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HIGHLIGHTS

- **Complex AOG Attack at Lake Qargha in Kabul**
- **Sustained AOG activity country-wide**
- **10 NGO-Direct Incidents including 3 in Ghor**

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

Amidst sustained AOG activity country-wide, an infantry team of seven AOG operatives - including two with BBIED vests - attacked a leisure hotel on Lake Qargha (Kabul), killing 15 civilians in the process, and taking over 60 hostages. The incident appeared to perform a number of important functions for the AOG, firstly it demonstrated that AOG have the ability to strike anytime and anywhere, secondly it nurtured perceptions of insecurity in the capital - consistent with the “do less but accomplish enough” strategy that AOG have employed country-wide, and lastly it served as a live fire hostage taking exercise - albeit against a soft target - to observe IMF/ANSF tactical procedures.

Despite this, AOG initiated activity in June 2012 remained significantly below that of 2011, with the 996 AOG authored incidents approximately equal to that of May, but contrasting significantly to the 1744 recorded in June 2011. However, the percentage of AOG attacks involving BBIEDs, SVBIEDs, and complex attacks—which combine to represent one way of considering how AOG deploy significant assets—almost doubled that of June 2011. This month, those three tactics combined to account for 1.5% of all AOG authored incidents, whereas in June 2011, the nearly identical 12 incidents accounted for only 0.7%. The fact that the deployment of such attacks have not decreased in equal proportion to the decrease in overall AOG activity illustrates an economy of military effort, and that AOGs understand the weighted importance of occasional spectacular attacks in creating a strong narrative of sustained opposition activity.

The deployment of AOG assets against a primarily soft target in Qargha does not detract from the fact that the vast majority of AOG authored incidents expressly engage hard targets, with over 85% of all AOG operations this month directly targeting GOA, IMF, or ANSF

targets, and an additional 8% consisting of roadside IED detonations and/or premature detonations that were likely intended to target the same. However, the inherent nature of increased AOG activity that occurs each summer directly correlates with an increased possibility that civilians will find themselves collaterally involved in a kinetic event, and this period demonstrated that the NGO community is not immune to that dynamic.

The total volume of NGO incidents this period doubled from that of the previous cycle, resulting in a total of 15 for the month. While significant, this number demonstrated no increase from the total recorded in May, and remained considerably below that of June 2011 (27). This pattern mirrors the reported volumes of AOG authored incidents between the three compared periods (May 2012, June 2012, and June 2011) as noted above. This is logical, as NGO incidents commonly plateau during the summer months due to increased NGO exposure to conflict and crime. To that point, seven of the 10 NGO incidents recorded this period were attributed to the armed opposition. While the most notable involved two INGO compounds that got caught up in an AOG attack on the DAC in Ghor, and were subsequently looted, most of the AOG authored incidents involved intimidation, with IEDs detonating near NGO vehicles or NGO staff approached, stopped, or called to be questioned about their programming and/or affiliations. The data support the analysis that such AOG stance towards NGOs is context-specific and most commonly mirrors local AOG attempts at shaping their areas of operations rather than being an expression of an active AOG stance against NGO presence. Balancing NGO exposure against risk-benefit thresholds becomes of critical importance during the summer months as further violence on NGOs can be expected to correlate with the peak of kinetic activity in the field.

CENTRAL REGION

KABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	1


Kabul City was home to the only NGO incident in the central region during the second half of June, an incident which was consistent with the primary threat profile faced by the NGO community in the national capital. As an international NGO staff member was waiting outside her guesthouse during the daytime of the 24th, a man approached her and forcibly pulled her bag from her shoulder, before running to a colleague waiting on a nearby motorbike, who helped the thief escape from the scene. A similar incident occurred in December 2011, just a few streets away in Kart-e Seh, and more widely, such motorcycle-bound robberies are a common tactic used by petty criminals, whether they are targeting pedestrians or vehicles, and most often occur to individuals openly displaying assets that appear valuable.

While not affecting the NGO community directly, the complex attack that took place at Lake Qargha on the 21st/22nd was far and away the most violent security event of the fortnight. A total of seven AOG infantry operatives, including two BBIED operatives, stormed the Spogmai Hotel, the largest such hotel at Qargha, late on Thursday night during the celebration of a wedding. The team killed three armed guards before

executing just over a dozen men inside as they took control of the hotel. This also involved the seizure of roughly 60 hostages, before the remaining five operatives (the two BBIEDs having killed themselves on the approach) holed up in preparation for the ANSF response, which arrived roughly 20 minutes later.

At 0900 hrs. the morning after the attack, approximately 21 hostages escaped via the lake, although one hostage who could not swim drowned. The security forces managed to kill the last of the AOG operatives by roughly 1130 hrs., before clearing the hotel to ensure that none had remained alive.

Some days later, the IEA issued an uncharacteristically long written justification for the attack; in it, they stated that they had carried out surveillance on Qargha more generally, and had seen Afghans, both civilian and governmental, engaged in what they perceived to be immoral activities, such as alcohol consumption and prostitution. Moreover, they asserted that many foreigners had also been seen engaged in these activities – including NGO employees they claimed to be ‘spreading Christianity in the country over the past



decade’. While real levels of both foreign attendance and such activities at Qargha are significantly lower than implied in the IEA’s statement, the inclusion of NGOs in their statement, and their willingness to conduct such an attack against an ultimately social target, is concerning.

However, some qualifications to this are important to note. First, such anti-NGO statements are inconsistent with the general acceptance of NGOs at the field level across most of the country, and are more about indicating their opposition to the specific practice of proselytizing than about NGOs *per se*, whose programs and projects are often actively welcomed by the armed opposition (see Nangarhar in this report for an example). Furthermore, such targeting is likely to remain very rare, as the armed opposition remains sensitive to popular backlash against their more civilian casualty-heavy attacks; one such attack over the medium term is enough to make their point, and as such the next complex attack in the national capital is likely to focus on an exclusively military/GOA target.

WARDAK

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Insecurity in Wardak continued along the same vein as the previous period, with conflict incidents focused on the Kabul-Ghazni highway, the Jalrez district road and the Chak district center and surrounding area. However, what was noticeable was not the form of incidents, but rather their volume; total opposition-authored kinetic events more than doubled over the previous period, with particular expansion in Chak and Jaghatu. As such, while Wardak continues to be secondary to Ghazni in terms of AOG strategic focus, the lower-than-average incident volumes seen so far this year are starting to give way to a more typical conflict dynamic in the province.


The highway remained a key locus for conflict incidents, which occurred all the way from the southern outskirts of Maidan Shahr to the far south of Saydabad, and witnessed more than a 25% increase in overall volumes over the previous period (from nine to 13 AOG-authored incidents, or roughly one a day). These incidents were almost evenly split between SAF and IED attacks on security forces and supply convoys, with six taking place in Saydabad (the most contested area of the highway in Wardak), four in Maidan Shahr and three in Nirkh.

However, the most notable of the incidents along the highway was not an IED or SAF attack, but instead a failed BBIED attack against an ANA facility in the Shashgaw area of Saydabad: a lone

BBIED operative approaching the facility was identified and then shot and killed by Afghan soldiers before he could detonate his vest. This was only the second instance of a BBIED attack in Wardak's conflict history, and like the first it failed; this indicates that such attacks are most likely operational spillover from the Ghazni conflict next door - where it was later confirmed that the operative was sent from.

Also significant was an armed attack on the provincial governor's convoy in Nirkh's Sur Pul area, which failed in its objective to sustain any casualties, while the most casualty-heavy incident was an armed attack on a supply convoy and associated PSC guard (in Sheikhabad), which led to the death of two PSC guards, one truck driver and eight AOG fighters. There were also a number of incidents connected to AOG IED emplacement, most significantly an IMF airstrike on an IED cell as it was planting IEDs in the Salar area of the highway, which killed all three opposition fighters; a contrasting incident saw an AOG attack on an ANA EOD team that was defusing an IED in the Sheikhabad area, sparking a fire-fight that led to the death of one Afghan soldier.

Elsewhere, Chak saw a number of IDF and SAF attacks on its district center, particularly the ANP HQ, while also seeing the targeted killing of an ANP policeman who was on his way from the district center to a nearby checkpoint.



But most tangibly, a pressure plate IED (PPIED) detonated against an ANA vehicle on a secondary road in the Ambokhak area, killing two soldiers, in the latest in a series of deadly IED strikes across the province – whose armed opposition has a particularly effective level of IED expertise. In Jalrez, a PPIED struck an ANA vehicle in the Ismail Khel area on the main district road, injuring two soldiers, while in Mullah Khel, just west of Maidan Shahr, an ambush of an ANP convoy killed a policeman and injured another. In all then, armed opposition cadres in these districts maintained significant pressure on the national security forces, without seeing any casualties inflicted on themselves in return.

In the ongoing Kuchi-Hazara conflict, just two related conflict incidents were recorded. First, a clash in Day Mirdad's Dasht-e Yurord saw three Hazaras killed and two others wounded, while in the Kajaw valley of Markazi Behsud, an IED struck an ANA vehicle and killed two Afghan soldiers and injured two more. As with similar incidents in the previous period, the latter incident can be understood to be both armed opposition-related and ultimately driven by the land dispute, as the Kajaw valley has no known permanent AOG presence, which instead manifested itself just as Kuchi nomads moved into the area. Further political meetings also took place over the issue, which again failed to find any lasting, or even temporary, solution sufficient to halt the sporadic violence.

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 27th of June 2012. NGO incident counts include the total for all direct incidents attributed to all actors.

LOGAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0


The most significant security incident in Logar during the past fortnight took the form of an ambush of an ANP responder convoy just outside the Baraki Barak district center. After opposition fighters attacked an ANP checkpoint west of the district center on the main district road, a police convoy set out from the ANP base to assist; in the convoy was the Baraki Baraki Chief of Police, and the AOG ambush that intercepted the convoy saw the COP and another policeman killed. While it seems that the targeting and killing of the COP was not pre-planned by the armed opposition, and as such was merely luck, the ability for AOG units to simultaneously lay siege to an ANP CP and target the responders, so close to the DAC demonstrates the strength of the armed opposition in Baraki Barak.

Other incidents also demonstrated this, most notably the IED strike against an ANA vehicle in the Shahi Khel area, which killed a soldier, as well as the IDF attack on the ANA/IMF facility in the main bazaar area, which injured two Afghan soldiers in an unusually accurate use of BM-1 rockets. Meanwhile, on the main Chark-Baraki Barak district road, an IED struck an ANA vehicle and killed an Afghan soldier, and in the Bakhshabad area between the Baraki Barak DAC and Puli Alam center, but to the south of the river, an IMF airstrike killed eight AOG fighters as they were planting IEDs on the area's main sec-

ondary road at roughly 0800 hrs. In all, then, areas south of Puli Alam remain strongly contested between security forces and the armed opposition, with each landing successful blows against the other during the period.

Insecurity across the full extent of Logar's section of the Kabul-Gardez highway was also visible during the fortnight. In Mohammad Agha, there were three instances of AOG attacks on security forces or supply convoys, all occurring between 1400 hrs and 0800 hrs, again highlighting the importance of maintaining tight daytime travel windows between Kabul and Logar. South of Puli Alam towards Gardez, three pressure plate IED strikes struck ANA and IMF targets, killing one Afghan soldier and injuring two others; of note, these took place between the hours of 0900 hrs and 1300 hrs, indicating that AOG contestation of this roadway continues through daylight hours – although not in the form of a physical confrontational presence by AOG cadres, thus implying that insecurity for NGOs remains primarily based on the risk of being collateral involved in such blasts.

The danger of being accidentally struck by pressure plate IEDs, (PPIEDs) which are indiscriminate in nature, was demonstrated by one that struck a Kuchi tractor on a secondary road in Puli Alam, killing four children, two men and



two women. Another noteworthy use of PPIEDs took place along the secondary road that leads to the Aynak mine in eastern Mohammad Agha, when one detonated in the Bawo Khel area south of the mine, striking an ANP vehicle and killing two policemen, as well as injuring six more. This is the most serious incident to occur in the Aynak area, which has mostly drawn sporadic IDF towards the large, MOI-managed ANP force that guards the economically valuable site. This incident came six days after the ANP arrested an opposition cell that was planting IEDs on the main road leading to the mine, demonstrating somewhat of a change in AOG activity in this area.

Statistically, overall armed opposition activity during the fortnight rose significantly on the first half of the month, as has been the case across the provinces neighbouring Logar too. However, whereas neighbouring Wardak has seen a significant decrease in overall conflict volumes over 2011 levels, as the battle for Ghazni has gathered much AOG attention and resources, Logar remains roughly on par this year with AOG activity - demonstrating the continuing importance of the province both in terms of transit for southeastern networks, and as an important element of the effort to restrict road transit out of Kabul in all directions.

ACRONYMS:


Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.

KAPISA

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

After the high incident numbers that occurred over the first half of June in Kapisa, this period saw a notable decrease, although two of the five incidents that did occur were of considerable significance. This overall change in volume can be primarily attributed not to security force activity, but instead to the movement of a number of opposition cadres from the eastern districts they dominate across the watershed into western Laghman, to take advantage of the void left by the IMF forces that departed there in early June. Multiple pitched attacks against ANSF and GOA targets in the Laghman districts of Dawlat Shah and Bad Pakh, as well as reports of significant cadre migration, provide evidence for this interpretation, and as such it is likely that incidents will re-escalate in eastern and southern Kapisa once these cadres have attained their objectives in

Laghman and returned. However, even with reduced numbers, two operations of significance stood out during the past fortnight. First, on the 18th in the main Tagab bazaar, an opposition operative detonated an IED that had been pre-placed in a shop just as a mid-level ALP commander was passing, killing him and three other local policemen, as well as two civilians; 10 other civilians were also injured. Insecurity in the main Tagab bazaar, so close to the DAC, has been very rare over the years, in spite of rising AOG strength in the wider district. To reinforce the point moreover, on the 27th opposition fighters attacked the ANP HQ in the DAC area. Although they did not inflict any damage or casualties on this occasion, two such attacks on district police high command, coming after last peri-



od’s casualty-heavy assault on an ANP CP in Tatar Khel, continues to strongly demonstrate to the police how difficult their work is going to be in the coming months.

The only other incidents during the fortnight occurred in Shukhi, the traditional focus for insecurity on the Mahmud Raqi-Njirab main road, and in Njirab itself – all of them targeting the police. In the former, a pressure plate IED struck an ANP vehicle and injured three policemen. In Njirab, an RCIED struck an ALP vehicle on a secondary road, injuring one, while opposition fighters also staged and armed attack on an ALP CP in the Pachaghan area, just north of the Njirab DAC; in the exchange of fire, no one was injured.


BAMYAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

The most notable events to occur in Bamyan during the past fortnight were connected to the initial occurrence of an RCIED detonation against the vehicle of the Saighan district governor, which took place on the main Kahmard-Saighan district road (in the Kafsh Khel area) at roughly 1600 hrs on June 20th. This was the most serious instance of armed opposition activity ever recorded on the main district road in Saighan, which has previously seen very infrequent AOG incidents, primarily SAF attacks on ANSF targets, and as such represented a new confidence in targeting practices, although not necessarily any new AOG presence.

ANP/NDS conducted a search operation in response to the IED incident, and arrested an individual in the Dardwal area later confirmed as the newly-appointed district shadow governor (DSG) of Saighan district. They also seized a small cache of weapons and explosives that was with the individual, who is a native of Baghlan, and who had recently returned to the area after training in Pakistan, which presumably included IED construction and deployment.

It is indicative of the very low numbers of armed opposition members in this district that the DSG was himself directly responsible for the IED strike, rather



than solely operating at the command and control level. The detention of the DSG is likely to help security forces in their pursuit of further AOG operatives in Saighan and Kahmard, who are part of the same armed opposition network which spreads west from Tala Wa Barfak. It also represents a tangible achievement by the ANSF in the immediate aftermath of a high-profile AOG incident, and indicates that ANSF in the area remain reasonably capable of effectively responding to such infrequent AOG-driven insecurity.

Shortly after on the same day,

PARWAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Insecurity in Parwan continued to be focused on the section of the Kabul-Bamyan highway that runs through Ghorband and Shinwari districts, as the armed opposition maintained their pressure on the ANSF and GOA as part of their efforts to constrict access to Bamyan center. Opposition cadres followed last period’s attacks on the convoys of the provincial governor and Shinwari district governor with SAF attacks on ANP convoys in the Abakan and Qalacha areas of the highway in Siyagerd, as well as two (inaccurate) rocket attacks on the Siyagerd DAC.

Afghan security forces also conducted a further clearing operation against AOG presence, after similar operations in the first half of the month. Having delayed the operation due to concern over insufficient medical support capabilities – indicating their expectation of sustaining significant casualties, as they had in the previous

operation – they finally conducted a major daylong operation in the Qemchaq and Dashtak areas on the 26th. In the operation, two AOG cell commanders were killed and four opposition fighters injured, while three security force members were also injured – an outcome more in favor of the security forces than they likely anticipated. That being said, while the specific operation may be deemed by the ANSF as a success, the opposition remains operationally and numerically strong across multiple side-valleys through Ghorband and Shinwari districts, and are able to draw on multiple diverse cadres in their efforts on the highway.

Evidence of this enduring AOG strength in this strategically important transport corridor was found in the ANP seizure of a car laden with explosives in the main Siyagerd bazaar on the evening of the day of the security force oper-



ation, and was also demonstrated in another, unusual incident, when men loyal to the Shinwari district shadow governor (DSG) shot and killed the district’s most senior AOG military commander.

The cause of the incident was the perceived moral transgressions of the military commander, who had been having an affair with a married woman. What matters with this incident is the fact that the DSG was willing to sacrifice his leading operational commander during the height of the fighting season – a decision that seems to indicate his confidence in his ability to replace the commander without any significantly negative impact on the opposition’s operational capabilities in the midst of their concerted effort to contest the highway.

ANSO STAFF AND VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT:

We would like to take this opportunity to welcome the new **ANSO RSA East**, Mr. Ross Baillie, and give a heart felt thanks to the outgoing **ANSO Country Director**, Mr. Nathan Ronaldson, and the outgoing **ANSO RSA South**, Mr. Peter Dimitroff, for all their hard work and dedication to the NGO community in Afghanistan during their multiple terms with ANSO. However, we are pleased to announce that Nathan will be staying on with us as the **INSO Chief Operations Officer**.

*

We are presently recruiting for **ANSO RSA South** position based in Kandahar and **ANSO RSA Mobile**. If you have a solid working experience from a conflict environment, a NGO mindset combined with an analytical background, and a desire to be challenged, all the while being a member of a close knit team, you are encouraged to forward a cover letter, CV, and 2 substantive writing samples to jobs@ngosafety.org.

NORTHERN REGION

SAR-E PUL


Security in Sar-e Pul continues to decrease. Although the province has recorded only 61 security incidents in 2012, just over 50% of those have been recorded over the past two months, with 16 occurring in May and 17 in June (note: the last few are not included on the attached graph). Further to this, AOGs are driving this increase, authoring approximately 70% of all recorded insecurity. While the current cycle did not see a continuation of the IED-related activity noted the previous cycle, there was a second AOG attack inside of Sar-e Pul city itself (following the PRP's jail break), the AOG seizure, occupation, and then abandonment of a village in Sozma Qala, an attempted attack against a GOA education official in southern Sar-e Pul, and two incidents around Qush Tepa village of Sar-e Pul district (just off the Sar-e Pul - Shibirghan road). Adding to these were three cases of girls falling sick in school for unknown reasons in Sar-e Pul city, as well as anecdotal reports of AOGs moving into villages to pressure locals for taxes.

Despite the above noted incidents involving educational structures, it does not appear that a trend towards the systematic targeting of education (girls' or otherwise) is surfacing. Tests returned from the schools in Sar-e Pul stipulated that no known poison was discovered, although it should be noted that—as in Takhar—perception

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

still plays an important role in how the situation develops, and the degree to which these reports will successfully calm the local population, some of whom have their own theories, remains uncertain. In light of this, should more such cases arise, they may cause significant anxiety - and potential civil unrest - no matter what the cause. As to the latter attack against a school guard in Qala Sokhta, it appears the AOG was targeting an education official visiting the school with a second GOA employee, and the guard was beaten (and the GOA official's car set on fire) when it appeared the officials had been warned of the AOG's arrival, allowing the GOA employees to flee the scene on foot.

Elsewhere, while continued insecurity in Qush Tepa village is to be expected, the second occurrence of AOG activities inside of Sar-e Pul city (manifested in a close range attack against first the ANP and then - on the same night - ALP) shows an increasing comfort level and freedom of movement for AOGs not previously witnessed this year. Although AOGs are not able to move freely in the city, the dual attacks indicate a shrinking sphere of security not only throughout the province, but in and around the city as well. However, the most recent incident occurred at night outside the city center, and



AOGs remain unable to move openly in the city by day.

This increased level of confidence was further supported by AOG willingness to launch an attack against - and then temporarily hold - Kata Qala village in Sozma Qala (located close to the Kohistanat border). AOG took the village with little resistance on the 22nd and held it for a number of days before the village was retaken by a joint ANSF force on the 26th. Although Sozma Qala has seen only limited AOG activity this year (including an AOG initiated illegal checkpoint on the 26th along the Sozma Qala – Sangcharak road), neighbouring Kohistanat has attracted both GOA and AOG attention due to the new ALP program (and transit routes to Faryab), marking the seizure and temporary control of the village as a statement to GOA and IMF (who train the ALP) that AOGs will not easily cede ground. However, much as the village was taken with little actual violence, it was retaken - primarily by ALP - with a similarly low level of physical engagement. Although eight suspected AOG were arrested (only two with weapons), most slipped out the back and away to the south.

In light of the above, it appears likely that AOG will continue to stand up a strong physical presence in the province well into the summer, and that their activities will continue at a relatively high rate and with increasing reach.


BALKH

Three phone calls made by an AOG to an INGO operating in the Toqi area of Shortepa district marked only the second NGO-direct security incident to occur in Balkh this year. This marks a significant decline from the nine NGO direct incidents reported over the same six month period in 2011. The phone calls included no direct threats, but suggested that the NGO needed to stop employing females and pay taxes to the AOG. Despite not accumulating the incident volumes of more kinetic districts in the province (such as Chimtal or Chahar Bolak), Shortepa maintains a low but consistent volume of AOG activity every year, with anecdotal reports from the area suggesting that AOGs are more present throughout the district—especially in Toqi—than the low incident volumes suggest (only eight security incidents all year, six of them AOG-authored). This is

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

likely due to a relatively lax presence of GOA authorities throughout the district. Through the end of June, the only other NGO-direct incident recorded in the province this year also occurred in Shortepa, when an NGO compound suffered close range SAF in April.

In general, trending for the province remained roughly consistent despite approximately a 30% decrease in overall incident volumes (prior to late reporting). 13 security incidents were recorded in total, with six of those occurring in Chimtal and Chahar Bolak, and an additional four in the districts south of Mazar (specifically Sholgara, Kishindeh, and Chaharkint). The fact that the two districts west of Mazar (Chimtal/Chahar Bolak) are the most kinetic is consistent with long standing trends. In fact, this period marked a notable decrease, with the two districts



notching 13 incidents between them the PRP. The increase of activity to the south, where many NGOs work and travel, is more notable. 17 of the 27 security incidents recorded in those three districts have taken place over the last three months, including five of the seven AOG authored incidents and a 22 June IM-F/ANSF joint operation into Tandorak (Chaharkint), which in 2011 was an AOG stronghold (and is believed still to be one of the operational bases for those AOGs destabilizing the area). The lasting effect that this operation’s sole arrest may have on the security paradigm for the districts may be relatively insignificant, as witnessed by the fact that two other security incidents there took place after said operation.

TAKHAR


Following the PRP’s arrests of those alleged responsible for the poisoning of school girls throughout Takhar, the province remained devoid of school poisonings and overall mostly quiet this period. Only five security incidents were recorded, the most notable of which was the arrest of an AOG member transporting suicide vests in a private vehicle in Ishkamish district. This marked one of three BBIED vest seizures in the region this period. The other four consisted of two arrests and two criminal incidents, all in Taloqan.

Although Takhar province sees

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

sporadic IED-based incidents of note, such as the May 2011 killing of General Daoud, BBIEDs are rare, with the only recorded BBIED being a December 2011 detonation against a parliament member at a funeral in Taloqan. Nevertheless, reports are surfacing that AOGs have been moving between Burka (Baghlan) and Ishkamish, and that AOGs operating in Kunduz, Khandabad and Archi districts of Kunduz have at times been known to use Ishkamish (and Burka) as safe-havens during major military operations.

Further to this, insecurity in Ish-



kamish is exceptionally rare, with the district recording only nine incidents in 2012, and 34 over the last two years combined. No BBIED discoveries or detonation have ever been recorded there, and recent IED activity has been limited to one IED detonation in May, and four IED discoveries and one detonation in 2011. No information exists at this time as to whom may have been the target.


KUNDUZ

In an incident that occurred on the last day of the PRP, but was only reported this period, a tent used by an INGO as a school was the recipient of stray gunfire when an AOG attacked an ALP checkpoint in Archi district. The incident occurred on a Friday, so no students or teachers were present during the shooting, and no injuries occurred. Although the NGO was not directly targeted, and the province has seen only one NGO-direct incident thus far this year, the incident was indicative of the increased activity that is being recorded throughout the province. As of the time of this report, the entire province had recorded 206 security incidents through the end of June, denoting a 39% decrease from 2011's total of 338 over the same period. However that difference has nar-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

rowed over the summer, with June recording 55 security incidents, denoting only a 23% drop from the previous June's total of 71. Although only 25 security incidents occurred this cycle, this gap is expected to narrow further with late reporting.

In terms of distribution, Kunduz was the site of seven security incidents, including five IED detonations that combined to injure seven civilians (including one child), two ANP, and cause the death of one ANP policeman. Imam Sahib matched Kunduz with seven incidents, although only two of them were AOG authored (both ineffective IED detonations), and Chahar Dara recorded six, including five authored by AOG and an IED discovery (with four IED detonations that caused injuries to




four ANSF but no civilians). In total, just over 50% of the province's 25 security incidents were AOG authored, with all but one of them consisting of IED detonations. Approximately 30% were authored by ANSF, with the majority of those being IED discoveries (four) or cache recoveries (two). While the total volume continues to demonstrate increases in overall security reporting throughout the province, the prominent role that IEDs continue to play—while making up a somewhat higher percentage of AOG authored incidents than usual this period—remains generally consistent with long standing trends, and is not expected to decrease significantly in the coming month.

SAMANGAN

The roadside robbery of five NGO staff members as they were transporting a large quantity of cash to a project site marked the first NGO-direct incident in Samangan since 2010, and the first in Aybak district since 2009. Aybak accounted for five of the eight incidents recorded this cycle, with most of them being criminal authored. The most troubling element of the NGO robbery was the fact that the thieves appeared to expect them and know that they were transiting significant assets, suggesting that someone involved with the organization, amongst the beneficiaries, or who knew of/had observed their programming had planned the robbery.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

Further insecurity resulted from the increasing spill over of AOG activity from neighbouring Baghlan, which is witnessing its most active month all year (see Baghlan). Primarily focused in the eastern part of the district, this was illustrated when AOG abducted and killed a village elder in Omali village of Hazrati Sultan district, an area which sits on the border with Baghlan, and had been the subject of AOG taxations twice already in April. As has occurred in many of the northern provinces this period, reports of AOGs pressuring communities for taxes have risen with increased AOG activity, and although this is generally consistent with seasonal trends, reports ap-



pear to be more pervasive. Equally disturbing are reports of AOG activities carried out against those who do not support them, such as in the current incident, where the elder was killed for refusing to collect taxes for the AOG. The areas bordering Baghlan are particularly vulnerable not only in their proximity to the kinetic province, but because they are often positioned outside of regular GOA patrol routes. Areas like these appear likely to remain vulnerable to expanding AOG activities as AOG operations and presence continue to increase in Baghlan.

FARYAB


As insecurity increased in Kunduz and Baghlan, reporting decreased significantly in Faryab—which has been the most kinetic province in the region—continuing a short term trend that had began the PRP. Faryab recorded 40 security incidents in June, marking a 44% decrease from the previous month, including only 17 incidents recorded this period. AOG activity remains a major component of manifested insecurity, with over 50% of the cycle’s reporting being AOG authored. Though Qaysar maintained a relatively high volume of reporting, with eight security incidents, five of them AOG authored, but in contrast to prior months, IED activity was rare in the district, with 80% of the AOG authored incidents being SAF attacks against ANSF targets. Rounding out those districts that typically see the most activity, Almar recorded a mere two incidents (both of them attacks on civilians, in-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

cluding the killing of a school teacher), and Pashtun Kot recorded none.

Other notable incidents did occur. A civilian bus was stopped at an ANP checkpoint in Andkhoy along the Maymana – Shibirghan road, and four AOG members were arrested with three suicide vests. This caused some anxiety as the PRP had witnessed two BBIED attacks, but suicide attacks have otherwise been exceptionally rare in the province (as noted in the previous report).

The tossing of a hand grenade into the provincial governor’s compound, causing no injuries, created further commotion, but as the 27th security incident reported in the district this year—and the only incident recorded there this cycle—it did not represent a particularly significant attack or deployment of assets. Although it remains unclear who initiated the attack, it is assessed as likely a



criminal incident. ACG initiated incidents have occurred in Maymana approximately twice as often as AOG authored ones this year, and the incident did not suggest significant planning. However, the targeted killing of the Qaramqol district chief of NDS in a daytime attack along the Maymana – Shibirghan road was in line with AOG targeting trends in Dawlatabad/Qaramqol, and marked one of two daytime attacks along this well used road this period (the other occurring in Dawlatabad against a PGM commander’s vehicle). Sporadic daytime attacks and general insecurity around these two districts remains notable, but ANSF/IMF/GOA elements have accounted for 95% of the targets this year, marking the one incident that did target civilians (an NGO abduction in January) a sole notable outlier.


BADAKHSHAN

The most notable incidents among those eight recorded this period were all ANSF or IMF initiated, with NDS arresting three AOG members from their residence in Kishim on 28 June with a suicide vest (marking the third seizure of a BBIED vest in the North this period, with similar incidents occurring in Faryab and Takhar), and two night operations in Shahri Buzorg and Yaftali Sufila districts, with the latter two resulting in four AOG members arrested and an additional four killed. While few details have arisen regarding the BBIED seizure, such incidents remain strong outliers in Badakhshan, which has witnessed

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

only two BBIED detonations in the last six years (one against a PGM commander in Kishim in April 2012, and one against an ANP station in Fayzabad in 2007). Although Kishim is known to house a regular local AOG presence, the opposition authored only two incidents in the district this year, and just four in 2011.

Of note to NGOs tracking the residual threat following the May abduction of NGO workers and the subsequent IMF operation, the night raids included (in Yaftali Sufila) the arrest of an AOG member claimed by IMF to be related to the kidnapping of four



INGO staff members in late May. While the extent to which this is true remains unclear, and IMF assertions that he was a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) unlikely, it is probable that both operations were the result of intelligence gathered during the operation. In fact, the only incident not initiated by IMF/ANSF this cycle was an AOG attack on ANP who were conducting poppy eradication in Argo.

BAGHLAN


The detonation of an IED approximately 15 meters from four INGO staff members in Tala Wa Barfak marked one of ten IED detonations this cycle. The IED in this particular case caused no injuries, and as the NGO was in the process of returning to their car after visiting a project site by a different route than how they had arrived, it is likely that the IED was not planted for the express purpose of targeting them, but was nevertheless triggered by their presence. This marked the second NGO-direct incident recorded in the province this year, but the first ever in Tala Wa Barfak district.

Baghlan displayed increased IED activity and diversified emplacement en route to recording 42 security incidents this month, making it the province’s most kinetic for 2012, and marking almost a 30% increase over May (the second most kinetic with 33). 28 of those incidents took place this reporting period, with 18 au-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

thored by AOGs. While Baghlani Jadid remained active, accounting for eight security incidents—five AOG initiated—the increase came from elsewhere, with Puli Khumri notching nine security incidents (seven AOG authored), including five IED detonations, two IED discoveries, and two RPG attacks against fuel tankers. This proliferation of IED activity outside of Baghlani Jadid combined with a notable increase in roadside attacks marked the most significant developments this cycle. This was punctuated by an IED detonation against a fuel tanker inside of Puli Khumri city, one of nine attacks against fuel tankers to occur this cycle.

Prior to this period, Puli Khumri—which saw significant insecurity last year—had recorded only three IED detonations in 2012, and none since February. In contrast, Puli Khumri witnessed five detonations this cycle alone, with the nine total security incidents



accounting for 30% of the district’s security reporting for the entire year. IED detonations also occurred in Burka, Tala Wa Barfak, and Dahana-I-Ghuri. To put this in perspective, the eight IED detonations that occurred outside of Baghlani Jadid this period accounted for half of the total volume to occur outside of Baghlani Jadid over all of 2012.

AOG activity increased along roadways as well, resulting in 11 roadside incidents. These included two on the Baghlan – Samangan road (RPG attacks against fuel tankers), two on the Baghlan – Kunduz road (an IED detonation and an attack on a fuel tanker), and two on the Khinjan – Dushi road (an IED discovery and an AOG SAF attack on an ANA vehicle). Although these are likely to continue, the majority occur outside of NGO travel times (between 1600 and 0900 hrs) due to night time emplacements and a decreased ANSF presence.


JAWZJAN

Despite increased insecurity in Sar-e Pul, reporting declined significantly in Jawzjan this cycle, with the province notching only three security incidents, and none in the usually contested Tri-Provincial area (Darzab and Qush Tepa). However, each of the incidents that did occur were of interest.

The district governor of normally quiet Qarqin was assassinated with his wife and daughter in their private residence on the night of the 28th, assessed as likely due to an interpersonal dispute despite the obvious political nature of the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

target. The son of a CDC head was abducted by AOG in an insecure portion of southern Khaniqa, with anecdotal reports indicating the incident occurred because of a dispute with the AOG over paying taxes. The third incident occurred in Mingajik, where a local religious elder was killed in a mosque. Prior to this period, these three districts had combined for only 13 security incidents in 2012, although 10 of those had occurred over the last three months, demonstrating the recent increase in AOG activity reported



throughout northern Jawzjan.

While current reporting indicates that AOGs continue to move throughout these northern districts, recorded incident volumes show a discrepancy with these reports, and the current period in particular demonstrates a perceptible lull.

WESTERN REGION

HERAT

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	1


An AOG intimidated eight INGO staff members in the eastern part of Adraskan this reporting period. 12 AOG members entered a village and interrogated the staffers while they were conducting a field survey. Throughout the interrogation, the AOG expressed their rejection of female staffers travelling without being accompanied by their male relatives, and warned the staff against ‘working for foreigners.’ However, the AOG departed leaving the NGO staff unharmed when local villagers (including armed men) surrounded the location in support of the NGO workers. The incident directly highlighted the importance of local acceptance in areas which serve as occasional conduit for non-local AOG. Eastern Adraskan has been reputed to be part of a pathway for the movements of exogenous AOG from the south (Farah or Shindand) to the north (Guzara or Pashtun Zarghun).

The volume of AOG authored incidents in the province increased from nine to 21 this reporting period, largely due to a spike in AOG activity in Shindand. During the first fortnight of this month, mounting ANSF/IMF pressure – resulting in the arrest of 16 AOG members, including two major commanders and the district shadow

governor – temporarily disrupted AOG operations in Shindand, as indicated by the fact that only two AOG incidents were recorded. However, eight AOG incidents were recorded this reporting period, with four IED detonations and four direct attacks on ANSF. It is likely that this spike in activity and increased presence directly correlated with increased AOG traffic to the north via eastern Adraskan, an important dynamic to be monitored over the coming months.

AOG activity has increased in the western districts, where local AOG have begun to increase their activities. Prior to this, exogenous AOG from Shindand had been the only active group in the district. This was evidenced in Kohsan, which recorded no AOG authored incidents in the second quarter of 2011, but witnessed four over the second quarter of 2012, all of them occurring in June, and assessed as the work of local AOGs.

Ghoryan recorded its second AOG incident this year (the first occurred in April) when AOG attacked an ANP patrol vehicle in the district center area, killing four ANP. Similar to Kohsan, Ghoryan district had no AOG incidents during the second quarter of 2011. Data analysis confirms anecdotal



reporting that the IEA is now empowering local AOGs in these western districts, particularly in Kohsan, but potentially in Ghoryan as well, which may translate into increased activity.

In Herat city and throughout the suburban districts, AOG activity remained low, with only one direct attack on an ANP checkpoint in Guzara recorded throughout the period. However the eastern and northern districts also contributed to the overall increase in AOG activity in the province. While three security incidents split between Pashtun Zarghun and Obe marked a subtle increase over the one incident recorded in Obe the previous cycle, the volume is too low to support meaningful analysis. All of the incidents recorded this period consisted of close range conventional attacks with SAF and RPGs targeting ANP checkpoints or patrols. A two week lull in the northern districts came to an end as AOG initiated two IED strikes against ANP patrols in Kushk and two direct attacks on ANP/ANA CPs in Kushki Kuna. At this time the primary risk to NGOs remains collateral involvement. However, as is true throughout the country, that risk increases as conflict activities increase.

GHOR

Ghor witnessed three incidents which directly involved NGOs this reporting cycle. On the 18th of June, approximately 12 AOG operatives attacked multiple ANP CPs in the district center of Du Layna during the nighttime hours, and during that attack - after first raiding ANP checkpoints - looted two separate INGO compounds in the vicinity. Items stolen from the INGO premises included motorcycles and blankets, items that would generally allow AOGs to increase their operational mobility. Further to this, while the IEA publically claimed responsibility for the attack on the ANP/GOA facilities, no references were made to the NGOs, suggesting they were targeted circumstantially.

On the same day, an RCIED detonated against an INGO vehicle while in transit around the district center in Dawlat Yar. While no casualties or damages were reported, the presence of the INGO was clearly the trigger for the detonation, as no other potential target was in the immediate vicinity at the time. It remains unclear whether the NGO was purposefully targeted or unintentionally triggered the device. A few days after this, another RCIED struck the acting district governor as he was walking through the same area, reiterating the involvement of the same local AOG cadre whose visibility has been increasing in and around the district center over the course of the year.


In the third incident involving an NGO, a hand grenade was thrown into the private residence of an NGO staffer, causing no casualties but minor damages to the building. The NGO staffer had previously received an indi-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	3

rect threat (via intermediaries) from an AOG warning the staffer to stop working with IMF. That and the fact that the area is known to have a significant AOG presence makes it appear that this third incident was also AOG initiated.

In fact, the second quarters of both 2012 and 2011 experienced equal volumes of NGO incidents (eight for each year), but this year witnessed more AOG initiated NGO incidents (six against four). This is despite the fact that the province at large has recorded roughly the same volume of AOG authored incidents over those periods (30 against 27). In contrast, the number of ACG incidents has decreased from 26 in 2011 to 18 in 2012. NGO related insecurity has followed this trend, with only one NGO incident attributed to ACG during the second quarter of 2012 as opposed to four over the same period in 2011.

In terms of general tactical trending for the second quarter, while close range conventional attacks remained the most dominant tactic for AOG, the use of IEDs increased from four to nine. Further to this, although IED incidents were mainly found in the southern districts in close proximity to Helmand over the second quarter of 2011, this year that same period witnessed six IED incidents in the northern and central districts, one of which included the second NGO incident detailed above, besides a relatively consistent volume of IED activity in the southern districts near Helmand. This tactical shift suggests that local AOG cadres have gained increased access to IED



expertise and materials/devices.

Only four AOG incidents were recorded in total throughout the province, which marks a 50% decrease when compared with the previous period, but still saw June's total volume of AOG activity eclipse each of those months before it. This decline is largely attributed to the fact that no AOG incidents were recorded in the southern districts (Taywara and Passaband) where AOG activity had been rising sharply since the poppy harvest season ended last month. However, as evidenced by the large scale attack on the district center in Du Layna, which was jointly organized by both local cadres and Helmandi AOG, it appears that AOG have gained more control over the south, and intensification of the conflict in the northern and central districts is expected as exogenous AOG shift their operational focus further north towards the middle of the summer.

Adding to the potential for conflict, a large number of ANSF troops have been recently deployed into Chaghcharan City. It is reasonable to assume that ANSF will launch clearing operations in Chaghcharan, particularly in Murghab Valley where local IEA cadres have a strong presence, as well as in Charsada and Dawlat Yar, which are scheduled to participate in the upcoming third tranche of the security transition. This is likely to cause disruptions to existing local dynamics. The most important factor in determining the level of stability in those districts may be which side the commander of a local armed group decides to work with. The commander is a key actor with a large following, who is actively negotiating with the GOA while maintaining strong family connections with AOG leadership.

BADGHIS


Three NGO staff members were intercepted and searched at an illegal checkpoint established by approximately 40 AOG members in Qala-I-Naw as they were in transit on board a public transport vehicle. The staffers continued their journey unharmed after explaining that they were working for a private construction company. Of note, the AOG checked all passengers on the public vehicle, as well as those of 13 other private vehicles, as to whether or not they were related to the GOA or “Americans.” Over the course of these searches, six passengers were singled out, with two of them subsequently abducted due to suspected relations with the GOA or an IO.

This marked the second NGO incident this year. Although this does not constitute a high volume,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

the timing is notable, as prior to the last incident (when 12 AOG members abducted and released a local demining NGO staff member and his relative - an ALP member - from their private residence in May), no NGO incidents had been recorded anywhere in the province since July 2009. Further to this, incidents targeting IOs have followed similar trending, with two in 2012 after no recorded incidents since 2009.

Although both NGO incidents were initiated by AOG - and occurred during the second quarter of this year - the volume of AOG activity has remained nearly 30% below the volumes for the same actors and period in 2011. In this light, it appears likely that increased NGO exposure throughout the province is most directly



related to the slight rise of NGO incidents, but little can be ascertained from such a small overall volume.

AOG activity remained low this period, with only 11 AOG authored incidents recorded, and apart from the NGO incident in Qala-I-Naw, the other 10 were close range conventional attacks mainly targeting ANP/ALP. No IED incidents were witnessed, a notable decline from the four recorded the PRP, but four of the AOG attacks directly targeted ALPs (particularly in Ghormach and Murghab), demonstrating the tension between the two actors, which is likely to intensify as the ALP program extends in the future.

FARAH


Armed opposition activity in Farah was consistent with the previous period, recording 17 AOG authored incidents, but not reaching the levels recorded in June. However, some changes were witnessed in the geographical distribution of activity, which shifted from the central districts to the east. This was particularly evident in Farah district where, likely due to mounting ANSF/IMF pressure, AOG incidents declined from five the PRP to zero this cycle.

The volumes and tactical preferences of AOGs remained mostly

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

unchanged in Bala Buluk, but armed opposition activity in Bakwa gained momentum as AOG mounted four attacks on IMF military logistic convoys en route to eight total AOG authored attacks.

Conflict has intensified in Farah this year as opposed to 2011, recording increased AOG activity, a dynamic which it shares with none of the other Western Region provinces save Ghor. Over the second quarter of 2012, Farah has recorded levels of AOG activity that are approximately 60% above those in 2011. Despite the in-



crease, no NGO incidents were recorded in the second quarter of either year. Further to this, the number of IMF initiated incidents increased from two to six, while ANSF incidents stayed almost unchanged. Co-relation between rises in both AOG and IMF initiated incidents suggest that a higher strategic importance has been placed on Farah this year.

EASTERN REGION

NANGARHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	14
This Report Period	0


As with many provinces in the eastern region, after a relative lull over the first half of June – which can be attributed to the effort the armed opposition expended in staging attacks in May to announce the beginning of the summer fighting season – the second half of the month saw a significant increase in security incidents in Nangarhar.

Yet this does not imply that the security situation has become significantly less safe for the NGO community in general. While the risk of being collaterally involved in kinetic incidents rises proportionately to the level of these kinetic incidents, a stronger AOG presence can also signify safer access, if the armed opposition is positively disposed to NGO presence. This dynamic was seen during the period in Nazyan, when nightletters were distributed through local communities encouraging NGOs to work in the area, and to feel assured that the armed opposition is looking out for their safety. Such open invitations were recently offered by the local community itself in Nazyan, and it is likely that the armed opposition in the area are themselves acting in a politically responsive way vis-à-vis local society.

In Jalalabad, there were just two opposition security incidents, as the city continues to see a less concerted AOG effort and a more and more effective ANSF presence. First, after a long pause, the

latest in the long-lasting pattern of armed opposition using IEDs to target music shops manifested itself, this one in the Daramsal area which killed two civilians and injured another two; notably, it detonated at 1400 hrs, rather than in the early morning, as with the pattern that had been more common in previously recorded incidents of this type. Next, an IED struck an ANBP patrol vehicle early on the 27th near to the Sharq radio station, although not injuring any of the border policemen on board. There were, however, what the ANSF believed to be credible reports of planned complex attacks in the city late in the month, leading to heavy ANSF and NDS deployment in the city center, with nothing manifesting itself by the time of writing. Such developments provide good indications of the on going AOG effort towards such larger, spectacular operations in the city, which would likely focus on key military and governmental institutions - just as the more minor AOG-authored security incidents continue to be down on the levels seen in recent years.

Outside the capital, Chaparhar continued to concern, with numerous AOG incidents along the main district road, leading to the deaths of policemen, government employees and community elders, as well as civilians, in what can be understood as an escalated effort



to constrict all access to the district by armed opposition. Most notable perhaps, the deputy district governor was amongst two GOA officials killed in a road ambush in Trelly.

Similarly in Bati Kot, entrenched AOG cadres continued to press ANSF both on the highway and in the parts of the district close to the river. There were SAF and RPG attacks against ANP CPs on the highway, and at the Shehla Chawk, an IED placed in a tree detonated as a policeman was walking past, injuring him. Furthermore, an IED struck the private vehicle of the Khogyani district governor, who is from Bati Kot, as it was travelling in the Farme 4 area, while in the Sepai market another IED struck an ANA vehicle, although in both cases there were no casualties from the blasts.

In the southern districts, Khogyani saw an insightful incident when a 16 year old boy attacked an IMF patrol with a sickle, injuring one soldier before escaping the scene on foot – an acute example of the antagonism that many in the area feel towards international military forces. In Pachir wa Agam, an IED struck an ANP vehicle in the Pas Sabar area, killing two policemen. Finally, at Shinwar’s Nazyan bridge, two BBIED operatives riding a motorcycle saw their vests prematurely detonate, in the latest in a series of failed BBIED attacks across the southeast and centre of the province.

NURISTAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0


After the major strategic changes embodied in the first two weeks of June, Nuristan was home to further important developments in the second half of the month, in both Kamdesh and Waygal. In the former, a short period of AOG adjustment to the new IMF presence ended on the 29th, when a large massed assault began on the GOA and ANSF presence in the three villages that comprise the district center, starting with a BBIED against the home of the Chief of Police and an AOG setting fire to the district governor's home - before at least 100 AOG fighters attacked the ALP and ANA forces in the area in a three-sided assault. This had been expected for some time - becoming even more likely after the IMF's return to the area - and led to at least 17 AOG deaths, mostly in IMF airstrikes, as well as a number of civilian and ANSF casualties. Such an attack will further shake a besieged GOA in Kamdesh, particularly as they know they will soon not have IMF support to fall back on in an emergency.

Waygal too was home to a major security event, taking the form of a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike against a group of AOG commanders just prior to a leadership meeting in Algol village. In the strike, five mid-level commanders were amongst eight killed in all. It marked the third such UAV strike in Waygal in just over a month. Yet in spite of the-

se drone strikes, and a short clearing operation in September 2011 to 'retake' the district center, Waygal remains effectively under complete AOG control. As previously reported, it is becoming clear that the IMF's approach to this district mimics the US approach to Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), refraining from ground force intervention and instead concentrating on sourcing intelligence for drone strikes against high-value AOG targets: hence the presence of mid- and high-level AOG commanders in the casualties of all three strikes.

And just as in the FATA, while UAV strikes can kill AOG leaders and drive them into hiding, they do not counter the opposition's local political supremacy, and are furthermore a *de facto* declaration that the IMF are no longer trying to support the expansion of the GOA's ability to bring governance and development to these areas.

However, recent developments indicate that the GOA itself is seeking to push back on AOG dominance in Waygal, using a strategy it is increasingly focusing on throughout the eastern region. In late April, two separate HIG cadres, led by one of Waygal's oldest *mujabedin* commanders, joined the APRP process in a formal ceremony in Parun. With a HIG-linked provincial governor and efforts to use HIG to hold



back the rising IEA power in Kamdesh, the contours of an emerging GOA provincial strategy to expand its reliance on HIG as a key bulwark in Nuristan are becoming clear. Most centrally, these Waygal HIG cadres appear likely to be turned into ALP units in an attempt to wrestle back some control of this IEA-controlled district, which would likely follow clearing operations in the district center area.

Yet there must be strong reservations about the scope for success in prosecuting this strategy in Waygal. While much of district society has grown increasingly tired of the conflict that the AOG presence has brought them, there remains strong ideological and thus practical support for the opposition. Furthermore, nearly a decade of IEA and associated AOG presence in Waygal has reduced the district's pre-existing HIG constituencies almost to non-existence. Kamdesh, by contrast, has both a strong HIG bloc in the district center, and very little support for IEA or other AOG activities and objectives in outlying villages - and yet even there the HIG district government has needed to draw on ever-growing IMF and ANA support to hold back IEA expansion, the difficulty of which was made plain in the aforementioned massed assault on the 29th. As such, any attempted HIG bulwark in Waygal is highly unlikely to present a credible challenge to the IEA's successful attainment of near-uncontested dominance in a district whose population is often actively supportive of their political and military objectives.

LAGHMAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

The past fortnight in Laghman has been a clear example of the mismatch between the IMF withdrawal timetable and field-level security conditions, after their withdrawal from three of the province’s western and northern districts at the beginning of June. Overall, incident levels rose in Laghman during the period, particularly in two of the districts from which IMF departed – Bad Pakh and Dawlat Shah – which also saw significant increases in AOG numbers. This expansion in both opposition numerical strength and in kinetic activity indicates the confidence with which AOGs are currently filling some of the void left by the withdrawn IMF, as well as pointing to the expansion of opposition cadres from neighbouring Kapisa’s AOG-controlled eastern valleys – with these newly arrived cadres therefore likely to be operating under the command and control of Kapisa’s AOG leadership.


In Dawlat Shah, over a four day period there were four separate attacks against the DAC and nearby security force positions, shortly after the reported arrival of new AOG cadres to the area. In Bad Pakh an ambush of an ANA patrol led to the death of one ANA soldier, and the abduction of another; it required local elder mediation to secure his release. There was also a brief attack on an ANP checkpoint, and two protracted assaults on the DAC/ANP HQ, the first time the DAC had been targeted since May 2011 (shortly after it was established from scratch, when Bad Pakh was carved out of Mehtarlam district); indeed, the only previous incidents in Bad Pakh this year thus

far had been an attack on the IMF/ANA base on May 3rd, as part of the region-wide kinetic push to symbolically announce the beginning of the fighting season. As such, that four significant assaults took place within days of IMF withdrawal and the arrival of new opposition cadres is a strong indication of the offensive posture of these cadres, and points to the high likelihood of sustained pressure on fragile government presence in Bad Pakh, just as in Dawlat Shah.

Moreover, this growing AOG strength in southern Kapisa and western Laghman manifested itself in increased insecurity along Highway 7, again in the key Tangi Abrisham bottleneck, which saw a handful of SAF attacks on ANSF either early in the morning or late in the evening – and also included a direct SAF attack on civilian vehicles on the 27th.

Indeed, in line with the general expansion of AOG confidence in other parts of the province, an AOG unit staged the first illegal checkpoint on the highway since January 2011 – the most insecure period in the highway’s history – in the Mashala Kamar area. As with before, the unit, which came down from the Tor Ghar in the late evening, were dressed in ANSF uniforms in order to cause vehicles to stop; however, on this occasion, the unit faked an armed clash (with themselves in the position of ANSF under fire) in order to stop the vehicles, and after doing so, kidnapped a number of civilians – releasing the women and elderly amongst them, and ultimately just keeping two men.

Elsewhere in the district, there



were two AOG assaults in the Char Bagh area, one on the DAC and one on a nearby ANP checkpoint – demonstrating the presence of the opposition in diverse areas of the district.

Finally, in Alingar, home to the last remaining IMF detachment, there was relatively little AOG activity, primarily manifesting itself in attacks on IMF supply convoys; in one incident, a truck driver was killed when his fuel tanker was attacked by the opposition. However, activity along the main Mehtarlam-Alingar road was recorded, most importantly in Mehtarlam’s Besram area, where the opposition staged an illegal checkpoint on the main road on the evening of the 17th; in the event, the opposition fighters shot and killed one local, and injured three others. Indeed, AOG presence in this area was of sufficient concern for IMF to conduct a clearing operation against opposition forces in the nearby Maidani area, which is in Mehtarlam district, on the main road to Alingar.

It can be assessed with confidence, therefore, that in all places where AOGs have operated over the past two years, they are now present and active, and moreover are in expansion mode, even on the outskirts of the provincial capital. While many other parts of the country have seen a noted decrease in AOG conflict activity this year, Laghman has so far in 2012 seen a significant increase, with June representing a near doubling over the same month in 2011. Given southern Kapisa’s increasingly powerful AOG presence, and their expansion into western Laghman, we can furthermore expect that this trend of stronger and more confident armed opposition forces in Laghman will continue through the summer.

KUNAR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

For Kunar in the past fortnight, the armed opposition maintained its operational intensity, sustaining the same level of monthly incidents as in May. There were just a small number of noteworthy events, perhaps the most significant of which was the assassination of a mid-ranking ANA officer by an on-duty ANA soldier at a checkpoint near the Ganjgal IMF base in Sirkanay, one of the places where IMF are currently focusing their efforts; the soldier responsible subsequently managed to escape the checkpoint, and presumably joined local opposition cadres. That the incident took place the same day as a major IMF clearing operation in the district, and at roughly the same time as a number of AOG attacks on ANSF and IMF targets across the

district, indicates that the IMF continue to look unlikely to effectively clear the district of its deeply entrenched AOG presence.

Beyond that, perhaps the most significant security events that affected NGOs were the large demonstrations along the main provincial highway, staged to protest the allegedly biased quotas assigned by the GOA for this year's batch of Hajj participants from Kunar; in four separate demonstrations, protestors from the districts south of Asadabad attempted to show their anger that these districts had received the same number of overall allocations as the Pech valley had.

Finally, on the 27th NDS arrested six students from Nangarhar University in Asadabad, for alleged



connections to the armed opposition; one was from Kunar and the remainder from Logar and Wardak. In recent years, some students from Nangarhar University have appeared more ideologically supportive of the armed opposition, with some of those showing interest in turning those views into action; there are few places better to do so than Kunar, and it is likely that they were planning to travel up into Pech to gain practical experience in opposition activities, as many young Afghans and foreigners have done in the valley over the past decade.


KHOST

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

Khost as a whole had another relatively quiet fortnight, with incident volumes continuing to be substantially down on 2011 levels, as the Haqqani IEA faction continues to employ an economy of force effort while also increasingly politicising itself in the province. However, even with such an economy of force, they managed to demonstrate their ability to inflict serious damage to the security forces when they set their mind to it – as they did during the previous period in their attack on Salerno, which inflicted one of the highest number of IMF injuries in a single event during the entirety of this conflict's history. Similarly in this period, a lone BBIED operative approached an IMF checkpoint operating near the Spin Jumat in Khost city; in the blast, three IMF soldiers, five Afghan police and 17 civilians were killed,

with a further five soldiers, three ANP and 37 civilians injured. While lone BBIED operatives are usually ineffective, this operative was the cause of the greatest casualty count in Khost city in the past decade, both in terms of IMF and civilian fatalities; Haqqani BBIED operatives have been shown to be effective, as evidenced by numerous complex attacks across the country.

Elsewhere in the city during the past fortnight, IEDs were the key form of kinetic incidents. In the Old Military Hospital area, an IED attached to a bicycle detonated in the vicinity of an ANP vehicle, injuring two civilians; this incident appears to have been targeting the security forces, rather than relating to the ongoing NGO issue in that locality. At the city's



Telecoms Square, moreover, another IED detonated, again injuring two civilians in what looked to have been a premature detonation.

Outside the provincial capital, developments were within predictable parameters, with IMF operations focusing on the Haqqani stronghold of Sabari, and AOG SAF and IDF attacks occurring sporadically across the province's rural districts. It is expected that current incidents levels will fluctuate only mildly through the coming summer months, but that further large statement attacks will continue to take place, as a means of demonstrating that Khost's armed opposition remains unbroken.

PAKTYA


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Continuing the trend established in recent periods in Paktya, overall incident levels continued to increase across the province as expected. Also in line with the revealed priorities of the armed opposition in the province, Gardez district was the focus of the majority of security incidents, as they continues to press on the security forces in and around the soon-to-be transitioned provincial capital.

While armed opposition activity was detected just kilometres outside the provincial capital in all directions, a key front for the armed opposition continued to emanate from the southwest of Gardez town, in the Chawni, Ibrahimkhel and Khataba areas. While the previous period’s killing of IMF soldiers in an IED in Chawni was not repeated, there was a further IED strike against an IMF vehicle, as a result of which an airstrike was called in later in the day, killing three AOG members as they were planting more IEDs. In Ibrahimkhel, an AOG unit attacked an ANA convoy during the midmorning on the main Zurmat road; some days later, ANP arrested a number of locals from the area for providing assistance to the armed opposition. Finally, in Khataba, just outside the capital, IMF conducted two clearing operations that collectively led to the arrest of six

AOG members.

Another focus for AOG-led insecurity was found to the north along the Kabul-Gardez road, continuing on from the last period. In Tandan there were two separate SAF assaults on ANP convoys, while in Loya Tera there was a combination of SAF attacks and IEDs against security forces. These attacks are part of the wider attempts to constrict access along the Kabul-Gardez road, which currently see similar (and indeed substantially greater) efforts across the provincial border in Logar. Finally, in Rubat AOG fighters abducted a local ANA soldier as he was visiting his home on leave, his fate remaining unknown at the time of writing. Gardez town itself remained broadly quiet, but two security incidents on the 30th demonstrated the AOG networks encroaching on the city continue to make progress; in the Ghazni bazaar area an unidentified individual threw a grenade into a parked ANA vehicle, causing it damage, while later in the day an IED detonated in front of the city’s Kabul Bank branch, killing two ANP policemen and injuring two civilians in what appears to have been an attack on the police. Given opposition proximity to the provincial capital now that cadres and materiel have had time to re-



turn to the province, it can be expected that further ANSF- and GOA-focused insecurity will occur in the town over the coming summer months, including infrequent larger attacks.

Indeed, elsewhere in the province evidence of this focus on Gardez was detected; in Dand wa Patan, ANBP arrested four AOG members travelling in a car laden with explosives that was reported to be on its way to the provincial capital. Other than that, insecurity was concentrated in Sayid Karam and Zurmat, the districts either side of the capital which are currently key contested spaces between the government and opposition. In Sayid Karam, there were two attacks on the district center, as well as the targeted killing of a former ANA soldier in the Sawi area. In Zurmat, a combined IED-SAF ambush of an IMF convoy in the Koti Khel area led to the death of an AOG fighter and the injury of an IMF soldier, while in Saw, an IED and a SAF attack targeted ANP units in separate events. Finally, during an ANP/IMF operation in Sahak, an ANP policeman attempted to shoot and kill an IMF soldier, and was consequently arrested – in what was a failed attempt to be the latest in a nationwide pattern of ‘green-on-blue’ attacks.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

SOUTH REGION


GHAZNI

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Incident levels remained elevated in Ghazni province for another report period, with over 80 entries over the last two weeks. The overall profile consists of the usual mix of direct and indirect AOG actions against DACs, IMF/ANSF patrols and PSC units escorting logistical shipments destined for IMF facilities throughout the province. One of the potentially significant trends which is present in this current report period is the continuing series of clashes between AOG fighters aligned with IEA and HIG. Over the past six weeks there have been six recorded cases of clashes between AOG associated with HIG and IEA, centered in Andar district. Local reports suggested that HIG was opposed to the IEA threat, issued in late April, that temporarily closed down provincial schools; this has not been confirmed as a core reason for the armed clashes, but is more likely one in a series of irritants between the two groups, with HIG appearing to have roots in the local communities within Andar district, resisting an increase in the number of IEA operations on their turf. During this report period, another significant clash between HIG and IEA fighters took place in what appears to be the epicenter of the conflict, Payinda Khel village (site of several previous clashes in May and June) as eight IEA fighters were killed by HIG gunmen on 18 June. Two days

later a small force of IEA fighters attacked and set fire to the residence of a local HIG commander in nearby Ghandi Khana village, injuring the HIG commander's wife, and most likely ensuring a future escalation of violence between the two insurgent groups.

Elsewhere the province hosted 16 AOG attacks on IMF/ANSF patrols and posts, with AOG continuing a policy of harassing fire followed by rapid disengagement to avoid taking casualties from the better-equipped IMF/ANSF units. As a result, these attacks produced only a handful of significant casualties, with the majority of these being civilians. In Muqur district's Manak village, AOG fighters ambushed a PSC guard force escorting an IMF logistical convoy with RPG and SAF, resulting in the deaths of three civilians in the cross-fire. Another AOG ambush of an IMF logistical convoy in the Mutawal area of Qarabagh district killed two more civilians. Aside from those incidents it appeared AOG fighters sustained the most casualties during the remaining direct attacks. An IMF patrol responded to an AOG ambush outside of the village of Mirwal, also in Qarabagh district, by counterattacking and killing three AOG fighters before the rest could withdraw from the area. Similarly, a third incident in Qarabagh, this time an AOG attack against an ANP post in the



area of Nosar Khel, ended badly for the opposition as the ANP force withstood SAF and replied by killing three of the AOG attackers and wounding an additional three.

IMF/ANSF operations were limited, with only a dozen recorded operations against AOG units in the province. The most significant of these included a raid on a suspected AOG safe house in the area of Mullah Noh Baba in Andar district, as IMF soldiers engaged with and killed a total of four AOG fighters and detained another three. Similarly, a joint IMF/ANSF force killed two AOG members and seized a cache consisting of 30 prepared IEDs during an operation in Qarabagh district's Qalander Khel village.

Lastly, another emerging trend in the South Region has been on display in the province, with another incident involving Pakistani AOG fighters. In Andar district's Qala Khel village, ANA killed five Pakistani fighters and captured another three after a prolonged exchange of SAF. This is the latest in a series of reported clashes involving Pakistanis, and although foreign fighters have been encountered throughout the South region by IMF/ANSF, they have usually been in small numbers – one or two advisors or specialists (such as IED-makers). Larger groups of fighters are now being seen in the region, marking a trend worth monitoring.


KANDAHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

With over 100 separate security entries for the report period, Kandahar has experienced a dramatic rise in incidents, outpacing all other provinces in the South region, most likely signaling the start of a sustained peak (the so-called ‘fighting season’) in what is still regarded as key terrain for both AOG and GOA. With 41 IED incidents in total, IEDs played a major role in degrading the security environment in the province and a large number of significant IED cache discoveries did not prevent a burst of IED strikes against ANSF, IMF and civilians. Substantial caches were discovered in Zhari district’s Siya Loy area, as 29 IEDs were seized, and in Panjwayi’s DAC where an ANA patrol located 16 IEDs in an abandoned house. Ghorak district appears to be the site of several IED factories, as on three separate occasions ANSF units discovered substantial quantities of prepared IEDs – in a residence close to the DAC 39 IEDs were destroyed by an IMF EOD team on 17 June. On the same day, in Ghorak’s Kinar-e-Sang area, a further 19 IEDs were discovered and destroyed by an ANP search operation. Lastly, on the following day another operation uncovered an additional cache consisting of 15 IEDs in a ruin, also near the district’s administrative center. IED strikes took place on 22 separate occasions, resulting in a total of 11 ANSF deaths, as well as the deaths of five civilians and three AOG fighters, the last being killed while emplacing an IED in Kandahar City’s District 9. The single deadliest strike occurred on 23 June as a roadside IED hit an ANA vehicle, killing three ANA

soldiers immediately and severely wounding three others, one of whom succumbed to his injuries later in the day.

Although IED incidents vastly outnumbered direct attacks, one sees the beginning of a concerning trend – a greater reliance on large-scale suicide attacks. The first half of the year has seen a significant increase in suicide attacks in the South region, with 25 to date, compared to 16 for the same period last year. The more significant difference however is the size of the attacks, with the most recent involving groups of two or more suicide attackers. Earlier this month, on 6 June, a complex suicide attack involving both an SVIED and BBIED strikes near the entrance to a logistics facility supporting the Kandahar Airbase killed 22 civilians, and wounding an additional 24. During this report period two such incidents stand out. On 19 June in the Malajat area of Dand district, four BBIED attackers wearing ANP uniforms attempted to breach the defences of a joint IMF/ANSF base. The attack was repelled however the four suicide bombers managed to detonate their devices, killing themselves and three ANP officers, and leaving an additional seven other ANP wounded. On the same day, a group of seven AOG fighters equipped with BBIED attacked an IMF base near the Dahla Dam in Shah Wali Kot district, eventually detonating their devices, killing themselves and wounding 10 IMF soldiers, some severely. The obvious coordination, along with the sheer scale of the attacks, suggest that AOG leadership is intent on gen-



erating international media attention through ‘spectacular’ attacks, to be seen as forcing IMF out of the country on AOG terms and portraying the IMF effort as a defeat.

Other less ambitious direct attacks occurred a total of 21 times, with the majority of them consisting of short engagements involving SAF attacks on ANSF posts, indicating a desire to maintain an operational tempo while reducing exposure to significant casualties. Interestingly, the handful of direct attacks during which AOG units risked a prolonged exchange of fire appeared to target ALP units, perhaps suggesting that AOG planners consider these units easier targets (or of a higher priority than regular ANSF units). Typical of this trend was an incident in Zhari district’s Chahar Kusa village, where AOG fighters attacked an ALP post with heavy weapons and SAF for two hours, resulting in two ALP officers and two AOG members killed. A similar attack took place in Bargany village of Spin Boldak district, as AOG fighters attacked an ALP post with heavy weapons and SAF, killing one ALP officer and wounding three others during a prolonged firefight lasting over two hours. The length of these firefights suggests that ALP units may not yet have communications with, and access to, potential air assets from IMF/ANSF.

Lastly, in the latest instance of ‘green on blue’ incidents (wherein ANSF soldiers attack IMF personnel) an ANP officer stationed in Sanzary village, traditionally a hotbed of AOG activity in Khari district, opened fire on a group of IMF soldiers, killing one IMF soldier and wounding two others before escaping.

ZABUL


With approximately 40 entries recorded over the past two weeks, Zabul experienced a slight increase in security incidents during the current report period. The most impactful of these were IED strikes, and victims included civilians as well as IMF/ANSF personnel.

Eight separate IED incidents accounted for a large number of deaths and injuries. In Naw Bahar’s DAC a roadside IED hit a patrolling IMF vehicle, severely wounding two IMF soldiers. Two days later another roadside IED hit a PSC vehicle in Bazargan village of Shahjoy district, killing three PSC guards, wounding two others, and completely destroying their vehicle. The most significant IED incidents however involved civilian casualties. In Karato village of Arghandab district as a

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

roadside IED hit a local taxi, killing four civilians including a woman and her two children, and in the Nawrak area of Qalat district a roadside IED hit a local farm truck, wounding eight civilians passengers. Lastly, in an attempted targeted killing, an RCIED detonated as the vehicle of a prominent local tribal leader was passing through Shahjoy’s DAC, killing one of his bodyguards and slightly injuring the tribal leader. The tribal leader had been vocally supportive of expanding the ALP program in the area, however it has not been confirmed that this was the reason for his being targeted.

IMF/ANSF operations experienced some notable results, including two separate operations which took place in Qalat district,



in the areas of Mulladin village and the DAC, in which a total of nine AOG fighters were detained, along with a significant amount of weapons and ammunition. The most significant clash however took place on 25 June in the Zanzir area of Shamulzayi district as ANBP officers, responding to an earlier IED strike, engaged with an AOG force consisting of an estimated 20 fighters in a firefight lasting over three hours. Four ANBP officers were killed however AOG fighters managed to remove their casualties, preventing an accurate estimation of AOG killed and wounded.

HELMAND


Incident levels in Helmand are significantly down from previous periods, especially in the second half of the current report period.

The area of Trikh Nawa in Marja district came to the fore with several large clashes between IMF/ANSF forces and AOG fighters. In the morning of 18 June the hostilities began as AOG fighters attacked an ANA patrol with heavy weapons and SAF, resulting in four AOG members and one ANA soldier being killed, and two ANA soldiers wounded. Later that day ANA soldiers returned to the area and engaged with AOG, however results were mixed, as three AOG members and one ANA soldier were killed, and two ANA soldiers were severely wounded. This clash led to

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

planning for a further operation to dislodge AOG from the area, and on 26 June ANSF units moved into Trikh Nawa and engaged AOG in a prolonged firefight, resulting in the deaths of four AOG fighters and the capture of another eight AOG, which will most likely quell AOG activity for several weeks as they re-group from their losses.

One of the more significant incidents occurred late in the report period as AOG gunmen killed five local farmers, accusing them of accepting fertilizer and other agricultural support from a provincial government program. This is significant in that this incident represents an extremely broad definition of the idea of



‘collaboration with GOA’ as it could be argued that the majority of the population who receive any sort of support from GOA are therefore legitimate targets. This incident also demonstrates the fairly unpredictable nature of AOG units in Helmand, who appear to have more discretion in terms of local actions than units in neighbouring Kandahar province. It is difficult to imagine that this was sanctioned at a high level, as this goes against the IEA’s strategic objective of appearing more measured in their actions vis a vis the local populace.


PAKTIKA

Paktika province and its districts appeared to experience a slight decrease in overall incidents numbers during the most recent report period, however it must be noted that in keeping with traditional patterns in the province the majority of AOG-initiated incidents were indirect fire attacks which have little or no impact – literally – on their intended targets, usually DACs or IMF facilities. Nevertheless, these should still be considered serious, and occasionally civilian residential areas are struck. During this report period, there were 13 instances of indirect fire, involving the use of both mortars and rockets, in the province, with only one incident involving any significant effects. This occurred on 23 June in the Marjan area of Waza Khwa district’s DAC, when AOG fighters fired four mortar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

rounds towards the DAC and one of them struck a nearby civilian residence, injuring five of the occupants, two of them severely.

Another feature of the report period was the AOG’s particular focus on Gayan district, and especially its DAC, which itself hosted nine separate AOG-initiated security incidents, involving both indirect and direct fire attacks. On 15 June several mortars were fired at the DAC, followed the next day by a similar barrage. While no damage was incurred in either incident, the DAC was then attacked on 17 Jun by an AOG force using RPGs and SAF. The force withdrew before any IMF/ANSF could engage, however they – or another AOG force – returned two days later to conduct another direct attack using heavy



machine guns and SAF. Once again they demonstrated a reluctance to sustain any major casualties and broke off their engagement after approximately 45 minutes, with no injury to either side in the clash. Lastly, three further IDF attacks on the DAC area, two on 24 June and a third on 25 June completed an intense 10-day period of attacks for the area. It is most likely that the intention of this burst of activity was meant to test the defenses and abilities of the joint IMF-ANSF forces based in the area, probably in preparation for a more determined and sustained assault in the near future.

URUZGAN


With over 60 recorded incidents, Uruzgan is experiencing a gradual increase over past report periods. Although IEDs continue to figure prominently in the security profile of the province, there has been a noticeable increase in direct AOG attacks, with the majority of these targeting ALP personnel and check-posts.

The establishment and expansion of the ALP program in Uruzgan has been fiercely contested by AOG over the past six months, with direct attacks on recruits, as well as several instances of the targeted killing of local leaders supportive of the initiative during the April-May period. There were eight direct attacks recorded over the past two weeks against these units. In the area known as Kap-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

to, in Tirin Kot district, AOG fighters attacked an ALP post with heavy weapons and SAF, killing one ALP recruit and wounding two others. Similarly, in the village of Qadam Shah, in Khas Uruzgan district, AOG attacked an ALP post with RPGs and SAF, killing two ALP officers and wounding four others. The most significant incident involving ALP took place as AOG attacked an ANP post with heavy weapons and SAF near the village of Darafshan in Tirin Kot district, resulting in one AOG mid-level commander and one ALP officer killed, and another three AOG fighters and two ALP officers severely wounded.

IED strikes appeared to be also



targeting ALP units, with 10 separate incidents involving strikes against ALP personnel and vehicles, in addition to another seven strikes affecting ANSF units. In these, a total of eight ALP and four ANP officers were killed, and a further 11 were wounded in incidents throughout the province.

The most serious IED incident, however, took place outside the village of Saraab, in Chora district when an IED hit a local Mazda truck which was carrying farm workers, killing six of its occupants, severely wounding another three and completely destroying the truck.

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MISSING THIS PERIOD:

ANSO did not provide analysis for the following areas:

➡ Daykundi, Nimroz, Panjshir

These areas will be included in subsequent reports. If you have any information that would help us better understand the dynamics, please contact your local ANSO office.

ANSO is overseen by an NGO Advisory Board. If you have any questions or feedback, good or bad, let them know on:

Advisoryboard.afg@ngosafety.org

NGO can register up to five persons to each of ANSO mailing lists. For a registration form please contact:

Registration.afg@ngosafety.org



ANSO REGIONAL DIVISIONS

COMMON ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised militias) / **DC**-District Centre / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **IMF**-International Military Forces / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device / **PDO**-Private Development Organisation / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police / **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative / **IEA**-Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-District Shadow Governor (IEA) / **PGM** - Pro-Government Militia / **APRP** - Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program