Document #2035819
Freedom House (Author)
Democracy Percentage | 38.69 / 100 |
Democracy Score | 3.32 / 7 |
By Aleksandar Brezar
The year 2019 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was marked by yet another period of post-electoral political stalemate. Citizens were exposed almost daily to ethnonationalist-populist rhetoric, feeding fears of another potential conflict down the road. In practice, this rhetoric served only to paper over the cracks in an increasingly impoverished and overburdened society, with politicians showing little to no interest in developing plans to resolve the country’s most pressing issues.
This tendency was best illustrated in the months-long drama over the lack of a state-level government after the 2018 general elections, during which leaders used any opportunity to elevate matters of ethnonational importance. Milorad Dodik of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), Bakir Izetbegović of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and Dragan Čović of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ BiH) stood out as the most culpable, as the respective leaders of the main Serb, Bosniak, and Croat parties most responsible for repeated breakdowns in government-formation negotiations.
In mid-November, the political stalemate, proximately caused by arguments over BiH’s participation in the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) program, suddenly came to an end. An agreement was reached, with the SNSD’s Zoran Tegeltija appointed as head of the state-level Council of Ministers (CoM), which was finally formed on December 23.1 The abrupt nature of the agreement demonstrated that BiH’s complicated and cumbersome political system can, in fact, function if the political will is present. It also showed that ethnonationalist-populist rhetoric can give way to practical solutions, with the SNSD retreating from its hard-line anti-NATO stance to secure Tegeltija’s appointment (though over accusations of betraying Serb group interests).
The state-wide crisis of political will further manifested in the lack of any decision-making by the state-level Parliamentary Assembly. The few parliamentary sessions that took place over the course of 2019, mostly via teleconference, focused solely on maintaining the budget necessary for the assembly’s functioning.
One of the most pressing issues that the governing bodies neglected to address during the year was the ongoing migrant and refugee crisis. With tens of thousands of people on the move through Bosnia on their way to the European Union (EU)—or, in some cases, seeking asylum in BiH itself—local authorities showed a clear lack of empathy and responsibility, failing to ensure a swift, systematic response to the stark increase in the number of those looking for help. Instead, migrants and refugees were used as pawns in various political games on the state and entity levels, exacerbating a humanitarian crisis laid bare by numerous reports pointing out the threats to these groups’ safety and well-being.2
However, 2019 was not without a silver lining: ending BiH’s status as the last country in Europe without a public Pride event, LGBT+ activists managed to overcome significant social, political, and economic barriers to organize Sarajevo’s first Pride march in September. Despite facing resistance from parts of society, including threats and counter-protests, the well-attended event went off without incident, finally making visible one of the most vulnerable populations in BiH today.
Journalists suffered further indignities during the year, with outlets facing constant pressure as violence against the media in many forms reached new heights in the country. Many attacks on the press were either supported by or came directly from authorities or their representatives in both the Republika Srpska (RS) and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) entities, intensifying a climate of fear.3 Although physical attacks, like that against BN TV’s Vladimir Kovačević in Banja Luka in 2018, have seen perpetrators put on trial and sentenced,4 violence against journalists (in particular, female journalists) is slowly becoming a socially accepted form of expressing disagreement with the work of the press. Given this trend, coupled with significant job insecurity and flawed legal protections against all but outright assassination attempts, it is surprising that journalists have continued to expose more cases of corruption than the authorities.
The judiciary had its own scandal of the year, with the president of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC), Milan Tegeltija, facing accusations of corruption in a highly publicized case. Despite minor protests and calls for his resignation, the absence of viable mechanisms for his removal allowed him to remain in office, adding more doubt to questions about the judiciary’s integrity. Moreover, throughout the year, chief state prosecutor Gordana Tadić and state Minister of Security Dragan Mektić continued their public bickering, further straining public trust in the judiciary.
In February, after members of BiH’s tripartite state presidency came back from Brussels claiming that the country would receive EU candidate status in November, it was revealed that state officials had submitted incomplete answers to additional questions pursuant to a European Commission (EC) questionnaire, one of the key requirements for this long-sought designation. Although only slightly embarrassing at home, this failure prompted an EC opinion on BiH’s progress toward EU accession, which clarified that the country’s candidate status was nothing more than a pipe dream. Meanwhile, the government invested no visible effort in the country’s EU accession path and has remained almost entirely silent before the international community.
A large number of citizens see emigration as the new form of protest over the continuing stagnation (if not deterioration) of the country’s social, political, and economic situation, and any major positive changes occurring in BiH in 2020 are unlikely. Local elections scheduled for late 2020 can be expected to take over all other areas of public life, albeit on a much smaller scale than in the lead-up to the 2018 general elections. Additionally, since political deadlocks have proven to be effective in pushing ethnonationalist agendas, it would be no surprise to see such obstructions recur during the upcoming period.
Externally, with NATO membership a constant tool for political games, the EU accession path almost wholly abandoned bar the occasional positive statement, and the country turning toward other foreign partners such as Russia, Turkey, and China, it would be difficult to identify any outside actor who could take an active role in bringing BiH out of its current limbo.
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. | 2.00 / 7.00 |
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. | 4.50 / 7.00 |
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. | 4.50 / 7.00 |
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. | 3.25 / 7.00 |
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. | 3.00 / 7.00 |
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. | 3.00 / 7.00 |
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. | 3.00 / 7.00 |
Author: Aleksandar Brezar is Southeast Europe/Western Balkans Network Lead for The Democratic Society, a UK/Brussels-based non-profit organization working for greater participation and dialogue in democracy in Europe and elsewhere. He produces and cohosts Sarajevo Calling, a bi-weekly podcast on current and past sociopolitical events in countries of the Western Balkans. In the past, he has worked as Brussels correspondent for Balkan Insight, while also serving as a regular contributor for BiH on topics ranging from NATO and EU integrations to war crimes processes and peace-building efforts. At BHRT (National Radio–Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina) he served as Head of New Media; at Analiziraj, he was Senior Contributor on media ethics, as well as disinformation debunking and fact-checking. He has also contributed to the Guardian, Washington Post, PBS, and Al Jazeera English. Brezar won the Poynter Institute’s inaugural Balkan Factchecking Award (2017), the Europa Nostra Award and Grand Prix for Preservation of Cultural Heritage (2016), the Jules Chametzky Literary Translation Award (2016), and received a Pushcart Prize nomination (2015).
The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0–100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic.
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