

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Possibility of demonstrations as election related tensions mount
- Security worsens in the northern province of Kunduz due to civilian casualties
- Another IMF incident reported at an NGO clinic
- Deputy Chief of Intelligence killed in the East

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
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
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COUNTRY SUMMARY



After recording a staggering 1091 attacks by Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) in August, attack numbers have now fallen by almost half in early September. Although incident levels normally decline in September, the drop is not usually this sharp, which reinforces our assessment that AOGs expended much of their fighting resources on election day. Despite the current and likely temporary lull, significant AOG attacks and operations were reported in every region during the last 2 weeks.

In the Central Region, attacks against a military base and the airport in Kabul were the most significant this period; however, the worsening situation in Wardak, Logar, Bamyan, Kapisa, and Daykundi are more worrisome for NGOs. As explained in more detail on page 3, serious concerns and public frustration over the election process continue to fuel tensions in Kabul. The potential for demonstrations and civil unrest is perhaps at its highest since the start of the election. Important decisions and announcements are expected from election bodies and political parties in this next period and will likely have important security implications for NGOs.




Fighting in Kunduz drove incident levels in the Northern Region to record heights in August (see chart right*), but the situation was made much worse by two recent incidents: a U.S. airstrike ordered by the German forces reportedly killed and injured a large number of civilians, and a botched military operation by British forces that rescued a kidnapped British journalist killed his Afghan colleague and left several others dead. These two incidents, which are examined in detail on page 7, will no doubt turn local residents even further against international military forces, and probably foreigners and INGOs in the area as well.


The increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Herat City and the high casualty rates and collateral damage caused by these attacks are especially disconcerting because of the large number of NGO staff living in the city. A number of significant explosive and IED related seizures were reported in the last two weeks in districts around Herat City, indicating AOGs' intent to carry out more such attacks. In the coming period, there is a risk that AOG will attempt to target Government officials who normally attend public ceremonies during Eid since they are usually more difficult to protect in these areas. This has been the case in the western region in the past. More kidnapping threats are also in circulation in the west, as discussed on page 10.

The assassination of the Deputy Head of Afghan intelligence and the Chairman of the Laghman Provincial Council made international headlines this month as it demonstrated the AOG ability to target one of the nation's key security figures and a long-time opponent of the Taliban and HIG. The total number of AOG attacks in the East Region (see below) remain very high mostly due to intensive fighting in Kunar. As discussed on page 13, a change in AOGs' effectiveness and coordination during attacks was noted during this reporting period because they resulted in significant casualties to international military forces.


NORTHERN REGION—AOG INCIDENTS




WESTERN REGION—AOG INCIDENTS



EASTERN REGION—AOG INCIDENTS



SOUTHERN REGION—AOG INCIDENTS



* Please note the scale difference among the charts. September data includes incidents up to Sept 8 only.

KABUL

Kabul continues to experience a post-election lull in security incidents. In the last reporting period, only a dozen security incidents were recorded across the province. Criminal activity has virtually halted as the population is divided between those pre-occupied or totally ambivalent about the ongoing post-election theatre. To date, almost three thousand complaints have been received by the Electoral Complaints Commission, which has severely brought into question the legitimacy of the election. Candidates have committed publicly to the legal process and, thus far, have been able to restrain supporters from using the streets as an avenue of protest. The question remains as to whether the certified election re-


sult will be released before the patience of the politically mobilised becoming exhausted.

The period also witnessed two high profile AOG attacks in Kabul City. The first occurred on 7 September when two AOG in a Toyota Corolla allegedly attacked Camp Phoenix along Jalalabad Road. The engagement, using SAF and RPGs, is reported to have lasted approximately one hour and resulted in the death of the two AOG. (Unconfirmed reports of explosions at the rear of the heavily fortified compound were also received.) The second incident occurred the following morning when a SVBIED detonated at the entrance to the Kabul military airport. The explosion resulted in four fatalities and approximately fourteen wounded, including IMF. The attack is similar in nature to the 15 August SVBIED attack on ISAF HQ, which killed almost a dozen people and left one hundred wounded. In both instances, a vehicle was able to approach a

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Election demonstrations
- Complex attacks against high profile targets
- Abductions

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0



heavily secured area without detection and detonate causing significant casualties. Two rocket attacks also struck Kabul on 6 and 14 September; the first hit a house in District Five and killed three civilians.

Other districts of Kabul Province have also remained comparatively quiet. An ANP vehicle struck an IED on 7 September in Chahar Asyab, injuring two, and on 12 September in Khakki Jabbar, a dispute between an ANP and his IMF mentor led to several shots being fired and three people being injured, including the two said men.

Despite calls for restraint by candidates, the possibility remains that demonstrations may occur in the following weeks as frustration with the post-election results increases. The concern is that any protests may be met with a disproportionate response from ANSF. NGOs should ensure that all staff avoid large gatherings in the current uncertainty.

DAYKUNDI


Two arrests were made during the last reporting period in relation to the robbery of a significant amount of money from an IEC car travelling through the Shilan Pass between Nili and Ishtarlay. Arrests were made in Lawran Valley on 3 and 11 September, and a

number of weapons as well as money were found. Acts of random banditry occur irregularly along the pass; however, violence is rarely used. Separately, there have been no reported encroachments on Nili from the known AOG strongholds in the districts of Kajran and Gizab. An informal consensus between elders on both sides of the divide seems to assure the continuance of the status quo for the immediate future. The security situation in the province is likely to be affected by a change

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- High AOG infiltration in Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran
- Low security presence throughout the province

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0



in the local political power structure following the installation of any new regime in Kabul. In the past, NGO activities have faced threats, including a realised kidnapping, due to local commanders attempting to gain leverage in political negotiations. Similar threats are liable to be issued if local political dynamics suffer a significant change in the weeks ahead.

LOGAR

Baraki Barak, Muhammad Agha, and Charkh continue to be the most hostile environments in Logar with IED attacks and ambushes, mainly directed at IMF and ANSF, being the most frequently used AOG tactics.

The main risk to NGO operations remains collateral exposure to IMF/ANSF and AOG engage-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Collateral damage from attacks on security forces/police

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

ments as well as from IEDs planted by AOG along district roads. For the month of September alone, there were eleven discoveries of IEDs along district roads in the province, with an additional two premature detonations. An IED also struck an ANA vehicle on 5 September with two ANA soldiers being wounded. A further IED strike against an IMF convoy that left no casualties also occurred.

As mentioned above, the bulk of recent incidents have been in Ba-



raki Barak, Kharwar, and Charkh, probably due to reported effective AOG control. Furthermore, unless an NGO has specific guarantees of support and evidence of acceptance, all of Logar should currently be considered hostile to NGO operations. With this, ANSO recommends complete suspension of travel by internationals or by local staff that might be identified as having an NGO link.

WARDAK

Once again, Wardak dominates the number of AOG initiated incidents across the central region. Wardak hosted double the amount of reported security incidents compared to the seven other central provinces combined. During the last two weeks, two NGO incidents occurred in the province. Firstly, and of relevance for all NGO, was the 2 September IMF intrusion into an NGO hospital in Saydabad. During the evening, armed IMF entered the hospital without reportedly informing staff of their intent. Four local guards and two relatives of patients were tied up while IMF conducted a search of the hospital, forcing patients from their wards and breaking two doors in the process. After approximately two hours, IMF left the facility


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Abduction
- Rocket and IED attacks
- Intimidation

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	2

demanding that the NGO workers inform IMF of any suspected AOG being admitted for treatment. After the incident it was learnt that IMF was in pursuit of an alleged AOG suspect. From a security perspective, IMF operations of this nature serve to destabilise long established community relations, alter local perceptions of NGOs' intent, invite possible AOG retaliatory attacks on NGO facilities and/or staff and, of course, endanger the lives of NGO personnel during any intrusion.

The second NGO incident also occurred in Saydabad. On 6 September, a number of gunmen, believed to be AOG, stopped an NGO vehicle along Highway One and detained two staff members for several hours. As the NGO was known in the area for its activities, the subsequent vocal intervention of local villagers apparently played an important part in their release. (The vehicle is still



believed to be missing, though.) The two incidents illustrate the importance of community acceptance and impartial assistance in the delivery of humanitarian and development aid. Separately, AOG initiated attacks against ANSF/IMF and logistical convoys continue unabated. AOG initiated incidents against IMF, in the last reporting period, are four times as likely to assume the form of standoff attacks, such as IEDs or rockets, than a conventional ambush using SAF or RPGs. The reason, quite simply, is that IEDs are vastly more effective than a close range AOG assault on the superiorly armed IMF. Of note is that the reverse is true for ANSF. Attacks against ANSF are almost four times as likely to comprise close range ambushes as IEDs or rockets. Salar Area in Saydabad remains the most risky for NGO operations with seven separate incidents recorded for the month to date.

PARWAN

On 12 September, an IED detonated outside the residence of a political leader in Chaharikar, killing one guard and wounding another. No arrests have been made, as yet, and it is not clear whether the incident is politically or criminally related. Although the provincial


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage, especially in the area of Bagram Airbase
- NGO-targeted criminal abduction
- Irregular IEDs targeting ANSF in the Ghorband Valley

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

capital is one of the first names mentioned in rumours of election demonstrations, no protests or gatherings have been reported to date. Demonstrations, if they occur, will most likely take place in Kabul, where a national and international audience is assured.

Two rocket attacks, on 31 August and 14 September, targeted Bagram Airbase, and in both instances, there were no reported casualties. Only in the last three months have rocket attacks against the airfield been noted, possibly due to increased surveillance by ANSF/IMF of the ad-



joining district, Kohi Safi. The increase in rocket attacks in recent months, although from a low base, suggests that AOG have become increasingly adept at deploying and launching standoff attacks. There remains a minimal risk to NGO operations due to the vast majority of attacks occurring at night and impacting in or around the military base, without causing civilian casualties.

KAPISA

The security situation in Kapisa shows increasing signs of instability. The increase in the number of factional and AOG attacks in the west of the province remains a distinct concern due to the level of AOG operations. On 4 September, an IMF vehicle was struck by an IED in Shuhki Area of Mahmudi Raqi, killing two IMF and wounded eight. Follow-


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Collateral damage from attacks on police and security forces, especially in Tagab and Nijrab
- Electoral related violence
- Collateral damage from rockets, IEDs, and mines

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

ing the usual pattern, an ANP check-post in Sher Khel, Tagab District, was attacked twice by AOG. Virtually all attacks in Tagab occur against ANSF and IMF; however, recent feuding between different AOG has led to open conflict. On 31 August, reportedly four senior members of HIG were killed by the Taliban on the way to a Shura. Several other such attacks have been undertaken in recent weeks and threaten to possibly destabilise the current AOG leadership structure in the province.

Kapisa province has a strategically important location in the central region. AOGs are using some of its districts as logistical bases to



attack neighbouring provinces. The areas of concern are Nijrab, Tagab, and Alasay. Also, criminal activity is a concern along the main roads and sub-roads. All movements should be conducted only during daylight and with constant radio communication.

Alasay and Nijrab—given periodic military operations and reports of heavy AOG infiltration—should also be considered unstable and potentially volatile. Mahmud Raqi is vulnerable to periodic attacks as evidenced by recent rocket attacks directed at police and the DAC.

PANJSHIR

Even though Panjshir was host to an official ceremony to mark Great Ahmad Shah Masoud Day on 10 September, with many VIPs in attendance, there have been no

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

reported security incidents during the last reporting period. Panjshir is ethnically homogenous, with a strong sense of identity and virtu-

ally insurmountable mountain ranges that have kept the province largely immune from the rising tide of insecurity engulfing the rest of the country. The security environment is highly unlikely to change in the weeks ahead.

BAMYAN


The Ghandak Valley in Shibar District again features prominently in any security reports emerging from Bamyan. In the latest incident, two trucks were stopped by three gunmen who subsequently stole 200,000 Afs from the drivers. AOG in and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG/ACG threat around Ghandak Valley, Shibar

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

around the Ghandak Valley are less ideologically driven than concerned with competition for limited resources. Attacks typically assume the form of rockets against ANP checkpoints or the occasional ambush. Profiting from criminal activity is also not uncommon. The Ghandak Valley and surroundings is the only major AOG risk for NGOs operating in Bamyan, so simple avoid-



ance of the area will mitigate this risk. Although rumours persist of possible AOG retaliatory attacks due to the arrest of Mullah Burhan on 2 August in Shinkari Valley, there have been no reported incidents to date.

TAKHAR

An internal dispute amongst INGO staff led to one employee being sent a threatening text message. While this issue is reported to have been resolved without incident, it serves as a reminder that human resources policy and management are integral parts of an NGO's security strategy.


A few incidents in Farkhar highlighted how problems with poor governance are having a significant effect in areas with little or no AOG activity. In response to alleged police brutality (ANP had

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- AOG attacks on ANSF
- Weak governance

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

shot a local), armed locals attacked the local police headquarters in protest. The ANP responded in kind, killing four civilians and injuring another. The entire confrontation is possibly symptomatic of poor training (the initial alleged brutality) and fraught relations between locals and the ANP, but in any event, the likely outcome will be decreased trust between the ANP and those they are meant to serve. Thin governance also seems to be at issue in the normally pacific district of Rustaq where factional disputes led to the killing of a former commander and apparent drive-by shooting retaliation, which left a few more locals dead.



Elsewhere in Takhar, AOG-initiated activity continues to be a significant concern both along the Amu River, between Yangi Qal'a and Khwajayi Ghar, and on the road from Taluqan leading west to Kunduz. In the former area, AOG attacks on ANSF, ANP, and ANBP in particular, occurred unabated. West of Taluqan, IMF continue to be favourite AOG targets, though other high-profile vehicles should also be avoided. Yet again, an AOG shot up a fuel tanker whilst trying to hijack it in the vicinity of Aqmasjid.


KUNDUZ

Two major incidents in Kunduz captured global media attention during this reporting period and are likely to expedite the current vicious cycle powering the GoA's increasingly tenuous control over the province. In the first instance, an AOG captured, nearly within site of the PRT, two large fuel tankers, with which they absconded to the nearby AOG-controlled district of Chahar Dara. Before moving very far, and under circumstances which will continue to be the subject of much ongoing investigation, a large number of AOG members and locals were killed in an IMF airstrike. Shortly thereafter, a team consisting of a foreign and local journalist was abducted by an AOG and held for a few days before the foreigner was rescued in a raid which left his associate, one IMF soldier, and two civilians dead. The two issues are separated greatly in their cost to human life, but both will play a great role in fuelling negative local perceptions towards IMF and probably foreigners in general. In the first case the sheer volume of casualties speaks for itself, but in the case of the raid, the obvious preferential treatment of abductees because one of them was foreign has also been the cause for a lot of resentment amongst locals who are aware that many of their politicians would not get similar treatment. Moreover the abduction provided a window into the capabilities and limitations of

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	0

Kunduz-based AOGs. The abduction was the first high-profile event of its kind in the NR and subsequent reporting confirms that the AOG required a wide and deep pool of local acceptance to carry it off (this local acceptance is the main barrier to abduction in the North). Abductees and the men necessary to conceal them are quite noticeable and must be moved frequently, providing a myriad of opportunities for discovery and requiring potentially passive supporters of AOG activity to become active, as many of them will be asked to harbour the hostage or keep silent about their movements. Of note, reporting indicates that the AOG was running out of such support when the raid occurred, but it is also unknown how long IMF were aware of the captives' location and the exact sequence of events that led to the decision to undertake a rescue.

AOG activity continued apace throughout the province in other less attention-grabbing but equally significant incidents. AOGs occupied three major towns and a number of smaller settlements in north-eastern Imam Sahib District and at one point threatened to capture Aqmasjid. While ANSF did repel the AOGs from Aqmasjid itself, reporting indicates that AOGs are still in control of much of the surrounding countryside. In Dashti Archi District, AOGs continued harassing the ANP in their headquarters, which stands as the lone outpost of GoA control in that district, and engaged in some policing activity by confronting an ACG. Further evi-



dence of increased attention on Kunduz by outside AOGs was confirmed in ongoing special forces operations which have succeeded in capturing or killing multiple foreign AOG members who typically possess a greater amount of military experience and contribute to AOG organisation and coordination.

Ironically, the increased level of control might have provided a more favourable environment for local national staff whose projects still continue to operate in Kunduz. Previously, local AOG leaders fought amongst themselves as much as they did with IMF, and the recent escalation in the province seems to have brought them into a more defined hierarchy. The end result is that AOGs have bigger fish to catch than NGOs, and NGOs have a more coherent structure with which to negotiate access. In any event, entry into and passage through Kunduz is not recommended for organisations that do not already have operations there (and the assumed concurrent degree of acceptance/safe passage that has allowed them to continue as such). Still, the risk of collateral involvement for all NGO employees remains high given ongoing clashes between IMF/ANSF and AOGs, which now include airstrikes on a fairly regular basis. Travel for expatriate staff is not recommended in any circumstance and only when absolutely essential for local staff after they have fully sanitised themselves of any NGO links.

In Kunduz city, increasing AOG activity was complimented by ACG activity. A prominent member of a local ACG sent threatening letters to a number of people, one of whom was an IO employee, with the aim of extorting money from them. In another instance of criminal activity, an NGO employee was implicated in the murder of his wife.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Increasing AOG control
- IEDs
- Abduction

BAGHLAN

The prime areas of concern with regards to NGO security in Baghlan remain the Baghlani Jadid Corridor and the district of Dahanai Ghorri to the west of Puli Khumri. In the case of Baghlani Jadid, incidents cluster along the main Puli Khumri – Kunduz Road for the simple reason that that is the only place where the GoA chooses to confront AOGs. AOGs have shown themselves capable of frequent and well-managed checkpoints which often last a few hours before ANSF can disperse them. Such checkpoints run the entire length of the district and present a twofold threat to


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- AOG checkpoints
- AOG control
- Collateral involvement of NGOs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

NGOs: one is detention or confiscation of property by an AOG, and the other is collateral damage resulting from proximity to an AOG-ANSF confrontation. Reporting indicates that AOGs' attention towards NGOs is minimal, with their focus rather being directed at GoA, ANSF, IMF, and those affiliated therewith. Land travel along this road north of Puli Khumri remains not recommended for anyone, especially expatriates; however, in the event that local staff travel this road, they should be sanitized of all documentation linking them to an NGO as a precaution.

The case of Dahanai Ghorri is proving to be the source of more and more severe incidents. The root of discontent in this district involves local politics with certain political shifts having suddenly



and dramatically altered the area's relationship with the GoA. The main road from Puli Khumri to Mazar-e Sharif remains unaffected (the area surrounding Chashmi Sher), but roads leading to the District Centre have been subject to frequent illegal checkpoints. In one such instance, ANSF sent to disperse such a checkpoint were involved in a three-hour fire-fight which left 23 ANP wounded and 8 AOGs dead; both sides seem to have retreated with the AOG seizing a large cache of GoA equipment. Travel off of the main road in Dahanai Ghorri is not recommended barring established agreements of safe passage with the local AOG, and even then the risk of collateral damage remains significant.

FARYAB


An AOG launched an apparent attempted raid on an INGO demining site near the village of Fayzabad located on the border of Dawlatabad and Shirin Tagab districts. The attackers were dispersed by the NGO's guards, managing to cause only light damage, but the motive for the attack remains unresolved. Possible mo-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Localised disputes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

tives are likely either local political rivalries or general AOG antipathy towards NGOs, with deminers often providing a soft target because of their predictability and immobility. The rest of the province experienced a continuation of patterns previously seen in the province. The western districts continue to see regular attacks and engagements between ANSF and AOGs, while north of Faryab, AOGs continue to target ANSF and IMF with ever-popular culvert-emplaced IEDs. These con-



tinue to have a rather low rate of success, however, due to lower acceptance by local communities and frequent detection by ANSF and IMF. The main risk facing NGOs travelling the ring road between Andkhoy and Maymana remains collateral damage resulting from IED targeting of ANSF and IMF.

BADAKHSHAN


The first NGO-direct incident of the year in Badakhshan consisted of a SAF attack on an NGO-run clinic in the Khostak area of Jurm District. The two suspects were later arrested by ANP, but not before they shot and killed a local civilian who may have gone to investigate what was happening.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Localized disputes
- AOG sentiment between Fayzabad and Warduj

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	1

This incident, while AOG in intent, typifies the sparse and sporadic violence found in Badakhshan. Due to geography, politics, and hence grievances, play out on the most local level, and anticipating incidents requires the most specific situational awareness. Jurm, Baharak, and Warduj have been known to harbour a certain amount of AOG sentiment due to networks connecting them to conservative madrassas in Pakistan, but such sentiment has so far translated into very few incidents.



When and where violent activity does manifest in the future will likely depend heavily on local dynamics and extremely local proximate causes. Other instances of violence in Badakhshan included an RPG attack on a road construction company compound in Kishim and an attack on an ANBP post in remote Kuran-wa-Manjan District.

FARAH


AOG initiated ambushes on ANSF/IMF convoys were commonplace throughout Farah province along with IED and RCIED related incidents. Nevertheless, during this reporting period their intensity has increased significantly despite military operations led by security forces at the beginning of the month.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Bullet point
- Bullet point
- Bullet point

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

Along with attacks on ANSF vehicles, it appears that logistic convoys remain high value targets for AOGs; one such attack occurred in Bakwa, for example, where an SVBIED targeted a PSC convoy carrying IMF materials, killing 3 PSC employees. However, the most significant incident took place on September 12th when an intense armed clash occurred between AOG and ANSF/IMF following an AOG ambush on an IMF convoy that was also carrying logistic materials. The fighting



lasted a few hours, and IMF conducted an air-strike to support their troops on the ground. The exact number of casualties is not known at this stage; still, this incident is extraordinary in its scale and duration. It also may serve as an example of increasing AOG organisation in the area.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

GHOR

On 10 September, an NGO-related incident occurred when unknown armed men abducted a local NGO worker from his house in Tulak District. Apparently, he was forced to follow the armed group to Farsi District, Ghor Province; however, on the way to this district, during the night, he managed to escape.


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Roadside IEDs
- Abduction
- AOG activities

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	1

As was the case of a similar incident that occurred on 29 August where an NGO worker was detained for about 1 hour, the exact motivation behind this abduction is not clear. Still, the effect of the volatile security situation in some areas may be benefiting criminals, and NGOs can be seen as a soft targets.

The majority of the few recorded AOG initiated incidents during the last reporting period were confined to Pasaband, Tulak and Charsada districts. With this, two incidents of note occurred during



the period. AOG attacked the District Governor's convoy in Charsada, wounding his 2 security guards, and AOG fired two rockets towards the District Centre in Tulak, causing no injuries. Additionally, thanks to negotiations led by village elders, the NGO staff's motorbike which was stolen on August 29 was finally returned.

HERAT

After an explosion that succeeded in killing the Injil District Chief of Police along with 13 ANP and 20 civilians, Herat City witnessed another major incident, however less deadly.

An RCIED exploded near the Masjed Jam-e Bozorg on September 4th, wounding several civilians and apparently targeting a former local commander. This incident was preceded by another IED explosion which occurred, as well, in Herat City in District 8 two days before. This time, though, the IED did not cause any casualties. And on 15 September, District 8 was, once again, targeted by an IED in which 2 people were wounded.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- IEDs
- Abduction
- Rocket attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	12
This Report Period	0

Whether or not all these incidents are AOG or ACG-related, they should be considered as a reminder of the threat of collateral damage to NGOs from IEDs, even if these attacks do not directly target them.

It is also worth noting that a worrying trend is developing in the area. Looking at the province as a whole, the election period was characterized by an increase in IED seizures, whereas the current period is dominated by significant weapons/explosives cache discoveries throughout the districts neighbouring Herat City (Injil, Karukh, Kushk, Adrasan and Obe). This situation illustrates a high level of AOG/ACG activity and the willingness to conduct offensive operations in the area.

Another characteristic feature of the security situation in Herat province is the high level of criminality, with numerous cases of kidnap that have targeted mainly



contractors and businessmen. Additional reporting suggests that kidnappers may specifically target passengers along the airport road. During the last reporting period, the main area of AOG activity in the province remained Karukh and Kushki Kuhna; however, Guzara (where AOG fired two rockets targeting the District HQ) and Pashtun Zarghun districts also have witnessed AOG-initiated incidents.

On a positive note, though, according to a recent announcement, an important AOG commander – influential in Shahrak District, Ghor, and Chishti Sharif, Herat – has reconciled with the government. This announcement apparently has not yet been translated in practice, however, because the said commander did not lay down his arms, and it remains to be seen whether his activity will change.

BADGHIS

Badghis witnessed one indirect NGO related incident. On September 7th, unknown gunmen killed 3 national staff that were employed by a for-profit international development organisation and stole their cash and motor-bikes. Reporting suggests that the motivation behind this accident was most likely criminal. Of note, as also seen in the recent NGO

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- AOG assaults on ANSF
- Abduction
- Rocket attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

staff abduction in Ghor, no prior threats or warning preceded this incident.

In Badghis, logistic convoys remain also valuable targets for AOG operations. During this reporting period, two separate convoys were attacked in Muqur and Murghab districts.

Besides these incidents, AOG initiated attacks continue against ANSF/GoA targets; for example, two rockets that were fired towards the Qala-i-Naw Airport landed in the vicinity of a residential area. It should be underlined,



also, that numerous cases of abduction of government employees have been recorded in Murghab and Muqur districts.

And in keeping with past activity in the traditionally unstable area of Sabzak Pass, ANSF/IMF have been undertaking a series of operations which resulted in a reported 13 AOG fatalities.

KHOST

Khost continues to have a high level of AOG incidents with 24 reported this period, and IEDs remain their preferred tactic with 11 detonated or located. Nearly half of reported AOG incidents occurred in Khost City with small IEDs being common including two magnetic mines attached to


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Kidnapping
- Collateral damage from attacks

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	0

civilian vehicles and another two small devices placed in shops in the city centre. All AOG indirect fire, which is still wildly inaccurate, occurred in Sabari District. Shamal District saw three attacks on vehicles resulting in 10 casualties to civilians or PSC guards.

Local tribal leaders have indicated they are not interested in providing security for a presidential run-off and are also not interested in another vote. Community security forces were a large part of the



security effort for the first election across eastern region, so this does not bode well for a run-off if required.

Khost remains very dangerous for NGO operations, and NGO international staff area advised to limit their travel to Khost City.

ANALYTICAL BYTE: Preliminary analysis of the IMF surge in the south suggests that the increase in forces has only further exasperated conflict levels as of yet. If trends persist, moreover, spiking incident levels will not likely lead to fractures in AOG cohesion; rather, the increase may instead be bolstering the Taliban in their attempt to reign in divergent AOGs. Additionally, rampant targeting of GoA officials at the district level—chiefs of police and governors—is likely to damage any semblance of GoA resolve or efforts at encouraging good governance at the micro level. Lastly, strife between IMF and civilians in contentious provinces, such as in Kunduz, will put NGO expatriate staff at risk and possibly erode communal acceptance.

LAGHMAN

Laghman saw one of the most significant incidents of the period nationwide; the assassination by BBIED of Dr. Abdullah, Deputy of NDS and Mr. Imadudin, Chairman of the Laghman Provincial Council, along with at least 22 other people most of whom were bodyguards. Dr. Abdullah was a long time opponent of both the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ Attacks along Highway 1
- ➔ Continuing IED threat near DACs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Taliban and HIG and had been the target of several previous plots and is believed to have been the target of this attack. NGOs should take note of this failure to protect a high profile person even when the threat was well known. Promises of local security at well advertised events cannot be taken seriously and high profile events should be avoided.

Other than the high profile bombing, the security situation in Laghman remained stable this period



with an even mix of IEDs, IDF aimed at IMF bases, and direct attacks on police posts. All AOG incidents occurred in Mitharlam or Qarghayi Districts with only one incident on Highway 1: an attack on an ANA post.

The various supporters of presidential candidates are reported to be calm, and election related violence does not seem imminent.

NANGARHAR

The security situation in Nangarhar remains stable with AOG incidents spread out across the province. Khogyani and Sherzad remain the provinces with the greatest threat to NGO operations. The most significant incident for NGOs was an AOG attack on an NGO clinic in Sherzad District. The attackers entered the


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ Kidnap threat
- ➔ AOG attacks on JAF and GOA facilities
- ➔ Attacks on polling stations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	1

clinic late at night, tied the two guards up outside, and set fire to the building. The motive is not clear, but the clinic had been used as a polling station, and AOG had warned that they would punish locals for hosting polling sites. (NGO senior staff should not stay overnight in the districts as the chance of kidnap during one of these late night AOG intrusions is high.) Any location that had been used as a polling station is a possible target for assault or demolition.

Jalalabad City continues to be quiet with a few minor incidents



including a small IED found near a radio station and the occasional rocket fired ineffectively at the Jalalabad Airfield. Highway 1 saw no incidents this period, and NGO travel to Kabul and Torkham is within safe limits.

The sense among NGO local staff in Jalalabad is that most people are not particularly concerned about the presidential election and that widespread violence is unlikely.

NURISTAN


Nuristan remains volatile with limited government control. 12

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- ➔ Increased military operations
- ➔ Large numbers of AOG at large

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

AOG incidents were reported with the vast majority being direct fire attacks on ANP posts in Kamdesh District. The police in Kamdesh appear to be under siege, and NGO operations in Nuristan are not recommended.



KUNAR

Kunar had a very violent period with 63 AOG-initiated incidents. With this, direct attacks on security forces were the most common AOG tactic, ending in 54 such incidents. Seven indirect fire attacks were recorded, and only two IEDs, both in Manogai, were reported. One IED attack against IMF is significant because it involved three devices that severely damaged three armoured vehicles and indicates a rare sophistication in IED use. The most violent incident in the province, however,


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Spread of AOG operations onto the Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway
- Indirect fire aimed at IMF/ANP
- Increased combat operations

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	0

was a drawn out firefight between an IMF/ANA/ANBP force and AOG in Sirkanay District, during which 18 security force members were killed and 24 injured after being ambushed in a village. Additionally, eight AOG were reported killed and four captured. This event is significant for three reasons: mentored ANSF/IMF do not normally lose fire fights with AOG, the AOG showed better coordination and cunning than is usual, and press reports indicate that air and artillery support was denied to the security forces because of concern over causing civilian casualties in the village.

AOG attacks continue to focus on IMF/ANSF facilities and convoys, but IMF supply contractors are coming under increasing pressure with four separate attacks on convoys that resulted in 2 dead, 2



wounded, and four trucks destroyed. Road construction companies are also under heavy pressure with four incidents that resulted in six security staff dead, 11 wounded and 18 abducted; another eight guards were abducted but quickly released after having their weapons stolen.

The Jalalabad- Asadabad Highway saw more AOG activity near Patan area in Nurgal District where AOG have been ambushing IMF convoys and attacking police posts very early in the morning. (NGOs should plan their travel to Asadabad after mid-morning.)

The situation in Kunar is likely to get even worse. Consequently, NGOs are advised to limit their activities to Asadabad City.

PAKTYA

Paktya was relatively quiet this period with only 12 AOG incidents of which six occurred in


KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Complex attacks in Gardez City
- High kidnap threat, especially along the Gardez-Khost Road
- IEDs, especially along Gardez-Khost Road

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Gardez District. Three IEDs were discovered or blew up on the Gardez-Sayid Karam Road, and the Gardez-Khost Road also remains a likely place for IED employment.

Local elders held a meeting in Gardez on 6 September and indicated that they will not supply Arbaki (tribal) security forces for a presidential run-off and are not interested in voting again. They did agree that they would support



whoever was elected. (The Arbaki were very important in keeping attacks on polling stations at very low levels in Paktya, so this not bode well for a run-off if required.)

KANDAHAR

AOG methods in the province are diffuse, yet severe. Multiple suicide attacks were witnessed in the region during this reporting period; for example, three suicide BBIED attackers approached the NDS Sub-office in District 2 of Kandahar City on 12 September. The initial BBIED attacker shot and killed the guard at the gate of the NDS compound, but he was then shot and killed on the spot by other NDS officials. Two other BBIED attackers concurrently detonated their BBIED vests before they could enter the compound, killing a child and wounding three NDS personnel.

And as is typical for the province, uncorroborated reporting suggests that AOG are intent upon striking a high-profile target, possibly the ANP HQ, NDS HQ, the Governor's office, or the Kandahar Prison in the near future; and also a separate threat asserts that AOG are intent on assaulting a specific


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0

international organisation compound in District 6.

Whether for attention-getting purposes or out of necessity, AOG appear to be favouring suicide attacks in the province; for example, in Spin Boldak District, a BBIED attacker riding on a motorbike attempted to target an IMF convoy, but failed, prematurely detonating his vest; and another BBIED attacker targeted an ANP vehicle, wounding six ANP and three civilians in the Panjwayi Bazaar on 10 September.

Despite the overwhelming lethality of AOG attacks, AOG efforts at intimidation should not be ignored. On 7 September, AOG abducted a team of health workers (a nurse, vaccinator and a driver) whilst they were returning to Kandahar City, but released them the following day due to the mediation efforts of tribal elders. And on 1 September, suspected AOG operatives warned a group of deminers to suspend their activity in Spin Ziyarat of District 6, Kandahar City, until the 24th of Ramadan (14 September).

AOG also conducted diffuse efforts to target GoA. On 7 September, AOG orchestrated attacks



against ANP posts with RPGs and SAF in Districts 2, 3 and 6. This led to the deployment of ANSF/IMF and ended in 5 AOG fatalities. In another incident, AOG attacked the Shorbak DAC for several hours. Also of note, two motorcyclists shot and killed a local female in District 2 on 7 September (She was an IEC chairperson for a polling centre during the recent elections).

The pervasive IED threat persisted, also, despite an IMF airstrike that destroyed an IED factory in Zhari on 4 September. In sum, twenty-two IED strikes occurred during the reporting period. In a snapshot, an IED hit a patrolling IMF vehicle, killing 2 IMF soldiers and wounding 5 others in Dand District on 6 September while another IED hit a civilian vehicle, killing 6 persons and wounding 3 others in Mirakhor of Maywand. To conclude, NGOs should expect the security situation in Kandahar Province to further deteriorate, with continual IED/rocket and suicide attacks being conducted on targets by AOG residing inside and outside of their respective target areas.

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- Kidnap
- IEDs
- Sensational attacks

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

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HELMAND

Helmand Province continues to be volatile. During this reporting period, 2 suicide attacks occurred in Nahri Sarraj District on 9 September. In the first, a suicide bomber wearing a BBIED vest exploded himself in the vehicle parking lot of an IMF base, killing the suicide attacker and 2 civilian drivers and wounding 5 IMF soldiers. The second occurred when a BBIED attacker riding on a mo-

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Suicide Attack
- Roadside IEDs
- Collateral damage from AOG-IMF/ANSF clashes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

torbike was identified and shot dead by ANP as he attempted to enter their post, causing his vest to explode and wound 2 ANP.

As seen historically, tribal and communal elder efforts proved fruitful, this time on 1 September, in securing the release of six deminers whom AOG had kidnapped on 29 August. With this, kidnap is common in Helmand; for example, in Lashkar Gah City on 13 September, ANP detained 2 people for purportedly kidnapping a child and demanding a large ransom from the child's family.

A number of IED strikes also occurred during the reporting pe-



riod: an IED struck an IMF patrol, killing one IMF soldier in Baba Ji, Lashkar Gah, on 2 September; and another IED hit an IMF soldier whilst he was on a foot patrol, killing him, also in Baba Ji but on 13 September. In another incident, 3 civilians were killed during an IMF airstrike in Karez, Musa Qala, on 3 September. Of note, AOG are dominant in the centres of 3 districts – Baghran, Deshu, and Washer – where there is reportedly no GoA presence at all.

GHAZNI

On 10 September in Ghazni City, a demonstration consisting of approximately 1,500 civilians took place. The demonstrators moved towards the Governor's office to voice their dissent concerning an incident that happened the previous night in Sar Karez when four unknown armed men abducted a mullah from his mosque and later killed him. The mullah's corpse was located in the morning in Qala-e-Naw, Ghazni City. Reporting further indicated that the demonstrators moved towards Masoud Chowk area, and the demonstration turned violent. Demonstrators reportedly began throwing stones at ANSF, and

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS


- Abduction
- Collateral damage from IEDs or convoy ambushes

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

ANSF opened fire, killing 4 demonstrators and wounding 24 others, at a minimum.

AOGs assaulted various district centres during the period; for example, AOG attacked the Dih Yak DAC on 3 September and the Rashidan DAC on the 6th, both for short durations. Also, in Qala-e-Naw on 13 September, AOG attacked a convoy of local trucks carrying fuel to an IMF base, killing 4 PSC guards and burning 3 fuel tankers and 1 escort vehicle. Also, in Saeed Waal of Waghaz on 14 September, AOG clashed with a group of armed robbers, resulting in 3 thieves killed and another wounded.

IMF also attempted to take the initiative through an operation in Andar District on 11 September, resulting in 1 IMF soldiers and 15 AOG killed. And at the time that this report is being drafted, rumours persist of an impending



IMF operation that will seek to secure the corridor between Ghazni City and Gardez.

Several IED strikes also occurred during the period: in Giro District on 4 September, a roadside IED hit an IMF vehicle, killing 1 IMF soldier and wounding 5 others; and an IED killed one employee of a mobile phone company and wounded 4 others in Andar District on 5 September.

URUZGAN

An increase in IED strike was reported during this period. Two RCIEDs, in what was probably meant to be coordinated detonations, exploded a distance of 100 meters and 60 meters from the compound of an international organisation (IO) in Tirin Kot on 3 September. Tirin Kot experienced many more IED strikes, for example, one killing four civilians on 5 September and another wounding four IMF soldiers on 4


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

September. Additionally, an RCIED placed under a culvert in a crowded area detonated while an ANP vehicle was passing through the Janan Agha Market on 7 September. The target was believed to have been an ANP post commander in the vehicle, but as is often the case, bystanders took the brunt of the attack, with two children being killed and fifteen other civilians being wounded (three ANP were also wounded). In another blow to civilians, an IED hit a civilian vehicle, killing twelve occupants and wounding 2 others in Chora District on 9 September.

AOG are evidently favouring IED strikes and utilising armed assaults

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs/BBIED
- AOG opposition to NGO operations
- Clashes




much less. In one example, though, AOG attacked an IMF patrol, killing 1 IMF soldier in Dihrawud District on 6 September. And in an example of typical strife between armed parties, on 14 September in Chora District, ANA clashed with PSC guards working for IMF special forces, resulting in three ANA soldiers and two PSC guards killed and one ANA and two PSC guards wounded.

PAKTIKA

For Paktika, the most significant incident occurred when a suicide BBIED attacker targeted an ANP patrol in Barmal District on 12 September. (The only casualty was the death of the suicide attacker.) Additionally, IMF/ANSF conducted several operations during the period.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

On 12 September in Urgun District, IMF conducted an airstrike targeting an AOG hideout and killed twelve AOG, whilst two AOG were also purportedly killed during another airstrike in Yosuf Khel District on the same date. Also, ANP/IMF conducted a joint operation in Sar Hawza on 3 September that concluded in eight AOG killed and four ANP injured. Again in Sar Hawza District on the 3rd, ANSF/IMF claim to have killed an additional seven AOG. In another incident in Nika District on 3 September, ANSF/



IMF conducted an operation that reportedly killed 5 AOG, and in Ziruk District on 1 September, they assert that they killed a total of fourteen AOG in multiple clashes. (As is evident through the abovementioned information and recent developments, NGOs should consider Sar Hawza to be a dangerous district.)

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS

- IEDs
- Abductions
- AOG - IMF/ANSF clashes

NOTE: Graphs in this report are current as of 8 September 2009.



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feedback, good or bad, let
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ansoab@yahoo.com

ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military Forces / **AOG**-Armed Opposition Groups / **GOA**-Government of Afghanistan / **ACG**-Armed Criminal Groups / **ANA**-Afghan National Army / **ANP**-Afghan National Police / **IED**-Improvised Explosive Device / **AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces / **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Grenade / **IDF**-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Improvised Exploding Device / **PRP**-Previous Reporting Period / **ANBP**-Afghan National Border Police / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire / **NDS**-National Directorate of Security (intelligence) / **PSC**-Private Security Company / **DC**-District Centre

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MISSING

This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the provinces of:

Samangan
Balkh
Jawzjan
Sar-e Pul
Nimroz
Zabul

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the significance of the incidents occurring there.

If you can help us understand the province better, please contact us.

TRAINING

Armadillo at Large will be providing training for the NGO community in Kabul during October. For further information, please visit

www.armadilloatlarge.com.

ANSO will be conducting a trial of its newly designed communications training in mid-October and hopes to unveil the session for regular provision in early November.