission, which is itself struggling to cope with planning for DDR in South Sudan.
56 Given South Sudan's current security climate, it is highly likely that collected weapons will be recycled into the security forces, not destroyed. As many of the guns came from the security forces in the first place this 'recycling' will likely have a negative impact in the future.
57 Interview with NGO worker, Juba, January 2008.
58 See <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/cpa01092005/cpa_toc.html>. In the absence of a clarifying legal framework, arguably all civilians are illegally armed.
59 It is feared that in the event of a relevant law being drafted in haste or being fast-tracked to catch up with events on the ground it could be subverted for political purposes.
60 In Eastern Equatoria, disarmament to date has involved ad hoc, reactive, small-scale emergency measures. In July and August 2007, for example, the commissioner of Torit County (with the backing of the governor) took matters into his own hands and adopted a policy based on levels of perceived belligerence or criminality. Interview with Alessio Clement, Sudanese conflict analyst, Nairobi, March 2008. See also Schomerus (2008), p. 55.
61 This order follows numerous GoSS statements on the need for disarmament over the past year. A previous significant one was made at a GoSS Governors' Forum in March 2008, which recommended that *all* civilians in South Sudan be disarmed.
62 Notably, some communities are vocally calling for disarmament. An article posted on the Gurtong diaspora website on 28 April 2008 included an appeal from the Ofi community to engage in disarmament fast. See Nakimangole (2008).
63 In June 2008 MPs in Torit complained that they had not been consulted about the presidential decree, describing it as 'illegal' and 'flawed' and noting that the circumstances were not in place (e.g. an implementation plan, talks with neighbouring countries, security) for such a campaign.
64 Interview with Riak Gok Majok, director of the CSAC Bureau, Juba, January 2008.
65 A regional conference bringing together GoSS Vice-President Riek Machar, civil society organizations, and members of parliament from Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia to discuss peace and development issues was scheduled for Juba in October 2007 but has yet to take place.
66 It is important to note that in the absence of baseline information or a firearm registration system it is impossible to measure success in terms of the percentage of firearms relinquished by a given community.
67 The UPDF often undertook its disarmament between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. to surprise people.
68 See Small Arms Survey (2007b) and Akabwai and Ateyo (2007) for a detailed description of the abuses. See also Knighton (2003) for a historical perspective on disarmament.
69 See Small Arms Survey (2007b) and Riam Riam (2007) for background.
70 See GoSS, Southern Sudan DDR Commission and UNDP (2007), p. 11. Regarding services, a letter from the deputy governor and minister of Local Government and Law Enforcement of Jonglei State, Hussein Mar Nyuot, to the United Nations Development Programme on 23 February 2008 stated that 'services' were essential to achieving community security. He explicitly mentioned agricultural schemes, roads, water supplies, health services, prisons, education, training, and peace dialogues.
71 Interview with Riak Gok Majok, director of the CSAC Bureau, Juba, January 2008.
72 See Akabwai and Ateyo (2007), pp. 23, 28.
73 In an effort to stabilize the South there appears to be a pattern emerging of the GoSS replacing governors it deems unable to handle security issues with 'hard-core' military candidates. This has occurred in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Warrap, Lakes, and, most recently, Jonglei States. Email correspondence with UN official, December, 2007.
74 Minutes from a meeting between the governor of Jonglei, director of the CSAC Bureau, and UN and NGO partners, unpublished, 21 February 2008, Bor, South Sudan.
75 See Otuho Community Association (2008), pp. 2–4. Among the dead were three people who were reportedly tied up and killed by the SPLA.
76 See Garfield (2007a) and (2007b).
77 Members of the SPLM, local authorities, SPLA, or security forces were not permitted.
78 Families comprise groups of people linked by blood or marriage with an identified head of household. Heads of household tend to be male, except where a husband is dead or absent. A household is defined as a group of people at least some of whom are family members, who share resources and work to generate further common resources for subsistence. A household may consist of one or more *tukuls* (homesteads).

79 Some clusters identified in advance were inaccessible or members were absent when the survey team arrived, and new unmapped clusters were found during the survey, necessitating flexibility and a revision of the original sampling plan.

80 The sample was chosen by drawing an imaginary circle around the area where family compounds were concentrated. A centre point of this circle was identified and from here the interviewers spun a bottle and walked in the direction indicated, tagging occupied households for participation. When the outskirts of a town were reached interviewers returned to repeat the procedure.

81 Field observations, James Bevan, SAS, April 2008.

82 Error rate was controlled using chi-square analyses of independence between error groups. Questionnaires were sorted into error groups ranging from 0 per cent error, 0–1 per cent error, 1–2 per cent error, 2–3 per cent error, and so on. Using ten independent, neutral questions, we compared responses within each error group and compared each group individually against a control group, which had 0 per cent error.

83 In Sudan, states are divided into counties; in Kenya, districts are comprised of divisions.

84 The rural/urban distinction in South Sudan is often difficult. One yardstick for defining an urban location is if a settlement has a permanent SPLA/SPLM or police presence; another is if it has a name and at least five family compounds, each within sight of one another. In the absence of these (in other words in most cases) areas were deemed rural. Rural areas tend to have compounds that are far enough apart to be partially or completely out of sight of each another. Often in these rural areas there are *kraals* (temporary cattle camps) present and no buildings owned by Sudanese authorities.

85 Respondents were permitted more than one response.

86 Respondents were permitted more than one response.

87 This percentage may under-represent the actual number of witnessed events in Eastern Equatoria since the results from both the tight and larger samples show the opposite trends.

88 Respondents were permitted more than one response.

89 'Fight from within' refers to a fight with, or involving, only people from the village or *boma* (a populated enclosure e.g. cattle camp). 'Fight—outside' refers to a fight with, or involving, only people from outside the village or *boma*. 'Fight—both' refers to a fight with people from both. Similarly, 'Robbery—outside' refers to a robbery perpetrated only by people from outside the village or *boma*. 'Robbery—within' refers to a robbery from within the village or *boma* and 'attack—outside' refers to an attack by people from a neighbouring village or *boma*.

90 Field observations, James Bevan, SAS, April 2008.

91 Respondents were permitted more than one response.

92 Interview with Alex Losikiria, project coordinator, APEDI, June 2008.

93 The survey instrument was slightly modified for use in Kenya. In Lokichoggio and Oropoi Divisions residents were asked to think back approximately two years to parallel the time when the CPA was signed in Sudan.

94 Interview with Alexander Losikiria, project coordinator, APEDI, March 2008.

95 Field observations, Jonah Leff, SAS, April 2008.

96 The KPR deserves the designation of a quasi-state institution because its members are trained by the Kenyan government but are subsequently left without any funding. Under the control of the Kenyan police and district commissioners, the KPR exists for the most part in rural areas (although members are found in the town of Lokichoggio) and is hired on a voluntary basis. Despite receiving minimal training, members are given guns and ammunition by the Kenyan state and have a record of increasing insecurity by, among other means, hiring out their guns or using them in banditry and raiding themselves. See Mkutu (2007), p. 56.

97 Respondents were permitted more than one response.

98 Respondents were permitted more than one response.

99 Notably, areas of Turkana North (notably Lokichoggio and Oropoi Divisions) experienced a small-scale disarmament campaign in 2005, which was a peaceful response to the violent military campaign in Turkana South. APEDI and local chiefs managed to collect approximately 270 firearms peacefully and without confrontations. Interview with Alexander Losikiria, project coordinator, APEDI, May 2008.

100 Interview with Alexander Losikiria, project coordinator, APEDI, March 2008.

101 Field observation, Jonah Leff, SAS, May 2008.

102 See, for example, Buchanan-Smith and Lind (2005), p. 3, and Bevan (2007), p. 7.

103 Interview with Alessio Clement, Sudanese conflict analyst, Nairobi, March 2008.

104 See the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, GoSS (2005), Section II, on customary ownership of land.

105 The SSLC was officially established in 2006 but the GoSS parliament has yet to pass a law giving it a legislative basis. See CPA Monitor (2008), para. 91 and Pantuliano (2007), p. 5.

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