Document #1274980

ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (Author)

a-4163 (ACC-AFG-4163)

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Jalaluddin Haqqani
Barnett Rubin führt in seinem Buch „The Fragmentation of Afghanistan“ zu Jalaluddin Haqqani folgendes an: Haqqani sei in Pakistan ausgebildeter Maulawi und gehöre zum Clan der Jadran. Er sei ein Kommandant der HIK und Mitglied des National CS. Im März 1991 war er maßgeblich an der Einnahme von Khost beteiligt. Ab April 1992 soll er der Shura von Gardez vorgestanden sein. Er sei zum Justizminister der ersten Regierung der ISA ernannt worden, habe seinen Posten aber nie angetreten. (Rubin 2002, 1995, S. 288)
Die Asian Times Online rechnet Haqqani ebenfalls dem Jadran (oder Zadran) Clan zu. Der Clan ist eine Seitenlinie des Soloman Khail-Stamms, der wiederum einer der beiden Linien des einflussreichen Stamms der Galzai ist. Es sei kein Zufall, so der Autor, dass die Taliban ivor allem in Paktia einen starken Rückhalt genießen, da viele von ihnen ebenfalls zu den Galzai gehören:
"There are strong historical reasons why this region of Paktia is the center of Taliban activity. Most tribes in Paktia, and especially in the Gardez region, have a soft spot for the Taliban. Gardez is the home of the famous warrior tribe, the Galzai, which has two main branches - Ahmed Zai and Soloman Khail. Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani, who captured Khost province from the communist militia in 1991, hails from the Zadran tribe, which is a branch of the Soloman Khail. Similarly, most of the Taliban in Paktia hail from the Galzai or one of its branches. This makes for strong blood ties." (Asian Times Online, 7. März 2002)
Jalaluddin Haqqani war unter den Taliban sowohl Minister für Stammes – und Grenzangelegenheiten, Gouverneur von Paktia sowie ab September 2001 Oberkommandant der Streitkräfte der Taliban. (Frontline, 2.-15. Februar 2002) Ihm werden z.B. in einem Bericht von Frontline sowie der Asia Times Online Verbindungen zur al-Qaeda bereits in den 1990er Jahren unterstellt, so soll er unter anderem das 1998 in Reaktion auf den Anschlag auf die US-amerikanische Botschaft in Kenia bombardierte Lager von Osama bin Laden geschützt haben. Laut dem Bericht der Asia Times Online sei der pakistanische Geheimdienst ISI Drahtzieher in der Region, und Haqqani sei der Stammesführer der Jadran, der vom ISI während des afghanisch-sowjetischen Krieges am meisten ausgenützt wurde, um die Einschleusung arabischer Söldner zu erleichtern.
"If there is any doubt on that issue, consider the location of bin Laden's camp targeted by US cruise missiles [in August 1998], Zahawa. Positioned on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was built by Pakistani contractors, funded by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence directorate and protected under the patronage of a local and influential Jadran tribal leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani. However, the real host in that facility was the Pakistani ISI. If this was later to become bin Laden's base, then serious questions are raised by the early relationship between bin Laden and Pakistan's ISI." It described Jalaluddin Haqqani as "the Jadran tribal leader most exploited by ISI during the Soviet-Afghan war to facilitate the introduction of Arab mercenaries " and the Taliban as "the handy cloak woven by Pakistan to shroud their progress"." (Asia Times Online ,23. Oktober 2003)
Das indische Magazin Frontline brachte im Februar 2002 einen Hintergrundbericht über den Werdegang von Jalaluddin Haqqani unter den Taliban:
"A report filed by Reuters on October 9, pondering the future of the Taliban, pointed to the prominence of Jalaluddin Haqqani: "One of the main weathervanes will be Jalaluddin Haqqani, the most prominent mujahideen commander from the Soviet war who sided with the Taliban when they made him Minister for Tribal Affairs.
"Haqqani has returned to his stronghold in Khost, the eastern border area where Saudi-born militant Osama bin Laden reportedly had several training camps, and Afghan analysts are watching to see if he will turn coat and support Zahir Shah."
A veteran mujahideen and northern Pushtun leader, Haqqani rose to prominence as a military leader of the radical Islamic group and militia of Pushtun resistance to the Soviet-leaning Communist government in Kabul, Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, during the 1980s. At the time, he was a strong ally of the United States. (Hekmatyar in turn retains strong ties with Iran). Haqqani's power base was in Jalalabad and particularly in Khost in Paktia province. He played a pivotal role between the southern Pushtuns from Kandahar, who formed the core of the Taliban, and what that group sees as the northern usurpers from Kabul. Haqqani was renowned as the architect of one of the most stunning military reverses suffered by the Najibullah government - the fall of Khost in 1991. He was named Justice Minister in the first mujahideen government formed in Kabul in 1992, but defected to the Taliban just before they seized the capital in September 1996. In 1995, Haqqani defected and allied himself with the emerging Taliban and helped the Taliban secure control of the Nangarhar province in 1996. The defection was a key factor in securing territorial advantage for the Taliban. At the time, bin Laden was living there as a guest (and friend) of Haqqani. Haqqani possessed a valuable trove of apparently at least 70 U.S Stinger missiles.
Haqqani led the Taliban's brutal military campaign north of Kabul during the winter of 1996-97, sweeping through the towns of Estalif and Qarabagh, carrying out what his opponents described as ethnic cleansing of the Tajik minority there. In 1998, he switched posts, being appointed to the important position of Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs in the Taliban government. Haqqani is known to have had close ties with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), ties that go back to the 1980s. His relationship with bin Laden led to the building of many training camps in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Paktia (especially south of Khost). The Zhawar Kili Al Badr camps in the Khost area were targeted and hit with some 70 cruise missiles when Washington launched its first strike against bin Laden in 1998 after the bombings of U.S embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In late September 2001, Omar appointed Haqqani the commander-in-chief of the Taliban armed forces. He also served as Governor of Paktia.
DURING the first month and a half of the U.S. war on Afghanistan, the belief in Washington was that the heavy U.S. bombing would lead to splits within the Taliban leadership. Some thought that a moderate Taliban faction might regroup in Pakistan and disassociate itself from Kabul. Haqqani was seen as one possible leader of such a splinter fraction. During the first four weeks of the air campaign, U.S. planes studiously avoided hitting Afghanistan's largest and most fortified training camps burrowed into the mountains east of Khost. This area reportedly hosted five of Haqqani's bases, partly built by Osama bin Laden when he was a U.S. ally.
Much ado was made in the Western press about Haqqani's visit to Pakistan between October 17 and 21. Such speculation dissipated when Haqqani commented to local reporters during the trip: "We will retreat to the mountains and begin a long guerilla war to reclaim our pure land from infidels and free our country like we did against the Soviets.... We are eagerly awaiting the American troops to land on our soil, where we will deal with them in our own way.... The Americans are creatures of comfort. They will not be able to sustain the harsh conditions that await them."
Three weeks later the U.S. began its bombing campaign, targeted specifically to kill Haqqani. In the confusion reigning in Kabul on November 11 and 12, as the Taliban lines in the north collapsed, Kathy Gannon reported for the Associated Press, that a lieutenant of Haqqani was the contact person between the Taliban and "the Arabs" of Al Qaeda." (Frontline, 2.-15. Februar 2002)
Nach dem Fall der Taliban, so die Financial Times Deutschland, soll Haqqani sich nach Pakistan abgesetzt haben.
"Er verantwortet laut afghanischen Quellen den Versuch der Taliban und al-Kaida, sich in seiner ehemaligen Hochburg in Paktia neu zu formieren. Haqqani lebe in der pakistanischen Region Süd-Wasiristan nahe der afghanischen Grenze, sagt Haji Mohammed Ishaq, Polizeichef von Gardes, der Provinzhauptstadt von Paktia. Ehemalige Führungsfiguren des pakistanischen Geheimdienstes ISI stützten ihn." (Financial Times Deutschland, 21. März 2002).
Laut New York Times soll sich Haqqani im November 2001 in Khost im Haus einer Privatperson versteckt haben. Bei einem Versuch, den Kommandante durch Raketenangriffe zu töten, sollen 20 Personen, die sich im Hof von Herrn Serajuddin zu diesem Zeitpunkt aufgehalten haben, durch Bomben der US-amerikanischen Truppen umgekommen sein. Haqqani konnte entkommen. Serajuddin selbst, der laut mehreren im Artikel zitierten Zeugen keinerlei Verbindungen zur Taliban oder al-Qaeda haben soll, soll längere Zeit von den US-Truppen festgehalten worden sein. (NYT/Common Dreams, 2. Februar 2002; siehe auch Frontline, 2.-15. Februar 2002)
 
Laut UNHCR Return Information Update vom 15. August 2003 ist Jalaluddin Haqqani der Anführer der Hezb-e Islami in den Bezirken Wase Zadran und Showak Zadran. (UNHCR, 15. August 2003, S. 10; andere Schreibweise: Jadran, siehe AIMS District Map, Juni 2002)
 
Laut Einzelentscheiderbrief des BAFl vom November 2003 gehört Jalaluddin Haqqani zu den meistgesuchten Personen der afghanischen Regierung. Seiner Kontrolle unterstehen die Provinzen Khost, Paktia und Paktika. Er soll dem Führungsrat einer Widerstandsbewegung namens Saiful Muslemeen („Schwert der Muslime“) angehören, die sich aus Taliban, al-Qaeda-Kämpfern und Hekmatyars Hezb-i Islami zusammensetzen soll. (BAFl, November 2003)
 
Aktualisierung Dezember 2004:
"Jalaluddin Haqqani, who has a $ 250,000 bounty on his head, is a veteran warlord who fought the Soviets with US-supplied weapons and is now allied with al-Qa'ida. He has become the biggest thorn in the side of Khost, but some believe he may be semi-retired in Saudi Arabia.
US officers say Haqqani's network of madrassas (Islamist schools) in Pakistan send young, brainwashed assassins across to kill government officials, ambush US supply lorries, and mount mass attacks on government positions that often end in the deaths of badly trained guerrillas. Commander Rahman said: "Pakistan says it is helping America but it is not. Pakistan is two-faced."
General Kilbaz Sherzai, an old communist intelligence chief trained in Frunze Military Academy, the Soviet Sandhurst, shares that view. He now works for the Americans in Khost and has just survived a suicide attack by an inept attacker. "The boy was sent by Haqqani," the general said. He is convinced the capture of Haqqani could lead to the terror mastermind. "He is a friend of Bin Laden and has many links with al-Qa'ida," he said. "I'm sure he knows where Osama is. We don't know why Pakistan doesn't arrest him." (Belfast Telegraph, 1. November 2004)
"Paktika Gov. Gulab Mungal said Afghan forces later arrested a suspect in the attack, whom he identified only as a deputy of Jalaluddin Haqqani, a front-line Taliban commander who served briefly as tribal affairs minister before the fall of the hard-line Islamic regime in late 2001. He remains at large." (The Associated Press, 21. Oktober 2004)
"On one central corner, the house of Taliban commander Jalaluddin Haqqani lies in rubble. A 500-pound US bomb hit it in the last stages of the war. But Haqqani escaped and the bomb killed several women and children; bright bits of colorful cloth have been hung on wires outside it as a shrine to the victims residents call martyrs. Haqqani remains in Pakistan, where he helps foreign fighters cross into and out of Afghanistan, said Mashal, the Interior Ministry spokesman." (The Boston Globe, 7. Oktober 2004)
"How many men and women actually turn out at polling stations may depend on how seriously they take threats by the Taliban and the Al Qaeda terrorist network to kill anyone who does. The warnings are issued in "night letters," leaflets scattered in the streets or pinned to doors in the darkness, for Khowst residents to find after the 9 p.m. curfew lifts each morning.
Triziwal pulled a recent night letter from beneath a pile of papers in his inbox. It was issued under the name of Al Qaeda and made eight points, among them: People should stay away from television sets "because if you watch TV then you will die as a nonbeliever." The letter warned Afghans that non-Muslims had come "to destroy your religion and your country."
"This is our most important message: Any mullah or teacher who helps these nonbelievers will be killed and if they take voting cards they will also be killed," the leaflet said.
"Tell this message to all your villagers, that they must not take voting cards and they must not vote, because voting is the act of communists."
It was signed "Long life to Jalaluddin Haqqani," the former Taliban commander in Khowst and a senior figure in the ousted regime. U.S. forces have tried several times to kill Haqqani, including launching airstrikes on his house in Kabul, the capital, during the 2001 war against the Taliban.
But Haqqani is apparently alive and fighting, along with his ally from the war against the Soviets, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former recipient of covert U.S. aid who is now battling American forces in a loose alliance with the Taliban." (Los Angeles Times, 1. Oktober 2004)
"Karachi: A senior member of the Taleban Military Council, Mola Dadollah Akhund name as transliterated , who commands Taleban's armed activities in Kandahar and Zabol, has said that Usamah Bin-Ladin and Mola Omar are safe. All decisions about war and war fronts are made by our central advisory council.
Talking to Jang over telephone from some unknown place, he said that Mola Omar is neither sick nor has he nominated Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani as his successor. Similarly, reports about Bin-Ladin's wellbeing are received frequently. Every order of Mola Omar is obeyed throughout Afghanistan, while Karzai has no writ outside Kabul. The Kabul regime exists nowhere outside its offices." (Jang/ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28. August 2004)
"Hekmatyar denied any involvement in the recent killing of Chinese construction workers in northern Afghanistan, and said a breakaway Taleban faction led by Mola Soban could be behind it. He repeated his claim that Mola Omar was not well and that the Taleban was now being led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, and that Usamah Bin-Ladin was in Kandahar." (Kashmir Images, 04 July 04/BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5. Juli 2004)
"Dans le Sud-Est, dans les provinces de Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia et Khost, plus connu sous le nom de "Loya Paktia", les talibans tenteront de s'appuyer sur les toutes-puissantes tribus pachtounes.
L'ancien chef moudjahidine et leader de la tribu des Zadran, figure mythique de la lutte anti-soviétique, Jalaluddin Haqqani est le responsable des opérations militaires pour cette région, marquée par une très forte tradition tribale d'auto-gestion." (Agence France Presse, 18. März 2004)
"Troops have already met with some success, including the destruction of a terrorist cell that had been plaguing American forces in the restive border region near Pakistan, said Lt. Col. Harry Glenn, the commander of a U.S. military base in the province of Khost.
One operation in January around a remote pass linking Khost with neighboring Paktia province led to several arrests in a stronghold of Jalaluddin Haqqani, apparently prompting him to flee.
"There has not been an attack in that pass since," Glenn told The Associated Press in an interview on Monday." (The Associated Press, 2. März 2004)
"Experts believe that a U.S. military operation will soon be launched in Khost as a precautionary step to minimize the influence of mujahideen leader Jalaluddin Haqqani whose remit extends from Khost to North Waziristan, as well as to undermine Hizbi Islami leader Gulbeddine Hikmatyar whose influence extends from North Waziristan to the Afghan Kunar Valley." (Mideast Mirror, 27. Februar 2004)
"Former Afghan Prime Minister Golbodin Hekmatyar, now wanted by the United States, has declared year 2004 as the "Year of War" by giving a call to "mojahedin" to increase target-oriented attacks on the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan.
"As the latest move, after the announcement by the US of the start of an operation in the stronghold of Hekmatyar, the Hezb-e Eslami (HE) has decided to increase operations and attacks against the US-led forces in Afghanistan," sources told Daily Times.
"The instructions were communicated to the "mojahedin" by Mr Hekmatyar who has declared the year 2004 as the "Year of War" and told them to increase militancy," sources added. Sources said militants have been urged to focus on suicide attacks on coalition forces.
"New targets were also given to militants to attack the enemy including the US forces, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, Afghan militia and people accommodating the said forces in Afghanistan," sources said.
They said the new task would be completed with the help of Mr Hekmatyar and Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani. "The close aide of Mr Hekmatyar, Engineer Kashmir Khan and Maulana Haqqani will play their role regarding the new war strategy," sources added.
"The militants who were recruited in the name of the 'Secret Army of Mojahedin' (SAM) will fight against the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, which was built up by the HE," sources said." (BBC Monitoring, 24. Februar 2004)
"Bin Laden and his deputy, the Egyptian Ayman Al-Zawahiri "are alive and both are in Afghanistan, in different places", Mohammed Saiful Adel told an AFP journalist in an interview in the city of Khost, close to the border with Pakistan.
A former leader of the anti-Soviet Mujahaddin fighters, Jalaluddin Haqqani, "has taken on the role of deputy leader of the Taliban," the Taliban spokesman said. "He is playing a key role in our movement and is responsibile for all the military operations," he added.
"Haqqani is personally leading the operations in Paktia, Paktika and Khost," said the spokesman, referring to three southeastern provinces." (Agence France Presse, 20. Februar 2004)
"Gearing up for the "final" battle against US-led forces in Afghanistan, Taliban is regrouping in the Khyber Agency region of Pakistan for the crucial offensive to be mounted in spring under a new commander to recapture major cities, media reports said.
"The resistance under a new commander is regrouping in the remote Khyber Agency region of Pakistan, using the infrastructure of people and fortifications laid by Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda several years ago," Hong Kong-based 'Asia Times' online said in a report.
Quoting Taliban sources, it said the new commander for the proposed "spring offensive" would be Mullah Sabir Momin of Orugzan province.
Uptil now, Pakistan has aided some commanders in Afghanistan belonging to the Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
"Pakistan's purpose was not so much to damage the US interests, but to establish a counter-force to the growing pro-India presence along the Afghani border areas with Pakistan", though it worked against the US interests also, the report said.
American intelligence agencies "tracked HIA recruiting offices in Pakistani cities such as Karachi and Peshawar and pointed to the various locations in Pakistan where HIA volunteers were being given training, money and arms".
The report said "legendary" Afghan commander Jalaluddin Haqqani - who joined Taliban, became a Minister in the erstwhile Afghan regime and is now the "main force" behind the resistance in Khost and Paktia - visited Miran Shah in Pakistan several times, but authorities turned a blind eye".
It said the Taliban would now "step up their struggle to include more suicide attacks" which would be the "prelude to a broader struggle that will start in spring in which the Taliban will attempt to retake the major cities in Afghanistan that they held before being ousted by the US in late 2001"." (The Press Trust of India, 13. Februar 2004)
Situation in Paktia
Zu einer deutlich positiven Einschätzung der Sicherheitslage in Paktia kommt CARE in seiner Studie zur Sicherheitssituation in Gardez vom November 2003 (S. 39-41) Jalaluddin Haqqani wird nicht als Machtträger erwähnt:
“Gardez has been a focal point for political attention since the fall of the Taliban. In contrast to other areas where the political leadership has been allowed to remain in place, President Karzai has replaced the governor of Paktia a further two times – to Raz M. Delili and then M. Assadullah.
Paktia has an unusually cohesive tribal system and tribal leaders often negotiate together and thereby exercise a huge amount of influence. Following the fall of the Taliban, a seven-tribe Council formed and immediately began to provide administration for Gardez city. The tribes remained actively engaged in provincial politics in 2003, negotiating on behalf of communities with the international military, the Karzai government, and why Paktia has remained relatively free of extremist militancy in 2003.“ (CARE, 19. November 2003, S. 39)
Gegenteilig dazu UNHCR, ebenfalls im November 2003:
“In some of the districts of Khost, Paktia and Paktika which border Pakistan, the situation became tense after the elements of the Taliban movement and its supporters have made attacks against the military bases of coalition forces and Afghan authorities.” (UNHCR, 18. November 2003, S. 6; siehe auch UNHCR, September 2003, S. 2)
Und Human Rights Watch im Juli 2003:
"In Paktia province, the Karzai-appointed governor, Raz Mohammad Dalili, officially controls the province, but local military commanders, including commanders associated with Shura-e Nazar, control most villages, checkpoints and police stations—despite the fact that Dalili is flanked by a U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Team. […]Afghans interviewed by Human Rights Watch described numerous cases of soldiers and police arresting, beating, and holding people for ransom, and the existence of “private prisons” in Kabul city, and in Laghman, Paktia, and Nangarhar provinces." (HRW, 29. Juli 2003, S. 19, 21)
Laut einem Artikel von Dawn am 30. August 2004 ist der im Mai 2003 von Karzai eingesetzte (siehe Daily Times, 25. Mai 2003) Haji Asadullah Wafa weiterhin Gouverneur von Paktia (Dawn, 30. August 2004).
 
Laut den von der Gemeinsamen Wahlbeobachtungskommission (JEMB) veröffentlichten Ergebnissen erhielt Hamid Karzai in der Provinz Paktia 95,9% der abgegebenen Stimmen. (Jemb, 27. Oktober 2004).
 
Die Associated Press berichtete in einem Artikel vom 27. April 2002 von Rekrutierungen der Taliban in Dörfern in Paktia. Laut dem Geheimdienstchef von Khost, Uddin, soll Haqqani über etwa 100 Guerillakämpfer verfügen, die Angriffe auf US-Militär ausüben und danach wieder in ihre Dörfer zurückkehren.
“There also is no distinction in ideology between the people who live along the border. Most people in that deeply conservative region support the Taliban's hardline version of Islam, revile anything that is western and are staunchly anti-American.
Uddin said he has evidence that villagers in Paktia are being pursued by Taliban to set up cells of guerrilla fighters. Money is being spent recruiting guerrillas and meetings are being held usually in groups of three villages, he said.
These guerrillas are believed to be behind some of the recent attacks on U.S. forces in Khost. Less than one month ago the Khost airport, taken over by the U.S. military was attacked. Gunmen have taken aim at U.S. soldiers. One was killed earlier this year.
Just this week a mortar was fired near the airport. It's not known whether the soldiers were targeted or caught in the crossfire of the latest round of tribal feuding.
Uddin said each cell would include about 100 guerrilla fighters, who could be called upon at any one time to stage an attack. After the attack, they disband and melt back into the village fabric, explained Uddin. The method was learned and used by U.S.-backed Afghan Islamic insurgents in the 1980s Afghan war against the invading former Soviet Union.
The feuding warlords who have taken control of Paktia province is making recruitment easy, says Uddin.
"People's patience is running out. They are fed up with all these gunmen everywhere," he said. Some blame the United States because Washington is paying warlords for their help in the war on terror. Each soldier gets paid dlrs 200 a month. For the warlords with a lot of men, helping the U.S. war effort is a lucrative business, he said.
"They are paying all these commanders, creating mercenaries," he said. "Maybe one day Paktia will be separate from the rest of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban.“(Associated Press, 27. April 2002)
Im November 2003, so UNHCR, hat eine Entwaffnungsphase in Paktia begonnen:
“The disarmament process, known as the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), is currently underway in the southeastern Paktia province. The Paktia disarmament is the second pilot phase of the DDR effort after the northeastern province of Kunduz started on 21 October, where about 1,000 ex-combatants had been disarmed, demobilised and were now being reintegrated into society through the multi-million Japanese- funded, UN-backed campaign. The Afghan government aims to disarm some 100,000 fighters serving in militias across the country within three years and reintegrate them into the civilian life. Soldiers get $ 200, clothes and food, as well as help in starting a new life -- some will be offered jobs and training.“ (UNHCR, 1. Dezember 2003, S. 3)
Für allgemeine Informationen zu Landstreitigkeiten und illegaler Inbesitznahme von Land durch oder mithilfe lokaler Kommandanten möchten wir Sie auf den Bericht von UNHCR vom 22. Juli 2003 sowie den ACCORD-Reisebericht vom September 2003 verweisen. Human Rights Watch berichtete im Juli 2003 von solchen Fällen in Paktia:
„Illegal Seizure and Forcible Occupation of Land
Human Rights Watch also received information that commanders in Nangarhar, Paktia, Gardez, Ghazni, and Wardak provinces have used their power to seize land and property, either for their own use, to rent, or to distribute to underlings and supporters.“ (HRW, 29. Juli 2003, S. 43)
Aktualisierung Dezember 2004:
Zur Sicherheitslage in der Provinz Paktia bis September 2004 siehe das ecoi.net Themenpapier Afghanistan: Sicherheit nach Region: http://www.ecoi.net/doc/de/AF/content/8/1288-1300#s2213
 
In den uns vorliegenden Quellen konnten wir keine Informationen über ein Dorf namens Ashamkel in der Provinz Paktia finden. (siehe AIMS List of settlements by province; Google)
Polizei in Chawney
Die „List of settlements by province“ des AIMS (Afghan Information Management Service) führt für die Provinz Paktia 2 Ortschaften an, die dem von Ihnen genannten „Chawney“ entsprechen könnten – „Chawni“ in Gardez (S. 4) sowie “Chawnay“ n Jaji (S. 6). Leider konnten in den von uns konsultierten Quellen und Datenbanken (ecoi.net, Google, Lexis-Nexis) zu beiden Schreibweisen keine näher gehenden Informationen über die Sicherheitslage gefunden werden.
Echtheit von Führerscheinen/Listen von Busfahrern
Leider liegen uns zu dieser Fragestellung derzeit keine Informationen vor. Eine Recherche dazu wäre mit sehr hohem Aufwand für uns und eventuelle Kontaktpersonen verbunden, wobei der Erfolg solcher Nachforschungen erfahrungsgemäß sehr gering ist.
 
Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Die Antwort stellt keine abschließende Meinung zur Glaubwürdigkeit eines bestimmten Asylansuchens dar.
 
Quellen: 
Aktualisierung November 2004
ecoi.net description:
Warlord Haqqai; situation in Paktia province; police in Chawney; authenticity of driving licences
Country:
Afghanistan
Source:
ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (Author)
Published:
22 December 2004
Document type:
Response
Language:
German
Document ID:
1274980 (former ID 91751)

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