NRC NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL

REPORTS

A thematic report from the Norwegian Refugee Council, December 2010

SOUTHERN SUDAN 2010:

BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

Displacement and reintegration in post-referendum Southern Sudan

The Norwegian Refugee Council in Sudan

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has been active in Sudan since 2004, providing protection and humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. From March 2009 the focus of the programme shifted exclusively to Southern Sudan following the expulsion, together with 12 other NGOs from Northern Sudan. Until this time, NRC was one of few NGOs working in the IDP camps around Khartoum, providing Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) on return related issues to ensure that Southern IDPs living in these camps could make a free and informed voluntary decision on whether or not to return.

In Southern Sudan, NRC carries out activities in 5 out of 10 states: Central and Eastern Equatoria (CE/ EE), Northern Bahr el Ghazal (NBeG), Warrap and Jonglei. NRC established a head office in Juba (CE) in 2006, and field offices in Yei (CE) and Aweil (NBeG) in 2007. Initially activities in CE consisted of ICLA projects; school construction took place in NBeG and Warrap; while Education expanded to include all counties of NBeG. In 2010 the NRC aims to assist approximately 46,000 people in Southern Sudan.

In 2010, the Aweil office became NRC's largest hub incorporating both ICLA and Food Security programmes. Education introduced an Intensive English Training for Arabic pattern teachers in Juba and ICLA now conducts mobile training activities in Magwi, Torit (EE) and Bor (Jonglei).

In order to meet the humanitarian challenges in Southern Sudan, NRC plans to enhance and expand its activities in 2011, and increase the geographical coverage, in existing locations from Aweil (Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap), and from Yei and Juba (Central Equatoria). Mobile teams also operate in selected areas of Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria. An important characteristic of this expansion is a multi-sector approach, building on synergies between the NRC's core activities. Additionally, NRC implements activities in communities with a holistic approach, coordinating closely with other national and international NGOs and UN agencies.

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL NRC

Between a rock and a hard place

Displacement and reintegration in post-referendum Southern Sudan

December 2010

Table of Contents

Maps: *Cumulative figures of new conflict related displacement reported in 2010, OCHA*

Returnees by Transit and Final Destination November 2010 - Status 30/11/2010, OCHA

Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot 2 November 2010 , OCHA

Author: Ingrid Macdonald
Researcher: Louisa Medhurst
Contributors:, Julie McKay, Patrik Eklof, Rolf A. Vestvik, Siri Elverland, Thomas Qviller, Gregory Norton, Nina Gehm
Frontpage Photo: Therese Witt

ISBN: 978-82-7411-209-4
Published: 14 December 2010

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL NRC

1. Summary

The Government of National Unity (GoNU) of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) are entering the final stages of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the up-coming Southern Sudan referendum on 9th January 2011. Southern Sudanese will vote to decide whether to stay united with the rest of Sudan or secede. Much of the focus has been on whether the technicalities of the referendum are in place and resolution of the high level political issues, namely: demarcation of the borders between the northern and southern states, agreements over natural resource sharing (including oil, water, pastoral land and migratory routes), citizenship, the application of international treaties and the allocation of the debt burden. Speculation is rife as to whether the referendum will occur on time, if secession will be chosen and if it is, whether the result will be respected by the GoNU. And whilst the high level political concerns are of fundamental importance, more attention is urgently required regarding the implications for the civilian population.

There will likely be significant population movement regardless of the result of the referendum. Violent reactions and large-scale displacement may occur if secession is chosen, denied, or appears to have been illegitimately denied. The current 2011 planning figures estimate movements of returnees, internally displaced and refugees in the hundreds of thousands to millions, with 50,000 Southerners already moving south since October 2010. And despite six years of recovery and reconstruction efforts by the GoSS and its partners, the capacity of Southern Sudan to support the reintegration of mass population movements is very limited. Chronic poverty, the high vulnerabilities of most Southerners and limited infrastructure and basic service provision following one of Africa's longest civil wars, mean that local populations have little capacity to cope with minor shocks. Violence and natural disasters, or mass displacement can (and do) easily tip communities from survival to crisis. The potential humanitarian impact could dramatically worsen an already precarious situation.

Norwegian Refugee Council published a report in February 2010 entitled, *Southern Sudan 2010: Mitigating a Humanitarian Crisis,* which highlighted the lack of delivery of peace dividends during the CPA period and the increased potential for humanitarian crisis in Southern Sudan. Many of the concerns detailed in the NRC report have not been addressed, although key recommendations concerning humanitarian preparedness and contingency planning are being implemented. This paper expands on the analysis of the earlier report in respect of displacement and reintegration challenges in pre and post referendum Southern Sudan. The paper draws on interviews and field visits conducted in Juba and Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and research and interviews conducted with key individuals in Khartoum during November 2010.

Recommendations:

- **The GoNU and GoSS should urgently agree on the future citizenship arrangement for Southerners in the north and Northerners in the south to remove a key area of uncertainty and to avoid statelessness for certain groups in the event of secession.** The million or so Southerners who have resided in the north for twenty years or longer may be forced to choose between remaining in the north or migrating to the south, before guarantees regarding their safety, rights and interests are settled.

- **It is essential for all actors to cooperate to prevent a return movement that is poorly planned, politically motivated and results from intimidation.** The inclusion of spontaneous returnees on an equal footing with facilitated returnees, and the provision of support at the point of final destination are welcome inclusions within the emergency return process in Southern Sudan. However, more effort is required by mandated actors to work with the GoSS and GoNU to ensure that population movements are voluntary and respect the safety and dignity of the returnees. Urgent efforts should be made to provide Southerners in the north with information concerning the return process and guarantees regarding their safety and rights over land, property and commercial interests in the post-referendum period. Mistreatment of Southerners in the north, or even rumours of mistreatment could spark a violent reaction in the south with far-reaching repercussions.

- **The GoSS and the GoNU should endorse enforceable agreements to ensure unimpeded access of humanitarian actors.** All parties should enable unrestricted access for humanitarian actors to safely provide needs based impartial assistance to vulnerable groups.

- **Whilst it is important for political actors and donors to demonstrate support for the new nation of Southern Sudan, if this occurs, the humanitarian architecture, programming and funding to respond to an unpredictable and potentially worsening context should not be prematurely dismantled or incorporated within stabilisation or other longer term strategies that could take years to realise.** The situation in Sudan in the post-referendum period will be unpredictable and, if secession is chosen, the GoSS will likely be overstretched agreeing a framework with the north, averting intensified internal conflict and establishing a policy environment to support a new nation. During this unpredictable and busy time, it is imperative that the broader humanitarian community is adequately equipped and remains able to respond to a potentially worsening humanitarian situation.

- **In the post-referendum period significant improvement to reintegration efforts could be achieved through agreement of a common and holistic reintegration/durable solutions strategy.** The strategy should address the needs of host communities and all returnees irrespective of when and where they returned as follows:

    - Strengthen support to returnees in both peri-urban and urban settings, including via livelihoods programming and improvements in access to markets since it is likely that many returnees may migrate to towns.

    - Include a grace period of at least 18 - 24 months following the referendum where donors, in collaboration with the GoSS, continue to support NGO service providers, whilst considering appropriate funding mechanisms that provide for flexible responses to fluctuating needs and a rapidly changing context.

    - Include mechanisms to address potential conflict in Southern Sudan, including over access to resources and land, ensuring security of tenure and appropriate land allocation for landless returnees.

    - Increase humanitarian protection activities and funding, demonstrate the impact of these activities to all stakeholders and support the establishment of protection sub-clusters at the provincial level.

This report is primarily focused on the humanitarian and displacement implications for pre and post referendum Southern Sudan in the event of secession. However, the referendum outcome will have equally significant implications for Northern Sudan. Focus is also needed on the challenges facing Northern Sudan if secession occurs, especially in already volatile regions such as Darfur.

2. Southern Sudan's humanitarian situation

The signing of the CPA in January 2005 between the NCP dominated Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) marked the end of Africa's longest running civil war in recent history. Hostilities resumed in earnest in 1983, following decades of tension, clashes and complaints of marginalisation of the south by the north. Over 2 million people were killed, 4 million internally displaced and half a million sought refuge outside the country.[1] Since 2005, more than two million Southerners have returned to Southern Sudan and the border areas. They have returned to a region with exceptionally high levels of poverty, limited infrastructure, basic services or livelihood opportunities following decades of civil war and neglect.

Despite six years of recovery and reconstruction, the humanitarian situation in Southern Sudan has worsened since 2008 with more people displaced in the south than in Darfur in the last 24 months.[2] Given the extreme poverty and high vulnerabilities of most Southerners and the limited infrastructure and basic service provision in Southern Sudan, local populations have little capacity to cope with even minor shocks. Violence and natural disasters, or mass movements of people can (and do) easily tip communities from survival to crisis as:

- Up to ninety percent of Southern Sudanese live in poverty, with an extremely high under five mortality rate of 135 per 1,000[3] and a maternal mortality rate of 2,054 per 100,000 live births.[4] Thirty percent of children are in school, with only 1.9 percent of enrolled pupils completing primary education.

Gender discrepancies are systemic, with women's illiteracy rate at 92 percent and the highest primary school drop-out rate for girls in the world.[5] In 2010 nearly half of the population in Southern Sudan required some type of food assistance or a food related intervention to support increased agricultural production and livelihood opportunities, including an estimated 1.5 million severely food insecure. Chronic and acute malnutrition affects 270,000 children.[6]

- Inter/intra communal violence has affected Southern Sudan for generations. Causes include the abundant supply of small arms in Southern Sudan, cattle raiding, disputes over migration, resource competition and conflict over control of land. The situation has been exacerbated through uneven disarmament leaving communities that have surrendered arms feeling vulnerable towards others that have not. 150 people were killed in inter-ethnic violence from July to September 2010 in Southern Sudan. At the same time, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has continued attacks and abductions in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal, with 25 people killed and 42,000 people forced to flee as of 30 October 2010. More recently, politically motivated inter-ethnic conflict displaced thousands in Lakes State and in Jonglei State in August 2010 following the 2010 elections.[7]

- The signing of the CPA did not end mass displacement in Sudan. Although it is estimated that 2.3 million IDPs and refugees have returned to the south[8] there were still 4.9 million IDPs in Sudan at the beginning of 2010.[9] Displacement is still ongoing in the south with an estimated 221,000 newly displaced people in 2010.[10] Temporary displacement is an established coping mechanism, where people leave their homes for a few days or weeks and stay with relatives or extended families to avoid violence or seek access to services during crisis periods. Of those who did return to the south, many have not achieved basic levels of reintegration, let alone durable solutions. In some instances those who have remained in Southern Sudan throughout the conflict have expressed resentment towards those who gained new skills during displacement and have now returned, especially given the extremely low absorptive capacity and high competition for natural resources, livelihood opportunities and basic services.

- Most of the improvements to infrastructure and basic service delivery have occurred in and around Juba, the capital of Southern Sudan and to a lesser extent, in other urban areas. The lack of accessibility, infrastructure and limited number of service providers in most states in the south results in NGOs providing the majority of basic services in Southern Sudan[11]. Many of the rural villages still lack basic services such as schools, health facilities and clean water, whilst infrastructure, such as all weather roads, is sparse and concentrated in Juba. Local level government bodies are constrained in their ability to meet the needs of their constituents due to limited resources, capacities and infrastructure, with capacity and resources primarily centred on Juba.

3. The Southern Sudan referendum, Abyei and the consultations

There has been a fragile peace between the north and Southern Sudan during the CPA period. Some key targets have been met such as the establishment of the GoNU and GoSS and most recently, national elections were held in April 2010. Overall though, many of the expected peace dividends hoped for by the Southern Sudanese have failed to materialise, especially at the local level. Sporadic politicised violence has also erupted in Abyei, Jonglei and Unity States, associated with the 2010 elections, and between Northern and Southern troops from 2006 to 2009. One of the final, and potentially most challenging, milestones is the upcoming referenda due to be held starting on 9th January 2011, where the Southern Sudanese will decide whether to stay united or secede from the north. As the main referendum outcome may result in two new nations, it will have significant impact on Sudan and its neighbours as noted by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon:

> *"The referendum has the potential to change the future of the country and send shockwaves throughout the region."*[12]

Preparations for the referendum have been slow with many of the key high-level political issues unresolved, including citizenship, border demarcation, natural resource management (oil, pastoral rights and water) and debt relief. The African Union (AU) High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Sudan and the United States

have brokered negotiations and pressed for a framework on the key issues, which is yet to materialise. As noted in the recent International Crisis Group Briefing, *Negotiating Sudan's North-South Future*, it is not realistic to expect a fully negotiated settlement prior to the referendum, however, the absence of one is contributing to 'uncertainties about the political and economic future' of Northern and Southern Sudan which 'sustains fears about the smooth conduct of the exercise and acceptance of its result.'[13] Norway has established a group focused on 'financial, economic and natural resource' issues, which appears to be progressing well. However, it is unlikely to generate a definitive agreement before January 2011.[14]

The technicalities of the referenda

A definitive main referendum result requires a simple majority vote of fifty percent plus one. However, a threshold of 60 percent of registered voters must be reached for the result to be valid. Southerners who are eligible to vote[15] and who have registered between 15th November and 8th December 2010 will have seven days to vote from 9th January 2011.[16] Given the problems associated with carrying out the elections in April 2010, most effort has gone into ensuring that the technical components of the main referendum machinery and systems are in place. Despite some problems, such as delays associated with the printing of ballot papers, it is clear that the GoSS is highly motivated for the main referendum to proceed as planned on 9th January.

The CPA formally expires in July 2011, six months after the referendum is due to take place. In addition to the main Southern referendum, the CPA provides for the following separate processes:

- In **Southern Kordofan** and **Blue Nile**, popular consultations will be held to determine what kind of status is preferred with respect to the north; that is, whether to have some form of autonomous arrangement whilst remaining within the north, to be fully integrated or to be part of Southern Sudan if the event of secession. However, the GoNU is only obliged to "'consider' the report" from these consultations[17] which is why it is widely believed that Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan will remain part of the north despite the presence of large Southern populations.

- In **Abyei**, a separate referendum is supposed to occur at the same time as the main Southern Sudan referendum, to determine whether Abyei will become part of the south (Warrap state) or Northern Sudan (Southern Kordofan state). The Abyei Referendum Act requires voters to be residents, which favours Abyei's settled inhabitants of Southern Ngok Dinka. However, the NCP is demanding that the nomadic Northern Misseriya should also be able to vote given their seasonal migration into the area. The Misseriya are anxious not to lose their grazing rights in Abyei, whilst the Dinka are concerned that the Misseriya will be used as proxy militias or to sway the vote in favour of the north. Abyei is also popularly perceived to be oil rich, despite only producing 0.6 percent of Sudan's oil revenue. [18] If the Abyei referendum does not occur by January 2011, it could be used by the NCP to undermine the overall result.

The referendum process so far

The most likely scenario appears to be that the main referendum will happen more or less as scheduled and that the Abyei referendum will not occur in January 2011. However, given the dynamics between north Sudan and Southern Sudan and the history of distrust and tactical manoeuvring, it is extremely difficult to predict the likely outcome. There is a strong popular belief that the north will seek to undermine the vote or to invalidate the result. For example, interviewees speculated that the north would encourage people to register multiple times and then deny access to voting in order to undercut the 60 percent threshold. Another example includes delays in the disbursement of funds and agreement of some of the legal instruments to support the referendum by the Northern led Southern Sudan Referendum Commission.

Postponing the main referendum is not considered to be an option in Southern Sudan: an imperfect referendum is considered preferable to none at all. Many Southerners believe that they have waited six years to cast this vote and that delays would be the result of trickery by the north or corruption of their officials. As reported in, *Southern Sudan at the Crossroads*:

> *'Most Southern Sudanese participants are strongly opposed to a referendum delay, and importantly, many participants cannot conceive of a single credible reason for a delay. If announced by the GoNU, many assume a delay would be an unnecessary delaying tactic or trick by the north, and most would not accept a GoNU delay…'*[19]

The GoSS is concerned that a delay may ignite conflict, although it is quietly acknowledged that a hold up of a few weeks may be acceptable.[20] The GoSS has raised the prospect of a unilateral declaration of independence in the case of postponement, but this is widely viewed as a negotiating tactic. A major uncertainty concerns the reaction of the NCP if the vote results in secession.

The Abyei Referendum Commission has not yet been established, borders have not been demarcated[21] and there is no agreement on oil sharing or voter eligibility. Despite the requirement for border demarcation prior to the referendum, it is common for countries to have soft or disputed borders – for example, Egypt and Ethiopia have disputed territory with Sudan; China with Japan and Russia, Japan with Russia and so on. As such, in principle, demarcation should not derail the referendum process. Since demarcation is also linked to the carving up of oil assets and access to pastoral land, the negotiations are likely to be long and difficult, and commentators are concerned that a lack of progress may provoke further tension in the conflict prone area or ignite the civil war again.[22] The NCP could also reject the referendum outcome if the Abyei referendum issue is not resolved before the main vote.

4. The potential humanitarian impact of the referendum

The referendum process and uncertainty surrounding the potential outcome, is already adversely affecting the humanitarian situation in Southern Sudan. Depending on the outcome of the referenda, this impact could intensify dramatically, especially if hostilities break out along the disputed north-south border or internal conflict increases in Southern Sudan. Tensions have been rising along the border with recent incidents reported in Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal involving the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the build up of SPLM and SAF troops on both sides of the border with some positioned only 60 metres apart and the recent request by the Vice-President of Sudan, Salva Kiir, for additional UN peacekeepers to be positioned in the border areas. The long standing grievances of the Nuba, the Southern affiliations of large numbers of people in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and the Misseriya question in Abyei are likely to make demarcation difficult and time-consuming. There is considerable potential for accidents, miscommunication or inadvertent border clashes, with serious implications for people living in the border areas.

Commentators observe that “away from the bigger towns, the population lacks political voice and is largely disconnected from governmental processes.” [23] Whilst south-south communal conflict will continue as it has done for generations, the risk of increased politicisation of ethnic violence and rivalries is high, especially in relation to control over natural resources and negotiation of political power. An escalation of the violence that erupted in Jonglei and Upper Nile between ethnic and political rivals following the 2010 election result could place the GoSS and international community in a difficult position, since the SPLA/M is dominated by some of the major ethnic factions, and the GoSS is dependent on the SPLA for security. Such a situation could position the GoSS as a party to an internal armed conflict. There are also substantial numbers of SPLA in the north and over 50,000 SAF troops in Southern Sudan, who form part of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). How these forces will react and be treated following the vote is unclear.

Contingency plans

The international humanitarian community, in support of the GoSS, has developed a contingency plan for the referendum period. The plan is based on a worst case scenario where the north and the south return to hostilities with up to 2.3 million internally displaced and approximately 420,000 Sudanese seeking asylum during 2011. The scenario predicts:

- 1 million people are displaced in the border areas,
- 800,000 Southerners in the north flee or are forced to move to Southern Sudan,
- 700,000 Southerners stay in Khartoum State,
- Approximately 1.6 million persons are internally displaced in Southern Sudan, in addition to two million who may be affected by conflict and a potential breakdown in trade and social service delivery, and up to 250,000 who may flee to countries of asylum.

The plan includes the pre-positioning of humanitarian supplies for the six core emergency pipelines (food, nutrition, non-food items and emergency shelter, health, seeds and tools, and water, sanitation and hygiene supplies) in key areas in Southern Sudan and the north and neighbouring supply hubs along with the necessary support in terms of logistics, coordination and protection. The plans for the north and south require US$ 63.3

million to allow implementation prior to the referendum. Whilst the contingency planning and prepositioning is a welcome step forward by the international community, it only covers the initial emergency response to the potential humanitarian crisis. Planning for the longer term response, especially given Southern Sudan's high susceptibility to shocks and the potential for protracted conflict with the north and internal conflict within Southern Sudan, has been limited. This would become a serious issue in the event of a confluence of major incidents leading to a significant deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Sudan.

5. Citizenship and access to information by Southerners in Northern Sudan

During the south – north war, displacement from Southern Sudan to Khartoum peaked between 1985 and 1995, decreasing after 2000. Today it is estimated that there are 1.7 million IDPs in Khartoum, which includes those from the south, Darfur and the east. The Southern IDPs in Khartoum mainly reside in the poorer shanty town areas of the city or in four large IDP camps.[24] However, it is difficult to verify this number given the limitations on access to the camps by the authorities, the high number of economic migrants and urban poor, and IDPs portraying themselves as residents.[25] Many Southern IDPs have resided in the north for twenty years; their children were born there, educated in Arabic, and they have established livelihoods. Although some will choose to move back to the south prior to the referendum (over 50,000 have already returned so far), many may choose to remain in the north. It is unclear what will happen to the Southern IDPs who stay in the north and those who have lived in the northern border areas of South Darfur for generations.

Following the expulsion of thirteen humanitarian actors in 2009, service provision in and around the Southern IDP camps in Khartoum was severely curtailed and there has been a considerable lack of information concerning the referendum and return process. Interviewees highlight restrictions on information concerning the registration process[26] and the implications of the different referendum outcomes. Negative media statements by high level NCP officials have also generated fear of reprisals, loss of rights, land and property, vote manipulation and the potential for statelessness for some groups if secession is chosen.[27] NCP and GoNU statements have been contradictory with some NCP officials claiming that Southerners will be expelled en masse and their property seized if they register. However, recent GoNU statements have attempted to sooth fears stating that Southerners in the north will not be expelled. Equally, Northerners living in the south, for economic or family reasons, fear that they may face violence or reprisals, as was seen in Juba following the death of the first Southern Sudanese President, Dr. John Garang de Mabior in 2006. There have already been noticeable movements of Northern and regional traders electing to leave temporarily during the referendum period. Some key immediate concerns include:

a) Clarifying the citizenship status of more than one million Southerners estimated to be residing in the north and substantial numbers of Northerners in the south is crucial. A conference in October convened by the UN Mission In Sudan (UNMIS) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on post-referendum citizenship outlined some of the main challenges and recommended a number of potential options, including dual citizenship and special pastoral arrangements that transcend borders. Experts also highlighted that ratified human rights treaties will remain binding on successor states. Based on interviews in Juba and Khartoum, it appears that the likely citizenship option may require Southerners and Northerners to choose nationality, with a grace period until the end of the CPA in July 2011 to accommodate movements between the new nations. Some arrangement to enable nomadic movements is also likely, although the practicalities of what this will mean in terms of documentation, the ability to carry arms and taxation at border crossings have not been resolved. This will remain a key flash point after the referendum, especially in Abyei.

b) For Southerners who have resided in the north for twenty years or longer, the prospect of being forced to choose between their adopted home in the north and their historical links to the south could be severe. The implications for their livelihoods, property and land rights, commercial interests, family ties and *identity* are substantial. It is not just the issue of citizenship for Southerners who fled the war twenty years earlier. Many 'Southern IDPs,' were born in the north, some have married Northerners and many have assets, land and bank accounts. The lack of clarity concerning

their status and rights is disturbing, especially since up to two thirds of Sudanese children are reportedly not registered at birth.[28]

c) The potential for mistreatment of Southerners in the north, or even rumours of mistreatment could spark a violent reaction in the south. Southerners will not tolerate abuse of their brethren in the north, which is a key flash point that the GoSS and international community appear keen to avoid. As noted in the NDI report, *Southern Sudan at the Crossroads*:

> *'There is a pervasive belief that Southerners living in the North will be in a perilous situation if the South chooses separation. However, participants claim acceptance of Northerners continuing to live in the South after separation but note their fate will be linked to Southerners' fate in the North…. In other words, if the Southerners are mistreated or killed, the same fate will befall the Northerners; however, if the Southerners do not face problems, neither will the Northerners. This sentiment crosses all gender, ethnicity and age groups.'*[29]

Given the sensitivities over the treatment of the Southerners in the north, they represent an important factor which the NCP could use to potentially secure concessions from the GoSS on high political negotiations. Efforts to move Southerners back appear to be motivated by some of these political considerations, thus calling into question the voluntariness of the movement and whether it can be considered permanent.

Recommendation

As stated by Ms. Erika Feller, the Assistant High Commissioner – Protection for UNHCR in her Keynote Address to the Sudan Citizenship Symposium on 6 November 2010:

> *Depending on the outcome of the referendum in South Sudan, the decisions made by authorities in North and South on nationality will have an immediate impact on the lives of millions of people. If they are not well drafted, the rules establishing who is a national of whatever state can turn citizens into stateless persons overnight. What this means in practice is that the rights and opportunities of many thousands of men, women and children are effectively obliterated, and with this, for host states, the seeds of new conflict and more displacement are firmly planted anew.'*[30]

The GoNU and GoSS should urgently agree on the future citizenship arrangement of Southerners in the north and Northerners in the south in order to reduce uncertainty in case of secession. Key areas of focus should be to:

- Ensure realistic timeframes for voluntary and informed choice of citizenship (if dual citizenship will not be considered).
- Agree protections and processes for identity documentation such as the provision of birth and marriage certificates, family reunification, security of personal property, banking, land (including the right to own land as non-citizens) and other commercial rights.
- Avoid potential statelessness of some groups and guarantee freedom of movement for legitimate migration are equally important.

6. Early return of Southerners as of 8 December 2010

Tens of thousands of Southerners have already moved south since October and returns from the north have increased steadily.[31] As of 8 December, the total number of returnees was over 50,000, with tens of thousands more anticipated. So far, the main return movements have been organised by individual Governors such as the Governor of Unity State, and the provincial government in Abyei, or they are spontaneous movements as seen with Northern Bahr-el Ghazal, Jonglei and Warrap.[32] Many of those returning are women and children carrying all of their household possessions.[33] It is therefore likely that they may not intend to return to the north, and that the men will remain behind to continue economic activities unless conditions become prohibitive.

a. The returns plans

Return planning for large scale population movements is not new to Southern Sudan. Following the signing of the CPA, the focus of the international community and GoNU/GoSS was on the facilitated return programme. This programme mainly involved support for transportation to 'areas of origin.' However, less than 13 percent of more than two million returnees used the organised process, with most finding their own way,[34] calling into question the usefulness of the organised return process. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) strongly disputes this view arguing that the facilitated return programme was successful and should be reinstituted given the magnitude of early return movements.[35]

In preparation for the referendum, and in addition to the contingency planning, the GoSS initially published the "Come home and Choose" plan promoting the return of 1.5 million Southern Sudanese from the north. Following concerns over the unrealistic timeframes, practicalities of implementation and the voluntariness and safety of such a return process, the plan was revised to de-link it from the referendum, increase the duration of application and to emphasize the longer term reintegration support.[36] The 'Come home to Choose' plan has since been replaced by the Accelerated Returns and Reintegration Initiative (ARERI) plan.[37] Whilst the ARERI plan is an improvement, questions remain over the voluntariness and sustainability of a movement of people with limited information concerning their rights and options.

Where possible, IOM is tracking the returnees on the buses from Khartoum, at the Kosti transit point, or upon arrival in Southern Sudan. Since registration is not occurring in Khartoum and there is little information dissemination, or access to the camps, it is extremely difficult to assess the likely numbers that will move prior to the referendum or their intended destination. The Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission's (SSRRC) Update on the ARERI of 23 November 2010 detailed a supported return of 2,000 IDPs on two flights per day from Khartoum for ten days, 4,000 IDPs on thirty busses and trucks from Khartoum to Upper Nile State, 4,000 IDPs transported by barge to Jonglei state and additional transport arrangements for other states (22,000 IDPs). Reports of registration of 250,000 Southerners by various provincial government administrations and the SSRRC have started to emerge,[38] however the validity of these numbers is difficult to verify. The GoSS has allocated 30 million Sudanese Pounds to support the return process.

b. Tracking and responding to the return movement – the 'Early Return Safety Net' programme

The UN and IOM have established an emergency returns sector in Juba with provincial returnee task forces established with the SSRRC in Malakal, Bentiu, Kwajok, Wau, Bor and Akobo. The group appears to be primarily concerned with implementation of the 'Safety Net' support for the returns programme which has the following operating principles:

- The Government is responsible for ensuring that returns are conducted in safety and dignity.
- Humanitarian partners will provide emergency assistance during transit and in reception areas and reintegration assistance will be provided at the final destination.
- Under exceptional circumstances, assistance will be provided to returning groups outside the final place of destination. However, this will be short term assistance appropriate to transiting groups.

The safety net programme comprises a three month food package by WFP and NFI support with some provision of latrines and shelter at the initial transit point where returnees are unable to travel to their point of final destination due to the rainy season.[39] The package is intended as an initial boost to assist

returnees, and thereby also support host communities.

Findings and Recommendations:

- **A welcome improvement from the 2005 facilitated return programme is the inclusion of spontaneous returnees on an equal footing with facilitated returnees.** Whilst spontaneous return movements are more difficult to track and time-consuming to administer, given the experience with the post-CPA facilitated return process, they may end up comprising the majority of the total movement.

- **Another improvement is that transit return support may be provided based on the point of final destination rather than just in the area of origin.** This recognizes that a fair portion of the returnees may not be able to return to areas of origin given their protracted displacement in the north, low absorptive capacity in their 'areas of origin' and their urban rather than rural character.

However, questions remain over whether these organised return movements are voluntary and respect the safety and dignity of the returnees, particularly given that the returnees appear to lack information to enable informed and voluntary decision-making at their point of departure. As such:

- **More effort is required by mandated actors to work with the SSRRC to ensure the voluntariness, safety and dignity of the return movement.** Avoiding a return movement that is poorly planned, politically motivated and results from fear should be one of the top priorities of all actors.

    - **Guarantees should be given by the GoNU and NCP that intimidation and violence towards Southern IDPs will not be condoned, and protections should be provided regarding the safety and the security of IDP property, land and commercial rights.**

    - **The GoNU and GoSS should work together with all relevant agencies to ensure the provision of appropriate information at the point of departure to enable IDPs to make free and informed voluntary decisions to return.** A proper registration process should be put in place, with the provision of necessary identification documentation.

- Whilst it is positive that the UN and IOM have moved quickly to respond to initial return movements with the establishment of the emergency returns group, the limited inclusion of NGOs as equal partners should be rectified, especially given that NGOs have a more extensive presence in many return areas than mandated agencies. The mechanism should also complement the cluster system rather than act as a parallel structure.

7. Reintegration and recovery in Southern Sudan

The situation in Sudan in the post-referendum period will be unpredictable and, if secession is chosen, the GoSS will likely be overburdened agreeing a framework with the north, averting intensified internal conflict and establishing a policy environment to support a new nation. Whilst it is important for political actors and donors to demonstrate support for the new nation of Southern Sudan, if it happens, the humanitarian aid architecture, programming and funding to respond to Sudan's unpredictable context should not be prematurely dismantled or included within stabilisation or other longer term strategies that could take years to realise.

Following the signing of the CPA in 2005, the international community moved swiftly to trim the humanitarian system in Southern Sudan. It was important to show support for the CPA, solidarity with the new GoSS and demonstrate that peace had arrived in Sudan. OCHA's presence was reduced and many humanitarian providers scaled down, or shifted focus to development programming. Poor security, high levels of violence and displacement and worsening humanitarian indicators over the last two years indicate that this shift was probably premature. It is important that the same mistakes are not repeated following the referendum. The reestablishment of OCHA in Southern Sudan and the roll out of the cluster approach, whilst requiring more investment and capacity at the state levels, has enabled strengthened humanitarian coordination, planning and pre-positioning.

At the same time, there needs to be a stronger linkage between strengthening the humanitarian

response with greater support for early recovery and transitional programmes, especially in the area of reintegration of returnees. An effective early recovery agenda and network that supports the reintegration of hundreds of thousands, if not millions of newly displaced and returning populations, in addition to improved support for the reintegration of over two million Southerners who returned during the CPA period, will be an important contribution to the future of a peaceful Southern Sudan.

Southern Sudan reintegration challenges and opportunities for sustainable improvement

A number of Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI HPG) studies have highlighted some shortcomings of the return and reintegration programme during the CPA period including; lack of leadership and a common understanding or strategy to promote reintegration, and the 'reintegration package' only focusing on short term needs comprising a three-month food ration and some seeds, tools and non-food items with uneven and uncoordinated distribution. [40] Other problems include: on-going insecurity hampering reintegration efforts; land conflicts between returnees and those who stayed during the conflict; the political refusal to acknowledge that returnees are coming back from urban contexts and thus, are more likely to return to urban areas; the lack of livelihood and economic development opportunities; and, the limited basic service provision, especially in provincial and local areas.[41]

In the post-referendum period significant improvement to the reintegration of new returnees and those who returned during the CPA period could be achieved through the following actions:

a) The GoSS and international community should agree a common and holistic reintegration/durable solutions strategy, covering host communities and all returnees irrespective of when and where they returned. Such a strategy would improve the predictability, quality and consistency of reintegration activities supported by the donors, government and non-governmental actors, whilst also providing a structure reflecting the Durable Solutions Framework.[42] It is important for the protection cluster to continue to highlight key protection concerns relating to vulnerable groups and the displaced by providing advice and guidance to the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and operational agencies, as well as advising on how the Durable Solutions Framework could be incorporated into return and reintegration planning and programmes. The strategy should:

- Promote a holistic, but pragmatic approach that incorporates basic service delivery, livelihood opportunities, linkage to markets in rural and peri-urban areas, support for resolution of land and property disputes and balances urban and rural response.

- Focus on the needs of the host community as well as returnees, and ensure that support and capacity is directed to the provincial and local level rather than just central institutions.

- Address the disconnect between emergency response, recovery and reintegration. There is no doubt that Southern Sudan will require humanitarian interventions for the foreseeable future, which therefore necessitates improved links with early recovery,

b) The reintegration/durable solutions strategy should strengthen support for urban programmes given that many returnees may migrate to towns rather than 'returning' to rural areas. The population of Juba is estimated to be 500,000 which is double the size of 2005, with significant contributions from over two million Southerners who returned during the CPA period.[43] As most of those who may return from the north are urban dwellers, this trend could easily increase. NRC is one of only a few organisations with urban reintegration programmes in Juba, whilst UNHCR is now taking a leadership role in planning and encouraging more focus on urban response, including through planned urban livelihoods and shelter workshops.

c) The reintegration/durable solutions strategy should include a grace period of 18-24 months following the referendum where donors, in collaboration with the GoSS, continue to support NGO service providers, whilst considering appropriate funding mechanisms that promote flexible responses to fluctuating needs and a rapidly changing context. Donors should be realistic as to the high level of expectation and demand that will be placed on the GoSS in the post-referendum environment, especially in the event of secession. Government capacity at the local and provincial level is already

stretched and will require significant time and consistent support to strengthen. NGOs are strategically placed to support strengthening of government at the local level, which should receive increased support from donors. There will also be high levels of uncertainty with potential increased conflict and displacement requiring a flexible and rapid response which NGOs are well placed to provide. Funding mechanisms will need to be highly flexible, more predictable and capable of rapid disbursement.

d) The reintegration/durable solutions strategies should include particular attention to mechanisms to address potential conflict regarding land and land ownership in Southern Sudan including land allocation for landless returnees. Some important factors include: the lack of capacity of local land administration and allocation structures, disruption to customary systems caused by long-term conflict and displacement, the high cost and lengthy delays associated with processing cases through the formal justice system, the lack of clarity in relation to the statutory framework for land created through the Land Act (2009), security of tenure and equal land rights for women. Further, the provisions of the Land Act which set 16 February 2012 as the final date for receipt of land claims will create significant difficulties in the event of substantial post referendum returns. NRC is one of the few actors working in the areas of land and property dispute resolution and land administration.

e) More attention and support is required for humanitarian and reintegration protection activities targeting displaced populations and returnees. The overt focus on the physical security activities and priorities of UNMIS has dominated the protection of civilians and more general protection agenda in Southern Sudan. Attention, support and funding for humanitarian protection activities have therefore been limited. Recent changes in the protection cluster with UNHCR leading, and NRC as co-lead have greatly improved the focus and performance of the cluster. The clear separation of the protection cluster from the physical security agenda of UNMIS is also welcome and has helped raise the profile of humanitarian protection. However:

- **Greater support for the establishment of protection clusters at the state level is required** to ensure an appropriate monitoring and response capacity outside Juba where the needs will be greatest.

- **Increased donor support for protection activities is necessary given the significant protection needs in Southern Sudan.** The protection cluster only received 40 percent of requested funding in 2010. Protection is the second largest submission under the Work Plan for 2011, which will require significantly increased donor support.

- **Increased investment by humanitarian actors in undertaking humanitarian protection activities is required and demonstrating impact with external stakeholders.** Examples of important protection activities include S/GBV and child protection programmes as well as NRC's legal assistance and information counselling programmes, which assist returnees to resolve land and property disputes through both the formal and informal justice systems.

e) With the many uncertainties that will result if Southern Sudan elects to secede, it is vital that there is continuity of funding for basic service delivery, emergency repose and reintegration programming. Ensuring the continuation, if not increase in flexible funding for humanitarian, early recovery and reintegration actors will be essential. The maintenance and increase of flexible funding that can be disbursed quickly to enable response in a volatile and unpredictable environment should be prioritised until the higher political concerns are resolved. Whilst Southern Sudan has multiple pooled funding mechanisms, bilateral funding for direct implementation of basic service providers at the local level will be crucial. Agreements formalising the relationship of the new nation of Southern Sudan with the IMF, World Bank and other multilateral financial institutions may take years to finalise. Important issues will include the application of international treaties and whether Southern Sudan will agree to incur some of the national debt of Sudan. In order to avoid the problems associated with the MDTF that were documented in NRC's previous report, basic service delivery and reintegration programming should not be linked to stabilisation strategies or state building funds,

nor is the World Bank the appropriate body to administer such funds during times of transition.[44] Where funding mechanisms are established the focus should be to ensure disbursements and accountability at the local and state level rather than just focusing on the central level, and given its problems, a continuation of the MDTF is not advisable.

f) The GoSS should facilitate an environment conducive to safe humanitarian access, including within the border areas. Security has deteriorated for humanitarian workers in Southern Sudan over the last 12 months making it difficult to access populations in need of assistance. Fifty incidents since February 2010 have been 'particularly serious' as they involved the physical abuse of a staff member, looting of humanitarian supplies or detention of staff without charge.[45] If the humanitarian situation worsens following the referendum and there are large movements of Southern returnees, humanitarian actors will require increased access throughout Southern Sudan. With the potential for conflict either between the north and south, and/or internally within the south, the constraints on access may be even greater. The need for safe and unimpeded delivery of aid was reiterated by the UN's Emergency Relief Coordinator during her recent visit to Southern Sudan at the beginning of November.[46]

8. Conclusion

The challenges facing Sudan will be significant whatever the result of the upcoming Southern Sudan referendum in January 2011. Violent reactions and large-scale displacement may occur if secession is chosen, denied, or appears to have been illegitimately denied. The current 2011 planning figures estimate movements of returnees, internally displaced and refugees in the hundreds of thousands to millions. And despite six years of recovery and reconstruction, the capacity of Southern Sudan to properly support mass population movement is limited. As the attention and capacity of the GoSS will likely be overstretched during an unpredictable and busy post referendum period, it is imperative that the broader humanitarian community is adequately equipped and remains able to respond to a potentially worsening humanitarian situation and large-scale reintegration needs.

Over 50,000 Southerners have already moved south since October. There have been some welcome improvements in return planning and response compared to previous processes. However, urgent efforts are required to provide Southerners in the north with information concerning return and to agree future citizenship arrangements in order to reduce uncertainty and facilitate a voluntary, safe and dignified return process.

Significant improvement to reintegration efforts could be achieved through agreement of a common and holistic reintegration/durable solutions strategy for Southern Sudan. The strategy should address the needs of host communities and all returnees irrespective and when and where they returned. Key focus areas should include increased support for peri-urban, urban, livelihoods and access to markets programming; strengthened basic service delivery; increased support for humanitarian protection activities and access to resources including land for landless returnees. The current disconnect between emergency response, recovery and reintegration should be addressed.

However, whilst political actors and donors will need to demonstrate support for the new nation of southern Sudan, if it happens, the humanitarian aid architecture, programming and funding to respond to Sudan's unpredictable context should not be prematurely dismantled or incorporated into stabilisation or other longer term strategies that could take years to realise. In the 18 - 24 months following the referendum donors and the GoSS should continue to support NGO service providers whilst ensuring appropriate funding mechanisms that strengthen flexible responses to fluctuating needs in a rapidly changing context.

Ends 14 December 2010

Acronyms

ARRI	Accelerated Returns and Reintegration Initiative
AU:	African Union
AUHIP:	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
GNU	Government of National Unity
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Person (s)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
JIU	Joint Integrated Unit (s)
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MTDF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NCP	National Congress Party
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NFI	Non-Food Item (s)
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI HPG	Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian Policy Group
OHCHR	United Nations Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PoC	Protection of Civilians
RCO	United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
S/GBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSRRC	Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIS	United Nations Mission In Sudan
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

Endnotes

[1] HPG and ALNAP: Where to now? Agency Expulsions in Sudan: Consequences and Next Steps. March 2009. P.3

[2] IDMC: Sudan: Rising inter-tribal violence in the south and renewed clashes in Darfur cause new waves of displacement. 28 May 2010.

[3] Infant mortality rate of live births, Maternal Neonatal Reproductive Health Survey, Ministry of Health for Southern Sudan, 2009-2015.

[4] Status of Millennium Development Goals in 2008 available at UNDP Sudan website: http://www.sd.undp.org/mdg_fact.htm

[5] OCHA Comparative Statistics, Sudan, 2009.

[6] OCHA Overview, November 2010

[7] OCHA Humanitarian Update 3rd Quarter 2010

[8] UNHCR: The end of the Road A review of UNHCR's role in the return and reintegration of internally displaced population. July 2010. P.51.

[9] IDMC: Sudan: Rising inter-tribal violence in the south and renewed clashes in Darfur cause new waves of displacement. 28 May 2010

[10] OCHA Conflict Mapping at 30 November 2010

[11]Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC): Southern Sudan 2010: Mitigating a Humanitarian Disaster. March 2010. P.9

[12] Remarks to the Security Council on Sudan on the 16 November 2010.

[13] International Crisis Group: International Crisis Group Update Briefing, Negotiating Sudan's North-South Future. 23 November 2010. P. 1.

[14] Norway is leading negotiations in the petroleum sector with its Special Petroleum Envoy. According to International Crisis Group, a 'roadmap' in this regard is expected mid-December.

[15] See Southern Sudan Referendum Act: Eligibility to register and vote is based on: 1) having one or both parents who belong to an indigenous group residing in Southern Sudan on or before 1 January 1956 "or whose ancestry is traceable to one of the ethnic groups in Southern Sudan"; 2) people who have been permanently resident "without interruption" in Southern Sudan since 1 January 1956; and 3) people who have permanently resident parents or grand-parents.

[16] The registration period was extended by seven days.

[17] Chatham House: Decisions and Deadlines A Critical Year For Sudan. January 2010. P.6.

[18] ICG: Negotiating Sudan's North-South Future, p.4 - 5

[19] National Democratic Institute (NDI): Southern Sudan at the Crossroads. Citizen Expectations, Aspirations and Concerns about the Referendum and Beyond. September 30 2010, p. 8.

[20] Interviews in south Sudan, November 2010.

[21] Following the signing of the CPA and subsequent decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in July 2009, there has been little movement on demarcation of the border in Abyei.

[22] Concordis International: More than a line: Sudan's north-south border. September 2010. P.53.

[23] Report commissioned by Pact Sudan through DfID, led by (project director and principal author) and Professor Tim Allen (lead researcher) of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Development Studies Institute (DESTIN): Southern Sudan at odds with itself: Dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace. July 2010. P.7

[24]Tufts and IDMC: Internal displacement to urban areas: the Tufts - IDMC urban profiling study Khartoum, Sudan: case 1 August 2008, p.6 - 8.

[25] IDMC: Sudan: Rising inter-tribal violence in the south and renewed clashes in Darfur cause new waves of displacement. P. 34 and 41-42.

[26] NRC interview on 15 November 2010.

[27] For example see the Reuters report 'Southerners fear reprisals in Khartoum, plan exodus' of 16 November 2010 available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MCOI-8B9KA5?OpenDocument

[28] UNICEF: Household survey, Sudan, 2006.

[29] NDI; Southern Sudan at the Crossroads. P.25

[30] See Erika Feller, Keynote Address to Sudan Citizenship Symposium, UNHCR, Kahrtoum, 6 November 2010.

[31] The UN Resident Coordinator's Support Office/Early Recovery Section Joint Weekly Report for the 18 – 24 Oct 2010 showing an increase of 11% of returnees from the previous week and a 28 % jump (at 2,415 individuals) in the report of the 15 – 21 November (through the Kosti transit hub).

[32] OCHA Sudan: Humanitarian Update on Returnees, Southern Sudan, 30 November 2010. NRC has also witnessed spontaneous returns in Northern Bahr el Ghazal.

[33] Interviews in Juba, Aweil and IRIN article – 3.12.2010

[34] ODI HPG, Sarah Bailey and Simon Harrigan: Food Assistance, Reintegration and Dependency in Southern Sudan. June 2009. P. 1. Quoting UNMIS/RR (2009) *Sudan IDP and Refugee Returns, reintegration Operations Statistical Overview*. Khartoum: Information Management Office.

[35] Interview with Head of IOM, 19 November 2010.

[36] The development of the ARERI followed recommendations from HPG's report Long Road Home: Opportunities and obstacles to the reintegration of IDPs and refugees returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas, Report of Phase 1. August 2007.

[37] UNHCR submission for the OHCHR's compilation report: Universal periodic review: Sudan, November 2010.

[38] IRIN: Sudan: Culture Shock for many Southern returnees*,* 3 December 2010.

[39] UNMIS: Thousands of returnees languishing in Unity State. 17 November 2010 available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MDCS-8BBFKG?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=sdn

[40] ODI HPG: Sarah Bailey and Simon Harrigan: Food Assistance, Reintegration and Dependency in Southern Sudan. June 2009 P.1.

[41] ODI HPG Sara Pantuliano, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Paul Murphy and Irina Mosel: The Long Road Home: Opportunities and obstacles to the reintegration of IDPs and refugees returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas. September 2008.

[42] UNGA A/HRC/13/21/Add.4: *The Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons,* Report of the Representative of the Secretary General on the human rights of international displaced person, Walter Kålin, 9 February 2010, states that, 'a durable solution is achieved when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without account of their displacement.'

[43]ODI HPG Ellen Martin: Gender, violence and survival in Juba, Southern Sudan, HPG Policy Brief 42. November 2010.

[44] NRC: Southern Sudan 2010: Mitigating a Humanitarian Disaster. March 2010 .P.10: "Total donor funds paid into the MDTF for Southern Sudan since its inception is US$593.4m by June 2009. However, the total value of grant agreements signed by the MDTF has only reached US$234.7m, while the amount actually disbursed is even lower at just US$159.3m. When considering the exceptionally low level of development in Southern Sudan and the extensive investment requirements, a disbursal rate of around 27% cannot be considered sufficient."

[45] OCHA, December 2010

[46] See OCHA: ERC calls for improved humanitarian access in southern Sudan. 5 November 2010

Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot

OCHA

Conflicts and natural disasters, such as floods, affect people in parts of Sudan. Limited humanitarian access in some of the affected areas inhibits relief assistance.

- 2010 conflict incidents
- 2010 flood areas

Southern Sudan and the referendum

A vote on the independence of Southern Sudan is scheduled to be held in January 2011. Any dispute over the results could have humanitarian consequences. While nearly half of Southerners were expected to receive food aid at some point in 2010, the environment is becoming increasingly difficult for aid workers.

- South Sudan referendum area
- Abyei district special referendum: The people of Abyei will vote to decide whether to join the North or South.
- Main hubs of pre-positioned aid supplies.

Displaced **215,000** people were newly displaced in 2010 by inter-tribal clashes and political violence in the South.

Access **118** incidents of interference with humanitarian work in Southern Sudan have been recorded in 2010.

80,000 people have been affected by seasonal flooding



Darfur and displaced people

Tribal clashes, fighting among factions of armed groups, and conflict between rebels and Sudan's armed forces continues to affect the people of Darfur while restricted humanitarian access has prevented delivery of some aid.

Level of humanitarian access in Darfur

- Limited access
- Reduced or intermittent
- No access
- Known locations of displaced people

Displaced **268,500** people were estimated to be newly displaced in 2010 due to conflict in Darfur.

Access **27** international peacekeepers and aid workers have been kidnapped since March 2009 in Darfur. One remains in captivity.

Monthly planned and actual beneficiaries of food distributions in Darfur



Source: WFP Sudan, Food Distribution Statistics September 2010

Key dates in the Southern Sudan referendum

9 January: Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M).

30 July: John Garang, leader of SPLA/M and Sudanese Vice-President, dies in a helicopter crash weeks after the nation's new power-sharing constitution is ratified.

May: Violence in Abyei displaces 50,000 people.

April 2010: Sudan holds the first national elections in more than 20 years. Incumbents triumph in the North and South.

9 January 2011: Referendum vote scheduled for Southern Sudan and Abyei district.

22-30 December 2009: Legislation governing the referendum in the South and legislation enabling a referendum on the future of Abyei is passed.

2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010

Source: OCHA Sudan unless otherwise noted **Creation date:** 2 Nov. 2010 **Feedback:** ochaavmu@un.org, OCHASudan@un.org http://ochaonline.un.org www.reliefweb.int

Cumulative figures of new conflict related displacement reported in 2010 - Status 30/11/10: 221,073 IDPs

OCHA

The data in the map are subject to availability of IDP figures at the time of production and represents numbers reported by authorities and/or assessment teams. It does not claim to be exhaustive or fully verified.



National and State boundaries based on Russian Map Series, 1:200k, 1970-ties. County Boundaries digitized based on Statistical Yearbook 2009 Southern Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics and Evaluation - SSCCSE. Digitized by IMU OCHA Southern Sudan

Code: SS-0073b-11
Date: 02/12/10
IMU OCHA SS

OCHA Sudan is funded by:
Common Humanitarian Fund (Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden & DFID) , Switzerland, ECHO, USAID/OFDA and Italy

Returnees by Transit and Final Destination November 2010 - Status 30/11/2010

OCHA



Norwegian Refugee Council
PO Box 6758 St. Olavs plass,
0130 Oslo
NORWAY

NRC
NORWEGIAN
REFUGEE COUNCIL

Web: www.nrc.no
E-mail: nrc@nrc.no
Phone: 23 10 98 00
Fax.: 23 10 98 01