

# HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN MONTHLY REPORT

APRIL 2014



## HIGHLIGHTS

- Increased shortages of essential items in the Gaza Strip due to the closure of the single commercial crossing on Jewish holidays and following rocket firing.
- Extensive areas in the Bethlehem governorate seized by the Israeli authorities for settlement expansion.
- Increased concern over the potential forcible transfer of Bedouin communities around the EI area, to the east of Jerusalem.

## Overview:

### Gaza crossings must remain open continuously

This month, on the occasion of Passover (the Feast of Freedom), the Israeli authorities closed the Kerem Shalom crossing, the single conduit for the entry and exit of goods to and from Gaza, for four days. The crossing was also partially closed on three additional days during the month in response to the firing of rockets at southern Israel by Palestinian armed groups, in addition to the closure on Fridays and Saturdays.

As a result, the volume of goods that entered Gaza during April was the lowest recorded since October 2011, leading to shortages of some essential items, including dairy products and fruits. The closures also exacerbated the pre-existing shortages of fuel, cooking gas and construction materials. The main reason for the shortage of building materials is Israel's longstanding import restrictions in the context of the blockade. This situation has worsened since July 2013

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
## APRIL FIGURES

Palestinian civilians killed (direct conflict)	0
Palestinian civilians injured (direct conflict)	284
Structures demolished in the West Bank	91
People displaced in the West Bank	179

## STRATEGIC RESPONSE PLAN 2014

394 million  
requested (US\$)

31.5% funded



Queue at a Gas filling station, Gaza City, April 2014

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Coordination Saves Lives



following the halt in the smuggling of building materials from Egypt via the tunnels, driving a steep increase in the unemployment rate to the highest level in four years – 43 per cent (relaxed definition) in the first quarter of 2014. On a positive note, towards the end of April the Israeli authorities announced that most international projects requiring the import of construction materials, including UN projects, would be allowed to resume.

In the West Bank, this month also witnessed negative developments in two fronts, affecting already vulnerable Palestinian communities. Following a significant decline in the previous two months, the number of demolitions and displacements in Area C spiked again in April, including a remarkable increase in the number of donor-funded structures targeted. The Israeli authorities also issued a number of demolition and eviction orders on Bedouin and herder communities in the hills to the east of Jerusalem, increasing risks of forcible transfer.

Secondly, in April, the Israel authorities granted final approval for the establishment of a new settlement in the heart of Hebron city and issued a military order declaring extensive areas in the Gush Etzion settlement area of Bethlehem as “state land”. The allocation and subsequent development of this land by adjacent settlements is expected to further impede the access of Palestinian farmers to their land and undermine their agricultural livelihoods.

To prevent further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, the crossing with the external world must be opened continuously and the restrictions on the entry and exit of goods lifted, subject only to legitimate security considerations. In the West Bank, it is imperative to suspend the demolitions and displacement in Area C and ensure that a fair and transparent planning system is put in place. All settlement activities should be halted; “state lands” are a public resource, which, under international law, should be allocated for the benefit of the Palestinian population.

## RESTRICTIONS ON KEREM SHALOM HIGHLIGHT HUMAN VULNERABILITY IN GAZA

Lowest volume of imports since October 2011

Since the progressive closure of the three other Israeli-controlled commercial crossings, Kerem Shalom has remained as the sole crossing point for imports and exports to and from Gaza. In April, Kerem Shalom was only open for 15 full days out of a potential 26 working days (including Fridays). There were four days of closure for Jewish holidays and another three days of partial closure in response to Palestinian rocket fire from Gaza at Israel; on these days the crossing was exceptionally open for the entry of fuel and for 49 truckloads of goods, including food supplies and animal feed. Overall, 3,519 truckloads of goods entered Gaza via Kerem Shalom in April, compared with a monthly average of 4,267 truckloads during first quarter of the year. This was the lowest figure recorded in more than two and a half years and represents approximately 30 per cent of the 12,350 truckloads that entered monthly via all crossings (Karni, Sufa, Nahal Oz) during the first five months of 2007 prior to the imposition of the blockade.<sup>1</sup>

*To prevent further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, the crossing with the external world must be opened continuously and the restrictions on the entry and exit of goods lifted, subject only to legitimate security considerations.*

**ABEER ADNAN AL NEMNEM, 41 YEARS OLD, AL SHATA REFUGEE CAMP**

*We live a very miserable life in Gaza. My husband is unemployed due to health problems and I work in a kindergarten for 300 NIS a month. We are a family with 10 children, most of whom go to school except the youngest. We struggle every day to meet our children's growing needs and to put food on their plates. In addition, we have to cope with problems beyond our control, such as electricity cuts, water shortages and lack of cooking gas.*

*The shortage of cooking gas is every mother's nightmare. If we run out of gas, we have to wait for more than three weeks to get our gas cylinder refilled. We cannot afford a backup cylinder as we are too poor. During these three weeks, I sometimes use a small gas cylinder to light the house for food preparation during electricity cuts. When the small cylinder runs out, I try to time preparing the food with the electricity cuts schedule, using an unsafe electric cooking stove to prepare simple meals such as fried potatoes or eggs or boiling milk for the children. The stove is not safe because of the poor electricity supply and because it is low on the ground and I'm always afraid one of the children will knock it over and burn themselves.*

*It often happens that the children wake up at night during electricity cuts and I cannot even prepare milk for them. It's even worse when my children have to go to school without breakfast or even a cup of milk or tea. The same thing happens when they come back from school - no food if there is no gas or electricity. Our house is small; I cannot build a wood stove to prepare food for the children to reduce the risks from the electric stove. My children are exposed to danger every time we run out of gas, but what can I do?*

Since the beginning of 2012, at least 18 people, including 16 children, have been killed and 11 others, including nine children, injured in their houses in electricity-related incidents, according to the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights

*The volume of imports in April was the lowest in more than two and a half years and represents approximately 30 per cent of equivalent figure in 2007 prior to the imposition of the blockade.*



Abeer Adnan Al Nemnem Al Shata refugee camp

## THE GRADUAL SHUTDOWN OF GAZA COMMERCIAL CROSSINGS

In June 2007, the Karni crossing, which served as the main crossing for goods, was closed; a single conveyor belt was left in partial service for grain, animal feed and (from summer 2010) gravel until it closed in March 2011. The Sufa crossing, used mainly for the transfer of building materials, closed in 2008. The Nahal Oz crossing, through which fuel was transferred into the Gaza Strip, closed in 2010. Physical and administrative restrictions are also imposed at Kerem Shalom, with prohibitions on the entry of goods in shipping containers.

The restricted operation of Kerem Shalom has led to reduced entry of food items such as dairy products and fruit, among other essential items, and has compounded the ongoing shortages of fuel, construction materials and cooking gas (see case study below). The supply of fuel and construction materials to Gaza has been reduced since July 2013 when the Egyptian authorities began to close down the smuggling tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza border in the context of military operations in the Sinai.<sup>2</sup> In recent years, these tunnels were primarily used to smuggle cheap subsidized Egyptian fuel and construction materials for the private sector, whose entry through the Kerem Shalom crossing remains restricted by Israel.

As a partial response to the lack of construction materials in the private market, in September 2013 the Israeli authorities increased the number of truckloads for commercial use allowed in through Kerem Shalom. However, in October, following the discovery of an underground tunnel from the Gaza Strip into Israel, the entry of basic construction materials was halted for both the commercial sector and for international organizations; UNRWA, for example, the largest implementing agency, was forced to halt 30 construction projects. In early December, the Israeli authorities announced the partial lifting of the ban on the import of basic construction materials for international projects, although the ban on the import of construction materials for the private sector remains in place. Clearance to resume work was given at the end of April for 20 of these 30 projects, worth over US \$90 million and at various stages of implementation. UNRWA is still awaiting clearance to resume ten projects previously approved by the Israeli authorities and worth US \$24.6 million.

The amount of fuel that entered Gaza through Kerem Shalom in April was the lowest recorded since the beginning of 2014. Overall, around 17.7 million litres of fuel (except cooking gas) entered compared with around 21 million litres on average per month since the beginning of 2014. The decline was mainly in industrial fuel for the Gaza Power Plant (GPP); 6.2 million litres of fuel compared with 7.3 million litres in March. As a result, on 11 April, the GPP was forced to shut down one of its two operating turbines in anticipation of the closure of Kerem Shalom crossing and the resulting reduction in fuel supply; the duration of the scheduled outages, however, did not increase. The second turbine resumed operation on 15 April, after four days of complete shutdown. The plant needs around 16 million litres of fuel per month in order to run at full capacity and produce around 120 megawatts.

*“The shortage of cooking gas is every mother’s nightmare. If we run out of gas, we have to wait for more than three weeks to get our gas cylinder refilled”*

Abeer Al Nemnem, Al Shata refugee camp.



## MASSIVE LAND SEIZURE IN BETHLEHEM GOVERNORATE

Settlement development in the areas seized may undermine agricultural livelihoods

On 6 April, the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) issued a military order declaring nearly 1,000 dunums of land in Area C in western Bethlehem governorate, as “government property” or “state land”. Following the issuance of the orders, the ICA deployed signs in Hebrew and Arabic next to some of the plots with the words: “State land – trespassing is prohibited”. While declarations of state land served in the past as the main tool for the seizure of land to establish settlements, its use has been largely discontinued since the early 1990s. Hence, the resumption of this practice and the large size of the affected area may indicate a broader policy change.

### FAWZI SALAH, 70, RESIDENT OF AL KHADER, FATHER OF NINE

*I own a small piece of land which is not cultivated near the fence of El'azar settlement that falls within the area of the confiscation order. All the land in this order belongs to members of my extended family or to my neighbours. We stopped cultivating these plots because of Israeli restrictions and the high costs involved. Many times our bulldozers were confiscated when we attempted to level the land.*

*My biggest fear is about the future of another plot of 120 dunums I own and cultivate nearby. All my children and their families rely to some extent on the income from that land. If the settlement is expanded in the confiscated area, as we saw many times in the past, the only road leading to that plot will be blocked or also confiscated. Three years ago the Sde Bo'az outpost included only one caravan, but look at it now. It's a small village and the settlers there attack and intimidate us all the time when we are working the land.*



*The development of the areas declared as “state land” by settlements is expected to further impede access by Palestinian farmers to hundreds of dunums, which have not been seized and are currently cultivated.*

The parcels of land are located within the fiscal boundaries (land division for taxation purposes) of the Al Khader, Nahhalin and Beit 'Ummar villages. Several residents of these villages claim ownership over parts of the land, although due to a range of constraints in recent years they have not cultivated or otherwise used it, except for a small area (20 dunums). Under Israeli military legislation, they have 45 days to submit an objection to a military appeals committee before the ICA formally takes possession of the land; if the objection is rejected, the affected individuals can petition the Israeli Supreme Court.<sup>3</sup>

In practice, some of the plots had already been taken over by Israeli settlers in past years and the declaration of “state land” appears to be part of a process towards the retroactive “legalization” of the takeovers. These plots include a settlement outpost (Netiv Ha'avot) established in 2001 on land claimed by residents of Al Khader as their private property; some 50 settler families currently reside there.<sup>4</sup> Another ten parcels of land were taken over and cultivated by settlers.<sup>5</sup>

Based on previous practice, once the declaration of “state land” is finally endorsed, the land is formally allocated to Israeli settlements for development. Given the spatial distribution of the affected parcels, their development will encircle a large section of the Gush Etzion area, connecting and creating territorial contiguity between the settlements of El'azar, Allon Shvut, Rosh Zurim, Neve Danyyel and Efrata (see map).

#### WHAT IS A “STATE LAND”?

Following a 1979 landmark ruling by the Israel Supreme Court (the Elon Moreh case), forbidding the allocation of land requisitioned for military purposes for the establishment of settlements, the Israeli authorities developed a new policy based on a controversial interpretation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858.<sup>12</sup> Despite many amendments introduced since, the Code has remained in force as the main source to regulate land rights issues in the West Bank.

The new policy builds on a provision of the Code stipulating that the state may take possession of land that is not cultivated for three consecutive years and turn it into “state land”. The policy includes a new and restrictive interpretation of what constitutes “cultivation” for the purposes of the Code, as well as a range of bureaucratic and legal hurdles undermining the ability of Palestinians to effectively challenge such land seizures.

In the context of this policy, the Israeli authorities have declared nearly 1.3 million dunums, or approximately 43 per cent of today's Area C, as state land. The vast majority of the declarations and seizures took place between 1979 and 1992. Another 17 per cent of Area C, approximately, was declared as state land during the British and Jordanian periods in a different context and using different procedures.

According to Israeli official data, over 99 percent of all state land in Area C has been included within the jurisdictional boundaries of Israeli settlements (local and regional councils) and subsequently allocated for settlement or closed military training purposes.<sup>13</sup>



An ICA committee provided final endorsement to prior declarations of land as “state land” carried out during the 1980’s in some 30 separate sites across the West Bank comprising approximately 28,000 dunums.





OCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

# "STATE LAND" DECLARATION IN THE GUSH ETZION SETTLEMENT AREA (BETHLEHEM)

April 2014



Source: Dror Etkes, Kerem Navot

Such development is expected to further impede access by Palestinian farmers to hundreds of dunums of private land lying within the encircled area, which have not been seized and are currently cultivated. In dozens of similar cases across the West Bank, where Palestinian private land falls within or in close proximity to a settlement built up area, access of farmers has been restricted by a “prior coordination” system, which undermines agricultural practices and livelihoods.<sup>6</sup> Access to agricultural land in the Gush Etzion area will be further impeded if the Barrier is completed as planned, separating these lands from the Bethlehem urban area, where some of the landowners reside.<sup>7</sup>

Also this month, the Ministry of Defense presented an overview of Israeli measures adopted by the ICA in Area C during 2013 to a sub-committee of the Israeli parliament. According to reports of this event in the Israeli media, during this period an ICA committee known as the “Blue Line Team” provided final endorsement to prior declarations of land as “state land” carried out during the 1980’s in some 30 separate sites across the West Bank comprising approximately 28,000 dunums.<sup>8</sup> While these lands have already been seized and included within the municipal boundaries of settlements, under Israeli procedures, this endorsement is a pre-condition for actual planning and construction on them.

From the VPP  
on Area C<sup>11</sup>

In approximately half of the residential areas in Area C (268 out of 532) people reported that the Confiscation or requisition of land is one of their main protection concerns.

Finally, on 13 April, the Israeli Minister of Defense granted his approval for the purchase of the Al Rajabi building in the H2 area of Hebron city by Israeli settlers. This follows an Israeli Supreme Court decision issued last month rejecting an appeal by Palestinians challenging the validity of the transaction.<sup>9</sup> On the same day, three settler families moved into the property and 10 other families will reportedly move in once renovation of the building is complete. This is the fifth settlement established in the heart of Hebron city. So far, the movement of Palestinian students in the vicinity of the settlement has not been affected, although some incidents of settler harassment have been reported.<sup>10</sup>

## DEMOLITIONS DISPLACE NEARLY 180 PEOPLE

Bedouin communities in Area C at risk of forcible transfer

Following a significant decline in the previous two months, the overall number of demolitions of Palestinian structures and the related displacement of people across the West Bank spiked again in April (91 and 179 respectively), well above the monthly averages documented in 2013 (55 and 92).

The majority of the 87 demolitions this month took place in Area C. Around a third (30) of the targeted structures were located in the Jordan Valley and the remaining distributed across various areas of the West Bank. Half of the structures were demolished on two days (1 and 29 April) in three Bedouin communities: Al Jaw’wana (13) and Humsa al Buqai’a (14) in the Jordan Valley, and Tell al Khashabah (17) in Nablus. Overall, 171 people residing in Area C were displaced due to demolitions during the month, half of them children.

There was a remarkable increase in the number of donor-funded structures demolished in April: 26 structures in six demolition incidents compared with a monthly average of nine in the past three months of 2014 and ten in 2013.



There was a remarkable increase in the number of donor-funded structures demolished in April. In total, 26 structures were demolished in six demolition incidents compared with a monthly average of nine in the past three months of 2014 and ten in 2013. In five of the incidents, 11 residential structures were demolished, displacing over 100 people. In addition, 35 donor-funded structures received stop-work or demolition orders, placing 170 other people at risk of displacement.

Of particular concern this month were measures adopted by the Israeli authorities that increase the risk of forcible transfer of Bedouin and herder communities in the hills to the east of Jerusalem. These included a new wave of demolition and stop-work orders in the community of Jabal al Baba, targeting the same families that received stop-work orders in late February 2014. In addition, eviction orders were issued against at least three families in Sateh al Bahr, a community partially located on a “firing zone” that benefits from a shelter and sanitation project funded by an international donor. The community managed to obtain a judicial injunction freezing the eviction orders for 45 days.


These developments take place in the context of a broader plan advanced by the Israeli authorities to “relocate” most Bedouin communities across Area C into several sites adjacent to Area A. The area in the Jerusalem periphery referred to above appears to be a high priority in the context of this plan; at the Israeli High Court of Justice this month, a petition was submitted by the Kfar Adumim settlement demanding the implementation of a demolition order against the Khan Al Ahmar elementary school, which serves 128 children. According to the state attorney, the outline plan for the site identified for the relocation of this community (Nuweimeh) is about to be deposited for public review.

Much of the area in question has been allocated for the expansion of Israeli settlements, including the construction of thousands of settlement housing and commercial units between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and Jerusalem as part of the E1 plan, and large areas are also planned to be surrounded by the Barrier.

Also this month, four structures were demolished in East Jerusalem, two of which were residential. Eight people were displaced, significantly lower than the monthly average (28) since the beginning of the year. One of the structures in Jabal al Mukabbir was demolished by its owner to comply with the demolition order and avoid additional expenses applicable if the demolition were to be carried out by the authorities.

*Recent demolitions take place in the context of a broader plan advanced by the Israeli authorities to “relocate” most Bedouin communities across Area C into several sites adjacent to Area A.*

### Demolitions and displacement in Area C and East Jerusalem






OCHA

# BEDOUIN COMMUNITIES IN E-1/MA'ALE ADUMIM SETTLEMENT AREA AT HEIGHTENED RISK OF FORCIBLE TRANSFER

May 2014



## IMPACT OF THE BARRIER ON ACCESS TO EDUCATION

By deviating from the Green Line, the Barrier has impacted access to essential services for Palestinians who reside in areas between the Green Line and the Barrier (the 'Seam Zone'). In recent years, re-routings of the Barrier have removed certain Palestinian communities from the 'Seam Zone' and reconnected them to the remainder of the West Bank. However, some 11,000 Palestinians, including students, must still pass through checkpoints to access education, health, and other services on the Palestinian side of the Barrier. Access to education is also affected in East Jerusalem, where the Barrier is transforming the geography, economy and social life not only of Palestinians who reside within the Israeli-defined municipal area, but also residents of the wider metropolitan area.

### **The case of Nazlat Issa**

Nazlat Issa, population 2,650, is a community in the Tulkarm governorate in the northern West Bank. In the initial completion of the Barrier, Nazlat Issa was located between the Barrier and the Green Line with adjoining Palestinian communities. A re-routing in 2004 returned these communities to the 'West Bank' side of the Barrier, except for a section of Nazlat Issa consisting of seven households.

As with other communities left between the Barrier and the Green Line, those in the Nazlat Issa enclave who are over 16 years of age require permanent resident permits to be able to live in and access their homes. Moreover, children under 16 must carry copies of their birth certificates and/or a parent's ID card. The enclave lacks basic health, education and other services, including shops, obliging residents to pass through a checkpoint to reach workplaces and essential services and to maintain family and social relations; the checkpoint opens daily between 06:00-22:00. The entry of dairy products, meat and eggs is restricted and service providers require permits to enter the enclave. In case of medical emergencies, an ambulance needs permission to cross. Social isolation is compounded by non-resident Palestinians, including family members and school friends, requiring permits to visit the enclave.

On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The ICJ recognized that Israel 'has to face numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts of violence against its civilian population' and that it 'has the right, and indeed the duty, to respond in order to protect the life of its citizens. [However], the measures taken are bound nonetheless to remain in conformity with applicable international law.'

The ICJ stated that the sections of the Barrier route that run inside the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, violated Israel's obligations under international law. The ICJ called on Israel to cease construction of the Barrier 'including in and around East Jerusalem'; dismantle the sections already completed; and 'repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto'.

In the lead up to the tenth anniversary of the ICJ advisory opinion in July 2014, OCHA is issuing a series of articles in the Humanitarian Bulletin to highlight the continuing humanitarian impact of the Barrier. This month's feature examines the Barrier's impact on access to education.

*Some 11,000 Palestinians who reside in areas between the Green Line and the Barrier, including students, must pass through checkpoints to access education, health, and other services on the Palestinian side of the Barrier.*





Sixteen students (eight females) from the enclave attend schools in Nazlat Issa have been affected. In April, UNICEF and OCHA interviewed these children, ranging from six to 18 years of age, who must pass through the Barrier to access their schools. The pupils have to pass through a gate and multiple-component security system on their daily journey to and from school. Both

genders prefer to cross in a group, with the girls in particular reporting that their parents objected to them passing unaccompanied through the checkpoint. The security process can involve the removal of jacket/shoes and there are no female soldiers on duty.

Although there have been no reports of access denied, the children can be delayed at the gate while they wait for soldiers to summon them, sometimes for up to half an hour, with longer delays if a change in shift is involved. This can result in children arriving late for school in the morning and the opening hours can make it difficult for them to take part in extra-curricular activities. Some boys complained that the 22:00 closing time was too early in summer. Some boys also reported that soldiers try to provoke or harass then when they cross, especially if they are accompanying the girls. Some children have had guns pointed at them 'for fun', or have witnessed individuals without permits being detained and handcuffed/blindfolded.

In general, the children complained about being constantly monitored/controlled from the checkpoint and the stress of remembering to carry identification documents. One boy reported having to bring his father to the checkpoint on multiple occasions as his photocopy was torn. Another boy who looks older than his 15 years carries his mother's ID card (an Israeli citizen) permanently rather than a photocopy to prove his age and identity.

The main regret was the social impact of the isolation and the inability to receive school friends and family members at home. All social events and rites of passage, including birthday parties, religious holidays, wedding and wakes, have to be held on the 'West Bank' side of the Barrier.

Many expressed a wish for the Barrier to be removed or for the enclave to be reunited with the rest of the village on the 'West Bank' side. Although determined not to leave the enclave, most simply wished to be able to live 'like any other child in the world'. However, the teachers confirm that the Barrier has not led to any drop-outs from the educational system and the academic performance of these children was judged to be above normal. This determination was reflected in the children's ambitions, especially the girls, for professional careers as doctors, lawyers, engineers and teachers.

Although there have been no reports of access denied, the children of Nazlat Issa enclave can be delayed at the gate while they wait for soldiers to summon them, sometimes for up to half an hour, with longer delays if a change in shift is involved.

### **The case of 'Alfe Menashe enclave'**

To the south of Nazlat Issa, another two communities in Qalqiliya governorate face restrictions on access to education. The circuitous route of the Barrier around Alfe Menashe settlement isolates two communities, Arab ar Ramadin al Janubi and Arab Abu Farda (population 800), in the Seam Zone between the Barrier and the Green Line. Residents over 16 years of age require permanent resident permits to live and non-resident Palestinians require permits to visit the enclave. Access to the communities is restricted to Habla gate and Jaljoulia checkpoint.

A total of 80 students (47 girls) from the two communities face problems commuting to school, in particular because of the limited opening hours at Habla gate (07:00-09:00; 13:15-14:15; 17:30-18:30). The children commute to school on buses paid for by the Israeli Civil Administration. Searches and harassment have resulted in increased stress levels and low school achievements.

A new school was opened in Arab Ar Ramadeen al Janubi in 2013 to enable children up to the fourth grade to study in their community and avoid the daily trip to school in Habla and Qalqiliya. Four teachers, including a school principal, from outside the community were recruited by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education in Qalqiliya. They require special permits to access the school through Jaljoulia checkpoint and are subject to frequent delays due to searches at the checkpoint and the long queues in the morning as hundreds of workers use the checkpoint to access their work in Israel.

### **The case of isolated areas in East Jerusalem**

In East Jerusalem, the Barrier places certain Palestinian communities located within the Israeli-declared municipal boundary on the 'West Bank' side of the Barrier, in particular Kafr Aqab and Shu'fat camp. Although the total number of pupils affected is not known, in 2012 some 3,414 East Jerusalem students used public transport to pass through a checkpoint on a daily basis to commute to schools on the 'Jerusalem' side of the Barrier.<sup>14</sup> 'The commuting time for these children, some of whom are extremely young, is between one to two hours every morning; as a result, they often miss the beginning of the school day.'<sup>15</sup> Although these pupils would find it easier to attend schools in neighbouring localities (such as Ramallah in the case of Kafr Aqab or Anata for Shu'fat camp), they would then be unable to prove that their 'centre of life' is in Jerusalem and would risk the revocation of their permanent resident status.

Conversely, in other areas in East Jerusalem, some 1,400 West Bank residents in 17 communities are isolated on the 'Jerusalem' side of the Barrier. Those who hold West Bank ID cards are now physically separated from the wider West Bank, their previous centre of life, but their residency status denies them access to the surrounding East Jerusalem area for work, markets and for services, including education. Although the number of pupils affected is also unknown, hundreds have to pass through checkpoints on a daily basis to reach their schools on the West Bank side of the Barrier.<sup>16</sup>

*In 2012 some 3,400 East Jerusalem students used public transport to pass through a checkpoint on a daily basis to commute to schools on the 'Jerusalem' side of the Barrier.*

For example, the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), in cooperation with UNICEF, monitors access for the An Nu'man dislocated community, where around 40 students cross a checkpoint to access their school in Al Khas on the 'West Bank' side of the Barrier. 'At the beginning of the project, the daily checks of the boys' bags used to result in children being late for school. After EAs regularly started monitoring the checkpoint, soldiers have stopped checking the children's bags. This has been attributed by locals to the EAs' presence.

## End notes

1. During April only four truckloads of agricultural produce exited Gaza to international markets compared with 25 truckloads the previous month. The decline was mainly connected to seasonal demand rather than the additional closing of Kerem Shalom. Since the beginning of 2014, 77 truckloads of selected agricultural items have been allowed to exit Gaza to regional and international markets, compared with over 5,700 truckloads of a wider range of exports to the West Bank, Israel and to regional and international markets during 2007.
2. The Palestinian Federation of Industries estimated that in June 2013 around 7,500 tonnes of construction materials were entering through the tunnels every day.
3. For further information on the legal procedures related to the application of this seizure mechanism, see A Guide to Housing, Land and Property Law in Area C of the West Bank, February 2012.
4. Two petitions filed to the Israeli Supreme Court by landowners and Peace Now demanding the evacuation of the outposts were rejected on the grounds that the ICA is looking into the status of the land. See Haim Levinson, *Ha'aretz*, 13 April 2014.
5. See Kerem Navot, *Israeli Settler Agriculture as a Means of Land Takeover in the West Bank*, August 2013.
6. OCHA, *West Bank Movement and Access Update*, September 2012, ch.VI.
7. See also, OCHA, *Shrinking Space: Urban Contraction and Rural Fragmentation of Bethlehem Governorate*, May 2009.
8. See Haim Levinson, *Ha'aretz*, 29 April 2014.
9. OCHA, *The Humanitarian Bulletin*, March 2014.
10. A Protection Cluster fact sheet outlining protection concerns and the humanitarian impacts of settlement activity in Hebron city (H2) is available at: [http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/\\_assets/files/field\\_protection\\_clusters/Occupied\\_Palestinian/files/oPt\\_PC\\_factsheet\\_Hebron\\_City\\_H2\\_2014\\_EN.pdf](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Occupied_Palestinian/files/oPt_PC_factsheet_Hebron_City_H2_2014_EN.pdf).
11. For further information about the Vulnerability Profile Project (VPP) see, OCHA, *In the Spotlight – Area C Vulnerability Profile*, March 2014.
12. For further details, see B'Tselem, *Under the Guise of Legality - Declarations of State Land in the West Bank*, March 2012.
13. Data provided by the ICA to Bimkom, Planners for Planning Rights, in February 2013 in the context of a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
14. ACRI, *Ir Amim, Failed Grade: East Jerusalem's Failing Education System*, August 2012, p. 15. The number of teachers and staff who hold West Bank ID cards and who work in East Jerusalem is unknown. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Education in 2013, 10 per cent of the students in Waqf schools, in addition to 20 per cent of the teachers and almost 30 per cent of school support staff, cross a checkpoint on a daily basis to access their schools. Information from UNICEF.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *EAPPI Access to Education Report, April 2013-February 2014*, p.2.



# Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables

## Conflict-related casualties and violence<sup>1</sup>

### Direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict related casualties

	2011	2012	2013										2014				
	Total	Total	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total

#### Palestinian deaths

Gaza	108	264	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	2	11	4	2	5	0	11
West Bank	17	8	2	0	0	1	5	0	3	6	3	27	2	1	6	0	9
Total	125	272	3	0	0	1	6	1	4	9	5	38	6	3	11	0	20
Of whom are civilians <sup>2</sup>	62	136	2	0	0	1	6	1	2	6	5	32	5	3	7	0	15
Of whom are female	3	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	2

#### Palestinian injuries

Gaza	468	1485	4	1	2	2	7	5	1	5	28	83	41	40	17	37	135
West Bank	1647	3175	652	428	122	136	130	369	104	315	131	3881	178	181	219	247	825
Total	2115	4660	656	429	124	138	137	374	105	320	159	3964	219	221	236	284	960
Of whom are civilians	2054	n/a	655	429	124	138	137	373	104	320	158	3959	216	219	234	281	950
Of whom are female	151	n/a	10	40	8	12	4	10	4	15	20	158	4	2	5	27	38

#### Israeli deaths

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	11	7	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0
Of whom are civilians	11	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
Of whom are female	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

#### Israeli injuries

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	122	345	17	33	1	11	5	9	15	5	4	151	9	6	5	15	35
Of whom are civilians	56	60	4	15	1	8	0	5	9	2	3	74	8	5	0	6	19
Of whom are female	3	7	2	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	10	1	0	0	1	2

\* Two Palestinians died of injuries they sustained by Israeli forces during the second intifada and by Israeli settlers in 2005

\*\* Figures include those provided by the Ministry of Health in Gaza during the recent Israeli offensive on Gaza (14-21 November)

\*\*\* Figures by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

\*\*\*\* The number of injured Israeli soldiers is provided by COGAT

### Tunnel-related casualties<sup>3</sup>

	2011	2012	2013										2014				
	Total	Total	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
Deaths	36	11	1	3	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0
Injuries	54	18	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	1	0	10	0	11

### Israeli-settler related incidents resulting in casualties or property damage

	2011	2012	2013										2014				
	Total	Total	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
Incidents leading to Palestinian casualties <sup>4</sup>	120	98	17	10	7	6	4	8	9	4	3	94	8	6	9	10	33
Incidents leading to Palestinian property/land damages	291	268	38	45	29	23	16	29	36	24	6	306	21	17	24	27	89
Subtotal: incidents affecting Palestinians	411	366	55	55	36	29	20	37	45	27	9	399	29	23	33	37	122
Incidents leading to Israeli Casualties	23	35	4	5	1	2	0	4	4	3	3	38	8	3	0	3	14
Incidents leading to Israeli Property/land damages <sup>5</sup>	13	15	1	0	3	0	2	0	0	1	3	12	0	1	1	3	5
Subtotal: incidents affecting settlers	36	50	5	5	4	2	2	4	4	4	6	50	8	4	1	6	19

### Civilian Palestinians killed or injured by unexploded ordnance in Gaza

		2011	2012	2013										2014				
		Total	Total	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
Adult	Injured	7	12	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	0	4
	Killed	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Child	Injured	17	19	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	0	0	7	1	8
	Killed	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Grand Total		27	34	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	26	0	0	11	0	0

## Child Protection

### Number of Palestinian children killed - direct conflict

	2011	2012	2013										2014				
	Total	Total	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
West Bank	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	1
Gaza Strip	11	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1

### Number of Palestinian children injured - direct conflict

West Bank	308	427	289	188	34	22	35	130	25	132	33	1232	39	46	62	83	230
Gaza Strip	125	105	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	10	4	7	6	9	26

### Number of Israeli children killed - direct conflict

oPt	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Number of Israeli children injured - direct conflict

oPt	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	1	0	0	1
Israel	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Number of Palestinian children held in detention by Israeli authorities

In Israel and oPt	192 monthly average	198 monthly average	238	223	193	195	180	179	159	173	154	199 monthly average	183	230	202	196	203 monthly average
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### Number of Palestinian children displaced by demolitions

West Bank, inc EJ	618	474	38	41	58	17	46	53	19	29	75	558	114	28	21	90	253
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### Number of incidents resulting in the disruption of schools<sup>19</sup>

oPt	na	321	8	5	4	1	2	15	NA	NA	NA	47	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
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Source: OCHA, DWG, Defence for Children International, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violations affecting children in armed conflict

## Access

### Access to healthcare - Gaza

	2011	2012	2013										2014				
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 Monthly Average	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Mon. Ave.
Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing <sup>15</sup>	872	777	1155	1117	1165	1299	1023	1303	1420	1347	1362	1148	1538	1,485	1,806	1,677	1627
of which approved	721	719	957	900	985	1106	932	1182	1314	1227	1181	1010	1350	1,289	1,553	1,308	1375
of which denied	19	7	0	1	0	7	3	5	11	5	4	3	37	50	33	31	38
of which delayed <sup>16</sup>	83	17	198	216	180	186	88	116	95	115	177	135	151	146	220	338	214

Source: WHO

### Movement of humanitarian staff, West Bank

	2011	2012	2013										2014				
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 monthly ave	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Mon. Ave.
Incidents of delayed or denied access at WVB checkpoint <sup>17</sup>	38	37.5	24	51	30	33	34	45	30	23	17	40.1	11	31	20	39	25
Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint	22	21	10	32	15	12	19	22	10	8	5	22.3	1	9	4	12	7
Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents	25	21	6	16	4	8	24	60	13	13	3	18.5	2.5	26	29	35	23

Source: OCHA

## Search and Arrest

	2011	2012	2013										2014				
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Mon. Ave.
Search Campaigns (West Bank)	349	<b>338</b>	338	370	461	242	333	252	281	435	250	<b>316</b>	434	236	475	325	368
Palestinians detained (West Bank)	262	<b>283</b>	367	459	472	298	341	416	314	529	262	<b>380</b>	491	295	581	344	428

Source: OCHA

### Palestinians under Israeli custody (occupation related)<sup>6</sup>

	2011	2012	2013										2014				
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Mon. Ave.
Total as of the end of the month	5326	<b>4,451</b>	4748	4801	4827	4828	4762	4806	4753	4785	4,768	<b>4,760</b>	4,881	4,961	4,999	5,021	4,966
of whom are women	26	<b>7</b>	14	16	14	11	12	12	12	12	15	<b>12</b>	14	17	18	18	17
of whom are administrative detainees <sup>7</sup>	240	<b>245</b>	155	147	137	134	134	135	143	143	150	<b>148</b>	175	181	186	191	183
of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	633	<b>897</b>	1216	1194	1150	1219	1295	1299	1301	1301	1,351	<b>1,188</b>	1376	1470	1471	1,495	1,453

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through B'Tselem)

## Demolition of Structures

### Structures demolished<sup>8</sup>



	2011	2012	2013										2014				
	Total	Total	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
of which in Area C	571	<b>540</b>	40	58	69	32	20	93	13	19	88	<b>565</b>	101	17	5	87	210
of which in East Jerusalem	42	<b>64</b>	6	11	3	1	36	2	8	6	0	<b>98</b>	5	9	9	4	27
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>604</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>663</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>237</b>


### People Displaced due to demolitions<sup>9</sup>



	2011	2012	2013										2014				
	Total	Total	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
of whom were displaced in Area C	1006	<b>815</b>	40	32	101	48	33	108	7	43	140	<b>805</b>	160	24	17	171	372
of whom were displaced in East Jerusalem	88	<b>71</b>	24	59	30	0	63	6	34	18	0	<b>298</b>	23	34	28	8	93
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1094</b>	<b>886</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>1103</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>465</b>









## Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel<sup>18</sup>



Source: Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, Gaza

\* Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.

## Strategic Response Plan(SRP) 2014:

Cluster	SRP 2014	
	Total request in USD	% of funds received
 Coordination and Support Services	18,588,100	22.0%
 Education	18,524,513	7.1%
 Food Security	277,790,034	9.3%
 Health and Nutrition	9,581,909	12.4%
 Protection	44,076,682	27.9%
 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	25,348,733	16.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>393,909,971</b>	<b>31.5%</b>

# Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

## Casualties

1. **Conflict-related casualties:** includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and internal Palestinian violence.
2. **Civilians:** includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a “continuous combatant function” as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
3. **Tunnel related casualties:** figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

## Israeli settler-related violence

4. **Incidents resulting in casualties:** includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
5. **Incidents resulting in property damage/losses:** *ibid.*

## Search and Arrest

6. **Palestinians in Israeli custody:** includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a “security detainee/prisoner”. Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a “regular” criminal offense.
7. **Administrative detainees:** Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

## Demolitions

8. **Structures demolished:** includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
9. **People displaced due to demolitions:** includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
10. **People affected by demolitions:** includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

## Access West Bank

11. **Permanently staffed checkpoints:** staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and ‘agricultural gates’ along the Barrier.
12. **Partially staffed checkpoints:** checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
13. **Unstaffed obstacles:** includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
14. **‘Flying’ or random checkpoints:** checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

## Access to health

15. **Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez:** includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
16. **Delayed applications:** includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

## Movement of humanitarian staff

17. **Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint:** includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.

## Imports to Gaza

18. **Truckloads by type:** for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

## Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.