USDOS – US Department of State (Author): “Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1991”, Document #1160756

Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1991

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The year 1991 witnessed a series of fast-moving events that .

profoundly altered the entire political and economic landscape

in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) and that

by the end of the year concluded with its dissolution. Until

August, the U.S.S.R. remained a centralized multinational state

governed and administered largely by a single, if increasingly

fractious, ruling party—the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union (CPSU).

Despite the numerous reforms initiated in 1991, antireform

elements of the Soviet leadership continued efforts to reassert

central authority. Until August, U.S.S.R. President Mikhail

Gorbachev continued to bow to growing pressure from his Interior

and Defense Ministers and State Security chief to reassert the

authority of the internal Soviet security apparatus. President

Gorbachev also, however, pressed for a formula to renew the

U.S.S.R. under the terms of a new union treaty which granted

enhanced powers to republic governments. Such a formula was

agreed in principle by Gorbachev and the leaders of nine

republics ("Nine plus One") at Novo Ogarevo on April 23.

By August most of the nine republics had agreed to the text of

a new union treaty. An attempted coup d'etat on August 19

aborted the signing of the treaty and set in motion fundamental

political changes that included the liquidation of the CPSU.

It also radically changed the composition of the Soviet

leadership and the political scene and powerfully increased

autonomist sentiment in many Soviet republics. The Baltic

states declared independence and were admitted to the Conference

on Security and Cooperation in Europe as independent member

states on September 10. The Soviet Government recognized their

independence on September 6.

By December 1, when Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for

independence in a republicwide referendum, all of the Soviet

republics had declared themselves either independent or

sovereign. On December 8, the leaders of Russia, Byelarus

(Byelorussia), and Ukraine declared the U.S.S.R. central

Government dead and formed a Commonwealth of Independent

States. By year's end, 11 republics had joined the

Commonwealth and agreed that the U.S.S.R. had ceased to exist.

Traditionally, the Soviet leadership relied on a massive and

pervasive security apparatus to enforce compliance with its

decisions and directives. This apparatus included the Committee

for State Security (KGB), the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the

police, armed forces, and the state procurator. Until the

failed coup, these forces were heavily involved in continuing

human rights abuses, for example, in the Baltic states and in

Armenian-populated regions of Azerbaijan. In the wake of the

failed coup, profound changes took place in these institutions.

The new Chairman of the KGB eliminated a number of directorates

that monitored the private affairs of citizens and began to

transfer all armed units of the KGB to the U.S.S.R. armed

forces.

In October the U.S.S.R. State Council (the interim Soviet

executive) decided to eliminate the U.S.S.R. 's KGB by breaking

up the remaining directorates into a foreign intelligence

service, an interrepublic counterintelligence service, and a

state committee to protect the frontiers. The Soviet Defense

Ministry instructed its regional commanders to prevent the

armed forces from becoming involved in internal conflicts in

the republics, including in ethnic conflicts. With the formal

f;n-79R _ Qo

dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and the formation of the

Commonwealth of Independent States, the internal security

structure in the former Soviet republics was again in flux.

The All-Union Interior Ministry and the last vestiges of the

All-Union KGB have been dissolved. In December Russian

President Boris Yeltsin decreed the creation of a combined

Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs. However, the

Russian constitutional court, established in October, ruled in

January 1992 that Yeltsin's order was unconstitutional.

Internal security and intelligence organizations continued to

evolve in the other Commonwealth states as well.

Facing an economy in serious decline, the Soviet Government

announced its intention to introduce deep, far-reaching

economic reforms. In April nine republics plus the central

Government signed an agreement (the "Nine plus One") that

transferred key economic powers from Moscow to the republics.

After the failed coup, 12 republics negotiated and initialed an

accord laying the foundations of an economic community in which

the signatories agreed to form a customs and banking union,

cooperate on fiscal and monetary policy, and repay the foreign

debt. However, it never went into effect, and the December

agreement establishing the Commonwealth provided for no economic

coordinating mechanism. A coherent system of property and

contract rights, large-scale privatization, price decontrols,

and competition between producers had not emerged by the end of

the year.

The central Government under President Gorbachev and a number

of republic governments, including particularly Boris Yeltsin's

government in Russia, continued to implement the human rights

gains of recent years, albeit slowly and unevenly in the face

of kaleidoscopic political and economic changes. Freedom of

speech and press, assembly and association, religion, and

travel continued to expand. In September the U.S.S.R. Congress

of People's Deputies adopted the Declaration of Human Rights

and Freedoms, although its legal effect in the republics was

unclear. In June the popular election of Boris Yeltsin as

President of the Russian republic from a field of several

candidates—the first such election in Russian history—was a

major democratic milestone.

The most extensive human rights abuses occurred in the republic

of Georgia where the popularly elected leader. President Zviad

Gamsakhurdia, abused his mandate by trying to impose direct rule

on local governments seeking autonomy and by cutting off dialog

and compromise with the political opposition. In the process,

he imprisoned scores of political opponents, eliminated freedom

of expression, and initiated a virtual civil war, which led to

hundreds of dead, wounded, and missing. In early January 1992,

Gamsakhurdia was forcefully ousted by his domestic opponents

and fled the country, leaving Georgia in the hands of a

military council and a civilian government appointed by it.

Other significant human rights abuses included the killings in

January of unarmed civilians by Soviet Interior Ministry forces

in Lithuania and Latvia operating under the orders of hardline

elements in the central Government; the forced deportation of

Armenian villagers by the Soviet army and the Azerbaijan

government; and ethnic-based conflicts in several republics and

regions, including Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Chechen-

Ingushetia, and Ossetia. The defense of human rights remained

unevenly implemented in the former U.S.S.R. as a whole, and

many are still not effectively protected by law. The judiciary

in the Soviet Union and successor states had been neither

independent nor empowered to act as a guarantor of human rights

by the end of the year. At times, union and republic leaders

vied with duelling laws and decrees, as each side argued that

its authority was supreme. The center became increasingly

irrelevant, with republics gradually assuming primary

responsibility for the protection of human rights.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were no confirmed reports of political killings in 1991.

There have been assertions, however, that some reported killings

were politically motivated. On July 31, six Lithuanian police

and customs officials were shot to death by assailants at the

border post of Medininkai. A seventh official wounded in the

attack is still alive after being shot in the head. This attack

came after months of violent actions by hard-line Communist

elements opposed to Baltic independence. The investigation by

the Lithuanian Procurator General's Office concluded that the

killings were perpetrated by Riga-based "Black Beret" or "OMON"

forces of the U.S.S.R. Interior Ministry, though the trial is

still pending and who ordered or authorized the murders has not

been established.

Following the unsolved killings of Father Aleksandr Men' and

Father Lazar' (a priest investigating the Men' murder) in 1990,

another Russian Orthodox priest. Father Serafim Shlykov, was

murdered in Moscow in February.

In Georgia there were reports that civilian inhabitants of the

autonomous region of South Ossetia had been abducted by Georgian

troops and guerrillas and later killed and their mutilated

bodies dumped in front of their families' homes. In addition,

reputable human rights sources reported that the bodies of

kidnap victims were sometimes sold back to their families for

ransom. On one occasion, a mass grave containing the bodies of

40 victims was discovered.

b. Disappearance

In Georgia South Ossetians claimed that many Ossetian civilians

abducted by Georgian troops and guerrillas disappeared for

periods of up to 3 months. In other cases (see Section l.a.),

missing persons subsequently were found dead. Ossetians

estimated over 40 victims were unaccounted for as of October

1991.

In Azerbaijan an international human rights fact-finding group

heard reports that 100-200 persons had disappeared after being

taken into custody by Soviet and Azeri troops.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

In the conflict between the Azerbaijan and Soviet forces on the

one side and ethnic Armenians on the other, there were credible

claims that Armenians detained by Azeri interior ministry

personnel were tortured. Refugees recounted detailed reports

of torture and beatings. In Georgia, after Gamsakhurdia had

fled the country, press reports carried pictures of alleged

torture chambers and devices in the basement of the

presidential offices where Gamsakhurdia tried to hold out

against the opposition's assault.

Soviet detention or incarceration practices remained harsh.

Many prisoners suffered from mental and physical abuse and

mistreatment during interrogation, trial, and confinement,

according to a wide variety of reliable sources. There were no

reports of law enforcement personnel being punished for use of

excessive force or of victims being able to seek redress.

No instances of long-term hospitalizations of sane persons were

reported in 1991. Current law, however, still provides the

basis for compulsory psychiatric hospitalization without

adequate legal protection of persons arrested under questionable

circumstances and then diagnosed as mentally ill. Allegations

persisted of the use of psychiatric examinations and the threat

of compulsory commitment to intimidate persons whose actions

irritated local officials. In the Khmara case in Ukraine (see

Section l.d.), codefendant Oleksandr Kovalchuk was allegedly

detained in a prison psychiatric ward and injected with

psychotropic drugs. The Ukrainian prosecutor general denied

petitions of Kovalchuk 's defense attorneys to perform an

independent medical examination of Kovalchuk. Human rights

sources, who have for many years followed the issue of

psychiatric abuse, claim that use of sulfazine as a form of

punishment continues in the former Soviet Union, especially

outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg (Leningrad).

Cruel and degrading treatment of military conscripts, sometimes

resulting in death, remained a problem in 1991. The Committee

of Soldiers' Mothers, an organization formed to draw attention

to this matter, pressed for a halt to the prevalent practice of

violent hazing of new recruits by their immediate superiors.

In contrast to his predecessor, the new Minister of Defense

after the coup attempt called publicly for help to put an end

to this practice.

A series of prison riots, strikes, and takeovers occurred

throughout the year, usually to protest substandard treatment

and conditions. Prisoners were frequently placed in punishment

cells for violations of camp rules, sometimes for several

months. Conditions in punishment cells are excessively

punitive. For example, at prison camp ug-42/14 in the town of

Vel'sk in Arkhangel ' skaya Oblast, prisoners claimed that camp

administrators put prisoners wearing only normal prison garb in

a punishment cell with only a grating for a roof and left them

there for up to 24 hours in all types of weather, including

extreme cold. As a result of a similar practice in the Tobol'sk

prison, one prisoner froze to death. No administrative process

exists to ensure that prisoners are not arbitrarily or

inappropriately sent to such cells. Prisoners held in Perm

labor camp 35, Vel'sk prison camp ug-42/14, and L'viv (L'vov)

camp V1315/48 during the coup attempt reported that, when news

of the coup arrived, camp authorities immediately instituted

harsh regimes and threatened prisoners with extended sentences.

Under the criminal codes of the republics (e.g.. Article 188-3

of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)

criminal code), prisoners may receive an additional 3- to

5-year sentence for "malicious disobedience" in labor camps.

Whereas in the past this article was used to extend the

sentences of prisoners who had nearly completed their sentences,

there were no reports that this occurred in 1991.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Few concrete improvements in criminal procedures were recorded

during 1991. Persons may still be detained arbitrarily and

without arrest warrants. The criminal code of the RSFSR, for

example, recpjires that detainees be charged or released within

72 hours. Once charged, however, the criminal code permits

holding an accused person in pretrial detention for up to 18

months at the sole discretion of the procurator's office.

There is no requirement for judicial approval or a preliminary

judicial hearing on the charges and the continued detention.

Similar procedures were generally applicable throughout the

republics. In criminal cases, detainees may be released and

restricted to their place of residence pending trial.

A 1990 law signed by President Gorbachev permitted defense

counsel to participate in a case from the moment a charge is

brought or from the moment a detention order is implemented.

These new procedures were being implemented only slowly.

Defense lawyers for the accused coup plotters complained that

they were denied access to their clients during initial

interrogations by investigators from the state prosecutor's

office.

Radical opposition Democratic Union Party leaders Valeriya

Novodvorskaya and Vladimir Danilov were arrested on May 13 and

21, respectively, under Article 70 of the RSFSR criminal code

(public calls for the violent overthrow or change of the Soviet

Government and social order). They had signed a letter

analyzing the actions of the Soviet Government in the Caucasus

and in Lithuania which had said "that in these conditions armed

counteraction, out of place in other times, becomes a legal

means of struggle by the people against the authorities whose

hands are stained with blood." The two were held without trial

in the KGB's Lefortovo prison in Moscow until their release in

the immediate aftermath of the attempted coup's failure. The

charges, however, were not dropped.

During the spring and early summer, Azerbaijan's police arrested

over 100 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, a primarily Armenianpopulated

district which was the site of prolonged conflict.

Azeri officials claimed that the Armenians were armed bandits;

Armenian officials maintained the detainees were "hostages "

taken during the enforced deportations of Armenians from

Nagorno-Karabakh that began in April. The Azeri police did not

bring charges against many of the Armenians. Some were held

for up to 2 months before being released. According to some

reports, some of the prisoners were subjected to frequent

beatings while in captivity.

In Georgia President Zviad Gamsakhurdia ' s government arrested

over 80 members of the opposition to prevent their public

activities (see Section i.e.).

There were no reports in 1991 of persons being punished by

being sent into internal exile.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Soviet court system is made up of layers of courts, each

political entity—district, city, oblast, republic, union

—

having its own court, higher courts serving as appellate courts

to lower ones. Military tribunals served to handle cases of

military jurisprudence. To a large degree, the court system at

all levels remained strongly under the influence of the

political leadership in 1991. In the republics, local, regional

and republic-level courts were presided over by judges who are,

for the most part, poorly trained and lacking a concept of an

independent judicial function. The U.S.S.R. Supreme Court and

the U.S.S.R. Procurator General's office remained, until after

the August coup attempt, organs designed to protect state power

rather than the rights of individuals. Once formal charges

were brought, the burden of proof of innocence remained

squarely on the accused.

Until August, the CPSU's control of society continued to

influence the legal and judicial system, thus placing limits on

the objectivity and independence of the judicial process. With

the banning of the CPSU following the attempted coup, this

influence diminished. However, the process of change was

uneven, and strong authoritarian control by officeholders in

some republics effectively replaced the party's influence. The

establishment of an independent judiciary has not yet been

accomplished.

Generally, trials are public. Defendants have the right to

attend proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence.

The court appoints an attorney for defendants who do not have

one. Defense lawyers, like judges, were subject to numerous

state controls. For example, lawyers for the accused coup

plotters cited Soviet legal practice that permits the

prosecution to discuss the details of an investigation with the

press but may subject defense attorneys to criminal prosecution

for similar public disclosures. Under Soviet law, the

Procurator's office was responsible for conducting all

preliminary investigations into allegations of criminal

conduct. During 1991 there was little evidence of change in

Soviet criminal procedures that permit prosecutors to conduct

initial interrogations of suspects in criminal cases without

the presence of defense lawyers.

Soviet criminal practice is based on the presumption of guilt

if, after having investigated an alleged crime, the state

procurator's office sees fit to press charges. Few criminal

cases result in acquittal. On the other hand, weak cases

increasingly were dropped. Defendants have a right to appeal,

as does the prosecution. This right was exercised by a growing

number of defendants, and higher courts continued to overturn

some cases.

In September the Soviet prosecutor general said there was no

evidence that prominent exiled writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn

had committed any crime. Solzhenitsyn ' s case officially had

been under investigation since 1974 when it was alleged he was

in violation of the high treason provisions of Article 64 of

the RSFSR criminal code.

No prisoners are known to be currently serving sentences solely

under the so-called political and religious articles of the

Soviet and republic criminal codes (e.g.. Articles 70, 142,

227, and the now abolished 190-1 of the RSFSR code). Since

1989 the U.S. and Soviet Governments have reviewed criminal

cases with possible political motivations. Of the 75 persons

whose cases were initially raised by the United States, the

last 2 persons were released in September after being pardoned

by republic governments. A commission under the Office of the

U.S.S.R. Presidency to review the cases of alleged political

prisoners was established in the fall of 1991 but had not begun

to consider such cases by the end of the year. Following the

August coup, the Russian government released a number of

prisoners whom it considered to have been imprisoned for

political reasons. In July the Russian parliament passed a law

creating the Russian republic constitutional court, a first

step towards creating an independent, third branch of

government. In the fall, the Parliament confirmed the judges.

In Georgia local and international human rights groups reported

that President Zviad Gamsakhurdia ' s government arrested over 80

members of the opposition, including former national guard head

Dzhaba loselani, arrested in February, and Torez Kulumbegov,

chairman of the supreme soviet of the South Ossetian republic,

who was arrested in January. Kulumbegov was charged with

inciting interethnic hatred, abusing his official position, and

exceeding his authority. In September Georgian police arrested

two leading opposition members. National Democratic Party head

Georgiy Chanturia and National Congress member Georgiy

Haindrava. Chanturia was accused of antigovernment activities.

The government maintained that most of the others were suspected

of having committed violent crimes, such as robbery or

possession of illegal weapons. However, critics insisted these

charges were developed only as a pretext to incarcerate the

opposition. Many of those arrested are still awaiting trial,

pending conclusion of police investigations. In early January

1992, Kulumbegov, Chanturia, and many other political prisoners

were forcibly freed from prison by opponents to Gamsakhurdia.

There were numerous reports of instances in which charges were

trumped up for political reasons. As an example, in the

republic of Turkmenistan, writer Shirali Nurmuradov remained in

prison, where he was sentenced in late 1990 to 7 years for

alleged "swindling" (Article 158 of the Turkmen criminal

code). Nurmuradov and his defenders, including the

International PEN Society, claimed the charges were fabricated

at the behest of Turkmen Communist Party leader Saparmurad

Niyazov because the writer had criticized him. Niyazov

reportedly had earlier threatened to have Nurmuradov imprisoned

for his outspoken opposition.

In the republic of Kazakhstan, 28-year-old lawyer and Democratic

Union activist Viktor Leontev was arrested and sentenced to 2

years of correctional labor in June in the city of

Petropavlovsk under the 1990 law against insulting the honor

and dignity of the U.S.S.R. President. Leontev had been

selling an "anti-Soviet calendar" (sometimes seen being sold

openly on the streets of Moscow) which portrayed a caricature

of Gorbachev wearing a hammer and sickle crown. Reportedly, he

was the 16th person convicted under this law.

Ukrainian people's deputy Stepan Khmara was detained in a Kiev

prison without trial from November 1990 through April 1991.

Khmara and five codefendants were arrested for allegedly

attacking a militia colonel. The leaders of the Ukrainian

National Movement "Rukh" and the democratic opposition stated

that the arrest of Khmara, an outspoken anti-Communist, and his

codefendants was politically motivated. Khmara is a member of

the Ukrainian Republican Party. At his trial, which began on

May 14, the militia periodically denied access to the courtroom

to his defense attorneys and his close relatives, as well as to

people's deputies and the press. On July 18, special

detachments of the Ukrainian militia broke into the Kiev hotel

room where Khmara was staying, released tear gas, and began

beating about 40 people's deputies and other Khmara supporters

who had been staging a vigil inside his room. Khmara himself

was beaten, dragged out of his room, and taken to Kiev's

internal security prison.

On August 25, following the Ukrainian parliament's declaration

of independence, the parliament's presidium declared amnesty

for Khmara and his codefendants, who were released the next day.

Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or

Correspondence

During the first two-thirds of 1991, government interference

with privacy remained pervasive. Constitutional provisions for

the inviolability of the home provided citizens with little

real protection from illegal entry and search. Agents of the

Ministry of Internal Affairs continued to act under the

provisions of a U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet decree authorizing them

to enter private homes in pursuit of suspected criminals.

According to a law adopted prior to the August coup attempt,

permission from a procurator is required before a wiretap may

be installed. The number of KGB personnel engaged in wiretaps

reportedly was reduced by two-thirds. Electronic monitoring of

residences and telephones reportedly continue. Foreign radio

broadcasts were not jammed. Foreigners visiting refuseniks or

dissidents were not harassed.

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

In the first half of 1991, U.S.S.R. security forces provoked

numerous violent incidents in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia

(which were forcibly incorporated by the Soviet Union from 1940

to September 1991). The situation was particularly acute in

January, after military units and armed units of the KGB and

Soviet Interior Ministry were sent into the Baltic states,

allegedly to enforce the military draft.

Beginning on January 11, Soviet paratroopers forcibly seized a

number of buildings in Lithuania. On the night of January

12-13, 14 unarmed civilians were killed and more than 100 were

injured when Soviet paratroopers and armored vehicles seized

the Vilnius television center. On January 20, four people were

killed when Soviet Interior Ministry special forces, known as

OMON, took over the Latvian Interior Ministry building in Riga.

Soviet military and Interior Ministry commanders involved in

these incidents reportedly acted at the behest of local

Communist Party organizations loyal to the Moscow-headquartered

CPSU, masquerading as "Committees for National Salvation." On

June 3, the U.S.S.R. Procurator General, in a preliminary

report on the activities of Soviet troops in Vilnius on the

night of January 12-13, said his office had found no evidence

that Soviet troops were responsible for 'the deaths at the

television center. The report contradicted the statements of

numerous eyewitnesses, including foreign journalists, present

at the television center.

Interethnic violence in the Caucasus resulted in hundreds of

deaths during 1991. By the end of December, hundreds of

persons had been reported dead and hundreds more wounded in

fighting between Armenians and Azeris throughout the year. In

April Soviet army and Interior Ministry forces and Azeri OMON

detachments attacked several Armenian villages in Nagorno-

Karabakh and forcibly deported over 1,000 residents to Armenia,

causing death, injuries, and loss of property. Deportations

continued until the August coup attempt in Moscow brought Soviet

army participation to a halt. As Soviet troops began to

withdraw at the end of 1991, Azeri and Armenian combatants

increased the level of fighting, and reports of victims

continued to mount.

In Georgia politically motivated, interethnic violence resulted

in numerous deaths as Georgian militia and civilian armed bands

staged frequent attacks upon South Ossetians. Ossetian

nationalists estimated that Georgians killed over 300 Ossetians

in periodic fighting which began in 1989. Ossetians accused

the Georgian Government of cutting off access to power and

foodstuffs in the region.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Freedom of speech, press, and expression were exercised to an

unprecedented degree in 1991, but there were also direct,

violent assaults on those freedoms. Freedom to criticize the

Government, for the most part, expanded in 1991. Some anti-

Soviet political activists, however, were harassed, detained,

or arrested ostensibly for holding unsanctioned meetings,

slandering political leaders, conducting acts of malicious

hooliganism, and espousing violent, anticonstitutional acts.

In addition to the Novodvorskaya and Leontev cases (Sections

l.d. and I.e.), Gennadiy Smirnov, charged in 1990 with insulting

the honor and dignity of the U.S.S.R. President, was sentenced

to a year in an ordinary prison camp in February. Democratic

Union member Nasibulla Ratikov was similarly charged in June

when the prosecutor in Yurga in the Kemerovo region accused

Ratikov of distributing literature calling Gorbachev a Fascist.

On November 7, 1990, Valeriy Sedov of Mensk (Minsk) attached to

a statue of Lenin a symbolic figure of "a prisoner of the gulag"

during a demonstration. In May Sedov was arrested and held for

2 months before being released on bail after a 32-day hunger

strike in protest against prison conditions.

Although freedom of press, including the broadcast media, became

more widespread, it also came under savage attack as when in

January Soviet Interior Ministry special forces occupied the

entrance to the House of Print in Riga, Latvia, and Soviet

paratroops seized television and radio facilities in Vilnius,

Lithuania, with significant casualties.

While continuing to observe the letter of the U.S.S.R. law on

the press, the Soviet Government prior to August violated its

spirit on several occasions, particularly through efforts to

dictate the editorial leadership of influential media

organizations and to restrict access to supplies and

subscribers. The All-Union State Television and Radio Company

(Gosteleradio) canceled several of its most popular television

programs, including "Vzglyad" ("Viewpoint") and "TSN" (a

reform-oriented news program), and restricted broadcasts by

Radio Rossiya, largely because of pressure from its governmentappointed

director. The Government was also accused of efforts

to oust the reform-oriented deputy editor in chief of the daily

newspaper Izvestiya and replace him with officials from the

state publishing company and the Communist Party's Ideology

Department. Those efforts failed when the newspaper staff and

the Moscow Union of Journalists threatened to go on strike in

protest, but the replacements were still added to the staff as

additional deputy editors, and the popular editor in chief of

the Izvestiya supplement Nedelya (The Week) was removed.

Efforts to restrict freedom of the press included, in Moldova

and the Caucasus, death threats against journalists for several

publications and arson attacks by nationalist groups. In some

cases, journalists' families or the journalists themselves left

the area for their own safety.

The Georgian government, in response to articles it perceived

as anti-Georgian, prohibited journalists representing several

national publications from reporting from its territory. A

stringer for Radio Liberty was ordered to leave a press

conference by President Gamsakhurdia himself. A local

newspaper, Molodezh' Gruzii, was shut down by the government

for reporting that was objectionable to President Gamsakhurdia.

Georgian journalists who published articles critical of the

President claimed that government officials harassed their

families and put their homes under surveillance in an effort to

persuade them to stop writing. Some claimed they were

encouraged to leave Georgia. The Georgian government also

refused to broadcast any programming from Moscow or from the

Russian republic.

In Azerbaijan opposition newspapers were required to submit

their publications to government censors. By the end of the

year, an opposition newspaper editor reported that the

government had ceased censorship of his organization's

publications but continued to threaten other nominally

independent newspapers with restricted access to printing

supplies and services in the event of unfavorable reporting.

One of the chief targets of the August 19 coup d'etat was the

media. After the collapse of the coup and the victory of the

supporters of democratic reforms, official and latent

restrictions on the media were substantially relaxed in nearly

every region. On the other hand, the Russian government's

decision to suspend six publications accused of supporting the

coup and to force other publications to reregister provoked

concerns that it was also resorting to censorship and to

government control of the media. One weekly, Glasnost, a

publication of the Communist Party's Central Committee, was

closed down by both the coup plotters and the victorious

reformers. Most of the suspended publications were later

allowed to resume publication, but those media traditionally

reliant on funding from the Communist Party suffered a grave

financial crisis since the party's assets were frozen.

In the wake of the coup's failure and the backlash against the

Communist Party and central Government, many republics and

administrative districts also imposed restrictions on the

press. In several republics, including Ukraine, Moldova, and

Georgia, the media that had supported either Communist Party or

Russian nationalist points of view in the past were banned,

including, in some regions, Pravda, Trud, and TASS . Republic

governments reasserted their control of printing plants and

broadcasting stations in most regions. Chronic paper shortages

forced the Ukrainian government to cut back newsprint supplies

to both Communist papers and proreform, independent papers.

Former Communist papers in the wake of the coup changed their

names and appear to be transforming themselves into organs of

the republic government.

On October 30, the RSFSR Ministry of Press and Mass Information

reported that official warnings had been issued to two widely

read independent newspapers, Moscow News and Nezavisimaya

Gazeta, for their publication of reports that Yeltsin had

discussed the possibility of a nuclear strike on Ukraine. It

termed the articles "propagation of war and interethnic

discord," which were held to be in violation of Part 1, Article

5, of the U.S.S.R. law on the press and other mass media. In

December former CPSU daily Pravda came under pressure from the

Ministry to give up some of its premises to the Russian

government's press organ, the Russian Information Agency (RIA).

After the August coup attempt, the rules for foreign journalists

did not change, but enforcement was increasingly lax. For

example, the Foreign Ministry continued its liberal policy of

granting visas to foreign journalists, access to Foreign

Ministry press briefings was open to all accredited foreign

journalists, and approval for travel was easier to obtain.

Travel to closed areas was not routine, but exceptions were

granted.

As in other areas, academic freedom was in flux in 1991. The

banning of CPSU activity nationwide affected all institutions

of higher learning, with all curriculums coming under wholesale

review and revision. While access to archives continued to be

difficult, access to Western-produced books, magazines,

journals, and other educational materials increased

dramatically.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Public demonstrations were an intrinsic part of the Soviet

Union's political landscape in 1991—indeed, their number and

frequency made them almost commonplace in the larger cities.

Political rallies were a key part in the June electoral

campaigns in Russia. Small groups of protesters, picketing on

such issues as the environment and social benefits, were a

regular presence before legislative sessions from Tajikistan to

Byelarus. Massive public outpourings in Moscow and St.

Petersburg were critical in thwarting the attempted coup d'etat

of August 18-21.

The law on demonstrations stipulates that demonstration

organizers must apply for permission to local officials 10 days

in advance, and that officials must respond at least 5 days

before the demonstration's scheduled date. Civil and criminal

penalties ranging from fines to 15-day jail sentences and

stiffer punishment may be levied against participants in

unauthorized demonstrations.

Communist authorities attempted to prohibit certain

demonstrations, including a student demonstration demanding

better university conditions in March and a pro-Yeltsin rally

in May. In Uzbekistan, people's deputy and opposition activist

Shovruk Ruzimurodov was arrested in May for participating in an

unsanctioned rally in protest against price rises. After the

Uzbek supreme soviet revoked his deputy's immunity, Ruzimurodov

was charged with a criminal offense and remained in detention

at the end of the year. Ruling authorities in other republics

—

e.g., in Georgia—attempted to ban protests by political

opponents.

The junta also declared public protests illegal during the

short-lived coup attempt. These demonstrations were, however,

called—and given legal sanction—by President Yeltsin and the

Moscow and St. Petersburg mayors. After the failure of the

coup, there were no reports of local officials in Russia

denying permission to demonstrate.

As of January 1, 1991, a new law on public organizations went

into effect in the Soviet Union. It legalized a multiparty

political system, allowed the formation of political parties

and mass social movements, and guaranteed such organizations

the right to propagate their views. The law also allowed

political parties to field candidates in elections, provided

that no citizen had his rights and freedom to participate

limited, and declared all parties equal before the law. All

public organizations must register their bylaws and the names

of their leaders with the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Justice or with

the republic-level justice ministries. In the case of

political parties, organizers must also present 4,000 valid

signatures of party supporters and a 4,000-ruble fee to

rvibles to register as a Russian republic party.

Under the law on public organizations, organizations advocating

violent changes in the constitutional order were forbidden. In

late 1991, the only banned parties in the Russian republic were

the Communist Party (at the union and republic levels) and the

Liberal Democratic Party. In each case, they were prohibited

for their alleged activities in support of the failed coup.

The new law and the breakup of the CPSU's predominant position

in the political hierarchy intensified the trend towards

establishing new social and political organizations,

representing a broad range of social, ethnic, and age groups

throughout the Soviet Union. Popular fronts existed in all

republics and in certain ones—notably, Moldova, Byelarus,

Georgia, and Ukraine—were powerful political forces.

Sociopolitical movements seeking greater autonomy for minority

peoples also sprang up in autonomous regions and oblasts

throughout the Soviet Union, including an estimated 140 in

Russia alone.

These new organizations represented a wide spectrum of

political viewpoints, including monarchists, anarchists,

nativists/Fascists, Socialists, and social and liberal

democrats. In addition, numerous interest groups

—

environmentalists, religious organizations, labor unions—were

also launched. Moreover, two broad coalitions. Democratic

Russia (Demrossiya) and the Movement for Democratic Reform,

were active in banding together proreform groups in Russia.

In Azerbaijan the state of emergency prevented opposition

parties from holding public political assemblies throughout

much of 1991. Azerbaijan's government lifted the state of

emergency in August.

In central Asia mass demonstrations occurred in various areas

in the wake of the August coup attempt. The most serious of

these occurred in Tajikistan after the Communist-dominated

parliament deposed the President and reinstituted Communist

rule. The city government supported the demonstrators who were

disciplined and peaceful, and there was no attempt made to

suppress them by force. In Uzbekistan, several attempts to

hold mass demonstrations after the August coup were suppressed:

for example, one in August and another on September 8.

Multiparty systems were formally introduced in much of Central

Asia, but pluralism remained in the early stages of development.

In Kazakhstan, the Communist Party disbanded and reformulated

itself as Socialist. President Nursultan Nazarbayev refused to

join. Instead, he addressed the founding session of the

People's Congress of Kazakhstan, a party uniting opposition

forces, on October 6. In Uzbekistan, President Islam Karimov

allowed Erk, a moderate splinter group that broke off from the

nationalist movement Birlik, to register as a party. Birlik was

permitted to register as a movement but not as a party entitled

to enter electoral contests. The Islamic Rebirth Party was

banned in Uzbekistan, although it does function illegally in

some areas. In Tajikistan 2 weeks of demonstrations resulted

in repeal of the law barring registration of the Islamic Revival

Movement. Multiple parties and candidates participated in

presidential elections in Tajikistan, while Presidents Askar

Akayev of Kyrgyzstan and Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan faced no

opposition in their successful reelection bids.

Kazakh authorities banned a September 17 ride on horseback by

Cossacks from the RSFSR into Uralsk, in northern Kazakhstan, to

mark "400 years of Cossack service to the Tsars." The Kazakh

Government claimed the march was an incitement to ethnic

violence. Cossacks ignored the ban, and the demonstration took

place peacefully.

c. Freedom of Religion

In 1991 there was continued progress toward freedom of religion.

Authorities throughout the Soviet Union displayed a more

tolerant attitude toward religion, although pockets of

bureaucratic resistance or even hostility could still be found.

On January 7, 1992, Orthodox Christmas was observed as an

official national holiday in Russia for the first time since

the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.

The visibility of religion increased dramatically. Religious

services were televised, particularly during the Christmas and

Easter holiday seasons. In addition, Protestant religious

programming from the United States was broadcast on Sunday

mornings on Soviet television. Religious groups, official and

unofficial, continued to be allowed to hold seminars,

conferences, and revival meetings, frequently in public

facilities rented for that purpose. It was common to see

public proselytizing in major cities, including street stands

with placards calling passersby to rejoin and revitalize the

Russian Orthodox Church, persons speaking about their

Protestant faith, and appeals from adherents of such groups as

the Hare Krishna and the Baha ' i faith.

The press contained extensive coverage of religious issues,

statements of religious leaders, and complaints about the

collapse of Christian moral values in the Soviet Union. Visits

to the Soviet Union by foreign religious figures, including

representatives of evangelical Protestant ministries from the

West, were numerous and unimpeded. Missionaries from almost

every world religion were present in the Soviet Union, and many

organizations maintained permanent representatives in the

country. State academic institutions, including Moscow State

University, not only renamed their "departments of religion and

atheism" to focus instead on religious ethics and liberty but

also hosted Western lecturers on religious ethics and the role

of religion in public policy.

Obstacles to complete freedom of religion still existed at the

local level where remnants of the old state-party bureaucracy

sometimes hindered or harassed religious believers. A primary

cause of local problems was the fact that the 1990 legislation

that granted freedom of religion provided for registration of

religious groups of 10 adults or more by local authorities.

Some groups viewed the registration requirement itself as

contradicting the tenets of their beliefs and therefore refused

to register officially. Although failure to register did not

result in harassment, groups had to register to acquire the

status of a "juridical person" and to have access to most of

the benefits of the new law, including access to the media and

the right to establish schools, own property, and engage in

social work. The registration process was used for

obstructionist tactics by some local authorities, i.e., lost

applications, endless reviews of applications, or denial of

adequate facilities, especially in the cases of non-Russian

Orthodox groups, principally Protestant groups, the Ukrainian

Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), and the Russian Orthodox

Free Church (ROFC).

The ROFC is the new Russian branch of the U.S. -based Free

Orthodox Church, which earlier broke from the traditional

Russian Orthodox Church, charging that it was controlled by the

Communist regime. The ROFC found it especially difficult at

the local level to register new congregations or to acquire new

facilities. An additional issue at the local level was

favoritism toward the traditional Russian Orthodox Church by

local bureaucracies, resulting in fewer restrictions on the

Orthodox Church than on other religious groups.

The importation of religious materials into the Soviet Union

was largely unrestricted. Bibles and children's Bible stories

were common items on sale at street kiosks in major cities.

Korans were imported into the central Asian republics in large

numbers.

The number of clergy and places of worship in all parts of the

Soviet Union are still inadequate for the population, but

churches, synagogues, and mosques were reopened in many places,

and seminaries and other institutions of clerical education

expanded their enrollment.

As a rule, young men who objected to military duty because of

their faith continued to be subject to prison terms. In July

Moldova joined Georgia as the only two republics to pass a law

providing for alternative forms of service for conscientious

objectors. In some other republics, legislation providing

alternatives to military service for conscientious objectors

was under discussion.

In Ukraine parishioners of the long-banned Ukrainian Catholic

(Uniate) church and the UAOC continued to be registered

throughout Ukraine, a process begun in 1990. Uniate demands

for the return of their property confiscated after they were

banned in 1946 led to some violence in western Ukraine, where

some churches used by Russian Orthodox believers were forcibly

taken over by Uniates. However, city councils in western

Ukraine assumed a mediatory role in resolving property

disputes, often providing land and building materials for

Russian Orthodox parishes displaced by Uniate congregations.

The UAOC was granted permission to purchase abandoned church

buildings or construct new churches in Kiev, Kharkov, Poltava,

and Dniepropetrovsk.

Exiled hierarchs of the Ukrainian Catholic church and the UAOC

were allowed to return to Ukraine in 1991. Ukrainian Catholic

Cardinal Lubachivskiy (banished from Ukraine for over 40 years)

established his residence in L'viv. UAOC Patriarch Mstyslav

(living in the United States for nearly 50 years) was allowed

to establish a chancery in Kiev and to travel extensively

throughout the republic.

Despite strong remaining currents of anti-Semitism among the

Soviet populace, Jews around the Soviet Union in general

experienced continuing and increasing freedom to pursue their

religion (see also Section 5). Synagogues were returned,

religious schools (yeshivas) opened, and the teaching of Hebrew

spread. City councils in Kiev and L'viv restored synagogues to

their respective Jewish communities. Hassidic and Lubavicher

Jewish communities were allowed to run summer camps for

children in Kiev and Poltava. A yeshiva was opened in Kiev in

1990. A U.S. citizen became the Chief Rabbi of Kiev's Jewish

congregation in 1990.

The governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan professed to

guarantee freedom of religion but practiced some restrictions.

Human rights activists charged that only two Christian churches

are currently functioning in the ethnic Armenian region of

Nagorno-Karabakh in predominantly Islamic Azerbaijan. In

Armenia there were reports of Muslim Kurds experiencing

discrimination at the hands of Armenian authorities.

Throughout Central Asia new working mosgues continued to open.

In Tajikistan alone, the number of mosqijes increased tenfold

over the last few years, and Islamic authorities completed a

new building for the theological seminary in Dushanbe.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Although citizens were generally free to move about within the

country, travel in certain areas, such as frontier regions or

areas of military significance, required special permission.

All adults are issued internal passports (identity documents)

which must be carried during travel and used to register visits

of more than 3 days with the local authorities, a requirement

for the most part ignored by -travelers not staying in hotels.

Although only about 15 percent of Soviet territory was formally

closed to travel by foreigners, in practice most territory

outside of major cities was difficult to visit or inaccessible,

because the closed areas often were transportation hubs.

The right to choose one's place of residence, though guaranteed

by law, was restricted in practice. Under the "propiska" (pass)

system, all citizens must register their place of residence.

The authorities limited the number of residence permits in an

increasing number of large cities, including Moscow, St.

Petersburg, and Kiev, where housing was at a premium. In

October the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee abolished

the "propiska" system and gave authorities until January 1,

1992, to make the necessary legislative revisions. The effect

of this decision remains to be seen.

On May 20, the Soviet Government passed the long-awaited law on

the procedure for Soviet citizens to exit and enter the U.S.S.R.

(the emigration law) . Since the demise of the Soviet Union,

Russian government officials have said that the Union's

practices with regard to exit and entry are being observed in

Russia. The Soviet rules have remained in effect in other

republics as well. The law making it a crime to leave the

U.S.S.R. without permission is still on the books—Article 83

of the Russian republic criminal code; one couple was arrested

under this article in 1991. The new emigration bill was not

scheduled to come into force until January 1, 1993, however,

and the requirement that Soviet citizens obtain an exit visa

before traveling abroad remained in effect. Nonetheless, under

the terms of an implementing resolution, the requirement that

emigrants have an invitation from a first-degree relative in

the country to which they are emigrating was dropped. Instead,

emigrants could submit either an invitation from any relative

abroad or permission to enter the country to which they are

emigrating. The resolution also annulled the 1967 decree under

which emigrants to Israel were required to give up their Soviet

citizenship. Corruption in the passport and visa-issuing

offices—exacerbated by a shortage of new passports—remained a

major impediment to unrestricted emigration and travel abroad,

especially in Azerbaijan, where it was reportedly widespread.

The new emigration law perpetuated the practice of restricting

the emigration of those with access to state secrets and added

a new restriction on the emigration of draft-age men who have

not yet completed their obligatory military service. The state

secrets provisions were more clearly delineated and limited than

under previous administrative regulations. Under the new law,

Soviet citizens taking on employment requiring access to state

secrets will be presented with a document to sign, formally

accepting restrictions on emigration and travel abroad.

Further, the law stated that the normal maximum restriction

would be 5 years. Though the requirement to receive permission

from close relatives in the Soviet Union before emigrating

remained, a would-be emigrant under the new law could try to

settle this problem in the courts, to which there had been no

recourse in the past. Nevertheless, since the new law comes

into force in 1993, there were still scores of instances in

which access to state secrets or inability to obtain the

permission of relatives blocked emigrants' plans. A commission

set up under the U.S.S.R. presidency in the fall of 1991 and

carried over to the Russian presidency in December began to

review cases of refuseniks who had not worked with secrets in

more than 5 years. By January 1992, the commission had resolved

many such cases favorably, i.e., exit restrictions were lifted.

By the end of the year, the newly independent states continued

to permit high levels of emigration and appeared to maintain

the facilitated exit procedures established in the emigration

law passed by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. The Russian

government gave explicit assurances that it would fully

implement the emigration law by or before the law's original

deadline of January 1, 1993.

During 1991 hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens traveled

abroad and emigrated, and many former Soviet citizens who now

reside abroad, including prominent dissidents, were allowed to

return to the U.S.S.R. to visit.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens

to Change Their Government

Throughout 1991 CPSU influence in most sectors of society

waned. The 1990 decision to strip the CPSU of its

constitutionally protected leading role accelerated the process

of democratization in Soviet society. CPSU complicity in the

use of force against the freely elected Baltic governments in

January seriously damaged the party's ability to exercise its

traditional influence. Democratic forces rallied in the spring

throughout the U.S.S.R.; local and republic elections during

this time turned power over to the first freely elected

governments in Soviet history. Boris Yeltsin became the first

popularly elected President of the Russian republic. The

elections were carried out by secret ballot and, for the most

part, featured multiple candidates from a broad political

spectrum. This was the first practical demonstration of the

right and ability of citizens peacefully to change their

governments.

Despite the strengthening of democratic forces during the year,

until the failed August coup the CPSU continued to be the single

most powerful political force in Soviet society. In the wake of

the failed August coup, however, CPSU activities were suspended

and later banned in Russia and then in other republics.

At the republic level, the right of citizens to change their

government in some cases faced problems. Azerbaijan, for

example, held presidential elections on September 8 in which

the current president ran unopposed. Some opposition

candidates declined to field candidates; another contender

withdrew his candidacy a week before the election, saying he

did not wish to lend it credibility. Opposition leaders

claimed that the state of emergency, which was lifted only a

few weeks before the election, prevented them from adequately

presenting their views to the public. Azerbaijan utilized the

traditional Communist system of voting, in which voters only

enter a private polling booth to cast a negative ballot.

Although suffrage in Azerbaijan was ostensibly universal, the

republic's traditional Islamic culture discouraged women from

voting.

In Georgia President Gamsakhurdia won a landslide victory in a

popular election held in the spring. His opponents, however,

charged that Gamsakhurdia, who earlier had been elected

President by Georgia's parliament, purposely scheduled the

election quickly in order to ensure that his competition would

not have time to mount an effective campaign. In January 1992,

the military council that forcefully ousted Gamsakhurdia

promised new elections in the near future.

In Moldovan presidential elections on December 8, President

Mircea Snegur was the only candidate on the ballot after two

others dropped out of the race because of a lack of popular

support. The pan-Romanian nationalist Popular Front

organization called for a voter boycott of the election in

protest against Snegur ' s refusal to commit himself to immediate

unification with Romania. Voter turnout, however, was high at

around 80 percent.

In central Asia, the right to change the government was limited.

Real political pluralism remained embryonic. The Communist

Party was suspended in all five republics after the failed

coup. Elections by secret ballot with universal suffrage were

held in Kyrgyzstan on October 12, but opposition parties put up

no candidates. Similarly, in Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev

ran unchallenged. In Uzbekistan the December 29 elections

featured two candidates—however, the attempt by the popular

"Birlik" leader Abdurakhim Pulatov to register as a candidate

was denied on technical grounds. In Tajikistan elections in

November involved seven candidates, including one backed by a

coalition of democratic, nationalist, and Islamic forces,

including the Islamic Party which until November had been

banned. However, ex-CPSU First Secretary Rohmon Nabiyev

emerged victorious amid charges of serious voter fraud.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

Major domestic human rights groups include the Moscow Helsinki

group, which follows the issue of prisoners of conscience; the

Association of Independent Psychiatrists, which covers the abuse

of psychiatry; the Soviet -American Bureau for Emigration, Human

Rights, and Anti-Semitism; the newspaper Ekspress Khronika,

which follows human and minority rights issues around the

former Soviet Union; and Memorial, which focuses on

rehabilitation of past victims of human rights abuses. All

such organizations were able to operate for the most part

without government interference or repression. They have

occasionally experienced difficulties in registering with

government entities, in gaining the cooperation of typographers

in what were formerly Communist Party-controlled print

facilities, and in receiving office space to run their

activities.

Soviet and republic authorities generally displayed a

forthcoming approach to foreign criticism and review of human

rights practices and permitted several international

nongovernmental human rights groups to establish offices or

conduct fact-finding missions. In September-October, Moscow

hosted the third meeting of the Conference on the Human

Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe, which was open to Soviet and foreign press and public,

as well as nongovernmental organizations. The Soviet

Government facilitated a short-notice visit by a group of

conference delegates to Perm 35 labor camp where alleged

political prisoners were held.

Discussion of human rights issues between the United States and

the U.S.S.R. remained institutionalized in regular meetings

with the Foreign Ministry's Administration for International

Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights. Staff members of

the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe were

permitted to travel to various republics as unofficial

observers of elections and referendums throughout 1991.

Azerbaijan's government allowed some international human rights

organizations, including members of the international Sakharov

delegation, limited access to conflict-ridden Nagorno-Karabakh,

but other observers were refused entry. Georgia's government

claimed to welcome inquiries concerning its human rights

practices. President Gamsakhurdia personally urged a visiting

delegation of the U.S. Helsinki Commission to send a

representative to Georgia on a long-term basis to observe the

human rights situation at first hand. However, human rights

activists and U.S. Embassy officials experienced difficulty in

meeting with imprisoned political activists due to bureaucratic

restrictions.

The government of Kazakhstan announced that it would welcome

the establishment in the republic of permanent representatives

of international human rights organizations.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status

As power in the Soviet Union devolved to more or less sovereign

republics, the issue of the central authorities' practice of

discrimination against nationalities disappeared. All 12

republics declared sovereignty or independence from the former

Soviet Union. As a result, each republic was free to enjoy

language, cultural, religious, and political rights according

to its own wishes. However, each was also freed from central

government restraint in dealing with internal minorities, and

the attitude towards and degree of discrimination against

minorities varied from republic to republic.

Jews enjoyed increasing cultural and religious freedom but at

the same time continued to be subjected to public expressions

of anti-Semitism. On May Day, thousands of demonstrators

marched in St. Petersburg accusing Soviet leaders of favoring

Jews at the expense of Russians. Demonstrators carried

anti-Semitic placards and called RSFSR President Yeltsin "a

stooge for Jewish international capital," and anti-Semitic

posters were posted on a main boulevard in St. Petersburg. The

openly anti-Semitic organization Pamyat ' published a paper

containing excerpts from the long-discredited disinformation

tract "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." Pamyat' began radio

broadcasts in September. These expressions of anti-Semitic

attitudes added to Jews' fear that in times of economic

hardship and political unrest they would be singled out for

arbitrary retribution by an increasingly desperate populace.

Jewish groups' long-standing complaint that the Soviet

Government did not speak out strongly enough against anti-

Semitism was assuaged to some extent by the forceful statement

of President Gorbachev condemning anti-Semitism read at the

commemorative ceremony at Babi Yar in Ukraine in October. At

the same ceremony, Ukrainian President Kravchuk apologized for

injustices perpetrated by Ukrainians against Jews throughout

history.

Over 60 million Soviet citizens live outside their nationality's

administrative region or belong to a nationality that has none.

For many of these, devolution of power has meant a worsening of

discriminatory practices. In the worst cases, harsh

discriminatory treatment of national minorities in Georgia and

Azerbaijan escalated into conflicts just short of all-out civil

war and resulted in hundreds of deaths. As 1992 began, these

conflicts continued to erupt into violence. Developments

regarding the rights of national minorities are described below

by region.

Russia: In the Russian republic, several autonomous republics,

oblasts, and districts based on national minorities declared

sovereignty. The results were not always harmonious. In the

northern Caucasus, for example, territorial disputes flared

among various ethnic groups. In April, after the U.S.S.R.

Supreme Soviet annulled deportation decrees from the 1940 's,

Ingush and Ossetian groups clashed in north Ossetia when the

Ingush attempted to repossess their former homes in the area.

The Ingush also clashed repeatedly with Cossacks in the region.

The government of Chechen-Ingushetia was dissolved in November

when the Chechens declared independence from "Russian

chauvinism." The Ingush voted to remain inside Russia provided

that lands expropriated in the 1940 's were returned. This

exacerbated the Ingush territorial dispute with North Ossetia,

abd Ingush guerrilla attacks were met by crearion of an

Ossetian national guard. In Tatarstan old-line Communist

political leaders retained their hold on power. Violent

demonstrations occurred in Dagestan when Muslims were unable to

make the hajj. The cause of many of these problems was the

release of interethnic tensions built up and suppressed over

decades of harsh Soviet rule.

Ukraine: As a consecjuence of the Ukrainian act of independence

on August 24, advocates of Ukrainian cultural, linguistic, and

economic self-determination became a major political force in

the Ukrainian legislature. At the same time, the government and

major democratic (non-Communist) political parties appeared to

be open to all thenic and religious minority groups in Ukraine.

For example, in September the Ukrainian parliament appointed

ethnic Russians to key positions in the Ukrainian governnient

(prosecutor general and minister of defense) . The Ukrainian

parliament was expected to amend the Ukrainian citizenship law

so as to do away with notations in internal passports

identifying Ukrainian citizens by nationality or religion.

Some political organizations in the predominantly Russianspeaking

areas of southern and eastern Ukraine (particularly

Crimea) remained opposed to Ukrainian independence. They were

espacially concerned about increased use of Ukrainian as the

official language of the republic. The Ukrainian parliament

conceded to Crimean demands for political, economic, and

linguistic autonomy on the condition that Crimea remain under

Ukrainian territorial jurisdiction. The Crimean Tatr community,

in the process of returning to the region, has expressed

concern that their rights also to be protected within the

framework of the yet-to-be-negotiated Crimean constitution.

The Nationalities Declaration allows national minority groups

to use their languages in official transactions.

Moldova: The question of minority rights remained a central

issue in the Moldovan republic's internal politics. Ethnic

disagreements with the Russian and Gagauz minorities resulted

in 1990 in secessionist movements in the geographic areas where

those groups are in the majority. Both the Russian and Gagauz

minorities maintained that the government repressed their

cultures, gave preference to Moldovans in housing and

employment, and forcibly imposed Romanian as Moldova's official

language. Moldovans, however, claimed that they were only

righting old wrongs, especially the imposition of Russian as

the official language on the majority Romanian-speaking

population since 1940. Republic officials stated that they

were committed to meeting the concerns of ethnic minorities.

Tensions nevertheless continued, reaching a peak in December.

On December 1, both the secessionist Gagauz and Russian

trans-Dniester regions held independence referendums and

presidential elections. The central Moldovan government

declared the elections illegal and annulled them. Moldovans in

the trans-Dniester region claimed there were attempts to force

them to participate in the elections, including threats of job

loss for those who did not vote. On December 8, Moldova held

presidential elections. Voting in the trans-Dniester and

Gagauz areas was obstructed by the local authorities, with

numerous reports of harassment and intimidation of ethnic

Moldovan voters and a press and radio campaign discouraging

participation. Few polls were allowed to open in these areas,

and attempts were made to close some of those that did open.

The worst armed clashes of 1991 occurred on December 13 when a

firefight between Moldovan and trans-Dniester uniformed forces

in the trans-Dniester city of Dubossary resulted in seven

deaths and a dozen wounded. Both sides blamed the other for

the fighting. While negotiations brought a halt to this

outbreak, sporadic clashes continued in the early days of

January 1992.

The Moldovan parliament enacted a series of legal provisions to

protect minority rights, including the right of parents to

educate children in their own language and the right of each

region to preserve its flag and symbol. Schools teaching in

Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Hebrew, and Gagauz were opened in 1991.

In addition, all classes in the ethnic-Russian trans-Dniester

area were taught in Russian. Restrictive language laws were

eased somewhat, although they still required that persons in

certain positions, e.g., directors of industrial and research

facilities, doctors, and high-level government officials, speak

both Russian and Romanian.

Tensions between Russians and Moldovans in the trans-Dniester

region remained high during the year, with sporadic clashes

occurring and some casualties reported. The Russian trans-

Dniester leadership expressed support for the attempted August

coup in Moscow; shortly thereafter, four of its leaders were

arrested by Moldovan authorities for allegedly attempting to

set up a new Moldovan government. In response, the trans-

Dniester leadership imposed a blockade on the principal rail

artery at Tiraspol, causing substantial economic losses for

Moldova. On October 3, the two sides reached agreement to end

the rail blockade and free the four detained trans-Dniester

leaders. They also set up a commission to resolve Russian-

Moldovan disputes, called for the disarming of civilian militia

groups, and agreed that both sides would do everything necessary

to guarantee peace and order and restore an effective economy

in Moldova. In September a fact-finding group from the RSFSR

visited Moldova and publicly acquitted Moldova of human rights

violations against Russians. Also in September, a Turkish

delegation visited the Gagauz region at the invitation of the

Moldovan government to investigate Gagauz complaints. The

Turkish delegation came away generally satisfied with Moldovan

treatment of the Gagauz and would not endorse the Gagauz

declaration of independence from Moldova.

Caucasus: As described above (see Section l.f., among others),

the picture in the republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan is one

of violent interethnic conflict spurred by harshly

discriminatory policies of the republic governments. The

dispute between Armenians and Azerbaijanis worsened

considerably as Azerbaijan's government deported whole villages

of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. Other Armenians were jailed

or killed during the conflict. The few Armenians remaining in

Baku (primarily spouses of Azeris) complained that they are

unable to find employment. In Georgia many ethnic groups

complained of de facto discrimination in housing and employment.

The Georgian prosecutor called the Armenian group Krunk ' s plans

to promote the Armenian language in the Armenian community of

Abkhazia a rude violation of the republic's language laws. In

a letter to the chairman of Krunk, the prosecutor threatened to

ban the organization if it did not correct its ways. Georgian

militia and armed civilians continued to attack Ossetian

villages in the former south Ossetian autonomous oblast. An

economic blockade of the region cut off power and supplies of

medicines, foodstuffs and other necessities. In Georgia

citizens were able to worship freely, but some minorities,

including Jews, claimed they are subject to discrimination in

housing and employment despite local laws.

Central Asia: Anti-Russian riots did not occur this year as

they did last, but fear of ethnic tensions was one factor

leading thousands of ethnic Russians to move from Central Asia

to Russia. The RSFSR has expressed concern over the fate of

Russians in Kazakhstan (where they numJDer 40 percent of the

population) and other central Asian republics. The Central

Asian republics have all adopted language legislation declaring

the language of the titular nationality to be the official state

language, while designating Russian as the language of

interethnic communication. In some of these republics,

particulary Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, this has

resulted in Russian emigration. Russians report that they

suffer difficulties now that they cannot speak the state

language. In Uzbekistan some Russians have reported that when

they present their ration coupons they are brusquely told to go

to Russia. Some Jews and Tajiks living in Samarkand have

expressed fears of growing nationalism among some Uzbek groups.

Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men, including

the right to participate in all areas of the social, political,

and economic life of the Soviet Union. An extensive system of

day-care service and maternity leave benefits allowed women,

after they have borne children, to retain employment. Women

are well represented at many levels of the general economy and

paid the same as men for equal work.

Despite their nominal legal equality, women bear the brunt of

many of the hardships of Soviet daily life. Virtually all

women have no economic choice but to work both inside and

outside the home. One report estimated that more than 3

million Soviet women worked in conditions harmful to their

health, and 500,000 women worked at hard, physical labor. In

the central Asian republics, where women's rights in reality

most often diverged from those they nominally enjoy,

traditional national practices often prevented women from

taking their equal place alongside men in economic life.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The right of workers to form and join unions of their own

choosing showed little change in 1991. The passage by the

U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet in December 1990 of the Law on Trade

Unions provided for the existence of trade unions as independent

organizations which are equal before the law with official,

government-sponsored unions. However, this law did not diminish

the role and status of the official trade unions and their hold

on union membership because it protected their inherent

advantages arising from close links with enterprise directors

and exclusive control over workers' vacations, childrens' camps,

recreation facilities, and other social benefits. The 1990 law

also continued official union control over the state social

insurance system.

The approximately 30 sectoral trade unions of the former

officially sponsored All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions

(AUCCTU), which renamed itself in October 1990 the General

Confederation of Trade Unions (GCTU), continued to perform many

of its traditional functions as "the transmission belt from the

Communist Party to the masses." Despite its new name and

attempts to recast its image, the GCTU retained most of the

AUCCTU' s top leadership and apparatus and continued to enjoy a

privileged and close relationship with the Government and

Communist Party, at least until August.

Independent labor leaders considered the official trade unions'

control of social functions usually performed by the State as

the greatest obstacle to the growth of true, independent trade

unions in the U.S.S.R. Attempts during 1991 by the independent,

democratic unions to break this monopoly had little effect.

With the postcoup breakdown of central authority, labor

activists in some areas were emboldened to wrest for themselves

a role they were previously denied. Independent labor activists

reported throughout 1991 that enterprise directors, local

government officials, and police and judicial authorities

applied various forms of pressure on workers who attempted to

exercise their right to form and join unions. Most commonly,

worker activists faced physical violence or threats of

violence, illegal arrest or threats of arrest, legal

harassment, threats of dismissal or the withdrawal of benefits

controlled by the state, or outright dismissal. Police beat

several independent labor activists badly in 1991, and at least

one died as a result of police brutality. Individual

enterprise directors prohibited independent worker activity in

some mines.

Notwithstanding the obstacles, the independent Soviet workers'

movement , which began as a mass movement only in the summer of

1989, continued to grow. The 9-week miners' strike in March

and April found support in some areas of Byelarus long

considered a bastion of Communist Party stability, bringing

life close to a standstill for short periods of time. Workers

in numerous coal-related factories in Ukraine and Siberia also

joined in support of the miners' demands.

There were credible reports of groups of workers forming small,

independent trade unions in various areas of the country. In

St. Petersburg, public transport workers displayed their

independence from the State on several occasions. In October

the Independent Union of Miners (NPG) formally established a

branch in Byelarus, textile workers formed a free trade union

in Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, as did railway workers in

western Ukraine. The NPG also founded an independent,

democratic union organization in Russia in November.

Cooperative employees in Kazakhstan joined together to form a

union, Birlesu. The independent airline pilots' and air

traffic controllers' unions grew in membership. Despite the

Soviet Constitution's prohibition of independent trade unions

in the armed forces, the clandestine union Shield continued to

organize.

The coal miners in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine and

Kuzbas region of western Siberia continued to represent the

largest and most potent centers of independent organized labor

in the Soviet Union. The miners' strike in the spring, which

at its height involved dozens of mines and more than 200

enterprises and caused severe disruptions to production in

vital coal-related industries, demonstrated the important role

that independent, democratic labor groups now play nationwide.

Repeating demands first raised in 1990 for radical changes in

Soviet political and economic life, including the resignation

of top Soviet leaders, the miners' strike forced the Government

to cede power from Moscow to republic-level coal ministries.

The Government responded to the miners' strike with a series of

decrees and administrative measures designed to restrict

further the circumstances under which workers can strike.

Labor legislation passed by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet in

October 1989 formally established the right to strike for the

first time but also provided for a lengthy dispute settlement

process. The law banned strikes in the Government and military

services and contained broad, undefined references to

"essential services" in which strikes could also be prevented.

In March the Government suspended completely the workers' right

to strike for 2 months.

In April the Ukrainian supreme soviet announced a ban on strikes

on Ukrainian territory. In May the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet

issued a decree providing for administrative and criminal

prosecution for persons organizing work stoppages in key

industries. It also amended the 1989 law, announcing that the

Government may postpone or suspend strikes and that "political"

strikes would henceforth be illegal. Despite these decrees.

several hundred thousand workers remained off the job. Some

leaders of the workers' movement were prosecuted by local

authorities for their role in organizing the spring strikes.

The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of

Experts noted in 1991 that the 1990 Law on Collective Labor

Disputes still refers to the enterprise works committees as the

only competent trade union body for the settlement of labor

disputes, thus precluding the legal establishment of new

independent organizations outside the official structure.

The GCTU continued its control over the Communist labor

international, the World Federation of Trade Unions, which in

1991 played a much reduced international role following the

collapse of Communist-dominated trade unions in central and

eastern Europe and uncertainties created by the democratic

reform process.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Virtually all Soviet workers, who almost automatically were

made members of an affiliate of the AUCCTU, became members of a

GCTU affiliate when the AUCCTU was disbanded. Outside the

mining industry and some segments of the air transport

industry, the vast majority of Soviet workers still have to

rely on the official unions and factory and enterprise work

councils to express their interests.

Soviet authorities revealed a reluctant willingness to deal

with the independent labor movement. In the wake of the miners'

strike in July 1990, the central Government conceded one of the

NPG's major demands, the right to conclude wage agreements with

the central Government. After repeated attempts to get the

State to the bargaining table failed, the miners launched their

9-week strike in March 1991. Following that strike, the

Government again granted the NPG the right to negotiate on

behalf of its members the terms and conditions of employment

with their enterprises, which were supposed to be put on a

self-financing basis as part of the economic transition

process. The NPG, however, was frustrated in many attempts to

conclude collective agreements with individual mines.

Enterprise directors often refuse to negotiate with NPG

representatives.

There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Soviet law contains no prohibition on forced or compulsory

labor, although the Declaration of Human Rights and Liberties

adopted by the All-Union Congress of People's Deputies in

September included language expressly forbidding it, and the

U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics have

ratified one of the ILO's forced labor conventions. Convicted

criminals, including those in some republics confined for

political offenses, were commonly forced to work, often under

very difficult conditions and for minimal wages, in local

projects and to assist in the production of primary and

manufactured goods. Inmates at some correctional labor

colonies struck over harsh work conditions, demanding that camp

norms be brought into conformity with international standards.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs discussed using part of the

large profits derived from the Soviet prison system to finance

penal reforms. Labor camp prisoners were widely known to be

the main labor force for the Soviet lumber industry.

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

The law establishes a statutory minimum age for employment of

16. However, numerous reports appeared of child labor in the

Central Asian republics and the Caucasus, particularly in the

agricultural sector.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

The bottom rung of the official pay scales for each industry in

effect serve as an administrative minimum wage. Reform plans

call for the establishment of minimum wages, usually republic

by republic, but by year's end these had not yet been

legislated. Even official trade union spokesmen estimate that

well over half of the population do not have an income to

afford a minimum standard of living.

The labor code sets a limit of 41 hours of work per week.

However, in practice, workweeks can range from considerably

less than this to considerably more, depending on local

circumstances. Many workers work significantly more hours to

meet end-of-the-month production goals. Other workers work far

fewer hours, since the disordered state of the Soviet economy

requires them to spend many hours a day, much of it during

official work time, searching for basic necessities for their

families. Officially, workers receive other benefits in

addition to their wages, such as heavily subsidized prices for

basic goods and foodstuffs in state stores. The value of these

benefits, however, has been significantly eroded by growing

shortages of basic consumer goods and food in state stores. In

addition, the qTjality of state-subsidized housing, health care,

and transportation, on which the vast majority of the

population must rely, is generally very low.

The law establishes minimum conditions of workplace safety and

worker health. However, these standards are generally ignored,

and no effective enforcement mechanism exists. The Parliament

in June heard testimony that in a single year over 14,000 died

on the job, 20,000 became invalids, and some 700,000 workers

were injured.

Workplace safety emerged as a major issue in the miners'

strikes, among airline pilots and air traffic controllers, and

in the armed forces. In 1991 there again were numerous mining

disasters in the Donbas, and workers report that few

significant safety measures had been adopted in the aftermath

of these accidents.

ecoi.net description:: Annual report on the human rights situation (covering 1991) [automatic text recognition from scan by archive.org; refer to original scan in case of errors]

Country:: Russian Federation
Source:: USDOS – US Department of State (Author)
Published:: February 1992
Original link:: http://archive.org/stream/countryreportson1991unit/countryreportson1991unit_djvu.txt
Document type:: Periodical Report
Language:: English
Document ID:: 1160756 (former ID 241617)