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Afghan Taliban/Quetta Shura

Quetta, the capital of Balochistan Province, and its surrounding areas have become the base for the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan. Taliban leaders, including supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, have established what is known as the ‘Quetta Shura’ in the city from which they direct insurgent actions in southern Afghanistan. They also reportedly raise funds from wealthy donors throughout the Persian Gulf and act as a conduit for weapons and supplies to fighters in Afghanistan.1 While Afghan and Western government officials have stated that the Afghan Taliban is using Quetta as a base of operations, among other towns in Pakistan near the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, Pakistani authorities have denied that the Afghan Taliban are based in Quetta.2 Nonetheless, it is reported that many analysts believe that the Pakistan military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) tolerate the presence of the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan, that they have long been aware of their presence in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and that they “likely even maintain active contacts with them at some level as part of a hedge strategy in the region”.3

The Quetta Shura has reportedly been in existence since 2002, when Mullah Omar and his followers sought refuge in Pakistan after being forced to flee Afghanistan. The movement was initially small, but has since expanded in size and organisational complexity. In 2008, the Quetta Shura Taliban issued a statement in the insurgent publication Al Samood which outlined the structure of the organisation, including councils responsible for military, finances, politics, culture, recruitment, training and education, and ulema, among others. There has, however, been speculation that this may be “an attempt by the Taliban to portray itself as a unified organisation capable of running the state”, rather than “a franchise of tribal and communal networks with loose ideological and physical relationships”.4

The Quetta Shura Taliban is led by Mullah Omar and his deputy Mullah Abdul Ghani, who control a number of military councils, which in turn control four regional zones. The Peshawar Shura is led by Maluvi Abdul Kabir, who also acts as liaison to the Haqqani Network; the Miram Shah Shura is based in Miramshah in North Waziristan and is led by Siraj Haqqani, the head of the Haqqani Network; and the Girdi Jungle Shura is based in a large refugee camp in Balochistan. While the various Pakistan-based Afghan Taliban networks are run with varying degrees of autonomy, they nonetheless remain connected by their shared ideological objectives.5

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3 Kronstadt, K.A. 2010, ‘Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 1 June, p.21
The Afghan Taliban has long been linked with Pakistan insurgent groups, some of whom provided fighters during the civil conflict in Afghanistan in the 1990s. The leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) in the FATA and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) have publicly sworn allegiance to Mullah Omar and the Afghan Taliban. Nonetheless, the Afghan Taliban has claimed to have no involvement in the conflict within Pakistan, while members of Pakistani insurgent groups have been involved in actions against Afghan and coalition targets in Afghanistan. In February 2009, Mullah Omar was reportedly the instigator of the formation of the Council of the United Mujahideen, an organisation that brought together rival insurgent leaders from various TTP factions. This grouping’s stated aim is to fight US and coalition forces in Afghanistan, but has reportedly not met again since the initial meeting, and fighters from some of the different TTP factions involved have clashed since then.

In early 2010, the Afghan Taliban’s top military commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was arrested in Karachi. A few days later, two other top Taliban leaders were arrested in unnamed Pakistani cities and a fourth in KP. Seven of the Afghan Taliban’s top 15 leaders were reportedly arrested during February 2012, possibly indicating an increased willingness on the part of Pakistani authorities to take action against Afghan Taliban leaders on Pakistani soil, but also pointing to the spread of their influence across the larger cities of Pakistan. Both of these factors were underlined by the arrest of the former Afghan Taliban finance minister in Karachi in March 2010. In November 2012 Pakistan released at least seven “senior Afghan Taliban prisoners”, a move interpreted as a sign of good faith by Pakistan in the brokering of peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

In March 2011, The New York Times reported that three Afghan Taliban leaders had been killed in Quetta, and that Taliban leaders and fighters were no longer moving around the area as openly as previously. This report claimed that Pakistan had become a much less secure base for the Afghan Taliban than previously, although there are competing claims as to whether the killings were carried out by CIA or ISI operatives, or the result of internal power struggles. In November 2012, Pajhwok Afghan News reported that the Taliban deputy minister of education been shot and killed in Quetta; a “Taliban source” is

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6 For further information on the TTP see Country Advice, 2012, Pakistani Taliban, 18 June.
quoted as stating that the deputy minister had angered younger Pakistani militants by denouncing attacks on mosques and civilians.\textsuperscript{12}

The Quetta \textit{Shura} was reported in August 2012 to remain a “major power broker” in Quetta, managing security, building hospitals, investing in real estate and collecting funds through charity front organisations in the major cities of Pakistan. Militants are reported to restrict the movement of women in Quetta, and to have attacked internet cafes, music and CD shops throughout the city, with local police and security forces reportedly unable or unwilling to intervene.\textsuperscript{13} In December 2012, Afghanistan president Hamid Karzai accused the Quetta \textit{Shura} Taliban of planning the attempted assassination in Kabul of Afghanistan’s National Director of Security.\textsuperscript{14}

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Haqqani Network

The Haqqani network has been described as “one of Afghanistan’s most experienced and sophisticated insurgent organisations”. Based in the North Waziristan Agency (NWA) in Pakistan’s FATA, the Haqqani network is led by Siraj Haqqani, the son of network founder Jalaluddin Haqqani. According to one source the Haqqani network “is a coalition of militants that train terrorists, provide logistics, and organise operations against US, NATO, and Afghan forces in Afghanistan.”\(^\text{15}\) The Haqqani network is officially part of the Quetta Shura Taliban organisation, but it maintains its own command and operational structure. Like the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani network is reportedly protected by “elements within the Pakistan security establishment”, who view the Haqqani network as a “proxy force” representing Pakistani interests.\(^\text{16}\) Despite denials from Pakistani officials that the ISI makes use of the Haqqani network in such a manner, a 2010 article cites a reported intelligence intercept from 2008 in which Pakistan’s Army Chief referred to Jalaluddin Haqqani as a “strategic asset”.\(^\text{17}\) Further, a March 2012 report from the Institute for the Study of War claims that the Haqqani network “effectively organises the tribal and insurgent groups of the southern part of Pakistan’s [FATA] in ways consistent with the interests of the Pakistani government”.\(^\text{18}\)

Although based in Dande Darpa Khel village, near Miram Shah in NWA, the Haqqani network has been involved in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan for “much of the last thirty years”, and is not directly involved in attacks within Pakistan. The Haqqani network has allegedly been responsible for, or directly involved in, “many of the high-profile, spectacular attacks” on Kabul over recent years.\(^\text{19}\) During the 1980s, Jalaluddin Haqqani was backed by Pakistan and US intelligence agencies in the conflict with Soviet-backed forces in Afghanistan.\(^\text{20}\) In the mid-1990s, he switched the network’s allegiance to the Taliban, and although never formally a member of the Taliban, he served as a

\(^{17}\)Kronstadt, K.A. 2010, “Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments”, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 1 June, p.36  
minister in the Taliban government. After the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and the fall of the Taliban regime, Jalaluddin and Siraj Haqqani worked with former Taliban leaders to reconstitute the Taliban's forces in southern Afghanistan.

As noted above, the Haqqani network is closely integrated with the Afghan Taliban, to the extent that Siraj Haqqani has denied that the Haqqani network even exists, and that ‘enemies’ use the term in an attempt to divide the resistance movement. Jalaluddin Haqqani was named regional commander for the East of Afghanistan under the Quetta Shura Taliban’s command structure, due to his influence in the area, but the allegiance of the Haqqanis to Mullah Omar is viewed as largely strategic. The Haqqani network maintains its own command structure from Miram Shah, running a parallel administration including security forces, courts and tax offices, and controls criminal enterprises including smuggling, kidnapping and extortion. The most senior members in the Haqqani network are based in and around Miram Shah, and control local commanders in the south-east of Afghanistan.

From the Miram Shah base, the Haqqani network reportedly trains and offers safe houses to militants from other insurgent groups targeting coalition forces and Afghan government targets in Afghanistan. The Haqqanis are reported to have links with foreign fighters and groups, as well as native Pakistani insurgent groups including the TTP, Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Members of these Pakistani insurgent groups have been engaged in operations within Afghanistan. The network also reportedly has influence in the towns around Miram Shah, and in the areas of Pakistan bordering the Afghan provinces of Paktika, Khost and Paktia. An October 2011 report quoted a journalist from Bannu, in KPK, who stated that the influence of the Haqqani network extends beyond NWA to the South Waziristan, Kurram and Orakzai tribal agencies.

The Haqqanis operated an extremist madrassa in Dande Darpa Khel village before the Pakistani military shut it down in September 2005 and “U.S. drone strikes destroyed its

two main compounds and killed scores of Haqqani relatives and fighters in September 2008”. The US has been targeting the Haqqani network’s leadership with drone strikes since 2009, which have killed senior insurgent leaders and limited the freedom with which the Haqqanis and other insurgent groups operate in NWA. The program of drone missile attacks, rather than on-ground military assaults, is reportedly due to the reluctance of Pakistani officials to take action against the Haqqani network and other insurgent groups operating from NWA.  

According to a 2011 analysis of Pakistani Taliban groups, the strength of the Haqqani network as of 2010 was some three to four thousand fighters. It has been responsible for some of the most high-profile and deadly attacks in Afghanistan over recent years, including the January 2008 attack on Kabul’s Serena Hotel, the failed assassination attempt on President Karzai in April 2008, the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008, and the raid on Afghan government buildings in Khost in 2008. More recently, the Haqqani network was responsible for a complex attack on government buildings in central Kabul in January 2010, and for attacks on the Intercontinental Hotel and the US Embassy in Kabul in June 2011. The Haqqani network planned and executed an attack on the offices of the Kabul Bank in Jalalabad in February 2011, an attack which targeted Afghan soldiers and police who were collecting their salaries and which killed at least 38 people. In September 2011 it was responsible for a suicide bomb attack on a coalition military base in Sayyadabad, Afghanistan which injured 77 US troops. It was also reportedly involved in an attack on a Kabul hotel in June 2012.

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29 Qazi, S H 2011, ‘Rebels of the frontier: origins, organisation, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 22, No.4, pp. 574-602, p. 588  
32 Dressler, J. 2012, The Haqqani Network – A Strategic Threat, Afghanistan Report 9, Institute for the Study of War, March, p. 31  
34 Dressler, J. 2012, The Haqqani Network – A Strategic Threat, Afghanistan Report 9, Institute for the Study of War, March, p. 29  
Punjabi Taliban

Prior to 2006, militant action in Pakistan was roughly divided into two theatres: Taliban factions based in the north-west targeting international forces in Afghanistan and Western targets in Pakistan; and Punjab-based militant groups targeting Indian Kashmir or Shias in Pakistan. In recent years, factions of militant groups founded and based in Punjab, including SSP, LeJ and JeM, have linked with elements of the TTP in FATA and KPK to create a loose coalition of insurgents branded the Punjabi Taliban. These Punjab-based groups have established bases in FATA and KPK, and are providing logistical, financial, and manpower assistance to the TTP.

A combination of waning state support for many of the Punjab-based militant groups, and a backlash against Pakistani military operations against Islamist groups (particularly the 2007 Lal Masjid incident), has led elements of existing insurgent groups, which did not previously focus their violence on the Pakistani state, to gravitate toward the tribal militant groups of the FATA and KPK. It has also been suggested that Kashmir-focused militant groups turned to existing Taliban factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the Pakistani authorities stopped supporting militancy in Indian-administered Kashmir.

The Punjabi Taliban, as a loose coalition formed from distinct militant groups, does not have a discernible leader or command structure. Many members of the group undertook high-level training while part of militant groups enjoying state patronage, and most are products of fundamentalist Deobandi madrassas in Punjab. While they bear the ‘Taliban’ name, the members of the Punjabi Taliban are likely to be better educated and better equipped than members of the Pashtun Taliban groups.

According to one analyst, Punjab “has become a major recruiting ground and hub for the planning of terrorist attacks, and … a human resource for the fighting in Afghanistan”. It has been alleged that SSP and LeJ madrassas, mosques and training camps are used to funnel militants and resources from Punjab around the country. The south of Punjab province shares borders with South Waziristan and Balochistan. Cordesman and Vira

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note that between “March 2005 and March 2007, over 2,000 militants from southern and northern Punjab reportedly moved to South Waziristan to develop logistical networks”. Qazi estimated in 2010 that the Punjabi Taliban had a fighting strength of around 2,000.

The Punjabi Taliban has been described as “one of Pakistan’s gravest security challenges”, as it has “mounted some of Pakistan’s most notorious terrorist attacks” in recent years. US and Pakistani authorities reportedly believe that the September 2008 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, the March 2009 attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, and in December 2009 a car bomb attack on the ISI in Multan, the bombing of a market in Lahore, and a bomb attack on a military mosque in Rawalpindi, were all combined TTP/Punjabi Taliban operations. In May 2010, twin bomb attacks on Ahmadi mosques in Lahore which killed over 80 people were linked to the Punjabi Taliban.

The Punjabi Taliban claimed responsibility for the March 2011 assassination in Islamabad of the Federal minorities minister, Shahbaz Bhatti, a Christian, due to his opposition to the country’s blasphemy law. On December 3 2012, responsibility for an assassination attempt on a Swedish Christian charity worker in Lahore was attributed to the Punjabi Taliban by a report in The News. On 6 January 2013, Al Jazeera reported that at least 16 suspected members of the Punjabi Taliban has been killed in a US drone strike on a village in South Waziristan.

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Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan

The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (Corp of the Prophet’s Companions, or Guardians of the Friends of the Prophet) is a Punjab-based Sunni sectarian group that has been involved in violence primarily targeted against the minority Shia community. The SSP has also operated as a political party, and an SSP leader was a minister in the coalition government in Punjab in 1993. The SSP is one of the five groups that were proscribed by President Pervez Musharraf in January 2002. To circumvent the proscription, the group was renamed ‘Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan’ (MIP), but the MIP was similarly proscribed in November 2003. The group was again renamed, this time to the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), which was itself proscribed in March 2012.

The SSP, initially known as the Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba, was established by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Maulana Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi, Maulana Eesar-ul-Haq Qasmi and Maulana Azam Tariq in Jhang, Punjab in September 1985. Its establishment was driven by Sunni resistance to the dominance of the large landholders in rural Punjab, who are mostly Shia, and by a Sunni sectarian drive to have Pakistan declared a Sunni state. It has also been suggested that the SSP also received some level of support and sponsorship from the then dictator Zia-ul-Haq as a counter to Shia pro-democracy forces. Of the founders of the SSP, Jhangvi was assassinated in February 1990, Farooqi was assassinated in January 1997, and Tariq was assassinated in October 2003 while he was still the Member of the National Assembly for Jhang.

In 1996 an element of the SSP split off to form the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), a violent sectarian group that was proscribed by President Musharraf in August 2001. The SSP has always maintained a political profile, regularly contesting elections and having been part of a Punjab coalition government. The LeJ is widely considered to be the armed wing of the SSP, although this is denied by SSP. The SSP also reportedly has close connections to the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad (TNSM) and Jaish-e-Mohammad. SSP


54 Abbas, H. 2010, Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence, Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 22 September, p. 35


cadres are reported to have received military training from the *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen* (HuM) and the Afghan Taliban. The SSP draws support and assistance from political parties in Pakistan, primarily the *Jamaat-e-Islam* (JeI) and the *Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam* (Jul). The Jul is associated with running a large number of *madrassas* all over Pakistan from where recruits for the HuM, SSP and Talib are provided.  

SSP has influence in all the four provinces of Pakistan and is considered to be one of the most powerful extremist groups in the country. It has also reportedly succeeded in creating a political vote bank in the Punjab and KPK. SSP is reported to have 500 offices, and branches in all 34 districts of Punjab, and to have approximately 100,000 registered workers in Pakistan and 17 branches in foreign countries, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Canada and England. SSP maintains operations in areas of NWA controlled by the Haqanni network, and controls many of the Sunni *madrassas* in Pakistan which produce a significant number of militants used by the Haqanni network and others for attacks in Afghanistan.

Most SSP cadres hail from Punjab. SSP is reported to have approximately 3-6,000 trained cadres. SSP extremists have been involved in targeted killings of prominent opponent organisation activists, and in attacks on worshippers in mosques operated by opposing sects including Shia and Ahmadis. SSP supporters were reportedly the ‘inspiration’ behind the 2009 attacks on Christian communities at Gojra, Punjab in which a Muslim mob killed eight Christians and burned nearly 100 houses. SSP militants also reportedly carry out targeted assassinations of the clergy of opposing sectarian groups, targeting Shia and Barelvi Sunni clergy. SSP activists also targeted Iranian interests in Pakistan as part of their anti-Shia actions, and assassinated Iranian diplomats in the early 1990s.

SSP is heavily involved in the ongoing sectarian violence in Karachi through its front presence as the ASWJ, and in recent months several high-level leaders have been the subjects of assassination attempts. In December 2012, a key ASWJ leader, Maulana Orangzaib Farooqi, was injured in an assassination attempt in the Moti Mahal area of

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&lt;[http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief32finalised.pdf](http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief32finalised.pdf)\> - Accessed 8 October 2010

61 Dressler, J. 2010, *The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan*, Institute for the Study of War, October, p. 15  


Karachi.\textsuperscript{65} Also in December 2012 a founding member of SSP, Maulana Rafiqul Khalil, was killed in an attack on his vehicle in Karachi, and another ASWJ leader, Maulana Ashgar, was killed when armed men opened fire on his car on 7 January 2013.\textsuperscript{66}

In September 2012, a former district leader of the SSP, Hafiz Abubakar, was assassinated in Chiniot, Punjab.\textsuperscript{67} On 1 January 2013, a former district SSP leader, Chauhdry Zulfiquar Jutt, was identified as one of the attackers in the murder of Shia leader Malik Mukhtar Hussain during a Shia mourning procession in Chiniot.\textsuperscript{68} In September 2012 \textit{The Express Tribune} reported that Malik Ishaq, former head of \textit{Lashkar-e-Jhangvi}, had been made the vice-president of \textit{Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamat} (ASWJ), the re-branded \textit{Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan} (SSP).\textsuperscript{69}

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Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

Some reports suggest that Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), a Punjab-based Sunni Deobandi militant group, was formed in 1996 by disgruntled former members of the SSP who believed that the SSP was moving away from its initial radical anti-Shia ideals, set by the group’s late founder Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. Others argue that LeJ was created by the SSP leadership to act as an armed wing separate from the political wing, to further the political aims of the SSP while allowing the LeJ to continue violent sectarian activities. While the SSP attempts to distance itself publicly from the actions of LeJ, and claims that the outfits are not formally linked, few analysts of the security situation in Pakistan believe this to be the case. The SSP and LeJ share the same sectarian beliefs, both source their members from Deobandi madrassas in Punjab and both have the same ideological goals.

LeJ’s stated aims are: to make Pakistan a Sunni state, through violent means if necessary; to have Shias declared non-Muslims; and to eliminate followers of other faiths, particularly Jews, Christians and Hindus. A number of sources agree that LeJ is among the most violent and dangerous sectarian militant organisations that has existed in Pakistan. Siddique claims that LeJ “is believed to have been behind most of the attacks against Western targets in Pakistan since 9/11”, and describes LeJ’s role in fomenting sectarian violence in Pakistan as “pivotal”.

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73 Siddique claims that LeJ “is believed to have been behind most of the attacks against Western targets in Pakistan since 9/11”, and describes LeJ’s role in fomenting sectarian violence in Pakistan as “pivotal”. 75
74 Abbas, A. 2009, Sectarianism; The Players and the Game, Scribd website, p. 22
LeJ was proscribed by the Musharraf regime in August 2001, but “no practical measures were taken to demolish its organisational infrastructure”.76 Although based in Punjab, LeJ is known to maintain operations in the Haqqani network stronghold of North Waziristan.77 LeJ cadres have reportedly been involved in TTP operations targeting Pakistani authorities, and the group has been linked with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), as well as having a close relationship with the Afghan Taliban.78

LeJ has an estimated active membership of around 300 cadres, organised into sub-units controlled by semi-autonomous leaders. LeJ operations have usually been carried out by small independent cells of five to eight members, which disperse into the community after the operation and reassemble later at a training camp.79 The primary targets of LeJ are Shias, and LeJ operatives have targeted Shia politicians, clergy, professionals and lobbyists, among the hundreds of Shias it has reportedly killed in attacks. While suicide bombing is the favoured method used by LeJ cadres to target large groups of Shias, they have also been known to use rockets, landmines and small arms.80

A 2009 article in the CTC Sentinel claims that LeJ “has morphed into the collective armed wing of various Deobandi terrorist groups”, and that attacks blamed on LeJ have in fact been carried out by several Deobandi militant groups. The article further claims that in some cases Pakistani police cannot differentiate between the groups, and in other cases militants responsible for attacks may have involvement with multiple insurgent groups at the one time.81 The Australian National Security listing for LeJ concurs, stating that there is often intermingling between insurgent networks in Pakistan, particularly at the lower levels, and that there is probably overlap between LeJ and Jaish-e-Mohammed and Jamiat-ul-Ansar.82

Although key leaders and many activists of the LeJ have been detained in recent years, reportedly “the group remains a significant threat to Shia, Western, Pakistani Christian

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77 Dressler, J. 2010, ‘The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan’, Institute for the Study of War, October, p.15
and Pakistani government targets”. LeJ continues to target the Shia community and other groups considered heretics in Punjab, while also targeting Western interests in Pakistan and claiming responsibility for assassinations in Baluchistan.

In May 2011 it was reported that LeJ had killed “several Shias” gathered in a field in Quetta with “guns and rockets”. LeJ also claimed responsibility for the killing of 13 Shi’a Hazaras in Akhtarabad, Quetta, in October 2011. A few weeks prior to this, the LeJ had reportedly “circulated an open letter addressed to Hazaras in Quetta reading: ‘All Shi’ites are worthy of killing. We will rid Pakistan of unclean people.”

In its 2012 World Report, Human Rights Watch stated that Sunni militant groups, such as the supposedly banned LeJ, operated with impunity even in areas where state authority is established, such as Punjab and Karachi. On September 19 2011, 26 members of the Hazara community travelling by bus to Iran to visit Shia holy sites were forced to disembark by gunmen near the town of Mastung and shot dead. Three others were killed as they took the injured to a hospital. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi claimed responsibility.

LeJ has primarily directed its sectarian attacks against Hazaras in Balochistan in 2012. 46 people were killed in sectarian violence in Quetta up to July 2012, primarily during April and May, and in June 2012 an LeJ bomb attack on a bus transporting Shia pilgrims near Quetta killed 15 people. In December 2012 19 Shia pilgrims were killed by a remotely detonated bomb in Mastung district of Balochistan, and although LeJ did not claim responsibility, a New York Times report on the incident notes that LeJ have repeatedly singled out Shias in Balochistan for attack. A subsequent report in The Express Tribune stated that Jaish al Islami, a splinter group of LeJ, claimed responsibility for the attack.

In May 2012, the Militant Leadership Monitor reported that LeJ founder Malik Mohammad Ishaq had been released from prison by the Lahore High Court and had

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become active in the Defence of Pakistan Council (DPC), an alliance of “more than 40 terrorist groups and some political parties”, including JuD/LeT, SSP and LeJ. This report further claims that LeJ has assassinated witnesses in cases involving Ishaq, as well as a judge who was hearing a case against him. Ishaq was reportedly greeted by the leader of the SSP on his release. In August 2012, Ishaq was again arrested for delivering a “provocative speech to spread sectarian hatred” at a religious gathering in Lahore. Ishaq was released on bail in September 2012, and in the same month The Express Tribune reported that Ishaq had been made the vice-president of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamat (ASWJ), the re-branded Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).

**Lashkar-e-Taiba/Jamaat ud-Dawa**

*Lashkar-e-Taiba* (LeT, ‘Army of the Pure’), was established as the military wing of the Pakistani Islamist organisation *Markaz-ad-Dawad-wal-Irshad* (MDI) in the early 1990s. After being proscribed by the Musharraf regime in 2002, LeT rebranded itself as the charity organisation *Jamaat ud-Dawa* (JuD), and continued to operate as previously.

LeT reportedly received funding and training from the ISI during the 1990s, as it was committed to targeting Indian civilians and interests in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and to training extremists for operations in India. LeT subscribes to the minority Ahle-Hadith sect, and has criticised Deobandi insurgent groups for their attacks on the Pakistani state. Cordesman and Vira claim that LeT has “immense value to Pakistan”, as it has not become involved in attacks on Pakistani soil, and has proved highly capable of mounting complex, high-profile attacks on Indian targets.

LeT is based in Muridke, near Lahore in Punjab, and is led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. Its cadres are mostly drawn from Pakistan and Afghanistan, along with a small number of foreign fighters, spread across a network of training camps in Pakistan and in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. LeT has been active in insurgent activities in J&K since at least 1993, and has also stated that it seeks to bring about the “restoration of Islamic rule over all parts of India”, as well as “a union of all Muslim majority regions in countries that surround Pakistan”. The group has reportedly called for global jihad, and stated that it would “plant the ‘flag of Islam’ in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi”. The LeT has also been reportedly involved in high-profile attacks in Afghanistan in recent years.

Nonetheless, LeT’s main focus has been India, and it has claimed responsibility for a number of major attacks on Indian soil. These include an attack on the army barracks at the Red Fort in Delhi in 2000 that killed three people, a January 2001 attack on Srinigar airport that killed five, and a 2002 attack on Indian border forces that killed at least four. In addition, the Indian government has accused LeT of being responsible for a 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, the July 2006 bombings of Mumbai’s commuter rail

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network, and the high-profile November 2008 attack on Mumbai that killed nearly 200 people. LeT has denied being responsible for these incidents, but in November 2009 LeT’s chief of operations, Zakur-Rehman Lakhvi, was one of seven men charged by a Pakistani court with planning the 2008 Mumbai attack.\(^{100}\) In November 2012 Ajmal Kasab, the only surviving member of the LeT group that carried out the 2008 Mumbai attack, was executed at a prison in Pune, India. In response, Reuters reported that an LeT spokesman had “promised revenge for Kasab’s hanging”.\(^{101}\) LeT reportedly claimed responsibility for an October 2012 attack on an Indian army convoy outside a hotel in Indian-administered Kashmir that killed one person.\(^{102}\)

According to a 2011 analysis by Cordesman and Vira, “The LeT’s hallmark modus operandi has been the ‘fidayeen’ attack, which was perfected on the Kashmiri battlefield and was on display during the 2008 Mumbai attacks.” These attacks are not “suicide operations per se… (But) more akin to high-risk missions in which well-trained commandoes engage in fierce combat during which dying is preferable to being captured”.\(^{103}\) The US government has offered a $2 million reward for information leading to the capture of Abdul Rahman Makki, a founder of MDL notorious for his “overt justifications of fidayeen missions”, and a $10 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Hafiz Saeed.\(^{104}\) The Indian government has accused Pakistani authorities of “shielding” Hafiz Saeed from responsibility for attacks on India, and while he has been arrested and detained on occasion, Cordesman and Vira characterise these as “largely sham operations”.\(^{105}\) Indeed, Kronstadt reported a “widely-held view” that the Pakistan military “will do everything to preserve [LeT] as long as it believes there is a threat from India”\(^{106}\).

Besides its jihad activities, LeT is reported to run a madrassa, a hospital a residential complex for ‘scholars’ and leaders at its headquarters in Muridke. It has also established 16 ‘Islamic institutions’, 135 secondary schools, an ambulance service, mobile medical


clinics, blood banks and seminaries across the country.\textsuperscript{107} In addition, LeT publishes a range of media to further its interests, including an official website, weekly and monthly Urdu-language journals, and other magazines including the English-language ‘Voice of Islam’.\textsuperscript{108} Cordesman and Vira note that the large social services network run by LeT through the \textit{Jamaat-ud-Dawa} (JuD) makes LeT “in some sense…akin to Lebanese Hezbollah” than to other Pakistani militant groups.\textsuperscript{109}

Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan

Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP – the Army of Mohammed) was established in 1993 under the leadership of Ghulam Reza Naqvi and Murid Abbas Yazdani, as an armed offshoot of the Shia politico-religious organisation Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jaffaria (TNFJ). It was based in the predominantly Shia suburb of Thokar Niaz Beg in Lahore. SMP, which was primarily active in Punjab, was established as a counter to violent Sunni fundamentalist and sectarian groups such as SSP and LeJ. Along with these two groups, SMP was proscribed by the Musharraf regime in the early 2000s. As a Shia organisation in a majority Sunni nation, SMP has been linked with Iran, and received support from them at least in part as a result of SSP’s targeting of Iranian interests in Pakistan.

According to Abbas, in the early to mid-90s the SMP “launched a full-fledged retaliatory battle against SSP” and LeJ, “assassinating many top leaders in the process”. In 1996, Yazdani was assassinated, reportedly on the orders of Naqvi, which led to the fragmentation of the organisation. In December 1996, Pakistani security forces arrested Naqvi, who had been forced by the internecine conflict to flee the group’s headquarters. The South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) claims that SMP “for all practical purposes stopped operating” after Naqvi’s arrest, that the group’s finances and training dried up, and that its cadres started operating independently at this time.

Abbas notes that Iran withdrew its funding for SMP in 1996 and that SMP remained underground for much of the next decade, before reportedly resurfacing in Punjab in 2004. According to Abbas, some reports suspected the involvement of SMP in the killings of high-profile SSP and LeJ leaders in 2009, although this did not turn out to be true in at least one of the cases. However, recent reports indicate that SMP may have become more active in the past four years.

The SATP noted that in September 2009, Pakistani law enforcement agencies had issued a most wanted list of 83 “high-profile terrorists”, and that the majority of the “most

112 Abbas, H. 2010, Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence, Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 22 September, pp. 37-38
113 Abbas, H. 2010, Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence, Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 22 September, p. 37
116 Abbas, H. 2010, Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 22 September, p. 40
wanted belong to the LJ and the SMP”. The SATP also noted the re-emergence of SMP and SSP as conspicuous active forces in Karachi in July 2008, in spite of their status as banned organisations. 117 The International Crisis Group also claimed in March 2009 that SMP had re-established a conspicuous presence in Karachi in the wake of heightened sectarian violence in the city. 118 According to the SATP, SMP militants have been arrested for involvement in sectarian killings in Karachi in 2010 and 2011. 119 In addition, in 2011 a Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies report listed SMP as being among the militant groups responsible for sectarian violence in Karachi. 120 In contrast to the sources claiming the majority of SMP activity took place in Karachi, Cordesman and Vira claimed that SMP was “considerably more active in the Punjab and tribal areas than in Karachi”. 121 No further reports were located which support or deny this claim.

The Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM – Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad’s Sharia) was founded by Maulana Sufi Mohammad in 1992 in the Malakand division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The aim of the TNSM is the full imposition of sharia in Malakand, Swat and surrounding districts; in 1998, Sufi Mohammad is reported to have stated that: “We want enforcement of the Islamic judicial system in totality: judicial, political, economic, jihad fi sabillillah [jihad for the cause of Allah], education and health”.

The TNSM is reported to be affiliated with the TTP (it is sometimes referred to as the ‘Swat Taliban’), particularly after the Lal Masjid operation in mid-2007, and current leader Maulana Fazlullah is reported to have been appointed the TTP commander for the Swat district. Fazlullah is particularly noted for his heavy use of illegal FM radio stations, on which he broadcast his interpretation of the Quran and sharia. The TNSM was proscribed in 2002 by the Musharraf regime but flourished through the second half of the 2000s, until the Pakistani military moved against the TNSM in force in mid-2009.

During the mid- and late-1990s, the TNSM under Muhammad attempted to enforce sharia in the Swat valley. Widespread poverty, lack of development and infrastructure, and the inability of the government to provide education and security in the Swat valley rendered the anti-government, pro-sharia stance of the TNSM relatively appealing to the local population. The TNSM presented themselves as rebels against the wealthy clan leaders and large landowners, vowing to forcibly take the land and resources back for the people.

The popularity and influence of the TNSM suffered a blow in the early 2000s, when Muhammad organised thousands of Pakistani fighters to go to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance (NA). Many of these fighters were killed or arrested by the NA, and others were arrested after their return to Pakistan and the banning

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123 For example, see: Qazi, S H 2011, “Rebels of the frontier: origins, organisation, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 22 no.4, 574-602, p. 593
127 Qazi, S H 2011, ‘Rebels of the frontier: origins, organisation, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 22 no.4, 574-602, pp. 592-593; see also: Country Advice & Information Service 2009, ‘Record of Conversation with Dr. Aneela Babar’, 29 May
of the TNSM. Muhammad himself was arrested and imprisoned on his return to Pakistan, and his son-in-law Fazlullah subsequently took command of the TNSM. Following these events, the TNSM was largely out of sight until the October 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan. In the wake of the earthquake the TNSM was involved in local relief work, and Fazlullah used his radio broadcasts to promulgate the idea that the disaster was a punishment for the non-Islamic behaviour of the local population. He used his pirate radio stations to broadcast the demands of the TNSM, which include: the imposition of sharia in the Swat valley and across Pakistan; creation of a parallel government in the Swat valley; opposition to girls’ education and polio vaccination campaigns; prohibition on barbers shaving beards; closure of NGOs that employ female staff; and the closure of video and music shops.

Fazlullah was made the TTP commander in Swat in late 2007, although it has been suggested that the TNSM had been cooperating with the Taliban prior to this. Pakistani intelligence officials have reportedly stated that the support and training supplied by the TTP emboldened the TNSM in Swat.

The TNSM mounted regular attacks on government facilities in Swat, as well as on schools, police, security forces, and video and music shops, throughout much of 2008. It has been reported that “scores” of police officers were killed by the TNSM, and that half of the region’s police force deserted in fear of the group. The TNSM took control of hospitals and police stations, and set up checkpoints and sharia courts in areas they controlled, and meted out strict punishments to those convicted of offences. Fazlullah also established a militia named the ‘Shaheen Force’, which functioned as both a criminal and morals police force.

Muhammad was released from prison in 2008, and acted as an intermediary in the negotiation of a peace deal between the KPK government and the TNSM. The government offered a number of concessions, including the imposition of sharia in the

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Swat valley, in return for peace. However, following the signing of the peace deal by President Zardari in April 2009, TNSM fighters began moving into areas of the districts of Buner, Shangla and Dir.\(^\text{135}\) The cease-fire was short-lived; the TNSM refused to lay down their arms, and when TNSM fighters entered Buner district and took police and paramilitary officers hostage in late April, the Pakistani military responded with a large-scale offensive against the TNSM across the Swat valley.\(^\text{136}\) Heavy fighting continued through May, with widespread civilian displacement, but by late June 2009 military authorities claimed to have cleared the ‘Taliban’ from Swat. Nonetheless, it has been reported that the military operation only succeeded in gaining control of the urban centres and major roads of the Swat valley.\(^\text{137}\)

Since being largely driven out of KPK by the Pakistani military in 2009, the TNSM has reportedly been based in Konar and Nuristan in Afghanistan. The group has been held responsible by the military and local officials for cross-border attacks on Pakistani security forces in KPK and FATA, including an August 2011 attack on two outposts in Chitral district of KPK in which at least 36 members of the Pakistani security forces were killed.\(^\text{138}\) In June 2012, Reuters reported that militants loyal to Fazlullah were responsible for the beheading of 17 Pakistani soldiers in a cross-border attack in the Dir district of KPK. This report does not mention the TNSM, but rather notes Fazlullah in his role as a TTP leader, and quotes “a Western diplomat” who claims that Fazlullah is still “a very big problem for Pakistan”.\(^\text{139}\)

In October 2012, it was reported that Fazlullah was suspected of having ordered the assassination of Malala Yousafzai, the Swat schoolgirl who had spoken out against the Taliban and in favour of education for girls.\(^\text{140}\) A spokesman for Fazlullah also reportedly threatened to kill Malala’s father in the aftermath of the failed assassination attempt.\(^\text{141}\) In December 2012, Pakistan Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik demanded that Afghanistan arrest and extradite Fazlullah to Pakistan, stating that the TNSM had been responsible for cross-border attacks in Bajaur, Dir and Chitral districts.\(^\text{142}\)

\(^{135}\) IHS Jane’s 2011, Afghanistan – An IHS Jane’s Special Report, 7 October, pp. 38-39


\(^{138}\) IHS Jane’s 2011, Afghanistan – An IHS Jane’s Special Report, 7 October, pp. 38-39


\(^{142}\) ‘Malik demands Afghanistan to hand over Maulvi Fazlullah’ 2012, Dawn, 4 December <http://dawn.com/2012/12/04/malik-demands-afghanistan-to-hand-over-maulvi-fazlullah/> Accessed 10 January 2013
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