

HUMANITARIAN MONITOR MONTHLY REPORT

MAY 2013



May Overview

May marks six months since the ceasefire understanding that ended the period of escalated hostilities between Israel and Palestinian armed groups in November 2012. The understanding presented a chance to improve the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and this month provides an opportunity to take stock.

Some Palestinian armed groups have not adhered to the ceasefire understanding and firing of projectiles at southern Israel has continued, raising serious concerns under international humanitarian law. The UN has repeatedly condemned such action in the strongest terms.

The measures adopted by Israel in reaction to these attacks include imposition of heightened restrictions on free movement of people and goods. These restrictive measures have not directly targeted responsible armed groups, but rather have

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HIGHLIGHTS


- Access improved, but uncertainty remains around current restrictions on Gaza land and sea areas.
- Most complaints filed with the Israeli authorities following “Pillar of Defence” closed without criminal investigation.
- Concerns raised over failure of Israeli troops to protect Palestinians during settler attacks.
- Palestinian community “re-joins” rest of West Bank following re-routing of the Barrier.

MAY FIGURES

Palestinian civilians killed (direct conflict)	0
Palestinian civilians injured (direct conflict)	460
Palestinian children under Israeli detention	219
Structures demolished in the West Bank	47
Patients' applications to leave Gaza approved by Israel	81%

CAP 2013 FUNDING

403 million requested (US\$)
53% funded




Farmer tending land in the access restricted area. Gaza

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Coordination Saves Lives



impacted the wider civilian population. As such, they have exacerbated existing high levels of vulnerability and have raised concerns regarding the prohibition on collective punishment outlined in international humanitarian law.

The ceasefire understanding provided indications that the long-term restrictions on access to land and sea areas would be relaxed. This month, the Israeli authorities extended the sea areas accessible to fishermen to 6 nautical miles (nm) from shore – a notable mark of progress. A further extension to 12 nm, as per previous commitments made by Israel, would allow fishermen to exploit high value fish stocks and increase the catch by about 65 per cent. Only then would there be a really significant recovery of the fishing industry and the livelihoods of the 3,000 families in Gaza who depend upon it.

Access of farmers to agricultural land between 300 to 1,500 metres from Gaza's perimeter fence also saw an overall improvement since November 2012, with some farmers reporting being able to reach land that has been off limits for years. However, due to a lack of clarity on the scope of current restrictions and continued instability, many farmers and fishermen are reluctant to invest in the newly accessible areas, reducing the positive impact of the recent easings on people's livelihoods. Concerns remain regarding the use of force to implement access restrictions in these areas. Some farmers have taken the risk of encountering live fire from the IDF in order to harvest crops.

Since December 2012, the Israeli authorities have also facilitated entry of a small amount of construction materials through the official crossing for the private sector in Gaza. However, the only functioning official crossing for goods (Kerem Shalom) was closed for approximately 50 per cent of the time during March and April, including in response to Palestinian rocket-fire, triggering temporary shortages of basic items, including cooking gas, fresh fruit and dairy products. This month the situation improved, with the crossing opened on almost all scheduled operating days.

No relaxation of the longstanding restrictions on the movement of people to and from Gaza via Israel (Erez Crossing) was envisioned as part of the ceasefire understanding. Moreover, during March and April access was further restricted largely to emergency humanitarian cases and international travellers only. While these additional restrictions were lifted in May, access to the Gaza Strip from the south deteriorated as Rafah was unofficially closed for about a week by Egyptian security officials, following a kidnapping incident in the Sinai Peninsula.

Six months on from the ceasefire, accountability for reported violations of international humanitarian law during the November 2012 hostilities, committed by Israel and by Palestinian armed groups, remains elusive. According to information available, both sides have failed to open effective investigations into cases of civilian death or injury occurring during the hostilities.

Despite some progress in certain areas over the last six months, the situation in the Gaza Strip remains fragile. There is growing frustration among Gaza residents over the lack of any significant improvement in their daily lives. In particular, expectations regarding the lifting of restrictions on the free movement of people and goods that are necessary

to support real economic growth, improve food security and reduce dependency on aid have not been fulfilled.

There are a number of concrete measures that Israel could take immediately in this regard – measures that could affect an immediate improvement in the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip whilst also taking into account Israel’s security concerns. These include significantly relaxing access restrictions imposed on land and sea areas and allowing the flow of goods and people between Gaza and the West Bank to the fullest extent possible, subject to conditions outlined in international law.

Urgent action is also required, by both the Israeli authorities and by the de facto authorities in the Gaza Strip, to hold accountable those who violate international humanitarian law. Investigations into allegations must be conducted in compliance with the standards of independence, impartiality, thoroughness, promptness, effectiveness and transparency, and substantive and procedural barriers to an effective remedy must be removed.

The ceasefire presented a real opportunity to change the situation on the ground for the benefit of the civilian population in Gaza, and in southern Israel. This opportunity must not be lost.

IMPROVED ACCESS TO LAND AND SEA AREAS SINCE NOVEMBER 2012

Significant uncertainty surrounds current restrictions

Since the November 2012 ceasefire understanding between Israel and Hamas (the November Agreement), farmers and fishermen have had greater access to previously restricted areas, compared to the preceding period. Yet, the remaining access restrictions, compounded by a significant degree of uncertainty and instability, have continued to undermine the people’s livelihoods.

This month, the Government of Israel (GoI) extended, once again, the fishing areas permissible for Gaza fishermen to 6 nautical miles (nm) from shore. This limit, which had been set following the November Agreement, was reduced on 21 March 2013 to 3 nm, according to an announcement by the GoI, “in response” to the firing of rockets by Palestinian armed groups. The fluctuating access restrictions imposed at sea in the recent period have left fishermen fearful that they will be unable to capitalize on investments made in the context of the relaxation of restrictions.¹

According to FAO, clear economic gains have been observed under the implementation of the 6 NM mile fishing limit. Despite fishers having lost two-thirds of their sardine season (April – June), the extension to 6 NM on 21 May allowed fishers to access sardine shoals in deeper waters for part of the month. The total fish catch this month was an estimated 475 tons, 76 per cent higher than the equivalent figure in May 2012 (269 tons), when the limit was set at 3 NM. However, May 2013’s total catch is only 73 per cent of the average catch (655 tons) caught during periods when fishers were able to consistently access 6 NM (from 2006 to 2009).

**Information for this piece was provided by OHCHR and FAO, on behalf of the Protection Cluster and Food Security Clusters, respectively.*

Uncertainty also surrounds access to land areas, located along the fence separating Israel from the Gaza Strip. Prior to November 2012, the Israeli authorities imposed a “no go” zone along the fence that had been officially declared to cover areas up to 300 metres from the fence, but, in practice, was enforced up to 500 metres from the fence. In addition, access to land for hundreds of metres beyond that was risky and uncertain due to incidents of shooting by Israeli forces. These conditions prevented or impeded access to some 35 per cent of Gaza’s agricultural land.

Following the November agreement, the Israeli Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) informed the humanitarian community on several occasions that farmers would be permitted to access on foot areas up to 100 metres from the fence.² However, the IDF spokesperson later contradicted this information, indicating that access would be prohibited within 300 metres of the fence.³ At present, there is no publicly available information setting out the Israeli policy on access to areas along the fence, nor a clear coordination mechanism known of by the general public. Many farmers report relying on what they see or hear from others to determine which areas they can access, a practice contributing to an overall feeling of instability and lack of clarity regarding future access and sustainability of livelihoods.

Initial monitoring and analysis undertaken by the Protection Cluster since November 2012 indicate that in most areas, farmers are unable to access areas closer than 300 metres from the fence.⁴ In the few places where farmers have been able to access areas within 300 metres of the fence (usually up to 200 metres from the fence), they are prevented from using machinery, such as tractors, rendering some land unusable as it must first be rehabilitated for cultivation. In some cases reported to OCHA, farmers have brought machinery into the 300 metre zone, risking fire, so that they can actually utilize the land.

However, in general, farmers’ access to areas between 300 to 1,500 metres from the fence has improved throughout the Gaza Strip since November 2012. In some areas, farmers are now able to reach land that has been off limits for years. In other areas, farmers report that they are able to reach their land more frequently, stay later, or bring workers to assist them. Farmers and herders also report feeling safer whilst working on the land.

In some instances, farmers reported going heavily into debt to cultivate newly accessible land. However, other farmers, having seen their crops destroyed one or more times in the past, reported a reluctance to make significant investments out of fear of a possible deterioration in the security conditions, and a renewed tightening of access restrictions. Continued presence and monitoring in newly accessed areas was requested, particularly during the harvest season. Farmers and others also consistently highlighted their need for material support for seeds and infrastructure, to enable them to make use of the newly accessed land.

Further, farmers continue to express concern about their physical security, due to the ongoing use of live fire by the Israeli military to enforce the access restrictions. Since the November agreement came into effect, four Palestinian civilians have been killed⁵

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and 108, including 22 children, have been injured in the access restricted areas on land. Most of these cases occurred within 300 metres of the fence, in the month following the ceasefire. Of the total casualties, one fatality as well as at least 10 of the injured were farmers. Another three of the injured were collecting rubble and scrap metal and one of the injured was a shepherd herding sheep. The presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) is also an ongoing concern.

IMPROVED ACCESS AT GAZA CROSSINGS

Follows multiple rounds of intensified restrictions

In an improvement over previous months, Kerem Shalom and Erez crossings were open for all scheduled days in May 2013, except 14 and 15 May, due to Israeli holidays. This followed over two months of intensified restrictions on the movement of people and goods to and from the Gaza Strip.

Overall, access to the Gaza Strip has been mixed in the period following the 21 November 2012 cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. After an initial, limited easing to allow some gravel imports to Gaza, the Israeli authorities closed Kerem Shalom crossing on multiple occasions. These closures have highlighted the vulnerability of a population dependent on a single crossing point for the entry of goods from Israel or the rest of the oPt.

In late December 2012, Israel began authorizing the entry of 20 truckloads of gravel per day for the private sector. These were the first such private sector imports since the start of the blockade in June 2007; since June 2010, Israel had allowed entry of a limited

amount of construction materials via Kerem Shalom, but only for approved international projects. Other construction materials, such as cement and steel bars, remain barred for import by the private sector via Kerem Shalom. Similarly, Egypt began allowing imports of construction materials through the Rafah crossing, exclusively for a series of projects funded by the Government of Qatar. Rafah, for its part, had not operated for the transfer of goods since August 2005, with the exception of a limited number of humanitarian items, primarily medicines.

However, beginning in late February 2013, Israel closed the Kerem Shalom crossing on four different occasions in response to the firing of projectiles by Palestinian armed groups towards southern Israel. These closures, together with a number of closures on religious holidays in Israel and regularly scheduled closings, resulted in the prolonged closure of Kerem Shalom on a number of occasions. Between 27 February and 30 April, Kerem Shalom was closed for 37 out of 63 days (including 13 days for closures in response to rocket-fire, six for holidays, and 18 for regular closures on weekend days).

The repeated, irregular closure of Kerem Shalom has resulted in shortages of basic items, including cooking gas, fresh fruit and dairy products, which make up roughly 40 per cent of all goods entering Gaza. A number of cash crops, including cherry tomatoes, herbs and cut flowers, were also prevented from being exported from Gaza, impacting the livelihoods of a number of Gaza farmers. During the most recent strawberry export season (December 2012–February 2013), only 24% of the total amount exported during the same period in 2006–7, before the blockade was put into place, left the Gaza Strip via Kerem Shalom crossing. International reconstruction efforts were likewise affected during the recent closures, resulting in delays to and additional costs of project implementation.

Given the closure of all the other land crossings between Israel and Gaza between 2007 and 2010, access of goods to Gaza is dependent on the regular operation of Kerem Shalom. This is particularly important in view of the fact that Kerem Shalom already operates at a reduced capacity compared to other cargo terminals between Israel and the oPt. Kerem Shalom operates between Sunday and Thursday, from 07:00 until 16:30, while the four West Bank commercial crossings with Israel – Tarqumiya, Betunia, Jalame and Taybeh - work longer hours during the week, some, until 22:00 pm, and all, operate on Fridays, allowing for greater access to and movement of goods and commodities.

In conjunction with the closure of Kerem Shalom, the operation of Erez crossing was similarly reduced on a number of occasions since the declaration of the cease-fire. During the exceptional closures between late February through April, the Erez crossing was restricted to all but emergency humanitarian cases, internationals, and, on a few days, the departure of West Bank and Jerusalem ID holders from Gaza. During this period, non-critical medical cases and Palestinian businessmen were not allowed to cross. Consequently, crossing volumes decreased from a monthly average of roughly 5,000 people exiting Gaza through Erez in January and February 2013, to 4,300 and 4,500 people in March and April respectively.

Given the closure of all the other land crossings between Israel and Gaza between 2007 and 2010, access for goods to Gaza is dependent on the regular operation of Kerem Shalom.

Access to Gaza from the south has also been restricted recently. Between 17 and 22 May, Egyptian security officials unofficially closed the Rafah crossing, following the kidnapping of seven members of Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula. Rafah Crossing serves as Gaza's main access point to the outside world, in light of the restrictions on Palestinian movement via Erez Crossing to Israel. Once re-opened, around 4,500 Palestinian travellers, stranded on the Egyptian side of the crossing, were able to cross into Gaza and over 5,000 others, including medical cases, exited Gaza during the course of the following week. Since 19 May, Egyptian officials have also imposed an unofficial closure on the Nitzana crossing, the primary commercial crossing between Israel and Egypt, which also has been used to facilitate the transfer of Qatari-donated fuel to Gaza; since 22 March 2013, there have been no further fuel transfers, however, due to the security situation in the Sinai.

CONCERNS ABOUT THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND REMEDY FOR REPORTED VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING NOVEMBER HOSTILITIES

Six months after operation "Pillar of Defence", accountability and effective remedy for reported violations of international humanitarian law, committed by Israel and Palestinian armed groups during the crisis, remain elusive. Between 14 and 21 November 2012, at least 174 Palestinians and six Israelis were killed in Gaza and southern Israel. Of the Palestinian fatalities, 101 are believed to have been civilians, including 14 women and 36 children. Of the Israeli fatalities four were civilians. Another 1,046 Palestinians and 239 Israelis, the majority of them civilians, were injured. In the Gaza Strip, 382 houses were destroyed or sustained major damage.

The failure to open effective investigations into cases of civilian death or injury, and the cumulative impact of substantive and procedural obstacles on victims seeking redress for harm suffered, raise serious concerns about accountability and the right to access justice and an effective remedy. Urgent action by both the Israeli authorities and the de facto authorities in Gaza is required, to ensure that investigations are undertaken in compliance with the standards of independence, impartiality, thoroughness, promptness, effectiveness and transparency, and to remove substantive and procedural barriers to an effective remedy.

Most complaints with the Israeli authorities closed without criminal investigation; Barriers impede Palestinians' ability to seek remedy

Palestinian, Israeli and international human rights organisations have documented allegations of incidents in which civilians were killed, injured or their property was destroyed by Israeli forces during the eight days of conflict, in a manner contrary to international humanitarian law. Some organisations in Gaza are providing legal assistance to enable victims to pursue accountability through criminal investigations, and to access redress for harm suffered. However, there are serious concerns that Israel has yet to take adequate measures to investigate these allegations, to ensure accountability, and to provide an effective remedy to victims.

* Information on actions by the Israeli authorities provided by OHCHR based on an update issued on behalf of the Protection Cluster on 21 May 2013.

Human rights organizations in Gaza have filed 96 complaints with the Israeli military justice system regarding alleged violations of international humanitarian law during the November crisis, calling for investigations. On 11 April 2013, the IDF Military Advocate General (MAG), which is responsible for examining and investigating such allegations, released the status of its examination of complaints of alleged violations from November. In approximately 65 incidents, it states that no basis was found for opening a criminal investigation. In most instances, no information is provided to justify the MAG's decision to close the case. Where a justification is provided, it is of a general nature and fails to include meaningful explanations. Decisions regarding whether to open a criminal investigation into approximately 15 other incidents were pending.

To date, the MAG has responded by letter to 25 of the complaints submitted by human rights organisations in Gaza, stating in 11 instances that the case was under review, and in 14 instances that there was no evidence to justify the opening of a criminal investigation. Again, the information provided was general and vague.

Among the cases closed without criminal investigation was one concerning the Al Dalou family, whose home was targeted by an Israeli airstrike on 18 November 2012, killing 12 people, including five children and four women. Concerning this case, the MAG stated that the attack targeted a 'senior terrorist operative and several other terrorists' and that the extent of civilian harm was not foreseen. However, no factual detail is offered to support these claims. Human rights organisations investigating the case have uncovered no information to suggest a military objective was targeted, and the MAG response provides no details that could be used to review its claim. Furthermore, given that the three-storey house collapsed, and that numerous adjacent houses sustained damage, the MAG does not explain how the extent of civilian harm could not have been foreseen.

Gaza residents are also seeking compensation for cases of death, injury and property damage arising from possible violations during the military operation. So far, human rights organizations in Gaza have submitted to the Israeli Ministry of Defence notification of intent to pursue civil claims on behalf of victims in 298 such cases.

To seek compensation in the Israeli civil court system, Palestinian victims and their lawyers must comply with a myriad of procedural requirements and face legal obstacles that are becoming increasingly insurmountable. Procedural barriers include onerous time limits, impracticable requirements related to the power of attorney from Gazan clients to Israeli lawyers and High Court guarantees payable by claimants.⁶

In addition to the procedural barriers, Israeli law exempts the State from any civil liability for "an act done in the course of a military operation by the IDF."⁷ In February 2013, the Israeli Southern Central Court in Be'er Sheva dismissed 15 civil cases filed by Gazan human rights organisations, which sought compensation for deaths, injuries and material losses suffered by Palestinian civilians in prior military operations. The court relied upon the exemption of state liability for acts done during military operations, and on non-compliance with procedural requirements relating to the power of attorney. This

Urgent action is required by both the Israeli authorities and the de facto authorities in Gaza to ensure that investigations are undertaken in compliance with international law.

judicial precedent is a major setback to victims' right to access an effective remedy and justice, including in relation to the November crisis.

No evidence of investigations by the de facto authorities in Gaza

Regarding the de facto authorities in Gaza, there is no evidence of attempts to investigate alleged violations of international law committed by Palestinian armed groups, affecting Israeli or Palestinian civilians. While the de facto authorities have indicated their willingness to investigate incidents of killing of alleged collaborators, there is no additional information available on any investigative actions taken. Likewise, there is no available information regarding mechanisms that would allow Israeli or Palestinian civilian victims of violations to seek compensation.



PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT TO CHILDREN FOLLOWING “PILLAR OF DEFENCE”

Gap remains for more specialised support for those severely affected by the crisis

Exposure to eight days of violent armed conflict in November 2012 had a devastating impact on the psychosocial wellbeing of tens of thousands of children and adolescents in the Gaza Strip. In order to shape a psychosocial response, two key rapid assessments were conducted immediately after the 21 November ceasefire: the oPt Inter-cluster Rapid Assessment (IRA) and a Psychosocial Rapid Assessment.

The latter, which surveyed a sample of 545 boys and girls living during the hostilities in the 35 hardest-hit areas of Gaza, revealed severe psychosocial distress. It found that

* This piece was contributed by UNICEF.

children who had been injured, who lived in homes that had been destroyed or damaged, or who had witnessed several violent events (bomb explosions, people injured or killed and property damaged or destroyed) were a priority for intervention. It also indicated that the conflict had affected boys and girls



Children participating in a group session designed to identify those who suffered trauma.

© UNICEF State of Palestine/ El Baba. November 2012

differently, with boys showing more emotional symptoms, such as increased levels of fear, and girls displaying more physical symptoms, such as a significant change in appetite or nervousness. Older children were proportionately more affected than younger ones.

In response, UNICEF and partners developed, as part of the broader humanitarian response, a project designed to provide early psychosocial interventions to mitigate the effect of trauma, alleviate psychosocial distress and strengthen the resilience of 95,000 children and adolescents, 25,000 caregivers and 500 professionals. UNICEF is supporting two local civil society partners, the Palestinian Centre for Democracy and Conflict Resolution (PCDCR) and Ma'an Development Centre, to scale up their existing psychosocial interventions. Additionally, support is provided to the Ministry of Education (MoE) to deploy its existing 420 school counsellors in the 397 government schools, to provide psychosocial support for children most affected by the conflict.⁸ The project is made possible by the support of the UN Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF).

The current project builds upon the work of UNICEF and partners since the end of Operation "Cast Lead" in January 2009, to establish in Gaza an extensive psychosocial response system for children and adolescents and to better enable them to cope with extreme stress and build resilience.⁹ With financial support from ECHO and, more recently, the Government of Japan and the French National Committee for UNICEF, this response system comprises of 21 Family Centres for younger children, 15 Adolescent-Friendly Spaces¹⁰ for children aged 12 to 17, and five emergency psychosocial support teams. The emergency psychosocial teams provide counselling on a one-on-one basis and in small groups across Gaza. They remained active during the eight days of the military escalation, visiting over 100 children and families despite the risks of moving around during the bombings.

Psychosocial interventions are conducted under the oversight of the Mental Health and Psychosocial Working Group (MHPSS), co-chaired by WHO and UNICEF. Coordination and partnership with the Ministry of Social Affairs and two Child Protection Networks (CPN) as well as MoE and Ministry of Health in Gaza, are also ensured. As of the end of April 2013, the project had reached over 60,000 children, half of them girls. In addition, over 10,000 caregivers, nearly one third of whom male, were reached with specific activities to strengthen parenting skills.

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A remaining gap is to improve the referral and management of more severe cases.
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A remaining gap is to improve the referral and management of more severe cases. Based on the rapid assessments referred to above, many thousands of children were most likely severely traumatised, but there is a limit to what a targeted community response can achieve. With better referral, case management and training of mental health professionals, children most affected by this and other humanitarian crises are more likely to have their psychosocial wellbeing restored.

CASE STUDY: ISRA', 9 YEARS OLD

Isra' is a nine-year-old girl residing in Beit Lahia in northern Gaza. During the November crisis she was with her grandmother when an area adjacent to her house was targeted by Israeli missiles. The shrapnel injuries her grandmother sustained during the attack caused her to lose her eyesight. Isra' was severely affected psychologically, as indicated by a range of symptoms, including loss of appetite, nightmares, decreased academic achievement and classroom participation, tendency to cry for no obvious reason, preference to stay alone and distancing herself from her friends.

Isra' was included in a group counselling activity run by UNICEF partner, the Palestinian Centre for Democracy and Conflict Resolution (PCDCR), implemented as part of the work of the emergency psychosocial teams. Despite some progress in the group counselling sessions, Isra's overall psychosocial wellbeing showed no significant improvement.

Subsequently, she was referred to individual counselling, where she received more personal support based around an individual case plan. The case plan helped Isra' discuss and begin dealing with her experience, fears and negative ideas. The counsellor also visited Isra's school, to seek the support of her teachers in improving her psychosocial wellbeing through understanding and encouragement. After follow up sessions, Isra' was sleeping better, with fewer nightmares. Her school performance improved and she slowly regained interest in doing her homework. At home, her relationship with her siblings also improved; she is friendlier, more patient and wants to play with them again. She is also seeking now the company of her friends.

Follow-up sessions continue to ensure Isra' has appropriate psychosocial support to enable her full recovery. Without the support of the psychosocial team, there was a significant risk that the negative impacts of the trauma she sustained would have been more damaging, possibly causing her to drop out of school jeopardising her chances of a career and a pathway out of poverty.

A WAVE OF SETTLER VIOLENCE FOLLOWS KILLING OF SETTLER

Concerns over IDF troops' failure to intervene


A wave of settler violence broke out this month following the 30 April killing of a 32-year-old Israeli settler from Yitzhar settlement by a Palestinian, in the northern West Bank. Overall, during May, OCHA oPt recorded a total of 52 settler-related incidents that resulted either in Palestinian civilian casualties or damage to Palestinian-owned property. The monthly average of such incidents recorded so far in 2013 has increased by over 20 per cent compared to the equivalent figure in 2012 (37 vs 30). During May OCHA also recorded five incidents resulting in Israeli-settler injuries or damage to their property.

A total of 48 Palestinians, including 13 children, were injured in settler-related incidents this month, either by Israeli settlers (20) or by Israeli forces (28) during confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli settlers. An additional 20 Palestinians were injured on 30 April (outside the reporting period), immediately following the killing of the settler. Also, fourteen Israeli settlers were injured by Palestinians during the month. This month, settlers damaged over 1,700 trees and saplings, primarily in the Nablus governorate, representing some 40 per cent of the trees damaged in 2013 (over 4,000).

A key concern raised this month by human rights organizations concerns Israeli soldiers' failure to protect Palestinian civilians and their property during settler attacks. As the occupying power, Israel is responsible for ensuring public order and safety in the territory under its authority.¹¹ However, there are clear indications that many Israeli soldiers in the field understand that their role is mainly to provide security for settlers.¹² Footage captured between March and May 2013, by volunteers of the Israeli human rights


The monthly average of settler-related incidents resulting in Palestinian casualties or damage to Palestinian-owned property has increased by over 20 per cent compared to the equivalent figure in 2012.

Settler-related incidents resulting in Palestinian casualties or property damage



CASE STUDY: SCHOOL BUSES ATTACKED BY SETTLERS NEAR YITZHAR JUNCTION

On the morning of 30 April 2013, approximately 100 Palestinian girls, aged between 13 and 15, and six teachers, from the Qibyah Girls' School in the Ramallah governorate, were attacked by Israeli settlers. The students and staff were travelling in two hired busses and were heading to the Wadi Al Bathan Park in Nablus on a school trip.



When the girls were en route to the park, a 32-year-old Israeli settler was stabbed and killed by a Palestinian man at the Za'tara/Tapuach checkpoint, in the Salfit governorate. Upon arrival at the checkpoint, the buses were not allowed to pass, so the drivers took a detour. When they approached Yitzhar junction, near Yitzhar settlement, they encountered a large crowd of Israeli settlers, accompanied by some 15 Israeli soldiers. The settlers blocked the road and began stoning the busses. Other settlers blocked the reverse path with their cars. According to eyewitnesses, over 80 Israeli settlers were present, some of whom tried to force open the doors of the bus and enter. Israeli soldiers on the scene reportedly failed to intervene for much of the attack.

One of the 14-year-old students recounted her experience to OCHA: *"I had been waiting for this trip all year long. On the way, we were singing and laughing. Then our joy turned to horror; everyone started screaming and crying. Stones and glass fragments were falling on us through the windows. The bus was surrounded by Israeli settlers who were stoning us. The headmaster told us to get on the floor, and I think if we had remained in our seats, we would have died. We were shocked and terrified. I was injured by flying glass. I cannot stop thinking about the incident."*¹⁶

According to the driver of one of the busses, it quickly became clear that to reach safety they would have to drive through the group. Soldiers initially did not assist in clearing the area and at least one participated in the attack, according to one of the drivers, 42-year-old 'Othman Al Abisi: *"I didn't know what to do, I felt so helpless. The girls were screaming, the settlers were surrounding the bus and throwing stones at them, and then a soldier placed a gun to my head and threatened to shoot me if I moved. Other Israeli forces were standing behind the settlers and watching. The most they did was ask the settlers to move back. Eventually, the Israeli forces opened the road for us and lead us to Huwara, but only after the settlers had vented all their anger on us."*

The incident had lasted for approximately 15 minutes. In Huwara, near Nablus city, other Israeli soldiers provided first aid for nine girls and a driver, all of whom had been injured by glass fragments and stones.

On 2 May, the headmaster of the school, along with the two drivers, were requested to give their testimonies to the Israeli authorities at Beit El, through the coordination of the Palestinian DCO in Ramallah. When asked to describe the perpetrators, they were unable to do so, because many of the attackers were masked and the scene was very chaotic. An Israeli commander informed the headmaster that four suspects had been detained, but unless they could provide some footage of the attack as evidence, before the next court date, the four would be released. Footage of a portion of the attack, filmed by one of the girls, was provided to Beit El.

All of the students have received psycho-social support, provided by YMCA, in the period following the attack, with some of the worst affected students being referred for more intensive counselling.

organization B'Tselem, for example, shows Israeli soldiers failing to take measures to prevent attacks on Palestinians or their property, failing to intervene to stop such attacks or failing to detain settlers who have perpetrated violence.¹³

The failure to prevent attacks and protect Palestinian civilians in real time is part of a larger problem of accountability for settler violence in the West Bank. Other problems identified by human rights groups monitoring the issue are inadequate or poorly conducted investigations, and insufficient allocation of resources. Some measures of the current system, including requiring Palestinians to file complaints at police stations located inside Israeli settlements, actively work against the rule of law by discouraging Palestinians from filing complaints. According to the Israeli human rights organization Yesh Din, of over 780 investigation files relating to settler violence between 2005 and 2011 and monitored by the organization, over 90 per cent were closed without indictment.¹⁴

Settler-related violence undermines the physical security and livelihoods of Palestinians. At present, OCHA estimates that there are 110 Palestinian communities, with a combined population of over 315,000 people, who are vulnerable to settler violence; of these, almost 60 communities (population over 130,000) are at high-risk.¹⁵

The new Barrier route reconnects roughly 2,900 dunams of land, including the built-up area of the village, previously isolated to the west of the Barrier, to the rest of the West Bank.

RE-ROUTING OF THE BARRIER IN KHIRBET JUBARA

Positive developments emerge alongside ongoing access difficulties

On 1 May, the Israeli authorities completed construction of a new Barrier route in the Tulkarm Governorate, dismantling the old route and removing an associated checkpoint. The re-routing, which began in 2011, followed a 2006 Israeli High Court of Justice ruling ordering the Israeli military to change the route of the Barrier in the area because of the disproportionately negative impact it had on the community of Khirbet Jubara, estimated population 350.

The new Barrier route reconnects roughly 2,900 dunams of land, including the built-up area of the village, previously isolated to the west of the Barrier, to the rest of the West Bank. Since 2003, when the Barrier and checkpoint were erected in the area, residents of Khirbet Jubara were required to obtain a resident permit from the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) in order to remain in, and access, their community. Access for non-residents, including relatives, friends, Palestinian social and emergency service officials and humanitarian organizations, required permits and/or prior coordination, contributing significantly to the isolation of the community.

Removal of the checkpoint and permit system will improve access to social services and livelihood opportunities in the West Bank. Public transportation will now be available to and from the community, helping ease the movement of some 60 - 100 students from the village that were previously required to pass the checkpoint on foot to attend schools outside of the enclave.¹⁷ Medical patients will have improved access both to health centres in the West Bank and to emergency services that can now freely access the community. Social conditions have also been eased, particularly for marriages between

Khirbet Jubara residents and those outside the village; changing residency to a “Seam Zone” community, required to obtain a resident permit, is difficult, time consuming and not always possible.

The re-routing will also improve access to livelihoods. Previously, traders and individuals were limited in the types and quantities of goods they could bring through the checkpoint, including construction materials, which required special authorization. Upon entry, commercial goods were unloaded at the checkpoint, a practice resulting in delays and potential damages. Thus, as a result of these restrictions, by 2009 a once thriving poultry industry in Khirbet Jubara had been reduced from 120,000 to 20,000 chickens; by 2012, the industry had completely collapsed. With the re-routing, farmers have already started rehabilitating several farms.

Despite such improvements, the new route will continue to have an adverse impact on Khirbet Jubara and several surrounding communities. The new route leaves roughly 12,200 dunums of land to the west of the Barrier, including 50 dunums of agricultural land owned by several families from Khirbet Jubara. These land owners, and their workers, will now have to apply for permits to access their land. The existing Barrier route also continues to affect neighbouring villages, such as Far’un, Ar Ras and Kafr Sur, whose residents own 4,000 dunums inside the enclave. While the new Barrier route includes two gates, access conditions through the gates are still unclear. Generally, access to agricultural land beyond the Barrier is channelled through 80 gates. The majority of these gates only open during the six weeks olive harvest season, and usually only for a limited period during the day. In addition, Barrier construction in the Khirbet Jubara enclave as a whole, including the new and old route, have resulted in the levelling of roughly 700 dunums of Khirbet Jubara’s land and the uprooting of some 1,000 olive trees.

Much like in other “Seam Zone” enclaves, emergency services will continue to require prior coordination to access land located behind the Barrier, a requirement that has often resulted in significant delays or denied access. In May 2012, for example, some 1,700 dunums of agricultural land were severely damaged, including 850 olive trees, in the Khirbet Jubara “Seam Zone” when Palestinian Authority fire brigades were delayed from accessing the area.

NEW PROJECT STRENGTHENS RESILIENCE IN HERDING COMMUNITIES IN AREA C

Preventing displacement in Al Ganoub, South Hebron

Al Ganoub (population 180) is a remote Bedouin and herder community, located in a part of Area C of the West Bank. The community, located roughly 5 km. from Sa’ir in the Hebron Governorate, is surrounded by four Israeli settlements and settlement outposts.¹⁸ Residents rely on a herd of some 2,500 goats and sheep as their main source of livelihood.

Al Ganoub is representative of many Bedouin or herder communities in Area C: it faces difficult access to services and no infrastructure, lacking a paved access road and without connection to the electricity grid or to the water and sewage network. Its residents rely

**This piece was provided by FAO.*



Tents and animal sheds in Al Ganoub, near Sa'ir, in the West Bank Governorate of Hebron.

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Area C communities cope with a range of daily pressures that, combined, place many of the residents at high-risk of displacement.

on tankered water for domestic and agricultural needs, at vastly increased costs. In this context, water consumption in some of these communities dips to 20 litres per capita per day, one-fifth of the WHO's recommendation. The community also copes with a range of other daily pressures, including settler violence and takeover of land and the threat of demolitions, all of which combined place the community's residents at high-risk of displacement.¹⁹

Recognizing the particularly vulnerable situation of communities like Al Ganoub, Bedouin and herder communities in Area C form one of the priority areas for humanitarian intervention identified in the 2013 Consolidated Appeal for the oPt. Within this context the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), with the support of the Government of Canada, is implementing a project that seeks to protect farmers' livelihoods and prevent displacement, with improved access to affordable water as its main component.

Most herder communities – particularly in the eastern and southern parts of the West Bank, where Al Ganoub lies – receive very low amounts of rainfall and can also be located in difficult areas for tanker trucks to reach. Tankered water costs, on average 50 NIS per cubic metre (including transport cost of the water), compared to a cost of 5 NIS from the water network of nearby Sa'ir. In Al Ganoub, water transport accounted for more than one-half of the cost of the water itself and 25 per cent of the overall cost of inputs necessary for herding.

In Al Ganoub, in order to improve the community's access to water and reduce related costs, FAO invested in the rehabilitation of the community's existing, although dilapidated, rainwater cisterns. Project beneficiaries report improvement on many levels: "I have 500 goats," said Jamil Muhammad Shaldeh. "I now save 150 NIS per day that I used to pay for tankered water. Also, if we need to buy water, because the rainfall levels are low, we can now bring larger quantities and save on transport." Another resident, Zouhour Shaladeh, reports: "I used to have to carry water to the tents on a daily basis,

sometimes riding a donkey 5-6 times a day to far away cisterns. Now the water is much closer and easier to reach.”

In total, nine cisterns in the area were rehabilitated for public use, benefiting the entire community. FAO’s efforts are implemented in close cooperation with the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture and other local partners, such as the YMCA. Herding communities in a similar situation to Al Ganoub -- located in Area C with limited access to, and high costs of, water pre-intervention – are given priority. The large storage capacity, and subsequent cheaper access to water, significantly lowers households’ water costs, thus, increasing their resilience in these drought-prone and highly vulnerable areas. In total, activities undertaken as part of this project will benefit roughly 4,000 households in six different governorates across the West Bank.



According to FAO, for every USD 1 invested in community cisterns, USD 77 is saved in water costs, making humanitarian interventions in communal cisterns one of the most cost effective responses. However, under the CAP 2013, emergency water-related interventions for agriculture are under-funded and require urgent attention.²⁰

End notes

1. For example, following the extension of the fishing area in November 2012, many fishermen invested in expensive equipment, including lights designed to attract fish from up to 10 NM, in order to maximize their fishing catch at 6 nm. The announced reduction of the fishing area to 3 nm, in March 2013, left these fishermen in fear that they were worse off than they had been prior to the expansion of the fishing area.
2. This information was published on COGAT’s website on 25 February 2013, but later removed.
3. This information was included in a 10 March 2013 letter sent to the Israeli human rights organization GISHA.
4. Protection Cluster “Analytical Update on the Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip: Monitoring of access to land in the ‘buffer zone’ following the 21 November 2012 agreement,” May 2013.: available at http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Occupied_Palestinian/files/oPt_PC_Analytical_Update_Access_Land_in_ARA_05.2013_EN2013.pdf.
5. Three men were killed in the ARA in separate incidents where groups of youth were gathered, in some cases demonstrating, in areas close to the fence following the ceasefire.
6. Since a court ruling in 2011, court guarantees must be paid for each individual claimant in a case, significantly increasing the sum payable where there are multiple victims: where cases are dismissed, claimants are charged with the State’s legal costs, which are taken from the court guarantee.
7. Various legislative amendments have expanded the definition of a military operation. Most recently, in July 2012, an amendment (Amendment no. 8) to the *Torts (State Liability) Law* was passed, with retroactive application to 12 September 2005, giving courts the power to dismiss cases on this basis at the preliminary stage, without hearing witnesses or considering evidence. The Israeli Southern Central

Court in Be'er Sheva has ruled that the exemption applies even if the victim could substantiate a claim that damage was sustained as a result of a violation of international humanitarian law.

8. See "School rehabilitation in Gaza following 'Pillar of Defence,'" in the March 2013 Humanitarian Monitor. The planned activities are currently carried out by two local civil society partners and the MoE. The Palestinian Centre for Democracy and Conflict Resolution (PCDCR) manages five emergency psychosocial support teams and other psychosocial professionals. MA'AN Development Centre (MA'AN) manages the Family Centres and Adolescent Friendly Spaces, providing targeted outreach services to the most vulnerable children. The MoE is investing in building its counsellors' capacity to better respond to the crisis, focussing on sustainable approaches that can be replicated and employed in response to similar events in the future.
9. Together, each year these three mechanisms reach around 50,000 children and adolescents and their caregivers.
10. The Family Centres and Adolescent Friendly Spaces were established as community resources for emergency preparedness and response targeting children, adolescents and their caregivers. They help families affected by the conflict rebuild their lives, and provide a place where children and their caregivers can receive a variety of protection services, such as psychosocial care, UXO risk education, first aid training, recreational activities and structured learning opportunities. These Centres are located in the marginalized and/or high-risk areas, such as refugee camps and the vicinity of Access Restricted Area.
11. See Article 43 of the annex to the Hague Regulations of 1907 and article 27 of The Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
12. See Yesh Din, "A Semblance of Law: Law Enforcement upon Israeli Civilians in the West Bank," 2006 and the official report of Advocate Talia Sasson, *Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts*, 31 March 2005.
13. B'Tselem, "Security forces fail to protect Palestinians from settler attacks in incidents documented by B'Tselem over last three months," 29 May 2013. B'Tselem has written to the Israeli authorities, calling for investigations into settlers' activities and the conduct of Israeli soldiers in these cases.
14. *Law Enforcement Upon Israeli Civilians in the West Bank*, Yesh Din Monitoring, 2005-2011, March 2012. <http://www.yesh-din.org/infoitem.asp?infocaid=190>. Yesh Din has filed 17 complaints on behalf of Palestinians for settler attacks during May 2013.
15. In assessing the vulnerability of each community, the following criteria were taken into account: a) frequency of violence; b) gravity of violence; and c) isolation of the community. See August 2012 issue of the Humanitarian Monitor for additional details of the assessment.
16. Testimonies included herein were given to OCHA oPt on 30 May 2013.
17. Students' numbers include elementary through university students. The opening of an elementary school in the village in 2012 reduced the number of students passing each day from approximately 100 to 60.
18. Pnei Kedem, Asfar (Mezad), Ibei Hanahal and Ma'ale Amos.
19. In March and April 2013, the Israeli authorities distributed demolition orders affecting all the structures in their village, including dwellings, tents, animal sheds and water cisterns, etc.. Their case is currently under review in Israel's courts. Residents also report violent altercations with nearby Israeli settlers. For example, in late March 2013, approximately ten settlers, some of whom were armed, held herders from Al Ganoub at gun point while their dog attacked the herder's animals, subsequently killing two goats. In another case, last year, 30 of the community's olive trees were completely destroyed by settlers from Asfar (Mezad) settlement. Residents report that the most damaging effects of these incidents are inflicted upon children and says many of the community's young people are unable to sleep and in a constant state of fear due to such attacks. Al Ganoub's children go to school in Sa'ir (roughly 5 km away) and the community pays a daily rate of 70 NIS to cover their transportation costs.
20. Project OPT-13/A/52233/123, submitted by FAO, focuses on 80 water harvesting structures and project OPT-13/A/52205, submitted by the Swedish Cooperative Centre (SCC), focuses on 50 water harvesting structures.

CONTRIBUTING AGENCIES

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), Al Haq, Badil, Save the Children (UK), Defence for Children International – Palestine Section (DCI-PS), Oxfam GB, Palestine Hydrology Group (PHG), Campaign for the Right to Enter, Action Against Hunger (ACF),

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Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables

Conflict-related casualties and violence¹

Direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict related casualties	2011	2012				2013				
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May
Palestinian deaths										
Gaza	108	14	180	2	253	2	0	0	1	0
West Bank	17	0	3	2	9	4	3*	2	2	0
Total	125	14	177	4	262	6	3	2	3	0
Of whom are civilians ²	62	0	114	4	136	6	3	2	2	0
Of whom are female	3	0	22	0	23	1	0	0	0	0
Palestinian injuries										
Gaza	468	29	1516**	21	1834	14	10	5	4	2
West Bank	1647	57	740	177	3175	254	756	492	657	458
Total	2115	86	2257	198	5009	268	766	497	661	460
Of whom are civilians	2054	59	na	179	n/a	268	766	496	660	460
Of whom are female	151	8	na	13	n/a	8	13	14	9	12
Israeli deaths										
Israel, Gaza and West Bank	11	0	6	0	7	0	0	0	1	0
Of whom are civilians	11	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	1	0
Of whom are female	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Israeli injuries										
Israel, Gaza and West Bank	122	1	253***	6	345	6	24	42****	18	33
Of whom are civilians	56	6	na	4	60	3	11	18	4	14
Of whom are female	3	0	na	1	7	0	1	1	2	4

*The figure includes two Palestinians who died of injuries they sustained by Israeli forces during the second intifada and by Israeli settlers in 2005

** Figures include those provided by the Ministry of Health in Gaza during the recent Israeli offensive on Gaza (14-21 November)

*** Figures by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**** The number of injured Israeli soldiers is provided by COGAT

Tunnel-related casualties ³	2011	2012				2013				
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May
Deaths	36	0	0	0	11	6	2	2	1	3
Injuries	54	0	0	0	18	6	0	12	1	1

Israeli-settler related incidents resulting in casualties or property damage	2011	2012				2013				
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May
Incidents leading to Palestinian casualties ⁴	120	11	7	10	98	7	8	11	17	9
Incidents leading to Palestinian property/land damages	291	48	20	18	268	17	19	14	34	43
Incidents leading to Israeli Casualties	23	3	5	5	35	2	2	9	4	5
Incidents leading to Israeli Property/land damages ⁵	13	0	1	1	15	2	0	0	2	0

Civilian Palestinians killed or injured by unexploded ordnance in Gaza	2011	2012				2013					
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	
Adult	Injured	7	1	0	1	12	1	0	0	1	2
	Killed	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Child	Injured	17	2	0	0	19	5	5	6	0	3
	Killed	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Grand Total	27	3	1	1	34	7	6	6	1	5	

Source: United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

Search and Arrest

	2011	2012				2013				
	Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
Search Campaigns (West Bank)	349	319	291	367	338	313	287	282	338	370
Palestinians detained (West Bank)	262	318	468	391	283	296	411	421	367	459

Source: OCHA


Palestinians under Israeli custody (occupation related)⁶

	2011	2012				2013				
	Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
Total as of the end of the month	5326	4298	4432	4517	4,451	4593	4713	4764	4748	4801
of whom are women	26	11	10	10	7	10	10	11	14	16
of whom are administrative detainees ⁷	240	156	178	178	245	159	169	164	155	147
of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	633	925	990	1031	897	1069	1118	1196	1216	1194

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through BTselem)

Demolition of Structures


Structures demolished⁸



	2011	2012				2013				
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
of which in Area C	571	81	28	19	540	120	11	1	40	39
of which in East Jerusalem	42	2	7	6	64	21	3	1	6	11
Grand Total	613	83	35	25	604	141	14	2	46	50

*20 are in Area B

People Displaced due to demolitions or evictions⁹



	2011	2012				2013				
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
of whom were displaced in Area C	1006	129	0	14	808	243	6	0	40	28
of whom were displaced in East Jerusalem	88	6	29	19	71	14	42	10	24	59
Grand Total	1094	135	29	33	879	257	48	10	64	87

Source: Displacement Working Group

Child Protection

Number of Palestinian children killed - direct conflict

	2011	2012				2013				
	Total	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
West Bank	2	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	0
Gaza Strip	11	0	40	0	44	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Palestinian children injured - direct conflict

West Bank	308	7	222	29	427	36	146	162	291	64
Gaza Strip	125	10	24 - without Gaza war	4	105	3	3	0	2	0

Number of Israeli children killed - direct conflict

oPt	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Israeli children injured - direct conflict

oPt	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	4	0	0
Israel	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Palestinian children held in detention by Israeli authorities

In Israel and oPt	192 monthly average	164	178	195	198 monthly average	219	236	236	238	219
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Number of Palestinian children displaced by demolitions

West Bank, inc EJ	618	87	14	10	474	156	23	5	38	41
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Number of incidents resulting in the disruption of schools¹⁹

oPt	na	4	297	2	321	1	7	4	NA	NA
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Source: OCHA, DWG, Defence for Children International, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violations affecting children in armed conflict

Access

Access to healthcare - Gaza

	2011	2012				2013				
	2011 Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	2012 Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing ¹⁵	872	789	725	894	777	796	907	882	1155	1117
of which approved	721	705	629	820	719	738	836	762	957	900
of which denied	19	6	5	4	7	2	2	1	0	1
of which delayed ¹⁶	83	78	91	70	17	56	69	119	198	216


Source: WHO

Movement of humanitarian staff, West Bank

	2011	2012				2013				
	2011 Monthly Average	Oct	Nov	Dec	2012 monthly ave	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
Incidents of delayed or denied access at WB checkpoint ¹⁷	38	60	40	22	37.5	34	69	51	24	51
Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint	22	28	26	15	21	18	52	33	10	32
Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents	25	36	16	6	21	8	29	17	6	16

Source: OCHA

Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel



Source: Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, Gaza

* Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.

Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): CAP 2012 and 2013

funding status as of 21 May 2013

Cluster	CAP 2012		CAP 2013	
	Total request in million \$	% of funds received	Total request in million \$	% of funds received
Agriculture	24,921,339	61.4%	31,665,733	33.2%
Cash for Work and Cash Assistance	95,559,928	34.9%	70,481,900	15.1%
Cluster not yet specified	0	0.0%	91,733	197.9%
Coordination and Support Services	21,167,518	95.7%	21,295,527	31.1%
Education	16,662,763	54.7%	21,779,922	21.2%
Food Security	170,513,876	83.0%	160,052,254	51.5%
Health and Nutrition	20,742,170	86.6%	22,536,007	34.6%
Protection	46,131,077	73.8%	55,799,858	38.8%
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	24,208,531	55.8%	19,307,048	7.2%
Total	419,907,202	71.8%	403,009,982	52.8%

Source: Financial Tracking System (FTS)

Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

Casualties

1. **Conflict-related casualties:** includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and internal Palestinian violence.
2. **Civilians:** includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a “continuous combatant function” as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
3. **Tunnel related casualties:** figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

Israeli settler-related violence

4. **Incidents resulting in casualties:** includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
5. **Incidents resulting in property damage/losses:** *ibid.*

Search and Arrest

6. **Palestinians in Israeli custody:** includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a “security detainee/prisoner”. Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a “regular” criminal offense.
7. **Administrative detainees:** Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

Demolitions

8. **Structures demolished:** includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
9. **People displaced due to demolitions:** includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
10. **People affected by demolitions:** includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

Access West Bank

11. **Permanently staffed checkpoints:** staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and ‘agricultural gates’ along the Barrier.
12. **Partially staffed checkpoints:** checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
13. **Unstaffed obstacles:** includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
14. **‘Flying’ or random checkpoints:** checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

Access to health

15. **Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez:** includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
16. **Delayed applications:** includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

Movement of humanitarian staff

17. **Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint:** includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.

Imports to Gaza

18. **Truckloads by type:** for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.