8. Juli 2016

Allgemeine Informationen zu Minderjährigen in Afghanistan

Laut der afghanischen Statistik-Behörde (Afghan Central Statistics Organization) seien im Jahr 2014 fast 47 Prozent der Bevölkerung unter 15 Jahre alt und weitere 37 Prozent zwischen 15 und 39 Jahre alt (USIP, August 2015).

 

Das Kinderhilfswerk der vereinten Nationen (UNICEF) schreibt unter Bezugnahme auf statistische Daten aus dem Jahr 2013, dass die Sterblichkeit von Neugeborenen in Afghanistan bei 36 pro 1000 lebend geborenen Kindern liege, während 70 von 1000 lebend geborenen Kindern vor Erreichen des ersten Lebensjahres sterben würden. Die Kindersterblichkeit unter 5 Jahren liege bei 97 (101 bei Jungen, 94 bei Mädchen) pro 1000 Lebendgeburten bzw. in absoluten Zahlen bei 100.000 Personen aus einer Gesamtbevölkerung von 30,5 Millionen Menschen. (UNICEF, 2015, S. 36).

 

Laut UNICEF habe die Alphabetisierungsrate unter jungen Menschen im Alter von 15 bis 24 Jahren im Erhebungszeitraum 2009 bis 2013 bei Jungen 62 Prozent und bei Mädchen 32 Prozent betragen. Laut Daten aus dem Zeitraum 2009 bis 2012 lag der Anteil von Kinder beliebigen Alters, die Grundschulen besuchen würden, an der Gesamtzahl der Kinder im Grundschulalter bei 121 Prozent bei Jungen bzw. 87 Prozent bei Mädchen. (UNICEF, 2015, S. 60)

 

Laut Daten von UNICEF aus dem Zeitraum 2005 bis 2013 sind 11 Prozent der Jungen und 10 Prozent der Mädchen von Kinderarbeit betroffen. Weiters seien 15 Prozent der Kinder mit spätestens 15 Jahren verheiratet. (UNICEF, 2015, S. 84)

 

Die Geburtenregistrierungsrate liegt laut UNICEF-Daten aus dem Zeitraum 2005 bis 2013 insgesamt bei 37 Prozent (60 Prozent in Städten und 33 Prozent auf dem Land) (UNICEF, 2015, S. 84 und 102).

Bildung

Das US-Außenministerium (US Department of State, USDOS) thematisiert in seinem im April 2016 veröffentlichten Länderbericht zur Menschenrechtslage (Berichtsjahr 2015) die Schulpflicht und deren Umsetzung wie folgt:

„Education is mandatory up to the lower secondary level (six years for primary school and three years for lower secondary), and the law provides for free education up to and including the college level. Many children, however, did not attend school.“ (USDOS, 13. April 2016, Section 6)

Al Jazeera, ein arabischer Nachrichtensender mit Sitz in Doha (Katar), schreibt in einem Artikel vom Februar 2016:

„The government and international donors boast about eight million children being registered in schools. In fact, due to poverty and deteriorating security conditions, about 40 percent of primary school-aged children are not attending school.” (Al Jazeera, 16. Februar 2016)

Das UNO-Flüchtlingshochkommissariat (UNHCR) hält in seinen im April 2016 veröffentlichten Richtlinien zur Feststellung des Internationalen Schutzbedarfs Afghanischer Asylsuchender Folgendes bezüglich des Zugangs von Kindern zu Bildung fest:

„Children are reported to face significant obstacles to access to education. Concerns have been expressed about the fact that official government statistics for school attendance may significantly overestimate the number of children attending school in the country, as well as about the quality of education on offer. School attendance by girls continued to be substantially lower than for boys. High levels of insecurity are a major factor in hampering access to education. The reported use of schools for military purposes by both AGE [Anti-Government Elements] and pro-government forces poses further concerns.” (UNHCR, 19. April 2016, S. 68)

Der Bericht des USDOS vom April 2016 informiert folgendermaßen über Schulbesuchs- und Alphabetisierungsraten von Jungen und Mädchen:

„In most regions boys and girls attended primary classes together but were separated for intermediate and secondary education. Of the country’s 9.1 million school children, the Ministry of Education estimated 3.5 million, or 39 percent, were girls. Many students, however, were not enrolled full time or dropped out early. According to the Education for All 2015 National Review Report: Afghanistan, in 2013 the gross enrollment rate for girls as a percentage of total enrollment was approximately 41 percent at the primary level, 36 percent at the lower secondary level, and 35 percent at the upper secondary level. According to the same report, the literacy rate for girls and women 15 to 24 years of age was 32 percent as of 2012.

The status of girls and women in education remained a matter of grave concern. Key obstacles to girls’ education included poverty, early and forced marriage, insecurity, lack of family support, lack of female teachers, and the long distance to school. Former president Karzai’s 2012 Decree on Governance and Corruption addressed the lack of female teachers, particularly in conservative rural areas, by charging the Ministry of Education with recruiting an additional 11,000 teachers and increasing the number of district-level teacher training support centers to provide training opportunities for female teachers. According to the Ministry of Education, 32 percent of teachers (63,904) were women as of 2014.” (USDOS, 13. April 2016, Section 6)

Dieselbe Quelle schreibt, dass unter anderem die schwierige Sicherheitslage den Zugang von Kindern zu Bildung einschränke:

„Violent attacks on schoolchildren, particularly girls, also hindered access to education. Violence impeded access to education in various sections of the country, particularly in areas controlled by the Taliban. The Taliban and other extremists threatened and attacked school officials, teachers, and students, particularly girls, and burned both boys’ and girls’ schools. In May a rocket struck a school in Logar Province, killing a teacher and two students. In July a bomb detonated in front of a school in Kandahar Province, killing three children and injuring six others. In the same month an unknown motorcyclist threw acid into the eyes of three female high school students in Herat Province. No group took responsibility for the attacks.

Insecurity, conservative attitudes, and poverty denied education to millions of school-age children, mainly in the southern and southeastern provinces. A representative from the Ministry of Education estimated in May that approximately 150,000 schoolchildren in insecure areas did not have access to education. There were also reports of abduction and molestation. The lack of community-based, nearby schools was another factor inhibiting school attendance.” (USDOS, 13. April 2016, Section 6)

Die UNHCR Richtlinien zur Feststellung des Internationalen Schutzbedarfs Afghanischer Asylsuchender vom April 2016 weisen darauf hin, dass es vor allem in Zusammenhang mit Bildung für Mädchen weiterhin Berichte über Angriffe durch regierungsfeindliche Gruppen auf Schulen, Lehrpersonal und SchülerInnen gebe. Die Richtlinien führen zudem eine Reihe von weiteren Hindernissen für den Bildungszugang für Mädchen an:

„AGEs [Anti-Government Elements] are also reported to continue to carry out direct attacks against schools, teachers and students, especially in relation to education for girls. While the majority of reported attacks are attributed to the Taliban, groups affiliated to ISIS [Islamic State] are also reported to forcibly close schools and to threaten and intimidate teachers. Other obstacles to girls’ education in particular included poverty, early and forced marriage, lack of family support, lack of female teachers, and long distances to the nearest school.” (UNHCR, 19. April 2016, S. 69)

Gewalt gegen Kinder

UNHCR bemerkt in seinen Richtlinien zur Feststellung des Internationalen Schutzbedarfs Afghanischer Asylsuchender, dass es zahlreiche Berichte über Gewalt gegen Kinder, darunter auch sexuelle und geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt, gebe:

„Violence against Children, including Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Child abuse is reported to be widespread, with the number of reported cases on the rise. Common forms of abuse include physical violence, sexual abuse, abandonment and general neglect. Some forms of domestic violence against children is reported to take place in the name of discipline. Sexual abuse of children reportedly remains pervasive. While most child victims of sexual abuse, particularly girls, are reported to be abused by family members, boys and girls were also reported to be at risk of sexual violence at the hands of pro-government forces, AGEs [Anti-Government Elements], and ordinary members of society. Young boys continue to be at risk of bacha bazi, a practice in which boys are kept by powerful figures, who make them dance in female clothes for male audiences, and who use them for sexual exploitation. The practice is reported to be on the rise. Impunity for sexual abuse of children is reported to remain a problem: most abusers are not arrested, and there are reports of children raped with impunity by security officials and police officers. Some children who were prosecuted for ‘moral crimes’ were survivors of abuse rather than perpetrators of crime; having reported instances of sexual abuse, they are perceived to have brought shame on their family and to be in need of punishment. Some children were reportedly imprisoned.” (UNHCR, 19. April 2016, S. 66-68)

„The ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] and AGEs are reported to abduct children for various purposes, including reprisals and punishment of the victim’s family members. Children are also reported to be abducted, and subsequently to be executed, maimed or raped, on the basis of accusations of having assisted the opposing party.” (UNHCR, 19. April 2016, S. 69)

Der USDOS-Länderbericht zur Menschenrechtslage vom April 2016 informiert wie folgt über Kindesmisshandlung und sexuelle Gewalt gegen Kinder:

„NGOs reported increased numbers of child abuse victims during the year, and the problem remained endemic throughout the country. Such abuse included general neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, abandonment, and confined forced labor to pay off family debts. Police reportedly beat and sexually abused children, including an incident, verified by UNAMA [UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan], when 10 ALP [Afghan Local Police] members in Sar-e Pul Province beat eight civilians, including two boys, with their rifle butts. NGOs reported a predominantly punitive and retributive approach to juvenile justice throughout the country. Although it is against the law, corporal punishment in schools, rehabilitation centers, and other public institutions remained common.

Sexual abuse of children remained pervasive. NGOs noted girls were abused by extended family members, while boys were more frequently abused by men outside their families. In September a man was arrested in Jowzjan Province for allegedly raping his 15-year-old daughter. There were reports religious figures sexually abused both boys and girls. NGOs noted families often were complicit, allowing local strongmen to abuse their children in exchange for status or money. While the Ministry of Interior tracked cases of rape, most NGOs and observers estimated the official numbers significantly underreported the phenomenon. Many perpetrators of child sexual abuse were not arrested, and there were reports security officials and those connected to the ANP [Afghan National Police] raped children with impunity. The practice continued of bacha baazi (dancing boys), which involved powerful or wealthy local figures and businessmen sexually abusing young boys trained to dance in female clothes. Reports of the practice have increased since 2001. A September 20 article in the New York Times documented the practice of bacha baazi by pro-government forces residing on a U.S. military base in Kunduz Province. Following the New York Times report, the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and President’s Office issued statements condemning the practice. The president also ordered the creation of a working committee including the AIHRC [Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission], Ministry of Interior, and Attorney General’s Office to investigate and monitor cases of abuse and create a mechanism to prevent and prosecute perpetrators. The government took few other steps to discourage the abuse of boys or to prosecute or punish those involved. In August 2014 the AIHRC released its national inquiry on bacha baazi. The report asserted bacha baazi was a form of trafficking already criminalized and called on the government to enforce the law actively. It attributed the root causes of the practice to lack of rule of law, corruption, gaps in the law, poverty, insecurity, and the existence of armed insurgent groups. The report noted the serious psychological and physical harm victims faced and called on the government to provide protective services to victims. […]

Sexual Exploitation of Children: Although pornography is a crime, child pornography is not specifically prohibited by law. Exploiting a child for sexual purposes, as with bacha baazi, was widespread but not specified as a crime under the law, although some aspects of this practice are separate crimes under the penal code.” (USDOS, 13. April 2016, Section 6)

Die Nachrichtenagentur Agence France Presse (AFP) berichtet in einem Artikel vom Juni 2016, dass die Taliban männliche Kindersexsklaven, die von Polizeibeamten „gehalten“ würden, einsetzen würden, um Anschläge durchzuführen:

„The Taliban are using child sex slaves to mount crippling insider attacks on police in southern Afghanistan, exploiting the pervasive practice of ‘bacha bazi’ -- paedophilic boy play -- to infiltrate security ranks, multiple officials and survivors of such assaults told AFP.

The ancient custom is prevalent across Afghanistan, but nowhere does it seem as entrenched as in the province of Uruzgan, where ‘bacha bereesh’ -- or boys without beards -- widely become objects of lustful attraction for powerful police commanders.

The Taliban over nearly two years have used them to mount a wave of Trojan Horse attacks -- at least six between January and April alone -- that have killed hundreds of policemen, according to security and judicial officials in the province. […]

The insurgents have long denied using children in combat, a claim repeatedly debunked by rights groups and the government.

Survivors of insider attacks who spoke to AFP, including Matiullah, suggest the Taliban are exploiting the institutionalisation of bacha bazi in police ranks for military gain.

Practically all of Uruzgan's 370 local and national police checkpoints have bachas -- some up to four -- who are illegally recruited not just for sexual companionship but also to bear arms, multiple officials said.

Some policemen, they said, demand bachas like a perk of the job, refusing to join outposts where they are not available.

Horrifying abuse at checkpoints makes the boys, many unpaid and unregistered, hungry for revenge and easy prey for Taliban recruitment -- often because there is no other escape from exploitative commanders.” (AFP, 19. Juni 2016)

Kinderehen

Der Al-Jazeera-Artikel vom Februar 2016 berichtet wie folgt über die zwangsweise Verheiratung von Mädchen gegen einen Brautpreis:

„Girls are forced into marriages, at times in their pre-teen years, in exchange for a bride price or to settle debts that the father is unable to pay otherwise.” (Al Jazeera, 16. Februar 2016)

Das USDOS informiert in seinem Länderbericht zur Menschenrechtslage vom April 2016 über das gesetzliche Heiratsalter für Mädchen und Jungen, die Gesetzeslage zu Zwangsheirat bzw. Kinderehen sowie über die tatsächliche Praxis der Verheiratung von Minderjährigen:

„Early and Forced Marriage: Despite a law setting the legal minimum age for marriage at 16 (15 with the consent of a parent or guardian and the court) for girls and 18 for boys, international and local observers continued to report widespread early marriage. […] During the EVAW [Elimination of Violence Against Women] law debate, conservative politicians publicly stated it was un-Islamic to ban the marriage of girls younger than 16. Under the EVAW law, those who arrange forced or underage marriages may be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years, but implementation of the law remained limited. The Law on Marriage states marriage of a minor may be conducted with a guardian’s consent.

By law a marriage contract requires verification that the bride is 16 years of age, but only a small fraction of the population had birth certificates. Following custom, some poor families pledged their daughters to marry in exchange for ‘bride money,’ although the practice is illegal. According to local NGOs, some girls as young as six or seven were promised in marriage, with the understanding the actual marriage would be delayed until the child reached puberty. Reports indicated, however, that this delay was rarely observed and young girls were sexually violated by the groom or by older men in the family, particularly if the groom was also a child. Media reports also noted the ‘opium bride’ phenomenon, in which farming families married off their daughters to settle debts to opium traffickers.” (USDOS, 13. April 2016, Section 6)

Darüber hinaus thematisiert das USDOS das Risiko für Mädchen, Opfer von Ehrenmord zu werden:

„Girls under age 18 continued to be at risk for honor killings for perceived sexual relations outside of marriage, running away, not accepting a forced marriage, or being a victim of sexual assault. In July media reported family members of a 15-year-old girl in Baghlan Province shot and killed her and a 17-year-old boy after the two returned home following an elopement.” (USDOS, 13. April 2016, Section 6)

Kinderhandel

Al Jazeera spricht in seinem Artikel vom Februar 2016 von einer Zunahme von Kindesentführungen und Kinderhandel seit 2014:

„There has been a surge of abductions and child trafficking since 2014. Afghans are convinced that the impunity enjoyed by kidnappers and traffickers is due to the involvement of influential individuals and security forces in this lucrative business.” (Al Jazeera, 16. Februar 2016)

Das USDOS schreibt in seinem im Juni 2016 veröffentlichten Länderbericht zu Menschenhandel (Berichtsjahr 2015):

„Afghanistan is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Internal trafficking is more prevalent than transnational trafficking. Most Afghan trafficking victims are children who end up in carpet making and brick factories, domestic servitude, commercial sexual exploitation, begging, poppy cultivation, transnational drug smuggling, and assistant truck driving within Afghanistan, as well as in the Middle East, Europe, and South Asia. NGOs documented the practice of bonded labor, whereby customs allow families to force men, women, and children to work as a means to pay off debt or to settle grievances, sometimes for multiple generations with children forced to work to pay off their parents’ debt. Some Afghan families knowingly sell their children into sex trafficking, including for bacha baazi—where men, including some government officials and security forces, use young boys for social and sexual entertainment. There are reports that some law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges accept bribes from or use their relationships with perpetrators of bacha baazi to allow them to escape punishment. Some families send their children to obtain employment through labor brokers and the children end up in forced labor. Opium-farming families sometimes sell their children to settle debts with opium traffickers. According to the government and the UN, insurgent groups forcibly recruit and use children as suicide bombers. Boys, especially those traveling unaccompanied, are particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Children in orphanages are also particularly vulnerable and were sometimes subjected to trafficking. Some entire Afghan families are trapped in debt bondage in the brick-making industry in eastern Afghanistan. Members of the Shia Hazara minority group were victims of forced recruitment and forced labor.” (USDOS, 30. Juni 2016)

Kinder im bewaffneten Konflikt und Rekrutierung von Minderjährigen

Die internationale Menschenrechtsorganisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) erwähnt in ihrem World Report vom Jänner 2016 (Berichtszeitraum 2015), dass Präsident Ghani am 2. Februar 2015 ein Gesetz zur Kriminalisierung der Rekrutierung von Minderjährigen durch die afghanischen Sicherheitskräfte unterzeichnet habe. Die lokale afghanische Polizei (ALP) und regierungstreue Milizen würden jedoch in manchen Provinzen nach wie vor Kinder rekrutieren. Die Taliban würden sogar 14-jährige Jungen für den Kampf und die Durchführung von Selbstmordanschlägen rekrutieren. Die UNO habe über einen deutlichen Anstieg von Angriffen auf Schulen, vor allem durch die Taliban, im Zeitraum April bis Juni 2015 berichtet. Drohungen von regierungstreuen Milizen und Aufständischen hätten zur Schließung von Schulen in Kunduz, Ghor und Nuristan geführt. Im Mai sei Afghanistan der globalen Safe Schools Declaration beigetreten und habe sich damit verpflichtet, mehr zum Schutz von Studierenden, Lehrenden und Schulen während eines bewaffneten Konflikts zu unternehmen:

„On February 2, Ghani signed into law a decree criminalizing recruitment by Afghan security forces of soldiers less than 18 years old. However, Afghan Local Police (ALP) and pro-government militias in some provinces continued to recruit children. The Taliban recruited boys as young as 14 to fight and carry out suicide bombings.

The UN also reported a significant increase in attacks against schools between April and June, mostly by the Taliban. Threats from both pro-government militias and insurgents led to school closures in Kunduz, Ghor, and Nuristan. In May, Afghanistan endorsed the global Safe Schools Declaration, thus committing to do more to protect students, teachers, and schools during times of armed conflict, including through implementing the Guidelines on Protecting Schools from Military Use.” (HRW, 27 Jänner 2016)

Das USDOS bemerkt in seinem Länderbericht zur Menschenrechtslage vom April 2016:

„There were reports the ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces] and pro-government militias used children for specific purposes in a limited number of cases, and the Taliban and other anti-government elements recruited children for military purposes […]. The Law on Prohibition of Children’s Recruitment in the Military was approved in November 2014 by the Lower House of parliament and signed into law by President Ghani in February.” (USDOS, 13 April 2016, Section 6)

Al Jazeera berichtet im Februar 2016:

„In the absence of exact figures, reports on Afghan child combatants rely on anecdotes and witness accounts. On the government side, it is believed that the problem is especially pronounced in the government-sanctioned and US-funded ALP [Afghan Local Police] militia forces.

The phenomenon appears to be more widely present among terrorist organisations. Teenage students of religious madrasas, mostly in Pakistan, comprise the bulk of Taliban and Haqqani Network’s foot soldiers. Children are also used as suicide bombers.

A greater number of children are used by both sides as cooks, servants and errand boys, positions that all international legal instruments against the use of children in combat include in their definition of ‘child soldier’.

Conflict, poverty, flawed policies and the dismal application of the rule of law kill Afghan children in droves on a daily basis. Each year, hundreds of children die in armed hostilities, air strikes, suicide attacks, car bombs, or land mines.” (Al Jazeera, 16. Februar 2016)

Die UNO-Hilfsmission in Afghanistan (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) geht detailliert auf die Folgen des bewaffneten Konflikts auf Minderjährige ein:

„UNAMA once again documented the devastating impact of the conflict on children. One in four civilian casualties of the conflict is a child. Between 1 January and 31 December, UNAMA documented 2,829 child casualties (733 deaths and 2,096 injured) resulting from conflict-related violence, a 14 per cent increase compared to 2014. […]

Ground engagements continued to cause the highest number of child casualties, with UNAMA documenting 1,427 child casualties (293 deaths and 1,134 injured) from this tactic – an increase of 34 per cent. Ground engagements accounted for half of the total child casualties.

Consistent with trends reported in the UNAMA 2015 Midyear Report, the mission documented a 14 per cent decrease in child casualties from IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] compared to 2014 - 531 child casualties (158 deaths and 373 injured).36 However, IEDs remained the second most frequent cause of child casualties, accounting for 19 per cent of all children killed and maimed during 2015.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) left behind from previous and current conflicts continued to cause serious harm to children. ERW poses a particular risk to children due to their lack of understanding about the dangers of unexploded ordnance, their innate curiosity, and due to poverty. For example, on 24 November, a group of children playing in an abandoned house in Kabul city found an ERW and threw it against a wall. The ERW detonated, killing seven boys and a girl and injuring three others.

ERW caused 365 child casualties (113 deaths and 252 injured), a 10 per cent increase from 2014. ERW killed an average of two children and injured five each week in 2015.

Consistent with trends documented by UNAMA in its 2015 Midyear Report, child casualties from suicide and complex attacks increased by three per cent in 2015.

UNAMA documented 225 child casualties (50 deaths and 175 injured) from these tactics. Child casualties from targeted and deliberate killing incidents increased significantly in 2015, with UNAMA documenting 127 child casualties (58 deaths and 69 injured), an increase of 67 per cent compared to 2014.40 In most cases, Anti-Government Elements targeted the parents or adult relatives of the children, including through the use of magnetic-IEDs attached to private vehicles. For example, on 7 January, Taliban detonated a magnetic-IED attached to the private vehicle of the Chief Judge of the Laghman provincial court of appeals as he drove his daughters to school in Jalalabad city, Nangarhar province, killing the judge and injuring his two daughters. Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack on their website. UNAMA also notes concern that child casualties from aerial operations increased by 69 per cent in 2015, causing 91 child casualties (36 deaths and 55 injured). UNAMA documented that Afghan security forces caused 49 out of the 91 child casualties from aerial operations. UNAMA is concerned that this trend may increase as the Afghan Air Force fields more combat aircraft in 2016. UNAMA also documented slight increases in children casualties from conflict-related abductions. […]

In 2015, although civilian casualties from incidents impacting education and education-related personnel decreased by 32 per cent, causing 25 civilian casualties (11 deaths and 14 injured), overall incidents increased by 56 per cent. Between 1 January and 31 December 2015, UNAMA documented 111 conflict-related incidents affecting education compared to 71 incidents in 2014.

Incidents of intimidation and threats against education-related personnel largely accounted for the increase in such incidents - from 26 in 2014 to 68 in 2015. Threats and intimidation directed at teachers and educational staff resulted in the closure of more than 222 schools across seven out of the eight regions of Afghanistan for varying periods of time, affecting at least 124,218 students, including 68,291 girls.” (UNAMA, Februar 2016, S. 16-19)

Die in New York ansässige internationale Menschenrechtsorganisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) schreibt in einer Pressemitteilung vom Februar 2016:

„Human Rights Watch interviewed relatives of 13 children recruited as Taliban soldiers over the past year, and verified these claims through interviews with civil society activists, political analysts, and the United Nations. Despite Taliban claims that they only enlist fighters who have achieved ‘mental and physical maturity,’ and do not use ‘boys with no beards’ in military operations, some of the children recruited from madrasas in Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces are 13 or younger. The Taliban have previously denied ‘the use of children and adolescents in Jihadic Operations,’ but its deployment of individuals under the age of 18 violates international law applicable in Afghanistan and in cases involving children under 15 is a war crime. [...]

The Taliban recruit and train children in age-specific stages. Boys begin indoctrination as young as six years old, and continue to study religious subjects under Taliban teachers for up to seven years. According to relatives of boys recruited by the Taliban, by the time they are 13, Taliban-educated children have learned military skills including use of firearms, and the production and deployment of IEDs. Taliban teachers then introduce those trained child soldiers to specific Taliban groups in that district. […]

The Taliban have recruited and used children as fighters since the 1990s, but Kunduz residents whose sons have been among those recruited, together with analysts who have monitored the recruitment drive, believe that recruitment increased in 2015 due to expanded Taliban operations against Afghan government forces. The establishment of training centers in madrasas in the Taliban’s expanded zone of control in Kunduz also led to increases in child soldier recruitment. Kunduz residents told Human Rights Watch that the Taliban had recruited and deployed more than 100 children from Chahardara district alone in 2015.

Because the Taliban begin the indoctrination of children from an early age, they are easily persuaded to fight. Relatives of child soldiers in Kunduz told Human Rights Watch that the Taliban target children because it is easy to convince them of the righteousness of jihad, and because they are at an age where they do not feel responsible for providing for a family and so are easily persuaded to take on dangerous tasks. In general, children are not recruited by force. However parents who have tried to retrieve their children are usually unable to do so because the Taliban claim that the boys are of age, or are committed to jihad regardless of their age.

The Taliban madrasas attract many poor families because the Taliban cover their expenses and provide food and clothing for the children. In some cases they offer cash to families for sending their boys to the madrasas. An expert on Kunduz told Human Rights Watch that traditionally, even before the Taliban established madrasas in these areas, rural and village families sent at least one son to the local madrasa because of the prestige associated with the status of becoming a mullah (someone educated in the basics of Islamic law). In the cases of child soldiers Human Rights Watch investigated, some boys attended the madrasas in the early morning hours and then attended government schools later in the day. Other boys who had been recruited attended the madrasas full time. For example, ’Razeq’ (a pseudonym) 16, a resident of Chahardara district in Kunduz province, is a student in Class 6 at a government-run school, which he attends between 8 a.m. and noon every day. Between 5 a.m. and 8 a.m. he attends a madrasa controlled by Malawi Abdul Haq, a Taliban commander in the district. As of late 2015, the madrasa had about 80 students, most of them children between the ages of 13 and 17. All of them are vulnerable to recruitment.

According to some reports, children as young as 10 years old fought with Taliban forces in the battles that led to the Taliban’s temporary takeover of Kunduz. Leila Zerrougui, the UN special representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict, told Al-Jazeera that ‘children between the ages of 10 and 15 were used by the Taliban and dozens of them were deployed’ during the fighting in Kunduz in September and October 2015.” (HRW, 17. Februar 2016)

Die in Großbritannien ansässige Nichtregierungsorganisation Child Soldiers International schreibt in einem Briefing an den UNO-Menschenrechtsrat vom Juni 2015:

“However, field research conducted by Child Soldiers International in Afghanistan in May 2015 shows that despite this progress in implementing the road map, serious concerns remain:

-         Recruitment of children by the ANP and the ALP is ongoing, albeit on a reduced scale.

-         Inadequate age verification procedures, low levels of birth registration, and a prevalence of opportunities to falsify identity documents have contributed to on-going underage recruitment and use in the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces].

-         The use of children by the ANP [Afghan National Police] as ‘tea boys’ and guards at check-points has continued.

-         Effective safeguards to prevent future recruitment have not been put in place and there has been no progress in producing a standardised training manual for the ANSF.

-         Efforts to verify the presence of children in the ranks of the ANSF, demobilise and rehabilitate them have been stymied by access constraints and serious security concerns.

In the absence of robust and comprehensive oversight mechanisms, children continue to be formally and informally recruited and used in the ANSF.

Poverty continues to be the main driver behind underage recruitment with many children joining the ALP and ANP to support their families. In addition, a deep sense of filial responsibility and prestige, which comes from joining the national security forces, continue to provide a strong social incentive to enlist.

Armed opposition groups have also continued recruiting and using children to manufacture, transport and plant IEDs and conduct suicide attacks. Sexual violence against children in a climate where reporting remains low due to cultural stigmatisation and fear of reprisals, is pervasive. Accountability mechanisms, which could lead to investigations and prosecutions of offenders, and work as a deterrent for future recruitment, are woefully absent.

Detention of children on national security related charges continues to be widely practiced by authorities in Afghanistan. Once children are arrested, they are dealt with not as victims but as adult offenders. Ill-treatment and torture during interrogations, which are primarily focused on obtaining confessions, is common.” (Child Soldiers International, Juni 2015)

Der US-amerikanische öffentlich-rechtliche Rundfunksender Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) berichtet in einer Ausgabe seiner Dokumentationsserie Frontline vom November 2015:

„The government has limited reach in areas controlled by the Taliban, ISIS’s Afghan affiliate or other insurgent groups. These armed groups employ various methods to recruit children — including coercion, financial assistance, or offering protected status for either the child or his family.

‘The Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have this dynamic where they can force people to give up a child by saying, ‘You can either give us this amount of money — which is usually more than an annual salary — or you can give us one of the kids,’ Mia Bloom tells FRONTLINE. ‘And because the families are quite large, the parents then have to make this Sophie’s choice of which child they’re going to give up.’

Bloom, a professor of communication at Georgia University, is currently co-writing a book called Small Arms: Children and Terror, which examines the recruitment and use of children by terrorist groups. She says that in some cases, families who’ve given up a child to an armed insurgent group like the Taliban might be compensated. In effect, one child is sacrificed for the wellbeing of the family.

For the children themselves, the kinds of compensation or benefits offered are also much greater today than in the past. ‘It used to be a mobile phone and a gun, and a level of prestige that was accorded,‘ says Hogg. ‘Now actual cash is changing hands.‘

Another way children join armed groups is through family or social ties. If their father or brother belongs to a group, it’s more likely they’ll join too.

‘If groups hold territory and establish an influence in schooling systems, this can be another way through which children can be recruited,’ says Leah Farrall, a counterterrorism research associate at University of Sydney. This seems to be the case in the village of Shaigal, where FRONTLINE’s Najibullah Quraishi saw ISIS fighters integrating into local lives and teaching their ideology at the local school. […]

Once recruited, children may be used for a range of war-related activities. The Taliban has been named as a recruiter of children since 2007, according to the United Nations. Children recruited by the Taliban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan have been used as messengers and lookouts, as well as for espionage or even suicide attacks in more extreme cases. In Feb. 2014, for example, a 14-year-old boy detonated his explosives near a police checkpoint in Paktika province, killing himself, six civilians and injuring five police officers.

In all, 20 boys were killed carrying out suicide attacks from Sept. 2010 and Dec. 2014, according to a report prepared by the U.N. Secretary-General on children and armed conflict. Witnesses cited in the report described one incident where a suspected member of the Taliban ’forced a boy to push a bicycle-borne improvised explosive device (IED) towards an Afghan National Army vehicle, killing himself and eight civilians.’ In other instances, boys as young as six were used to unknowingly transport explosives in 2014, and two of the three were killed when they detonated. In 2013, another six boys were wounded while assembling an IED.

While research is scant, the general assumption among experts is that groups like the Taliban use children for such bombings because children are less likely to arouse suspicion.

‘Child operatives are generally subject to less scrutiny than adults, easier to recruit, more malleable, easier to train,’ Hogg says. ‘They’re easier to use for ‘suicide’ bombings, in which they are victims of exploitation, because they’re much more impressionable.’

And when directing children to carry out such attacks, the militants training them use trickery, says Bloom.

‘They’ll tell children that if they become a martyr they won’t feel any pain at the moment of the explosion,’ says Bloom. ‘They even go through the motions with the older kids of burying them alive to get used to the idea that they rise from the dead, or they shoot them with fake bullets to show that they’re invincible.’” (PBS, 17. November 2015)

Der UNO-Generalsekretär bemerkt in seinem Bericht zu Kindern im bewaffneten Konflikt vom April 2016, der sich an die UNO-Generalversammlung richtet:

„Children were disproportionately affected by the intensifying conflict in Afghanistan. The number of child casualties verified by the United Nations has risen by 14 per cent since 2014 and reached the highest number ever recorded. One in four civilian casualties in 2015 was a child.

The number of verified cases of recruitment and use of children more than doubled compared with 2014. A total of 116 cases (115 boys, 1 girl) were documented during the reporting period, of which 48 were verified. Thirteen verified recruitment cases were attributed to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces: five to the Afghan Local Police; five to the Afghan National Police; and three to the Afghan National Army. The majority of verified cases were attributed to the Taliban (20) and other armed groups (15). The Taliban continued to recruit children for combat and suicide attacks. There is continuing concern about allegations of cross-border recruitment of children and of use of religious schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan for child recruitment and military training by the Taliban and other armed groups (see S/2015/336, para. 21).

As at 31 December, the Ministry of Justice reported that 214 boys had been detained in juvenile rehabilitation centres on charges relating to national security, including association with armed groups. In addition, 166 detainees arrested as children were being held at the Parwan detention facility for security-related offences; 53 of those were under 18 years of age. I am concerned about children being held in a high-security facility for adults for extended periods without due process, and about reports of the consistent use of solitary confinement for children.

The United Nations verified 1,306 incidents resulting in 2,829 child casualties (733 killed, 2,096 injured) — an average of 53 children were killed or injured every week. Of the casualties, 42 per cent (339 killed, 850 injured) were attributed to armed groups, including the Taliban, groups affiliated with ISIL and Hezb-i-Islami, and 23 per cent (177 killed, 471 injured) to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces and pro-Government militias. A total of 55 child casualties were attributed to international forces, the majority of which were caused by air strikes (21 killed, 20 injured), and cross-border shelling (3 killed, 9 injured). A third of child casualties (937) could not be attributed to a specific party. The leading causes of child casualties remained ground engagements (55 per cent), improvised explosive device attacks (19 per cent) and explosive remnants of war (13 per cent). The number of casualties relating to air strikes by Afghan and international forces almost doubled in 2015.

The United Nations received 11 reports of sexual violence, affecting nine boys and six girls. One incident involving a boy recruited and sexually abused by the Taliban in the northern region was verified. Concerns remain regarding the cultural practice of bachah-bazi (‘dancing boys’), which involves the sexual exploitation of boys by men in power, including Afghan National Defence and Security Forces commanders.

Attacks on schools and protected personnel continued to be verified, including the killing, injury and abduction of education personnel. Of 132 verified incidents, 82 were attributed to the Taliban, 13 to ISIL-affiliated groups, 11 to undetermined armed groups, 1 to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and 23 to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces and pro-Government militias; 2 incidents could not be attributed to any party. The emergence of ISIL-affiliated groups in the east had an impact on access to education and led to the closure of 68 schools, affecting more than 48,751 children in Nangarhar Province. […]

The verified number of children abducted more than tripled compared with 2014. A total of 92 children (74 boys, 4 girls and 14 of unknown sex) were abducted in 23 incidents, including incidents linked to the killing of seven children and sexual violence against a child. The abductions of 69 children were attributed to the Taliban (two killed), 3 to ISIL-affiliated groups (all killed) and 12 to undetermined armed groups. An incident involving eight children remains unattributed.” (UN General Assembly, 20. April 2016, S. 5-7)

In einem Bericht zur Lage in Afghanistan vom Juni 2016, der sich ebenfalls an die UNO-Generalversammlung richtet, hält der UNO-Generalsekretär Folgendes fest:

„There are continuing concerns about the detention of children on national security-related charges, including for alleged association with armed groups. As at 31 March, 227 boys were detained in juvenile rehabilitation centres on such charges. In addition, in February 2016, 166 detainees who had been arrested as minors, including 53 who were still children, were being held with adults in a high-security facility in Parwan Province.

Between 1 January and 31 March, the task force on monitoring and reporting verified 343 incidents resulting in 161 children killed, including 43 girls, and 449 others (336 boys and 113 girls) injured. Ground engagements remained the leading cause of child casualties, followed by explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. There were 208 child casualties attributed to anti-government elements, including 149 to the Taliban. Pro-government forces were responsible for 154 child casualties. The United Nations received 18 reports of child recruitment and use involving at least 40 boys and verified the recruitment of 9 boys, comprising 7 by the Taliban, 1 by anti-government elements and 1 by the Afghan National Police. On 6 April, the Ministry of the Interior opened a new child protection unit in the Afghan National Police recruitment centre in the city of Kabul, bringing the total number of such units to seven across the country. In the first quarter of 2016, the United Nations received reports of eight incidents of abduction and verified four incidents involving five boys. The abduction of four boys was attributed to the Taliban and the abduction and rape of one boy to the Afghan Local Police.

Conflict-related violence continued to have an impact on health and education facilities, affecting schooling and the provision of health services for children. The task force on monitoring and reporting verified 17 incidents affecting access to education and 29 incidents affecting health-care services. On 18 April, the United Nations released a report, entitled ’Education and health care at risk‘, covering the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2015. Documented therein were 132 conflict-related incidents against schools in 2015 alone, representing an increase of 86 per cent compared with 2014. Also documented therein were 125 incidents affecting access to health care in 2015, compared with 59 in 2014 and 33 in 2013.” (UN General Assembly, 10. Juni 2016, S. 8)

Straßenkinder und Kinderarbeit

Voice of America (VOA), der offizielle staatliche Auslandssender der USA, berichtet im Mai 2016:

„With war still raging in Afghanistan, the country also faces the problem of child labor as families put their school-age children to work to help make ends meet.” (VOA, 5. Mai 2016)

Das USDOS bemerkt in seinem Länderbericht zur Menschenrechtslage vom April 2016:

“The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled and the AIHRC continued to estimate the number of street children in the country at six million, but the National Census Directorate had not conducted a recent survey. Street children had little or no access to government services, although several NGOs provided access to basic needs, such as shelter and food.” (USDOS, 13 April 2016, Section 6)

Die UNHCR-Richtlinien vom April 2016 enthalten folgende Informationen zum Thema Kinderarbeit:

„Under the Labour Law children younger than 14 are prohibited from working under any circumstance. Children between the ages of 15 and 18 may engage in ’light work‘ for up to 35 hours per week, but may not be employed in work activities likely to threaten their health or cause disability. Despite this, child labour reportedly remains widespread. Manifestations of child labour in Afghanistan are reported to include the worst forms of child labour, such as debt bondage and other forms of forced labour, the use of children in illicit activities including the drug trade, as well as the use of children in prostitution. Children are reportedly also engaged in hazardous work likely to harm their health, safety or morals. Poor institutional capacity reportedly remains a serious impediment to effective enforcement of the Labour Law, including inadequate resources for inspections and the enforcement of sanctions for violations. In addition, the authorities’ capacity to enforce the Labour Law’s provisions in relation to children is reported to be further limited by the fact that fewer than 10 per cent of children are reported to have formal birth registrations. Street children are among the most exposed and vulnerable groups in Afghanistan, with little or no access to government services. Poverty and food shortages are reported to be key reasons for families to send their children on to the streets to beg for food and money.” (UNHCR,. April 2016, S. 66)

Al Jazeera berichtet in seinem Artikel vom Februar 2016:

„Six million school-age children are engaged in labour. About 60,000 are begging in the streets of Kabul alone, mostly forced to deliver their day's earnings to petty urban gangs. Abject poverty compels many parents to consent. […]

Abducted children are used in forced labour or domestic servitude, either inside the country or in neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. Some are recruited in terrorist organisations and others are sold for commercial sexual use. The practice of ‘bacha bazi’ (boy play) has expanded exponentially with the rise of the new affluent elite.” (Al Jazeera, 16. Februar 2016)

Situation von Waisenkindern (insbesondere in Kabul)

Die in Kabul herausgegebene englischsprachige Zeitung Afghanistan Times schreibt in einem Artikel vom März 2015:

„Currently, 90 percent of orphans live at home or work on the streets. However, no comprehensive and nationwide survey has been carried out to get correct information and glimpse of the ground reality. According to a survey carried out in 2009 survey, there are 120,000 orphans in Afghanistan. Chief of the Orphanage Department, Sayed Abdullah Hashimi, in an interview with Afghanistan Times said the orphanages in the country can only accommodate 10 percent of the total orphans. ‘The government does not allocate adequate budget to support the orphanages. It is not only about accommodating orphans but also about providing them all facilities that need such as food, healthcare and education,’ he said while reflecting the unfortunate reality. He said the government allocates around $3.4 million in the ordinary budget for orphanages which is used through the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD). ‘The amount cannot meet all the needs.‘“ (Afghanistan Times, 15. März 2015)

Humanium, eine in Deutschland, Frankreich und der Schweiz ansässige NGO zur Patenschaft von Kindern, schreibt in einer mit 2011 datierten Übersicht:

„There are thousands of orphans in Afghanistan; this is, in fact, a direct consequence of the armed conflict which ravaged the country. Nevertheless, only a very few children are left to their own devices since the Afghan culture, mainly based on Muslim principles, makes it obligatory for Afghans to help children in need. Thus, orphans are generally taken in by members of the family or certain others in the village. Unfortunately, some ‘adoptive parents’ treat these children as if they were little slaves. Sometimes the orphans are discriminated amidst the guardian’s own children and their education is given secondary attention.” (Humanium, 2011)

Die in Großbritannien registrierte Nichtregierungsorganisation Afghan Orphans schreibt in einem undatierten Überblick zu Waisenkindern in Afghanistan:

„There are an estimated 2 million orphans in Afghanistan. Orphans have a high vulnerability to sexual abuse, forced prostitution and financial exploitation due to not having the basic means of survival. Children in Afghanistan suffer from chronic malnutrition and widespread occurrence of micro-nutrient deficiency. In fact 1 in 10 children die before reaching the age of 5 years. Those orphans who survive the early years are then forced by circumstance to work from the age of 6 or 7 in order to provide for themselves and their siblings. These children miss out on their education and on their childhoods. Lack of a normal childhood and no education feeds into a vicious cycle of underdevelopment and poverty.” (Afghan Orphans, ohne Datum)

In einem Artikel vom Jänner 2015 erwähnt die pakistanische Zeitung Dawn, dass es 30 staatliche Waisenhäuser gebe und geht auf die Lage in den Kabuler Waisenhäusern „Window of Hope“ und „Tahia Maskan“ ein:

„International aid was meant to transform Afghanistan's welfare standards, but orphanages in Kabul reveal that the most vulnerable children, many left parentless by war, have seen little benefit from the billions of dollars spent. At Windows of Hope, an orphanage in the wartorn capital, organisers and volunteers make the best of a tiny budget to look after 12 children, most of them severely disabled. Despite spartan conditions, house manager Frozan provides basic comfort and security for youngsters left neglected by the foreign-funded Afghan government and the many international charities that are active in the country. ‘These are the children who do not have anyone who cares for them,’ Frozan, 22, said. ‘There are many problems because they need someone every moment of the day. ‘Many are victims of war, because they have lost their families. They have suffered, they have mental issues, and their relatives are not prepared to keep them. […]

Adjusting to a new and even more challenging era, Windows of Hope is seeking funds from the government and Afghan community groups, rather than relying on the occasional foreign grants that have kept it open in recent years. But the government's 30 public orphanages are often beset by corruption, and they highlight officialdom's inability to funnel cash to those need it most. At the state-run Tahia Maskan orphanage in Kabul, 500 boys aged between 11 and 18 live in a huge run-down building with few facilities. Sayed Abdullah Hashimi, director of public orphanages, admits that some Afghan parents with connections use government orphanages to house and educate their children, meaning real orphans are denied scarce resources. He says the government allocates 85 Afghanis per day to feed each child in state orphanages, but that only 50 Afghanis reach their intended destination due to bureaucracy and corruption […]

‘Our orphans eat meat three times a week, fruit three times a week, yogurt three times a week, and rice every day. ‘There are an estimated 110,000 orphans in Afghanistan, about 12 per cent of them in orphanages, Hashimi said.’” (Dawn, 5. Jänner 2015)

Eine im Mai 2014 veröffentlichte Reportage des Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), eines in London ansässigen internationalen Netzwerks zur Förderung freier Medien, erwähnt, dass es in Afghanistan rund 70 Waisenhäuser gebe, von denen die Hälfte staatlich und der Rest privat betrieben werde. Der Artikel geht auf die Situation in den Kabuler Waisenhäusern Tahia-e Maskan und Alauddin ein:

„Nurullah, 16, kicked away stones angrily as he walked across the yard of the Tahia-e Maskan orphanage, making his way through groups of children who sat warming themselves in patches of sun. […]

Although conditions are hard for the 450 children who live at the Kabul orphanage, places there are nonetheless prized, due in part to the fully-funded scholarships to study abroad which are available to some when they are old enough. Children and staff told IWPR that many of the residents came from the northeastern provinces of Panjshir and Badakhshan, and had been enrolled at the orphanage through family connections. One child from Badakhshan living at the orphanage, who asked to remain anonymous, said that not only were both his parents still alive, his family was far from poor. ’There are more chances to obtain foreign scholarships at these orphanages,’ he explained. ’So my father, who has a friend who’s a member of parliament, asked him to enroll me in this orphanage so as to be able to take advantage of the scholarships. ’ A long-term staff member, who also asked to remain anonymous, said that most of the children were from Panjshir and Badakhshan, and were placed there to boost their chances of studying abroad. […]

Although places at the Kabul orphanage are much sought after, the children say conditions are poor. Rooms in the orphanage smell damp, with dirty bedding and few sources of light throughout the building. Some of the children show signs of neglect, and all look downcast. ’As well as the food being inadequate – we’re starving most of the time – it isn’t healthy, either,’ said Hakimullah, 14. ’We don’t get treated properly when we get sick. They only give us a paracetamol tablet at the clinic and that’s all. They don’t take us to hospital unless we’re too ill to walk.’ The director of the Tahia-e Maskan orphanage, Atiullah Wahaj, acknowledged that there had been a lack of heating during the winter months, but said it was because of city-wide power shortages. ’This problem existed all around Kabul. We too were working in cold rooms,’ he said, adding that wood-burning stoves had been installed in as many rooms as funds allowed. As for the orphanage clinic, Wahaj said that it was perfectly well equipped, and staff would take children to hospital if requested. And while the meals available at Tahia-e Maskan might not be gourmet-standard, he claimed they were more than adequate. ‘We act according to dietary guidelines. Before distribution, the meals are checked by the duty doctor and only then given out,’ he said. Wahaj also denied claims by some children that they faced physical abuse at the institution. ‘We treat the children in line with all national and international laws on children’s rights,’ he said. ‘No one has the right to beat children.’ However Farhad, not his real name, told IWPR that children faced a thrashing for even minor misdemeanours. ‘The staff beat us using cables, electrical wires and sticks,’ he said, adding that no one intervened even when small children were treated in this way. Children needed love, beatings, Farhad said. Abdol Jalil, a teacher at Tahia-e Maskan for the past 12 years, insisted that if children misbehaved they were forced to carry out duties such as cleaning toilets, bedrooms or the yard, and were not beaten. ’These tasks are designed to reform them,’ he said, adding that each day was run according to a tight schedule. ‘We constantly monitor the implementation of their educational programmes. We don’t allow the children to waste their time,’ he continued, noting that as well as the usual subjects, the orphans had access to computer, science, art, calligraphy and English-language courses, as well as vocational options. Tahia-e Maskan, in the northwest of Kabul, is used to house young and adolescent boys. Conditions at Kabul’s other orphanage, located in Alauddin in the southwest, seem far better. Home to 350 young boys and girls, the bedrooms are tidy and well-kept and the playground is clean. There, the childrens’ main fear appears to be what will happen to them when they leave the institution. ‘Everything is organised here. Our only concern is where to go and what to do after we graduate from year 12 and leave the orphanage,’ said Nuria, 17, who has lived in the orphanage for the last seven years, adding that she would like to study abroad. ’Now that I am graduating from 12th grade, I do not know where to go,’ added Omed, an 18-year-old from Badakhshan. ’I have nowhere to live. I don’t know what to do. The government should consider this problem as well.’ There are some 70 orphanages in Afghanistan, half of them state-run and the rest private. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) confirmed that mistreatment of children in orphanages was widespread. Hanifa Maruf, a child rights support worker at AIHRC’s regional office, said beatings were common in orphanages as well as in mainstream schools. ’The commission has recorded such cases. Although the commission has signed a memorandum of understanding with the education ministry according to which children must not be beaten at schools or orphanages, unfortunately it has continued,’ she said. She too agreed that children were often enrolled at orphanages through contacts rather than real need. Demand for orphanage places remains high.” (IWPR, 7. Mai 2014)

Folgender Bericht von Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan (PARSA), einer Nichtregierungsorganisation, die gefährdete Frauen und Kinder in Afghanistan unterstützt, enthält Informationen über ein weiteres Waisenhaus in Kabul, das „Shamsa Village Orphanage“:

·      PARSA - Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan: Shamsa Village Orphanage, ohne Datum
http://afghanistan-parsa.org/shamsa-village-orphanage/

 

 

 

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 8. Juli 2016)

·      Afghan Orphans: Orphans, ohne Datum
http://www.afghanorphans.org/orphans.php

·      AFP - Agence France Presse: Taliban use child sex slaves to kill Afghan police, 19. Juni 2016 https://uk.news.yahoo.com/taliban-child-sex-slaves-kill-afghan-police-021230453.html

·      Al Jazeera: Afghanistan: Pity the children, 16. Februar 2016
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/02/afghanistan-pity-children-160210082008267.html

·      AP – Associated Press: For Afghanistan’s abandoned children, help is scarce, 29. April 2015 (verfügbar auf breitbart.com)
http://www.breitbart.com/news/for-afghanistans-abandoned-children-help-is-scarce/

·      Child Soldiers International: Briefing on the situation of underage recruitment and use of children by armed forces and insurgent groups in Afghanistan to the UN Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, Juni 2015
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1442228834_childsoldiersinternationalafghanistanbriefingjune2015final7404027.pdf

·      Dawn: A decade of aid cash brings little cheer for Afghan orphans, 5. Jänner 2015
http://www.dawn.com/news/1155047

·      HRW - Human Rights Watch: World Report 2016 - Afghanistan, 27. Jänner 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/318331/457332_de.html

·      HRW - Human Rights Watch: Taliban Child Soldier Recruitment Surges, 17. Februar 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/319950/459151_de.html

·      Humanium: Children of Afghanistan, 2011
http://www.humanium.org/en/asia-pacific/afghanistan/

·      IWPR - Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Despite Harsh Conditions, Places Prized at Afghan Orphanage, 7. Mai 2014
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/despite-harsh-conditions-places-prized-afghan-orphanage

·      PARSA - Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan: Shamsa Village Orphanage, ohne Datum
http://afghanistan-parsa.org/shamsa-village-orphanage/

·      PBS – Public Broadcasting Service (Frontline): Why Afghanistan’s Children Are Used as Spies and Suicide Bombers, 17. November 2015
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/why-afghanistans-children-are-used-as-spies-and-suicide-bombers/

·      UNAMA - UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Afghanistan Annual Report 2015; Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Februar 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1455518569_unama-protection-of-civilians-annual-report-2015-final-0.pdf

·      UN General Assembly: Children and armed conflict; Report of the Secretary-General [A/70/836–S/2016/360], 20. April 2016
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1466670273_n1611119.pdf

·      UN General Assembly: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security; Report of the Secretary-General [A/70/924–S/2016/532], 10. Juni 2016
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1466074301_n1616020.pdf

·      UNHCR - UN High Commissioner for Refugees: UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, 19. April 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1461054450_570f96564.pdf

·      UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund: State of The World's Children 2015: Statistical Tables, 2015
http://www.data.unicef.org/corecode/uploads/document6/uploaded_pdfs/corecode/SOWC_2015_Summary_and_Tables-final_214.pdf

·      USDOS - US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2015 - Afghanistan, 13. April 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/306241/443515_de.html

·      USDOS - US Department of State: Trafficking in Persons Report 2016 - Country Narratives - Afghanistan, 30. Juni 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/326081/466022_de.html

·      USIP – United States Institute of Peace: Afghan Youth and Extremists: Why Are Extremists’ Narratives So Appealing?, August 2015
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB188-Afghan-Youth-and-Extremists.pdf

·      VOA – Voice of America: Child Labor in Afghanistan Remains a Problem, 5. Mai 2016
http://www.voanews.com/content/child-labor-afghanistan-problem/3317452.html