

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Large scale AOG action in Badghis
- Unabated suicide attack levels
- Abductions and kidnappings remain a concern throughout the country

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
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COUNTRY SUMMARY

The slow but consistent deterioration of conditions in Bala Murghab district of Badghis reached a new high this period with close to 300 AOG fighters assembling for a surprisingly well resourced operation against an ANP convoy.

The area has seen large formation operations recently (150 AOG attacked an ANP post June 1st) but they have not previously displayed the same level of organization, resilience and commitment. This watershed event likely marks the beginning of increased AOG efforts in the area and subsequent destabilization of the province. At this point it remains unknown whether it also indicates the start of a strategy to more vigorously target “softer” IMF areas in advance of IMF offensive operations in the South and East but ANSO believes it has to be considered likely.

Suicide attacks continued to grab attention this period with and ongoing focus on district and provincial centers and security targets. (see inset) and the unfortunate



death of NGO staff caught up in the attack in Kabul.

The ISAF operation west of Kandahar City this period is likely indicative of the plans for a more aggressive prosecution of the conflict. However, the tactics used (i.e. bulldozing of access routes), and the resulting local dissatisfaction, has left an environment which would be highly unsuitable for subsequent assistance activities (humanitarian or otherwise).

The use of force protection shootings (known as *Escalation of Force* in the military) also gained attention this period with civilians being shot for driving too close to ISAF vehicles in both Herat and Kabul with the latter sparking violent protest.

Use of IED, small arms and indirect fire remained prevalent across the country although the visit of the UN Security Council (and other foreign diplomats) this period passed without major incident towards that group.

Incidents impacting NGO demonstrated an ongoing downturn as staff and resources are withdrawn from the field for winter. There is no update yet of the NGO international recently abducted in Kabul.


KABUL

In the early evening on 19 November, an unknown assailant fired on an UN armoured vehicle as it dropped off a national passenger at home in the Doghabad area of District 7. The bullet (believed to have been fired from a handgun) struck the passenger-side window causing minor damage. The incident would have been much more serious were it not for the bullet-proof glass. But while the attack was likely deliberately directed at an international vehicle, given the level of expertise that AOG/ACG are capable of and have demonstrated in other attacks, this appears to have been a random opportunistic incident. The darkness and relative isolation of the area likely contributed to the assailant's decision and ability to carry out the attack. For

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	22
This Report Period	0

NGO the incident is a reminder of the dangers of travel in isolated areas—especially after dark—even within the confines of Kabul city. The killings of civilians by international military forces received prominent attention this period. On 27 November in Kabul, locals peacefully protested the problem. On 28 November, IMF shot and killed a civilian after a collision involving an IMF convoy and a civilian vehicle on Jalalabad Road. The incident sparked a violent response by people at the scene, who threw stones at the IMF and at least one non-military international vehicle. This is the fourth incident in Kabul city this year in which IMF have killed one or more civilians. NGO can likely expect increasingly violent response to future incidents.

Except for the areas north, AOG/ACG can be assumed to have a significant control around the perimeter of Kabul city. Recent incidents and reports indicate



that Khaki Jabbar is destabilizing and subject to AOG attacks. Government and security forces are believed to have little control outside the district centre, which itself is vulnerable to attack (as demonstrated in a 30 October AOG assault). AOG are said to move freely from Musayi to the west and Surobi to the east, and the primary road to the district from Kabul through Bagrami follows a canyon vulnerable to ambush. Travel through Surobi remains risky as evidenced by periodic attacks on IMF contracted vehicles. Within Kabul city, IED attacks are a salient threat, as demonstrated by a 27 November attack near Massoud Square. Reports indicate the VBIED was targeting an IMF convoy and detonated prematurely. More such attacks can be anticipated in the coming weeks. Abduction is also an ongoing threat; a French NGO worker abducted in Karte Parwan on 3 November is still being held by captors.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Destabilization of areas surrounding Kabul City
- IED/suicide attacks
- Abduction/kidnapping

WARDAK

While AOG incidents have slowed considerably in recent weeks; down to about half what they were in the peak of summer Wardak remains the most volatile of the Central Region Provinces, and any areas east of the Bihsud districts should be considered highly dangerous for NGO operations due to threats of direct AOG attack and active conflict between AOG and security

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

forces. Even with a slowdown, AOG have had demonstrated considerable success controlling the main highway and intimidating the populace. In Saydabad this reporting period AOG successfully hijacked five new vehicles with drivers, and wounded an election worker with small arms fire. DAC attacks are also prevalent and can be expected to continue in the coming weeks.



from the eastern part of the district possibly targeting NGO in Hisa i Awali Bihsud and Markazi Bihsud. However, NGO recently travelling in Markazi Bihsud were cautioned by locals not to travel after dark in the “Mushak area” (at the north-west forks of the main road to Bamayan) due to the potential for banditry.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Overall instability
- Suicide and IED attacks
- Abduction/kidnapping

There have been no new sightings relative to last period's report of an opposition or criminal group

PARWAN

Parwan has been relatively quiet this period with only one recorded AOG incident. In Kohi Safi, AOG distributed night letters threatening locals not to work at Bagram Airbase. Last reporting period (13 November), AOG in Kohi Safi ambushed a convoy


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in Ghorband and Kohi Safi
- IED threat along Chaharikar-Bamyan road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

belonging to the chief of police. Kohi Safi is rumoured to experience a significant AOG movement from neighbouring Tagab in Kapisa, and NGO should view Kohi Safi as risky for operations.

The road west from Chaharikar to Bamyan has not experienced an IED incident since late September. This may be partially attributable to a winter exodus of some AOG. After suspending travel in August, this month the UN reas-



sessed the route to Bamyan, and has found the road to be “fairly favourable.” However they strongly advise convoys with two armoured vehicles and two provincial escorts, which suggests that the route is still risky for NGO travel.


BAMYAN

There were no significant incidents reported during this period in Bamyan. With the onset of winter, NGO can expect hazardous travel conditions and closed roads to be common in the coming months.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG presence in Kahmard, Saygan, and Shibar
- Winter related road hazards



DAYKUNDI

Daykundi has recently experienced an increase in security incidents. During the period of January through October the province logged a total of 25 AOG & ACG incidents, in November it has recorded two AOG incidents and five ACG incidents. The AOG incidents— both occurring this period— were the hijacking of two fuel tankers (along with the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Minimal security presence
- AOG migration
- Banditry

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

abduction of one of the drivers) in Gizab district, and an attack on an ANP checkpoint in Nili. Gizrab is known to be heavily infiltrated with AOG and should be avoided by NGO (along with Kajran). Nili is more hospitable than the southern districts, but can be risky for NGO— especially internationals, who could be considered high value abduction targets.

NGO should note the potential for increased criminality in Daykundi. As mentioned in the previous ANSO report, the onset




of winter could prompt more criminal incidents as people seek the means to obtain resources necessary for basic survival. In Khadir this period an ACG robbed the passengers of a mini-van. This is the third such occurrence in the province this month, with the previous two occurring in Khadir and Shahrstan.

LOGAR

AOG incidents have tapered off in the last half of November with only four incidents reported so far this period compared to 15 in the previous two-weeks. Likely, this is largely related to a winter-prompted slowdown. In the com-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

ing month, Logar will likely experience reduced but continual AOG-related attacks and threats. The province is effectively under AOG control and remains dangerous for NGO operations. The AOG saturation has made Logar (as well as Wardak) the planned target for increased IMF operations and troops come January. While this may ultimately diminish the AOG presence, in the short to



medium term it will likely mean more kinetic warfare and increased clashes in Logar as well as Wardak.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Attacks along main routes
- AOG freedom of movement
- Abduction/kidnapping

KAPISA

While most AOG incidents in the province are directed at security forces, this month there were incidents targeting development and education work. Belatedly reported last period, in Nijab on 13 November AOG attacked a road construction site (the second such attack of the month in Nijrab, with the first occurring on 8 No-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

vember). Also on 13 November, AOG allegedly threatened students and staff in a girls' school. While neither incident of these incidents was NGO-related, the targets have parallels to NGO work, thus suggesting the potential for NGO targeting in the province.



most frequent clashes and is where IMF have concentrated their Kapisa operations. November's GOA and IMF activity has been at about its highest level of the year, suggesting a crack-down on AOG. During the last two weeks, ANA has recorded activity in Nijrab and Mahmudi Raqi while IMF has operated in Tagab.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from clashes
- Significant AOG presence in some districts

Tagab, Nijrab, and Alasay districts are all likely heavily infiltrated with AOG, which are reported to use the province's eastern region as a staging area for operations in Kabul Province. Tagab has the

PANJSHIR

Panjshir recorded no incidents this reporting period and only one criminal and one AOG incident so far this year—an armed house robbery in February and the firing of rockets and small arms at a PRT in June. The province's rela-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

tive prosperity, tribal homogeneity, and the population's ability to effectively deter AOG and self govern keeps incidents low. Additionally, incident reporting is likely regulated by provincial authorities.

No Graph Available

NOTICE: Please note that the figures provided in this reports provincial graphs are as of 26 November 2008.

FARYAB


The relative calm of Faryab in the past few reporting periods should not be taken as a sign of stability or the onset of winter giving the recent activity in Badghis. A possible explanation for the lack of

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in west of province
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

AOG activity in Qaysar, Almar, and Pashtun Kot districts is that all local AOG resources have been shifted to the contiguous districts of Bala Murghab and Ghormach in Badghis, which have been witnessing severe and sustained AOG attacks on IMF, ANSF, and DACs (see Badghis for more information).



JAWZJAN


While comparatively quiet during this reporting period, one incident occurred which fit the pattern of previous incidents in the Aqcha-Mingajik-Mardiyan area. Night letters distributed over large portions of those three districts contain an appeal for locals not to work with IMF and the government and urged them to start a jihad (this was an extremely general and vague letter in comparison to most such letters which

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG agitation
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	0

often contain specific threats with specified consequences). The coordination involved in the letters' distribution was significant in that it revealed that the letters were commissioned at a higher level rather than a spontaneous outpouring of popular antipathy. The letters were all identical facsimiles whose distribution required access to a photocopier and car and was likely carried out by one or two individuals. The appeal to start a jihad was also highly significant in that it seems a tacit admission of the failure of previous AOG hopefuls to ingrain



such sentiment in the area on widespread scale. This incidence of night letter distribution should not be taken as either increase or decrease in the immediate threat posed by local AOGs to NGOs, and the nature of AOG agitation is a reminder of the tactical constraints faced by those groups who seek wider destabilization in eastern Jawzjan.

BADAKHSHAN


A few scattered incidents in Badakhshan highlight the sporadic nature of threats in the province. An IED which exploded at the buzkashi grounds was variously attributed to IMF or their presence, leading to a spontaneous protest which turned violent. The demonstrators proceeded to har-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Pockets of AOG sentiment
- IED

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

ass a nearby IMF convoy and then move onto the PRT where the protesters threw stones until they were dispersed by ANSF. In another incident, villagers protested against the construction company responsible for building the Kisham-Fayzabad road, whom they accused of stealing stones from their village. Besides these protests there were a few IEDs incidents directed at high-profile targets and two BM-1 rockets were




fired at the Fayzabad PRT. While the overall situation in Badakhshan is relatively calm, NGOs should keep in mind that Badakhshan is an extremely diverse and variable province and localised situations may vary substantially.

BALKH

While most of Balkh remains comparatively stable, the western districts remain sources of concern, as does ACG activity within the city of Mazar-e-Sharif itself. Throughout 2008 incidents have increased substantially in Western Balkh, particularly the districts of Chimtal and Chahar Bulak. With a month left to go in the year, incidents in Chimtal have more than doubled on 2007, from 9 to 21, while in Chahar Bulak they have nearly quintupled, from 12 in 2007 to 52 in 2008. While some

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

of this increase can be attributed to better reporting, the increase is nonetheless real. Although volumes have increased, tactics have not, with most of the AOG activity finding expression through IEDs, grenade attacks, and the firing of small rockets. Another area where incidents have increased is also the seizure of drugs and weapons caches. This could be either a reflection of increased ACG activity or increased efficacy on the part of ANSF. Sholgara is another district of concern; although incident volumes are lower, the district has seen the consistent targeting of schools (by night letters and attacks) and elders.



The ongoing threat of ACG activity in Mazar-e-Sharif was shown by an incident whereby ACGs entered a UN compound searching for a local staff member they had intended to kill. There has also been a steady trickle of thefts and home-invasion robberies in the city. While such robberies have primarily targeted the city's business elite and not the NGO community, they should serve as a reminder of the ACG activity present and the need for proper guard training and site security measures.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG sentiment in western districts
- General AOG activity

BAGHLAN

The relative quiet in Baghlan over the month of November can probably be attributed to this year's early snowfall, which has helped to render some of its more restive areas inaccessible to AOG

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0


movements. A VBIED targeting an IMF convoy in the Baghlani Jadid bazaar underscored the continuing threat such attacks pose along that stretch of road and hence the ongoing need to keep distance from IMF, ANSF, and other high-profile targets. Additionally, the rise in AOG sentiment in a few districts of Bamyam means that road travel there via



Doshi and Tala-wa-Barfak is no longer advisable even if the weather does permit.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG activity in remote districts
- IED/VBIED along Puli Khumri-Kunduz road



KHOST


Reported security incidents in Khost have been at similar levels to those experienced in the first half of this month and the corresponding period in 2007. AOG activity continues to be dominated by the use of IEDs, with two explosions in Sabari and an attack against a guard force vehicle in a crowded market area of Khost

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- IED in district centers

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	0

City. Also in common with other reporting periods, education facilities continue to be targeted, and during the night of 19 November 2008, AOG used several IEDs to cause structural damage to a school in Mando Zayi. Other incidents have included an attack on a checkpoint and a DAC rocket attack in Sabari, as well as a fire-fight at Nadir Shah Kot in the west of the province, after which ANP were able to detain a number of suspected AOG members.



While IED activity did not reach the same levels as during the first half of November, reports of suicide bombers entering Khost City persist and must be taken as a good indication of future activity in the area.

KUNAR

With one more reported AOG initiated incident than the corresponding period in 2007, activity in Kunar continues to follow a pattern dominated by repeated direct fire attacks against established security force positions. Some locations, such as Korangal, were attacked at least twice a day over 48-72 hour periods and this level of activity is not unusual across the rest of Mano Gai District. Security force positions in Chapa Dara, Narang, and Chawkey districts also sustained


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from clashes
- IED along Sirkanay-Nari road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

frequent short duration attacks by AOG, with indirect fire being used only once, when 3 rockets were fired at, and missed, a security force position in the Dewagal Valley.

IED attacks have continued in Sirkanay, and the route north-east from Sirkanay to Nari saw several IED finds by security forces and one detonation. Convoy attacks occurred across the province, while most were against vehicles carrying IMF supplies, an attack in Chapa Dara resulted in the theft of wheat being transported to Nuristan.



Reports of new AOG movement, in the northern district of Chapa Dara and southern districts of Sirkanay and Khas Kunar continue. The extent to which these movements are forced by ongoing security force operations on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is unclear, but, with the possible exception of cross-border indirect fire incidents, these operations have so far failed to significantly reduce AOG activity in Kunar and may play a part in such activity continuing into winter.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

NANGARHAR


The number of reported AOG incidents in Nangarhar in the latter half of November is lower than both the preceding period and the corresponding period in 2007. Several currently unattributed killings however show that a range of risks are now present and should temper any optimism.

In the early part of the reporting period national staff members in the Jalalabad offices of an NGO and an IO both received copies of the same night letter. Earlier in the month other night letters had been distributed in the province's southern districts, warning the local population against cooperation with international forces and

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	1

working for GoA. On 16 November 2008, an unusually long engagement between security forces and AOG took place at Khogyani DAC, where a 2 hour firefight saw several stray RPG rounds cause damage to a NGO clinic. Elsewhere in the province, only two IED incidents were reported and this low number may be a result of recent security force operations that have seized IED components and arrested or killed AOG members involved in their construction and placement.

AOG in Nangarhar have continued to use direct fire against security forces; in addition to the Khogyani attack, the DAC in the western district of Hisarak and a police checkpoint in Rodat were both subjected to harassing fire. The last ten days of the month have seen several currently un-



tributed and unconnected attacks in the districts of Surkh Rod and Chapahar, with a refugee community activist, a former Taliban spokesman, and a GoA employee all being killed in their family homes. On the night of 26 November 2008 the Chancellor of Nangarhar University was also attacked in his home but the attackers fled the scene when they met significant resistance.

Reports of a planned suicide attack in Jalalabad City continue to circulate, and while IED activity has been reduced in recent weeks, should nevertheless be deemed as credible. Phase 3 of the voter registration process is starting in early December and may present more opportunities for targeting by AOG.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Collateral damage from clashes
- Abduction/kidnapping
- AOG intimidation

LAGHMAN

In common with most other parts of the region, AOG activity is at a similar level to the corresponding period in 2007. While there have been few incidents in Laghman, two of those that have occurred demonstrate unusual AOG targeting. On the afternoon of 22 November 2008 a small team from a national NGO was returning to Mihtarlam from a field visit in

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

Alishing when their vehicle was attacked without warning by AOG. The driver of the vehicle was able to drive through the ambush and two of the occupants sustained minor injuries. Further south, at the other end of the Alingar valley in Qarghayi two days later, the vehicle of a tribal elder was attacked in a similar fashion, and again the driver of the targeted vehicle was able to escape the ambush.



Elsewhere in Laghman, a rocket attack on parked trucks continues the recent trend of AOG activity around Surkhakan on Route 1, and an IED find in the village of Parwai in Alingar again illustrates the risks associated with travel north of Alingar DAC.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG attacks in Alingar Valley
- AOG attacks along route 1

NURISTAN

The increased reporting of security incidents that has accompanied increased IMF deployments into Nuristan has continued into the second half of November with 10 AOG initiated incidents being reported. Half of these incidents have been short direct fire attacks against a single IMF location in

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Collateral damage from clashes
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

the village of Kamo in Kamdesh District, and other locations in the same district accounted for a further 4 similar incidents.

The only incident reported outside Kamdesh was in the west of the province, where AOG engaged security forces at Du Ab DAC for a short period on 16 November 2008.

Early in the reporting period reports were received of AOG



movement into the southern district of Nurgram and this was soon followed by an attack on an NGO vehicle a short distance away in northern Laghman as described elsewhere in this report.

PAKTYA


The number of AOG incidents reported in Paktya remains at a similar level to that of the same period in 2007, and follows a similar pattern to the one shown in the first part of November. AOG initiated incidents have been concentrated in the western district of Zurmat, along the road south from Gardez to Khost, and in Khost City itself. In the south

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Collateral damage from clashes
- IED along main roads
- Abduction

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

of the province a SVBIED attack against Shamal DAC on the 20 November 2008 killed 15 people and again demonstrated the risks associated with working in and visiting DACs in the Eastern Region. Incidents in Zurmat included a range of types, with rocket attacks against security force installations, IEDs placed on main roads, and direct fire being used against security forces. The ambush of the District Administrator's convoy on 19 November 2008 provided a further illustration of AOG capabilities in



the district. Increased security force deployments into Zurmat are likely to be accompanied by continuing AOG attacks and all travelling through and working in the area will be aware of the collateral damage risk presented by security force/AOG engagements.



BADGHIS


The abduction of three civil engineers of Afghan nationality employed on a road construction project is the latest of such incidents against employees of construction firms and NGO working in the district of Ghormach and Murghab. There is a strong likelihood of AOG being instrumental in these abductions. Given the strong influence exercised by AOG in these districts and the previous trends pointing to a high possibility of such incidents, NGO operating in the area need to exercise due caution and keep well informed against possible targeting of their staff in the future.

On the 27/ 28 Nov night, it is estimated that 300 AOG am-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

bushed a joint ANA and ANP convoy of nearly 50 vehicles in Bala Murghab city suburbs, sparking a battle for several hours. The action resulted in the spill-over of the fighting to the city limits with an approximate number of 40 ANA/ANP being killed, and 60 wounded. The AOG are reported to have suffered 40 killed - mainly as a result of the air strikes which followed thereafter. The ambush and the subsequent successes of the AOG go to show that: the AOG are well organized; in sufficient strengths; and can carry out well planned and large scale operations; and have access to actionable intelligence.

This happens to be the first kind of an offensive operation by the AOG in this area executed on such a large scale. The magnitude of the operation and the audacity of the attackers is a pointer to the build up of AOG combat force




levels and the accompanying logistics and leadership to support such bold manoeuvres. The ability of the attackers to hold the security forces at bay for long periods and sustain the momentum of the assault in spite of air strikes, indicates the levels of operational preparedness and the tenacity of the attackers in carrying out their plans against heavy odds.

More of such actions by the AOG are not being ruled out in the future. NGO operating in the area must take all necessary precautions to avoid falling victim to collateral damage as a result of being caught in the cross fire - in a situation of conflict which has involved air strikes and has the potential to involve use of area weapons. It also calls for a fresh review of NGO security procedures and operations, in view of the heightened risks posed by the worsening security situation in these areas.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abductions/kidnapping
- Increased AOG activity and capacity



HERAT

An INGO national staff member went missing in Ingil District on 19 Nov has since been recovered. Though the motivations behind, as well as the events leading to his release, remain unclear at this time, there is the possibility of this event being the result of AOG actions. Information suggests that the staff member was being held to ransom by AOG as a conveyance of their unhappiness with aspects of the NGO presence in this area. The incident also indicates the growing influence of the AOG in this area and its possible repercussions on NGO operations in the future.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Threats and intimidation
- Grenade attacks within Herat City

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	14
This Report Period	1

AOG operating in the areas of the Gozara and Ingil districts have communicated verbal threat warnings to the residents of the districts entailing affecting of serious consequences upon people registering for the voting registration process or exercising of the ballot. Herat, Ingil and Gozara districts are under the increasing influence of AOG activities. The areas have witnessed a spate of security incidents; the frequency of which is expected to increase with the oncoming election period, as actors manoeuvre to gain leverage through projection of influence over population bases. NGO's need to keep their staff informed and safeguard them from the spill-over from such threats.

Instances of grenade attacks and initiation of explosive devices



continue to be a regular feature in the security context of Herat City and its surrounding areas. Besides being an indicator to the deteriorating law and order situation, it also goes to demonstrate the increase in the activities of criminal elements in collusion with political actors. In the run-up to the upcoming elections, incidents of this nature may increase in frequency; possibly aimed at causing panic or affecting a general sense of insecurity - with the larger objective of gaining political mileage by rival groups. NGO may well avoid high profile targets and the recurrent venues of such attacks.

GHAZNI

Demonstrative of AOG desires to further erode confidence in the GoA's ability to provide law and order, especially so close to the capital, Ghazni province has been afflicted during this reporting period with the entire gamut of AOG operations—IED, assaults on DAC, convoy ambushes, election related intimidation, and summary executions of suspect GoA informants—that, writ large plague the country.

With this, it appears the only trends are AOG general reliance


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Abduction/kidnapping

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

on IED to ensure that ANP and some non-state actors, such as road construction firms, incur casualties without AOG losses, as well as limited close range attacks on ANP and DAC. In almost all cases of AOG close range assaults, however, AOG were repulsed and suffered greater casualties.

In this apparent continual defeat of AOG, we see a basic message: despite the cost, AOG can bring the fight, at any time, and at any place. While AOG evidently do suffer graver casualties, the realization that ANSF and GoA collaborators, as known parties to the conflict, must live in constant fear of attack, can be an effective drain



on morale and efficacy. Activities in the province are also illustrative of IMF and ANSF inability to provide adequate numbers on the ground: there is a growing reliance on air strikes to counter AOG sieges or to curtail AOG concentrated activity. Because of Ghazni's strategic location close to the capital; reporting of continued migration of AOG into the province; and high incident rates, NGO should expect AOG operational tempo to continue within the province.


KANDAHAR

A national NGO received a telephone on the 24th of November from confirmed AOG spokesman advising the organisation to cease its activities or face consequences. This threat was related to the organisations role in providing legal representation to prisoners in criminal cases. AOG dissatisfaction over the lack of support in their cases appeared to the motivating factor in this incident as a follow on call indicated that if the NGO supported their cases then they would be allowed to continue working unimpeded. While follow on information suggested that the initiating factor behind these calls was based on an internal matter to the organisation, the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	13
This Report Period	1

subsequent involvement of AOG compelled the NGO to cease its activities. While this incident does not present a broader threat to the NGO community, the fact that AOG elements were involved in order to solve what ultimately appears to be an internal dispute is disturbing.

There was also an incident involving 2 NGO offices (one national, one international) who were subjected to night time searches by local security forces. The initial motivations behind these searches were confusing, though further details indicated that they were a result of misunderstood government policies (and NGO compliance with same) and the overzealous application of these by ANP. In follow on discussions recurrences of such incidents appear unlikely though should it, NGO



are advised to contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department for resolution.

A recent operation in Zhari District is indicative of future operations conducted by IMF. With the intent of pushing into AOG invested territory, military forces utilised numerous tactics which resulted in local dissatisfaction. The bulldozing of access routes, the burning of narcotic crops, and inappropriate search techniques all have resulted in a environment which would be unsuitable for a “follow on” NGO presence.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Suicide attacks
- Abduction/Kidnapping


ZABUL

The previously reported ongoing ANA operation in the District of Shah Joy has concluded. The intent of this operation was the displacement of AOG elements in-situ as well as the disruption of AOG actions along Hwy 1 in this area.

Anecdotal evidence indicates that this operation has achieved some level of success as locals have reported a notable decrease in num-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

ber of AOG checkpoints they encounter. While this situation is cause for some cautionary optimism, trends indicate that without a continued focused effort to reinforce such successes, AOG will simply re-infiltrate and reengage. In addition, this has no immediate impact to overall freedom of movement for non-security actors within both this province and the SR as a whole. As this area of stability is non-contiguous, it presents with a “road to nowhere” situation which only affords very localised movements safety. In relation to this, there are also indicators that there will be follow on



ANSF operations into neighbouring districts, though it is not clear at this time when and where these will occur. Despite overarching intentions (as stated by all parties to the conflict) to maintain the momentum of operations into the winter months, meteorological realities may temper this intent, as this province is notoriously hard hit and freedom of movement is usually heavily curtailed.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Ongoing ANSF operations
- IED and suicide attacks

PAKTIKA

During this reporting period, we see that AOG are pervasive throughout Paktika province despite GoA administration of its districts. Consequently, the province continues to experience AOG driven attacks against GoA and IMF assets, especially during convoy movements.

While the AOG preference of attack in Paktika is overwhelmingly IED, AOG have utilized SAF when targeting DAC, and in one case, a PSC convoy. One could conclude from this clear split in modus operandi that AOG operating in Paktika may be intent on utilizing personal, close range attacks only when they seek to either obliterate local ANP (e.g., a four hour AOG siege on the Omna DAC), or to inculcate fear through overwhelming violence, as seen in the abduction


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Attacks against logistical convoys
- Continued AOG infiltration

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

and later execution of two PSC guards who were transiting through Sar Hawza district.

In both examples, the desire to maximize results, and probably maintain superior odds, may be the rational between these dichotomies in methods. Thus, if reports of ongoing AOG infiltration (e.g., 50 AOG, including 6 suicide bombers, recently infiltrated into Ziruk District) are true, NGO should expect to witness increased close attacks on DAC, ANSF, and IMF, and possible increased IED emplacement on roads. With the onset of winter approaching, it is probable that additional AOG may seek to infiltrate into the province to further bolster their capability to conduct close range and stand off attacks throughout the winter season. NGO operating in the province should keep this possible sustainment of AOG operations in mind and recognize that vehicle movement throughout the area should always be evaluated because of



possible collateral damage or mistaken targeting by AOG.

Additionally, a specific recent incident of interest to NGO was the 28 November demonstration in the Sarobi District Centre, a response to purported civilian casualties during an IMF operation the previous night. According to demonstrators, six civilians were killed and four others were wrongly arrested by IMF during the abovementioned operation, leading demonstrators to demand that IMF cease similar operations or conduct them only in concert with ANSF. While this demonstration did remain peaceful, if unilateral IMF operations increase, as multiple parties are indicating, the likelihood of wrongful detentions and civilian casualties will also surely increase. NGO should thus be mindful of the probable subsequent escalation in backlash to IMF and expatriates if this should occur.

URUZGAN

Incident volumes have been consistently dropping since peaking during August. Overall incident trends have been more consistent than 2007, with 2008 witnessing a stable increase and peak followed by a steady decline. In addition, the incident volume peak in 2008 is nearly double that which was


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IED
- Instability along main routes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

experienced last year. This information suggests that AOG elements are more firmly established within the province and therefore more or less a permanent presence. While some of the larger scale operations within the SR this year have drawn away some resources, it is unlikely this has had any long term impact on their operational capacity.

The recent IED incident (30 November) involving ISAF forces reinforces the prevalence of this



threat within Uruzgan. These devices primarily target security forces, though the regular use of victim operated devices continues to present itself, manifested by detonations impacting civilians.



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ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / AOG-Armed Opposition Groups / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED-Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / NDS-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / PSC-Private Security Company / DC-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

- Takhar
- Kunduz
- Samangan
- Sar-e-Pul
- Ghor
- Farah
- Nimroz
- Helmand

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

NEW MEMBER ANNOUNCEMENT

We are happy to welcome new ANSO Board Member
Action Contre La Faim (ACF)

As part of their commitment to the Board ACF have also agreed to act, as far as possible, as representative of the wider NGO community towards ANSO

If you have any concerns, comments or questions about ANSO then please feel free to contact any of the nine Board members or myself