Document #1051420
IRB – Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Author)
In retaliation for a coup attempt in 1971,
Barre executed members of the three leading clans (Majerteen being
one of them) and has since institutionalized clan membership as the
predominant feature of Somali politics. [Ibid.] Barre has
also reportedly promoted interclan divisions and in-fighting to
maintain himself in power. Members of the Majerteen, Isaaq and
Hawiye clans have voiced uncertainty about their status under
Siyaad Barre's rule as he has formed a ruling coalition of the
Mareehan, Ogadeen and Dolbahanta clans (an alliance often referred
to as MOD). [Ibid, pp. 91-92.] Presently, the Marehan clan,
to which Barre belongs, dominates Somalia's political and economic
system. [Critique to the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices for 1987, (Washington: Human Rights
Watch, 1988), pp. 133-134.]
Tensions between the Somali government and
the two main opposition groups, the Somali National Movement (SNM),
a mainly Isaaq-clan organization, and the Democratic Front for the
Salvation of Somalia (DFSS), linked to the Majerteen clan, arose
about a decade ago. This apparently gave the government an excuse
to increase its abuses, which reportedly have increased sharply
since the start of the civil war. [Somalia: Imprisonment of Members
of the Isaaq Clan since Mid-1988, various pages; "Somalia: Showdown
in the North", in Africa Confidential, 29 July 1988, pp.
1-3, and Beyond the Headlines: refugees in the Horn of
Africa, (American Council for Nationalities Service, 1988), p. 38.]
At the present time, interclan enmity is reported to be worse and
potentially more violent than in any period of Somalia's history.
[Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, p.94.] Feuding clans
often resort to reciprocal assassination of one another's elders in
order to deprive a rival clan of its able leadership. [Ibid,
p. 161.] The SNM has allegedly killed members of rival clans
(non-Isaaq), often on the suspicion that they were opposed to the
SNM. [Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988,
(Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1989), p. 308.] Although a
report states that many Majerteen military officers do not actively
participate in clan politics, [Somalia: Nation in search of a
state, p. 156.] the army has also been riddled with internal
clan-based divisions, resulting in desertions and arbitrary
detentions. ["Somalia; Generals fall out", in Africa Confidential,
23 September 1988, pp. 1-2, and "Somalia: Showdown in the North",
29 July 1988, p. 2.] Moreover, since the outbreak of the civil war,
the government has increased its efforts to eliminate opposition
throughout the country. [Amnesty International (1988): Somalia:
A long term human rights crisis and Somalia: Imprisonment of
members of the Isaaq clan since mid-1988; Africa
Confidential, 16 December 1988, 6 January 1989, 20 January
1989.] Amnesty International reports that being a member of a
particular clan can be enough to arouse suspicion among Somali
authorities, who work on the assumption that many clan-members
support particular opposition groups. [Somalia: A long term human
rights crisis and Somalia: Imprisonment of members of the Isaaq
clan since mid-1988, various pages.]
The Democratic Front for the Salvation of
Somalia (DFSS; sometimes referred to as the Somali Salvation
Democratic Front or SSDF), one of the two major armed opposition
groups, is reportedly based in Addis Ababa and derives most of its
support from the Majerteen clan. ["Somalia: Showdown in the North",
in Africa Confidential, 29 July 1988, pp. 1-3; Somalia: Nation in
search of a state, p. 157; Somalia: Imprisonment of Members of the
Isaaq Clan since Mid-1988, (London: Amnesty International, 1988).]
Ethiopian forces reportedly imprisoned the leader of the DFSS,
Colonel Yuusuf, in 1987 after a power struggle within the DFSS
which resulted in Yuusuf's executing of four high-ranking members
of the Front. [Somalia: Nation in search of a state, p.
158.] The DFSS has been recently described as virtually inactive,
in spite of having approximately 2000 fighters reportedly armed
with Libyan-supplied weapons in bases which, according to recent
reports, were still located in Ethiopian territory, [Africa
Confidential, 29 July 1988, and 18 November 1988, p. 3.]
despite an agreement in April 1988 between Ethiopia and Somalia to
cut off support and bases in neighbouring countries for rebel
forces. [Keesing's Record of World Events, (London, Longman
Publishing Group), p. 36007.] Reports of recent DFSS actions could
not be found among the sources presently available to the
IRBDC.
For background information on the DFSS, please see the attached
copy of Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, (London:
Longman Publishing Group, 1988), p. 324.