

# THE ANSO REPORT

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## YOU NEED TO KNOW

- IEA announces spring offensive, Operation Badar
- ‘Sleeper’ agents within the ANSF
- Increasingly sophisticated targeting of key Afghan civil leadership
- IEA ‘protection’ of NGO clinic

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## COUNTRY SUMMARY

The IEA announced the initiation of their ‘Spring Offensive’ on April 29th, an event that occurs on a yearly basis and is generally intended as a strategic statement regarding their goals, methodology, as well as guidance to their leadership though is also an element of their wider information operations plan. The operation, known as ‘Badar’, while short on tactical details, contains a few comments of contemporary interest including:

1. An explicit statement regarding the targeting of foreign and local supporters of the IMF occupation, most likely directed at local logistics facilitators as well as foreign Private Development Companies (PDC)
2. A direct mention of the High Peace Council as legitimate targets.
3. An explicit instruction regarding the avoidance of civilian casualties and a warning to civilians to avoid target sites. Of particular concern to is the rather vague descriptions of “gatherings” which could be read to include any place where targets congregate either professionally or personally. Recent attacks that may fall within this definition may have included dog-fights, buzkashi matches,

salary lines, banks, demonstration, arbakai shura meetings and shops but we will need to monitor the target pattern closely to fully understand this scope of this term. When taken in conjunction with the instruction to deliver “meticulous military plans” however we would stop short of seeing it as carte blanche to attack any place that targets recreate or gather. (the full English text of the statement is provided on p. 25 & 26 of this report)

AOG use of ‘sleeper’ agents embedded within the ANSF is a tactic quickly becoming a definitive trend as seen during the end of 2010 and throughout 2011. While this tactic has proven to be particularly lethal, typically involving a single operative armed with a suicide device, it also serves a greater strategic goal.

It may prove to be a fault line for the impending transition plans, sowing the seeds of distrust between the two key agents of this plan, the IMF and the ANSF, as the on-going development of the ANSF remains a critical factor in the implementation of this plan.

A second, equally lethal and effective trend that has developed in line with the previous, is the surgical targeting of key leadership (military, political, and civilian) with suicide attacks. Of note, this trend, when coupled with the above, proves to be particularly difficult to mitigate for the target groups, as seen in the penetration of the MoD this period in Kabul.

The Eastern Region continues to provide a high volume of NGO incidents, with 3 recorded this period (1 Nangarhar, 2 Kunar), though Ghor also reported 3 incidents with a final one from the North. Of particular interest in an incident reported from Kunar in which the IEA broke off an engagement with security forces due to the potential of damage it would have caused an NGO clinic (which was occupied by security forces as a result of the attack). This is significant as it marks one of the first confirmed reports of such an action taken on the part of an AOG, further evidence that groups within the East are taking steps to minimise the conflicts impact on the NGO in this region.

## CENTRAL REGION

### KABUL

There were a total of 35 incidents reported this period, with only 3 AOG initiated, 5 IMF operations, 21 ANSF actions, and 6 criminal events. While most of the incidents fall within the standard categories of incidents reported in this province, there were a few exceptions.


The first incident, a brazen penetration of the MoD by an AOG bearing the full rank and insignia of an ANA Colonel (who was apparently an actual service member, though of lower rank) resulted in the deaths of 1 and the wounding of 4 others by SAF, with the apparent target of this attack being a high ranking official within the MoD. While the attacker was armed with a suicide device, he failed to detonate (reasons unknown) and was instead ultimately killed by weapons fire. This incident marks the latest in a string of such occurrences,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

generally involving 'sleeper' agents within the security forces who use their access to maximise casualties, generally through suicide attacks.

The second incident, which on its surface would appear similar to the first, also involved an ANSF member, this time Air Force, who ultimately killed 9 US mentors (8 IMF, 1 contractor) and wounded one national. While the IEA claimed responsibility for this attack, this appears unlikely, and the details of this event and his motivations remain more murky. Some reports suggest this was the result of private difficulties which, when coupled with an inter-personal dispute, triggered the individual to attack.

These two events speak to a higher level issue regarding the deterioration of trust between the ANSF and IMF, the goal of such



AOG efforts, which could have significant implications for the transition process, a key element of the broader IMF exit strategy.

Criminality, an issue that in many cases takes a back seat in light of the wider conflict, resulted in at least 4 deaths and 1 injury this period. All of these were caused by small arms fire resulting from inter-personal disputes. Lastly, there was one abduction of a business man from District 8 in Kabul City, a persistent issue from within the capital, a crime that falls under the purview of various abduction syndicates operating kidnap for ransom rings. Of note, this latest incident was perpetrated by a group wearing ANSF uniforms, an unfortunately common enough element in such incidents.


### KAPISA

Incident volumes were low in Kapisa this period, with only Tagab, Alasay and Nijrab represented. The focus was Tagab, with 3 direct attacks on ANSF in the middle of the period, one of which led to the death of an AOG fighter in the exchange of fire. Also in Tagab, a large IED struck an IMF vehicle, killing one soldier and injuring 9 more. As such, although last period was quiet in the district, partly because of on-going ANA clearing operations, this period has seen what may well be

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

the continuation of the AOG campaign in that district thought to have been announced with the SVBIED attack in late March. ANP did, however, manage to defuse a single IED in the Gurra area of the district.

In Alasay, two incidents on consecutive days in the Ashpi valley both shone insights onto the ongoing operations there. First on the 23rd, an IMF helicopter crashed while on operations there, and on the following day, a heli-



copter assault killed 7 AOG fighters and injured 4 others. Finally, in Nijrab, ANP discovered a large cache of mortar shells in Shada Gul village.


## LOGAR

A total of 15 security incidents were recorded in Logar this reporting period, displaying a drop when compared to the 19 reported in early April. Nonetheless, AOG activity in the province remained relatively constant with 8 AOG initiated incidents. The geographical distribution of security events followed familiar patterns with Baraki Barak, Charkh and Puli Alam districts recording the bulk of incidents. In Baraki Barak, apart from an AOG attack on an ANP checkpoint in Shah Mohammad Village, which resulted in one ANP wounded, another noteworthy incident took place in Pulijugi Area. On 24th April, an AOG stopped two IMF contracted fuel tankers. One fuel tanker was set ablaze and the other carjacked and both drivers taken hostage. Their whereabouts at the time of writing

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

this report are unknown. It is worth noting that reported abduction cases have been rare in Baraki Barak and this abduction marks the first incident to occur this year and only the fourth ANSO recorded abduction since 2009.

In the past two weeks Logar hosted three IED incidents, respectively in Puli Alam, Baraki Barak and Khushi, of which one device detonated. In Puli Alam, Padkhab area, an IED struck an ANA vehicle travelling on the main district road but did not cause casualties. In addition, AOG launched two IDF attacks in Charkh and Muhammad Agha districts. Both incidents occurred on the 19th, with one rocket that impacted in the DAC area of Charkh, injuring two civilians, and the second projectile landing in the vicinity of an ANP



checkpoint in the Aynak Copper Mine area of Muhammad Agha District.

ANSF/IMF activities were focused on Baraki Barak and Charkh districts. Although several arrests have been reported in Baraki Barak during the current military operations, anecdotal reporting suggests the vast majority of fighters had already left the area and moved to the neighbouring Wardak Province. In keeping with past practices, one should expect AOG to attempt to disturb ANSF/IMF freedom of movement through increasing IED emplacement along primary supply axes.

## PANJSHIR

The persistent peace of the Panjshir Valley was disrupted this period as a result of the unparalleled occurrence of two separate security incidents this period. These mark the first incidents to occur since an IED incident during the first week of January within Bazarak District, targeting the Provincial Governor's Office. These latest incidents, like those in the past, are exclusively the result of internal disputes or tensions, though some reports suggest AOG involvement, which appears to be a case of hearing hoof beats and looking for zebras. The first incident occurred on the 16th of April in Rukha and involved a low yield and unsophisticated IED detonating against an

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

IMF vehicle. It would appear that this device was meant to deliver a message, rather than cause actual harm, a message that involved local dissatisfaction over the implementation of a project by the PRT. While two suspects had been detained by the NDS, they were released shortly thereafter and there has been no further follow-up.

The second incident, this time on the 19th in Khenj, was more significant in that an ANP was killed in what appeared to be an execution-style killing. Local reporting indicates that this incident was a result of ANP vs. ANP action (rather than AOG) stemming from a personal dispute. An ANP

officer from outside the province attended the Panjshir with the apparent intent of settling a grudge, which was ultimately accomplished in a hail of gunfire, killing the intended target who was also an ANP officer. While the assailant made good his escape (despite suffering a vehicle accident during the attempt) 3 others were arrested as suspected accomplices and there is an ongoing investigation.

These types of incidents, particularly ones involving inter-personal disputes, are a regular feature of the security landscape, though they usually pass by unnoticed, shielded by the greater noise of the general conflict. In a quiet province such as this one, however, they result in greater notice, though ultimately present little impact to the security paradigm for NGO operations as they are focused and limited in their impact. As such, Panjshir remains perhaps the most permissive province for NGOs within the county.


## WARDAK

In Wardak the overall incident volumes has slightly increased in comparison to the previous reporting cycle, with 29 security incidents against the previous 25. AOG activity this period was focused on Saydabad, Nirkh, Chaki Wardak and Jaghatu districts. A noteworthy development was reported from Nirkh District where local elders' attempts to ease the dissension between HIG and the IEA failed, at least temporarily. On 17th April a prolonged armed clash occurred between these two groups in the Samardin area and claimed the lives of five IEA and three HIG fighters. In addition, four local villagers were wounded during the fire fight which lasted around 12 hours. Hostility between IEA and HIG is recurring in Nirkh and had already led to numerous open confrontations. Recently for instance, on 18th February an IEA element attacked

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

HIG positions in Sadonak Area, this time causing no casualties.

During this reporting period at least 10 AOG close range attacks have been recorded across the province, respectively in Saydabad (4), Nirkh (3), Chaki Wardak (2) and Jaghatu (1). AOG persist in their efforts to disturb vehicular movement along the Kabul-Ghazni Highway. In the last fortnight, apart from an ANP check post that came under attack in the Salar area, two convoys were assaulted in Haftasyab and again in Salar (all aforementioned incidents occurred in Saydabad). The later attack injured two ANA soldiers. In addition to these attacks, an IED detonated along the main road in Haftasyab, targeting a PSC convoy and injuring a driver. It is worth noting that an additional 4 IED incidents have been reported across the province with two de-



vices that detonated. A fatal IED incident took place in Aka Khel Village of Saydabad, where an explosive device detonated against a PSC vehicle killing one civilian and wounding another two. In addition, anecdotal reporting indicates that the security environment in Saydabad has been increasingly affected by AOG elements dislocating in face of military operations in the neighbouring district of Baraki Barak in Logar. At the same time, AOG in Wardak faced continued pressure from the ANSF/IMF with 11 evidenced operations that were reported in the late April throughout the province. These operations were focused on Saydabad, Jalrez, Maydan and Nirkh districts and resulted in two AOG killed, one injured and another 19 detained.

## PARWAN


This reporting period events in Parwan were shaped by a violent protest that occurred on 18th April in Chaharikar District. A large number of locals staged a demonstration protesting against an IMF night raid which resulted in the detention of three mullahs accused of having ties to local AOGs. The protestors blocked the main Kabul-Mazar-e-Sharif Road and pelted security forces with stones. In order to gain back control of the situation additional ANSF units, including ANCOP and IMF elements, were deployed to the area. As a result of clashes between the protestors and security forces, one civilian was reported to have been killed while another 19 civilians, 5 ANP and 1 IMF soldier were injured.

Generally speaking, the incident

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

level in Parwan remains low, and including this demonstration a total of 8 security incidents were reported in the last two weeks. Noteworthy, this period saw an absence of IED related incidents, however the province experienced two AOG close range attacks. The first incident took place on 22nd April in Ghorband District (Saydan Valley) when AOG ambushed an ANP convoy, wounding two ANP officials. The following day, in the Dozd Dara area of Shinwari District, an ANP check post was attacked by AOG with SAF. The attack also resulted in casualties, as 1 ANP was injured.

The pattern of AOG IDF activity has continued as well across the province. In the evening of 19th



April two rockets detonated in the vicinity of an ANP check post in the Joy Kajak area of Chaharikar District. And for the second consecutive reporting period, an AOG indirect attack was reported from Kohi Safi, with two rockets impacted close to the DAC on the 23rd. Finally, an SAF attack on fuel tankers was reported from Salang on the Kabul-Mazar Road. While attacks in Salang remain a rare occurrence, anecdotal reporting suggests that this particular incident is most likely related to some interpersonal grievance rather than an indicator of an established criminal group.



## NORTHERN REGION


### BALKH

The incident level in Balkh Province has remained consistent with the previous reporting cycle. Although no incidents were reported along the main road, AOG activities continued to increase in the areas west of the Mazar-e-Sharif City. In the AOG stronghold of Chimtal, an ANP check point came under SAF attack in the Gaz Pipeline Area. A brief fire fight ensued before the group withdrew. Prior to this, on the 17th in the vicinity of Muqran at around 5 pm, an AOG stopped a private truck carrying stones and gravel for a construction project and detained the driver with his assistant. The AOG set the truck on fire before releasing them. AOG initiated illegal check points and abduction of drivers in Chimtal are not unheard of, as AOGs continue to make it clear that anyone operating in district has to do so with their approval. The most notable recent case occurred between 27-28th February with the hijacking of three IO trucks in the Alburz mountain areas, where two drivers escaped and all three trucks were set on fire. As previ-

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

ously observed, Chimtal District continues to be affected by significant presence of AOG elements who operate openly during the day.

In this reporting period the neighbouring district of Chahar Bolak also saw several notable incidents with AOG focussing on attacking pro-government militia check posts. On 22nd April AOG attacked such a post located in Arzankar Village. The attack led to a three-hour long fire fight, injuring one AOG. The following day, another close range engagement occurred between AOG and pro-government militia members when during the night AOG attacked a militia post in the Timurak Area. For the second consecutive reporting period these incidents further confirm the renewal of AOG activities in both districts after a period of relative calm in the aftermath of Operation 'Ebtakar'. AOG activity also continued in southern Balkh, Sholgara District where AOG ambushed militia members in



Paikan Dara Village. The most significant ANSF/IMF operation recorded in this period occurred further south in Kishindih District when on 24th April, in the Doghaba Area, apart from the seizure of some weapons, four AOG members were killed in the joint operation.

On a different note, in Mazar-e-Sharif, the investigation related to the violence that took place during the 1st April demonstration continued this period with the reported arrest of a suspect who was allegedly involved in the incident. Also noteworthy, on 20th April in Mazar-e-Sharif City, three unknown individuals attempted to abduct the brother of an IO staff member who was relocated to Kabul as a result of the said demonstration. Although the majority of rare abductions taking place in Mazar involves 'valuable targets' such as businessmen, this incident was a clear attempt to exert the pressure on a witness in to disrupt the investigation into the 1st April attack.

**NOTICE:** The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the **27th of April 2011**.


## FARYAB

Maymana has been quiet thus far despite tensions that arose in the last reporting period between the PRT and the community. Anecdotal reports from the area suggested that elders gathered several times with the authorities in order to seek permission to hold a demonstration against the burning of the Holy Quran and the operation resulted in the killing of an ANBP policeman who had been involved in the death of two IMF soldiers. The authorities held the position that no demonstrations can take place unless an individual agrees to take responsibility for any violence that might occur. As no one had volunteered to take the responsibility, the potential for further protests did not translate itself into practice.

In the past two weeks focal points for AOG activity were Pashtun Kot, Quaramqol, Dawlatabad, and Qaysar districts. It is interesting to

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
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note that Northern Faryab has seen an increase of activity, with two more incidents taking place in Dawlatabad District—a known AOG hub. Noteworthy amongst these, on 16th April in Dashti Laili, an AOG entered the area to collect religious taxes from the community but was chased off by ANP reinforcement. AOGs have been reaching out to the community here for a while, with anecdotal reports suggesting that in February and March AOG elements stopped cars in order to request for local support. It is likely that insecurity will further increase in Dawlatabad as spring progresses, especially in the contested Jungal Area. The said area, which is located on the border between Dawlatabad and Qaramqol districts, experienced last year several illegal check points as well as direct attacks on ANP check posts. The renewal of this trend was ob-




served on 20th April when AOG carried out an attack against an ANP patrol. Five days later at around 5 pm, still in Jungal Area, an ANP post located approximately 200 meters west of the main road came under AOG fire. Also in the South of Maymana, AOG operations focused on Pashtun Kot with the abduction of a local civilian reported on 19th April in Taka Tozai Village. Plus there were two armed attacks occurring in Khwaja Namosa area in which one ANP was killed, and another ANP along with one IMF soldier were injured. Anecdotal reporting suggests that due to the ongoing military operation 'Wahdak', the spill over of dislocating AOG elements from Darzab and Qush Tepa (Jawzjan) may affect the security situation in the north of Faryab, in particular Shirin Tagab, Dawlatabad and Quaramqol Districts.

## KUNDUZ

This reporting period a total of 29 security incidents were reported in Kunduz Province, which represents a significant decrease as compared to 37 incidents recorded during the previous cycle. In addition, AOG and IMF appear to be refraining from conducting major operations across the province, at least temporarily. Whereas a lull in AOG-ANSF/IMF direct engagements has been observed over the past two weeks, IED emplacement in Kunduz remains a concern. There have been 18 IED related incidents taking place across the province with eight devices that detonated. Territorial distribution of these incidents

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
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followed well known patterns: eight of the mentioned 18 IED incidents occurred in Kunduz District alone, followed by four in Chahar Dara and Khanabad and finally two events in Archi. As noted in previous ANSO reports the majority of IED taking place in Kunduz are remote controlled devices and destined to target ANSF/IMF vehicles. However, in the last fortnight, an RCIED detonated against a private truck in Archi District injuring its driver and his assistant. In the same district, as a result of IED detonation that took place in Puli Pukhta area two teenage girls were wounded.




Kunduz district, where the majority of incidents were concentrated, witnessed two noteworthy events this period. On 18th April in District 2, an RCIED detonated in front of the residence of a community elder, injuring three local civilians including the elder and his son. Although it is not excluded that this incident was related to a personal grievance, AOG attacks against targets including GOA personalities, ANSF or associates are frequent in Kunduz City.

## BAGHLAN

Even though in the last fortnight the attention of Operation Nowruz remained focused on the traditional AOG strongholds of Burka and Baghlani Jadid, with a widely publicized report that IMF conducted a night raid in Burka on the 18th (Fulol Area) that killed 11 AOG members, including the District Shadow Governor, Dushi District was once again 'active'. The said district, which saw an unusual amount of insecurity over the previous reporting period, experienced several noteworthy incidents. On 18th April in Kilagai Village along the Puli Khumri-Kabul Road, three local nationals were stopped by an armed group led by a well known local ACG commander. Two of them were questioned and released on the spot, while the third one was abducted. Worthy to note that reports from the area link the perpetrator to an ACG who also has ties to various AOGs, and may have abducted this individual

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
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as part of a personal dispute that he had with the abductee's brother. It has been suggested that the abductee is currently being held for ransom. In addition, on the morning of 18th April in Kuru Area, armed individuals fired two rockets that impacted close to the main road, causing no injuries. After an illegal check point that was set up on the Puli Khumri-Kabul Road on the 11th, this reporting period saw two additional incidents affecting the main road. On the evening of 15th April unknown armed individuals attacked with SAF two fuel tankers, slightly damaging both of them. Another attack along the main road occurred on 21st in Kelagai area when an AOG launched an assault on IMF contracted fuel tankers burning three of them. Three other tankers were damaged but their drivers managed to escape the scene of the attack. Generally speaking attacks on fuel tankers




along the Main Kunduz – Kabul road were not uncommon in 2010, but few have occurred in 2011. It is extremely rare for such attacks to take place in Dushi, as opposed to Puli Khumri or Baghlani Jadid, which are usual hotspots in the province. According to ANSO data there have been 10 incidents, including the recent ones recorded in Dushi this month, compared to a total of 14 incidents recorded in the district last year. As previously noted, it is likely that the recent proliferation of events has been caused by AOGs and ACGs who have been forced south from Baghlani Jadid and Burka districts due to the Nowruz operation. On a positive note though, a previous hotspot-Cheshmashir Area along the Pul-e Khumri-Mazar Main Road- has so far remained quiet since Operation 'Jadid' that took place on early January 2011.

## TAKHAR

Takhar continues to see a significant decline in insecurity, with the majority of incidents related to criminal activity. Among them, an incident which occurred on the evening of 19th April in Taloqan District (Qulbars Area) disturbed many members of the community. Eight armed individuals, six of them wearing ANP uniforms, entered and robbed a private residence, and then assaulted a 12 year old child. Although a police investigation is ongoing, no arrests have been made so far. While this does not suggest any shift in the security paradigm, it is a disturbing reminder of the effects that violent crime can have

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
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on individuals and the community. A noteworthy incident occurred in Yangi Qala when an ACG opened fire on a private Corolla vehicle when the driver refused to stop on Yangi Qala-Khwaja Bahawuddin Road, causing however no injuries. In addition, in Taluqan City, a former Jihadi commander was shot and injured in District 1, apparently over a personal dispute. Another dispute resulted in one civilian wounded in the cross-fire, while the body guards of an ANA recruitment officer from Kunduz and a female Taluqan Provincial Council member clashed with



each other in District 2 of the city.

AOG activity was focused this reporting period on Khwaja Bahawuddin where on 20th April an AOG attacked a pro-government militia member's residence, and in Ishkamish where on 21st ANP discovered and removed an IED which was emplaced in the District Centre Area. In addition, the next day IMF conducted a night raid in Fakhrak Area of the same district, killing one AOG member and arresting another four.


## SAR-E PUL

This reporting period Sar-e Pul Province experienced the second NGO related incident recorded this year. On 25th April in Sar-e Pul district, around 20-25 unknown armed individuals entered Qush Tepa Village where an INGO is implementing a project. The project is run with intermittent presence of external staff in the area and through field visits. The armed men went to the owner of the house, which is rented by the organization, and demanded to know the whereabouts of the INGO staff. They also asked the owner to let them know in advance about the next visit of the INGO staff to the village. The armed individuals did not precisely give the reason for their demand; therefore the exact intention behind this information gathering remains at this point unclear. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the security environment in Sar-e Pul has become more fluid in the light of the ongoing military

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
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Operation 'Wahdak' taking place in Tri-Provincial area: Sayyad District, Qush Tepa and Darzab in Jawzjan, and Bilchiragh in Faryab. While on one hand it is possible that this incident can be related to AOG spill over from areas affected by the military operation, on the other given changes in security dynamics, local armed groups may become more suspicious particularly towards external elements such as non-local NGO staff.

This period Operation 'Wahdak' continued in Sayyad District with multiple operations that were carried out on the morning of the 17th resulting in numerous AOG casualties. An operation that took place at 2 am in Ahzdabala village claimed the lives of 10 AOG members. Following this, IMF conducted an airstrike in the same area at 4 am, killing a further eight AOG. Besides military actions, 30 individuals joined the peace process in 2 groups (on the 17th and




19th), adding to the 64 who joined in the previous reporting period. The authorities have already announced the operation was a success and claimed the Sayyad has been cleared of AOG presence. Probably to prove the contrary and to show its operational capacities (despite being pressured) on April 23rd a large number of AOG (estimated at around 25 operatives) launched an attack using RPGs and SAF against GOA facilities located in District 2 of Sar-e Pul City. This incident represents the first direct attack targeting the objectives located within Sar-e Pul City this year. However, it seems to confirm reports that despite the military operation taking place in the province insecurity along the main road did not improve significantly and furthermore instability has started to affect areas outside Sar-e Pul City.

## JAWZJAN

Although suffering from relatively little insecurity compared to other provinces in the North, Jawzjan continues to experience a noteworthy trend of "first time" incidents along the main Maymana – Mazar-e-Sharif Road in northern districts. On 10th March the first illegal checkpoint was recorded in Khwaja Du Koh, which resulted in the abduction of four individuals who remain at large, and on 25th March there was the first illegal checkpoint along this road occurring in Fayzabad District. In this reporting period, on 20th April, an AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint located on the main road in Aqcha District at around

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

0100hrs. Although attacks on ANP checkpoints are not notable, and are a common AOG tactic countrywide, the attack marks the first ANSO recorded AOG initiated incident on the main road in this district. Furthermore, again in Fayzabad District, an IED was found under a culvert in the Kokaldash area at 8 am on the 20th. Although Fayzabad does not see a lot of insecurity, Kokaldash is the same area where the illegal checkpoint was set up on March 25th, and where AOGs fired RPGs at a telecommunications tower in July 2010. While this does not represent a significant shift in security in northern Jawzjan, it seems that




an AOG is operating intermittently in the area. The military operation 'Wahdak' is still ongoing in Qush Tepa and Darzab districts with some weapons and ammunition seizures and IED discoveries reported during the present cycle. So far there have not been reports of armed clashes between AOG and security forces indicating, as seen during previous similar military actions, that the majority of combatants merged in with the local population and/or withdrew to surrounding safe areas.



# BADAKHSHAN


Badakhshan remained relatively stable with 11 security incidents that have been reported across the province in the past two weeks. Jurm District came to the fore this reporting period with two incidents of note. On 16th April a group of armed individuals attacked with SAF the ANP head-quarter from Dashtek Area. The incident marked a noteworthy outlier in a usually quiet district. Prior to this attack, Jurm had only witnessed two security incidents this year, both of them criminally motivated (the abduction and kill-

ing of a local female that took place on 28th January, and a road robbery along the Jurm – Baharak road reported on 17th February), and only seven incidents over the entire course of 2010, none of them aimed at ANP/GOA infrastructure. The second incident occurred in Sagab Village on the 28th, with an IED that detonated in a telecommunication tower compound, causing some structural damages, but no injuries. While noteworthy, these incidents may have been related to local



rivalries rather than denote a specific trend. Lastly, insecurity continues in Baharak District with on 27th April an RPG round that was fired against the DAC. The projectile however impacted in a local shop and set it ablaze. The incident marks the 19th security event to occur in the district this year.

Feb-April AOG Incident Comparison: 2006-2011  
(as of 27 Apr 2011)



## WESTERN REGION

### HERAT


Herat Province saw more than twice as many incidents (total incident volume) this April as compared to April 2010, though the number still remains slightly under that recorded for April 2009. However, AOG initiated incidents have increased in comparison to 2009, from 23% to 36% of the total volume. This figure reflects the expanded AOG presence in the northern districts of Gulran, Khushk (north of the district centre) and Kushki Kuhna, as well as the eastern districts Pashtun Zarghun, Obe and Chishti Sharif – in addition to the historic hotspots of Adraskan and Shindand in the south. The current period witnessed the same number of direct fire attacks as the previous one, these being concentrated in Shindand, Kushk, Kushki Kuhna and Gulran. In contrast, IED related incidents – especially discoveries – decreased notably, with only one IED explosion in Kushk and an incident involving an explosive device in Herat City. However, this is expected to be only a temporarily decrease.

The risk for civilians to be collaterally involved in hostilities between ANSF/IMF and AOG, as

	NGO Incidents
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well as in IED incidents, was again apparent in the north of the province. On 21st of April, three civilians were killed and six others wounded in the Bazara Alaghadari area of Kushki Kuhna, when ANSF/IMF responded to an AOG attack and a rocket impacted in a nearby village, though due to negotiations involving local elders the situation remained calm. Furthermore, on 18th of April an IED killed the civilian driver of a motorbike in Chardar area on the main road from Kushk to Kushki Kuhna. However, both areas are known for a higher level of hostilities, which increases the risk of collateral involvement.

In the east, AOGs in Pashtun Zarghun remained quieter during the last two weeks, but several ANSF/IMF operations, particularly in the western parts of the district, took place. This can be seen as a reaction to the noticeable AOG activity in mid-April and the continuing rumours about illegal checkpoints on the main roads and other intimidation measures by AOGs in the district. Chishti Sharif again saw an armed



clash between local commanders and AOGs on 20th of April – this time in Esfarz village. The recent armed clashes are indicative of an ongoing power struggle since 2010, and they are expected to continue to impact the security situation as well as the stability of the district in the upcoming months.

In general, Herat City was calm during this reporting period, although on 17th of April the second hand grenade attack against a private house this month was recorded, likely criminal related. In addition, an explosive device was thrown, reportedly out of a car, in the direction of the ANP checkpoint in the Spinade area of District 2 in the early morning of 20th of April. No damage or casualty was caused and the intention seems to have been rather to intimidate and create fear. Although similar incidents with even stronger impacts are not unlikely in Herat City, they are expected to remain infrequent for the time being and concentrated on ANSF/IMF as well as – to a lesser extent – GoA targets.




## BADGHIS

While the number of incidents in the second half of April are less when compared to the first half of the month, the incident level still remains higher than during the same period last year. Of note, the incident level in April was higher than in any month during 2010 – with the exception of the election month September. However, the number of AOG initiated incidents was lower this April than in April 2010, most likely reflecting the ongoing ANSF/IMF operations. Nevertheless, whether or not continuing air strikes will reduce AOG activity in the long term remains to be seen. During this reporting cycle IMF conducted four airstrikes in Murghab, which bring the number of airstrikes/operations up to 14 this year and to seven in April alone. If air operations continue

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

on the same level, this is a significant increase compared to 22 airstrikes during the whole of last year and indicates that there is no sustainable improvement of the situation so far.

Of note, civilians were affected by the ongoing hostilities during the fighting in Murghab as well as in an IED strike in Qadis. On 17th of April, AOG attacked an ANSF/IMF convoy with RPGs and SAF in Joye Khaja Area of Murghab. In response, IMF conducted an airstrike. Reportedly, seven civilians were killed and another four wounded among others. One day later, AOG attacked an ALP check post with RPGs and SAF in Qebchgha Area. One local civilian was injured in the crossfire. In addition, on 20th of April an IED hit a civilian



motorbike on a secondary road of Gulchin Village of Qadis, killing the driver along with another civilian. Joye Khaja and Qebchgha Area of Murghab as well as Gulchin Village in the north of Qadis district are known to be unstable areas with a high level of AOG influence. Such areas are expected to be continuing targets for ANSF/IMF operations during the next months. In addition, roads known to be used by ANSF/IMF such as the Qala-I-Naw – Muqur Main Road are likely to see continuing IED strikes and discoveries, as it was the case again during this reporting period.

### NOTICE: ANSO ORIENTATION SERVICE

All newly arrived NGO international staff (**no contractors or consultants**) from ANSO-registered NGOs are welcome to attend the next ANSO NGO International Staff Orientation that is scheduled for **0830 hrs at the ANSO Headquarters in Kabul on the 4th of May 2011**. (The briefing will last approximately 3.5 hrs).

Please note, this service is designed for newly arrived international staff that would like to be sensitized to ANSO services, trends in the conflict, the conflict's historical basis and regional-specific contexts, the NGO operational context, and an analytical overview of NGO recent incidents.

**Interested staff should contact their management for further details regarding attendance and registration.**




## GHOR

Although the general security situation in Ghor remains quiet, the current reporting period saw three direct NGO incidents though of note, in none of the incidents was the NGO itself specifically targeted. In Shahrak District, both incidents were rather caused by unlucky circumstances as seen on the 14th of April when an INGO team was involved in a car accident with a local sub-commander in Kaminij area. In reaction to the accident, supporters of the local sub-commander held the three INGO national staff members involved for five hours and kept the car. The local sub-commander was severely wounded and died on 20th of April in Chaghcharan City, and after his death, the driver and the two other INGO staff members involved in the accident brought the body to the sub-commander's village, effectively closing the incident. The second incident took place on the Herat – Chaghcharan Main Road in Bidan area, where armed men stopped an INGO vehicle on

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	3

19th of April. The armed men asked the INGO staff to take their luggage to a village in the opposite direction and this led to a disagreement between the driver and one of the armed men, who started throwing stones at the driver, injuring him slightly. The other INGO staff members present calmed the situation down which allowed the INGO staff to continue their travel without further problems. The motivation of the armed men seems to have been simply finding transport for their luggage and there are no indications that the violent reaction of one of them was in any way related to the INGO.

The third NGO incident, this one in Charsada, reflects unconfirmed reports about an increasing AOG presence in the district. On 24th of April, two illegal checkpoints on the Charsada – Chaghcharan Main Road were recorded, where an AOG was searching for GoA employees. The first incident, in Kotale Biji area, AOG abducted



four ANA who were on vacation while in the second, this one in Dahane Kargush area, AOG kept a package with documents belonging to an NGO, while searching a local transport vehicle. At present, it is unclear why the AOG took the package and if they even knew it was belonging to an NGO. Although AOG activity has been rather infrequent so far, two illegal checkpoints on the main road during the day are indicative of AOG confidence.

AOG activities in the south of Ghor have continued on a low level similar to last year, though 2010 recorded an increase of incidents beginning in May. On 22nd of April, a roadside IED hit an ANP vehicle in Lal Sorkh area of Taywara on the main road to Pasaband. Although IED related incidents still remain infrequent and are not necessarily on the main road, the general security situation along this main road reportedly remains concerning due to a significant AOG presence.

### NOTICE:

The full English version of the IEA statement regarding Operation Badar is provided on pages 25 and 26 of this report.

## EASTERN REGION


### NANGARHAR

The first set of significant developments in Nangarhar this period occurred in the Shinwari districts to the southeast, dominated by the Shinwar land dispute, in which sporadic exchanges of fire continued to take place between the two feuding sub-tribes in the first week of the period. It also led to the only NGO incident during this period. An NGO nurse from Bati Kot was returning through the Pekha area of Achin, the original frontline of the conflict, on the 28th after visiting in-laws belonging to one side of the dispute, when he was shot in the stomach by members of the opposing sub-tribe. He was not fatally injured and was safely stabilised. Before this incident, the issue first brought the governor and then a large delegation of Pakistani tribal elders down to the district, each attempting to find a negotiated solution to the issue. However, that this incident took place after the beginning of these high-level interventions indicates that it remains a standing concern at the end of the period, even if the involvement of such powerful actors is likely to prevent major outbreaks of inter-tribal violence, at least in the near term. Meanwhile, a significant number of ANP poppy eradication operations also took place in Achin, with more than 50 acres destroyed in multiple operations.

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1

In the Khogyani districts of Sherzad and Khogyani, the only significant AOG-initiated incidents were 2 IED detonations in the former and 3 in the latter – 3 of which targeted IMF convoys moving on roads in the vicinity of their DACs, in a familiar pattern to recent periods. And Sherzad was home to 5 of the 7 reported IMF operations, all search operations related to the fact of significant AOG infiltration into the district from Kurram Agency. In all, 14 AOG fighters were arrested, while a heroin processing facility in Termay was also raided and destroyed. ANP likewise raided another processing facility two days later. Importantly, given the recent high profile suicide attacks that have taken place in the region and elsewhere, in each facility a number of ANA uniforms were discovered.

In Jalalabad City itself, three IED detonations occurred, all in Zone 2. Threat reports suggested an attack would occur on JAF towards the end of the period, but this did not materialise, although such attacks are assessed as likely in the near term. Another IED incident occurred in Jalalabad, this time near the Eidgah mosque in Zone 4, when a device was discovered on the vehicle of the Hesarak District Governor. This incident underlines the extent of AOG penetration into Jalalabad



City, but it is important to note that in spite of that presence, there continues to be a total absence of any indications that NGOs will be targeted by AOGs. Overall across the province, IED incidents significantly increased, by approximately 80%, with noteworthy examples amongst the rest in Chaparhar's Sra Kala, a traditional location. In Bati Kot, the second SVBIED in 6 weeks detonated against an IMF convoy, this one too causing no casualties among IMF service members. And in nearby Kot, unusually, two IMF operations took place, detaining 4 and seizing considerable quantities of weaponry.

Finally, in Dara-i Nur, AOG fighters infiltrating from neighbouring districts conducted two direct attacks, the first on the DAC on the 16th, and, more significantly, the second on an ANP vehicle with RPGs, which killed 2 policemen and injured a further 3; the following day locals staged a demonstration in protest of these attacks. These attacks underline the growing AOG strength in southern Kunar districts to Dara-i Nur's northeast, and their willingness to come into hostile territory to conduct attacks. However, if this continues it is likely that the local Pashai inhabitants of the district will become increasingly aggressive in defending their soil from non-Pashai infiltrators.

KUNAR


On all fronts, Kunar remained riven with conflict between opposition groups and local and international security forces during the period: in the northern third of the province; in the western corridor of Chapa Dara, Manogai and Wata Pur; and in eastern Sirkanay and Marawara districts, where major IMF operations recently finished. Firstly, two NGO incidents were reported during the period, each affecting clinics, one in Nari and one in Chapa Dara. In Nari, a joint IMF/ANA patrol was patrolling in the Saw area when they came under fire from AOG fighters lying in wait. The soldiers sought refuge in the clinic, but after some bullets had caused minor damage an AOG commander ordered his men to cease fire to prevent further damage to the clinic – the first recorded occasion in the province when AOGs have specifically held their fire in order to protect an NGO facility. The second incident occurred when AOGs, while attacking the Chapa Dara DAC, accidentally hit a clinic’s septic tank with a mortar, causing minor damage.

In the western corridor of Chapa Dara, Manogai and Wata Pur, AOGs continued to augment their position, and pressure the security forces present. The Chapa Dara DAC came under renewed assault, as it continues to await an influx of ANA to augment its besieged ANP garrison, while in Wata Pur, the number of AOG assaults rose

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
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significantly – to account for approximately a fifth of all incidents during the period, a clear sign of their intentions to continue to push the security forces towards and into Asadabad. The remaining IMF base in the district came under repeated assault, with a number of engagements during the period, one of which led to the deaths of 3 AOG fighters. In another engagement in the Nangalam valley, and one of a number of assaults on new ANA positions in the district, an ANA soldier at an ANA OP was killed, while an IED struck an ANP vehicle on the main road through Wata Pur towards the end of the period, claiming two policemen’s lives.

In the northern districts of Nari, Ghaziabad, Bar Kunar and Dangam, AOG attacks on security forces have also significantly increased in recent weeks, both a function of the improved climatic conditions in these high, remote areas, and of the increased emphasis that AOGs operating there are putting on making gains in this region too. Beyond the aforementioned AOG-IMF engagement that collaterally involved an NGO clinic, at least 6 kinetic engagements took place between IMF and AOG fighters in Nari, with a further two IDF attacks on IMF bases in the district. IMF also conducted an air strike in the area, killing 2 AOG fighters, and two ANBP-AOG engagements were also recorded. In Bar Kunar, be-



yond 4 direct attacks on security forces, in which one ANA soldier was killed, a large group of armed men entered a mosque in the Shutan area and assaulted the preachers inside, stealing a large quantity of money and valuables. In Dangam, only IMF operations were reported, including the killing of a senior Saudi Arabian commander just before the beginning of the period; the main Arab AOG operating in Afghanistan has recently strengthened its position in northern Kunar, integrating themselves into the local AOG landscape there, as IMF have come under increasing pressure to cede rural territory to AOGs. As such, this AOG will likely be a matter of increasing concern in coming months. Two other large IMF operations were recorded in Dangam on the 19th, killing a combined total of 23 AOG, and reportedly also two female civilians, and as such being the primary focus for IMF clearing operations this period.

Finally, in Marawara and Sirkanay, where major IMF operations recently concluded, a number of direct AOG assaults on ANP occurred, including two on the Marawara ANP HQ, demonstrating the quick turn-around time that AOGs in the region can demonstrate. In Sirkanay meanwhile, AOG fighters attacked the house of a soldier, who was absent, beat and tied up two male relatives and killed four of the women in the house, including a young girl, in an unusually violent incident.

## NURISTAN

In Nuristan in the past fortnight, the eastern districts have been the focus of security developments, while the AOG-held Waygal has been significant for the political developments that have taken place. Firstly, Bargi Matal was home to a well-planned, well-executed build-up of AOG forces in the immediate vicinity of the DAC. On the 20th, it was reported that a number of AOG CPs had been established within less than a kilometre of the ANSF CPs that sought to form a protective ring around the DAC, also of course home to provincial ANP HQ. Within days forward offensive positions for the AOG fighters had also been reportedly set up equally close to the ring of CPs.


This was the closest that the AOGs had come in establishing formal positions around the Bargi Matal DAC, after a substantial build-up of numerical strength over the winter and in the first quarter of 2011. The outbreak of fighting between the forces eventually arrived on the afternoon of the 28th, with sporadic kinetic engagements lasting the rest of the day, and with 2 AOG fighters confirmed killed by the time of writing. Because of the relatively even balance of power between the two sides seen in the current fighting in the remote district, further fighting can be expected over the coming weeks and months – at least until the deadlock is broken. Given the number

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
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of AOG fighters, both local and Pakistani, reported to be in the district, it is likely that they will eventually gain the upper hand and seize the DAC, absent any injection of further ANSF or IMF support, which is unlikely to come.

In Kamdesh to the south, there was a series of attacks on ANBP CPs in the Gawardesh valley, a key focus for AOG attacks in that district during the conflict, given its importance as a current and future potential infiltration route from Pakistan. Recently, ANA OPs have been established above the valley floor because of its centrality, but they have not prevented the valley-level ANBP CPs from continuing to be attacked; indeed, it was also reported that a 100-strong influx of new AOG fighters into the Gawardesh area was reported during the period, indicating the on-going AOG intentions to continue to apply pressure to the ANSF present. It is also reported that the non-local character of the new ANA at these OPs has also been a contributing factor in increasing local resentment of the security forces, likely to make their counter-infiltration work more difficult.

In AOG-held Waygal, no security incidents were reported, as it is currently home to just one party to the conflict. However, IEA leadership in Peshawar did announce the formal creation of an IEA district government in



Waygal at the beginning of the period, with a district governor, senior judge and a chief of police appointed; a religious affairs committee supportive of the IEA had already been de facto functioning. It was subsequently reported that on the 25th, furthermore, AOG members had come from Bargi Matal and Kamdesh to assist in the establishment of 5 AOG CPs across Waygal, thought to function much as ANP CPs do. The political significance of the establishment of a rudimentary IEA district government is not to be discounted, as it only further advances and solidifies the AOG position in the district, as well as setting an important example of formal IEA rule within the country for the first time since 2002. However, it has been reported that once AOG members captured the DAC, it was stripped by AOG looters, and is not known to have any resources at its disposal. As such, questions remain as to what indications it provides in regard to the character of formal IEA political rule.

Finally, elsewhere in the province the only significant reports were of an influx of AOGs, including a contingent of Pakistanis, with the intention to support the current efforts in increasing the AOG presence around the provincial capital, Parun. The route reported – from Pakistan into Waygal via a Kamdesh border crossing – is excellent evidence of the use of Waygal as a central safe haven and staging post for the planned AOG expansion across Nuristan and into neighbouring provinces.



KHOST


Khost incidence of conflict remained at a consistent weekly level during April, at approximately 65 significant security incidents a week, or just under 10 a day. During the second half of the month, the profile of these incidents shifted slightly, with a greater focus on Bak than Sabari as the primary battleground between IMF and Khost's AOGs. Whereas there were a dozen significant IMF operations in Sabari in the first half of April, double that of Bak, during this period the reverse was true, with the same numbers. In Bak, roughly 30 AOG fighters were detained during these operations, with just 6 reported detained in Sabari. It is worth noting the contrast with neighbouring Paktika, where many of the operations there during April resulting in AOG fighters being killed rather than captured, thus pointing to the unusual fact that during this period Khost was not the south-eastern province to record the highest levels of actual violence. Returning to the IMF operations, a half dozen were also conducted in neighbouring Tere Zayi, which led to 10 AOG detentions.

From the AOG side, Sabari was also quiet, with just one IED detonation and three discoveries, all in the DAC area, as was the execution by AOG members of a local for allegedly spying for the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	0

IMF. In Bak, there was an equally small number of AOG incidents all concentrated on the DAC area: just one IDF attack on the DAC, causing no damage; an IED that struck an ANP vehicle injuring one slightly; and two further failed IED incidents, one in which the two planters were killed when it detonated prematurely and one which was disrupted by ANA, leading to the arrest of two AOG operatives. Similarly in Tere Zayi, only three AOG incidents were recorded, comprising one IED that struck an IMF vehicle injuring 5 occupants, one that was discovered and defused, and an IDF attack on an ANSF CP that missed its target. In all, then, consistent IMF pressure on AOGs in this battlespace has made inroads, although the sustainability of these gains of course remains an open question.

Khost City recorded a predictable percentage of conflict incidents – about 30% of provincial totals – and AOG presence continued to be visible and significant. Perhaps the most important incident was a magnetic IED attack on the car of a senior official from the provincial governor's office, which killed him and an ANA soldier working as his protection. There were several other IED detonations in the city, only one of which had a clear



ANSF target; others detonated in markets, against a private mini-bus and in open areas, causing only civilian casualties (although none reported killed). ANSF continued to do an effective job at discovering and defusing IEDs in the city, with three times the volume of discoveries to detonations, a marked improvement on recent months and a positive sign for city security – although unlikely to ever be 100% effective. Finally, during the daytime of the 22nd mortars were fired at the Salerno IMF base, a common occurrence but which uncommonly killed one IMF service member.

In Tani and Gurbuz, a small number of AOG incidents were recorded, none of great significance beyond a non-fatal shooting of an NDS official by opposition fighters in the Gurbuz DAC. To the west of the province, Nadir Shah Kot saw some above-average activity from both sides, including a number of AOG deaths. AOG attacks on IMF patrols were recorded in the DAC and Zene Khel areas, while Zene Khel was also home to two major IMF search operations, which resulted in a combined total of 21 arrests, and one of which led to a firefight in which 7 AOG fighters were killed. It is worth noting that Nadir Shah Kot is also where 2 NGO workers were, and remain, abducted on April 7th.

## LAGHMAN


By far the most significant incident to occur in Laghman this period was the SBBIED at the ANA's 201st Corps HQ in Qarghayi's Gamberi desert area. The most credible information received was that an ANA soldier from Daykundi province, who had enlisted and been serving for a month, detonated his vest during an outdoor gathering of ANA and IMF, killing 4 ANA and 5 IMF along with himself, and injuring approximately 30 further soldiers to varying degrees. This HQ, with a rapidly expanding IMF FOB at its core, had only come online in the past 2 months, with some perimeter defence work still being carried out at the time of the attack, and is likely to have seriously shaken the present ANA leadership. However, such a sophisticated and unusual attack as this is very difficult to plan for, particularly given the ethnic identity of the BBIED operative, and it doesn't reflect any major shortcomings in the ANA at the HQ, which is coordinating relatively effective operations across the region.

This attack was a stand-out event, and connected to the provincial conflict only insofar as the Corps HQ is located in Laghman. However, while incident volumes rose only marginally, other important developments were recorded

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

across the province. First, an IMF operation in Alishing's Mayol valley killed the Alishing DSG and his brother, who were sheltering in a house, and led to the arrest of four others for providing them shelter, marking a significant intelligence success. And in Dawlat Shah, the northern district almost entirely off-limits to the relatively under-resourced IMF in the province, a joint IMF-NDS operation was conducted in the Mandi Setar area, which led to the killing of two AOG fighters and the detention of 3 more, and the injuring of 1 IMF and 4 NDS officials. As reported before, it is likely that as IMF transition control of Mehtarlam City to ANSF authority, and with the expectation that the rest of the province will transition in the second tranche, probably next year, we will likely see more IMF efforts to push up into the more isolated valleys of Alishing and Dawlat Shah to extend what currently is a limited IMF and GOA writ in these areas. Also in Alishing, IMF were attacked on two occasions, while ANP arrested two AOG fighters dressed in ANA uniforms.

However, the Mehtarlam City transition will not be without its own troubles, as some incidents in this period demonstrate. In Alikhel and Chelmati villages, the



former of which is very close to the PRT and the latter on the Alingar road, where IEA flags were raised in the second week of the period, while three rockets were fired at the PRT, marking a slightly more visible AOG presence in the environs of the provincial capital than recently.

In Alingar, the IED cell operating in the Parwa'i area attempted without success to conduct further IED attacks, with all four such devices discovered and defused. However, in the Salaw area AOG fighters managed to disarm and kidnap 5 ANP coming from Nurgaram, who were later released unharmed due to the mediation of tribal elders. Finally, IMF conducted one operation there, in the Dara-ye Mel area, killed 3 AOG fighters and arresting 2 more.

In Bad Pakh, the first confirmed IMF airstrike that killed AOG fighters (2) was recorded, after the recently clearing operations that pushed all known AOG fighters out of the area. And in Qarghayi district, finally, attacks on the Highway continued at a low level; 4 were recorded, all between Surkhakan and Tangi Abrisham, at 0700, 0900 and 1600 hours, thereby reinforcing the ANSO advisory to avoid travel on that road outside of the 9-4 window.


## PAKTYA

The level of security incidents continued to rise in Paktya, up approximately 50%, with notable increases in three important areas. First, there was an increase in IED and direct AOG assaults in Gardez City and its environs. In the Tera Bagh area on April 20th, AOG fighters attacked an ANP patrol, withdrawing after a brief firefight, while in the same area on the 28th, an IED was discovered on the Gardez-Kabul Road and subsequently control detonated. Other IED detonations were also recorded, including one in Shaikhan area which prematurely detonated, killing 3 of the 4 operatives who were planting it, while in the Banozai area a device detonated in a rubbish bin, killing a child. A private vehicle also hit an IED in the Trakanan area, injuring the occupants, and two further IEDs were discovered and defused in the city environs. Perhaps the most significant device that detonated was the one that did so at a side gate to the provincial

	NGO Incidents
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governor's compound on the morning of the 26th, injuring two civilians – a demonstration of AOG reach in the small city. ANP also arrested a former policeman on suspicion of assisting AOG infiltration into Gardez.

A second focus of conflict was the highly insecure southern districts of Zurmat and Wuza Zadran. In the former, AOG fighters attacked an IMF convoy in the Sahak area with SAF and RPGs, while on the same day in the same area IMF arrested 4 AOG operatives as they were planting an IED; in another IED incident, a device prematurely detonated in Shirkhan Choni, killing both the operatives planting it. A second direct assault took place in Zawo, on an ANP CP, with no casualties, while AOG operatives fired 5 mortars at the IMF base in the Kolalgo area on the 22nd. In the DAC area, too, 2 IEDs were discovered and defused, in all mark-



ing a significant increase in AOG activity in the district. In nearby Wuza Zadran, two IMF operations arrested 9 AOG fighters, while AOG operatives attacked the DAC with SAF and RPGs to no effect.

The final region of significance was the northern border districts of Jaji, Chamkanay and Dand wa Patan, where in each of their DACs AOGs attacked security force targets once during the period, with a final attack on an IMF convoy recorded on the border between Chamkanay and Dand wa Patan. Reports of AOG intentions to scale up cross-border operations and infiltration were also received, so we can expect that in the coming months, there will be increasing levels of such incidents as above in these border districts, including targets local ALP policemen.

### REGISTRATION INFORMATION:

Please note that both the **ANSO email and SMS distribution lists are updated once weekly, every Sunday**. The registration deadline is on the Thursday of every week, therefore, any requests submitted after this will not be updated until the following week. As well, NGOs are requested to provide their registration documentation (or to request the same) directly to the Operations National Counterpart, Mr. Masoud Habibi, at the following email address:

**[registration@afgnso.org](mailto:registration@afgnso.org)**

## SOUTHERN REGION


### KANDAHAR

After the killing of the Kandahar Chief of Police reported in the previous cycle, this reporting period the GOA security disposition in Kandahar City suffered another spectacular setback. During the night of 24/25 April a prison break occurred from the Sarpoza Prison located in District 7, in which, according to official sources, at least 476 prisoners managed via a tunnel. This well organized incident had been planned and executed over months and was achieved unnoticed in the early morning of the 25 at around 0400 hrs. The large majority of the escaped prisoners, if not all of them, were AOG fighters or associated who had been arrested by security forces at high cost of lives and resources. It is worth noting that AOG had already made attempts to free prisoners from Sarpoza in the past. The most significant incident took place on 13 June 2008 when around 30 AOG operatives attacked the prison utilising combination of VBIED, BBIED and SAF attack vectors. The attack resulted in numerous ANP casualties, as well as in the release of more than 1,000 prisoners. As it was a case in 2008, following the recent evasion ANSF/IMF launched a large search operation within the city. Reportedly, 71 escapees have been arrested so far

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with two others being shot and killed when they resisted arrest. In keeping with past practices, one should expect that following this incident AOG will further seek to reassert their presence in the area. A consequent attempt of retribution through intensification of the attacks on GoA and IMF targets should not be excluded as well.

Despite a series of IMF operations that had been conducted by the end of 2010 in several traditionally unstable districts of Kandahar Province (in order to 'clear' these areas from AOG presence) a significant level of AOG activity continues to be reported from Panjwayi and Zhari districts. Throughout the districts and urban centres of Kandahar the main AOG tactic consists in IED employment. This reporting period two civilians were wounded in an IED strike that occurred in Panjwayi Bazar Area while in Kandahar City a bicycle-mounted RCIED prematurely detonated in Deh Khoja Area of District 4. Also in Kandahar City, District 6 three IMF soldiers were wounded when an IED strike their vehicle in Mir Bazaar Area. It is worth noting that Mirwais Mina in District 7 of Kandahar City remains an area of frequent AOG activity



with an attack on IMF logistical convoy that took place on 23 April.

AOG intimidation tactics were less frequent, though nonetheless remain a concern. In the past two weeks a tribal elder was killed in Arghandab District and on 19 April in Panjwayi an AOG wearing an ANP uniform and riding on a motorcycle shot and killed an ANP official. Finally, in the Lola Wala Area of District 9, AOG shot and wounded an NDS officer. During this reporting period ANSF/IMF were active as well across the province. Apart from several weapon and ammunition caches that have been localised in Kandahar City; Daman, Zhari, Spin Boldak and Dand also experienced ANSF/IMF operations. On 22 April IMF conducted an air strike killing five AOG members and wounding five civilians in Zhari District. Finally, the steady potential for further suicide attacks across the province was underlined with the reported arrest of three potential suicide attackers that occurred on 19th April in Spin Boldak District. Two of them were foreign nationals (Pakistani) and the third one was a resident of Kandahar Province. Also in Spin Boldak, security forces seized six suicide vests and IMF uniforms and arrested two AOG members during a search operation.




PAKTIKA

The substantial jump in the intensity of the conflict in Paktika seen last period was sustained at roughly the same level during the second half of April, with both IMF and AOG operations continuing to have a high impact on each other. The Barmal-Gayan border zone, which sits across the border from the South Waziristan territory of an important AOG commander, continued to be the primary – although by no means the only – battleground in the province, with a third of all conflict incidents recorded there. Perhaps the most significant incident in this zone was in fact a failed one; a tractor rigged as an SVBIED prematurely detonated in the Tora Thangai area of Barmal, killing the driver and injuring two other AOG fighters that were reportedly accompanying the vehicle. The intended target of the attack is unknown, but it demonstrates the clear on-going danger of large suicide attacks on security forces or allied organisations. Also in Barmal, AOG staged attacks on an ANA patrol, killing one soldier, and two hit-and-run attacks on IMF bases in the Margha and Boris areas. 4 IDF attacks were also recorded on IMF bases and pa-

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trols in the same areas. Finally, members of the paramilitary Pakistani Frontier Corps reportedly fired a number of rockets at an ANBP CP in the Shkin area, injuring 2 policemen and, because of the proximity to the Shkin bazaar, seven civilians. In Gayan, two IDF attacks were recorded on the IMF base in Tilman, while two ambushes of ANA and IMF patrols were also recorded, with just one ANA soldier wounded in the encounters.

Across the two districts, IMF also conducted several operations, ground and air, almost all focused on their respective DACs. In all, 14 AOG fighters were killed, 2 injured and 8 arrested. In Urgun, bordering these two restive districts, another attempted suicide attack failed when a BBIED operative’s vest prematurely detonated in the Chinakha area, killing only the operative. It is thought that the target was the commander of the new Urgun ALP force, which would fit with recent targeting of ALP in Kunar and Paktya, as an emerging counterforce to AOGs. Yahya Khel was also home to an above average share of provincial conflict reporting, with 3 signifi-



cant IMF-ANSF operations within 2 days, all together killing 28 AOG operatives. AOGs were also active, with two hit-and-run attacks in the DAC area, one on an ANP CP and one on the IMF base there. They also destroyed a telecoms tower in the area, and appeared to be behind the assassination of an influential tribal elder and local government official, who was shot at his door by gunmen on the 28th.

As with last period, the provincial capital continued to be quiet, with just two incidents – both IMF operations which together detained 6 AOG operatives. And a small number of other ANSF/IMF-AOG kinetic engagements spread across the rest of the province were also recorded, with one notable incident in the death of two AOG fighters in a firefight in Jani Khel. The final incident of note is a salutary reminder of the perils of misidentification; in the Gomal DAC area, an AOG fighter opened fire and killed two of his fellow members of the armed opposition who were dressed in ANA uniforms, thinking they were in fact ANA soldiers.

**NOTICE:** Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

**ANSO:** “..by NGOs for NGOs..”


## URUZGAN

In Uruzgan the level of AOG initiated incidents was lower compared to the previous reporting period. In the past two weeks these incidents were mainly concentrated in the districts of Tirin Kot and Char Chino. Nonetheless, Dihrawud and Chora also experienced AOG activity.

As noted in previous reports, the main threat for NGO activity in Uruzgan consists of the robust volume of IEDs. In the last two weeks more than 50% of all recorded IED incidents took place in Tirin Kot District, which remains in line with previously observed patterns. While the said district saw four IED strikes against IMF and ANP vehicles, IED fatalities occurred on the civilian side when

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on 17th April in the Kot Wala area, a roadside IED hit a private vehicle wounding two civilians. Another notable incident related to the use of IED was reported in Char Chino, Tagaw Area. Also on the 17th an IED detonated against an ANP vehicle, killing three ANP servicemen and wounding two others. AOG initiated direct attacks usually play a minor role in the province and in the last fortnight were focused on Tirin Kot, Char Chino and Dihrawud districts with at least five such occurrences. In Char Chino and Dihrawud these attacks were carried out against IMF patrols, whereas in Tirin Kot it was two ANP check posts that came under



AOG small arms fire. The majority of the attacks were inefficient and AOG withdrew after a brief fire fight. However, in Char Chino following an AOG assault on an IMF convoy, six AOG members were killed in the IMF return fire. Noteworthy incident took place in Nachin and Khanaqa Area of Tirin Kot, where an AOG attack on an ANP check post claimed lives of two civilians killed in the cross-fire and injured another four.


## GHAZNI

In the last fortnight Ghazni saw significantly less incidents as compared to the previous reporting period. Although it is difficult to point out the exact reason behind this drop in the overall level of incident volumes, in particular those related to AOG activities, this decrease may be related to the high level of ANSF/IMF operations that had been recorded recently across the province which may have affected the AOG chain of supply. As well, it is also possible that AOGs are reorganizing themselves for the upcoming spring operations. Nonetheless, it is rather unlikely that this decrease will last for an extended period of time given the strategic importance of the province for AOG activity.

In the last two weeks AOG initiated direct attacks again largely outnumbered other types of incidents reported in Ghazni and were focused on IMF/ANSF pa-

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trols and to a lesser extent on ANP check points. Nonetheless, on 17th April in the Chagharu area of Ghazni District a civilian vehicle came under AOG small arms fire which resulted in injury of three passengers. As often in Ghazni, the majority of these engagements were brief and did not involved casualties from AOG as well as IMF/ANSF sides. As compared to the high volume of direct attacks IED deployment remained secondary. However, during this reporting period IED deployment was extremely efficient and fatal. Among 16 reported IED incidents, 9 devices detonated and resulted in a total of four civilians, six ANP, and three PSC guards killed. An additional six civilians, two ANP, two IMF soldiers and two PSC guards were wounded. In a single incident that occurred on 21st April in Ali Khel Village of Andar District, three



civilians were killed and six others, including three women, were wounded after a roadside IED struck their vehicle. Three days earlier, on the 18th in Pirakai, Khogyani District, an IED strike against an ANP vehicle killed six ANP and injured another two.

One ANP official was also killed in Shah Mir Sahab Area of Ghazni, in a well know type of attack, involving an AOG 'hit team' riding on a motorcycle. ANSF/IMF activities have reportedly decreased as well during the present cycle and were focused on Andar and Ghazni districts. While just a small quantity of weapons and explosive materials was netted, these operations seemed to affect AOG manpower and resulted in detention of at least 11 suspected AOG members.


## HELMAND

Helmand remained volatile, with the highest rate of AOG activity recorded among southern provinces. Whereas in the past two weeks evidence of ANSF/IMF operations were rather limited, AOG continued to widely employ hit and run tactic to harass IMF patrols or to attack ANP posts across the province. The hotspots for these direct attacks remained Nad Ali, Nahri Sarraj, Musa Qala and Sangin districts. The large majority of these confrontations were brief and ineffective and did not result in recorded casualties. Nonetheless, several prolonged engagement were reported from Nahri Sarraj and Nad Ali districts indicating an AOG confidence in their operational capacities to challenge IMF elements in the area. Nahri Sarraj District experienced its second BBIED attack this year. On 26th April a two-fold suicide attack took place when two BBIEDs attackers detonated their devices close to an IMF logistic convoy that was

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transiting on the Kandahar-Herat Main Road. The attack caused the injury of two civilians and the death of both attackers. It is worth noting that for the second consecutive reporting period the province witnessed suicide attacks involving two AOG operatives carrying out attacks in a coordinated manner. The previous two-fold suicide attack, reported in the last cycle, was conducted in Lashkar Gah City in the area of the Governor's Office.

A high-profile assassination was reported from Lashkar Gah City when on the 23rd two armed individuals shot and killed a prominent tribal elder and the deputy of the Peace Council for Helmand Province. The victim, who was also a former Governor of Marja District, was in the residence of the Head of the Peace Council at the time of the attack. The investigation is ongoing and ANP reportedly arrested an individual in relation to the killing. The details



surrounding the incident are still confusing and anecdotal reporting indicates the assassination was more likely related to other issues rather than a genuine AOG operation.

The figures associated with IED deployment recorded across the province were once again impressive. In the past two weeks apart from very 'active' districts of Nad Ali and Nahri Sarraj, IEDs were extensively deployed in Sangin and Naw Zad districts. The primary AOG targets continues to be IMF/ANSF patrolling vehicles, however this period reported casualties resulting from IED strikes were solely civilians. For instance, in two separate IED related incidents occurring in Naw Zad four civilians were killed and another two were wounded. An additional two civilians were wounded in Nad Ali when their motorcycle hit a roadside IED.

### VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT:

Do you have NGO experience and a thorough understanding of the challenges NGOs face in a conflict-environment? Are you looking for a new challenge and an opportunity to provide analysis on the conflict and security incidents to NGOs operating in Afghanistan? If so, please see the last page for instructions on how to apply for ANSO's latest vacancy.

## ZABUL


During the present reporting cycle, apart from IED emplacement which made up the majority of incidents recorded in Zabul, another characteristic of the security environment in the province consisted of AOG intimidation tactics. On 18th April in Qala Khel Area of Shahjoy District, AOG shot and killed a former persecutor who had already resigned from service. Two days later in the same district, but in Ashaq Zo village, a civilian was executed over the accusation of spying for the GOA. As was the case in Helmand several weeks ago, AOGs active in Qalat District apparently forced private telecommunication companies to shut down their networks from 21st April.

As mentioned, IED deployment remains prevalent throughout the province and this reporting period it has continued to increase when compared to the previous cycle.

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At least 29 IED related incidents were reported in Zabul, with 16 devices that detonated. The areas of concern with regard to the IED emplacement were in particular Shinkay, Qalat, and Shahjoy and Daychopan districts. The vast majority of reported IED strikes occurred against IMF patrols; however, PSC vehicles remains another AOG target of choice. For instance, on 19th April in Seory Lowyi Shor Area of Shinkay District as a result of an IED strike one PSC guard was killed, whereas two others were wounded. Noteworthy, on the 26th an IED emplaced under a culvert detonated in Mullah Salam Village causing heavy traffic jam along the main Kandahar-Kabul Highway.

The second major threat across the province is related to direct attacks. In Ghazni these attacks were focused on hitting such 'hard targets' as IMF patrols and were



concentrated in Shahjoy, Mizan and Daychopan. However, a notable incident occurred in Qalat District, Omaki Area, where AOG attacked PSC guards of a road construction company. A prolonged engagement ensued, with ANP units called in for support and which resulted in the death of two AOG members as well as weapons and military equipment seizure.

In the past two weeks IMF/ANSF activities were recorded in Shahjoy and Qalat districts. Operations conducted in the said districts allowed the IMF/ANSF to arrest ten AOG members. In addition, an IMF air strike was carried out in Bolan Ghar Area of Shahjoy and resulted in three AOG members killed and four others wounded.

### ANSO Quarterly Report:

For those interested in reviewing the first quarter of 2011's key trends and analysis for both the conflict and NGO incidents, the ANSO 2011 Q1 Report is now available on our website at [www.afgnso.org](http://www.afgnso.org).



## Statement of the Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate Regarding the Inception of the Spring...

Saturday, 30 April 2011 02:23 -



### Statement of the Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate Regarding the Inception of the Spring Operations.

**In the Name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful *Fight in the Cause of Allah, those who fight you and do not be aggressive. Allah does not love the transgressors.* (S:II V:190)**

To the Muslim and Mujahid Nation of Afghanistan!

Today, our sacred Jihad against all foreign invaders in Afghanistan successfully steps up to the threshold of its tenth year, with the help of the Almighty Allah (SwT) and your prideful Jihad and selfless sacrifices. With the approach of the spring, the Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan wants to declare the launching of the spring military operations christened as "Badar" to be waged against the invading Americans and their foreign Allies and internal supports.

For the purpose of success and effectiveness of the operations against the foreign invading forces and their defeated supporters, the following points must be born in mind:

As in the past, the Badar Operations will focus on attacks against military centers, places of gatherings, airbases, ammunition and logistical military convoys of the foreign invaders in all parts of the country.

Throughout the operations, the prior target of Mujahideen's attacks must remain foreign invading forces, members of their spy networks and (other) spies, high-ranking officials of the Kabul Puppet Administration, both military and civilian, members of the cabinet, members of the parliament, Heads of foreign and local companies working for the enemy and contractors.

Since members of the American espionage agencies, government officials of the Puppet Administration and enemies of the Afghan people and Jihad have ensconced themselves in the so-called Peace Council and are trying to pave the way for the prolongation of the American occupation by cashing in on the name of Jihad, religion and tribal chieftainship,; wants to prevent Mujahideen from waging Jihad against the invaders and are urging the Afghan Mujahid people to accept American slavery and surrender, therefore, members of the Council can be target of the Mujahideen attacks during the operations as, in view of their role, they are considered official members of the ranks of the enemy.

Strict attention must be paid to the protection and safety of civilians during the spring operations by working out a meticulous military plan. Utilizing all proven military tactics, the operations will focus on usage of advanced weapons against the air and ground forces of the invaders, tip-and-run attacks, and group offensives, city attacks, advanced explosives attacks, effective group and martyrdom seeking attacks by warrior Mujahideen.

The Spring Operations have been given the name of **Badar** in a hope that the Almighty Allah (SwT) may bestow on the Mujahideen victorious achievements versus all invading forces in Afghanistan like that which were bestowed on the believers during the historical battle of Badar in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Hijri lunar year. Some ardent diabolic chiefs of the polytheists were either killed or captured at the hands of the Mujahideen during the confrontation.

Before the launching of the Badar Operations, we call on all officials of the Kabul Administration, military officers, officials of the spy agency and all other employees to cut off their relations with the invaders and their supporters whatsoever, and join the Mujahideen for the cause of defense of the people and their own person.

All Afghan people should bear in mind to keep away from gatherings, convoys and centers of the enemy so that they will not become harmed during attacks of Mujahideen against the enemy or, as usual, the enemy may not avenge itself on them, following the operations of the Mujahideen.

The Spring Operations of Badar have been launched for the purpose of protecting the tenets of Islam and the religion from the claws of the invaders and salvaging the country and people from the foreign colonialism because the foreign invaders have committed unlawful aggression against the sovereignty of our country; have ignited the flames of war in the yard of our house; have destroyed orchards and houses with bombs and bulldozers; have martyred our countrymen and imprisoned them and have desecrated the holiest Divine Book of the Muslims, the Holy Quran. Therefore, the war in our country will not come to an end unless and until the foreign invading forces pull out of Afghanistan and the cause of the war are obliterated. The Islamic Emirate considers this its legitimate right and religious obligation to defend its religion and country. The Jihad of the Islamic Emirate will continue with the help of the Almighty Allah and the support of the Mujahid people until the attainment of this legitimate right.

The Badar Operations will begin throughout Afghanistan on May, the 1st 2011 i.e. 11 Saur Hijri solar year.

**Success comes only from Allah, the Almighty.**

**Leadership Council**

**Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan**



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#### ANSO ACRONYMS

**ACG**-Armed Criminal Group /  
**AEF**-Afghan Eradication Forces  
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /  
**ANBP**-Afghan National Border  
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National  
Police / **AOG**-Armed Opposition  
Group / **APPF**-Afghan Public  
Protection Forces (local depu-  
tised militias) / **DC**-District  
Centre / **GOA**-Government of  
Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire  
(ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised  
Explosive Device / **IMF**-  
International Military Forces /  
**NDS**-National Directorate of  
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-  
Previous Reporting Period /  
**PSC**-Private Security Company  
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled Gre-  
nade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire /  
**VBIED**-Vehicle Borne Impro-  
vised Explosive Device / **PDO**-  
Private Development Organisa-  
tion / **ALP**-Afghan Local Police  
/ **LDI**-Local Defence Initiative /  
**IEA**-Islamic Emirate of Afghani-  
stan (Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial  
Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-  
District Shadow Governor (IEA)

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## MISSING

This report ANSO  
could not provide  
analysis for the prov-  
inces of:

Samangan  
Daykundi  
Bamyan  
Nimroz

This is because we  
do not know enough  
about the area to  
comment on the sig-  
nificance of the inci-  
dents occurring  
there.

If you can help us  
understand the prov-  
ince better, please  
contact us.

## VACANCIES

ANSO is in search of experienced NGO staff to fill its South RSA position. If you have NGO experience, an analytical background, and the desire to be challenged, all while being part of a close-knit team, pass your CV, a cover letter, and 2 substantive writing samples to Mr. Nathan Ronaldson at [operations@afgnso.org](mailto:operations@afgnso.org). Applications will be accepted until the 1st of June 2011.